OPPOSITION TO RACE-TARGETING: SELF-INTEREST, STRATIFICATION IDEOLOGY, OR RACIAL ATTITUDES?*

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Although traditional anti-black prejudice among whites has decreased since the 1940s, social policies designed to assist blacks continue to face opposition and controversy. Accounts have pointed to self-interest, American beliefs about inequality, or persistent negative racial attitudes as underlying causes of widespread opposition to race-targeted policies. We hypothesize that opposition hinges on the explicitness of the race-targeting and whether the policy's goal is opportunity enhancement or equality of outcomes. We also hypothesize that the influence of individuals' self-interest, beliefs about inequality, and racial attitudes on opinions differs by whether or not a policy is race-targeted and by a policy's goal. We use data from the 1990 General Social Survey to analyze opinion toward race-targeted versus income-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies and toward race-targeted versus income-targeted equal outcomes policies. Results of these analyses lend general support to our hypotheses, and in particular, underscore the influence of group self-interest and perceived discrimination on white opposition to race-targeted policy.

Research on racial attitudes has directed attention to an important theoretical paradox. On the one hand, among white Americans adherence to Jim Crow racism, which asserts the biological inferiority of blacks and calls for strict segregation (Fredrickson 1971; Myrdal 1944; Takaki 1979), has declined steadily since the 1940s (Taylor, Greeley, and Sheatsley 1978). On the other hand, government policies to increase opportunities for blacks — busing for school desegregation, open housing laws, and various affirmative action efforts in education and employment — have faced intense public opposition (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1988). The juxtaposition of these two seemingly opposed social trends raises questions about the extent and nature of prejudice, the meaning of changes in racial attitudes, and the accuracy of our measures of tolerance.

Most researchers have accepted the decline in traditional prejudice as an important social change (Jaynes and Williams 1989; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1988). Therefore, attention has centered on accounting for the persistent low levels of support for policies targeting African-Americans. Three lines of explanation have emerged. An explanation based on self-interest proposes that white Americans are unlikely to support policies from which they do not benefit and that may impose costs on them, through taxation or other means (Wilson 1987; Skocpol 1991). A second explanation focuses on a potential contradiction between traditional American values of individualism and targeting policies to a group characteristic like race (Lipset and Schneider 1978). Accordingly, race-targeted policies violate basic norms and beliefs about the proper allocation of social rewards (Glazer 1975; Sowell 1984). A third explanation points to different types of racial attitudes. One such account contends that new forms of racism have emerged and form the basis of opposition to race-targeted policies (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988). Another account emphasizes beliefs about the sources of black-white economic inequality, i.e., a perceived lack of effort on the

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part of blacks themselves predisposes many whites to doubt the need for race-targeted policies (Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suezle 1983; Kluegel 1990).

Researchers have treated these explanations most often as isolated theories and sometimes as competing theories. However, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Each account identifies factors that can contribute to understanding the modern paradox of whites' racial attitudes. Specification of the factors underlying opposition to race-targeted policies can shed considerable light on basic theoretical issues in modern black-white relations.

Furthermore, previous research has investigated attitudes toward a limited range of policies. Although many specific survey questions have been analyzed, they usually reflect one type of government intervention: strong government action to prevent discrimination or to advance minority interests, often with the goal of assuring equal outcomes. Such a focus is incomplete. Government policies toward minorities can fall anywhere along the continuum from opportunity enhancement (e.g., training and education programs) to assurance of equal outcomes (e.g., specific hiring quotas). Indeed, modern debates over policy increasingly involve alternatives covering the full spectrum of possibilities (compare Pinkney 1984 to Wilson 1987 and Skocpol 1991 to Mead 1986 and Murray 1984). To date, no full multivariate analysis has considered the effects of self-interest, values and beliefs about inequality, and racial attitudes across the spectrum of possible policies.[1]

Previous research has examined the effects of these factors only on race-targeted policies. Assessing the effects of race-targeting, however, is best done by analyzing opinion about parallel race-targeted and non–race-targeted policy. Do race-targeted policies make certain factors salient that do not affect attitudes toward non–race-targeted policies?

Our purpose is to provide a more discerning and synthetic examination of race-targeting as the source of opposition to government efforts to assist blacks than was possible in previous research. We suggest that the combination of the explicitness of race-targeting and the goal of a policy (opportunity enhancement or equal outcomes) determines both the level of popular support for a policy and the exact mix of self-interest, beliefs about inequality, and prejudice that underlie this support. If this is so, then the impact of any of these three factors — prejudice, self-interest, or beliefs about inequality — on views toward social policy may be more variable than previously thought.

BACKGROUND

Racial attitudes have improved, deteriorated, or remained unchanged, depending on the question asked. Widespread support among whites for segregation and open discrimination as principles that should guide black-white relations have yielded to increasing support over the last 50 years for principles of equality (Jaynes and Williams 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman et al. 1988). For example, national surveys show that support for integrated schooling rose from 42 percent in 1942 to 95 percent in 1983 (Schuman et al. 1988). This decline in traditional prejudice continues as a result of cohort replacement and changes in individuals' attitudes (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Smith 1985).

Yet overwhelming majorities of whites in national surveys oppose special government economic assistance to blacks and government efforts to desegregate schools. As recently as 1988, a bare majority of whites favored legislation to prevent racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing (Schuman et al 1988). In addition, support for race-targeted policies typically exhibits weaker associations with a respondent's education, age, and region compared to their associations with support for principles of racial equality. These patterns leave little grounds for anticipating increased support in the future. Furthermore, black-white polarization on many race-targeted policies is

[1] Only three studies have attempted to assess the influence of these three types of factors in multivariate analyses of attitudes toward race-targeted programs. Jacobsen (1985) examined the partial effects of self-interest and aspects of racism on attitudes toward affirmative action. Kluegel and Smith (1986) examined the effects of self-interest, stratification beliefs, perceived discrimination against blacks, and racial affect on affirmative action attitudes. Bobo (1991) examined the impact of traditional prejudice, beliefs about inequality (economic individualism and social responsibility), and socioeconomic status on support for government assistance to blacks.

substantial. Majority support among blacks is often matched by majority opposition among whites.

Whites' opposition to race-targeted policies, however, is not monolithic. Lipset and Schneider (1978) emphasized that most white Americans support "compensatory" racial policies. Race-targeted job training or special education programs often draw majority support. However, "preferential" policies, such as job hiring or college admission quotas, elicit widespread opposition. Kluegel and Smith (1986) reported a similar pattern.

Self-Interest

Simple self-interest of individuals or groups may account for the vulnerability of policies that deliver benefits to specific subgroups of the population. Individual self-interest is often defined narrowly to mean tangible losses or gains to an individual or his or her immediate family (see Citrin and Green 1990 and Sears and Funk 1991 for recent reviews). Thus the effects of objective personal or family characteristics (e.g., income) on attitudes toward policy reflect individuals' private interests. For example, research has shown a durable though modest negative relationship between income and support for welfare spending (Gilliam and Whitby 1989; Shapiro and Young 1988).

However, self-interest is also often defined at a broader group level. Category membership and identification with a group and a sense of shared fate lead to group-based assessments of self-interest. This is readily seen in group differences in attitudes toward policies: Blacks are consistently more supportive of race-targeted policies and welfare policies than are whites of comparable socioeconomic status (Bobo 1991; Gilliam and Whitby 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986).

The distinction between individual and group self-interest should not be overdrawn. Often there is a direct tie between individual self-interest and patterns of group identification. For example, social class identities are strongly influenced by the objective individual characteristics of income, education, and occupation (Jackman and Jackman 1983). Such group identities can powerfully shape perceptions of self-interest (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Jackman and Jackman 1983).

Wilson argued on the basis of self-interest (1987) that race-targeted policies are unlikely to receive wide support because many people have no stake in them. This weak base of support becomes an acute source of vulnerability "when the national economy is in a period of little growth, or decline. Under such economic conditions, the more the public programs are perceived by members of the wider society as benefiting any certain groups, the less support those programs receive" (p. 118). Indeed, Skocpol (1991) identified a growing frustration among middle class whites with paying taxes to support welfare state programs during a period of economic stagnation. These programs did not benefit middle class whites, and in Skocpol's view, this frustration fueled a split in the Democratic Party and enhanced the electoral success of Ronald Reagan.

