Civil Wars, from Beginning … to End?†

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From the ancient world to our own times, there has been near-universal agreement on two features of civil wars: that of all wars, they are the worst, and that they are so terrible because they seem interminable. Civil strife may not be a eternal fact of life—“the primary form of all collective conflict”—as some have claimed.¹ However, for two thousand years, commentators have found civil war to be most wrenching form of war not least because it appears to be the most difficult to end. The primal Roman poet of civil war, Lucan, wrote in the opening lines of his Bellum civile (60–65 CE), “no foreign sword has ever penetrated/ so: it is wounds inflicted by the hand of fellow-citizens that have sunk deep”; later in his poem, a bereaved parent laments: “These sufferings await, again to be endured, this will be the sequence/ of the warfare, this will be the outcome fixed for civil strife.”² Three centuries later, Augustine narrated Rome’s history in his City of God (413–26 CE) as a series of civil wars that were “more bitter than all [Rome’s] foreign wars” in which “a chain of causes linked one crime with another.”³ Fast-forward to the late twentieth century, and we find former French president Charles de Gaulle expressing similar sentiments on a trip to Spain in 1970: “All wars are bad, because they symbolize the breakdown of politics itself. But civil wars, in which there are brothers in both trenches, are unforgivable, because peace is not born when the war concludes.”⁴ Because civil wars are so peculiarly agonizing and leave such deep

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scars on historical memory, they appear to be almost as hard to end as they are awful to endure. “If war is hell,” the historian Arno Mayer proposed in 2000, with a nod to William Tecumseh Sherman, “then civil war belongs to hell’s deepest and most infernal regions.”

Ending civil war is the starting-point for each of the essays in this timely AHR Roundtable, published to coincide with the sesquicentennial of the formal conclusion of the U. S. Civil War in 1865. They span the whole history of civil war, from ancient Rome to the present, and over every inhabited continent, from the Americas and Africa to Europe and Asia. They examine the varied conditions and methods for concluding civil wars, from military victory and constitutional settlement to amnesties, peace agreements, and international treaties. They also movingly describe the anguished aftermarts of civil war: among them, burying the dead, physical reconstruction, the dislocation of refugees, and the traumas of memory. Each engages with the rich historiography on specific civil wars—in Rome, France, Britain, China, Syria, the United States, Spain, El Salvador, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan—and many draw upon the work of contemporary political scientists who have analysed civil war termination synoptically and synthetically.

Taken together, they comprise the most comprehensive comparative treatment of civil war—and not just of ending civil war—ever assembled.

simbolizan el fracaso de toda política. Pero las guerras civiles, en las que en ambas trincheras hay hermanos, son imperdonables, porque la paz no nace cuando la guerra termina.”).  


7 For similar compilations on civil war, though mostly with less temporal depth and spatial scope, see Jean-Clément Martin, ed., La guerre civile entre histoire et mémoire (Nantes, 1994); Gabriele Ranzato, ed., Guerre fratricide. Le guerre civili in età contemporanea (Turin, 1994); Peter Waldmann and Fernando Reinardes, eds., Sociedades en guerra civil. Conflictos violentos de Europa y América Latina
Three features mark this Roundtable as unique: its scope, the comparisons that allows, and the conclusions they provide. The first is simply the range of historical examples it covers. For the most part, serial analysis of war termination in general, and of civil war termination in particular, has been conducted on a relatively narrow timescale of two centuries at most. Social scientists who study civil war have generally relied on large data-sets like the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Dataset, which begins in 1946, or the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan, whose baseline is 1816. Yet any truly historical study of civil war—its genealogy, its morphology, its durability, or its terminability—must stretch ten times further than the horizon of these analyses. As Josiah Osgood notes, the Romans invented the term “civil war” (bellum civile) in the 1st century BCE. At least within the western tradition, the Romans also have a strong claim to have invented civil war itself, as a phenomenon distinct from tumult, sedition, and the other less formalized episodes of internal violence the Greeks had called stasis. In this regard, the instances gathered here are salutary in treating civil wars and their termination over a longue durée of twenty-two centuries, from their beginnings in republican Rome to future prospects in South Asia, unlike

