【論壇】

「國際轉向」——敬覆批評者

大衛·阿米蒂奇(David Armitage)

目前為哈佛大學歷史系講座教授兼系主任，兼事講授思想史
與國際史，曾撰寫、編輯專著十三種。其中最新近出版為
2013年的《現代國際思想的基礎》。

* 本文譯者為陳正國。
史學之進退殊途，有開創新猷者，有舊題新研者，有舊學重構者。開創新猷者，於此三者中最為少見，但是讓歷史課題重生，或重構歷史領域，往往是史學前進之動能中之大者。在某些領域，此種重研重建，可以名之曰歷史取徑之回歸；例如「人類全史之回歸」，「長時段歷史之回歸」等等。1 在某些領域，此種重研重建宜乎稱之為歷史學的「轉向」——如語言轉向、文化轉向、帝國轉向、空間轉向等等。2 新近一場（從批判視角看歷史書寫的「轉向」）論壇上，有位年輕史家指出，上述此一史學進展應能循兩條路徑以增進史家之間的對話，避免對話之終結。其一，「我們須將諸轉向之語言視作願景，用之以描述或論辯正在發生，或剛剛發生的歷史變化。」其二，「轉向云云，必須在非取代論的框架之內，用以描述世代之間的變化差異：應是對前代（學術）的更新或重構，而非全然的取代。」3

我當初寫作思想史中的國際轉向時，正是懷抱此兩項建議之精神——願景與建構，既尊重各種取徑，但也強調必須基於既有的(史學)成就。我論證道，思想史或許能藉由國際轉向而重新界定它與其它研究領域—包括歷史與非歷史—的關係，從而能既開創新猷，又能舊題新解。

為達上述結論，〈思想史的國際轉向〉一文快速依序瀏覽了過

---

去、現在、未來的國際史與思想史。4 在上個世紀裡，此二史學次領域曾有過相互吸引與排斥的過程，如今它們似乎頗自得於其日益興榮的關係。我認爲，上述新興學術趨向已證實了我十年前的預測：以往史家、政治理論家、國際關係學者、國際法學者之間的對話關係將重現眼前。5 我也指出，我在別處所說的「國際的思想史以及國際化的思想史」(the intellectual history of the international and an internationalised intellectual history) 尚有许多工作待完成；亦即，一方面是國際領域的思想性反思，一方面是從國際脈絡從事思想史研究。6 值得欣慰的是，此次論壇的傑出參與人所提供的精闢評論同時觸及了這兩方面的議題。更令人欣慰的是，幾位評論人均頗能以拙文的精神本貌來看待拙文。以下，我就轉向他們對拙文概然提出的挑戰性評論。

* * *

包爾德大膽宣稱：「今日我們都已是國際人士。」7 受人敬仰的包教授是我的哈佛同事；我定期與他一起講授一門思想史方法中有關

---


global (空間) 擴展、時間旅行的研究生課程。正如在共同授課之時經常所展現的，包教授非常精準地意識到，時空視野的擴展對思想史研究法而言，既充滿挑戰也具多種可能性。他文章開頭所提到的意外禮物，一期新出的《儒學國際研究》正好說明了此點 (挑戰與可能)。包教授說：這本集刊的作者「都採用了他們所書寫的 (儒學) 傳統以外的模式談論儒學。」其所謂國際云云，其實只是因它外在於儒學傳統本身。對包教授而言，這其實並非是世界主義，而是種借取議述 (derivative discourse)：藉著使用自身傳統以外的標準或規範，冀望擁有更強大的文化資本、更有權勢的優越族群對自己施與青睞。但另一方面，誠如包教授的觀察所言，「今日世界之思想生活已無可避免的國際化了」，至少，具雄心的智識份子不應再只對其同胞或同語族者發表論點，而該同時對潛在的國際聽眾發論，正如哲學家可能曾經既對同時代的人發論，也對其後代發論。

吾人之思想生活的確越來越具國際化；但我仍不敢說這是「無可避免的國際化」。在拙文的一段卷首語，我引述了法國文化社會學家布迪厄 (Pierre Bourdieu) 的清明之語：「人們常認爲思想生活自然而然具有國際性。無事比此更遠於事實。」8 布狄厄認為，文本於旅行過程會遇到一連串的「守門人」——譯者、編輯、出版商；他們包裝、重編、傳布著以書本或學報形式出現的觀念。(我們或許可以將網絡世界裡以非物質形式傳布觀念的人加入守門人名單內。) 當觀念傳布或被傳布而逸越出其原生脈絡時，它們就有了新的意義。當它們與

原始創造之意圖之間的關係因傳布而鬆動時，它們就創造了原先無所預知的效果。上述這種現象似乎在包教授所舉的例子得到了證明，無論是《儒學憲政秩序》或蔣慶的《儒學憲政秩序》——當這些作品送到美國學術圈或以英文印製時，其意義與它們在原生情境裡所具有的意義就大不相同了。9 唯有對其議論之傳布的物質形式與過程有所警覺，我們才能開始了解何以思想生活成為國際化。

誠如包教授在其評論文最後所言，思想生活的國際化可以發生在時間中，也可以發生在空間裡。傳統有時耐力，卻也同時旅行著。傳統在旅行之際會與其它傳統混雜、對話。觀念與議論既可將千里之外的社群連結在一起，同時也可以將社群連結達千年之久。我曾在別處提倡跨時間與跨國族的思想史的作法。我提議應該「在觀念中」 (in ideas) 追溯歷史，希望對Arthur Lovejoy 及其追隨者所倡議的「觀念史」(history of ideas) 所提出的方法論往前推進。10 作者時間與跨國族的思想史研究之間最大的差異，應該是包教授在其評論文的最後一句話；他希望中國思想傳統可以進入「一場國際卻非單向的對話。」以全球的規模而言，國際論述自然是多向的對話，雖不必然沒有衝突或不對等。與此相反，我們對過去歷史的接觸方式是單向的；它是跨時間的，但因爲我們必然是在現在才得以建構過往，所以我們的接觸必然是單向的。同理，如果歷史源頭本身的國族的、帝國的而非國際的，我們也無法使其成為國際。因此，國際主義之外的選項以及抵抗國際主義就成了思想史研究的主題，因爲「對全球化的概念而