Group memberships and identifications, especially racial divisions in the United States (Blauner 1972), have long been recognized as bases for the development of perceived interests (Bobo 1988). On the basis of group self-interest, race-targeted policies should be more popular among blacks than among whites. However, the self-interest approach would also predict what sort of people are lost (or gained) as policy shifts from an explicit economic goal to an explicit racial goal. Whites of high socioeconomic status have little to gain from income- or race-targeted policies. Thus, whites of low socioeconomic status should be more supportive of income-targeted policies than would be whites of higher socioeconomic status. According to the self-interest hypothesis, a shift from income-targeted to race-targeted policies should lose support principally among whites of low socioeconomic status.

Stratification Beliefs

Normative and existential beliefs about economic inequality may affect attitudes toward race-targeted policies. At a normative level, beliefs about how the stratification order should work are thought to underlie opposition to race-targeting, especially opposition to affirmative action programs that promote hiring or admissions quotas for minorities. Lipset and Schneider (1978) argued that widespread commitment to equity as the principal criterion of distributive justice lies behind the virtually unanimous rejection of programs that

are seen to promote "quotas." In general, the American public gives greater support to "opportunity-enhancing" programs than to programs that promote equal outcomes (Kluegel and Smith 1986). For example, greater support is given to job-training programs for the disadvantaged than to programs that establish a minimum income for all workers. Equal outcomes programs are opposed because they are thought to violate the belief that jobs and economic rewards should be allocated on the basis of individual talent, training, and effort. Providing rewards on the basis of group status without regard to individual qualifications is seen as unfair and in the long-run is believed to threaten principles that sustain an economically prosperous society. Opportunity-enhancing programs receive greater support because they are consistent with the norm of helping people to help themselves. In addition, opportunity-enhancing programs do not challenge principles of equity. Indeed, requirements that beneficiaries of such programs make the effort to acquire the training and skills needed to improve their economic positions are fully consistent with reward on the basis of individual effort.

At an existential level, insofar as individuals attribute socioeconomic success or failure to personal causes (e.g., ability or effort) and view the opportunity structure as open and fair, ceteris paribus, they are unlikely to feel that government should intervene to help those less fortunate. However, beliefs about social responsibility are also a major dimension of popular thinking about inequality. Such beliefs are consistent correlates of policy preferences (Bobo 1991; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Those who see class background or other societal factors (e.g., limited job opportunities) as constraining socioeconomic attainment tend to support social welfare policy.

There are two reasons for expecting beliefs about the causes of inequality to have different influences on reactions to race-targeted policies as compared to income-targeted policies. First, if people who either deny structural causes of inequality or endorse individual causes do not support policies to help the poor, they may be even less likely to support policies to help blacks, as most blacks are not poor. Second, the contradiction between race-targeted policies and equity norms is sharper than the contradiction between income-targeted policies and equity norms. Income-targeted policies are more likely to be seen as dealing with individual needs than are race-targeted policies. Hence, equity norms should have a stronger influence on reactions to race-targeted policies than on reactions to income-targeted policies.

The impact of stratification beliefs on attitudes toward policy should be stronger when the goal of policy favors equal outcomes. The more a policy tilts toward mandating equal outcomes, the clearer the departure from equity norms. In addition, those who deny structural causes or endorse individual causes of inequality may support (or not oppose) opportunity-enhancing policies because such policies do not challenge a system perceived to be working fairly (Kluegel and Smith 1982, 1986). Equal outcomes policies represent such a challenge — they call for direct intervention in the stratification order. Opportunity-enhancing policies usually promote changing individuals to better fit within the current stratification order.

Racial Attitudes

Available survey data show that whites with negative attitudes toward blacks are also less likely to support race-targeted policies (Bobo 1991; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Sears 1988). Anti-black attitudes increase opposition to school busing (Bobo 1983; Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979) affirmative action (Kluegel and Smith 1986), and other government economic policies to assist blacks (Bobo 1988; Kluegel 1990). This research underscores the influence of two broad types of racial attitudes.

One group of scholars has emphasized the role of persistent racial affect. Some note the continuing influence of "traditional" prejudice, i.e., the persistence of an overt belief in the innate inferiority of blacks and avowed support for segregation and denial of rights to blacks (Weigel and Howes 1985). Others underscore the influence of prejudice in new guises, often labeled "symbolic" or "modern" racism (Sears 1988). In this view, racial hostility is vented indirectly, e.g., agreeing with statements such as "the government pays too much attention to blacks," or to "blacks who receive welfare could get along without it if they tried" (Sears 1988, p. 57). This "modern" racism avoids expressions of overt, blatant prejudice, which are no longer acceptable.

Another group of scholars calls attention to a more cognitive dimension of racial attitudes — beliefs about the causes of racial inequality (Apostle et al. 1983; Kluegel 1990; Kluegel and Bobo forthcoming; Sniderman and Hagen 1985). Many white Americans score low on traditional prejudice, i.e., they don't favor segregation or believe that blacks are innately inferior to whites. Yet the absence of traditional prejudice does not require a person to believe that racial discrimination is a major structural impediment to advancement of blacks (Kluegel 1990). Attributing racial inequality to structural conditions is an empirically distinct dimension of racial attitudes. Capturing this dimension requires different items from those commonly employed to measure traditional prejudice and symbolic racism (Kluegel and Bobo forthcoming). Recent analyses of popular modes of explaining racial inequality by sociodemographic factors (like age and education) and over time indicate that the decline in traditional prejudice has not been accompanied by an increase in structural explanations of inequality (Kluegel 1990).

We expect that opposition to race-targeted policies is more strongly based on anti-black attitudes than is opposition to income-targeted policies because whites perceive that they may also benefit from income-targeted policies. In light of the prevalent perception that blacks are disproportionately recipients of current government aid to the poor (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Gilens 1991), the difference in the effect of anti-black attitudes remains an open question. The differential impact of anti-black attitudes on opportunity-enhancing versus equal outcomes policy also remains an open issue. However, we expect that anti-black attitudes have a stronger effect on race-targeted, equal outcomes policies than they do on opportunity-enhancing policies. Specifically, we expect that prejudiced whites will object to equal outcomes policies because they guarantee benefits to blacks, who are disliked and seen as undeserving. In contrast, opportunity-enhancing policies often have a built-in "character test" — a person must make some effort to qualify for benefits, e.g., college scholarships for blacks who have achieved good grades in secondary school. Other things being equal, prejudiced whites may feel free to support or not oppose opportunity-enhancing policies because they believe that such policies screen out perceived "undeserving" blacks.

HYPOTHESES

H_1: *Simple self-interest.* Support for race-targeted policies relative to parallel income-targeted policies is lowest among whites who would benefit the most from income-targeted policies.

H_2: *Group self-interest.* The black-white difference in support for race-targeted policies is greater than the black-white difference in support for parallel income-targeted policies.

H_3: *Stratification beliefs A.* Among whites, normative and existential stratification beliefs have a stronger effect on attitudes toward race-targeted policies than on attitudes toward parallel income-targeted policies.

H_4: *Stratification beliefs B.* Among whites, stratification beliefs have a stronger effect on attitudes toward race-targeted policies promoting equal outcomes than on attitudes toward race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies.

H_5: *Racial attitudes A.* Among whites, racial attitudes have a stronger effect on attitudes toward race-targeted policies than on attitudes toward parallel income-targeted policies.

H_6: *Racial attitudes B.* Among whites, racial prejudice has a stronger effect on attitudes toward race-targeted policies promoting equal outcomes than on attitudes toward race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies.

DATA

To test these hypotheses, we examine the effects of self-interest, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes on attitudes toward opportunity-enhancing policies and equal outcomes policies. The data are from the 1990 General Social Survey (Davis and Smith 1990). The GSS is a full probability sample of English speaking adults living in households in the continental United States. The survey covered a total of 1,372 respondents and had a response rate of 73 percent. Our analyses are based primarily on data for 1,309 respondents — 159 blacks and 1150 whites. Respondents classified as

"Other" races were excluded because of their heterogeneous racial/ethnic composition and because they were too few to support reliable sub-group analyses. Further details on sample design may be obtained from Davis and Smith (1990).

RESULTS

Attitudes Toward Policy

Three opportunity-enhancing policies and two equal outcomes policies were chosen. The three opportunity-enhancing policies are consistent with the dictum that "government's role is to help people make it on their own" (Ellwood 1988, p. 10). These policies create circumstances that, in keeping with American individualism, enable people to do a better job of providing for themselves. One policy (enterprise zones) aims to increase the availability of job opportunities; the other two policies (special school funds and college scholarships) aim to improve individual human capital by increasing educational opportunities.

