@article {688179,
	title = {The Heterogeneous Impact of Market Size on Innovation:  Evidence from French Firm-Level Exports},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Lequien, M and Melitz, M}
}
@inbook {673746,
	title = {The Direct and Indirect Effects of Automation on Employment:  A Survey of the Recent Literature},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	author = {P. Aghion and Antonin, C and Bunel, S and Jaravel, X}
}
@workingpaper {688246,
	title = {Good Rents versus Bad Rents: R\&amp;D Misallocation and Growth},
	year = {2022},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Boppart, T and Klenow, PJ and H. Li}
}
@workingpaper {678815,
	title = {Opposing Firm-Level Responses to the China Shock: Horizontal Competition versus Vertical Relationships?},
	year = {2021},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Lequien, M and Melitz, M and Zuber, T}
}
@workingpaper {673752,
	title = {Exporting Ideas: Knowledge Flows from Expanding Trade in Goods},
	year = {2021},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Gigout, T and Lequien, M and Melitz, M}
}
@workingpaper {645916,
	title = {What Are the Labor and Product Market Effects of Automation? New Evidence from France},
	year = {2021},
	author = {P. Aghion and Antonin, C and Bunel, S and Jaravel, X}
}
@workingpaper {632841,
	title = {Environmental Preferences and Technological Choices: Is Market Competition Clean or Dirty?},
	year = {2021},
	author = {P. Aghion and Benabou, R and R Martin and Roulet, A}
}
@workingpaper {626976,
	title = {A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents},
	year = {2020},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Boppart, T and Klenow, P and H. Li}
}
@workingpaper {637513,
	title = {Reforms and Dynamics of Income Evidence Using New Panel Data},
	year = {2019},
	author = {P. Aghion and Ciornohuz, V and Gravoueille, M and Stantcheva, S}
}
@workingpaper {637512,
	title = {Anatomy of Inequality in France},
	year = {2019},
	author = {P. Aghion and Ciornohuz, V and Gravoueille, M and Stantcheva, S}
}
@workingpaper {633616,
	title = {Spreading Knowledge Across the World:  Innovation Spillover through Trade Expansion},
	year = {2019},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Gigout, T and Lequien, M and Melitz, M}
}
@workingpaper {633592,
	title = {The Impact of Regulation on Innovation},
	year = {2019},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Van Reenen, J}
}
@workingpaper {633581,
	title = {The Innovation Premium to Soft Skills in Low-Skilled Occupations},
	year = {2019},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and R Blundell and R Griffith}
}
@workingpaper {632842,
	title = {Climate Change, Directed Innovation, and Energy Transition:  The Long-Run Consequences of the Shale Gas Revolution},
	year = {2019},
	author = {D Acemoglu and P. Aghion and Barrage, L and D Hemous}
}
@workingpaper {620517,
	title = {Monetary Policy, Product Market Competition, and Growth},
	year = {2018},
	author = {P. Aghion and Farhi, E and E Kharroubi}
}
@workingpaper {620516,
	title = {The Inverted-U Relationship Between Credit Access and Productivity Growth},
	year = {2018},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and G Cette and Lecat, R and Maghin, H}
}
@workingpaper {603557,
	title = {Firm Dynamics and Growth Measurement in France},
	year = {2018},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Boppart, T and Bunel, S}
}
@workingpaper {602908,
	title = {On the Returns to Invention Within Firms: Evidence from Finland [forthcoming in the AER Papers and Proceedings, May 2018]},
	year = {2018},
	author = {P. Aghion and Akcigit, U and Hyytinen, A and Toivanen, O}
}
@workingpaper {587656,
	title = {The Social Origins and IQ of Inventors},
	year = {2018},
	author = {P. Aghion and Akcigit, U and Hyytinen, A and Toivanen, O}
}
@workingpaper {484741,
	title = {Missing Growth from Creative Destruction},
	year = {2018},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Bergeaud, Antonin and Boppart, Timo and Klenow, Peter J and Huiyu Li}
}
@workingpaper {560096,
	title = {Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth},
	year = {2017},
	author = {P. Aghion and Jones, B.F. and Jones, C.I.}
}
@workingpaper {552211,
	title = {On the Interaction Between Monetary Policy, Corporate Balance Sheets and Structural Reforms},
	year = {2017},
	author = {P. Aghion and Farhi, E and E Kharroubi}
}
@workingpaper {546176,
	title = {Tax Simplicity and Heterogeneous Learning},
	year = {2017},
	author = {P. Aghion and Akcigit, U and Lequien, M and Stantcheva, S}
}
@workingpaper {513526,
	title = {The Impact of Exports on Innovation: Theory and Evidence},
	year = {2017},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bergeaud, A and Mathieu Lequien and Melitz, M}
}
@workingpaper {513516,
	title = {Do Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment Respond to Simpler Fiscal Incentives? Evidence from France},
	year = {2017},
	author = {P. Aghion and Akcigit, U and Lequien, M and Stantcheva, S}
}
@workingpaper {485131,
	title = {Turbulence, Firm Decentralization and Growth in Bad Times},
	year = {2016},
	author = {P. Aghion and N Bloom and Lucking, B and Sadun, R and Van Reenen, J}
}
@workingpaper {234871,
	title = {Innovation and Top Income Inequality},
	year = {2016},
	author = {P. Aghion and Akcigit, U and Bergeaud, A and R Blundell and D Hemous}
}
@workingpaper {234096,
	title = {The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation},
	year = {2015},
	author = {P. Aghion and E Fehr and R Holden and T Wilkening}
}
@workingpaper {218981,
	title = {Education and Military Rivalry},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Jaravel, Xavier and Torsten Persson and Dorothee Rouzet}
}
@workingpaper {170266,
	title = {Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits},
	year = {2014},
	author = {P. Aghion and Jackson, M.O.}
}
@workingpaper {152916,
	title = {The Causal Effects of Competition on Innovation:  Experimental Evidence},
	year = {2014},
	author = {P. Aghion and Bechtold, S and Cassar, L and Herz, H}
}
@workingpaper {152911,
	title = {Monetary Policy, Financial Regulations, and Industry Growth},
	year = {2014},
	author = {P. Aghion and E Kharroubi}
}
@workingpaper {65841,
	title = {Patent Rights, Product Market Reforms, and Innovation},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt and Susanne Prantl}
}
@workingpaper {55766,
	title = {What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory?},
	year = {2013},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Ufuk Akcigit and Peter Howitt}
}
@workingpaper {40037,
	title = {Optimal Capital versus Labor Taxation with Innovation-Led Growth},
	year = {2012},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Ufuk Akcigit and Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde}
}
@article {34314,
	title = {Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations},
	year = {2012},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Drew Fudenberg and Richard Holden and Takashi Kunimoto and Olivier Tercieux}
