<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Review of International Organizations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Why do states choose multilateralism? We develop an argument focused on the burden-sharing versus control dilemma of principal-agent (PA) models. We also present two alternative theoretical frames that could explain this choice: a normative logic of appropriateness and hegemonic self binding. We examine the political bases of support for sending foreign aid through multilateral versus bilateral channels. First, we clarify the concept of multilateralism. We show that the choices for internationalism and multilateralism are distinct.  Second, we develop hypotheses from each of the three theories and examine how public opinion data allow us to shed light on these different theories about multilateralism. Finally, we provide evidence about the correlates of public support for multilateral engagement. We isolate how two competing rationales—burden sharing and control—dictate some of the politics around the choice between multilateral versus bilateral aid channels. The data support our claim that a principal-agent model can help us to understand the choice for multilateralism. &lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mateusz Siedlinski</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Lipman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michael H. Cho</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Augusto A. Litonjua</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Sparrow</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Per Bakke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amund Gulsvik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David A. Lomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wayne Anderson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Xiangyang Kong</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stephen I. Rennard</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terri H. Beaty</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John E. Hokanson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James D. Crapo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Edwin Silverman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christoph Lange</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dissecting direct and indirect genetic effects on chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) susceptibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human Genetics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michael Tomz</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dan Myers</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Influence of Emotion on Trust</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Teppei Yamamoto</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keele, Luke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lee, Julia</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lee, Julia</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physiological Responses to Shifting Bargaining Power: Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems in International Politics</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sailing the Water’s Edge: Where Domestic Politics Meets Foreign Policy</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Molly Roberts</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brandon Stewart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christopher Lucas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jetson Leder-Luis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bethany Albertson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shana Gadarian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Rand</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Topic models for open ended survey responses with applications to experiments</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michael Tomz</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comparative Political Studies</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Face Off: Facial Features and Strategic Choice</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political Psychology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">April</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymond Hicks</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Trade Policy, Economic Interests and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Studies Quarterly</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Why have developing countries increasingly opened their economies to trade? Research about trade policy in developed countries has focused on a bottom up process by identifying the economic preferences of domestic groups. We know less about preferences in developing countries. To explore this, we focus on the micro level and explore one country’s decision making in a systematic fashion, rather than using a cross-national analysis. We analyze how economic and political variables influenced Costa Rican voters in a referendum on CAFTA, an international trade agreement. We find surprisingly little support for Stolper-Samuelson models of economic preferences and instead find more support for skill-biased trade theories. Furthermore, we isolate the effects of political parties on the referendum vote; we document how at least one party influenced voters and this made the difference for CAFTA passage. Politics, in the form of parties using their organizational strength to cue and frame messages for voters, influenced an important trade policy decision. Theories about trade policy in developing countries need to take into account the impact of top-down political factors such as parties and message framing.&lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Teppei Yamamoto</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experimental Designs for Identifying Causal Mechanisms (with discussions)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of the Royal Statistical Society-Series A</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://imai.princeton.edu/research/Design.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">176</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Experimentation is a powerful methodology that enables scientists to empirically establish causal claims. However, one important criticism is that experiments merely provide a black-box view of causality and fail to identify causal mechanisms. Critics argue that although experiments can identify average causal effects, they cannot explain how such effects come about. If true, this represents a serious limitation of experimentation, especially for social and medical science research whose primary goal is to identify causal mechanisms. In this paper, we consider several different experimental designs and compare their identification power. Some of these designs require the direct manipulation of mechanisms, while others can be used even when only imperfect manipulation is possible. We use recent social science experiments to illustrate the key ideas that underlie each design.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Helen V. Milner</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Geopolitics of Foreign Aid</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Edward Elgar</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elizabeth Miller</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jon Pevehouse</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rogowski, Ron</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rick Wilson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to be a peer reviewer: a guide for recent and soon-to-be Ph.D.'s</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PS: Political Science &amp; Politics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://journals.cambridge.org/repo_A88Fl2yh</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">46</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin H.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction to the Geopolitics of Foreign Aid</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Geopolitics of Foreign Aid</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Julia Jooa-Lee</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Public Finance and Immigration Preferences: A Lost Connection?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Polity</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4-33</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Interactions</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adam Chilton</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Columbia Journal of Transnational Law</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dominic Johnson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rose McDermott</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jon Cowden</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dead Certain: Confidence and Conservatism Predict Aggression in Simulated International Crisis Decision-Making</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human Nature</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">98-126</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adam Chilton</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Doctrinal Paradox and International Law</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Statistical Method for Empirical Testing of Competing Theories</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Journal of Political Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://imai.princeton.edu/research/mixture.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">56</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">218-236</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Empirical testing of competing theories lies at the heart of social science research. We demonstrate that a very general and well-known class of statistical models, called finite mixture models, provides an effective way of rival theory testing. In the proposed framework, each observation is assumed to be generated from a statistical model implied by one of the theories under consideration. Researchers can then estimate the probability that a specific observation is consistent with either of the competing theories. By directly modeling this probability with the characteristics of observations, one can also determine the conditions under which a particular theory applies. We discuss a principled way to identify a list of observations that are statistically significantly consistent with each theory. Finally, we propose several measures of the overall performance of a particular theory. We illustrate the advantages of our method by applying it to an influential study on trade policy preferences.&lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barbara Walter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Conflict Resolution</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">994-1018</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymond Hicks</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causal Mediation Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stata Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">609-615</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Studies Quarterly</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">521-544</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While most existing theoretical and experimental literatures focus on how a high probability of repeated play can lead to more socially efficient outcomes (for instance, using the result that cooperation is possible in a repeated prisoner's dilemma), this paper focuses on the detrimental effects of repeated play--the ``Dark Side of the Future&quot;. I study a resource division model with repeated interaction and changes in bargaining strength. The model predicts a negative relationship between the likelihood of repeated interaction and social efficiency. This is because the longer shadow of the future exacerbates commitment problems created by changes in bargaining strength. I test and find support for the model using incentivized laboratory experiments. Increases in the likelihood of repeated play leads to more socially inefficient outcomes in the laboratory.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Albert Somit</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steven Peterson</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neurological Imaging and the Evaluation of Competing Theories</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Biology and Politics: The Cutting Edge</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emerald Group</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barbara Walter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reputation Building in International Relations: An Experimental Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Organization</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">343-365</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keele, Luke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Teppei Yamamoto</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unpacking the Black Box: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Political Science Review</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://imai.princeton.edu/research/mediationP.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">765-789</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Organization</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">pp 37–68</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stephanie Wang</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Quarterly Journal of Political Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243-255</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We investigate theoretically and experimentally the &quot;crisis bargaining model&quot;, a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their opponent's type using a quadratic scoring rule. We implement two treatments that vary a fixed terminal node payoff in the game, generating sharp comparative static predictions in both beliefs and strategies. We examine the relationship between beliefs and actions, which is not well understood in the empirical literature. We find that most beliefs and strategies are responsive to our treatments in the way predicted by theory, and that beliefs track departures from theoretical predictions about strategy choice. We highlight evidence for two deviations from Bayesian beliefs: conservative updating and motivated beliefs. We also consider other important roles for beliefs in strategic choice including the extent of rational expectations and best response to beliefs.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keele, Luke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Teppei Yamamoto</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causal Mediation Analysis Using R</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Advances in Social Science Research Using R</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lecture Notes in Statistics</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129-154</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chaudoin, Stephen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Helen V. Milner</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin H.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Security</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/ISEC_a_00003</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75-94</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Milner, Helen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Politics of Donor Countries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economics and Politics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">200-232</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid Commitments</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">50</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">40-49</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosuke Imai</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keele, Luke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Psychological Methods</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">309-334</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Traditionally in the social sciences, causal mediation analysis has been formulated, understood, and implemented within the framework of linear structural equation models. We argue and demonstrate that this is problematic for three reasons; the lack of a general definition of causal mediation effects independent of a particular statistical model, the inability to specify the key identification assumption, and the difficulty of extending the framework to nonlinear models. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach that overcomes these limitations. Our approach is general because it offers the definition, identification, estimation, and sensitivity analysis of causal mediation effects without reference to any specific statistical model. Further, our approach explicitly links these four elements closely together within a single framework. As a result, the proposed framework can accommodate linear and nonlinear relationships, parametric and nonparametric models, continuous and discrete mediators, and various types of outcome variables. The general definition and identification result also allow us to develop sensitivity analysis in the context of commonly used models, which enables applied researchers to formally assess the robustness of their empirical conclusions to violations of the key assumption. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the Job Search Intervention Study (JOBS II). We also offer easy-to-use software that implements all of our proposed methods. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barbara Walter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Experimental Evidence for Reputation Building and Deterrence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cambridge UP</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rose McDermott</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cowden, Jonathan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frazzetto, Giovanni</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Johnson, Dominic D. P.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) predicts behavioral aggression following provocation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.pnas.org/content/106/7/2118.abstract</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">106</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2118-2123</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) has earned the nickname “warrior gene” because it has been linked to aggression in observational and survey-based studies. However, no controlled experimental studies have tested whether the warrior gene actually drives behavioral manifestations of these tendencies. We report an experiment, synthesizing work in psychology and behavioral economics, which demonstrates that aggression occurs with greater intensity and frequency as provocation is experimentally manipulated upwards, especially among low activity MAOA (MAOA-L) subjects. In this study, subjects paid to punish those they believed had taken money from them by administering varying amounts of unpleasantly hot (spicy) sauce to their opponent. There is some evidence of a main effect for genotype and some evidence for a gene by environment interaction, such that MAOA is less associated with the occurrence of aggression in a low provocation condition, but significantly predicts such behavior in a high provocation situation. This new evidence for genetic influences on aggression and punishment behavior complicates characterizations of humans as “altruistic” punishers and supports theories of cooperation that propose mixed strategies in the population. It also suggests important implications for the role of individual variance in genetic factors contributing to everyday behaviors and decisions. </style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Evolving Political Science: Biological Adaptation, Rational Action, and Symbolism in Political Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Politics and Life Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political science, as a discipline, has been reluctant to adopt theories and methodologies developed
in fields studying human behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. I ask whether evolutionary concepts are
reconcilable with standard political-science theories and whether those concepts help solve puzzles to which
these theories classically are applied. I find that evolutionary concepts readily and simultaneously accommodate
theories of rational choice, symbolism, interpretation, and acculturation. Moreover, phenomena
perennially hard to explain in standard political science become clearer when human interactions are
understood in light of natural selection and evolutionary psychology. These phenomena include the political
and economic effects of emotion, status, personal attractiveness, and variations in information-processing and
decision-making under uncertainty; exemplary is the use of ‘‘focal points’’ in multiple-equilibrium games. I
conclude with an overview of recent research by, and ongoing debates among, scholars analyzing politics in
evolutionarily sophisticated terms.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neurological Imaging as Evidence in Political Science: A Review, Critique, and Guiding Assessment</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social Science Information</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-33</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>