For each of these three policies, parallel questions, one race-targeted (questions 1a, 2a, and 3a in Table 1) and one income-targeted (questions 1b, 2b, and 3b) were asked of random halves of the respondents. This provided an experimental comparison for assessing the impact of race-targeting. Possible responses were "strongly favor," "favor," "neither favor nor oppose," "oppose," and "strongly oppose." Responses were coded from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating strong opposition and 5 indicating strong support. The simple comparison of whites' support for policies targeted to help the poor to whites' support for policies targeted to help blacks provides an assessment of the overall effect of race. Table 1 gives the mean responses for blacks and whites to these paired questions. The rows under the heading "opportunity-enhancement indices" were calculated by averaging the scores on the three items separately for the race-targeted and income-targeted questions (see Appendix).

In general, the three policies elicited wide support. The means for the income-targeted questions concerning educational opportunity (questions 2b and 3b) are over 4.0 on a 5-point scale. (Approximately 90 percent of all respondents responded "favor" or "strongly favor" on these items; support for the proposed "enterprise zone" policy for poor areas was lower, but about 70 percent responded "favor" or "strongly favor.") Parallel race-targeted questions concerning education were also favored by majorities. However, the race-targeted policy on enterprise zones was favored or strongly favored by about 40 percent of white respondents. Mean support among whites was substantially higher for all three income-targeted policies than it was for the parallel race-

Table 1. Mean Levels of Support by Race for Race-Targeted and Income-Targeted Opportunity-Enhancing Policies: General Social Survey, 1990

Policy and Question	Blacks	Whites	*t*-test
Enterprise Zones			
1a. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in largely black areas.	3.84 (1.01)	3.12 (1.09)	5.61**
1b. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas.	3.79 (1.07)	3.72 (.98)	.49
Special School Funds			
2a. Spending more money on the schools in black neighborhoods, especially for preschool and early education programs.	4.42 (.68)	3.65 (1.04)	6.57**
2b. Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods, especially for preschool and early education programs.	4.32 (.80)	4.08 (.82)	2.32*
College Scholarships			
3a. Providing special college scholarships for black children who maintain good grades.	4.51 (.59)	3.65 (1.04)	7.33**
3b. Providing special college scholarships for children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds who maintain good grades.	4.36 (.72)	4.24 (.74)	1.31
Opportunity Enhancement Index			
Index of opportunity enhancement for blacks	4.26 (.60)	3.48 (.88)	7.64**
Index of opportunity enhancement for the poor	4.16 (.71)	4.02 (.65)	1.73
Number of cases	159	1,150	

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Ns for particular items vary due to random split balloting and non-response.

targeted policies. For whites, *t*-tests of the differences in means for the race-targeted question and income-targeted questions for each policy and for the index are all significant at $p < .01$. The percent of whites who supported ("favor" or "strongly favor") the income-targeted policies averages about 22 percent higher than the percent who support the comparable race-targeted policies.

The differences between the means for blacks and whites is significant for only one of the three income-targeted policies: Blacks express significantly more support for spending on schools in poor neighborhoods than do whites. By contrast, differences by race in mean support for all three race-targeted policies are large and statistically significant. In addition, for black respondents *t*-tests of differences in means for the race-targeted and income-targeted questions for each policy and the index reveal no significant differences. The lesser white support for race-targeted policy is distinctive and cannot be attributed to factors that influence attitudes of whites and blacks equally.

Parallel questions asked in the 1990 GSS also provide a comparison of whites' and blacks' attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted equal outcomes policy.[2] These paired questions were not asked of independent, randomly assigned halves of the sample, so no experimental manipulation is involved.[3] The questions are very similar, save that in one version of each policy the beneficiary is the poor and in the other version it is blacks. Table 2 presents the questions and mean responses separately for blacks and whites. In answer to the standard of living for blacks and the standard of living for the poor items, respondents were asked to place themselves on a five point scale. For the standard of living for blacks item, "I strongly agree the government is obligated to help blacks" defines one end of the scale (coded 5), "I strongly agree that government shouldn't give special treatment" (coded 1) defines the opposite end, and "I agree with both answers" defines the midpoint (coded 3). For the standard of living for the poor item, "I strongly agree the government should improve living standards" defines one end of the scale (coded 5), "I strongly agree that people should take care of themselves" (coded 1) defines the opposite end, and "I agree with both answers" defines the midpoint (coded 3). Possible responses to the two assistance items were "too little" (coded 3), "about right" (coded 2), and "too much" (coded 1). Thus, high values on all items represent a liberal response. Differences in the GSS response scales and in the availability of items for the same respondents prohibit constructing an index for the two equal outcomes policies.

Although these questions do not refer to a specific policy, they imply programs on the equal outcomes side of the policy spectrum. A call for efforts to "improve the standard of liv-

[2] The number of respondents who answered each question on equal outcome policies varies due to their inclusion on different randomly constituted ballots used in the 1990 GSS. The question on the standard of living of blacks was asked of all respondents; the question on the standard of living of the poor was asked of a randomly selected two-thirds of the respondents. The assistance to blacks and assistance to the poor items were asked of the same random half of the sample. See Davis and Smith (1990) for details of the ballot structure of the GSS.

[3] The random assignment of respondents to either the income-targeted or race- targeted opportunity-enhancing questions eliminated a potential response bias arising from respondents' desire to give consistent or "even-handed" answers to parallel questions (Schuman and Presser 1981). The potential for such bias of course is present for responses to the equal outcomes questions that involve a "within subjects" design. That the two pairs of questions about equal outcomes were near each other in the questionnaire heightens the potential for consistency bias. However, the GSS design makes it possible to test for such bias. Though the question on improving the standard of living for blacks was asked of all respondents, the similar question on improving the standard of living for the poor was asked of random two-thirds of them. Because the question regarding the poor was asked before the question regarding blacks, we can compare the mean response to the question on blacks for respondents who were also asked the question about the poor to the mean response to the question on blacks for respondents who were not asked about the poor. A significant difference between these two means such that support for government help to blacks is higher when the question about the poor is also asked than when it is not asked would indicate a consistency bias. However, the mean for the race-targeted question is slightly lower when the income-targeted version is asked than when it is not asked (2.37 versus 2.45), and the difference is not statistically significant. If this result generalizes to the questions on government spending on the poor and blacks, consistency bias does not seem problematic.

Table 2. Mean Levels of Support, By Race, For Race-Targeted and Income-Targeted Equal Outcomes Policies: General Social Survey, 1990

Policy and Question	Blacks	Whites	*t*-test
Improve Standard of Living of Blacks			
Some people think that blacks have been discriminated against for so long the government has a special obligation to help improve their standard of living. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to blacks. (No special treatment = 1; special treatment = 5)	3.73 (1.20)	2.40 (1.19)	13.11**
Improve Standard of Living of Poor			
Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. . . . Other people think that it is not the government's responsibility and that each person should take care of himself. (Not government's responsibility = 1; government's responsibility = 5)	3.88 (1.03)	3.12 (1.13)	6.63**
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. (Too much = 1; about right = 2; too little = 3)			
Assistance to blacks	2.78 (.44)	1.96 (.69)	10.54**
Assistance to the poor	2.91 (.29)	2.56 (.65)	4.78**

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

ing (living standards)" evokes raising minimum wages, direct transfer payments, or other means of income redistribution. Because the largest and most salient forms of current government spending to "assist" the poor or blacks — public assistance programs ("welfare") and affirmative action — may be seen as promoting equal outcomes, it can reasonably be assumed that respondents are evaluating government spending on equal outcomes policies.[4]

Table 2 shows a large gap between blacks and whites in support for the standard of living measures. Blacks show a higher mean levels of support for government efforts to improve the standard of living of both blacks and the poor, and for increased government assistance to blacks and the poor (i.e., the government is spending "too little" money).

For blacks, mean support for the parallel income-targeted and race-targeted equal outcomes items is nearly the same, while whites give significantly more mean support to the income-targeted policies. The *t*-test for the difference between means for blacks on the assistance item is significant; for whites, both *t*-tests are significant. Although only a minority of whites support strong government involvement to raise standards of living (scores "4" or "5") in general, the level of support for government help to the poor (30.6 percent) is roughly twice the percentage supporting government help to blacks (15.6 percent). Correspondingly, opposition to government help to improve the standard of living for blacks is considerably higher than opposition to improving the standard of living for the poor. About one-half of white respondents (50.5 percent) support the assertion that blacks should get no government help to

[4] Data from the 1987 General Social Survey support our assumption that these two questions were evaluated by respondents in terms of "equal outcomes." Three questions involving specific redistributive measures reducing income inequality were asked in this survey, questions proposing that government should: (1) "reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes," (2) "provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed," and (3) "provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income." Correlations between responses to our four equal outcomes items and the three redistribution items from the 1987 GSS range from .24 to .39, with an average of .28. (The average correlation among the redistribution items is .49.) Thus, consistent with our assumption, respondents who do not support income redistribution also do not support our equal outcomes items.

improve their standard of living (scores of "1" or "2"), only about one-fourth (24 percent) would deny government help to improve the standard of living of the poor.