}
@article {34313,
	title = {Monetary Policy, Liquidity, and Growth},
	year = {2012},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Emmanuel Farhi and Enisse Kharroubi}
}
@article {34312,
	title = {Industrial Policy and Competition},
	year = {2012},
	author = {Philippe Aghion and Mathias Dewatripont and L. Du and Ann Harrison and Patrick Legros}
}
@workingpaper {19729,
	title = {The Environment and Directed Technical Change},
	year = {2010},
	type = {Paper},
	abstract = {This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environ- mental constraints. A unique {\"O}nal good is produced by combining inputs from two sectors. One of these sectors uses {\`\i}dirty{\^\i}machines and thus creates environmental degradation. Research can be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize dynamic tax policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare. We show that: (i) in the case where the inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production; (ii) optimal policy involves both "carbon taxes" and re- search subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes is avoided; (iii) delay in intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger is the policy response, the shorter is the slow growth transition phase; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitutes. Under reasonable parameter values and with sufficient substitutability between inputs, it is optimal to redirect technical change towards clean technologies immediately and optimal environmental regulation need not reduce long-run growth.
},
	author = {D Acemoglu and P. Aghion and L Bursztyn and D Hemous}
}
@workingpaper {19727,
	title = {Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency and Directed Technical Change : Evidence from the Auto Industry},
	year = {2010},
	month = {12/14},
	author = {P. Aghion and A Dechezlepretre and D Hemous and R Martin and J Reenen}
}
@workingpaper {19728,
	title = {Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations},
	year = {2010},
	type = {Unpublished},
	abstract = {We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms when common knowledge of the state of Nature is relaxed to common p-beliefs about it. We show that with even an arbitrarily small amount of such uncertainty, the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and in addition there are sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we show that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small common p-belief value perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium exists.},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Fudenberg and R Holden and T Kunimoto and O Tercieux}
}
@workingpaper {19734,
	title = {The Causal Impact of Education on Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S.},
	year = {2009},
	author = {P. Aghion and L Boustan and C Hoxby and J Vandenbussche}
}
@workingpaper {19730,
	title = {The Relationship Between Health and Growth: When Lucas Meets Nelson-Phelps},
	year = {2009},
	type = {Paper},
	abstract = {This paper revisits the relationship between health and growth in light of modern endogenous growth theory.	We propose an unified framework that encompasses the growth effects of both, the accumulation and the level of health. Based on cross-country regressions where we instrument for both variables, we find that a higher initial level and a higher rate of improvement in life expectancy, both have a significantly positive impact on per capita GDP growth. Then, restricting attention to OECD countries, we find supportive evidence that only the reduction in mortality below age forty generates productivity gains, which in turn may explain why the positive correlation relationship between health and growth in cross-OECD country regressions is weaker over the contemporary period.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt and F. Murtin}
}
@workingpaper {19724,
	title = {When Does Domestic Saving Matter for Economic Growth?},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {Can a country grow faster by saving more? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. In our theoretical model, growth results from innovations that allow local sectors to catch up with frontier technology. In poor countries, catching up re- quires the cooperation of a foreign investor who is familiar with the frontier technology and a domestic entrepreneur who is familiar with local conditions. In such a country, domestic saving matters for innovation, and therefore growth, because it enables the local entrepreneur to put equity into this cooperative venture, which mitigates an agency problem that would otherwise deter the foreign investor from participating. In rich countries, domestic entrepreneurs are already familiar with frontier technology and therefore do not need to attract foreign investment to innovate, so domestic saving does not matter for growth. A cross-country regression shows that lagged savings is positively associated with productivity growth in poor countries but not in rich countries. The same result is found when the regression is run on data generated by a calibrated version of our theoretical model.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Comin and P Howitt and I Tecu}
}
@workingpaper {19721,
	title = {Credit Constraints, Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Industry Growth},
	year = {2009},
	note = {mimeo Harvard
},
	abstract = {This paper evaluates whether the cyclical pattern of fiscal policy can affect growth. We first build a simple endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs can invest either in short-run projects or in long- term growth enhancing projects. Long-term projects involve a liquidity risk which credit constrained firms try to overcome by borrowing on the basis of their short-run profits. By increasing Örmsímarket size in recessions, a countercyclical fiscal policy will boost investment in productivity-enhancing long- term projects, and the more so in sectors that rely more on external Önancing or which display lower asset tangibility. Second, the paper tests this prediction using Rajan and Zingales (1998){\textquoteright}s diff-and-diff methodology on a panel data sample of manufacturing industries across 17 OECD countries over the period 1980-2005. The evidence confirms that the positive effects of a more countercyclical Öscal policy on value added growth, productivity growth, and R\&amp;D expenditure, are indeed larger in industries with heavier reliance on external Önance or lower asset tangibility.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Hemous and E Kharroubi}
}
@workingpaper {19720,
	title = {Innovation and Institutional Investment},
	year = {2009},
	note = {mimeo Harvard
},