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9 Josiah Osgood, “Ending Civil War at Rome: Rhetoric and Reality (88 BCE–197 CE),” 000–00; see also Josiah Osgood, *Caesar’s Legacy: Civil War and the Emergence of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge, 2006).

conventional studies that have dealt solely with intrastate conflicts since the Second World War.\(^\text{11}\)

Greater temporal depth allows for more enlightening comparisons among civil wars and their endings: the second impressive quality of this Roundtable as a whole. The obvious analogy here is with the history of revolutions—those other transformative, often violent, political processes that have appeared sequentially across time and up to the present.\(^\text{12}\) Historians have generally preferred to study civil wars, like revolutions, individually and have left the cumulative analysis of both civil wars and revolutions to social scientists. Our tendency is towards profligacy—the reconstruction of contextual specificity through the interpretation of often intractable original sources—while our colleagues in adjacent social sciences prefer parsimony: “the reduction of potentially incommensurate phenomena to uniform categories,” as David A. Bell has recently described their procedure for analysing revolutions.\(^\text{13}\) This division of labor has generated multiple historical case-studies of particular civil wars; it has also served to reaffirm a methodological nationalism in their study that historians have begun to repudiate in favor of international, transnational, and global approaches to their subjects. The cumulative and collaborative approach adopted here may help to encourage more comparative consideration of civil wars, transnationally and transtemporally.

The Roundtable consists mostly of treatments of specific national instances of civil war—among them Roman, French, English, Chinese, Syrian, American, Spanish, El Salvadorian, Liberian, and Afghan. Their juxtaposition does shows that comparative examination of civil wars can adopt the serialism of the social sciences without losing the contextualism prized by historians. Unlike the study of

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\(^{13}\) David A. Bell, “Afterword,” in Baker and Edelstein, eds., *Scripting Revolution*, 347.
revolutions, which has a long pedigree stretching from the mid-seventeenth century to the present, the transtemporal and transnational comparison of civil wars is still in its infancy. By exemplifying what Tobie Meyer-Fong here calls “the plausibility and desirability of dialogue among historians working in different geographical areas and time periods” on civil war, this Roundtable marks a promising start to an ambitious area of historical inquiry. An enterprises like the one assembled here presents “an underappreciated opportunity to analyse [civil wars] comparatively,” as Osgood puts it. By encouraging comparisons across space and time, such efforts can provide more robust answers to the problems long posed by civil war in the past, as well as better questions for understanding how to end it in the future.

Comparative history shows that what might be learned from many civil wars is proportionately greater than the lessons to be drawn from any particular instance: the Roundtable’s third main collective contribution. By offering multiple examples of civil war, taken from widely differing times and places, under a broad range of political regimes (pre-modern and modern, monarchical and republican, imperial and statist, absolutist and democratic), and with a great variety of outcomes, the Roundtable provides a spectrum of the possibilities for ending civil war, from “giving war a chance” (the method of military victory) through to various forms of negotiated settlement, power-sharing, and internationally-enforced agreements. The Romans experimented variously with dictatorship, proscription, spectacle (in the form of triumphs), the manipulation of memory, and ultimately dynasticism as successive, if not always successful, prophylactics against the curse of civil war, and many of their remedies were imitated in the wake of later civil wars. For example, Alan Tulchin suggests that absolute monarchy “inhibited compromise” during the French Wars of Religion but that its capacities—notably shows of force, the manipulation of munificence, and the negotiation of religious

15 Osgood, “Ending Civil War at Rome,” 000.
tolerance—ultimately helped to bring decades of conflict to a close.¹⁷ The restoration of monarchy in England after 1660, combined with confessional compromise, likewise calmed contention, Matthew Neufeld argues, but only in tandem with the amnesia of an Act of Pardon, Indemnity and Oblivion (1660), a strategy whose origins go back to Athens in the 5th century BCE.¹⁸ By contrast, the reassertion of dynasticism, along with documentary destruction and “physical and ideological reconstruction,” brought only temporary closure after the Taiping War, as Meyer-Fong shows.¹⁹ Like other mid-nineteenth-century conflicts, in Syria and the United States, that civil war left much unfinished business and lingering questions after its formal termination—what one Spanish historian has called in a later context a “long uncivil peace” (larga paz incivil).²⁰