The race differential in support for race-targeted versus income-targeted equal outcomes policies is even larger for the evaluation of government spending. Twenty-two (22) percent of whites respond that "too little" is spent on assistance to blacks, whereas 64 percent report "too little" is spent on assistance to the poor. Correspondingly, 27 percent of whites feel that "too much" is spent by the government on assistance to blacks, whereas only 9 percent feel that "too much" is spent on assistance to the poor.

In general, the mean level of support for race-targeted policies among whites is markedly lower than the mean level of support for parallel income-targeted policies. In contrast, there is little difference among blacks in mean level of support for income-targeted and race targeted policies. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the black-white differences in means for attitudes toward race-targeted policies are substantially larger than they are for attitudes toward parallel income-targeted policies.[5]

Simple Self Interest

The Simple Self-Interest Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) predicts that whites of low socioeconomic status will support income-targeted policies but not race-targeted policies because they may benefit from income-targeted policies but are excluded from race-targeted policies. Table 3 presents the results of regressions conducted to test Hypothesis 1. Race-targeted and income-targeted versions of the opportunity-enhancement index and each of the two equal outcomes items were regressed on indicators of objective and subjective socioeconomic status — i.e., family income, education, perceived social class membership, and perceived relative standing in the income distribution.[6] Together these measures let us explore potential differences by the economic class and status (prestige) dimensions of socioeconomic position. Perceived class membership may also tap self-interest in a competitive sense. Several scholars have noted a perception among working-class whites that their problems are overlooked by the government in favor of a focus on problems of blacks or other minorities (Binzen 1970; Ransford 1972; Sennett and Cobb 1972; Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972).

Because the effects of socioeconomic status may be confounded with the effects of other sociodemographic factors, we included age, gender, region (South versus non-South), and rural-urban location in the regressions.[7] Table 3 presents, for whites, partial regression coef-

[5] To test the statistical significance of the difference between black-white differences in the mean of the index of opportunity enhancement for blacks and the index of opportunity enhancement for the poor we conducted a two-way analysis of variance with race and question version (income-targeted versus race-targeted) as independent variables. A significant interaction term ($F = 23.08$, $p < .01$) indicates that the race difference in support for opportunity enhancement is smaller for the income-targeted version than for the race-targeted version. To test for the significance of the difference between black-white differences in mean support for race-targeted and income-targeted equal outcomes policies we first calculated two difference scores: (1) (improve the standard of living of blacks) minus (improve standard of living of whites), and (2) (assistance to blacks) minus (assistance to the poor). We then calculated *t*-tests for the difference in means between blacks and whites for these difference scores. Both *t*-tests were significant at $p < .01$.

[6] Income is family income in categories from under $1,000 to $60,000 or more. Education is measured in years of schooling completed from 0 to 20 or more years. Perceived social class membership is determined by the response to the question, "If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class or the upper class?" Because of the small number of "upper class" responses, they were combined with responses of "middle class." Perceived relative standing in the income distribution is measured by the response to the question, "Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?" Because of the small number choosing "far above average," these responses are combined with responses of "above average."

[7] Age is measured in years. Gender is a categorical (0,1) variable, with female = 1. Region is also a categorical variable, coded 1 for current residence in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia). Rural-urban location is represented by three categorical variables: City = 1 if

Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Support for Income-Targeted and Race-Targeted Policies on Sociodemographic Variables: White Respondents in the General Social Survey, 1990

Policy and Independent Variable	Income-Targeted Version	Race-Targeted Version
Opportunity Enhancement Index		
South	.036†	−.253*
	(.066)	(.083)
Small city/town	−.039	−.042
	(.080)	(.113)
Rural	−.091	−.186
	(.089)	(.113)
Age	−.003*	−.001
	.(002)	(.002)
Female	−.032†	.216*
	(.059)	(.077)
Low income	.052	.112
	(.091)	(.112)
Education	.025*	.041*
	(.010)	(.014)
Working class	.060†	−.213*
	(.064)	(.083)
Lower class	.116	−.213
	(.172)	(.209)
Constant	3.814	3.012
R^2	.03	.09
Improve Standard of Living		
South	−.110	−.241*
	(.095)	(.082)
Small city/town	−.110	−.082
	(.122)	(.105)
Rural	.020	−.070
	(.020)	(.111)
Age	−.012*†	−.003
	(.002)	(.002)
Female	.288*†	.092
	(.087)	(.075)
Low income	.530*	.282*
	(.129)	(.112)
Education	−.012†	.054*
	(.015)	(.013)
Working class	.106†	−.304*
	(.094)	(.081)
Lower class	.540*	.034
	(.243)	(.210)
Constant	3.573	1.976
R^2	.09	.06
Government Assistance		
South	.023†	−.233*
	(.016)	(.069)
Small city/town	.041	−.070
	(.082)	(.089)
Rural	−.102	−.087
	(.086)	(.094)
Age	−.004*	−.004*
	(.002)	(.002)
Female	.009	.090
	(.056)	(.063)
Low income	.159*	.176*
	(.087)	(.094)
Education	−.012†	.017
	(.010)	(.011)
Working class	.017	−.119
	(.063)	(.069)
Lower class	.157	−.211
	(.163)	(.177)
Constant	2.850	1.986
R^2	.03	.07

(Continued in next column)

* $p < .05$

† Indicates significant difference between coefficients at $p < .05$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

ficients for the effects of the sociodemographic variables on attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted policies. Preliminary regressions (not reported) were run to test for possible non-linearities in the effects of the four indicators of socioeconomic status. They showed that perceived relative income has no statistically significant effect on attitudes toward policies, and that the effect of income is limited to the contrast between respondents with a poverty-level family income ($10,000 or less) and respondents with higher incomes. Thus, perceived relative income is not included in the regressions, and income is represented by a categorical variable, coded 1 for respondents with family incomes of $10,000 or less and 0 otherwise. Results of a test for the significance of the difference between coefficients for the two versions of each policy are also shown in Table 3. A statistically significant dif-

the respondent lives within an SMSA; Small City/Town = 1 if the respondent does not live within an SMSA and lives in a city of population 10,000 to 49,999 or a town or village of 2,500 to 9,999 population; Rural = 1 if the respondent does not live within an SMSA and lives in an incorporated or unincorporated area of less than 2,500 population, or in open country.

ference between coefficients indicates that the difference in support for income-targeted and race-targeted policy is larger for the groups defined by the specific variable than for others.[8]

The difference between the partial effects of education on attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted equal outcomes policies (improve standard of living and government assistance) is significant. Net of the effects of other variables, education has little to no effect on support for two of the three income-targeted policies, but support for improving the standard of living for blacks increases significantly with increasing years of education. Members of the self-identified working class, net of other factors, are more opposed on average to race-targeted policies than are self-identified members of other classes, but there are no significant effects of working class identification on support for the three income-targeted policies. Income effects do not follow a pattern indicating differential self-interest. Although low income respondents are more supportive of income-targeted policies, they are also more supportive of race-targeted equal outcomes policies than are higher income groups.

Urban-rural location has no statistically significant effects. Gender differences do not form a consistent pattern. Region and age, however, do have consistent effects. Though respondents from the South and other regions do not differ significantly on average in support for income-targeted policies, southerners express significantly less support for the three race-targeted policies than do non-southerners. Younger respondents are significantly more likely to support income-targeted policy than older ones, but except for government assistance to blacks, there are no significant differences among the young and the old in support for race-targeted policies.

In sum, results to this point give clear support to the Group Self-Interest Hypothesis (Hypothesis 2); mixed support is given for the Simple Self-Interest Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). Among whites, the shift from income-targeted to race-targeted policy consistently results in proportionately larger shifts toward opposition to race-targeted policy among the less educated, the self-identified working class, and those from the South, but not among the lower-income group.