	abstract = {We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured as cited-weighted patents), even after controlling for a possible endogeneity of institutional ownership. To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests managerial laziness with career-concern considerations, where institutional ownership increases the incentives managers have to innovate by reducing the career risk of innovative projects. While the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition, the career-concern one allows for complementarity. Our finding that the effect of institutional investors on innovation increases with product market competition supports the career- concern model. This model is also supported by our finding that that CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and J Van Reenen and L Zingales}
}
@workingpaper {19719,
	title = {Can Policy Influence Culture},
	year = {2009},
	note = {mimeo Harvard
},
	author = {P. Aghion and Y. Algan and P. Cahuc}
}
@workingpaper {19718,
	title = {Of Mice and Academics},
	year = {2009},
	note = {mimeo Harvard
},
	abstract = {This paper argues that openness of upstream research does not simply encourage higher levels of downstream exploitation, it also raises the incentives for additional upstream research by encouraging the establishment of entirely new research directions. We test this hypothesis by examining a {\textquotedblleft}natural experiment{\textquotedblright} in openness within the academic community: NIH agreements signed during the late 1990s that limited the IP restrictions imposed on academics regarding certain genetically engineered mice. Using a sample of engineered mice that are linked to specific scientific papers (some affected by the NIH agreements and some not), we implement a differences-in-differences estimator to evaluate how the level and type of follow-on research using these mice changes after the NIH-induced increase in openness. We find a significant increase in the level of follow-on research. Moreover, this reflects increased exploration of more diverse research paths. Overall, our findings highlight a neglected cost of IP: reductions in the diversity of experimentation that follows from a single idea.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and J Kolev and F Murray and S Stern}
}
@article {19715,
	title = {Distrust and Regulation},
	journal = {Currently revised for the Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2009},
	author = {P. Aghion and Y. Algan and P. Cahuc and A. Shleifer}
}
@article {19714,
	title = {Governance and Peformance of Universities},
	journal = {Currently revised for Economic Policy},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {We investigate how university governance affects research output, measured by patenting and international university research rankings. For both European and U.S. universities, we generate several measures of autonomy, governance, and competition for research funding. We show that university autonomy and competition are positively correlated with university output, both among European countries and among U.S. public universities. We then identity a (political) source of exogenous shocks to funding of U.S. universities. We demonstrate that, when a state{\textquoteright}s universities receive a positive funding shock, they produce more patents if they are more autonomous and face more competition from private research universities. Finally, we show that during periods when merit-based competitions for federal research funding have been most prominent, universities produce more patents when they receive an exogenous funding shock, suggesting that routine participation in such competitions hones research skill.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and C Hoxby and A Mas-Colell and A Sapir}
}
@book {19709,
	title = {The Economics of Growth},
	year = {2009},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	organization = {MIT Press},
	url = {http://www.amazon.com/Economics-Growth-Philippe-Aghion/dp/0262012634/ref=sr_1_1?s=books\&ie=UTF8\&qid=1311708156\&sr=1-1},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19697,
	title = {Exchange Rate Regimes and Productivity Growth},
	journal = {forthcoming in the Journal of Monetary Economics},
	year = {2009},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and R Ranciere and K Rogoff}
}
@article {19696,
	title = {Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence},
	journal = {forthcoming in the Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2009},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and R Griffith and F Zilibotti}
}
@article {19695,
	title = {Academic Freedom, Private Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation},
	journal = {Rand Journal of Economics},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {We develop a model that claries the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sectors ability to direct scientists towards higher-payo¤ activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and J Stein}
}
@workingpaper {19732,
	title = {Civil society and the state: The interplay between cooperation and minimum wage regulation},
	year = {2009},
	type = {Paper},
	abstract = {In a cross-section of countries, state regulation of labor markets is strongly negatively correlated with the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we argue that these facts reflect different ways to regulate labor markets, either through the state or through the civil society, depending on the degree of cooperation in the economy. We rationalize these facts with a model of learning of the quality of labor relations. Distrustful labor relations lead to low unionization and high demand for direct state regulation of wages. In turn, state regulation crowds out the possibility for workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the potential cooperative nature of labor relations. This crowding out effect can give rise to multiple equilibria: a {\textquotedblleft}good{\textquotedblright} equilibrium characterized by cooperative labor relations and high union density, leading to low state regulation; and a {\textquotedblleft}bad{\textquotedblright} equilibrium, characterized by distrustful labor relations, low union density and strong state regulation of the minimum wage.},
	author = {P. Aghion and Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P.}
}
@workingpaper {19722,
	title = {Environment and Directed Technical Change},
	year = {2009},
	note = {mimeo Harvard},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and L Bursztyn and D Hemous}
}
@workingpaper {19731,
	title = {Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem},
	year = {2009},
	type = {Paper},
	abstract = {The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore-Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Fudenberg and R T. Holden}
}
@article {19694,
	title = {The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {94},
	number = {4},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1397-1412},
	abstract = {We study the e¤ects of the progressive elimination of the system of industrial regulations on entry and production, known as the license raj, on registered manufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Burgess and S Redding and F Zilibotti}