言，其它概念並非如此。」

正是在此一面向，葛兆光對「國際轉向」所啓發東亞思想史研究的啟示意義所做的評論深具啟發。他主要關注之處在於思想史的國際取徑不該忽視或超越「國(民)族」(national)的取徑視野。葛教授問道，「『國際轉向』與『國族視角』是否可以共存且彼此受益？」他自已依其兩點理由提供正面的回答。其一，西方啓蒙史家所熟知：史家永遠必須貼近脈絡。另其一則不爲歐美史家所易曉，因爲正如葛教授所言，他們「個人未親身經驗政治上的巨大壓制與壓迫。」對我們這群在自由民主體制下生活與工作，長期以來，思想自由與學術自主已被保障的幸運者而言，我們的確應該被提醒，他在的社會中，國家的力量遠較普通國與仿在。在此等情情况下，專注於國家的歷史研究或許不只無可避免：在倫理上，乃屬必須。

我完全可以感受到葛教授論證的力量，並且同意他的一項觀察：我們不應將民族國家的思想史或更普遍的方法論上的國族主義相混淆。後者曾經被許多歷史書寫，而且仰賴社會科學超過一個世紀之久。的確，我在描文提到方法論的國族主義幽靈，只是將此種國族主義的歷史當成一個領域，並點出，大多數思想史如何避免了此種國族主義的缺點。不過，我願意依賴葛教授的評論，再強化我自己的論證邏輯，談談國際轉向對吾人有何好處。以下所論有三端，其一強調有關脈絡之三種不同概念，其二質疑「民(國)族」(nation)與「國家」(state)的統一關係，其三探討常被誤認為延續不變的民族性。

我是史基納(Quentin Skinner)的學生，現在又是他所創立的「脈

絡中的觀念」叢書系列的編輯之一，
12 我很難不服服葛教授對史基納
論述的附議：「觀念必須在脈絡中理解。」不過我仍需提醒，莫要以
為——假如葛教授之所為——脈絡只能等同於「當時代的政治文化」
（斜體為我所加），或認為脈絡只能在，或主要在「語言脈絡」中被建
構。當然，政治或語言脈絡都極為重要，它們可以回答思想史研究中
的諸多問題；幫助吾人形成關鍵的研究主題。然而它們並非全部。

政治脈絡之寬窄，係以國家主權之領土為斷。政治脈絡之外，尚
有文化、宗教、制度、經濟等等脈絡；其範圍或許比政治脈絡來得廣
些，或來得窄些。正如我在該文所指出，脈絡可以是物理與空間的，
也可以是語言或概念的。同理，這些脈絡可以遠超出國(民)族邊界，
也可以清楚限定如一個家庭、一所學院、或機構化的空間。從葛教授
評論文最後所舉的例子——「佛教如何越嶺渡海成爲朝鮮和日本的宗
教」——可以看出，他顯然非常清楚上述差別。脈絡並非靜態、限定
之物；脈絡可能移動、轉變。脈絡受變化支動，也受造成變化之行爲
者所支動。在上述這些不確定、變動的表象下，要重新建構脈絡來詮
釋特定觀念，是一項困難的工作。尤其是如果多重與重疊的脈絡——
有些近在手邊，有些在時空上相當遙遠——都能給予特定的言說以意
義的時候，情況將更爲困難。

同樣難以掌握的是民族與國家這兩個概念。此二者之間並無必然
關聯。扎實而累累的研究文獻已清楚顯示，此二者之聯結既相當晚
出，也相當偶然。一個世紀之前，韋伯將二者的關係以非常經典的方
式總結道：「民族乃是一情思之共同體；此情思能夠在其自己的國家
中清楚展現此共同體。因此，民族乃一共同體，並常具有創造屬於自

12 http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/series/series_display/item3937510/?
site_locale=en_GB。（取得日期：2013年3月1日）
己國家之傾向」。但在韋伯的時代，如此觀念仍相對新穎。13 這帶領我們回到葛教授的陳述：「差異性極大的各國歷史，以及這一歷史背景中所生出的問題與觀念，其實總是受制於『國家』。」如果葛教授此處之「總是」意指「只是」，我就不能苟同。但如果他所謂「總是」是指「在所有時間與空間中」，在現代與前現代，我則頗為疑惑。即使是在中國，我們仍舊應該追問，究竟國族或國家與帝國之間是否有其差異。「中國」(China)的領土在過去幾個世紀中頗有變化；其族群則在不同的朝代與共和國政權中生活。移民同樣創造出華人離散族群 (Chinese diaspora)，其範圍遠超中國主權 (Chinese sovereignty)的領域。我們何時能說「中國」係一國家政體 (a state)、國族、帝國、文明、語言共同體、離散族群？我們所探究的中國，究竟是上述眾多中國中的哪一個？顯然需要更精確的指涉。

「國族」(national)脈絡的固定化是短暫的，其在時空中並不具有永恆的延續性。話雖如此，我無意詮釋葛教授的有益提醒——思想史家在國際轉向時，不該忘記國族脈絡——不正確。我只是強調國際轉向的成果之一，在於當吾人以國族為脈絡分析的範疇時，對國族之不證自明，或國族之自然性，理當採取懷疑之態度。與此相反者，因「國際」一辭之核心包含「國族」，我們固然與葛教授一樣，期待「現在流行起來的超越國家的國際思想史研究，可以與各國傳統的國別思想史研究互相促進」，因爲若非如此，思想史家定然難從事。然而我們仍需鼓勵專注於國族脈絡的史家們，亦可嘗試發掘國族脈絡所不蘊含的觀念與論述。這些觀念與論述常常若不是因為其運作層次低於，或(有時)對立於國族/國家，就是因為它們超越國族脈絡，比如韋

學、佛教、道教等等葛教授在評論文中所提到的例子。我們也當提醒他們李蕾（Leigh Jenco）所說的「空間邊界。例如屬於民族國家的邊界，係在權力關係中被創造、強化；而我們正是在這種被給予的)空間邊界裡觀察移動。」無論國族主義者如何期待，國族並非自然之物。去除民族國家的自然外衣，或至少展示它是如何在國際的權力關係中被鍛造，依舊是史家必須面對的工作，而非只是思想史家的責任。

* * *

世界主義、國籍主義、全球主義以及比較研究常被視為國族主義、地方主義，以及其它種思想鄉巴佬主義的治癒良方。然而，正如李蕾所言，在政治理論領域裡，「國際化已經證明是歐洲認知模式以及民族國家形式的再認，而非取代或重新賦以意義。」她強調，政治理論的歷史可為想要國際化其領域的思想史家提供可資教訓的本事。畢竟，如果國際轉向的結果，只是回歸國族（或回歸歐洲或西方傳統經典或議題），這豈非轉到更壞的方向？