Stratification Beliefs and Racial Attitudes

The above results are also consistent with explanations of attitudes toward race-targeted policies that stress the differential influence of stratification beliefs and racial attitudes. Prior research has found that traditional racial prejudice is higher in the South than elsewhere, that it decreases with increasing years of education, and that it is higher among whites than blacks. Prior research also has shown modest tendencies for racial attitudes of all kinds to be more liberal outside the South and to become more liberal with increasing education (Schuman et al. 1988). Also, adherence to aspects of American stratification ideology varies substantially by socioeconomic status and race (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Relevant to our concerns, explanations for poverty become less individualistic with increasing education, and structural attri-

[8] To test for the statistical significance of the difference between regression coefficients in equations predicting support for opportunity-enhancing policies, we added a categorical (1,0) variable for question version (income-targeted versus race-targeted) and terms for the product of this variable with each of the determinants in the equations. To provide an equivalent test for the significance of the difference between regression coefficients for the income-targeted and race-targeted versions of the two equal outcomes policies, we regressed difference scores for the pairs of parallel items on the independent variables in Tables 3 and 4: (improve standard of living of blacks) minus (improve standard of living for the poor) and (assistance to the poor) minus (assistance to black). The equivalence is best understood in an example using one independent variable. When the two regression coefficients for a given independent variable from the separately estimated equations for the parallel race-targeted and income-targeted versions are equal, this indicates that the slopes of the two best-fitting regression lines are equal. The distance between these lines (i.e., the mean of the difference score) at any value of the independent variable will be a constant. Accordingly, a regression of the difference score on this independent variable will have a value of 0, because the covariation between a variable and a constant is 0. Also, in all but two cases, a significant difference in coefficients from the regressions for the equal outcomes policies emerges when a variable has a significant effect on one version of the policy but not on the other. In one of these two cases the partial regression coefficient for the independent variable on the race-targeted dependent variable is large and three times the value of the coefficient for the income-targeted dependent variable. Thus, the differences are substantively significant.

butions are less common among high-income persons. In addition, blacks endorse structural explanations for poverty much more often than do whites. If race-targeted policies elicit opposition on the basis of prejudice and other racial beliefs and attitudes while income-targeted policies face little or no opposition on racial grounds, then the effects of socioeconomic status and race on attitudes toward income-targeted versus race-targeted policies would differ. Operationally, these claims imply interaction effects such that stratification beliefs and racial attitudes have a clear impact on support for race-targeted policies, but a markedly smaller impact on support for income-targeted policies. In other words, if Hypothesis 3 (Stratification Beliefs A) and Hypothesis 5 (Racial Attitudes A) hold, then the initial evidence for simple self-interest and group self-interest effects may be totally or partially spurious.

Table 4 presents regression analysis results testing Hypotheses 3 through 6. Because these hypotheses concern effects among whites, regressions were estimated only for whites. We employ five indices, three concerning stratification beliefs and two concerning racial beliefs and attitudes. The Structuralism Index involves beliefs attributing poverty to structural causes. The Individualism Index involves beliefs attributing poverty to individual (i.e., personal) causes. The Equity Index measures the perceived fairness and necessity of income inequality. The Prejudice Index measures racial stereotyping of the type commonly included in definitions of "anti-black prejudice." The Discrimination Index measures the perceived degree to which blacks' opportunities for jobs and housing are restricted by discrimination. (Details of index construction for each measure are given in the Appendix).

We also employ a single item that attributes the black-white gap in socioeconomic status to a lack of effort on the part of blacks (Motivation). Prior research has established that such "motivational individualism" (Kluegel 1990) not only is an independent of traditional prejudice and perceived discrimination, but that many whites attribute the black-white gap in socioeconomic status to both discrimination and a lack of motivation or will power on the part of blacks (Kluegel 1990; Kluegel and Bobo forthcoming). Thus our measures span the major affective (traditional prejudice and symbolic racism) and cognitive dimensions (perceived discrimination) of racial attitudes.

Consistent with prevailing assumptions, we assume the direction of causation to flow from stratification beliefs and racial attitudes to attitudes toward policies. This assumption is supported by findings that such general beliefs and affect are acquired in early childhood (Simmons and Rosenberg 1971; Sears 1975; Leahy 1983), whereas attitudes toward policies are formed in late adolescence and early adulthood (Torney-Purta 1983). We also consider Structuralism and Individualism to be logically prior to Discrimination and Motivation, in the sense that Structuralism and Individualism are general dispositions toward explaining inequality from which explanations of black-white socioeconomic differences are in part derived. Although Discrimination and Motivation are shaped by beliefs about stratification, they also have racial content that goes beyond general attributions for poverty, and thus we include both stratification beliefs and Discrimination and Motivation.[9]

Prejudice is also considered causally prior to Discrimination and Motivation. Prejudiced whites are likely to reject explanations that attribute poverty among blacks to discrimination and to affirm explanations citing individual failings on the part of blacks. The regressions in Table 4 correspond to this causal ordering: Model 1 for the income-targeted and race-targeted versions of the policies gives the "semi-reduced form" effects of Structuralism, Individualism, Equity, and Prejudice, i.e., the total direct and indirect effects of these variables through Discrimination and Motivation on attitudes toward policies. Model 2 adds Discrimination and Motivation to Model 1.

Model 1 in Table 4 indicates that the effects of stratification beliefs on attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted policies are essentially equal, i.e., with one exception (Equity on the income-targeted version of Improve Standard of Living) differences between the regression coefficients are not statistically sig-

[9] We tested the hypothesis that the indicators of Structuralism and Discrimination represent a single underlying factor, i.e., they are alternative indicators of a general structuralism. The results do not support this hypothesis ($\chi^2 = 419.43$, 9 d.f., $p < .001$; adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .74). A two-factor model is needed to achieve an acceptable fit to correlations among the six items analyzed.

Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Support for Income-Targeted and Race-Targeted Policies on Stratification Beliefs, Racial Attitudes, and Other Independent Variables: White Respondents in the General Social Survey, 1990

Policy and Independent Variable	Income-Targeted Version		Race-Targeted Version	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Opportunity Enhancement Index				
South	.061† (.065)	.079 (.065)	−.210* (.083)	−.130 (.081)
Small city/ town	−.014 (.079)	−.011 (.079)	−.026 (.112)	−.061 (.109)
Rural	−.085 (.088)	−.085 (.088)	−.195 (.112)	−.215* (.108)
Age	−.001 (.002)	−.001 (.002)	−.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Female	−.007† (.059)	−.014† (.059)	.169* (.077)	.163* (.075)
Low income	−.017 (.091)	−.027 (.090)	.050 (.112)	.060 (.109)
Education	.024* (.010)	.018 (.011)	.032* (.014)	.026* (.014)
Working class	.039† (.064)	.035† (.035)	−.205* (.083)	−.176* (.080)
Lower class	−.031 (.173)	−.008 (.172)	−.265 (.206)	−.219 (.200)
Structuralism	.199* (.056)	.162*† (.058)	.177* (.070)	.052 (.071)
Individualism	−.007 (.054)	.005 (.055)	−.151* (.068)	−.043 (.068)
Equity	.105 (.052)	.122* (.053)	−.039 (.070)	.027 (.069)
Prejudice	−.119* (.039)	−.119* (.040)	−.077 (.047)	−.045 (.046)
Discrimination	—	.137*† (.042)	—	.278* (.054)
Motivation	—	.029† (.068)	—	−.283* (.086)
Constant	3.198	2.898	3.212	2.545
R^2	.08	.10	.13	.20
Improve Standard of Living				
South	−.057 (.091)	−.044 (.091)	−.155* (.078)	−.056 (.076)
Small city/ town	−.049 (.116)	−.049 (.116)	−.027 (.100)	−.041 (.096)
Rural	.031 (.122)	.035 (.122)	−.085 (.106)	−.090 (.101)
Age	−.009*† (.002)	−.009*† (.002)	.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Female	.233*† (.083)	.335*† (.082)	.020 (.072)	.009 (.069)
Low income	.395* (.125)	.396* (.124)	.131 (.107)	.125 (.103)
Education	−.013† (.015)	-.016† (.015)	.037* (.013)	.022 (.013)
Working class	.073† (.090)	.074† (.089)	−.308* (.077)	−.295* (.074)
Lower class	.371 (.232)	.372 (.231)	−.176 (.200)	−.095 (.192)
Structuralism	.631* (.077)	.595* (.080)	.600* (.067)	.421* (.067)
Individualism	−.184* (.075)	−.148* (.076)	−.176* (.065)	−.068 (.063)
Equity	.001† (.075)	.019† (.075)	−.149* (.065)	−.076 (.062)
Prejudice	−.005† (.052)	.023† (.053)	−.214* (.045)	−.168* (.044)
Discrimination	—	.011† .059)	—	.438* (.049)
Motivation	—	−.206* (.095)	—	−.242* (.079)
Constant	2.542	2.587	1.778	.839
R^2	.18	.19	.17	.25
Government Assistance				
South	.052† (.061)	.077† (.062)	−.183* (.066)	−.128 (.064)
Small city/ town	.076 (.079)	.073 (.078)	−.040 (.084)	−.048 (.081)
Rural	−.092 (.083)	−.081 (.082)	−.092 (.089)	−.097 (.085)
Age	−.002 (.002)	−.002 (.002)	−.001 (.002)	−.001 (.002)
Gender (1 = female)	−.025 (.056)	−.028 (.056)	.049 (.060)	.043 (.058)
Income	.096 (.084)	.095 (.084)	.093 (.090)	.090 (.086)
Education	−.014 (.010)	−.018 (.010)	.006 (.011)	−.002 (.011)
Working class (1 = yes)	.005 (.061)	.009 (.060)	−.117 (.065)	−.110 (.063)
Lower class (1 = yes)	.070 (.157)	.086 (.156)	−.328* (.168)	−.282* (.161)
Structuralism	.341* (.052)	.292* (.054)	.319* (.056)	.223* (.056)
Individualism	−.112* (.051)	−.077 (.052)	−.104* (.054)	−.051 (.054)
Equity	−.060 (.051)	−.038 (.051)	−.107* (.054)	−.068 (.052)
Prejudice	.021† (.035)	.042† (.036)	−.135* (.038)	−.114* (.037)
Discrimination	—	.089*† (.040)	—	.250* (.041)
Motivation	—	−.131* (.064)	—	−.096 (.066)
Constant	2.362	2.210	2.028	1.477
R^2	.13	.15	.18	.25