}
@workingpaper {19735,
	title = {Competition and Productivity Growth in South Africa},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Using three different panel data sets, we show: (i) that mark-ups are significantly higher in South African manufacturing industries than they are in corresponding industries worldwide; (ii) that competition policy (i.e a reduction of mark-ups) should have largely positive effects on productivity growth in South Africa.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Braun and J Fedderke}
}
@article {19713,
	title = {Credit Constraints and the Cyclicality of R\&D Investments: Evidence from France},
	journal = {Currently revised for the Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {We use a French firm-level panel data set over the period 1993-2004 to analyze the relationship between credit constraints and firms{\textquoteright} R\&amp;D behavior over the business cycle. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) the share of R\&amp;D investment over total investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes more procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) the result is magnified for firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon external finance; (iii) in more credit constrained firms, R\&amp;D investment share plummets during recessions but does not increase proportionally during upturns; (iv) average R\&amp;D investment and productivity growth are more negatively correlated with sales volatility in more credit constrained firms.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Askenazy and N Berman and G Cette and L Eymard}
}
@inbook {19693,
	title = {Democracy, Technology, and Growth},
	booktitle = {forthcoming in Institutions and Economic Performance},
	year = {2007},
	publisher = {Harvard University Press},
	organization = {Harvard University Press},
	abstract = {We explore the question of how political institutions and particularly democracy affect economic growth. Although empirical evidence of a positive effect of democracy on economic performance in the aggregate is weak, we provide evidence that democracy influences productivity growth in different sectors differently and that this differential effect may be one of the reasons of the ambiguity of the aggregate results. We provide evidence that political rights are conducive to growth in more advanced sectors of an economy, while they do not matter or have a negative effect on growth in sectors far away from the technological frontier. One channel of explanation goes through the beneficial effects of democracy and political rights on the freedom of entry in markets. Overall, democracies tend to have much lower entry barriers than autocracies, because political accountability reduces the protection of vested interests, and entry in turn is known to be generally more growth-enhancing in sectors that are closer to the technological frontier. We present empirical evidence that supports this entry explanation.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Alesina and F Trebbi},
	editor = {E. Helpman}
}
@article {19692,
	title = {Entry, Innovation, and Growth: Theory and Evidence},
	journal = {forthcoming in the Review of Economics and Statistics},
	year = {2007},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Blundell and R Griffith and P Howitt and S Prantl}
}
@article {19691,
	title = {Productivity Growth and Countercyclical Budgetary Policy: What Do We Learn from OECD Panel Data?},
	journal = {NBER Macroeconomic Annual},
	year = {2007},
	author = {P. Aghion and I Marinescu}
}
@article {19690,
	title = {Credit Constraints as a Barrier to the Entry and Post Entry Growth of Firms: Theory and Evidence},
	journal = {Economic Policy},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Advanced market economies are characterized by a continuous process of creative destruction. Market forces and technological developments play a major role in shaping this process, but institutional and policy settings also influence firms{\textquoteright} decision to enter, to expand if successful and to exit if competition becomes unbearable. In this paper, we focus on the effects of financial development on the entry of new firms and the expansion of successful new businesses. Drawing from harmonized firm-level data for 16 industrialized and emerging economies, we find that access to finance matters most for the entry of small firms and in sectors that are more dependent upon external finance. This finding is robust to controlling for other potential entry barriers (labor market regulations and entry regulations). On the other hand, financial development has either no effect or a negative effect on entry by large firms. Access to finance also helps new firms expand if successful. Both private credit and stock market capitalization are important for promoting entry and post entry growth of firms. Altogether, these results suggest that, despite significant progress over the past decade, many countries, including those in Continental Europe, should improve their financial markets so as to get the most out of creative destruction, by encouraging the entry of new (especially small) firms and the post-entry growth of successful young businesses.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and T Fally and S Scarpetta}
}
@article {19689,
	title = {Negotiating Free Trade},
	journal = {Journal of International Economics},
	year = {2007},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Antras and E. Helpman}
}
@article {19688,
	title = {Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {This paper develops a framework to analyze the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the trade-off shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three datasets of French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and C Lelarge and J Van Reenen and F Zilibotti}
}
@article {19687,
	title = {Growth versus Profit Maximizing Strategies over the Cycle: Giving the Market What It Wants},
	journal = {Journal of Finance},
	year = {2007},
	author = {P. Aghion and J Stein}
}
@article {19686,
	title = {Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt {\textquotedblright}winner-take-all{\textquotedblright} city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model in a novel data set covering US cities and towns from 1930 to 2000.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Alesina and F Trebbi}
}
@workingpaper {19738,