Such indeterminacy foreshadowed the twentieth-century traumas of civil war. For example, Sandie Holguín shows that in Spain the Franco regime deliberately “prolonged its civil war” to maintain power until 1975; this was followed after Franco’s death by a deliberate “Pact of Forgetting” (Pacto de Olvido) among Spanish politicians of all stripes.²¹ Clean closure also eluded peacemakers in sub-Saharan Africa and will likely also not come for Afghanistan. Competing narratives of civil war—whether as “liberation wars” or “criminal wars”—have determined colliding remedies for conflict in the one, according to William Reno,

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¹⁷ Alan Tulchin, “Ending the French Wars of Religion,” 000–00.
¹⁹ Meyer-Fong, “Where the War Ended,” 000. See also Tobie Meyer-Fong, What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century China (Stanford, 2013).
²⁰ Julián Casanova, “Presentación,” in Casanova, Francisco Espinosa, Conxita Mira, and Francisco Moreno Gómez, Morir, matar, sobrevivir: La violencia en la dictadura de Franco (Barcelona, 2002), x, quoted in Sandie Holguín, “How Did the Spanish Civil War End? ... Not So Well,” 000.
²¹ Holguín, “How Did the Spanish Civil War End?,” 000, 000; Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy, trans. Mark Oakley (New York, 2002).
while the unintended consequences of outside intervention will continue affect the other, if Abdulkader Sinno is correct. Reno’s illuminating emphasis on narrative highlights the ways in which scholarship itself can now influence the ways civil war ends, as the literature on, for example, “greed and grievance” in causing civil war, generate narratives which shape the responses of human rights groups, tribunals, and international organs such as the World Bank. These narratives can also inspire or deter outside intervention into existing conflicts. Historical examples do not always point in a single direction: in this sense, Sinno is surely right to conclude his examination of intervention in Afghanistan with a caution that “the lessons of history need not be deterministic”. The more lessons that can be learned, the greater the chances of avoiding past mistakes in ending future civil conflicts: for, as Reno reminds us, “Ideas turn out to be very important in shaping civil war termination”.

Civil wars can feel bitterly invasive to those who go through them because of their divisiveness, their apparent resistance to regulation, their tendency to inspire vengeance, and the very intimacy of their violence. As a result, they often leave lingering hostility, historical trauma, and fractious memory in their wake. Most of the essays in the Roundtable treat wars that dragged on, flared up, or mutated into other forms of slow, deep violence long after any formal settlement or surrender. Rome’s five Roman civil wars stretched over nearly three hundred years. The eight civil wars that later came to be called the French “Wars of Religion” lasted from 1562 to 1598 were indeed ended by the reimposition of monarchy. Seventeenth-century Britain suffered three civil wars over nine years (1642–51), along with a

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24 Sinno, “Partisan Intervention and the Transformation of Afghanistan’s Civil War,” 000.

fourth that never was, the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. The Taiping War lasted thirteen years (1851–64) and was the nineteenth-century’s bloodiest. The U. S. Civil War carried on formally for only four years (1861–65), but by some accounts was not concluded until five years beyond Appomattox in 1870, as Republicans declared that “wartime continued” through Reconstruction, anticipating the increasing elasticity of “wartime” more generally in the twentieth century. The civil war in El Salvador went on for twelve years while present-day Afghanistan threatens to suffer fresh “conflict that is curiously similar to the pre-Coalition civil war” when (or if) the U. S.-led forces in the country finally depart. These experiences of long duration and difficult termination could have been illustrated equally well by other drawn-out civil wars in Lebanon (1975–90) and Sri Lanka (1983–2009), for instance.

Social scientists who study civil wars have queried whether they are objectively harsher, more destructive, or more lacking in logic than other kinds of conflict. In the process, they have confirmed that civil wars seem particularly agonizing because they do last longer and are more likely to recur than other wars. It now appears that “the most likely legacy of a civil war is further civil war.”

