Research on American Nationalism: Review of the Literature, Annotated Bibliography, and Directory of Publicly Available Data Sets

Bart Bonikowski
Princeton University
May 1, 2008

With a Preface by Paul DiMaggio

Financial support from the Russell Sage Foundation, and helpful advice in identifying the relevant scholarly literature from Rogers Brubaker, Andrew Perrin, Wendy Rahn, Paul Starr, and Bob Wuthnow, are gratefully acknowledged.
Preface

Bart Bonikowski has produced an invaluable resource for scholars and students interested in American nationalism. His essay reviewing the literature in the field, the annotated bibliography that follows, and the inventory of data sets useful for the study of American nationalism constitute a sort of starter kit for anyone interested in exploring this field.

As Mr. Bonikowski points out, relatively few scholars have addressed “American nationalism” explicitly. Much research on nationalism takes as its object movements based on a fiction of consanguinity, and even work that focuses on “civic” or “creedal” nationalism has often treated the United States as a marginal case. Indeed, part of the U.S.’s civic nationalist creed is to deny that there is such a thing as “American nationalism.” Americans, so the story goes, are patriotic; nationalism is foreign and exotic, something for Europe or the global South.

The reality, of course, is not so simple. Both historical and social-scientific research demonstrates a strong tradition of ethnocultural nationalism in the U.S., providing evidence that Americans of other than European descent have often been perceived as less fully “American” than white Christians of northern European origin. Moreover, nationalism need not be defined solely in ethnocultural terms. Mr. Bonikowski’s working definition – “the self-understanding of individuals and groups framed in terms of their membership in a broader collectivity coterminous with the territorial, social, and legal boundaries of an actual or potential nation-state” – suggests that research on nationalism must take as its focus a broad range of sentiments, ideas, and forms of discourse that contribute to the persistence of a nation-state. However one chooses to define nationalism, if we are to understand how events influence identification with the nation-state,
the social construction of legitimate national membership, and the emergence of political movements that use national symbols as rallying points – and how these, in turn, influence changes in the U.S.’s political landscape and public policies – a broad focus is essential.

One of the key lessons of the literature that Mr. Bonikowski reviews is about the vast range of ways in which Americans have imagined the nation in which they reside, a diversity noted not only by historians who have traced change over time, but by social scientists who explore contemporary variation among persons and groups. It follows from this that any particular definition of nationalism will, in effect, cause researchers to make the fundamental error of selecting observations on the dependent variable. Instead, we must ask how ideas about the nation vary among groups, among social contexts, and over time.

Another key lesson is that discourse about the nation, and especially about legitimate membership in the American nation, becomes more salient when the polity is perceived to be threatened. Periods preceding and following major wars – not only the Civil War, but also the first and second World Wars, and the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts --- were characterized by vigorous discussions of national identity and civic obligation. Periods of large-scale immigration have also been associated with national soul-searching and the rise of ethnocultural nationalism. The convergence of the perceived threat of terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001 with war in the Middle East and large-scale, non-European immigration provides fertile terrain for an increasing salient discussion of nationalism, patriotism, collective identity, and civic obligation.
Even though relatively few scholars have studied American nationalism *per se*, Mr. Bonikowski’s essay and the annotated bibliography that accompanies it demonstrate that many have nibbled around its edges. In so doing, they have provided a rich set of concepts, distinctions, and arguments from which to fashion a research agenda and empirical hypotheses. We hope that the resources that his work provides will reduce intellectual barriers to entry and persuade readers that there is useful work to be done.

We are grateful to the Russell Sage Foundation for support for Mr. Bonikowski’s work, and to Rogers Brubaker, Andrew Perrin, Wendy Rahn, Paul Starr and Bob Wuthnow for assisting us in tracking down the relevant literature.

Paul DiMaggio  
*Princeton, New Jersey*  
April 24, 2008
The term “nationalism” has not been used in any item in an archived public opinion poll conducted in the United States over the past twenty years, except when referring to ethnic tensions in foreign countries\(^1\). Likewise, most scholars of nationalism have based their arguments on evidence drawn from other parts of the world: nation-state-building in early modern Europe, independence movements in Latin America and Africa, separatism in Canada and Spain, or ethnic conflict in hotspots such as Kosovo or Darfur. Yet confining nationalism to the status of an exotic or peripheral phenomenon that solely exists abroad misses important social, political, and economic processes that have produced and continue to sustain the national idea in the United States (Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997). As one of the first nation-states in the world, and one primarily founded on civic ideals rather than homogenous heritage\(^2\), the U.S. presents a fascinating case for the study of the emergence and development of national attachment, the use of nationalist ideology in state-building, changing symbolic racial and ethnic boundaries of the nation, and the interplay between religion and the sense of national purpose. Throughout American history, the state has repeatedly employed nationalist discourse to galvanize its citizenry in times of economic crisis, military struggle, or national mourning, as well as during more mundane occasions, like electoral campaigns or national holidays. From presidential speeches and commemorative rites to public debates about the justness of

\(^1\) American surveys and public opinions polls employ a number of concepts related to nationalism, such as patriotism and national pride, but not nationalism itself. In contrast, European surveys frequently feature questions about respondents’ nationalist attitudes. Findings are based on a search of three leading survey research databases: ICPSR, Roper iPoll, and ORS Polling the Nations.

\(^2\) The assumption that the United States is predominantly a civic nation is challenged by a number of scholars, including Gerstle, Kaufmann, Lieven, and Smith. This alternative perspective will be discussed in a later section.
particular policies, issues of national destiny and good citizenship have never been far from the center of public attention.

This begs the question why more scholarly attention has not been devoted to American nationalism. One possible cause is substantive. The violence catalyzed by many foreign nationalist movements during the era of colonial independence and in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union made ethnic unrest a much more interesting, and pressing, topic than the everyday nationalism of Western democracies. The United States had dealt with its sectional tensions in the prior century (and those tensions were hardly “nationalist” in the same sense as, for instance, Basque separatism) and its experience with minority militancy has been limited to isolated incidents involving radical groups with limited public support. Neither secession (despite the dreams of a handful of Texans and Californians) nor widespread ethnic or racial violence appeared to be likely threats in late-20th-century America.

Whether one believes American nationalism is a significant phenomenon is also a function of how one defines the concept. If nationalism refers solely to “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit” (Hechter 2000), then cases in which such boundaries are already congruent, as they are in the United States, are clearly not worth studying. However, if the term is defined more broadly, for instance as the “intense devotion to the nation, that real or supposed community of individuals who are convinced they share a common set of traditions, beliefs, and cultural characteristics” (Zelinsky 1998), then the United States becomes a much more interesting object of empirical inquiry. The contrast between these two approaches can be illustrated with another quote from Hechter (2000): “nationalism is
much more prevalent in some countries (Canada) than others (United States).” Hechter’s examples are reasonable if we follow the former definition, because no parallel to Quebec separatism exists in the United States. However, they seem misguided if we adopt the latter definition; few dispassionate observers would argue that Canadians exhibit more “intense devotion to the nation” than do Americans. Hence, before we delve into the literature on American nationalism, we must examine the concept of nationalism more closely.

**Defining Nationalism**

Definitions of nationalism, and of associated concepts like patriotism and national pride, can be classified into three broad approaches: political, psychological, and cultural. The first deals primarily with nationalism at the level of the collectivity and its elites, the second at the level of the individual, and the third at the level of individuals embedded in structures of social relations that pattern the cultural resources to which the individuals have access. These distinctions bear partial resemblance to Calhoun’s (1997:6) tripartite typology of nationalism as a political project, an ethical imperative (though Calhoun is less interested in individuals than are political and social psychologists), and a discourse. We will examine each of these approaches in turn.

**Political Definitions**

Sociologists, political scientists, and historians interested in nation-building tend to emphasize the political dimensions of nationalism. Gellner’s (1983:1) classic definition of nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” has informed much research in this area. For Breuilly (1985:3), this political principle involves three fundamental assumptions: “there exists a
nation with an explicit and peculiar character; the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; the nation must be as independent as possible.” Nationalism functions here as an ideology that can be consciously utilized by political movements to further their goals, but which also exists at a less explicit level as a frame through which individuals understand their social world. The political perspective has been used to study the historical origins of modern nation-states, as well as efforts by contemporary non-state actors to establish sovereign authority over a territorially bound population. In the American case, the former variant is applicable while the latter is not. Indeed much research on American nationalism has been concerned with the way in which the national idea gained prominence among the population of the colonies and the early Republic and how its meaning has subsequently evolved over the course of American history.

**Psychological Definitions**

A second conception of nationalism emphasizes the relationship between the individual and a generalized image of the nation. For instance, Lieven (2004) defines nationalism as the “devotion to an ideal, abstract, unrealized notion of one’s country, often coupled with a belief in some wider national mission to humanity.” A similar definition is employed by Zelinsky (1998), quoted earlier. This understanding of nationalism is influenced by research in political and social psychology concerning the importance of the nation for individual identity. However, the terminology used by psychologists (and interdisciplinary fellow travelers) differs from that of more historically and culturally minded sociologists, political scientists, and historians. Psychologists distinguish nationalism (“a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national
dominance” [Kosterman and Feshbach 1989]) from a broader concept of patriotism: “a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation” (Conover and Feldman [1987], quoted in de Figuerido [2003]). Nationalism is “explicitly connected to out-group antipathy” (Skitka 2005), while patriotism tends to be inwardly focused. Furthermore, patriotism comprises multiple dimensions, some of which are more closely associated with nationalism than others. For instance, Schatz, Staub, and Levine (1999) differentiate “blind” from “constructive” patriotism. Both involve positive identification with the nation, but the former is unquestioning and rigid (captured by the slogan “America right or wrong”), while the latter is critical, rooted in the desire to continually improve the practices of the collectivity. Of the two varieties, only blind patriotism is highly correlated with nationalism.

Cultural Definitions

The third approach to nationalism treats it as a cultural phenomenon, that is, a set of shared scripts and symbols used by individuals to make sense of their world and to justify their strategies of action. For Brubaker (2004), “nationalism is not a ‘force’ to be measured as resurgent or receding. It is a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.” Billig’s (1995) definition is consistent with Brubaker’s, though it places more emphasis on quotidian cultural practices: nationalism consists of “ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. […] Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry.” Nationalist “idioms, practices, and possibilities” and “ideological habits” can be identified at different levels of analysis, including the nation itself, organizations and
sociodemographic groups, and individuals. In the United States, most research in this
tradition has focused on “national identity,” a vague term for the ideals and beliefs that
characterize the nation. The focus of this research has shifted over time from a set of
core American values to the heterogeneous representations of the nation found in the
population and their relationship to broader social and political institutions.

Early research on American national identity sought to capture the essence of the
nation’s character, typically relying on principles articulated in official documents and
statements of national elites. This approach was especially popular prior to the 1970s
among consensus historians, as well as sociologists and political scientists studying
American political culture. It was rooted in the assumption, dating back to nineteenth
century idealism, that a singular, coherent national identity can be identified by studying
a nation’s intellectual history (Waldstreicher 1995). Invariably, such analyses converged
on an image of the United States as a civic nation based on a widely shared liberal
democratic creed. This view has been challenged by critical scholars, who have stressed
the need to analyze concrete policies and institutional practices in addition to official
ideologies. They have pointed to multiple competing ideological traditions in the United
States, many of which have been incongruent with the ideals of the liberal creed.

More recent cultural analyses have investigated the manner in which individuals
conceive of the national community. From this perspective nationalism is neither a mere
aggregate of individual attitudes (although it may be operationalized in this manner) nor a
feature of the nation itself, but rather a set of shared cultural resources generated through
the interaction between individuals and their social environments (see DiMaggio 1997).
At the individual level, these resources take the form of cognitive representations of the
nation, including its political and legal institutions, customs, traditions, and rituals. The specific content of these networks of symbolic meaning, known as schemata, varies systematically across social space: people who occupy similar social positions are likely to have more similar schemata of the nation than people whose social experiences differ considerably. The same is true of the extent to which nation schemata are likely to be connected with individuals’ self-conceptions (i.e., schemata of the self). In more sophisticated variants of this approach, individuals can possess multiple schemata of the nation, which can become activated by different social cues (Brubaker 2004). Rather than treating nationalism as an essential property of the individual, such studies see its different dimensions as variables: the extent to which an individual identifies with the nation and what that identification entails varies with the context. However, given how difficult it is to capture empirically dynamic and contextual processes of this sort, most cognitively oriented cultural research assumes that schemata are relatively stable and seeks to understand how their content varies across the population (but see Rahn 2004).