李蕾博士推想：思想史的國際轉向尚未前進地夠遠，而與此同時進展的政治理論，可以提供重要的參考，刺激它更往前邁進。她是對的。一般說來，史家——即便是思想史家——都不若政治理論家那般高度自我省視；主要原因是我們不太有雄心壯志，企圖建立自己的理論。不過，正如李蕾所言，整體史學的國際化——及其漸進的「去西方中心」、越來越注意到知識生產地的多元與相互連結——絕不可能不影響到思想史。而且，誠如李蕾所言，此史學國際化或許也會拉近思想史與政治理論的對話。不過，她的評論對想要從事此種對話關係的思想史家們，確實提供了重要的警語。

譬如，我完全不反對她所說，比較政治理論常有客體化、抽象化
的傾向，盡管這是比較方法常有的特色，而非政治理論所獨有。比較政治理論經常僵固了並列討論的不同傳統，例如為了幫助比較，研究者常將原本富有動能與發展的營學遺絡之家族，以靜態與概略的形式來表述。其結果，並行的傳統必須從歷史中被抽離出來。李蓋認為，政治理論的國際轉向其實已經向學術界再次肯定西方政治理論的中心地位：它揭露了政治理論的全球糾結，卻未能依循其邏輯，進一步仔細考慮「於其它地區所延傳的觀念裡的理論特質」。正如李蓋所言，企圖訴諸脈絡(例如霍基納的作品所示)或訴諸理解之視域(Hans-Georg Gadamer 的術語)將政治理論的內容與意義限定住，只會拘囚住觀念，阻止其旅行。14 這些方法論其實是僵掉了對話，阻撓了視域相容的可能。

我也同意李蓋博士所說的「許多政治理論家認為觀念的空間化，其實是限囿了，而非助長了思想的移動(性)」。我必須指出，其實此一觀點不獨惟政治理論家所有，許多史家也作如是觀。正是因爲如此，我才會在撰文中呼聲注意更寬廣與更富動能的脈絡概念。不過，較諸李蓋博士，我對「政治理論長久以來的理想的全球思想系譜」不會再長期受到忽視一節，仍較樂觀。

或許，思想史之國際轉向迄今最具解放意義的效果，正是人們對非西方的系譜與資源的重視加深了。除了李蓋所提的一些例子(多數取自東亞)，我可以再加上 Muzaffar Alam 的回教政治思想研究、Jennifer Pitts 對十九世紀初阿爾及利亞自由主義者 Hamdan Khodja 的研究，C. A. Bayly 對廣義十九世紀印度思想的傑出研究，Pankaj

Mishra of the 20th-century Asian postcolonial studies. In addition, Karuna Mantena reworked the idea of a general political theory, viewing it as a theory that is both real and practical. 15 This work is not yet complete, and some parts are still under development. I therefore look forward to seeing how Mantena’s own political theory develops, in terms of political thought and the new internationalization of politics. ‘The theory should be extended further, and it is essential to integrate the formal and substantive perspectives of politics in the global political space, and not only in the West, as the view of the modern world. ’ Mantena’s own recent work on the politics of Gandhian nonviolence, and the recent work on nonviolent politics, shows how the general political theory, and not only in the West, is essential to integrate the formal and substantive perspectives of politics in the global political space, and not only in the West, as the view of the modern world. ’


通往全球的國際思想史之架構。」

慕唯仁教授了解到，以資本主義作爲思想史的架構，勢必遭遇一些不滿。資本主義不是化約論嗎？難道它不也無可避免的將理念掩抑在物質之下嗎？難道慕唯仁所倡議的取徑不是否定了行動者與(人的)自主性嗎？這些反對意見其實已耳熟能詳。而今主要的思想史研究議程之所以被倡導，都因爲它們提出與強調物質分析的方法截然不同的方式；在此，我能立即想到的是史基納早先倡導廣義的韋伯方法論，並據以對受馬克思與Lewis Namier 影響的史學研究提出的爭議。17 上述這些爭議論點早已推進多時，慕唯仁教授現在應該可以比較輕鬆地達陣。任何思想史的跨國族轉向，無論是國際或全球範疇，都必然得同時注意全球與在地脈絡；至少在處理現代史時應該如此。最近有位心細善文的研究者提出「全球概念史」(global concept history) 一辭。他以馬克思主義對資本主義的分析手法，處理十九與二十世紀的跨地區運動與觀念的繼受。18 近來，國際思想史與全球思想史早已成功地將黑格爾與馬克思當作研究主題。19 慕唯仁對黑格爾何以是位全球史家有簡短、富啓發的說明，而他對資本主義與思想史中的物化現象所做的描述，對此一新興研究寫作貢獻良多。

慕唯仁教授稱資本主義為「我們時代的結構動能」。此說誠是。

18 Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
19 For example, Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
但我體內那位早期現代史家卻想追問，此處所謂「我們時代」究竟可以上溯至何時？正如世界體系理論家以及其他理論家所說，全球化的歷史可以看成是，過去五百年來世界各部份——「中心」與「邊陲」——逐漸整合進資本主義世界體系的故事。但此一過程相當滯進；在十九世紀之前，此過程甚難稱得上是全球性的整合。在此意義下，馬克思其實是以超歷史的方式，將當時相對新出的現象加以一般化。20 此外，吾人自可追問更大的問題：全球化究竟是否可以等同於資本主義？我們可以追溯全球化至何時？21 如果我們接受鴻惟仁教授的建議，將資本主義視為全球性（globality）之前提，而視全球性為國際思想史之背景，我們或許會踏一種風險，就是在空間極大的研究路徑上太過壓縮了時間。總之，如果在電報、火車、蒸汽船時代之前，資本主義不該被視為全球性的操作，這是否就意味著成年馬克思的十九世紀中葉之前，思想史的國際轉向都不管用？儘管有此一疑問，我強烈附從鴻惟仁教授的觀察：「邇來，思想史對於以全球眼光思考地方／空間與時間一事，若非有困難，就是尚未思考過。」我也同意他所說，某些國際關係理論家已經朝此方向前進，思想史家也該


嘗試進行。22 關於國際思想史乃依賴全球性一節，我個人尚未被說服；無論此全球性所指係為物質或概念。但閱讀葛唯仁教授評論之後，我更加相信，思想史的全球轉向已正式成爲吾人領域中的關鍵動向。23