	title = {The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {How does firm entry affect innovation incentives and productivity growth in incumbent firms? Micro-data suggests that there is heterogeneity across industries - incumbents in technologically advanced industries react positively to foreign firm entry, but not in laggard industries. To explain this pattern, we introduce entry into a Schumpeterian growth model with multiple sectors which differ by their distance to the technological frontier. We show that technologically advanced entry threat spurs innovation incentives in sectors close to the technological frontier - successful innovation allows incumbents to prevent entry. In laggard sectors it discourages innovation - increased entry threat reduces incumbents{\textquoteright} expected rents from innovating. We find that the empirical patterns hold using rich micro-level productivity growth and patent panel data for the UK, and controlling for the endogeneity of entry by exploiting the large number of policy reforms undertaken during the Thatcher era.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Blundell and R Griffith and P Howitt and S Prantl}
}
@workingpaper {19737,
	title = {Exchange Rate Volatility and Productivity Growth: The Role of Financial Development},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper offers empirical evidence that real exchange rate volatility can have a significant impact on long-term rate of productivity growth, but the effect depends critically on a country{\textquoteright}s level of Önancial development. For countries with relatively low levels of financial development, exchange rate volatility generally reduces growth, whereas for Önancially advanced countries, there is no significant effect. Our empirical analysis is based on an 83 country data set spanning the years 1960-2000; our results appear robust to time window, alternative measures of Önancial development and exchange rate volatility, and outliers. We also o{\textsection}er a simple monetary growth model in which real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative investment effects of domestic credit market constraints. Our approach delivers results that are in striking contrast to the vast existing empirical exchange rate literature, which largely Önds the effects of exchange rate volatility on real activity to be relatively small and insignificant.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and R Ranciere and K Rogoff}
}
@workingpaper {19736,
	title = {Cyclical Budgetary Policy and Economic Growth: What Do We Learn from OECD Panel Data?},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {This paper uses yearly panel data on OECD countries to analyze the relationship between growth and the cyclicality of government debt. We develop new time-varying estimates of the cyclicality of public debt. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) less procyclical public debt growth can have significantly positive effects on productivity growth, in particular when financial development is lower; (ii) public debt growth has become increasingly countercyclical in most OECD countries over the past twenty years, but this trend has been less pronounced in the EMU; (iii) less financially developed or more open economies display less countercyclical public debt growth.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and I Marinescu}
}
@article {19685,
	title = {Distance to Frontier, Growth, and the Composition of Human Capital},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {We examine the contribution of human capital to economy-wide technological improvements through the two channels of innovation and imitation. We develop a theoretical model showing that skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing effect closer to the technological frontier under the reasonable assumption that innovation is a relatively more skill-intensive activity than imitation. Also, we provide evidence in favor of this prediction using a panel dataset covering 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 2000 and explain why previous empirical research had found no positive relationship between initial schooling level and subsequent growth in rich countries. In particular, we show that in OECD economies it is crucial to isolate the two separate margins of primary/secondary and tertiary education. Interestingly, the latter type of schooling proves to be a factor of economic divergence.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and C Meghir and J Vandenbussche}
}
@article {19684,
	title = {Competition and Vertical Integration},
	journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings},
	year = {2006},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Griffith and P Howitt}
}
@article {19683,
	title = {Appropriate Growth Policy, Schumpeter Lecture},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {In this lecture, we use Schumpeterian growth theory, where growth comes from quality- improving innovations, to elaborate a theory of growth policy and to explain the growth gap between Europe and the US. Our theoretical apparatus systematizes the case-by-case approach to growth policy design. The emphasis is on three policy areas that are potentially relevant for growth in Europe, namely: competition and entry, education, and macropolicy. We argue that higher entry and exit (higher firm turnover) and increased emphasis on higher education are more growth enhancing in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. We also argue that countercyclical budgetary policies are more growth-enhancing in countries with lower financial development. The analysis thus points to important interaction effects between policies and state variables, such as distance to frontier or financial development, in growth regressions. Finally, we argue that the other endogenous growth models, namely the AK and product variety models, fail to account for the evidence on the relationship between competition, education, volatility and growth, and consequently cannot deliver relevant policy prescriptions in the three areas we consider.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19682,
	title = {Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2006},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and F Zilibotti}
}
@workingpaper {19802,
	title = {Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and Productivity-Enhancing Investment},
	year = {2005},
	abstract = {We examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment and thereby volatility and growth. We first develop a simple growth model where firms engage in two types of investment: a short-term one and a long-term productivity-enhancing one. Because it takes longer to complete, long-term investment has a relatively less procyclical return but also a higher liquidity risk. Under complete financial markets, long-term investment is countercyclical, thus mitigating volatility. But when firms face tight credit constraints, long-term investment turns procyclical, thus amplifying volatility. Tighter credit therefore leads to both higher aggregate volatility and lower mean growth for a given total investment rate. We next confront the model with a panel of countries over the period 1960-2000 and find that a lower degree of financial development predicts a higher sensitivity of both the composition of investment and mean growth to exogenous shocks, as well as a stronger negative effect of volatility on growth.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and G Angeletos and A. Banerjee and K Manova}