**Nationalism and Social Exclusion**

Although each of the traditions described thus far employs a different understanding of nationalism, they all associate certain aspects of it with social exclusion. Some classify these exclusionary tendencies as xenophobia, nativism, or chauvinism, while others equate the term nationalism itself with out-group hostility. In historical research on nation-building, the criteria of exclusion differ between those nations that have been founded on civic principles and those that have been based on a common ethnic heritage. In civic nations, typically associated with the West, citizenship is predicated on adherence to common ideals embodied in democratic political institutions. In ethnic
nations, usually associated with the East, membership in the nation is restricted to particular ethnic or racial groups. Some scholars have challenged this dichotomy, arguing that both forms of nationalism exist in all modern nation-states, though the degree to which one is prioritized over the other may vary (Brubaker 2004).

Within the cultural tradition, research on the multiple ideological traditions in American political culture has long emphasized the history of exclusionary state policies and features of public discourse marshaled in their support. On the other hand, the more cognitively oriented strand of cultural research has sought to identify how in-group and out-group perceptions shape people’s schemata of the nation, and the degree to which these schemata are associated with a variety of sociodemographic variables. Finally, as we have already pointed out, political psychologists tend to associate exclusion with the more conservative strands of patriotism and their correlate, “nationalism,” narrowly defined as a sense of national superiority.

Nationalism Defined

Having reviewed some of the dominant models of nationalism, it is now possible to construct a tentative definition of the concept. The purpose of this definition is not to capture nationalism in an exhaustive manner, but to serve as an orienting device that will help the reader make sense of the material included in this review. As such, it must be inclusive enough to correspond to the broad intellectual terrain covered by the literature, yet specific enough to be meaningful. We propose that nationalism be understood as the self-understanding of individuals and groups framed in terms of their membership in a broader collectivity coterminous with the territorial, social, and legal boundaries of an actual or potential nation-state. This self-understanding is produced through the
interaction of individual cognitive schemata, shared cultural understandings contained in various forms of public discourse, and institutional rules and conventions. The cognitive categories and affective orientations that constitute nationalism may inform individual and collective action, from the selection of car brands to foreign policy decisions, and vary in content and potency with individuals’ sociodemographic characteristics. The widespread identification with and loyalty toward the nation has been the result of a historical process of nation-state development, understood both as a conscious project of nationalist elites and an emergent consequence of economic and political transformations constitutive of modernity. With this understanding of nationalism in mind, we will now turn to extant empirical research that has examined various aspects of this phenomenon in the United States.

**State and Nation-Building**

One of the central questions in nation-building research is how a sense of common belonging emerges in a national population and how it interacts with processes of state-building. Nationalism is defined in this approach as the belief that the boundaries of a nation and its political governing unit should be congruent. This principle has motivated most political struggles for national sovereignty as well as attempts at preserving national culture when sovereignty has not been possible. In extreme cases where the efforts of nationalist movements are frustrated by existing state actors, political struggles can erupt into violence, ranging from isolated acts of terrorism to wars. For nations that succeed in forming their own states, the main challenge becomes to maintain territorial integrity by reproducing national attachment among their population. In the absence of state repression, members of the nation must feel a taken-for-granted sense of loyalty to the
nation, above and beyond any loyalties they may have to their localities or sub-national social groups. This loyalty can take on many forms, from an ambivalent acquiescence toward state institutions to an ardent belief in the moral righteousness (and possibly superiority) of the national collectivity.

The previously outlined distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is central in this literature. National movements, and the nations they have produced, are assigned to one category or the other depending on whether they justify membership in the collectivity based on common ethnic heritage or adherence to a shared set of ideals. The United States, along with most other Western countries, is typically viewed as a historically civic nation. The population of the early Republic was ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse; it was not characterized by a distinct unified culture; its presence in the North America had been limited to a few prior generations; and it did not have to struggle against foreign oppression (Kohn 1957). Rather than evolving naturally from a set of primordial characteristics, the national idea in the United States was a product of conscious strategies of political and economic elites, as well as an emergent consequence of changing geopolitical and economic circumstances.

The studies discussed in this section trace the emergence and propagation of national identification in the United States. All of them accept the notion that American nationalism has been predominantly civic and thoroughly modern\(^3\). However, this does not imply that the diffusion of national identification was a straightforward and linear process. The early United States experienced considerable partisan fragmentation, which gave way in the early 18\(^{th}\) century to sectionalist tensions. Following the Civil War that

---
\(^3\) In a later section on the social boundaries of the nation, we will describe other approaches, which consider the important role played by ethnicity, race, and religion in American nation-building.
resulted from those tensions, the nation had to reinvent itself as the North and the South began a gradual process of reconciliation. Although sectionalism faded during 20th century, a series of other national crises came to challenge American social cohesion. Multiple military conflicts, including the two World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, domestic campaigns against anarchists and communists, and the attacks of September 11th, 2001 are but a few examples. During such times of crisis, state institutions and media frequently turned to nationalist symbols in an effort to unify the population across various political and social divides. This section will focus on pivotal events in the early history of the United States during which the national idea first developed and solidified.

The Emergence of the American Nation

A number of studies attempt to pinpoint the time when the inhabitants of the colonies first began to view themselves as members of a new American nation. Most agree that the process began only a few years prior to the Revolution. According to Savelle (1962:903), most Colonists were ardently loyal to Britain well into the Revolutionary period, avowing a “Burkean type of [British] nationalism”. Although this was particularly true for the general population, even members of the political elites, including Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and John Hancock, displayed considerable respect, if not outright loyalty, toward the British monarchy as late as July 1775. Of course, to argue that the colonists were loyal to the Crown does not imply that they saw themselves as identical to their counterparts in Britain. On the contrary, many had a “distinct consciousness of differentness and a certain smug self-satisfaction” (Savelle 1962:904). However, in the years leading up to the Revolution, this “distinct consciousness” was rooted not in the idea of a new nation, but in loyalties to particular
regions and localities. Beyond geographic ties, the main divisions among the free population were political, with partisan allegiance split between the Tories and the Whigs. The Tories were uncritically loyal to the British state, while the Whigs sought reforms to the system of colonial governance. Yet, even the Whigs, despite their radical rhetoric, were overwhelmingly loyal to the Crown in the pre-Revolutionary period.

Of course, the situation changed with Britain’s persistent alienation of the colonies and consequent colonial secession. Merritt’s (1965) content analysis of newspaper columns from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, South Carolina, provides a rough timeline of the development of collective identity in Anglo-American territories during this period. References to the colonies as a whole and their inhabitants as a single collectivity increased dramatically from four in the period between 1735 and 1739 to twenty-two in the period between 1771 and 1775. The first references to “Americans”, rather than “British colonists” or “Her Majesty’s subjects,” appeared in 1764, only eleven years before the War of Independence. By 1770, over half of the articles that contained colonial self-references employed the terms “Americans” or “America.” The practice began in New England and gradually diffused (in fits and starts) to the middle colonies, and finally the South. This timeline shows a clear secular progression from local identification, to identification with the colonies, and finally with “America.”

The new sense of social cohesion of which Merritt’s results are suggestive stemmed from a number of well documented factors, including a prolonged fight against a common enemy, increased intercolonial contact through military service and commerce, institutions called into being by the Articles of Confederation, and a lively
public debate about the expansion of the Western frontier (Savelle 1962). The actions of political and intellectual elites were of great importance as well, with the former providing the nation with a new mythos (including the notion of manifest destiny) and the latter extending British liberal thought to American political institutions. Finally, a number of unique structural conditions allowed for the development of the new American nation, including a privileged geographic location, the relative absence of class warfare, and the possibility of relatively unhindered territorial expansion that did not require maritime conquest (Kohn 1957).

The New Nation

Scholars interested in institutional dimensions of national development acknowledge many of these factors as underlying causes of the evolving national identity in the United States, but view them as either correlates or results of another fundamental political process: American state-building. For Starr (2007), the choice of American political elites to adopt British liberal constitutionalism is of crucial importance for the subsequent development of the nation. It was part of “a plan to create power where there had been none,” a plan to self-consciously erect a complex federal state structure within a new national territory, which would strike a balance between individual civil liberties and state power (Starr 2007). Not only did this plan generate a centralized state, but it also empowered a society. By ensuring the rule of law and the responsiveness of political institutions to popular demands, it created the conditions for the accumulation of capital within the national boundaries, the establishment of a national network of transportation and communication, and the eventual development of mass education and social welfare
provision, all of which helped shape a rising modern sensibility and the diffusion of national identification throughout the population.

A national preoccupation with economic development was another crucial component of nation-building in the United States. The creation of a single American market in the latter half of the 18th century shifted people’s perception of everyday consumption and production activities from the local to the national context. This process was encouraged by early state policies aimed at economic integration, such as internal improvement programs, railroad land grants, protective tariffs, and the establishment of the post office and a national bank. Minicucci (2001) argues that such policies were more important for nation-building in the United States than intentional attempts at inventing a “union of sentiments” held together by patriotism (to use Erickson’s [1993:65] phrase), because they sought to overcome the “problem of space,” that is, the danger of the development of political factions with distinct geographic bases throughout the vast territory of the United States. Internal improvement policies, typically championed by Federalist, Republican, and Whig elites (e.g., Henry Clay’s “American System”), bolstered infrastructure development and encouraged economic growth, thereby helping create an increasingly integrated market that eventually became a common point of reference and shared interests for the national population. For Minicucci (2002:253), “National feeling, like the attachment to any political community, had a materialistic basis. Attachment to the union did not reflect a denial of self-interest but, rather, a reconstruction of it: self-interest properly understood.” The South, which lagged behind the North in internal improvement programs and other economic
integration policies, experienced stunted economic development. This became an important factor in the region’s sectional predilections.

The material bases of national identification in the United States were not limited to the economic realm. Rising literacy rates promoted by the burgeoning education system combined with the widespread availability of print media also played a key role in this process (Anderson 1991 [1983]). By the early 19th century, individuals in distant regions of the same national territory could simultaneously read parallel news from across the country. At the same time, the advent of bureaucratic information gathering and processing practices made it possible to enumerate the national population in a systematic manner. Both developments served to expand modern rationality and to solidify a sense of mutual belonging among national compatriots. While the role of the state in creating the census and other bureaucratic institutions is obvious, its involvement in promoting media growth only recently became a focus of scholarly attention. Not only did the American Constitution guarantee the freedom of the press, but the state also heavily subsidized the distribution of newspapers, magazines, and books via its vast postal network (Starr 2004). Similar policies would later encourage the development of the telegraph, cinema, and radio and television broadcasting. In contrast, media in most European nations lacked affordable distribution channels and were often governed by highly restrictive regulations.

Fault Lines in the Early Republic

Although the late 18th century was a time of a burgeoning American self-consciousness, this process was partly frustrated by a number of social fault lines that emerged in the early Republic. We will discuss the most obvious and insidious of these, that is, the
social, economic, and political chasm that separated blacks from whites, in a subsequent section. For now, we will focus on tensions within the free population which was newly incorporated as a national community. The first major tension that developed in the aftermath of the Revolution was rooted in partisan politics. Controversies over the French Revolution and the Jay Treaty, which unraveled against the background of an economic downturn, thrust the Federalists and Republicans into a seething conflict over the future of the country. People’s loyalties to the two parties were so fervent and polarizing that they eventually came to constitute two parallel, antagonistic political communities (Robertson 2001). With the aid of the rapidly growing popular press, they engaged in rhetorical attacks that discredited each other’s commitment to the wellbeing of the country, often employing ethnic and racial slurs to challenge the enemy’s legitimacy (thereby reproducing the racialized discourse that upheld the nation’s stratification regime). The clashes extended beyond the confines of editorial pages to street theater, processions, protests, and violent riots reminiscent of the anti-British unrest of the 1760s and 1770s.

Although differences between the two groups were fundamentally based on competing political philosophies and policy preferences, they extended to alternative ways of imagining the nation. Adherents of both parties celebrated the same national holidays and relied on the same national symbols, yet each side claimed them as their own and challenged the legitimacy of their use by the opposition. The resulting fusion of political and national discourses was so strong that the two groups could be characterized as espousing two competing nationalisms. Indeed, by the early 1800s they “could no
longer agree on whether they were part of the same nation or even whether they had fought a revolution for a common cause” (Robertson 2001:1264).

Despite their fiercely divisive nature, the partisan battles of the early 19th century had an ironic consequence: they unified the population and impeded the rise of local and sectional political factions. The need of both the Republicans and the Federalists for channels of mass communication motivated a rapid proliferation of partisan newspapers which helped generate unprecedented levels of political participation among the citizenry. Voting became a matter of personal pride and group loyalty and, as such, it helped solve Minicucci’s (2002) “problem of space.” By fusing partisan identity with “true” American identity, the country managed to prevent the sorts of tensions between local and national interests that led to the subsequent rise of separatist nationalist movements in many European nations. Partisan loyalty enabled a hybrid identification that was strongly local but which also transcended internal territorial boundaries: one could be a Virginian and a Republican or a New Engander and a Federalist (Robertson 2001).