容我最後轉到孫隆基博士的評論，以便在結束本文之前再次闡明我的論點。孫博士的評論含有許多對拙文意圖與陳述的誤解：其量之多使得我在閱讀其評論時開始懷疑，是否已在拙文中將自己的立場表達清楚。孫博士雖然可能不知道我曾寫過一本全球思想史的專書，並合編過另一本同領域的專書，他卻推斷我並非真的倡議全球史。24 他認爲我有「國際史的獨特品牌」（這可能是事實），進而推測我的目的在於「爲疲軟的外交史注入新活力的而努力」（這顯然有誤）。

是否拙文中有任何部分，或我畢生的書寫中有任何一點，可以被解讀成上文之目標，我自己真是茫然不知。我以爲拙文已經清楚表達，我的主要書寫身分就是一位思想史家。畢竟，拙文的標題是「思想史之國際轉向」而非「國際史之思想轉向」（雖然此一研究徑路不惟

22 Most notably, Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
23 請比較Moyn and Sartori 所編輯之專書中的文章。Moyn and Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History.
可行，甚至此其時矣)。25 我現在不是，也從未是一位外交史家。我從未措意於「編織各種相繫纖帶，使國際關係領域重新成爲一張藤子」，無論這句話真正意指爲何。我的意圖很簡單，就是鼓勵思想史家能從近年史學研究的國際化現象裡，汲取靈感，以利多方擴展其研究徑路。其他評論者均頗能掌握我的意圖，因此我確信，孫博士對我的誤解並不完全出自我本人的疏失。

孫博士相信學術分工漸漸分明，且糾結問題不多；他並相信許多歷史問題都已被解決，因此無須再多研探。我但願自己能有孫博士這樣的信心。如果二十一世紀之前真已有討論國際制度的思想史作品，我會驚嘆並願意傾聽。當然，國際機構作爲歷史研究對象由來已久。但就我所知，一直到最近才有思想史家，或應用思想史方法的國際史史家對此進行研究。26 孫博士宜稱道，國際思想家如Norman Angell 與 Hannah Arendt，一路到 Leonard Woolf 與 Alfred Zimmern 都稱得上是國際關係機構裡的「標準曲目」——再次，我很想知道是那些機構。他又宣稱，上述這些人的「思想傳記都已經到位了」，暗示吾人對其研究已可終止。如果此說爲真，那些迄今猶奮力從後代的傲慢中努力重新發掘，重現這些人的國際思想的一批學者，應該是還沒收到(孫博士)這消息。如果孫博士真的認爲，對「移民、離散社群、流行病投以關注」只消「相對簡單地裝備自我」國族史家就可以了，那他


對史學同行們的才能所懷抱的信心顯然遠超過於我。但願國族歷史的
國際化是如此簡易，那麼所有的國族史都可以按心裡所認定此種跨國
現象來寫書。很遺憾，至少迄今為止，情況遠非如此。

孫博士同時批評我道，我一方面因著輕看國族而「縮小」了歐
洲，另一方面又將啓蒙運動加以地方化、本質化了。我茫然不知孫博
士的指控所指為何，不過我倒是確定，這些指控乃建立在一連串不合
理的推理之上，在我論文中無法找到基礎。我無法明白，何以「滅消
『國族』就是滅消歐洲」。其實，對國族作為歷史的唯一單位所抱懷
疑態度者，在歐洲境外也所在多有。正如孫博士自己也提到的杜贊奇
《從國族中拯救歷史》正可為明證。27 我也從未認爲啓蒙運動乃「在
時間與空間中可以限定的單塊巨石」。再次，我實在看不出撰文何以
能被讀成我如此相信。我嘗言：「習以空間思考的思想史家在回答
『何謂啓蒙？』時，應該開始追問『何處啓蒙？』」我之所言，不過
是從新近研究觀念之流通、思想制度之地理分布、啓蒙思想之跨國
族，甚至全球的接觸所產生的深厚文獻加以描述而已（我承認相當簡
要）。對社群關係分析與視覺資料等等之數位化之賜，上述作品更見成
長，例如在卡內基大學裡所建置的《法蘭西斯特根的六級社會『觸
階』》（Six Degrees of Francis Bacon）資料，在麻省理工學院的《皇家
學院的比較》（Royal Society Comparative Trajectories）及史丹佛大學的
《文人共和國》（The Republic of Letters）、在牛津大學的《知識文化》
（Cultures of Knowledge），以及荷蘭多處研究機構所共置的《知識流
傳》（The Circulation of Knowledge）等計畫。28

27 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of
Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
此一新興學術遠非限囿或「本質化」啓蒙運動，而是強調啓蒙的
移動性與多樣性，及其在歐洲內外的延展性。29 任何人閱讀此類學術
著作後，都可以訴諸博士放心，它們並非在「在國族之上升立更上層
的單位，並加以實體化」，而是利用比較與連結的方法，揭露啓蒙觀
念在其間流傳與實踐的各式各樣的社群，包括國族的，次國族的，與
超國族的社群。在此一面向上，我附和一位當代全球史家的結論：他
說，正是因爲「全球流轉」、翻譯、跨國族的合作生產，使得啓蒙運動
成爲了它自身所宣稱的普遍與普世現象。」30

究其實，在博士寫下「文藝復興與啓蒙運動素來與普世的轉
喻(tropes)」時，他自己正犯了實體化與本質論的錯誤。因爲這麼說，
好似這些複雜而內部自存爭議的傳統沒有脈絡，卻有統一的內容。博
士在評論的後半段應用上述這些實體化的觀點分析五四運動——在
國族轉變的時間下的系列國族運動。他將五四運動與更廣泛的一九一
九年的「左派」「右派」極化一起審視，卻沒有提供任何[解釋]模式
（摘）

29 除了本书所引之作品，亦請參考下列作品。John Robertson, The Case for
the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Charles W. J. Withers and Robert Mayhew,
“Geography: Space, Place and Intellectual History in the Eighteenth Century”,
Journal for Eighteenth Century Studies, 34 (2011), pp. 445-52; Mayhew,
“Geography as the Eye of Enlightenment Historiography”, Modern Intellectual
History, 7 (2010), pp. 611-27; Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global
History: A Historiographical Critique", American Historical Review, 117 (2012),
p.999-1027; Caroline Winterer, “Where is America in the Republic of Letters?”,
Modern Intellectual History, 9 (2012), 597-623; Anthony Pagden, The
Enlightenment-And Why it Still Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013).