}
@workingpaper {19717,
	title = {Exploiting States{\textquoteright} Mistakes to Identify the Causal Impact of Higher Education on Growth},
	year = {2005},
	author = {P. Aghion and L Boustan and C Hoxby and J Vandenbussche}
}
@article {19712,
	title = {Volatility and Growth: Financial Development and the Cyclical Composition of Investment},
	journal = {Currently revised for the Journal of Monetary Economics},
	year = {2005},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Angeletos and A. Banerjee and K Manova}
}
@book {19707,
	title = {Handbook of Economic Growth},
	year = {2005},
	publisher = {Elsevier},
	organization = {Elsevier},
	address = {North-Holland},
	url = {http://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Economic-Growth-SET-set/dp/0444508376/ref=sr_1_4?s=books\&ie=UTF8\&qid=1311708002\&sr=1-4},
	author = {P. Aghion and S Durlauf}
}
@book {19706,
	title = {Competition and Growth},
	year = {2005},
	publisher = {Zeuthen Lectures, MIT Press},
	organization = {Zeuthen Lectures, MIT Press},
	url = {http://www.amazon.com/Competition-Growth-Reconciling-Evidence-Lectures/dp/0262512025/ref=sr_1_1?s=books\&ie=UTF8\&qid=1311707775\&sr=1-1},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Griffith}
}
@book {19704,
	title = {Volatility and Growth},
	year = {2005},
	publisher = {Clarendon Lectures, Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Clarendon Lectures, Oxford University Press},
	url = {http://www.amazon.com/Volatility-Growth-Clarendon-Lectures-Economics/dp/0199248613/ref=sr_1_1?s=books\&ie=UTF8\&qid=1311707680\&sr=1-1},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Banerjee}
}
@article {19681,
	title = {Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2005},
	author = {P. Aghion and N Bloom and R Blundell and R Griffith and P Howitt}
}
@article {19680,
	title = {The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2005},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt and D Mayer}
}
@workingpaper {19806,
	title = {Growth vs. Margins: Business-Cycle Implications of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and J Stein}
}
@workingpaper {19805,
	title = {Growth with Quality-Improving Innovations: An Integrated Framework},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@workingpaper {19804,
	title = {Entry Liberalization and Inequality in Industrial Performance},
	year = {2004},
	abstract = {Industrial delicensing which began in 1985 in India marked a discrete break from a past of centrally planned industrial development. Similar liberalization episodes are taking place across the globe. We develop a simple Schumpeterian growth model to understand how {\"O}rms respond to the entry threat imposed by liberalization. The model emphasises that {\"O}rm responses, even within the same industrial sector, are likely to be heterogeneous leading to an increase in within industry inequality. Technologically advanced {\"O}rms and those located in regions with pro-business institutions are more likely to respond to the threat of entry by investing in new technologies and production processes. Empirical analysis using a panel of 3-digit state-industry data from India for the period 1980-1997 con{\"O}rms that delicensing led to an increase in within industry inequality in industrial performance.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Burgess and S Redding and F Zilibotti}
}
@workingpaper {19803,
	title = {A New Growth Approach to Poverty Alleviation},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and B Aghion}
}
@book {19703,
	title = {Education et croissance},
	year = {2004},
	publisher = {La Documentation Francaise},
	organization = {La Documentation Francaise},
	url = {http://books.google.com/books?id=eYYvPQAACAAJ\&dq=Education+et+Croissance+inauthor:Aghion\&hl=en\&ei=ahEvTt_ZI-Ls0gHUwIW4AQ\&sa=X\&oi=book_result\&ct=result\&resnum=1\&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA},
	author = {P. Aghion and E Cohen}
}
@article {19679,
	title = {Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives},
	journal = {Review of Finance},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton and J. Tirole}
}
@article {19678,
	title = {A Model of the Private and Social Returns to Market-Enhancing Infrastructure},
	journal = {Economic Journal},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Schankerman}
}
@article {19677,
	title = {Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies},
	journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and A. Banerjee}
}
@article {19676,
	title = {A Balance-Sheet Approach to Currency Crises},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	year = {2004},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and A. Banerjee}
}
@article {19673,
	title = {Endogenous Political Institutions},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {2004},
	abstract = {Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both {\textquotedblleft}optimal{\textquotedblright} constitutional design and {\textquotedblright}positive{\textquotedblright} aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Alesina and F Trebbi}
}
@unpublished {19809,
	title = {Technology and Financial Structure: Are Innovative Firms Different? },
	year = {2003},
	type = {Paper},
	author = {P. Aghion and S Bond and A Klemm and I Marinescu}
}
@unpublished {19808,
	title = {Financial Development and the Instability of Open Economies },
	year = {2003},
	type = {Paper},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and A. Banerjee}
}
@workingpaper {19807,
	title = {Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth },
	year = {2003},
	author = {D Acemoglu and P. Aghion and F Zilibotti}
}
@book {19700,
	title = {An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report},
	year = {2003},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	url = {http://www.amazon.com/Agenda-Growing-Europe-Sapir-Report/dp/0199271488/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8\&qid=1311707293\&sr=8-1},
	author = {P. Aghion and G Bertola and M Hellwig and J Pisani-Ferry and A Sapir and J Vinals and H Wallace}
}
@article {19674,
	title = {Transferable Control},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2003},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19672,
	title = {Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and F Zilibotti}
}
@article {19671,
	title = {Incomplete Social Contracts},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	year = {2003},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@inbook {19670,
	title = {Allocating Decision Rights under Liquidity Constraints: A Simple Framework},
	booktitle = {Essays on Incomplete Contracts},
	year = {2002},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Rey},
	editor = {E.Brousseau}
}
@article {19669,
	title = {On Partial Contracting},
	journal = {European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings},
	year = {2002},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19668,