Partisan conflict abated considerably in the second decade of the 19th century, giving way once again to a shared “national feeling” (Robertson 2001). As would be the case time and again throughout American history, the population was united by military conflict. The War of 1812 brought Americans together military service, created animosities toward the British that matched those that had existed against the French, and most importantly, strengthened state power under James Madison, making possible widespread infrastructural improvements. However, the downside of the new partisan unity was an upsurge of sectional unrest, particularly in the South.
The culture of the Southern colonies had always been somewhat distinct from that of the North. Prior to the independence, many Southerners considered themselves more faithful to British traditions than their Northern counterparts. They closely followed new trends in English fashion and arts, sent their children to study at English universities, imitated English architecture and literature, and felt strong pride in English liberal constitutionalism (Blassingame 1968). However, the sense of difference felt in many parts of the South, reinforced by a common interest in the preservation of slavery, did not yet constitute a coherent regional identity. As all the North American colonies became increasingly isolated from England, the affinity of the South with Britain gradually dissipated and was replaced by an increasingly widespread identification with the American nation, which was facilitated by increased intercolonial contact with the North. However, in the post-Revolutionary era, pre-existing cultural differences between the two regions were amplified by political tensions. Disagreements over government policy came to the fore during the War of 1812, with New England dismissing the conflict as Western and Southern expansionist folly (Kohn 1957). The tensions subsided during the subsequent era of “good feeling,” but reemerged with new force in the mid-1800s, as regional nationalism swept the American South.

Persistent political conflicts across the Mason-Dixon line exacerbated pre-existing differences to such a degree that many Southerners came to view the two regions as separate nations inhabited by two distinct peoples (Kohn 1957). This new collective self-understanding was promoted by political and economic elites in an effort to galvanize support for their instrumental interests, particularly the preservation of slavery (Faust 1988). Given the lack of inherent differences between the population of the South and
the North, Southern nationalists constructed new myths of dissimilarity based on race (viewing themselves as descendents of the Normans fighting against the Saxons in the North), language (calling for a new “purity of diction” that would distance Southern English from “Yankee degeneracies” and “Africanisms”), and political heritage (perceiving themselves as the true heirs of the Revolution and comparing their struggle to the independence movements of the Poles and the Hungarians) (p. 11). The Southern cause was further legitimized by religious belief, which gave the struggle, and the slavery regime over which it was waged, a transcendent purpose. While Southern public discourse framed the War in terms of ethnic difference and religious providence, the North denounced the South’s actions in predominantly civic terms, as the work of “rebels”, “traitors”, and “despots” (McPherson 1999).

Yet, just as the War of 1812 helped diffuse partisan tensions, so did the Civil War ultimately serve to end sectionalism and strengthen national attachment throughout the United States. However, the mechanisms through which this occurred in the two conflicts differed. Whereas the population was united by the very experience of the war against Britain, the Civil War threatened to split the nation in two. What made national cohesion a possibility was the subsequent public, often contentious, process of reconciliation between the North and the South. Its long-term consequence was the final crystallization of American nationalism (Kohn 1957). However, sectional peace came at a high price, as newly freed blacks were excluded from the reconstructed nation. Blight’s (2001) analysis of public rituals, political campaigns, popular literature, and memoirs attests to the fundamental choice that faced America in the 1870s and 1880s: whether to incorporate the war into collective memory in a manner that stressed national healing or
racial justice. The mutual exclusivity of the two goals was continually emphasized by Southern elites who sought to return to the old racial regime. Although slavery was not restored, the focus on commonalities between the North and the South and the dismissal of the war as a momentary rupture in the unity of (white) America allowed the South to institute a legal system of racial domination that ensured the continued exclusion of blacks from full citizenship. America was healed, but justice would be put on hold for nearly a century.

The consolidation of sectional tensions was accompanied by the rapid growth of American state institutions after the Civil War, as well as by unprecedented national economic growth. These factors dissolved any remaining challenges to American collective belonging, solidifying nationalism in the United States. Although subsequent political and military crises affected the country’s public mood (Rahn 2004), they did not fundamentally challenge its territorial integrity. In such uncertain times, the state consciously sustained social cohesion through nationalistic rhetoric and integrative domestic policy, as was the case with the bond drive of the Second World War (Samuel 1997).

**National Identity and Political Culture**

The historical literature reviewed above focused on the development of collective identification with the nation in the United States. It described a process through which the inhabitants of the British colonies in North America began to think of themselves as members of a collectivity and, eventually, of a new nation. However, none of the studies examined the “cognitive categories and affective orientations” that constituted that identification, to use terms from our earlier definition of nationalism. Given that
cognitive schemata of the nation and their corresponding collective cultural logics inform individual and collective action, it is important that we identify their content. This is precisely the motivation behind scholarly attempts to capture “American national identity” as a more or less stable set of principles that characterize the nation and its people.

There are two variants of research on national identity in the United States. The first strives to capture the essence of the nation’s culture, as it is reflected in political institutions, the opinions of elites, and the mass media. The implicit assumption in these studies is that identifying the main historical trends in public discourse and political culture will improve our understanding of the American people and their political and economic choices. National identity functions here as a national ideology that shapes public opinion and policy (and hence its analysis typically takes on the form of intellectual history). Studies in this tradition range from those that seek to identify a single dominant ideology to those that reject the idea of a homogeneous “national character” in favor of multiple competing ideological frameworks.

The second variant of national identity research is concerned with the content of individuals’ nation schemata. These studies explicitly seek out patterned variation, typically by relying on statistical analysis of survey data. In contrast to the intellectual history approach, which is concerned with institutional and elite discourse, they examine the distribution of attitudes in nationally (or regionally) representative population samples.

Although most of the studies discussed in this section do not address the relationship between popular attitudes and public discourse (but see Schildkraut 2002),
Concern with that relationship is typically implicit. Popular attitudes are partly shaped by the cultural resources available in people’s social environments and the patterned distribution of those attitudes suggests that the availability of such resources is variable. Likewise, in some circumstances attitudes may influence people’s actions, which may in turn limit the possibilities of institutional or elite discourses. This is posited by symbolic politics theory (Sears 1993; Citrin et al. 1990, 2001), which argues that subjective conceptions of national identity may be better predictors of policy preferences than instrumental interests, if those conceptions are made salient in a given situation. Policy preferences activated by salient attitudes may translate into electoral behavior and political activism, which may influence the decisions of political actors. At the same time, it is important to remember that popular attitudes and elite opinions are rarely congruent (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Schildkraut 2002). Hence, to gain a full understanding of nationalism in the United States, we must study the relationship between popular and elite attitudes, as well as their interaction with cultural norms embedded in political, economic, and social institutions. Although none of the studies reviewed here accomplish all of this, they do offer partial evidence for how nationalism functions at each of these levels of analysis.

Images of National Identity

With the exception of partisanship and sectionalism, the nation-building literature outlined in the previous section depicts the development of national identification in the United States as a relatively unproblematic process. It suggests that once early tensions were resolved, the population of the country converged around a relatively cohesive, and presumably homogenous, sense of loyalty toward the national community. We have
argued that this approach could be complemented by an examination of how the sense of national belonging differed between social groups, including those based on race, class, or immigrant origin. Early research on American national identity followed a similar path to the nation-building literature. Tocquevillian scholars like Myrdal and Hartz, as well as consensus historians like Boorstin and Hofstadter, argued that the historical master narrative of the United States has been shaped by a coherent set of principles that comprise the national ideology. This ideology, often referred to as the “American Creed,” was seen as the foundation of America’s exceptional civic nationalism.

_Creedal Nationalism_. We will not review this literature in detail here, because its assumption of a single American national identity has been successfully challenged by subsequent scholarship. By the 1980s, few historians, political scientists, or sociologists, and virtually no political psychologists, espoused this view. Nonetheless, a few scholars continue to adhere to it steadfastly, in spite of the controversy aroused by their work. The most prominent of them is Samuel Huntington. His most recent book, _Who Are We?_, represents the most current version of the consensus perspective and its bold conclusions have fuelled a vigorous scholarly debate on the topic of American national identity. Most of the scholarly works to which we will turn in this section have been written as critical responses to the consensus tradition, and a few have specifically challenged Huntington’s views.

While many of his precursors from the 1950s and 1960s placed the United States squarely in the civic nationalism camp, with the Constitution defining the country’s core political and social principles, Huntington (2004) ostensibly challenges the civic-ethnic dichotomy by arguing that America has instead been built on _cultural_ nationalism. The
culture in this case is that of early Anglo-Protestant settlers, expressed in the ideals of the American Creed. These include democracy, liberty, equality, and individual achievement. Huntington is alarmed by the changing nature of American national identity, and particularly by its decreased salience after the 1960s, due to social movements and the rise of multiculturalism. Even though he acknowledges the revival of civic nationalism after 9/11, he doubts its ability to withstand challenges from proliferating other-national, sub-national, and transnational identities.

Huntington argues that even if American national identity does remain salient, its content is likely to be altered considerably by widespread immigration from Spanish-speaking countries. Unlike past generations of immigrants, more recent newcomers have had fewer incentives to assimilate to the dominant Anglo-Protestant culture because of the prominence of their own ethnic subcultures, which have been strengthened by a number of factors, including the use of a single non-English language, the proximity of Latin America, the geographical concentration of immigrant communities, the embrace of multiculturalism by elites, and pressure to use Spanish in official and public places. For Huntington, these alleged changes to American national identity are so profound that they may eventually lead to the nation’s dissolution, akin to the breakup of the Soviet Union. The only way to prevent such dire consequences, he asserts, is to return to a national identity that is based both on the American Creed and strong religious (i.e., Christian) faith.

In many respects Huntington’s is a standard creedal argument, much like those of neo-Tocquevillians and consensus historians, which emphasizes the civic character of American nationalism. However, this well rehearsed view is augmented by claims about
the ethnic and religious origins of the American value system. As such, his work is in itself an excellent example of the multiple ideologies that have long dominated American national identity discourse and which have preoccupied many scholars critical of the single-ideology perspective. A number of historians, political scientists, and sociologists have argued that alongside the liberal creedal conception of the American nation there have long existed more conservative and reactionary national ideologies, variously known as radical nationalism (Lieven 2004), nativism (Spencer 1994), republicanism (Walzer 1990), and ethnoculturalism (Smith 1988). We will discuss the racial and ethnic exclusion justified by inegalitarian ideologies in a subsequent section. For now, we will focus on the different understandings of the ideologies that have informed competing notions of American national identity.

Multiple civic traditions. Whereas Huntington sees a single creedal tradition based on Anglo-Protestant values, Walzer (1990) sees two: pluralist liberalism and a Rousseauian republicanism. The distinction is rooted in two divergent understandings of political life. Pluralists do not view politics as a source of personal satisfaction, but rather as the basis of social stability that makes possible other pleasurable activities. In contrast, for republicans public life (i.e., politics) is in itself a source of satisfaction that takes precedence over personal affairs. From these opposed political philosophies follow different criteria of ideal citizenship. Walzer argues that republicanism has been at the root of most exclusionary movements in the United States. Nativist movements like the Know-Nothings disparaged immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities primarily for their ostensible lack of political maturity. Rather than advocating their elimination, nativists sought to exclude them from citizenship, at least until their members acquired
sufficient “practical education […] in democratic virtue” (Walzer 1990:641). Pluralists, on the other hand, have supported a hyphenated American identity, in which citizens are free to emphasize either side of the hyphen but not to impose it on others. This more inclusive notion of American identity has superseded republican ideals over the course of the twentieth century, giving America the distinction of being a perpetually “unfinished society” of immigrants, driven by the productive tension embedded in multilayered collective identities. However, “American” is not a meaningless signifier as suggested by pluralist thought: “An ethnic American is someone who can, in principle, live his spiritual life as he chooses, on either side of the hyphen” (p. 650, emphasis in original). This is a considerable departure from Huntington’s (2004:92) conception of America as a “Christian country with Protestant values.”

Like Walzer, Lieven (2004) views American political culture as an uneasy synthesis of two competing intellectual traditions. However, for Lieven, the tension between them is not merely rooted in different political philosophies, but rather in a disparate attitude toward cultural otherness. The liberal creedal tradition has long stressed the rational and universal values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, none of which entails distinctions based on race, ethnicity, or religion (at least in principle). The cultural agnosticism of liberalism has given way in the second half of the twentieth century to an overt support for racial and ethnic tolerance. In contrast, the second “soul” of the American nation consists of a radical, ethnoreligious (“Jacksonian”) nationalism, which has been historically hostile to cultural difference. This ideology is not based on a republican belief in civic virtue but on a xenophobia historically rooted in Anglo-Saxon and Scots Irish cultural heritage, fundamentalist Protestantism, and a
historical legacy of white supremacy in the American South. It is composed of two strands: a revolutionary, crusading spirit and nostalgia for an idealized ethnoreligious past. Lieven argues that despite the ostensibly antithetical foundations of liberal and ethnoreligious nationalism, the seeds of the latter can be found in the exceptionalist and messianic tendencies of the former, which often become amplified during times of national crisis. The most recent example of such amplification was 9/11, a time when the country “had the chance to create a concert of all the world’s major states – including Muslim ones – against Islamist revolutionary terrorism [but] chose instead to pursue policies which divided the West, further alienated the Muslim world and exposed America itself to greatly increased danger” (p. 2).