時，能思考得更廣；我希望也能更細緻周延些。他們警敏的建言，是
拙文先前遇到的標記。拙文的寫作係從我個人的條件立場出發：包爾
德常稱之為「地中海」思想史，也就歐洲與美洲的歷史—— 雖然我也
的確試著交代其它地理領域的新近（史學）發展。此處只提出一個概
觀，它與歐洲思想史的國際轉向的意涵直接相關，但顯而易見地，它
尚無法涵蓋今日世界對史學寫作態度的複雜轉變及其衍生意涵。33 這
群評論者都是亞洲思想史家，其觀點與視角各殊，卻集體地成就了拙
文所無法達到的境界：他們本身就是思想史的國際化。如果拙文的整
理與分析，此點綿薄之力確實有助於此次史學對話所帶來的進步，我
會更有信心地說，國際轉向已是朝向更佳之境的轉向。

33 此文最早發表於2010年的一場工作坊—— （爲二十一世紀重新思考現代歐
洲思想史）。其反省距離當年 LaCapra 與 Kaplan 所編之《現代歐洲思想
史》已有三十年之久。Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., Modern
European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1982).
The “International Turn”: A Reply to My Critics

David Armitage

David Armitage is the Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History at Harvard University, where he teaches intellectual history and international history. He is the author or editor of thirteen books, most recently *Foundations of Modern International Thought*. 
Advances in historical scholarship may be made variously by innovation, by renovation or by realignment. Outright innovation may be the rarest of the three, but the revival of historical problems or the reorganisation of historical fields accounts for most of the energy that keeps the discipline moving forwards. In some areas, it can be appropriate to speak of the return of a historical approach: the “return of universal history” or “the return of the longue durée”, for example.¹ In others, and generally most frequently, it is usual to speak of historical “turns”: the linguistic turn, the cultural turn, the imperial turn and the spatial turn, for instance.² In a recent forum on “Historiographic ‘Turns’ in Critical Perspective”, one younger historian suggested two ways in which such movements might productively open up dialogue rather than close it down. First, he argued, “we need to employ the language of turns prospectively, to describe and debate change that is ongoing or just beginning” and, second, that “turning has to be framed within a non-supersessionist account of generational change: as a process of reinvention and reformulation of what came before, not a wholesale replacement of it”.³ It was very much in the spirit of these recommendations—forward-looking and constructive, respectful of alternative approaches but also building on existing achievements—that I

wrote about the international turn in intellectual history. By taking such a turn, I argued, intellectual history might simultaneously innovate and renovate by realigning itself with other fields of inquiry, both historical and non-historical.

To reach these conclusions, “The International Turn in Intellectual History” swiftly surveyed the past, present and future of both international history and intellectual history in tandem. These two sub-fields of historical writing, I noted, have been through periods of mutual attraction and repulsion across the course of the last century but they now seem to enjoy increasingly fertile relations. I suggested that these emerging scholarly trends fulfilled a prediction I had made almost a decade ago—that there would be a revival of earlier conversations between diverse scholars in history, political theory, International Relations and international law. And I argued that there was still much work to be done on what I have called elsewhere “the intellectual history of the international and an internationalised intellectual history”; that is, on the history of intellectual reflection on the international realm on the one hand, and on intellectual history seen in its international contexts on the other. I am delighted that the distinguished contributors to this roundtable have touched on both of these strands in their penetrating remarks. I am even more pleased that they mostly took my essay in the spirit in which it was meant. It is to their generous and challenging comments that I now turn.

Peter K. Bol boldly asserts, “We are all international now”. Professor Bol is my esteemed Harvard colleague, and I regularly teach a globe-spanning, time-travelling graduate seminar on methods in intellectual history with him. As he so often does when we teach together, Professor Bol shows himself to be acutely aware of the challenges as well as the opportunities attending any expansion of horizons in space, time or research methods. His opening example of the unsolicited gift of a recent volume of International Research on Confucian Learning nicely illustrates this. The authors in this collection, he writes, “have adopted a framework that comes from outside the [Confucian] tradition they are writing about” and which is international only in the sense that it is external to Confucianism itself. This signifies to Professor Bol not cosmopolitanism, but instead a kind of derivative discourse: an attempt to adopt standards and protocols from outside one’s own tradition in hopes of currying favour with those who have more power, more prestige or greater cultural capital. But, as Professor Bol also notes, this effort also indicates that “intellectual life in the world today is inevitably international”, in the sense that ambitious intellectuals must now direct their arguments to potentially global audiences as well as to their compatriots or fellow language-speakers, just as philosophers might once have addressed posterity along with their own

---

6 Echoing the British Liberal politician Sir William Harcourt in 1889 (“We are all Socialists now”) and possibly also myself, echoing Harcourt, in 2002 (“We are all Atlanticists now”): David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History”, in Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke, 2002), 11.
contemporaries.

Intellectual life today may be increasingly international but I am not certain that it is “inevitably international”. In the epigraph to my essay, I quoted the sobering words of the French cultural sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, “It is often believed that intellectual life is spontaneously international. Nothing could be further from the truth.”

Bourdieu argued that every text travels through a series of “gatekeepers”—the translators, editors and publishers who package, rearrange and circulate ideas in the material forms of books and journals. (We might also now add those who transmit them in their immaterial forms across the world, by way of the Internet.) When texts move—or when they are moved—out of their original contexts, they acquire new meanings; they also create unanticipated effects as they break loose from the intentions of their creators. This certainly seems true of the examples Professor Bol cites in his remarks, of the journal International Research on Confucian Learning and of Jiang Qing’s Confucian Constitutional Order, for example, works that take on very different meanings when sent to academics in the United States or published in English than they might possess in their original settings.

Only by being alert to the material processes of the distribution and

---


reception of arguments can we begin to understand how intellectual life becomes international at all.

The internationalisation of intellectual life can take place over time as well as across space, as Professor Bol notes at the end of his remarks. Traditions endure but they also travel. As they travel, they mingle and converse with other traditions. Ideas and arguments can link communities together over thousands of years and over thousands of miles simultaneously. I have argued elsewhere for an approach to intellectual history which is transtemporal as well as transnational, tracking the history to be found “in ideas” as a methodological advance on the “history of ideas” associated with Arthur O. Lovejoy and his followers.  