	title = {General Purpose Technologies and Within-group Inequality},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
	year = {2002},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt and G Violante}
}
@article {19667,
	title = {Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics of Income Inequality},
	journal = {Walras-Bowley Lecture},
	volume = {Econometrica},
	year = {2002},
	author = {P. Aghion}
}
@workingpaper {19716,
	title = {Agency Costs, Firm Behaviour, and the Nature of Competition},
	year = {2001},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19666,
	title = {Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality},
	journal = {Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy},
	volume = {55},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {229-264},
	author = {P. Aghion and D Acemoglu and GL Violante}
}
@article {19665,
	title = {Currency Crises and Monetary Policy in an Economy with Credit Constraints},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {ISOM Volume},
	year = {2001},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bacchetta and A. Banerjee}
}
@article {19664,
	title = {Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {68},
	number = {3},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {467-492},
	author = {P. Aghion and C. Harris and P Howitt and J Vickers}
}
@article {19663,
	title = {Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {2000},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton and M Dewatripont}
}
@article {19662,
	title = {A Simple Model of Monetary Policy and Currency Crises},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {2000},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Banerjee and P Baccheta}
}
@book {19699,
	title = {Inequality, Growth, and Globalization - Theory, History and Policy},
	year = {1999},
	publisher = {Raffaele Mattioli Memorial Lecture, Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Raffaele Mattioli Memorial Lecture, Cambridge University Press},
	url = {http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/growth-inequality-and-globalization-philippe-aghion/1006182284?ean=9780521659109\&itm=1\&usri=inequality\%2bgrowth\%2band\%2bglobalization\%2btheory\%2bhistory\%2band\%2bpolicy},
	author = {P. Aghion and J Williamson}
}
@article {19660,
	title = {Competition, Entry, and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies},
	journal = {Economics of Transition},
	year = {1999},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Schankerman}
}
@article {19659,
	title = {Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies},
	journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
	year = {1999},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton and S Fries}
}
@article {19658,
	title = {Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
	year = {1999},
	author = {P. Aghion and E. Caroli and C. {Garcia-Penalosa}}
}
@article {19656,
	title = {Dualism and Macroeconomic Volatility},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {1999},
	author = {P. Aghion and A. Banerjee and T Piketty}
}
@article {19655,
	title = {Competition, Financial Discipline, and Growth},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies },
	volume = {66},
	number = {4},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {825-852},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19711,
	title = {Financial Restructuring in Transition Economies},
	journal = {Currently revised for the Journal of Finance},
	year = {1998},
	note = {EBRD Working Paper $\#$32
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton and S Fries}
}
@book {19698,
	title = {Endogenous Growth Theory},
	year = {1998},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	organization = {MIT Press},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	url = {http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/endogenous-growth-theory-philippe-aghion/1100658751?ean=9780262011662\&itm=1\&usri=endogenous\%2bgrowth\%2btheory},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@inbook {19654,
	title = {On the Macroeconomic Effects of Major Technological Change},
	booktitle = {General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth},
	year = {1998},
	pages = {121-144},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	organization = {MIT Press},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt},
	editor = {E. Helpman}
}
@article {19653,
	title = {Market Structure and the Growth Process},
	journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics},
	volume = {1},
	number = {276-305},
	year = {1998},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19652,
	title = {Capital Accumulation and Innovation as Complementary Factors in Long-Run Growth},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
	volume = {3},
	number = {111-130},
	year = {1998},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19651,
	title = {Bargaining While Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1998},
	author = {P. Aghion and O Compte and P Jehiel}
}
@article {19650,
	title = {Ajustement macroéconomique aux technologies multi-usage},
	journal = {l{\textquoteright}Actualité économique, Revue d{\textquoteright}analyse économique},
	volume = {73},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {575-593},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@inbook {19649,
	title = {A Schumpeterian Perspective on Growth and Competition},
	booktitle = {Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, vol. 2},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {279-317},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt},
	editor = {D.M. Kreps and K.F. Wallis}
}
@inbook {19648,
	title = {The Economics of Enterprise Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe},
	booktitle = {Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare},
	year = {1997},
	publisher = {McMillan Press and St. Martin{\textquoteright}s Press},
	organization = {McMillan Press and St. Martin{\textquoteright}s Press},
	author = {P. Aghion and O. Blanchard and W Carlin},
	editor = {J. Roemer}
}
@inbook {19645,
	title = {A Schumpeterian Perspective on Growth and Competition},
	booktitle = {Advances in Economics and Econometrics},
	year = {1997},
	note = {Invited lecture to the 7th World Congress of the Econometrics Society
},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt},
	editor = {D. Kreps}
}
@article {19644,
	title = {A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development},
	journal = {lead article in the Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {64},
	number = {2},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {151-172},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@article {19643,
	title = {Real and Formal Authority in Organizations},
	journal = {lead article in the Journal of Political Economy},
	year = {1997},
	author = {P. Aghion and J. Tirole}
}
@article {19642,
	title = {Corporate Governance, Competition Policy and Industrial Policy},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {41},