(Continued in next column)

* $p < .05$

† Indicates significant difference between coefficients at $p < .05$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

nificant. Hypothesis 3, then, is not supported. Hypothesis 4, however, is supported. As predicted, Equity has statistically significant effects on whites' attitudes toward both race-targeted equal outcomes policies, but has no effect on whites' attitudes toward either version of the opportunity-enhancement policies. As indicated by the changes in R^2 after adding these variables to the regression equations, Structuralism and Individualism have a stronger effect on attitudes toward equal outcomes policies than on attitudes toward opportunity-enhancing policies. To calculate the joint effect of Structuralism and Individualism alone on attitudes toward race-targeted policies, we estimated regression models including the sociodemographic variables of Table 3 and Structuralism and Individualism only (excluding Equity, Prejudice, Discrimination and Motivation). Comparing the R^2 from these equations to their counterparts in Table 3 we find that Structuralism and Individualism add nine and seven percent respectively to explained variance in the race-targeted versions of Improve Standard of Living and Government Assistance. They add only three percent to explained variance in the race-targeted version of attitudes toward opportunity-enhancing policies.

Hypotheses 5 is clearly confirmed. Results for Model 2 indicate that Discrimination has markedly stronger and significantly different effects on attitudes toward all three race-targeted policies than on the parallel income-targeted policies. Motivation has a stronger effect on whites' attitudes toward race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies than on attitudes toward the parallel income-targeted policies.

Hypothesis 6 also holds. Whereas Prejudice has no statistically significant effect on whites' attitudes toward race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies, its effects on both race-targeted equal outcomes policies are significant.

Self-Interest Revisited

Model 2 in Table 4 also indicates that the differential (total) effects of region and education on attitudes toward opportunity-enhancing policies noted in Table 3 are largely accounted for by the differential impact of racial attitudes. In Model 2, South no longer has a statistically significant effect on attitudes toward any of the race-targeted versions of policies, and Education's effects are either greatly reduced or not significant. The effect of perceived working class membership, however, remains after controlling for the effects of stratification beliefs and racial attitudes. Thus, these results lend only limited support for the simple self-interest hypothesis. Is the initial support for the group self-interest hypothesis also reduced when we consider the impact of racial attitudes and other factors?

Do whites oppose race-targeted policies more than blacks after adjusting for black-white differences in sociodemographic characteristics, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes? If the larger black-white difference in support for race-targeted policies compared to support for income-targeted policies holds after adjusting for black-white differences in these variables, then strong evidence for group self-interest is indicated. Such findings imply that many whites oppose race-targeted policies only because they do not benefit their own group.

"Decomposing" mean differences (Jones and Kelley 1984), we compare black-white differences in mean support for income-targeted and race-targeted policies after adjusting for compositional differences, i.e., differences in sociodemographic factors, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes. Before adjusting for composition, however, we first address the question of whether attitudes toward policies are determined by the same factors among blacks and whites. If the effects of predictor variables are the same for both groups, then it is a straightforward matter to adjust for group differences — we need simply apply the black-white differences in mean values of sociodemographic variables, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes to the regression coefficients estimated in either the black or white sample. If they differ, however, then the choice of a comparison group for such a regression standardization must be made on theoretical grounds (Jones and Kelley 1984).

If such race differences are present in determinants of attitudes toward policies, it is debatable whether means for white respondents should be applied to the regression coefficients estimated for black respondents. In part, group self-interest may be manifested through weaker effects of socioeconomic status, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes among blacks than are found among whites, perhaps attributable to a sense of group solidarity among blacks. The question then becomes: Do whites oppose race-

targeted policies more strongly than do blacks after adjusting for the weaker effects of these variables and for compositional differences?

The small number of black respondents in the sample (159) overall reduces our ability to make reliable tests of black-white differences in partial regression coefficients. This problem is compounded by the even smaller number of blacks responding to particular items (a minimum of roughly 80) due to the split ballot design employed. We can only provide reasonably reliable estimates of the effects of sociodemographic characteristics, stratification beliefs and racial attitudes on the race-targeted version of Improving the Standard of Living which is available for all black respondents.

Results for Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 5 indicate statistically significant differences between blacks and whites in the influence of sociodemographic variables.[10] In particular, among blacks there is no effect of working class identification on support for Improving the Standard of Living for Blacks, although there is an effect among whites. Also, the significant effect of Education among blacks is opposite to the effect among whites. Opposition to Improving the Standard of Living for Blacks increases among blacks with increasing years of education.

On the other hand, Model 2 indicates that the effects of stratification beliefs and racial attitudes are much the same for blacks and whites. The only significant difference between coefficients for blacks and whites occurs for Motivation — this variable has no effect among blacks.

Since stratification beliefs and racial attitudes have substantially stronger effects on attitudes toward policy than do sociodemographic variables, the similar effects of stratification beliefs and racial attitudes for blacks and whites suggest that estimating the compositional components using the equations for whites will not differ much from estimating these components using the equations for blacks. Table 6 presents the results.

The top panel provides adjusted black-white mean differences calculated by applying black-white differences in the means of predictor variables to the regression equations for whites (Table 4, Model 2) for the effects of sociodemographic characteristics, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes on each policy. The bottom panel provides adjusted means calculated by applying black-white differences in the means of predictor variables to the regression equation for blacks for the effects of sociodemographic characteristics, stratification

Table 5. Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Support for Improving the Standard of Living for Blacks on Sociodemographic Variables, Stratification Beliefs, and Racial Attitudes: Black Respondents in the General Social Survey, 1990

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2
South	−.276	−.118
	(.210)	(.203)
Small city/town	−.239	−.097
	(.372)	(.348)
Rural	−.147	.222
	(.355)	(.347)
Age	−.002	−.000
	(.006)	(.006)
Gender (1 = female)	−.181	−.132
	(.195)	(.189)
Income (1 = <$10,000)	−.235†	−.423*†
	(.248)	(.237)
Education	−.062*†	−.079*†
	(.033)	(.032)
Working class (1 = yes)	.033†	.017†
	(.209)	(.196)
Lower class (1 = yes)	−.102	−.220
	(.399)	(-.05)
Structuralism	—	.581*
		(.219)
Individualism	—	−.135
		(.165)
Equity	—	.063
		(.181)
Prejudice	—	−.126
		(.135)
Discrimination	—	.529*
		(.174)
Motivation	—	.080†
		(.219)
Constant	4.976	1.864
R^2	.05	.21

* $p < .05$

† Indicates significant difference between black-white coefficients at $p < .05$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[10] To test the significance of the difference between regression coefficients for blacks and whites, we estimated regression equations including a categorical (0,1) variable for race and terms for the product of race with each of the other determinants of attitudes toward Improve Standard of Living for Blacks (Table 5).