28 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London, 1990); Samantha Subramanian, This Divided Island: Stories from the Sri Lankan Civil War (London, 2015).
own century, most of these apparently “neverending wars” have been resumptions of earlier civil wars. These recent discoveries about civil war recurrence are rediscoveries of what observers have known for centuries, even millennia, about civil war, its endlessness and its endurance. The Romans had learned that civil wars were like volcanoes: both destructive and dormant, shatteringly violent and yet disturbing when quiescent because likely to erupt again at any time. To stir the suppressed memory of civil war was, in the chilling words of the poet Horace, to “tread on fire/smouldering under ashes.”

Pace the orator and historian Titus Labienus, forgetting (oblivio) was not the best defense against civil war though, as Osgood remarks, half-forgetting it may have been. That was hardly an option for Rome’s heirs in the Latin West and beyond. Until well into the nineteenth century, Roman conceptions shaped perceptions of civil war in the western world and its imperial offshoots, though they were overlaid with multiple historical memories and intersected with other conceptions of internal conflict in Arabic, Asian and other traditions. Roman accounts of serial civil war—by Appian, Augustine, Caesar, Florus, Lucan, Plutarch, and Tacitus, among others—gave evidence that the remedies for civil war could be double-edged in their effects. The imposition, or re-imposition, of monarchy might in some circumstances be a cure, but struggles over the succession could equally likely engulf “the world in blood and ashes,” as the anti-

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34 “Optima civilis belli defensio oblivio est”: Seneca, Controversiae (10. 3. 5), quoted in Alain M. Gowing, Empire and Memory: The Representation of the Roman Republic in Imperial Culture (Cambridge, 2005), 82; Osgood, “Ending Civil War at Rome,” 000.

35 Armitage, Civil War: A History in Ideas.
monarchical republican Thomas Paine charged in 1776. History supplied cumulative repertoires for their conclusion as well as warnings about their potential interminability, but ultimately every civil war thus had to find its own ending.

How civil wars end is intimately linked to how they begin and the conditions under which they are fought. As Ussama Makdisi shows, the 1860 civil war in Syria “reflected a nineteenth-century crisis of pluralism” in the Ottoman empire that paralleled near-contemporaneous events in the United States. In the two cases, the “transformation from discrimination to non-discrimination” was framed in different terms: religious in Ottoman Syria, racial in the case of the United States. The outcomes were also distinct. Union victory in North America cemented territorial sovereignty along with the reassertion of racial dominance; Ottoman authority over a pacified Syria was diluted in Mount Lebanon by religious “coexistence in light of the Tanzimat mantra of non-discrimination.” By contrast, the pacification of the American South extended the war well beyond the moment of formal surrender though it was not accompanied by trials of the defeated or reprisals against them. This was a tempered use of force designed to snuff out once and for all the avant-garde nationalist aspirations of Southerners for self-determination. As William Blair argues, the use of force retarded reconciliation, while persistently “unanswered questions about citizenship and rights” for African Americans remained unresolved for almost a century. This was hardly what the reformist

37 Ussama Makdisi, “Diminished Sovereignty and the Impossibility of ‘Civil War’ in the Modern Middle East,” 000. See also Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (Berkeley, 1994); Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, 2000).
38 Makdisi, “Diminished Sovereignty and the Impossibility of ‘Civil War’,” 000.
40 William Blair, “Finding the Ending of America’s Civil War,” 000; see also William A. Blair, With Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill, 2014).
French politician Agénor de Gasparin envisaged in 1865 to be “the liberal conclusion of a civil war”.\footnote{Agénor de Gasparin to William H. Seward (May 1, 1865), quoted in Blair, “Finding the End of America’s Civil War,” 000.}

