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Personal Information: Date of birth: April 22nd, 1987. Citizenship: Hungary

Education:

Corvinus University of Budapest, 2005-10

B.Sc. and M.Sc., GPA: 4.0, major: **Economics**, minor: **Statistics**

Harvard University, 2010 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in **Political Economy and Government**

Thesis Title: “*The Clash of Brothers: Wars to Avoid Diffusion in a Contagious World*”

Expected Completion Date: Spring 2015

References:

Professor James Robinson
Harvard University (Government)
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Professor Alastair Iain Johnston
Harvard University (Government)
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Professor Beth Simmons
Harvard University (Government)
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Computer Skills:

R, Python, Stata, Matlab, LaTeX, SQL, C++, Java (basic), SPSS, Eviews, Microsoft Office

Research Fields:

Political Economy, Game Theory, Applied Microeconomics, Machine Learning & Text Mining

Teaching Experience:

Summer, 2014	Microeconomics, Harvard (Kennedy School) Summer program for mid-career students
Spring 2014	The Political Economy of International Conflict, Harvard (Economics) <i>Certificate of Distinction in Teaching</i>
Spring 2013	Modeling Wars with Game Theory, Harvard (Economics) <i>Certificate of Distinction in Teaching</i>
Spring 2013	Formal Theory (graduate), Harvard (Government) Teaching Fellow for Professor James Robinson
Fall 2012	Microeconomics, Harvard (Economics) Teaching Fellow for Professor Edward Glaeser
Spring 2012	Game Theory (graduate), Harvard (Economics) Teaching Fellow for Professor Syed Nageeb Ali
2007-9	International Economics, Corvinus (Economics) Teaching Fellow for Professor Eszter Szabo-Bakos
2007-8	Macroeconomics, Corvinus (Economics) Teaching Fellow for Professor Eszter Szabo-Bakos

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2011	Harvard University (Economics), Research assistant for Professor Attila Ambrus
2007-8	Corvinus University (Economics), Research assistant for Professor Klara Major
2013-4	Harvard University (Government), organizer for Political Economy Workshop

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2014-5	Harvard University Weatherhead Center, Samuel Huntington Fellowship
2014-5	Harvard University, Dissertation Completion Fellowship
2013	Harvard University, Merit Research Fellowship
2013-4	Harvard University, Certificate of Distinction in Teaching
2013-4	Harvard University, Institute of Quantitative Social Sciences, travel grants
2010-5	Harvard University, Graduate Fellowship
2013	Hungarian Academy of Sciences, travel grant

Research Papers:

“The Clash of Brothers: War as a Roadblock to the Diffusion of Democracy” ([Job Market Paper](#))

Two culturally similar nations may have very different political regimes (e.g. the two Koreas). The cultural similarity encourages citizens to compare the different political regimes, which in turn threatens a dictator. I formalize this process of political contagion in an infinitely-repeated bargaining model and show that more cultural similarity gives a politically-threatened dictator greater incentive to start a war against a democracy. The leader wants to ensure that his citizens see the other nation as an enemy rather than a role model. I test the implications of my model on a data set that combines cultural similarity measures of up to 200x200 country pairs with data on wars among these nations between 1816 and 2008. In panel regressions which include country-pair fixed effects, I find that when two countries share culture (measured by religion, race, and civilization), but differ in their political institutions, they are up to 80% more likely to fight a war. My results are stronger between physically distant country-pairs, which suggests that cultural affinity is not mismeasured physical proximity but a distinct factor in wars.

Most recent presentation: American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (2014)

Featured on:

-Washington Post's Monkey Cage blog: 'Russia vs. Ukraine: A clash of brothers, not cultures'

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/04/russia-vs-ukraine-a-clash-of-brothers-not-cultures/>

-Marginal Revolution blog: 'Can too much cultural similarity cause war?'