	number = {3-5},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {797-805},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19641,
	title = {Competition and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation; An Example},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {41},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {771-782},
	author = {P. Aghion and C. Harris and J Vickers}
}
@article {19640,
	title = {On Insider Privatisation},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1996},
	author = {P. Aghion and O. Blanchard}
}
@article {19639,
	title = {The Observational Implications of Schumpeterian Growth Theory},
	journal = {Empirical Economics},
	volume = {21},
	year = {1996},
	pages = {13-25},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19638,
	title = {Research and Development in the Growth Process},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
	volume = {1},
	number = {49-73},
	year = {1996},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@inbook {19637,
	title = {Technical Progress in the Theory of Economic Growth},
	booktitle = {Economics in a Changing World: Proceedings of the 10th World Congress of the International Economic Association, vol 5},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {101-122},
	publisher = {Macmillan},
	organization = {Macmillan},
	address = {London},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt},
	editor = {Jean-Paul Fitoussi}
}
@article {19636,
	title = {Some Implications of Growth for Ownership Structure and Organisational Forms},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1995},
	author = {P. Aghion and J. Tirole}
}
@article {19710,
	title = {Social Mobility and Corporate Development},
	journal = {Revised for the Journal of Political Economy},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and T Piketty}
}
@article {19635,
	title = {Opening the Black Box of Innovation},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and J. Tirole}
}
@article {19634,
	title = {Uncovering Some Casual Relationships between Productivity Growth and the Structure of Economic Fluctuations},
	journal = {NBER and Labour},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and G St Paul}
}
@article {19633,
	title = {The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {ISOM issue},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and O. Blanchard and R Burgess}
}
@article {19632,
	title = {On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe},
	journal = {NBER Macro Annuals},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and O. Blanchard}
}
@article {19631,
	title = {On the Management of Innovation},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	year = {1994},
	author = {P. Aghion and J. Tirole}
}
@article {19630,
	title = {Growth and Unemployment},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {61},
	number = {3},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {477-494},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19629,
	title = {Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information},
	journal = {lead article in Econometrica},
	volume = {62},
	number = {2},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {257-282},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19628,
	title = {Dynamic Duopoly with Learning Through Price- Experimentation},
	journal = {Economic Theory},
	year = {1993},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Espinoza and B Jullien}
}
@article {19627,
	title = {Economic Reform in Eastern Europe: Can Theory Help?},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1993},
	author = {P. Aghion}
}
@article {19626,
	title = {Financing and Development in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union},
	journal = {Financial Institutions in Europe},
	year = {1992},
	note = {CEPR and Cambridge
},
	author = {P. Aghion and R Burgess}
}
@article {19625,
	title = {Distribution and Growth in Models of Imperfect Capital Markets},
	journal = {European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 6th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {36},
	number = {2/3},
	year = {1992},
	pages = {603-611},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@article {19624,
	title = {The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation},
	year = {1992},
	note = {Also forthcoming in the NBER volume on Transition in Eastern Europe.
},
	author = {P. Aghion and O. Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {19623,
	title = {A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	volume = {60},
	number = {2},
	year = {1992},
	pages = {323-351},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@article {19622,
	title = {An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {59},
	number = {3},
	year = {1992},
	pages = {473-494},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@article {19621,
	title = {Optimal Learning by Experimentation},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {58},
	number = {4},
	year = {1991},
	pages = {621-654},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton and C. Harris and B Jullien}
}
@article {19620,
	title = {Unemployment: A Symptom of Stagnation or a Side-Effect of Growth?},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {35},
	year = {1991},
	pages = {535-541},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Howitt}
}
@inbook {19619,
	title = {Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of Default: A Political- Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt},
	booktitle = {Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of Default: A Political- Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt},
	year = {1990},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	organization = {MIT Press},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton},
	editor = {R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi}
}
@article {19618,
	title = {Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts can Enhance},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organisations},
	year = {1990},
	author = {P. Aghion and B Hermalin}
}
@article {19617,
	title = {On Renegotiation Design},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	volume = {34},
	number = {2/3},
	year = {1989},
	pages = {322-329},
	author = {P. Aghion and M Dewatripont and P Rey}
}
@article {19616,
	title = {The Financial Structure of the Firm and the Problem of Control},
	journal = {European Economic Review},
	year = {1989},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@article {19615,
	title = {Contracts as a Barrier to Entry},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {77},
	number = {3},
	year = {1987},
	note = {Reprinted in Industrial Economics, Oliver Williamson, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1990).
},
	pages = {388-401},
	author = {P. Aghion and P Bolton}
}
@article {19614,
	title = {On the Generic Inefficiency of Differentiable Market Games},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	year = {1985},
	author = {P. Aghion}
}