Table 6. Regression Standardization: Decompositions of Black-White Mean Differences in Support for Policies, General Social Survey, 1990

	Observed Black-White Difference	Adjusted Mean Difference	Percent Unexplained
USING REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR WHITES			
Opportunity enhancement for:			
Blacks	.78	.56	71.8
Poor	.14	−.10	−41.7
Improve standard of living for:			
Blacks	1.33	.80	60.1
Poor	.76	.30	39.5
Government assistance to:			
Blacks	.82	.52	63.4
Poor	.35	.12	34.3
USING REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR BLACKS			
Improve standard of living for blacks	1.33	.71	53.4

Note: The "adjusted mean difference" is calculated by subtracting the composition component from the observed black-white difference. The "percent unexplained" is calculated by dividing the adjusted mean difference by the observed black-white difference (and multiplying by 100).

beliefs and racial attitudes on Improve Standard of Living for Blacks (Table 5, Model 2).[11] The black-white difference in adjusted means for Improve Standard of Living For Blacks estimated using the equation for whites is slightly larger than that estimated using the equation for blacks. Nevertheless, it supports using the equations for whites to estimate adjusted mean differences. Lacking reliable estimates of the determinants of attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted policies among blacks, we can take the results using the equations for whites as a somewhat liberal but reasonable estimate of the influence of group self-interest.

The adjusted means in Table 6 clearly favor Hypothesis 2. A comparison of the adjusted mean differences in Table 6 with the observed (i.e., raw or "unadjusted") mean differences in Tables 1 and 2 shows that the same pattern of black-white differences in attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted policies appears in each. The "percent unexplained" gives the difference between the raw mean differences and adjusted black-white mean difference as a percent of the raw or "observed" difference. It provides an estimate of how much of the black-white difference in means remains after removing compositional differences in sociodemographic status, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes. Whereas the majority of the black-white mean difference in attitudes toward income-targeted policies is accounted for by compositional differences (roughly 60 to 65 percent), much less of the difference in attitudes toward race-targeted policies is explained by compositional differences. About 30 to 50 percent of the black-white mean difference in attitudes toward race-targeted policies is accounted for by compositional differences. If we interpret the unexplained black-white mean difference in attitudes toward race-targeted policies as due to group self-interest, there is evidence for a strong group self-interest effect.

CONCLUSIONS

Many social policies put forward over the past several decades to improve the conditions of African-Americans have faced opposition and controversy. Disputes over race-targeted policies persist despite an apparent steady decline in the traditional anti-black prejudice and bigotry associated with Jim Crow racism. To unravel this paradox, we sought to better specify when and why race-targeting undermines popular support for a public policy. Our results show that race-targeting diminishes whites' support for social policies across the policy spectrum. Race-targeting reduces support for opportunity-enhancing policies by about 22 percent on average relative to similar income-targeted policies. The impact of race-targeting is even larger when comparing policies that lean toward equalizing outcomes for blacks and whites.

The reasons for the effects of race-targeting are complicated. The salience of different factors hinges primarily on race-targeting versus income-targeting of policies, and to a limited degree on whether a policy is opportunity en-

[11] The "composition" estimates in Table 6 were obtained by subtracting the mean for blacks on each of the sociodemographic variables, stratification beliefs, and racial attitudes from the corresponding mean for whites, and multiplying the result by the corresponding regression coefficient in Table 4 (the top panel of Table 6) or Table 5 (the bottom panel of Table 6). The "adjusted means" (Table 6) are obtained by subtracting the estimated composition component from the observed (raw) difference in black-white mean support for a policy.

hancing or promotes equal outcomes. In general, the results give little support for the individual self-interest interpretation of these differences. The tendency of respondents with low education to express stronger support for income-targeted policies than for race-targeted policies is accounted for by the association of education with racial attitudes.

Group self-interest, however, has potent effects on support for policies. The effect of perceived working class membership is one aspect of group self-interest — part of the reason for opposition to race-targeted policies is the sense that race-targeted policies benefit blacks to the exclusion of problems of working-class whites. The strongest aspect of group self-interest seems to be a straightforward calculation by whites that members of their own group will not benefit. Our estimate of group self-interest is based on a residual, and may be somewhat liberal because we have relied primarily on regression equations estimated for whites. As with any residual, caution must be exercised in interpreting it, but in the absence of other explanations and given the many status and attitudinal variables we considered, it seems readily interpretable as a defense of group interest (Bobo 1988).

Stratification beliefs do not account for the greater opposition to race-targeted policies. Existential and normative stratification beliefs are important for shaping attitudes toward policies. The importance given to structural explanations of poverty (i.e., whether one sees limited opportunities as causing inequality) substantially affects attitudes toward income-targeted and race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies and equal outcomes policies. However, since structuralism and other stratification beliefs equally influence attitudes toward parallel income-targeted and race-targeted policies, they cannot explain why race-targeted policy is less popular than income-targeted policies.

Stratification beliefs play a role in the greater support for race-targeted opportunity-enhancing over race-targeted equal outcomes policies; through the substantially smaller (or absent) effect of stratification beliefs on attitudes toward opportunity enhancement policy than on attitudes toward equal outcomes policy. The greater support among whites of opportunity-enhancing policies compared to equal outcomes policies reflects the greater consistency of opportunity-enhancing policies with the commitment to equity and the perceived fairness of the stratification order that prevail in public opinion.

Consistent with our hypothesis, race-targeted policies elicit stronger effects of racial attitudes than do income-targeted policies. Although attitudes toward income-targeted equal outcomes policies are largely unaffected by racial attitudes, these attitudes do affect attitudes toward income-targeted opportunity-enhancing policy. We can only speculate about why this is so. Perhaps the popularity of income-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies leaves only those who hold strongly anti-black prejudices expressing opposition. Along the same lines, use of terms like "poor and high unemployment areas" or "economically disadvantaged" may have strong racial cónnotations for some respondents.

Of the racial attitudes, perceived discrimination has the strongest impact. Discrimination plays a large role in explaining the difference in support for income-targeted and race-targeted policies. Prejudice and attributing black-white differences in socioeconomic status to lack of motivation also have effects, although these effects are less consistent and are uniformly smaller in magnitude than those for perceived discrimination. The relative lack of support among whites for race-targeted policies reflects their markedly less pronounced perception of discrimination. For example, 72 percent of blacks attribute the black-white gap in socioeconomic status "mainly" to discrimination compared to only 36 percent of whites; 54 percent of blacks see "a lot" of discrimination in jobs compared to only 24 percent of whites. These results may be "theory driven" in that perceiving discrimination challenges the legitimacy of the broader system from which whites' relative privilege derives. If so, perceived discrimination may be a rationalization of group self-interest. Alternatively, the black-white difference in perceived discrimination may be "experience driven," as many whites simply have not experienced the discrimination encountered by blacks.

In sum, race-targeting matters, and it matters more when the policy leans toward assuring equal outcomes for blacks and whites. The reasons for these effects are largely traceable to group self-interest, to group perspectives on the nature of black-white inequality, and to a lesser degree to racial prejudice.

These results modify current theories at several levels. These results strongly caution against what Allport (1954) once termed "simple and sovereign" explanations. No single factor, such as prejudice, can account for the patterns we observed. Our results highlight the complexity of the policy choices now being debated, the effects of different dimensions of racial attitudes, and the unique interplay of factors that shape public responses to specific policies. Public opinion on how to deal with racial inequality has multiple sources.

Our results also raise questions about the central importance claimed for racial affect in opposition to race-targeted and general social welfare policies. Prejudice has no independent effect on attitudes toward race-targeted opportunity-enhancing policies. The cognitive dimension of racial attitudes (i.e., beliefs about discrimination) has stronger effects on the policy views we examined than does racial affect (i.e., prejudice or attributing black-white differences in socioeconomic status to lack of motivation). And as noted above, general beliefs and values about economic inequality shape whites' views on policies.

Our results cast serious doubt on the validity of classifying any items measuring attitudes toward policy as a measure of racism or prejudice. Some of the early work on symbolic racism used anti-affirmative action attitudes and anti-economic assistance to blacks attitudes as direct indicators of racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Citrin 1985). Given the multiple influences shaping these views and the dependence of the correlates of attitudes toward policies on the type of policy in question, it seems inappropriate to equate attitudes toward a given policy with racism.