Perhaps the most comprehensive account of the multiple ideological traditions that have defined American political culture is that of Rogers Smith (1988, 1993, 1997). Writing in explicit opposition to neo-Tocquevillian authors like Myrdal, Hartz, and Huntington, Smith advocates a complex understanding of American identity that includes all three of the ideologies outlined by Walzer and Lieven. The liberal tradition has emphasized the universal rights of individuals, republicanism has focused on community self-governance, and ethnoculturalism (or the inegalitarian ascriptive tradition) has sought the continued dominance of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant majorities. Smith argues that without identifying ethnoculturalism as a distinct and coherent ideology it is impossible to explain the prominent and persistent role of exclusionary ideologies based on ascriptive characteristics in American public discourse, policy, and public opinion. Based on meticulous empirical studies of legal cases, he demonstrates the interplay of the three traditions throughout American history. For instance, he cites the Chinese
Exclusion Case as one of many examples of legislation in which a restrictive ethnocultural view of citizenship trumped the liberal imperatives of the Bill of Rights with the aid of republican arguments about states’ rights (Smith 1988). As is demonstrated by the historical struggle over the rights of African Americans cultural and political development in the United States has not been entirely dominated by any one of the three ideologies. Smith (1997) argues that the revivals of inegalitarian ethnoculturalism have been brought about by political elites struggling to construct their own legitimacy and generate a sense of group solidarity in the population. While liberal and republican ideologies have often proved insufficient for these purposes, ethnocultural arguments have successfully conjured up a collective identity “that has inherent and transcendent worth, thanks to nature, history, and God” (Smith 1993:550).

Smith is not the only writer to suggest that liberalism alone may not provide a sufficient basis for group solidarity. Spencer (1994) makes a similar point with respect to multiculturalism, the late twentieth-century incarnation of liberal cosmopolitanism (though the normative commitments of the two authors differ considerably). Similarly to Lieven, he sees American political culture as an historical synthesis of nativist and liberal cosmopolitan ideologies, with the latter becoming dominant after the Second World War. The intellectual opponents of “scientific racism” and members of the Civil Rights movement, whose struggles made possible the triumph of cosmopolitanism, employed the language and symbols of the American Creed. However, liberal ideology shifted from cosmopolitanism to anti-assimilationist multiculturalism after the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. According to Spencer, this new paradigm favors ethnic identification over national loyalty and demands equality of results in place of equality of opportunity.
In a similar vein to Huntington, Spencer argues that multiculturalism encourages minority nationalisms, which threaten the common culture and solidarity of the United States, though instead of a return to an Anglo-Protestant past, he advocates a reawakening of creedal liberalism.

The weakness of Spencer’s, as well as Huntington’s, argument stems from its simplistic view of multiculturalism. The multiculturalism that favors the division of society into autonomous groups defined by rigid social boundaries follows the pluralist writing of Horace Kallen (Hollinger 1995). However, there is a second variant of multiculturalism, which is more closely aligned with the cosmopolitan approach of Randolph Bourne. It stresses the porous and dynamic nature of social groups and favors voluntary affiliation with multiple group identities. As such, it is completely consistent with the liberal tradition and the values embedded in the American Creed. To argue that pluralist separatism threatens a looming crisis without acknowledging the other type of multiculturalism, much less addressing the relative prevalence of the two, is unduly alarmist. However, in order to ascertain which variant of multiculturalism, or for that matter which of the broader ideologies discussed in this section, is more widespread, one must step outside of the field of intellectual history and into the realm of empirical survey research. The studies in sociology and political psychology that we will review next are less concerned with elite opinions and institutional practices than with the relationship between nationalist attitudes and sociodemographic attributes among the American population. As such, they make it possible to test explicitly some of the ideas developed in the theoretical accounts of American political culture.

Research on Conceptions of the Nation at the Individual Level
Survey research on the content of American nationalism addresses two major issues. First, it seeks to map the population distribution of the cognitive schemata of the nation – the conceptions held by Americans about their country’s core cultural and political characteristics and the preconditions of membership in their national community. These varied nationalist frames are often correlated with respondents’ sociodemographic traits, their attitudes toward minority groups, and their policy preferences. Second, this line of research explores variation in the cognitive and affective relationship between the individual and the nation captured by different forms of patriotism.

Some of the leading empirical research on the popular conceptions of American identity has been carried out by Jack Citrin and his associates. In a 1990 analysis of data from the California Field Poll, Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) find overwhelming consensus about the core features of American identity (defined as “characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community”). Interestingly, these include the liberal staples of racial tolerance, political participation, and individual motivation, as well as more ethnocultural beliefs in the importance of speaking English and faith in God. Although the ethnocultural attitudes garnered less support, they were still prominent, with 76 percent of respondents considering English skills and 40 percent considering religious faith “very important” (and another 21 percent considering faith “somewhat important”). The degree of consensus around this definition of “Americanism” varies somewhat with ethnicity (Hispanics and Asians were less likely to stress language skills), political orientation (Republicans were more likely to support the religious, linguistic, and individualistic elements and more partisan respondents were more likely to emphasize voting), age (younger people were less likely to espouse
ethnocultural attitudes), and education and income (both were associated with lower support for ethnocultural notions of Americanism). Yet, these differences are relatively small, leading Citrin, Reingold, and Green to conclude that “the staying power of Lockean liberalism in American political culture is impressive. As long as it is spoken in English” (p. 1134).

Citrin and his colleagues’ subsequent studies of U.S. national ideologies have yielded similar results. Citrin, Haas, Muste and Reingold (1994) find broad public support for the cosmopolitan liberal view combined with moderate public support for nativism and multiculturalism (which includes both varieties described by Hollinger [1995]). Multiculturalism was favored by 33 percent of respondents to the 1992 National Election Study, of whom a disproportionate number were young people. The authors also report some differences in the content of national schemata by race and ethnicity, with black and Hispanic respondents being particularly likely to define a “true American” in religious terms, while at the same time favoring a more egalitarian approach to national identity. Despite growing support for multiculturalism, Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) find that both blacks and whites consider national identification more important than ethnic loyalty.

The findings of Citrin’s research support the multiple-ideologies thesis put forth by historically oriented scholars of American national identity. However, the one ideological tradition largely missing from his work is civic republicanism, which occupies a prominent place in the accounts of Walzer (1990) and Smith (1997). In a more direct test of Smith’s framework, Schildkraut (2003) analyzed the content of focus group transcripts dealing with American identity. She found that over 65 percent of her
subjects’ responses could be accounted for using Smith’s tripartite typology consisting of liberalism (belief in universal individual rights and small government), civic republicanism (emphasis on responsibilities of citizenship), and ethnoculturalism (support and rejection of idea that American identity is based on ascriptive characteristics). Civic republicanism emerged as the most popular of the three ideologies. In addition, Schildkraut found evidence for the existence of a fourth national ideology not mentioned by Smith, which she termed “incorporationism,” that is, a view of the United States as a nation of immigrants which has always benefitted from the existence of multiple cultural traditions. This view is closely related to Citrin’s multiculturalism. However, because it simultaneously stresses the need for assimilation, it is more akin to Bourne’s cosmopolitanism than Kallen’s pluralism (whereas Citrin collapses the two variants). In fact, Schildkraut finds no evidence for the salience of separatist multiculturalism among her respondents.

The idea of political participation championed by civic republicanism is scrutinized more closely by Theiss-Morse (1993). Using a Q-sort factor analysis, she identifies four ideal-type views of good citizenship among her respondents: representative democracy (belief in the value of participating actively in electoral politics), political enthusiasm (strong support of all forms of political involvement, from letter writing and voting to civil disobedience), pursued interests (ambivalence about political involvement, trust in political elites, and emphasis on interest-group activity), and indifference (cynical and apathetic attitude toward politics). Analysis of survey data from Minnesota demonstrates that the first two dimensions are associated with Democratic Party affiliation and liberal ideology, while the latter two tend to be
associated with conservatism. This multidimensional approach to popular views of political participation complicates the Walzer’s (1990) argument about political underpinnings of republican nativism and liberal multiculturalism. There are more than two lay political philosophies and they do not map out onto ideological positions as neatly as Walzer suggests.

Although identifying the main dimensions of American national ideology is one goal of Citrin’s and Schildkraut’s research, their main interest is in the impact of these beliefs on political attitudes and behaviors. In particular, they seek to explore how adherence to Americanism (in Citrin’s case), or its different aspects (in Schildkraut’s), shapes people’s views of ethnic minorities and immigrants, as well as their support for policies relevant to these groups. Citrin, Reingold, and Green (2000) find that attitudes toward immigrants are generally ambivalent and are not affected by measures of social exposure and perceived economic threat, with most respondents feeling no direct and concrete effects of immigration. However, consistently with symbolic politics theory, they are strongly related to respondents’ Americanism score (a measure of agreement with the dominant view of American identity), even after controlling for a variety of sociodemographic and political covariates. Americanism is also a good predictor of support for particular policies, but only when those policies are framed in a manner that activates its affectively salient features. For instance, Schildkraut’s (2003, 2005) research demonstrates that any of the four main national ideologies can be associated with both support for and opposition to “official English” policies, depending on which symbols are evoked to justify the policy and how they are interpreted by the respondent.

Effects of Events on Nationalist Sentiments
The prevalence of particular nationalist ideologies, as well as the magnitude of their impact on other political attitudes, is also a function of the general conditions in which the country finds itself at a given historical moment. Historical research has demonstrated time and again that nativism and other forms of xenophobia become particularly acute during times of national threat and economic crisis (Higham, 1983 [1955]). Wendy Rahn (2004) argues that such events have an impact on the shared affective state of the nation, which she terms the “public mood.” Rahn avoids the pitfall of social anthropomorphosis by arguing that individuals’ affect toward the collectivity is shaped by their exposure to mass media and to one another. Information about society-wide events is reported in relatively similar ways to the entire population and then reverberates through social networks. Of course, to say that a public mood is shared does not imply that it is invariant across social groups. The content of the information varies somewhat, as does its interpretation by different segments of society.

Rahn examines this variation with respect to two dimensions of the public mood – valence (positive/negative) and arousal (high/low) – and the psychological centrality of national identity (two other dimensions of national identity, salience and solidarity, are omitted due to lack of data). Her analysis of survey data suggests that the relationship between the valence of the public mood and the psychological centrality of national identity is reciprocal, though the former has a stronger effect on the latter. On the other hand, the arousal dimension of the public mood seems to be an outcome of the centrality of national identity. In other words, people for whom national membership is important tend to exhibit a more positive affect toward the nation and respond more strongly to changes in the public mood. These affective and cognitive aspects of nationalism get
translated into political action by way of a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998), that is, people act in ways that reflect their notions of what is appropriate for a given identity and are motivated by the emotional arousal that results from a match between appropriate “being” and “doing” (Rahn 2004:24). Using the 1996 General Social Survey and the 1998 National Election Study she demonstrates the importance of the affective pathway between the two phenomena, with the centrality of national identity increasing arousal and political interest, which in turn boosts political behavior. A positive public mood further strengthens this relationship by increasing commitment to the nation.

A number of scholars have sought to assess the impact of the attacks of 9/11 on the public mood and expressions of nationalism. In a content analysis of letters to the editor published in seventeen newspapers prior to and following 9/11, Perrin (2005) finds a significantly greater prevalence of both authoritarian and anti-authoritarian “mode of argument” (i.e., “tendency to repress, censor, or punish others”) in the aftermath of the attacks (p. 168). Authoritarian discourse was strongest in the South and least prevalent in the Northeast, especially New York. In contrast to Perrin, Schildkraut (2002) focuses on the content rather than tone of public discourse in an attempt to identify which of the four national ideologies was most prevalent after 9/11. Her study of Los Angeles Times editorials and political speeches shows that political elites relied overwhelmingly on incorporationist arguments, stressing the importance of tolerance and inclusivity in difficult times. She compares this with the reaction of the same newspapers to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, which was dominated by overtly racist ethnocultural
rhetoric (for instance, Schildkraut quotes one article titled “How to Tell Your Friends from the Japs”) (p. 522).