<http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/03/can-too-much-cultural-similarity-cause-war.html>

“Dictatorial Propaganda Against Brotherly Democracies”

A culturally-similar democracy poses a threat to the rule of a dictator because it demonstrates to the dictator’s citizens how they could be alternatively governed. How does the dictator portray such a country in their domestic media? I conduct text analysis of dictatorial propaganda in two East Asian crises to find an answer through sentiment analysis. First I use the case of the two Koreas, where I exploit the democratization of South Korea in 1987. I analyze articles written by the North Korean Central News Agency and show that Pyongyang began to describe life in South Korea in more negative terms after 1987. Instead of denying cultural similarity between the two countries, the dictatorial propaganda emphasizes their similarity, but adds that the citizens of the culturally-similar country suffer greatly under misrule. At the same time, the propaganda questions the democratic nature of the culturally-similar country’s regime. Is it only dictatorships that use propaganda to sow doubt about another country’s democracy in citizens’ minds? I show this to hold true when comparing the Chinese and the South Korean press coverage of Japan. In December 2014 the Japanese Prime Minister visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine, which also commemorates war criminals from the Second World War. I find that both Chinese and South Korean newspapers describe the act in negative terms, but only China frames it as an undemocratic move.

Most recent presentation: International Studies Association Annual Meeting (2014)

Featured on:

-Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog: ‘Why China won’t let Hong Kong democratize’
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/02/why-china-wont-let-hong-kong-democratize/>

“The Torn Revolutionary: Overlapping Identity Dimensions and Political Violence”

This paper explores how multidimensional identity affects regime transition and violence in multicultural countries. First, a game-theoretic model of regime change finds that the size of the overlap of identity dimensions (e.g. language, religion, class) between the old and the new elite plays a key role. A big overlap has two effects on society: although it makes repression less likely, it also lowers the probability of regime change because each citizen has less to gain from a revolution. I test my theory on a case study: I compare the actions of the eleven nationalities that comprised the Austrian empire during the 1848-9 revolutions, at the same time also contrasting these nationalities with their ethnic kins beyond the borders of the empire.

Most recent presentation: Harvard-MIT-Yale Conference on Political Violence (2013)

“Diffusion After Wars Against a Common Enemy”

What makes some countries models of democracy for others? The existing literature argues that democratization spreads between countries which share some underlying identity. I argue that this shared identity can be created or reinforced by dramatic and highly-visible events, and in particular, by wars. First, I build an infinitely-repeated bargaining game, where countries have the option to fight a war. I find that fighting a common enemy reveals similarity between two countries, and this new information manifests itself in (reinforced) shared identity, which can lead to subsequent institutional diffusion. I use the example of Poland and Hungary to illustrate this mechanism. Finally, I use worldwide data on democratization (1950-2010) to show that my theory is generally applicable. I address the concern of endogeneity in various ways.

Most recent presentation: Harvard’s Political Economy Workshop (2014)

“International Institution Building Through the Lens of Domestic Institutions”

Can dictatorships participate in international agreements as effectively as democracies? To answer this question we need to know what the international commitment power of an authoritarian regime is. I build an infinitely-repeated bargaining game to investigate. The dictator faces a domestic commitment problem: a ruler cannot commit to redistribute resources to their citizens in low pressure periods. As a result, the authoritarian regime needs to do everything in its power to redistribute resources when domestic pressure on them turns high. My equilibrium shows that unstable dictatorships may not be able to commit to binding international agreements. The reason is that in an unstable dictatorship reneging in times of domestic pressure is more likely. I use the European Union’s attitude to dictatorial member states and candidates as a case study.

Most recent presentation: Harvard’s Political Economy Workshop (Spring 2012)

Conference Presentations:

2014	American Political Science Association Annual Conference
2014	Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference
2014	International Studies Association Annual Conference
2014	Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations Conference
2013	Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference
2013	Institute of Economics Summer Workshop, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
2013	New York University Alexander Hamilton Center Graduate Student Conference
2013-4	Harvard-MIT-Yale Political Violence Conference

Languages:

advanced	English, Hungarian, German, French, Spanish
advanced in reading	Italian, Portuguese, Dutch
intermediate in reading	Chinese