Of course, neither public opinion nor policymaking are static processes. Gamson and colleagues (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987) suggested that dynamic "issue cultures" develop around affirmative action and social welfare policies of the type we examined. Issue cultures involve competing ways of framing the issues. Such frames involve metaphors, phrases, and other symbols that evoke an interpretive slant on an issue. The success of a frame, they suggested, turns on the activities of those sponsoring the frame (especially as they compete with sponsors of alternative frames), media packaging, and the cultural resonance of frame elements.

In effect our experiments test the mass appeal of different policy frames. The degree of success of any policy to ameliorate racial inequality turns in part on public opinion (Burstein 1985). Equally important are competition among sponsors of different frames and how the media "frames" the issue for the public at large (Iyengar 1990).

Our research suggests that framing policy as "opportunity enhancing" — even if it is race-targeted — is a politically viable approach. On the other hand, our research also points to the need to address the denial of contemporary racial discrimination and sense of group self-interest prevalent among whites if policies addressing persistent racial inequities are to be pursued. These factors are strong potential political "weapons" in the battle over "frames."

On a methodological note, the experimental items we used allowed us to simulate central aspects of ongoing theoretical (Schuman and Bobo 1988) and political debates (Kinder and Sanders 1990). The method helped to identify supporters and opponents of specific policies and the cultural resonances (or hurdles) that policy advocates must address. No single attitude or predisposition guides white Americans' responses to policies addressing racial inequality. Different policies create different coalitions of supporters. Policies also vary in the type and degree of cultural resonance they arouse (Hassenfeld and Rafferty 1989). These processes should be the subject of direct empirical investigation, and survey-based experiments are an important vehicle for such research.

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Appendix: Methods of Index Construction

Policy Attitudes

Polychoric correlations (generated using PRELIS [Joreskog and Sorbom 1989]) among the respective race-targeted and income-targeted policy attitude items are given in Appendix Table A-1. For both race-targeted and income-targeted attitudes, the three opportunity-enhancing items (items 1, 2, 3) are highly intercorrelated. In addition, tests for the equality of factor structures show that a model assuming equal loadings and equal error variances for the parallel income-targeted and race-targeted versions of the opportunity-enhancing items fits well ($\chi^2 = 15.67$, d.f. = 3, $p = .01$, goodness-of-fit index = .993). This supports constructing the index used in our regression analyses.

In addition, the correlations between the opportunity-enhancing items and the equal outcomes items (4, and 5) are substantially smaller than those within the opportunity-enhancing items. In neither the race-targeted ($\chi^2 = 183.78$, d.f. = 5, $p = .000$) nor the income-targeted ($\chi^2 = 23.72$, d.f. = 2, $p = .000$) cases does a single factor model account for the correlations among the opportunity-enhancing and equal outcomes items. This is consistent with our argument that opportunity-enhancing and equal outcomes policies are evaluated differently.

Stratification Beliefs

Seven items were used to form three indices measuring stratification beliefs. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of four possible reasons "why there are poor people in this country": the lack of good schools (Schools), the failure of industry to provide enough jobs (Jobs), loose morals and drunkenness (Morals), and lack of effort by the poor (Effort). The fifth item asked respondents for their strength of agreement or disagreement with the statement "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." The sixth and seventh items concern the justice of economic inequality. Respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with two statements: "Only if differences in income are large enough is there an incentive for individual effort" (Incentive), and "No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers" (Study). Wordings and response formats for these five items and all other items we used are available in the *General Social Survey, 1972–1990: Cumulative Codebook* (Davis and Smith, 1990).

Following prior research (cf. Kluegel and Smith 1986) we formed three indices from the seven items: Structuralism is the average of responses for Schools, Jobs, and Opportunity. Individualism is the average of responses for Morals and Effort. Equity is the average of Incentive and Study. Roughly 10 percent of respondents answered "don't know" to the Incentive question. To minimize the effect of missing data, these respondents were assigned the score for their response to the Study question. For the Structuralism and Individualism indices, respondents were assigned a code for missing data if any of the constituent items had a missing data code. On average, for each of these three composites and the two described below, 5 percent or fewer of the cases were assigned missing data codes.

Racial Attitudes

Several items in the 1990 General Social Survey could be used to measure racial prejudice. Two of the commonly used items — attitudes toward legal prohibition of racial intermarriage and toward the right to practice residential segregation against blacks — were available for only two-thirds of the cases. To maximize the power of statistical tests, we employed only those items available for all respondents.

One item involves attributing the black-white gap in socioeconomic status to a lack of "inborn ability to learn" (Ability). Five items are part of a question concerning "characteristics" of groups. These five items consist of respon-

Table A-1. Polychoric Correlations Among Attitude Items: General Social Survey, 1990

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in [largely black areas] [poor and high unemployment areas].	—	.51	.41	−.03	—
(2) Spending more money on the schools in [black] [poor] neighborhoods, especially for preschool and early education programs.	.60	—	.66	.21	—
(3) Providing special college scholarships for [black] children [from economically poor backgrounds] who maintain good grades.	.60	.73	—	.21	—
(4) Improving the standard of living for [blacks] [the poor].	.30	.38	.39	—	.29
(5) Government spending to assist [blacks] [the poor].	.35	.49	.54	.52	—

Note: Correlations above the diagonal are for the income-targeted version of the question; correlations below the diagonal are for the race-targeted version of the question. Correlations between the government assistance to the poor item and income-targeted opportunity-enhancing items (1, 2, and 3) could not be calculated because they were not asked of the same respondents.

dents' ratings of each of several groups' on a seven-point scale with the following endpoints: (1) hard-working–lazy (Lazy); (2) violence-prone–not violence prone (Violent): (3) unintelligent–intelligent (Intelligent); (4) self-supporting–live off welfare (Welfare); and (5) patriotic–unpatriotic (Patriotic). Because by definition whites' anti-black prejudice (Pettigrew 1982) involves attributing less positive characteristics to blacks than to whites, we computed five difference scores by subtracting ratings assigned to blacks from ratings assigned to whites. A high score on the resultant items indicates a perception that whites possess more of a favorable trait than do blacks (cf. Bobo and Kluegel 1991).

To some extent the ratings of traits may be nonevaluative, descriptive assessments of actual group differences rather than indicate prejudice. Three considerations argue that they are more likely to indicate prejudice. First, the wording of the questions explicitly calls for a judgment about positive or negative personality traits rather than a report of social facts. For example the question on welfare expressly asks respondents whether blacks "*prefer* to be self-supporting" or "*prefer* to live off welfare." Second, these items are highly internally consistent, with an average correlation of about .4 among them. Also, the average correlation between the ratings and attributing the black-white gap in socioeconomic status to a lack of "in-born ability to learn" is .31. Expressing a belief that blacks are innately inferior to whites, of course, is commonly recognized as indicating racial prejudice. Third, these items correlate with other common indicators of prejudice. The average correlation between these six items and attitudes toward legal prohibition of racial intermarriage (Racial Intermarriage) and toward the right to practice residential segregation against blacks (Racial Segregation) is .27. In addition, we have run all the regressions reported in this paper with a summed index formed from averaging responses to Racial Intermarriage and Racial Segregation. The results of these regressions are the same in all important respects as those in Table 4. Finally, the summed index of prejudice based on the ratings of traits behaves the same as the index constructed from Racial Intermarriage and Racial Segregation when regressed on sociodemographic variables.

We employed three items tapping perceived discrimination against blacks. The first item involves agreeing or denying that the black-white gap in socioeconomic status gap is "mainly due to discrimination" (General Discrimination). The second and third items concern assessments of the amount of discrimination (on a scale from "a lot" to "none at all") blacks face in "getting good jobs" (Job Discrimination) and in buying or renting "housing wherever they want" (Housing Discrimination).

Based on previous analyses of the same or similar items (Kluegel and Bobo forthcoming; Kluegel 1990), we formed two indices from these nine items for racial attitudes. Prejudice averages Ability, Lazy, Violent, Intelligent, Welfare, and Patriotic. Discrimination averages General Discrimination, Job Discrimination, and Housing Discrimination. For Prejudice, respondents with missing data for two or fewer items were assigned the average of the four or more items for which data were available. If data were missing for more than two items, a "missing data" code was assigned for the Prejudice index. For Discrimination, respondents were assigned a code for missing data if any of the three constituent items had a code for missing data.

Confirmatory factor analyses strongly validate our grouping of items to form the above indices for stratification beliefs and racial attitudes. Results of these analyses and other details of index construction are available from the authors.

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