In contrast to the inclusive statements of national elites, public opinion polls conducted after 9/11 revealed a considerably higher prevalence of ethnocultural nationalism among the population as a whole (Schildkraut 2002). Support for immigration restrictions rose by twenty percent compared to a year before, a considerable proportion of poll respondents were in favor of internment (31 percent) and surveillance (32 percent) of Arab Americans, and 44 percent of respondents reported feelings of suspicion toward anyone “who appears Arab or Muslim” (p. 526). The more moderate attitudes of elites are particularly interesting given research (on other topics) that finds politicians typically to be more radical than their constituents, in both directions along the ideological spectrum. Schildkraut argues that this is due to the lack of acceptance for ethnocultural arguments in mainstream public discourse, combined with the tendency of national crises to lead to ethnocultural entrenchment. Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and Green (1990) observe a similar attitudinal gap with respect to “official English” policies, which were generally rejected by politicians and widely favored by large segments of the population. The authors argue that this gap is partly attributable to the contrast between the widely shared beliefs (especially among whites) about the importance of English proficiency as a criterion for membership in the nation and politicians’ fears of offending their ethnic constituents.

Research on “Patriotism”
All of the survey-based studies reviewed thus far seek to evaluate the prevalence of particular cultural scripts related to national identification\(^4\). A second empirical approach to nationalism, carried out primarily by social and political psychologists, is less concerned with the content of nation schemata and their representation in public discourse than with the affective relationship between the individual and the nation, typically referred to as patriotism. The perspective is rooted in the assumption that individuals come to identify with social groups during childhood, beginning with their family and ending with the nation, and that this identification fulfils their needs for “self-protection” and “self-transcendence” (Druckman 1994). Loyalty to the group typically generates some degree of antipathy toward members of other groups. Such in-group bias may be an automatic result of the classification process, a means of satisfying the need for self-esteem, a result of instrumental interests, or a functional prerequisite for interpersonal cooperation. The psychological studies that we will review here attempt to identify the different types of patriotism common in the United States and relate them to individuals’ attitudes toward out-group members.

In one of the more influential theories of patriotism, Schatz, Staub, and Levine (1999), distinguish between what they refer to as its “blind” and “constructive” varieties. Blind patriotism refers to “a rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism,” while

\(^4\) Following Brubaker (2004:41), we use the term “national identification” instead of “national identity” throughout this paper. Brubaker argues that “as a processual, active term, derived from a verb, ‘identification’ lacks the reifying connotations of ‘identity.’ It invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying. And it does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, such as the state) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve. Identification – of oneself and of others – is intrinsic to social life; ‘identity’ in the strong sense is not.” We agree.
constructive patriotism is based on critical loyalty to one’s nation, that is, “questioning and criticism of current group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change” (p. 153). Factor analysis of data from a survey of undergraduate students supports this typology. Both varieties of patriotism are correlated with national attachment (the correlation coefficient for blind patriotism was higher than for constructive patriotism) but only blind patriotism is significantly correlated with political ideology, party identification, and academic achievement. Predictors of blind patriotism include nationalism (defined as a perception of national superiority and desire for national dominance), feelings of national vulnerability, and fears of cultural contamination by external groups, while constructive patriotism was associated with interest in political information gathering and feelings of political efficacy. Finally, blind patriotism is associated with a preference for symbolic behaviors (e.g., teaching Pledge of Allegiance in schools) over instrumental behaviors (e.g., teaching the structure of U.S. government in schools), while constructive patriotism is not associated with a preference for either. These results are confirmed by Parker’s (2007a) analysis of the 2002 California Patriotism Pilot Study. Once Parker establishes empirical support for the existence of two types of patriotism, he examines their correlation with attitudes toward civil liberties and minorities. His results suggest that blind patriotism is negatively associated with support for free speech and due process, while symbolic patriotism has the opposite effect on free speech and no effect on due process. Respondents who espouse blind patriotism also tend to hold negative views of racial and religious minorities, while symbolic patriots are more likely to embrace all groups, including Islamic fundamentalists and Arabs.
Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz (1992) develop a more extensive typology of patriotism in the United States. Using Q-sort analysis, they generate five varieties of patriotism: iconoclastic (rejects political symbols and supports active critical involvement in political life), symbolic (is influenced by slogans and rituals and uncritically accepts U.S. policies), instinctive environmental (embraces political symbols and supports protest and civil disobedience in support of ecological causes), capitalistic (advocacy of economic growth blended with love of country), and nationalistic symbolic (embraces political symbols, sees critique of government authority as unpatriotic, and supports a religious conception of American manifest destiny). The authors show that these perspectives have a varied impact on political involvement and voting behavior.

In addition to identifying distinct dimensions of patriotism, scholars have been interested in their distribution throughout the population. In a critical response to claims that blacks and Hispanics exhibit a lower propensity for patriotism than whites, Parker (2007b) contends that patriotism may have a different meaning for groups with varied social experiences. Whereas blacks, whites, and Hispanics agree on the components of patriotism (in this case a tripartite scheme of blind, constructive, and conventional patriotism), the relative salience of those dimensions differs considerably between the groups. Constructive patriotism is the most inconsistent, yielding low factor loadings among blacks and Hispanics. Furthermore, for whites the three dimensions are mutually exclusive, while for blacks and Hispanics they are mutually reinforcing. Parker argues that the inter-group differences in the meaning of patriotism, captured by the dissimilar characteristics of its latent dimensions, can be attributed to blacks’ and Latinos’ experiences of discrimination, which make them less likely to believe in the possibility of
meaningful social reform. Parker’s argument that the meaning of a concept is likely to differ across social groups is of great potential importance for all nationalism research. The many surveys that simply ask respondents to rate themselves on a scale of national pride or patriotism may be drawing spurious conclusions by treating the responses as referring to the same thing. This can be rectified by devoting closer attention during both data collection and analysis to meaning heterogeneity in the population.

In addition to varying across social groups, meaning of concepts can also differ based on the situational context, further complicating conclusions about the prevalence of a particular form of patriotism at a given time. Variation of this sort is often difficult to capture with standard survey methods, leading scholars to rely on more innovative approaches. In one such study, Li and Brewer (2004) use a priming experiment to examine how environmental cues affect the manner in which survey respondents identify with the country during times of national threat (in this case the attacks of 9/11). They distinguish two forms of identification: patriotism (which is theoretically associated with group solidarity, individual interest in national welfare, and good citizenship) and nationalism (which is theoretically associated with “authoritarianism, intolerance, and warmongering”) (p. 728). Their findings suggest that when group belonging is framed in terms of common goals, heightened patriotism is associated with higher levels of tolerance for within-group diversity but not higher levels of nationalism. In contrast, when group belonging is framed in terms of essential traits that differentiate the group from others, patriotism is associated with lower tolerance and heightened nationalism. The authors conclude that “patriotism and diversity are not incompatible” and that the
degree to which they come into conflict depends largely on “what meaning of national identity is activated at the time that assessments are made” (p. 736).

A final issue that bears mentioning is the operationalization of patriotism. According to Huddy and Khatib (2007), measures of symbolic patriotism, like the one used in the National Election Studies, conflate affective identification with the nation with political ideology, while those of constructive patriotism (Schatz et al. 1999) confuse patriotism and political activism and are not sufficiently distinct from the alternative blind patriotism. Instead, the authors develop a measure of national identity (“a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation”), which is non-ideological and theoretically associated with increased political involvement by way of heightened adherence to group norms. Empirical tests using the 1996 GSS and student surveys show that the measure is related to but distinct from other measures of patriotism, is unrelated to ideology and partisanship, and is positively correlated with attention to politics, knowledge of current events, and voter turnout. Huddy and Khatib’s article raises important issues, but their proposed solution eliminates much of what is interesting in the existing studies of patriotism. The advantage of those studies is their multidimensional treatment of patriotism – affect toward the nation can vary in its strength, conditionality, and ideological justification. By reducing patriotism (or the affective dimension of nationalism) to simple identification with the nation we are likely to miss this important variation. Of course, one can accept Huddy and Khatib’s operationalization of patriotism and still capture other aspects of nationalism with separate variables. If existing measures of patriotism do indeed suffer from validity problems, such an approach could be more transparent and methodologically sound.
The Social Boundaries of the Nation

To understand fully the nature of American nationalism, we must direct our attention to the boundaries that have delimited American identity throughout the history of the United States. From the country’s founding, the categories of inclusion and exclusion that have given shape to definitions of “true” Americans have been strongly influenced by ethnicity and race. Given that a nation’s social boundaries are partly constituted by elite ideologies and are reflected in popular views of national identity, there are significant overlaps between the literature reviewed in the previous section and the studies to which we now turn.

Historical Research on Nationalism and Ethnocultural Exclusion

Central to both elite ideologies and public opinion is the tension between a civic and ethnic understanding of the nation, a recurring theme in this review. In the terms used by the national identity literature, a purely creedal conception of the nation is, in principle, blind to ethnic and racial differences, while an ethnocultural view defines the United States in explicitly racial terms, typically as an Anglo-Protestant, white nation. Documenting the prevalence of xenophobic tendencies in American public discourse and legal practice has been a main objective of scholars critical of the consensus approach to national identity. Similarly, the distinctions made by political psychologists between different forms of patriotism have had implications for our understanding of the construction of the nation’s social boundaries. However, in contrast to studies of national identity and patriotism, which, respectively, view race and ethnicity as elements of broader national ideologies or as implicit byproducts of individuals’ relationships to the
nation, the research reviewed in this section places racial and ethnic categories at the center of inquiry.

From the perspective of the literature on civic nationalism, the history of racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States is a peripheral topic. Exclusionary practices, whether sanctioned by law or social convention, are seen as aberrations in an otherwise egalitarian historical narrative of the American nation. This view has been challenged by many scholars whose work we have already summarized, most notably by Smith (1988, 1993, 1997). Even Huntington (2004) acknowledges that the civic principles of the American Creed have not been the sole determinants of the social boundaries of the United States. Instead, he argues for a cultural understanding of the country’s history, in which ethnic heritage plays a crucial role. Kaufmann (2000) and Blum (2005) press this argument furthest, viewing the United States as a fundamentally ethnic, not civic, nation. During the Revolutionary era, the nation was “over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British, and 98 per cent Protestant” (Kaufmann 2000:6) and its unity was based in the “Anglo-Saxon myth-symbol complex,” rather than its liberal political principles (p. 17). In fact, Kaufmann argues that liberal principles have been little more than rhetorical devices used to set the U.S. apart from other nations, thereby reinforcing Americans’ sense of ethnic particularism and national exceptionalism.

According to Kaufmann, the Anglo-Saxon myth-complex consisted of a set of beliefs constitutive of an “‘American’ ethnicity,” which had been used to police the nation’s cultural borders well into the 20th century (p. 17). This complex included beliefs in a messianic covenant with God to spread liberalism and Protestantism throughout the world; in territorial rights to the land stretching between the two ocean (considered to be
the New Israel); in cultural heritage dating back to pre-Norman Anglo-Saxons; in the rootedness of the American nation in white ethnicity and non-conformist Protestant religion, epitomized by the Puritans and the leaders of the American Revolution and symbolized by English last names; and in an egalitarian, independent yeoman sensibility rooted in Christian morality.

Kaufmann illustrates the strength of the Anglo-Saxon myth-complex with a description of the fervent reaction of native-born Americans to the influx of Irish immigrants in the 1840s. Immigration to the United States increased dramatically after the War of 1812, accounting for 30 per cent of population growth by 1851, compared to 3 per cent in 1810 (Kaufmann 2000:18). Furthermore, for the first time most of the new immigrants were Catholic rather than Protestant and originated outside of Britain. The consequent change in the composition of major American cities gave rise to a popular exclusionary movement, led by the Know-Nothing party, which sought to protect Protestant Anglo-American values by restricting the political and social rights of Catholics (whose religious affiliation was also a marker of their non-English ethnic background). This was the first in a series of recurrent upsurges of American “nativism,” a term formulated in the 1850s to denote an “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections” (Higham [1955] 1983:4). Subsequent waves of immigration, particularly from regions outside of northern Europe, invariably generated nativist responses by such groups as the Populists, trade unions, and patriotic societies, which feared that foreign influences would corrupt American culture, threaten their economic interests, or both. Such reactions were often triggered by downturns in the economic cycle, for which immigrants served as convenient scapegoats.
Blum (2005) makes a similar argument, referring to pre-Civil War United States as a “white republic,” in which religion, race, and nationalism were inextricably intertwined. In addition to citing the rise of the nativist movement, he stresses the crucial role played by slavery in justifying the discourse and practices of white supremacism. The white republic became fractured during the Civil War, as sectional tensions came to dominate public attention. Of course, the conflict itself was in part motivated by different views of the appropriate criteria for determining membership in the American nation. Following the war, the nation had an opportunity to extend full political and social citizenship to blacks, but the focus of public discourse and policy soon changed from reconstruction to sectional reconciliation, which enabled the revival of white, Protestant ethnic nationalism (Blight 2001; Blum 2005). National unity was further reinforced by the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 and the subsequent rise of American imperialism, both of which united whites from the North and South around a common cause. The latter turned the nation’s attention from the alleviation of internal racial divisions to the economic and political domination of foreign lands, which was justified by many of the same beliefs that had constituted the pre-Civil War Anglo-Saxon myth-complex. In the final analysis, the main change to the social boundaries of the nation over the 19th century entailed the expansion of the definition of “whiteness” to include Germans and Irish, and eventually Southern and Eastern Europeans and Jews. However, although the contents of the category expanded, whiteness itself continued to demarcate who was considered a “true” American well into the 20th century.