The biggest difference, it seems to me, between transtemporal and the transnational intellectual history is suggested by the very last line of Professor Bol’s response, where he notes that Chinese intellectual traditions might be brought into “a conversation that can be international without being unidirectional”. International discourse, on a global scale, is by definition multidirectional, if not always without frictions or inequalities. By contrast, our encounter with the past takes place on a one-way street: it is transtemporal but it must be unidirectional because it is only in the present that we are able to reconstruct the past. We also cannot make the past international when it was not so—when it was national or imperial in orientation, for example. The alternatives to internationalism, and the resistance to it, thereby become subjects for intellectual history because,

---

“for every concept that does globalize, others do not do so”.  

It is in this regard that Ge Zhaoguang’s remarks on the implications of the “international turn” for East Asian intellectual history are so illuminating. His main concern is that the new promise of international approaches to intellectual history should not ignore or supersede “national” approaches. Professor Ge asks, “Can the ‘international turn’ and ‘national perspectives’ co-exist mutually beneficially?” He answers in the affirmative, for two main reasons. One is quite familiar to Euro-American intellectual historians: that historians must always attend to context. The other is less obvious to such historians who, as Professor Ge notes, “have no personal experiences in great political coercion or suppression”. For those of us fortunate enough to have lived and worked in liberal democracies with long-established guarantees of intellectual freedom and academic autonomy, it is important to be reminded that the power of the state (guojia) is much more invasive and present in other societies. In those cases, to concentrate on the state may be not only unavoidable: it is ethically indispensable.

I certainly feel the force of Professor Ge’s argument and also agree with him that it would be a mistake to confuse “national intellectual history” with the broader methodological nationalism that has structured much work in history and allied social sciences in the past century or more. Indeed, I raised the spectre of methodological nationalism in my original

---

essay only to show how intellectual history had largely avoided its shortcomings for most of its history as a field. However, I would still want to press further the logic of my own argument about the benefits of an international turn in light of Professor Ge’s remarks: by stressing different conceptions of context, by questioning the implied unity of “nation” and “state”, and by querying the presumed continuity of nationhood itself.

As a former student of Quentin Skinner, and now also as the co-editor of the monograph series he founded under the title “Ideas in Context”, I could hardly disagree with Professor Ge’s endorsement of Skinner’s “argument that ideas must be viewed in contexts”. However, I would caution against assuming—as Professor Ge seems to do—that we should only identify contexts with “the political culture of the time” (my emphasis) or that they should be construed only, or even primarily, as “linguistic contexts”. Both of these forms of context are, of course, crucially important to answer a wide variety of questions in intellectual history and to frame essential research topics. However, they are not exhaustive.

As well as political contexts, there are cultural, religious, institutional, and economic contexts, any or all of which might be larger or narrower than the political context defined by the boundaries of a state. And, as I argued in my original essay, contexts may be physical and spatial, as well as linguistic or conceptual: these contexts, too, may extend well beyond national borders or be as tightly defined as the spaces of a household, an

academy, or any other institutionalised space. But Professor Ge is obviously well aware of this, as his closing example of Buddhism “travel[ling] over mountains and seas to land in Japan and Korea” shows. Contexts are not static and confining; they can be mobile, shifting and subject to change as well as agents of change in themselves. In those very features lies the difficulty of reconstructing them to interpret particular ideas, especially when multiple and overlapping contexts—some close at hand, others distant in time and space—give meaning to particular utterances.

Just as slippery are conceptions of the nation and the state. There is no necessary connection between these two entities. A robust literature has shown definitively how recent and how contingent is the association of state with nation: Max Weber classically summed up that relationship a century ago—“a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own”—but this was still a relatively novel notion at the time that he wrote.12 This bears upon Professor Ge’s statement that “historical problems and ideas are always structured by guojia, due to great differences in national histories”. If by “always” Professor Ge means “only”, I would have to dissent; and if by “always”, he means “in all times and places”, modern and pre-modern, I would also have my doubts. Even in the case of China, we should surely ask if there is a difference between a nation (or a state) and an empire. The boundaries of “China” have shifted over the centuries, as different territories and peoples

have come under the sway of successive dynastic and republican regimes. Migration has also created a global Chinese diaspora well beyond the boundaries of Chinese sovereignty. When should we then speak of “China” as a state, a nation, an empire, a civilisation, a linguistic community or a diaspora? Which of these many Chinas is under inspection will always need to be specified.

“National” contexts are only temporarily fixed and are not eternally continuous in time and space. This is not to say that I believe Professor Ge to be incorrect in his salutary reminder that national contexts should not be forgotten as intellectual historians take an international turn: I mean simply that one fruit of that international turn is a scepticism about the self-evidence or the naturalness of the nation itself as a category of contextual analysis. Conversely, because the very term “international” has “nation” at its heart, it is of course correct to hope, with Professor Ge, that “current international intellectual history can go hand in hand with studies of national intellectual history”: it could hardly function any other way. However, it should encourage historians focused on national contexts to look for those ideas and arguments that cannot be contained within a national framework, either because they operate at levels lower than—and sometimes in opposition to—the nation/state, or because they extend above and beyond national contexts, like Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, to mention only Professor Ge’s key examples. And it should also alert them to what Leigh Jenco calls “the power relationships that create and reinforce boundaries around the spaces in and through which we perceive though to move, such as those of the nation-state”. Nations are not natural, whatever
nationalists might want us to think. Denaturalising the nation-state, not least by showing how it was produced by international relations of power, remains an ongoing task for all historians, and not for intellectual historians alone.

* * *

Cosmopolitanism, internationalism, globalism and comparison have often been proposed as cures for nationalism, regionalism and other forms of intellectual parochialism. However, as Leigh Jenco notes, in the field of political theory, “internationalization has led primarily to a reassertion of European modes of knowing and the nation-state form, rather than their displacement or refiguration”. She argues that the experience of political theory can offer a cautionary tale for intellectual historians who seek to internationalise their field: after all, if the only effect of taking an international turn is a return to the national (or, at least, a return to traditional canons and questions from Europe or the West more generally), might it not be a turn for the worse?

Dr Jenco is surely right to infer that the international turn in intellectual history has not gone far enough, and that parallel developments in political theory can provide vital inspiration for it to extend further. Historians—even intellectual historians—are not generally as self-reflexive as political theorists, in large part because we do not usually share the ambition to produce theory ourselves. However, the broader internationalisation of the historical discipline—with its progressive “de-centring” of the West and ever greater attention to the multiple and connected sites in the production of knowledge—cannot leave intellectual
history untouched; it might also bring it into closer dialogue with political theory, as Jenco suggests. However, her remarks do offer some important warnings to intellectual historians who might want to pursue that rapprochement.