Concluding civil wars became paradoxically more complex and more likely over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they came increasingly to be matters of international concern. From the time of the Roman civil wars until the second half of the eighteenth century, such conflicts remained mostly internal or domestic matters. The American and French revolutions and the movements for redistributing sovereignty and authority in early nineteenth-century southern Europe and Spanish America brought questions of international recognition and intervention to the forefront of political and legal calculations for the first time.\footnote{For recent histories of early interventionism, see Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York, 2008); Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge, 2011); Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds., Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill (Cambridge, 2013).} In the following two centuries, during the Spanish Civil War and especially in the Cold War, outside powers became more inclined to use the parties in civil wars as proxies or to attempt to broker peace settlements through international institutions. Chávez demonstrates that the civil war in El Salvador ended more conclusively in 1992 not only because the contending sides had been more evenly matched but because international actors, including the United Nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union, had a greater stake in the war’s termination: this may not have been enough to create “the basis for a more peaceful and just society in El Salvador,” but it did help to end the war decisively.\footnote{Joaquín Chávez, “How the Civil War in El Salvador Ended?,” 000.} The likelihood of civil wars being terminated by international agreements will surely only increase, even as the dangers of what Reno calls “direct partisan intervention” in civil wars have also grown.\footnote{Reno, “Partisan Intervention and the Transformation of Afghanistan’s Civil War,” 000.}

Sometimes generations must pass before the fires of civil war can be extinguished. As Neufeld notes in the conclusion to his essay, “in the case of
seventeenth-century England, it took fifty years, three settlements, and one foreign war, to achieve civil peace once and for all”. Even that chastening summation may overlook the aftershocks of the British—rather than just English—civil wars in Scotland (where the Jacobite threat lingered until 1745, if not longer) and, especially, in Ireland where, as Lord Macaulay wrote in the 1840s, the historian’s “steps—to borrow a fine image used on a similar occasion by a Roman poet—are on the thin crust of ashes beneath which the lava is still glowing”. Similarly, the historical memory of the Taiping War would be argued over well beyond the end of the Qing dynasty against which the leaders of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Revolutionary Movement had raised their banners: indeed, it would only be after the Chinese Revolution in 1911 that the events could be branded as a civil war—rather than as an anti-dynastic “rebellion”—at all. This parallels the aftermath of the contemporary conflict in the United States which official documents, such as the 70-volume official history of the U. S. “Civil War” published between 1880 and 1891, called the “War of the Rebellion,” a title clearly intended to delegitimize the cause of the defeated Confederate “rebels.” Recent arguments over the flying of the Confederate flag in South Carolina suggest that the embers of conflict in the United States have not entirely cooled, one hundred and fifty years later. Likewise, the fiercely contested status of Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo (originally constructed in 1869 as a memorial to the imperial loyalists who died during Japan’s internal Boshin War) and of the Valle de los Caídos in Spain (monument to the Nationalist dead of the Spanish Civil War and burial-place of Francisco Franco) keeps the divisions of long-terminated conflicts alive into the present. In all these cases, to forgive civil war has not been to forget it.

45 Neufeld, “From Peacemaking to Peacebuilding,” 000.
48 Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (Honolulu, 2015); Tàrio Rubio, El Valle de los Caídos y la represión franquista (Tarragona, 2011).
This *AHR* Roundtable raises as many questions as it answers about the terminability, or interminability, of civil war. In light of two thousand years’ experience of ceaseless, repeated civil wars, its theme may appear to embody something of a *question mal posée*. Asking whether civil wars end rather than *how* they end might better capture the uncertainties of the lingering hostility, historical trauma, and fractious memory they often leave in their wake. This matters especially because, in the twenty-first century world, almost all wars are now “civil” wars: according to one widely cited estimate, there have been 259 armed conflicts since 1945 and more than 95% of those recorded since 1989 were intra-state not inter-state conflicts. The great majority of those became “internationalized civil wars” with the participation of near-neighbors or other external agents: in 2014, thirty-nine of the forty active conflicts globally were of this kind, in Afghanistan, Sudan, and elsewhere.\(^{49}\) They have produced not just destruction and dislocation within their respective countries but escalating numbers of refugees: 500,000 during the Spanish Civil War, almost one million from El Salvador in the 1980s, and over 4 million and counting from Syria since 2012.\(^{50}\) The world’s seemingly endless internal conflicts, from Afghanistan to Syria, provide compelling reasons to believe that, in cases of civil war, “committing to peace” might not be a straightforward means of “securing the peace,” as many of the essays in this Roundtable confirm.\(^{51}\) The durability of individual civil wars and the longevity of civil war as a phenomenon mean that “the better angels of our nature” still have a long way to go before “winning the war on war”—especially for ending civil war.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{51}\) Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Toft, *Securing the Peace*.

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