Kaufmann’s (2000) and Blum’s (2005) arguments about the fundamentally ethnic nature of American nationalism represent a radical position within the literature on
American nationalism. Most other studies on this topic view the social boundaries of the United States as products of a persistent tension between the egalitarian values of the American Creed and the xenophobic tendencies of ethnoculturalism. This tension serves as the starting point for the critical perspectives on American national identity described in the previous section. In fact, Kaufmann himself reverts to the dualist view in a 2001 article. Borrowing Ralph Waldo Emerson’s terminology, he argues that the United States has always been characterized by a “double-consciousness” that has strived to balance “notions of ‘race’ and ‘rights’” (Kaufmann 2001:48). Many historians have sought to document the cyclical manner in which American social and legal practices have oscillated between the two poles of this double-consciousness. The main theme of this literature is captured by Smith (1997), who argues that the expansion of the ethnic and racial boundaries of the United States has been gradual and non-linear, as each era of democratizing reforms has been followed by a backlash that has led to new restrictions on membership in the nation. In his study of citizenship law between 1798 and 1912, Smith identifies two main periods of reform (the American Revolution and its immediate aftermath and Reconstruction) and two associated periods of backlash (the Jacksonian period, with its Indian Removal and “new intellectual defenses of inegalitarian ascriptive systems” [p. 203], and the “Gilded Age of Ascriptive Americanism” [p. 347]). He also alludes to the third phase in the cycle, namely the Civil Rights era and the conservative turn of the 1980s.

John Higham ([1955] 1983) reached similar conclusions in his classic monograph *Strangers in the Land*. Beginning with the Know Nothing movement of the 1840s, Higham traces the history of nativism, distinguishing its three main components: anti-
Catholicism, anti-radicalism, and racialism. Much like Smith, he argues that nativist sentiments subsided during the Civil War and Reconstruction, in large part due to the post-war economic boom and the continued need for immigrant labor. The growing economic inequalities of the 1880s gave rise to anti-Catholic and anti-radical sentiments, particularly among fraternal organizations, the temperance movement, and organized labor. These sentiments fuelled nativist fervor during the economic depression of the 1890s, which was accompanied by increased immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, the prevalence of imperialist jingoism in public discourse, and a growing Anglo-Saxon ethnic nationalism. As the economy rebounded in the first decade of the 20th century, xenophobic rhetoric gave way to a new cosmopolitan outlook epitomized by the Progressive movement. However, this phase was also short-lived. In response to another economic downturn in 1914 racial nationalism backed by quasi-scientific claims gained widespread support and resulted in state-level restrictions on immigrant workers and numerous episodes of anti-immigrant violence. The First World War shifted the nation’s attention to anti-radical nativism aimed primarily at German-Americans, which motivated further exclusionary policies (including the Sedition Act and German internment) and the emergence of the 100 Percent Americanism movement. The Red Scare of the post-war years and the Great Depression helped spread categorical suspicion to other ethnic groups and culminated in a severe clampdown on immigration by the federal government.

Although Higham’s analysis stops at 1925, a similar cyclical pattern of progressive reforms and nativist backlashes can be observed throughout the 20th century. In *American Crucible*, Gary Gerstle (2001) takes this story from the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt to the Clinton era. Much as had been the case in the 19th century,
economic crises and threats to national security in the 20th century brought with them restrictive state policies and xenophobic public discourse, which waned once the crises subsided. Furthermore, military conflicts played a crucial role in expanding the social boundaries of the American nation, as had the Revolution and Civil War in the preceding centuries. The Second World War was the occasion for Japanese internment and witnessed a continued segregation of the American military, but in its aftermath racial nationalism and anti-Semitism declined. Similarly, the Cold War created new pressures toward social conformity that reached their height with anti-communist witch hunts, but it also catalyzed the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Gerstle describes these cyclical developments as more a ratchet than a pendulum: with each phase, the cycle brought closer the crisis of the “Rooseveltian nation” that had embodied the double consciousness of civic and ethnoracial ideals. The system ruptured with the Civil Rights movement and collapsed completely with the Vietnam War, as both the racial and civic bases of American nationalism became delegitimized (the former for violating human rights and the latter for its perceived hypocrisy). As a result, the 1970s brought about confusion and ideological drift, out of which emerged two movements: an anti-assimilationist multiculturalism and a reborn conservatism. Gerstle concludes with the emergence of a third alternative in the 1990s, namely Clinton’s liberalism, which combined cosmopolitan multiculturalism with a weaker version of Reagan’s civil nationalism.

The end of the 20th century did not bring about the complete elimination of racial and ethnic criteria of national belonging, however, nor did it herald a purely civic and cosmopolitan view of the nation. The voluminous literature on social stratification in the United States clearly shows that race and ethnicity continue to be important determinants
of Americans’ life chances, and discrimination by white Americans plays a considerable role in that process. Of course, the fact that blacks, Latinos, and other minority groups are worse off than their white counterparts does not imply that the latter consider members of these groups “less American” than themselves. To determine whether race and ethnicity continues to shape people’s conception of the nation we need to address this issue empirically. This is precisely what Devos and Banaji (2005) set out to accomplish in their study of the conscious and unconscious associations between the attribute “American” and white, Asian, and African American group membership.

Social Psychological Research on Nationalism, Patriotism and Intergroup Difference

Undergraduate students surveyed by Devos and Banaji (2005) exhibited a widespread consensus about the content of American national identity, with 88 per cent supporting egalitarian principles. Explicit questions about the strength of ties between each ethnic group and American culture, however, revealed a hierarchy in which Asians are seen as less American than whites and blacks. (The difference between the latter two was not statistically significant). The results of Implicit Association Tests, which tracked the precise speed with which testers matched photos of people of different ethnicities to the words “American” or “foreign,” demonstrated that white students find it considerably easier to link whites with being “American” than either Asians or blacks. This effect persisted even when whites were compared with black Olympic athletes (despite an explicit consensus that the latter are “more American” than the former) and when famous Asian Americans were compared with famous European whites, like Gerard Depardieu. (That is, European whites were identified as Americans more quickly than were Asian Americans). Furthermore, all three groups of subjects, including Asian Americans, had
an easier time associating whites than Asians with being American. The authors conclude that “in contrast to the nuances emerging from deliberate responses, implicit associations reveal a very consistent and robust American = White association” (Devos and Banaji 2005:463).

Political psychologists have also sought to understand the relationship between national attachment and racial and ethnic prejudice. Past research on small groups has yielded contradictory findings, linking in-group loyalty with both out-group antipathy (Adorno et al. 1950; Tajfel 1982) and sympathy (Allport 1954; Brewer and Campbell 1976). De Figuieredo and Elkins (2003) attempt to reconcile these findings by distinguishing between patriotism (pride in the political and economic achievements of the nation) and nationalism (belief in the nation’s superiority to any other) and correlating both phenomena with prejudice against immigrants. Controlling for a number of potentially confounding covariates, such as economic insecurity, authoritarianism, and general frustration, the authors find no significant relationship between patriotism and xenophobia. In contrast, nationalism exhibits a persistent and significant positive effect on antipathy toward immigrants. Despite the fact that both patriotism and nationalism entail a strong positive affect for the nation, only the latter has implications for out-group sentiments.

The results of Sidanis, Feschbach, Levin, and Pratto’s (1997) study of ethnic and national attachment suggest that the consequences of patriotism and nationalism for out-group antipathy may differ by ethnic group. Consistently with Sidanis’s group dominance perspective, the authors argue that in ethnically stratified societies dominant groups should exhibit more national pride than dominated groups and that national pride
should be positively correlated with ethnic loyalty for the former but not the latter. Their analysis of survey data supports these predictions, as whites in the sample exhibit higher degrees of patriotism than blacks (but see Parker 2007b) and the correlation between patriotism and ethnic pride is positive among whites and negative among blacks. Furthermore, patriotism among whites is correlated with measures of racism, while among blacks it is associated with egalitarianism. Interestingly, nationalism was highly correlated with ethnic attachment among all ethnic groups in the sample.

As the studies reviewed in this section demonstrate, ethnicity and race play a crucial role in shaping the social boundaries of the American nation. From the overt xenophobia of the Know Nothing movement of the 1840s to the more subtle associations between ethnicity and American identity among contemporary IAT respondents, being American has long been deeply connected to being white. Although tolerance of blatantly racist discourse has declined greatly over the past century to the point that it is largely unacceptable, implicit cognitive associations of American identity with whiteness continue to fuel less overt, “color-blind” forms of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2006). However, it would be a mistake to view all forms of national attachment as purely ethnic (rather than civic) and hence as correlated with ethnic and racial prejudice. Just as a number of national ideologies reject ethnocultural conceptions of American identity, many variants of patriotism are not associated with xenophobia (De Figuieredo and Elkins 2003). Furthermore, the likelihood of this association varies across social groups, with dominant groups being most likely to link in-group loyalty with out-group antipathy (Sidanius et al. 1997).

**Religion and American Identity**
Before turning to the reproduction of American nationalism through symbolic practice, we will briefly comment on the relationship between nationalism and religion, a topic that tends to be underemphasized in research on nationalism. Americans have always been a religious people and faith has been an important aspect of the nation’s self-definition. Furthermore, despite popular claims to the contrary, Americans have not become less religious over the past century (Finke and Stark 1992). The historical legacy of religion for American nationalism persists today in civic practices, such as the Pledge of Allegiance or the ubiquitous election-time references to candidates’ religious beliefs; and in public opinion, with polls demonstrating the continued importance of belief in God for American national identity (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990). The political landscape in the 1990s and early 2000s was also influenced by the rise of evangelical conservatism, whose definition of the nation has been deeply religious. Yet, despite the historical importance of religion in both the private and public spheres, the United States has maintained a consistent boundary between religion and the state and has been among the more religiously tolerant nations in the world. In fact, some scholars argue that it is precisely the country’s liberal approach to religion that has fuelled the vitality of America’s religious life (Finke and Stark 1992). Of course, religion has also served as a basis for exclusion, as evidenced by waves of anti-Catholic nativism in the 19th century, anti-Semitism in the early decades of the 20th century, and antipathy toward Muslims after 9/11. Atheism and agnosticism have been historically viewed as particularly suspicious, un-American, and capable of sustaining such radical and threatening movements as anarchism and Communism (Dohen 1967).
The religious dimensions of American self-understanding were the focus of a vibrant scholarly discussion in the 1970s, focused on the notion of “civil religion.” Robert Bellah (1967) coined the term to refer to a transcendental conception of the nation, religious in nature but distinct from denominational institutions, which provides the population with a source of solidarity and moral guidance. This Durkheimian approach views national symbols and rituals, like the flag, national holidays, or presidential inaugurations, as sacred (and institutionalized) representations of the collectivity. In this view, such symbols serve as reminders of the nation’s divine destiny and the “obligation, both collective and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth” (Bellah 1975). Since colonial times, this destiny has been defined by a messianic perspective, which sees the United States as an exceptional country chosen by God to wage a universal battle between good, represented by images like the “City on a Hill” and the “Redeemer Nation,” and evil (Cherry 1971). This “apocalyptic Whiggist” perspective has been most popular during times of national crisis, such as the Civil War and the two World Wars, and has served to justify American foreign policy, particularly during the era of American imperialism (Tuveson 1968). Its influence persists to this day, validating the United States’ self-appointed role as a missionary charged with the global dissemination of democratic values. In his treatment of the topic, Bellah emphasized the positive aspects of American civil religion and decried what he perceived as its decline in the face of a relentlessly individualistic consumer culture.

Near consensus on the importance of civil religion in America through the 1970s gave way to a decline in discussions of the topic by the early 1980s (Mathisen 1989). Aside from isolated applications of the theory to understand state-society relations,
including interpretations of the Constitution as a sacred text (Levinson 1980), of the presidency as a priestly institution (Fairbanks 1981), and the quasi-religious nature of political witch-hunts (Goodin 1981), interest in civil religion waned rapidly. Subsequent literature on the decline of civil society took on a decidedly less religious tone (e.g., Putnam 2000) and the sociology of religion turned to less sweeping and normative topics. Mathisen (1989) attributes this transition to the decline of civil religion itself as a historical reality during the late 1970s, captured by Bellah’s (1975:145) pronouncement that “American civil religion is an empty and broken shell,” as well as to the exhaustion of such research as a passing intellectual fad.