For example, I would not disagree with her that comparative political theory has a tendency towards reification and abstraction, though that is characteristic of the comparative method more generally and not unique to political theory. Comparative political theory often immobilises the traditions it juxtaposes. To facilitate comparison, a dynamic and developing family of Confucian heritages must be rendered static and schematic, for example. Parallel traditions must in turn be abstracted from history. Jenco suggests that a cosmopolitan turn in political theory has served mostly to affirm the centrality of western political theory to the academy: it has revealed political theory’s global entanglements but it has not followed its own logic to consider seriously “the theoretical substance of ideas circulating elsewhere”. As Jenco notes, attempts to specify the meaning and content of political theory by appeals to context (as in the work of Quentin Skinner) or to horizons of understanding (in the terms set by Hans-Georg Gadamer) only serve to confine ideas, to prevent them from travelling. They thereby stifle dialogue and interrupt any potential fusion of horizons.

I would also agree with Dr Jenco that “the spatialization of ideas has been interpreted by many political theorists as constraining rather than

enabling the mobility of thought”—and not just by political theorists, it must be said, but by many historians as well: it was for that reason that I urged attention to broader and more dynamic conceptions of context in my original essay. However, I am a little more hopeful than Dr Jenco that the “global genealogy of political theory’s long-held ideals” will not be overlooked for much longer.

Perhaps the most liberating result so far of the international turn in intellectual history has precisely been greater attention to non-Western genealogies and sources. To the examples Jenco herself mentions (mostly drawn from East Asia), I would add the work of Muzaffar Alam on Islamic political thought, Jennifer Pitts on the early nineteenth-century Algerian liberal Hamdan Khodja, C. A. Bayly’s magisterial survey of Indian thought in the long nineteenth century, Pankaj Mishra’s study of twentieth-century Asian anti-colonialism, and Karuna Mantena’s reincorporation of Gandhi into the political theory of realism as an original and substantive theorist of means and ends in his own right.14 Much of this work has appeared very recently or is still in progress—I therefore have high hopes for the

achievement of what Jenco calls the “true ‘internationalization’” of intellectual history (and political theory), “that is, the incorporation in a broader and more transformative way the insights located in truly global, rather than provincially western, spaces of thought”. Dr Jenco’s own recent work on the political theory of Zhang Shizhao and on theoretical engagement across cultures strongly indicates that those hopes are far from being misplaced.15

Viren Murthy’s richly thoughtful commentary only increases my confidence in the bright future of international intellectual history—and, indeed, the future of its close cousin, global intellectual history. Professor Murthy neatly inverts my closing remarks, which implied that a global turn is a logical extension of the international turn, by arguing that “globality forms the condition for the possibility of the international turn” itself (my emphasis). Murthy then enlists the help of two of the earliest global intellectual historians—Hegel and Marx—to propose capitalism as a “framework that could go beyond reductionism and open the way to a globally international intellectual history”.

Professor Murthy notes some inevitable resistance to the use of capitalism as such a framework for intellectual history. Is it not reductionist? Does it not inevitably subsume the ideal in the material? Would not such an approach deny agency and autonomy? The objections

are familiar and major programmes of research in intellectual history have been explicitly promoted as alternatives to specifically materialist analyses— I would think here, most obviously, of Skinner’s early engagement with historiographies indebted to Marx and to Lewis Namier in favour of a more broadly Weberian approach, for example. But arguments have moved on and Professor Murthy is now surely pushing at an open door. Any transnational turn in intellectual history—whether international or global in scope—surely needs to attend to global and local contexts simultaneously, at least in the modern period. What one sophisticated recent practitioner has called “global concept history” has brought about just such a convergence by applying a Marxian analysis of capitalism to the interregional movement and reception of ideas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And Hegel and Marx themselves have recently been productively treated as subjects for international and global intellectual history themselves. Professor Murthy’s brief and suggestive account of Hegel as a global historian of a sort and his treatment of the phenomena of reification in capitalism and in intellectual history add measurably to this emerging body of work.

17 Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2008).
18 For example, Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh press, 2009); Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2010).
Professor Murthy rightly calls capitalism “the structuring dynamic of our age” but the early modern historian in me wants to ask just how far back “our age” extends in this sense. As world-systems theorists, among others, have reminded us, the history of globalisation can be told as the story of the gradual incorporation of all parts of the world—“centres” and “peripheries”—into the capitalist world-system over the course of the last five centuries. But this was a gradual process that could hardly be called comprehensively global before the nineteenth century: in this sense, Marx himself was generalising transhistorically from the relatively novel conditions of his own time.\(^\text{19}\) There is, of course, a larger question about whether globalisation should necessarily be identified with capitalism at all and how far back we can go in time and still speak of globalisation itself.\(^\text{20}\) But if we are to follow Professor Murthy’s suggestions, and see capitalism as the precondition of globality, and globality as the backdrop for international intellectual history, we might risk compressing in time an approach that is expansive in space. After all, if capitalism cannot be seen as a global condition before the era of the telegraph, the railroad and the


steamship, does this mean the international turn cannot be applied to any period before the Marx’s maturity in the mid-nineteenth century? That doubt aside, I would strongly endorse Professor Murthy’s sense that “recent intellectual history has had difficulty or has not even tried to think of place/space and time globally”—and that it should attempt to do so, as some international relations theorists have recently tried to do.\textsuperscript{21} I am not yet fully persuaded that international intellectual history depends upon globality, whether material or conceptual, but after reading Professor Murthy’s remarks, I am even more convinced that a global turn in intellectual history is now an essential move for our field.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{center}
\textasteriskcentered
\textasteriskcentered
\textasteriskcentered
\end{center}

To clarify my own arguments before I conclude, let me turn finally to Dr Lung-kee Sun’s remarks. Dr Sun’s commentary contains so many misunderstandings of my intentions and my own statements that as I read it I began to doubt whether I had expressed myself at all clearly in my original essay. Dr Sun infers that I do “not go for” global history, though he may not be aware that I have written one work of global intellectual history and co-edited another collection of essays in the field.\textsuperscript{23} He states that I

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Most notably, Jens Bartelson, \textit{Visions of World Community} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Compare the essays in Moyn and Sartori, eds., \textit{Global Intellectual History}.
\end{itemize}
have my own “special brand of international history” (which may be true) and then suspects that my own aim is “an effort to jumpstart the decrepit field of diplomatic history” (which is certainly not correct).