Yet not all scholars agree that civil religion has disappeared from American public consciousness. Wuthnow (1990) rejects the notion that civil religion has been eroded by forces of consumer culture and instead argues that it has undergone important changes throughout the 1980s. The old (ostensible) value consensus has given way to polarization between two variants of civil religion, one conservative and orthodox and the other liberal and progressive. This polarization is not limited to civil religion – it also manifests itself within all major religious denominations in the United States. In fact, in the post-Reagan political climate, religion has become a lightning rod for ideological divisions, epitomized by the struggle between evangelical conservatism and liberal humanism. Wuthnow argues that together with the shift in religiosity from the public to the private realm caused by growth of the state and rise in educational attainment after the Second World War, the bifurcation of both religious institutions and civil religion is likely to necessitate the nation’s reliance on other legitimating myths, such as a quasi-
religious faith in personal growth, material success, and, especially, scientific and technological progress.

For others, there is little new in the distinction between the liberal and conservative dimensions of American religion. Blum (1985) argues that religion played a crucial role in post-Civil War Reconstruction, but also in the turn away from racial justice and toward North-South reconciliation. Immediately after the Civil War, many congregations supported the African American cause and thousands of Protestant missionaries traveled to the South to take part in Reconstruction efforts. Yet, Protestant elites were also instrumental in creating public support for abandoning progressive policies and in justifying America’s imperialist efforts. Prominent figures like Henry Ward Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Dwight Lyman Moody and organizations such as Women’s Christian Temperance Movement helped ensure the continuation of the “white republic” in which “the supremacy of whiteness, the supremacy of the United States, and the supremacy of Christ had again become viewed as one and the same” (Blum 1985). Meanwhile, African Americans continued to use a combination of Christian imagery and liberal civic nationalism over the subsequent decades in their political struggle for equality. Blum’s case study provides one example of a broader historical tendency: Religious discourse has in fact united Americans, but often around contradictory goals. Some have used religion to support exclusionary aims, as evidenced by the anti-immigrant movements of the early 19th century, while others have appealed to it in pursuit of social justice, as was the case for many abolitionists.

A final study that bears mentioning is George Thomas’s (1989) Revivalism and Cultural Change, which analyzes the causes and consequences of the Second Great
Awakening, as well as of American religious revivals in general. In a marked departure from Durkheimian sociology of religion, which views periods of religious fervor as conservative reactions to social anomie, Thomas formulates an institutional model, in which religious revivals help usher in new worldviews during times of widespread social change. Just as the First Great Awakening of the 1730s influenced the rise of revolutionary ideology, the Second Great Awakening created the conditions for abolitionism, temperance, and economic nationalism. The revival was itself a product of rapid market penetration which re-oriented the nation around new principles of economic individualism and national production and consumption. Revivalism, which championed Methodist individualistic millennialism over pessimistic and collectivist Calvinist dogma, was isomorphic in its goals with Republicanism and free market capitalism. As such, it brought the religious practices of the late 19th century in line with new economic realities, while also helping Americans make sense of their changing social order. During periods of rapid change, multiple movements frequently vie for the support of the public, which explains why religion can be used for contradictory goals, as described by Blum, or why it can enter into conflict with progressive movements, as described by Wuthnow. However, Thomas does not view such contradictions and conflicts as symptomatic of “culture wars” between forces of religious conservatism resistant to change and secularism supportive of it. Instead, he understands them as struggles between alternative ways of “build[ing] a new social order by drawing on traditional systems,” with the main point of difference consisting of the particular traditions to which the alternatives appeal (Thomas 1989:3).
The few studies outlined above represent most of the research on religion and nationalism. The rich discussion that Bellah initiated highlights the historical importance of religious interpretations of American national identity and destiny, the continued prevalence of which is supported by contemporary survey research. Wuthnow provides an update to this perspective by focusing on the polarization of civil religion at the end of the 20th century between the rival camps of the liberal humanists and the new Christian Right. However, lest we view these changes as unprecedented, Blum’s and Thomas’s work reminds us that alternative ways of adjusting to (and creating) social change have always existed in the United States. In the final analysis, religion must be viewed as an important element in the collective self-definition of the American people and one that continues to set their country apart from most other capitalist democracies.

**Symbolic Practices**

Most of the works reviewed thus far have focused on the content of elite and popular ideologies and, to a lesser degree, on the interaction of these ideologies with state institutions. Few of the studies reviewed have addressed how these ideologies are generated, diffused, and reproduced. In order to understand these processes, we must turn our attention to the symbolic representations of the nation which are instantiated in cultural practice. It is by way of public rituals, often sponsored by political and business elites, that American colonists first came to identify with the national community and its symbols. Over time many of these rituals became institutionalized to facilitate the periodic invigoration of national identification among the country’s citizens. However, exceptional events like public celebrations are not the only sites of the symbolic reproduction of nationalism. In a subtler manner, people also reaffirm their relationship
to the nation in the course of their everyday lives, when they interact with state institutions, make consumption decisions (whether to buy an American or foreign car, for instance), or watch sporting events (Billig 1995). By examining both official and quotidian nationalist rituals, and particularly by analyzing variation in their content over time and geographic space, we can learn much about how the population of the United States conceives of itself and its country.

While rituals are fleeting episodes of collective effervescence, the symbols that serve as their focal points tend to persist even after the celebrations die down. From historical figures and commemorative monuments to art objects and buildings, symbolic representations of the nation abound in the daily lives of American citizens (Zelinsky 1988). Such representations bear the imprints of the conditions in which they were produced and their use and reception varies over time and across social groups. Analyzing both the production and the reception of national symbols constitutes an important method for understanding how conceptualizations of the nation have evolved over time. From the perspective of cultural analysis, nationalism is not a set of ideas that constitute a coherent national identity, but rather a variety of practices through which individuals enact (and continually reproduce) their relationship to the nation. Such practices tend to reflect intense political struggles over the meaning of the nation’s past and the appropriate path for its future, which often occur at the intersection of elite and popular ideologies.

The cultural approach is exemplified by Waldstreicher’s (1995, 1997) research on collective ritual in the early Republic. Waldstreicher (1995:8) explicitly rejects the consensus historians’ emphasis on national identity, instead defining nationalism as “a
political strategy, developed differently at different times by specific groups, responding to the strategies of other groups.” His work aims to investigate the manner in which American national symbols were constructed and used in celebrations, speeches, and media reports to advance particular political interests. The main theme that emerges from Waldstreicher’s account of the first six decades of American history may not surprise students of culture, but it represents an advance over past research on nationalism: national symbols, he argues, are polysemous and lend themselves to various, often contradictory, political ends. His historical narrative begins with the 1770s, when revolutionary elites and their supporters employed well known British traditions to unite the population in a common cause against its colonial overseers (thereby giving shape to American nationhood). Toasts, sermons, and street theater were used to incite public protest, while existing holidays were modified to recognize the newly emerging nation, in some cases at the direct behest of the Continental Congress. By describing rebellious celebrations in detail, regional newspapers helped diffuse the practices beyond particular localities, further amplifying nationalist fervor throughout the colonies. Media reports emphasized the unity of the population in its desire for sovereignty and it so doing it “literally and figuratively papered over the disturbing class resentments (expressed in the anti-aristocratic language of the Revolution) that had energized much of the populace in the first place” (p. 18). A similar rhetoric of seamless unity dominated newspaper coverage of Constitutional ratification rallies in the 1780s, which sought to galvanize support for the new political system.

By the 1790s the ostensible unity of the new Republic gave way to bitter partisan struggle between the Federalists and the Democratic Republicans (Waldstreicher 1997).
Public rituals played a central role in this struggle. Holidays such as the 4th of July were used by both sides to claim monopoly on the legacy of the Revolution while depicting the opposition as un-American. Part of the vitriolic exchange, typically communicated by public toasts that were scrupulously reported by the press, consisted of belittling the form and content of the opposition’s celebrations and offering superior counter-displays of nationalism. Such was the power of this ritualistic tug-of-war that many Americans came to consider their party affiliation as important as their local or national identities. Partisan rivalry subsided by the beginning of the 19th century, but the importance of public rituals persisted in the sectional conflicts and ideological debates over slavery and imperialism that dominated the subsequent decades.

Throughout his historical narrative, Waldstreicher acknowledges an ongoing tension between elite and popular interests in the construction of national rituals. Although public celebrations in the early Republic were relatively inclusive and employed popular folk traditions, their content was steered by political elites toward particular goals, such as the diffusion of national loyalty or the advancement of partisan strategy. Furthermore, intellectual and business elites played an important role in filtering information for newspaper reports which were so crucial for the dissemination of nationalist ideas.

A perception of national consensus emerged in the 1770s and 1780s out of a feedback loop between the interests of elites, the content of media coverage, and the enactment of widely shared public sentiments. This theme is explored in Bodnar’s (1992) account of the evolving struggles between official and vernacular forms of public memory. Bodnar argues that elites use official memory to generate public loyalty toward
the institutions of the nation-state. Official versions of the past downplay disorder and dramatic social change (such as citizen protests or military defeats) and stress historical continuity (typically framed as steady progress), social order embedded in existing institutions, and the importance of citizenship responsibilities. When symbolic representations of official memory, such as those employed in state-sanctioned public rituals, come into conflict with vernacular memory, they tend to generate popular resistance. The public may infuse official rituals with alternate, oppositional meanings or it may reject them altogether, staging protests and counter-celebrations (as was the case among colonists opposed to continued British rule in the lead-up to the Revolution). Hence, the meaning of national symbols and rituals can be said to exist at the intersection of official and vernacular cultures, with the balance of the two reflecting the overall distribution of power in the society of the time. The changing relationship between the stakeholders in public memory rituals is one of Bodnar’s (1992) main concerns. In particular, he focuses on the shifting dynamic between the nation-state, business, regional interests, and vernacular culture (especially that of ethnic minorities).

Bodnar’s (1992) account of the first fifty years of the Republic is consistent with Waldstreicher’s. Bodnar emphasizes the importance of the nation-state during this time, as elites encouraged the expression of vernacular traditions in a manner that helped transfer popular loyalties from Britain to the newly formed nation. This period also witnessed the emergence of the first national symbols, such as Independence Day and George Washington. The heroic, larger-than-life status of the latter was secured after the Revolution by prominent “reputational entrepreneurs” (including Washington himself) (Schwartz 1987). The power of these symbols was further amplified by the partisan
infighting of the turn of the century, which minimized the importance of oppositional interests that did not conform to either the Federalist or the Democratic ideologies (Bodnar 1992). Once the conflict ended in a political consensus during the 1820s, however, previously suppressed class, ethnic, and regional tensions came to dominate public attention, fragmenting national commemorative rituals. Alternative symbolic figures, such as Davy Crockett, were used to rally support for different interpretations of American nationhood, and public holidays like the 4th of July were reinterpreted to signify leisure time for the working class rather than celebrations of the nation.

According to Bodnar, public commemoration of the past after the Civil War embodied a tension between a vernacular memory that attempted to come to terms with the colossal loss of life in individual communities (what Pettigrew [1996] termed the “cult of sacrifice”) and the official goal of national reconciliation. This tension was exacerbated by rising immigration levels and the significant role played by business in structuring public rituals. The private sector, and its government allies, aimed to connect commerce and technological progress with national pride and destiny. Their vision came into conflict that of immigrants, who resisted wholesale national assimilation, as well as with the interests of workers and racial minorities. New symbols, like the pioneer everyman, were constructed in resistance to official narratives and existing symbols were interpreted in oppositional ways. The latter was particularly true of Abraham Lincoln, whose official legacy as the architect of a reunited nation competed with his vernacular interpretation as the rescuer of slaves (among African Americans) and a rugged pioneer (among the working class).
By the First World War, the rapidly expanding state successfully nationalized most public rituals and suppressed their oppositional readings. The strengthened and homogenized public culture of the mid-20th century marked the zenith of the American nationalist project, which was now successfully fused with powerful statism (Zelinsky 1988). Its symbols, including national parks, the Pledge of Allegiance, the American flag, Uncle Sam, and Washington, D.C., remain salient to this day, unlike those that had characterized previous periods of American nationalism (e.g., Miss Liberty, the Liberty Tree, and landscape paintings). Cataloguing the changing nature of these symbols is the main objective of Zelinsky’s (1988) work. However, as both Zelinsky and Bodnar argue, the newly emerged nationalist-statist consensus between official and vernacular culture ruptured in 1960s and 1970s, when previously marginalized countercultures burst into mainstream public discourse. The cultural upheavals catalyzed by the Civil Rights, feminist, and anti-war movements infused American public memory with a critical quality that drastically altered the content of national symbols and rituals over the subsequent decades.

The shifts in the symbolic content of nationalist rituals could already be observed by the late 1970s. In her comparative study of American and Australian centennials and bicentennials, Spillman (1997) analyzes how concerns over the internal coherence and the international position of the nation shaped the cultural repertoires employed in public celebrations. In general, the U.S. bicentennial of 1976 featured fewer references to the international context than did the centennial of 1876. During the first, allusions were made to the country’s aspirations of geopolitical prominence and elites openly discussed

---

America’s British heritage. By 1976, neither topic received much attention. As an explanation for the former change, Spillman argues that the country’s unquestionable status as a global superpower in the 20th century did not require public reinforcement. The latter reflected a shift of cultural authority from Northeastern elites to a centralized state concerned with uniting the increasingly multiethnic national population.