I am at a loss to see how any part of my essay—or indeed anything else I have ever written—could be seen as directed towards that goal. I had thought it was evident that I wrote primarily as an intellectual historian—my essay was, after all, entitled “The International Turn in Intellectual History” not “The Intellectual Turn in International History” (though such an approach would itself be quite plausible and timely).24 I am not now, nor have I ever been, a diplomatic historian. I have no intention of “weav[ing] various affiliated strands together to re-mat the field of international relations” (whatever that might mean). My aim was simply to encourage intellectual historians to diversify their approaches by drawing inspiration from some recent and novel advances in the internationalisation of historical scholarship more broadly. My other commentators understood this aim quite well, so I am reassured that Dr Sun’s misapprehension of my argument was not entirely my own fault.

I wish I could share Dr Sun’s confidence that academic divisions of labour are clear and unproblematic and that so many historical problems have already been solved that little further work is necessary. I would be fascinated to learn of intellectual histories on international institutions.

written before the last decade: of course such organisations have long been
the objects of historical research, but I am aware of little work on them by
intellectual historians, or by international historians using the tools of
intellectual history, until very recently. 25 Dr Sun claims that international
thinkers from Norman Angell and Hannah Arendt to Leonard Woolf and
Alfred Zimmern are “standard fare” in institutes of International
Relations—again, I would like to know where—and he also asserts that
their “intellectual biographies are in place”, implying research on them
might now cease. If so, that news has not reached the cadre of scholars who
are working mightily to recover the international thought of these figures
from the condescension of posterity. And Dr Sun has much greater
confidence than I in the talents and capacities of fellow historians if he
believes that paying “attention to migrations, diasporas, and epidemics”
requires nothing more than a “relatively simple retooling” on the part of
national historians. If only the internationalisation of national history were
so easy, every national history would be written with such transnational
phenomena in mind. For the moment, at least, regrettably few still are.

Dr Sun also takes me to task for, as he sees, it “diminishing” Europe
by downplaying the nation while at the same time localising and
essentialising the Enlightenment. I am at a loss to know what Dr Sun means
by these accusations, but I am confident they are based on a series of non

25 In addition to the works cited in my original article, see now also Mark
Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Penguin,
2012), and the recently launched United Nations History Project website:
sequiturs with no foundation in my own essay. I cannot understand how “to diminish the ‘nation’ is to diminish Europe”: scepticism about the nation as the sole unit of history extends well beyond Europe, as Dr Sun’s own reference to Prasenjit Duara’s *Rescuing History from the Nation* (1995) testifies.\(^2^6\) I have also never thought of the Enlightenment as “a monolith confinable somewhere in space and time” and again fail to see how my essay could be read as if I did believe that. When I stated that, “to answer the question, ‘What was Enlightenment?’ intellectual historians attuned to space must now also ask, ‘Where was Enlightenment?’”, I was (admittedly rather briskly) summarising a rich vein of recent work which has examined the circulation of ideas, the geographical distribution of intellectual institutions, and the transnational, even global, reach of Enlightenment: work which has been immeasurably expanded by the application of digital methods of network analysis and data visualisation in such projects as *Six Degrees of Francis Bacon* at Carnegie Mellon University, *Royal Society Comparative Trajectories* at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Republic of Letters* at Stanford University, *Cultures of Knowledge* at the University of Oxford, and *The Circulation of Knowledge* at various institutions in the Netherlands.\(^2^7\)

Far from confining or “essentialising” Enlightenment, this scholarship stresses its mobility and variety as well as its extension across and well

---


beyond Europe. Any reading of this work would reassure Dr Sun that it does not “hypostatize superordinate units overarching the nation” but instead uses methods of comparison and connection to reveal the many different communities-national, subnational and supranational-where Enlightened ideas were discussed and implemented. In this regard, I would endorse the conclusion of one recent global historian that it was precisely the “process of global circulation, translation, and transnational co-production that turned the Enlightenment into the general and universal phenomenon that it had always purported to be.”

Indeed, it is surely Dr Sun himself who is guilty of hypostatisation and essentialism when he writes of “the time-honored and universal tropes of the Renaissance [and] the Enlightenment”, as if these complex and internally contested traditions lacked any context yet had an agreed content. In the latter part of his essay, Dr Sun deploys these reifications to analyse May Fourth as a series of national movements within a transnational

---


moment. He plots May Fourth alongside a broader polarisation of “Right” and “Left” in 1919, but offers no model to link events in Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, China, and the United States. Does he imply a causal connection? A comparative framework? Or merely a set of coincidences?

Dr Sun does not tell us how we might answer such questions (as Professor Murthy in fact did), but only how we should not approach them: that is, he argues, against my own essay, we should not ask “how ideas were manufactured and how they travelled, who trafficked them and who consumed them”. His only counterproposal to this allegedly “materialist” methodology is what he calls a “hermeneutic” handling. As far as I can infer from Dr Sun’s remarks, “hermeneutic” here means being guided by imprecise appeals to distant Western models of “Renaissance” and “Enlightenment”. Fortunately we do have more robust and revealing scholarship on the May Fourth movement that is properly attentive to the historical connections that made 1919 such a peculiarly charged moment for transnational and even global exchanges.30 This work, so far mostly by international historians attuned to intellectual history, rather than by intellectual historians who have taken an international turn, offers much better guidance for the broader task of globalising intellectual history. In this way, it also addresses Professor Murthy’s important question of “why certain ideas could go global at a particular time”, ideas such as revolution,

nationalism and self-determination.  

I am grateful to all the contributors to this forum for all their stimulating comments and criticisms. They have helped me to think more broadly, and I hope also more subtly, about the challenges the international turn presents, not just to intellectual history but also to national history and to political theory, for example. Their acute suggestions mark a major advance on my original essay. I wrote that piece from my position as what Peter Bol often calls “Mediterranean” intellectual history—that is, the history of Europe and the Americas—though I did try to account for some recent developments in other geographical fields. But a single overview, directed specifically towards thinking about the implications of the international turn for European intellectual history, obviously could not account for all the implications of a complex shift in historical attention that is changing history writing across the world. The varied perspectives offered by this diverse group of scholars of Asian intellectual history collectively accomplish what my own essay could not achieve: the internationalisation of intellectual history itself. If my modest effort at synthesis and prognosis helped to inspire that major advance in historical

32 The essay was first presented at a 2010 workshop on “Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History for the Twenty-First Century”, reconsidering the field almost thirty years after the publication of Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).
dialogue, then I am more confident than ever that the international turn has indeed been a turn for the better.