The cultural diversity of the American population in 1976, and the increased suspicion with which official memory was viewed in the aftermath of the protests of the previous decade, also affected the way in which the national past was formulated during the bicentennial. While the founding of the nation continued to occupy an important symbolic role, references to economic and political progress disappeared from public discourse (this was partly due to the different economic conditions during the two periods). However, the most drastic change was the central place occupied by celebrations of diversity in 1976. As Spillman argues, the main objective for national elites in 1876 was sectional reconciliation, which was served by references to national progress. In contrast, in 1976, the main objective was the inclusion of previously excluded groups who had loudly voiced their political claims in the preceding years. Given that many of these groups continued to be politically and economically disadvantaged, official accounts of a coherent past devoid of conflict and of rapid national progress would have likely led to public dissent. Instead, the bicentennial presented an inclusive and ambiguous historical narrative and celebrated the food and dance of diverse national constituencies.

Dana Frank’s (1999) *Buy American*, a historical analysis of economic nationalism in the United States, addresses an important aspect of nationalism that tends to be ignored
by most other research on the topic, namely the role of economic interests and consumer behavior in constructing public conceptions of the American nation. Frank focuses her research on recurrent public campaigns that urged consumers to purchase American products, beginning with the Great Depression and ending with the reaction to globalization in the 1990s. We include this book in the current section because of the nationalistic symbolism with which consumer products were imbued in the course of these campaigns. Buying an American appliance was portrayed not only as a wise consumption decision, but also as a sign of national loyalty and a way for average citizens to inflict damage on the foreign economies that allegedly threatened America. This rhetoric attempted to link personal consumption, economic progress, and national security in a manner that heightened people’s sense of national identification and incited their distrust of America’s economic competitors.

Frank argues that the three major “Buy American” campaigns of the 20th century shared two important features: first, they emerged during times of economic crisis and second, they were deeply intertwined with racist attitudes toward ethnic minorities (and with ethnocultural nationalism more broadly). As had been the case with the nativist movement, organized labor expressed anti-immigrant antipathy in their support of the campaigns. Labor’s constituents, in turn, were constantly reminded by political and economic elites of the threat posed to them by foreign capital and by foreign workers at home and abroad. The first Buy American campaign was launched in the 1930s under the leadership of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, Jr. and his supporters at the American Federation of Labor, while the second one was championed in the late 1970s and early 1980s by major American corporations, which encouraged the United
Auto Workers and local unions to spearhead it. The third campaign took place in the early 1990s in response to the recession of 1991 and the growing reliance of manufacturing on cheap foreign labor (though its direct catalyst was a public statement by a Japanese official about the poor productivity of American workers). All three cases demonstrate the manner in which (ethnocultural) nationalist sentiments can be manipulated by powerful political and economic interests. They also draw our attention to the manner in which even the most mundane objects, like automobiles and electronics, can take on enormously powerful symbolic meanings that reinforce individuals’ attachment to the national collectivity.

**Conclusion**

This review has covered a wide range of material from multiple disciplines in an effort to address a fundamental question: is nationalism a relevant topic for students of American society? In our view, the answer is a resounding “yes.” From nation-building and political culture to ethnic exclusion and cultural practice, the United States provides a fascinating case study of the emergence and continual reproduction of national identification in a capitalist democracy. Admittedly, scholars interested in sub-national ethnic nationalism that seeks to subvert existing state institutions may find little of interest in this literature (with the exception of historical examples of America’s founding and its subsequent sectional conflicts). However, one of our aims has been to demonstrate the analytical utility of a broader, more inclusive definition of the phenomenon. Nationalism is much more than an oppositional ideology of minority groups who had been denied sovereign rule over their own territories (or, to put it in Gellner’s terms, whose aspirations toward congruence between their political and
national units have been frustrated by geopolitical reality). To be sure, this dimension of nationalism is important; without it the origin of the American nation-state-building project would be impossible to understand. However, it is only one dimension among many. Nationalism is also a set of competing principles that determine the basis of membership in an existing nation-state, as has been demonstrated by the literature on national identity and political culture. It is also a rhetorical tool used to thinly veil upsurges in racism and xenophobia, as attested to by our discussion of the nation’s social boundaries. Furthermore, scholars like Robert Bellah remind us that nationalism can also serve as a surrogate religion, with its own priests, sacred texts, and witch-hunts. Finally, as we suggested in the previous section, nationalism is something that happens in commonplace public rituals, where official and vernacular cultures meet and sometimes clash. All of these dimensions are crucial for a complete understanding of the ways in which Americans construe their relationship to their nation and the mechanisms by which this relationship is both reproduced and transformed over time.

In other words, the United States has its own brands of nationalism. Given that this is the case, is the study of American nationalism of interest only to students of American history, politics, and society? Or can such research generate historical lessons and theoretical conclusions that help us understand nationalism as a general phenomenon? We believe that studying nationalism in the United States is important in both respects. The need for understanding the particularities of the American case is obvious. However, the utility of such an understanding for scholars of nationalism as a general phenomenon may require some additional explanation. Although we have reviewed a considerable volume of scholarly work on nationalism, these studies represent only a small fraction
of all research on nationalism. Most attention in this broad interdisciplinary field focuses on sub-national groups that seek national sovereignty. This is understandable given the contemporary relevance of many of these cases and their propensity to erupt into violent conflicts. American nationalism has certainly generated fewer casualties, at least in the United States since the end of the Civil War. This does not mean that there are no connections between American nationalism and human suffering, however. The manner in which Americans conceive of their nation has tremendous repercussions for the content of American domestic and foreign policy, which in turn affects the lives of millions of people across the world. The role played by ethnoculturalism in justifying the subjugation of African Americans or the use of the rhetoric of manifest destiny to rally support for American invasions of sovereign nations, are two cases in point.

Aside from the direct impact of nationalism on human welfare, the American case is unusual in ways that should interest comparativists. Few other wealthy democracies combine strong national loyalty with high rates of religious belief and participation. Religious faith has always been important for American nationalism, but its specific role is likely to change as American civil religion fades into history and the myth of the United States as the “Redeemer Nation” becomes increasingly untenable in a geopolitically multipolar world.

The United States is also one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world, but one in which ethnoculturally essentialist definitions of national identity remain strong. Given the long-term unfeasibility of maintaining the Anglo-Protestant myth complex and the lack of support for Canadian-style multiculturalism, it will be interesting to observe how the country chooses to incorporate its continually growing foreign-born
population and to reconcile the ongoing tension between civic and ethnic nationalist ideologies.

The role of the United States as a world economic leader and a core node in global trade networks presents another challenge, both to American nationalism and to scholars who seek to understand nationalism cross-nationally. One of the key debates in globalization research has concerned the impact of global interconnectedness on the nation-state as political entity and cultural concept, with some theorists suggesting that globalizing processes are gradually eroding the importance of the nation-state and others arguing for the continued importance of the nation-state in the global order. Given that the United States is at the forefront of globalization, it presents an ideal case for testing these propositions and gaining a better understanding of the impact of globalization on nationalism.

The most important reason for the broader relevance of American nationalism, however, is also the simplest: as a well established nation-state that places a high importance on civic nationalist ideology, the United States represents the perfect case for studying nationalism in its unremarkable, everyday form – the kind of nationalism that is largely missed by studies of sub-national ethnic conflict, but which is central to the continued reproduction of national attachment in democratic societies.

Although the research reviewed here provides a rich account of nationalism in the United States, much more work must still be done to advance our understanding of this complex topic. First, historical research is overrepresented in this field and most of it focuses on the 18th and 19th centuries. More research on contemporary nationalism is sorely needed.
Second, a more thorough investigation of the links between religion and national attachment is necessary, both during the early years of the Republic and in the period following the decline of “civil religion.” The relationship between nationalism, patriotism, and Evangelical Christianity in the contemporary United States also deserves our attention.

Third, national identification cannot be understood without reference to other levels of group attachment. Historians have taken into account local and regional interests, particularly in the decades preceding the Civil War, but political psychologists have yet to adopt this approach. Contemporary survey research should explore variation in the relative importance and meaning of local, regional, and national identification across geographical space and sociodemographic categories (and across time, to the extent that longitudinal data are available).

Fourth, political psychologists must continue studying the affective dimensions of national identification, captured by such concepts as “the public mood” (Rahn 2004). This line of research acknowledges that content and salience of national identification depend on exogenous changes in political and economic conditions. As such, it offers one way to move beyond the use of simplistic survey items in nationalism research that serve to obfuscate as much as they reveal.

Finally, most of the historical literature reviewed here emphasizes elite ideologies, while the studies that utilize survey data tend to stress popular opinions. More research needs to explicitly investigate the dialectic relationship between these two sets of attitudes. Despite important steps in that direction (e.g., Schildkraut 2002), existing
approaches must be elaborated considerably if we are to understand the mechanisms through which nationalism is constructed, diffused, and transformed.
American Nationalism

Annotated Bibliography

Bart Bonikowski
Department of Sociology
Princeton University
April, 2008
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nationalism and State-building ................................................................. 3
National Identity and Political Culture ....................................................... 9
  Historical and Synthetic Analyses .......................................................... 9
  Political Psychology and Survey Research .............................................. 13
Social Boundaries of the Nation: Inclusion and Exclusion ......................... 22
Nationalism and Religion ......................................................................... 30
Nationalism as Symbolic Practice .......................................................... 314
Many scholars view the nation-state as a quintessentially modern phenomenon dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries (Calhoun 2004). In this context, nationalism refers to the cultural, economic, and political mechanisms that facilitate the formation of state institutions and the development of the population’s loyalty toward the national community. The conditions in which the American nation-state was formed were somewhat unusual (just how unusual is a point of debate), because the inhabitants of the colonies did not share a common ethnicity, historical territory, or religion. The readings reviewed in this section examine how common conceptions of American identity developed and changed over time given these circumstances. Many of them focus on key historical moments, such as the American Revolution, the Civil War, and Reconstruction.


The article describes the gradual shift in loyalty away from English cultural heritage and toward the American nation among Southerners between 1763 and 1775. Before the final decades of the 18th century, Southerners considered themselves more faithful to British traditions than their counterparts in the Northern colonies. However, changes in the ethnic makeup of the South, gradual departures from English political practices and principles, and perceptions of unfair treatment at the hands of the English Crown shifted the collective identity of Southerners away from England and toward their own localities. Although Southerners viewed their culture and interests as distinct from the Northern colonies, in large part due to their reliance on slavery, a coherent Southern identity did not develop in this period. Instead, intercolonial contact with the North facilitated by improvements in communication and transportation and common experiences with British rule led to the gradual emergence of an overarching American identity. Despite the persistence of loyalties to England in some segments of the population, especially in colonies heavily dependent on the Crown (like Georgia), the nascent American identity eventually united the colonies in their fight for national independence.


In his historical study of struggles over the legacy of the Civil War, Blight identifies a long-standing tension between two ideals: justice and healing. Arguments over the manner in which the war should be incorporated into the collective memory of a reunited America and the means by which equal status could be ensured for freed slaves were based on divergent interpretations of the war’s meaning. As Blight’s analysis of public rituals, political campaigns, popular literature, and memoirs demonstrates, the debate was at its core dominated by the issue of race – those who wished to reconstruct the old racial regime (primarily Southern whites) fought to remove emancipation from the public discourse, while those who favored racial equality (primarily blacks and their white supporters) sought to maintain the primary role of slavery in the public
understanding of the Civil War. A third position dominant among most whites was that of reconciliation through a focus on the commonalities between the North and the South, rather than on the issues that once divided them. In the end, healing took precedence over justice. The resulting consensus over the war’s interpretation as a momentary rupture in the unity of (white) America, which only strengthened the nation, provided justification for the maintenance of a profoundly unequal social order over the subsequent century. A crucial exception to that consensus was black historical memory, which was kept alive by a rich (though hardly homogeneous) intellectual and cultural discourse infused with a deep religious faith in the eventual liberation of blacks from their suffering.


Faust documents the development of Confederate nationalism, arguing that a cohesive regional identity was shaped by elites in an effort to galvanize support for their instrumental interests, particularly the preservation of slavery. Given the lack of inherent differences between the population of the South and the North, Southerners self-consciously created myths of dissimilarity based on race (viewing themselves as descendents of the Normans fighting against the Saxons in the North), language (e.g., the enunciation of the last letters in all words), and political heritage (perceiving themselves as the true heirs of the Revolution and comparing their struggle to European independence movements). The Southern cause was legitimized by religious belief, which gave it a transcendent purpose during the Civil War. Two religiously-influenced themes became particularly central to Southern culture: the movement against “extortion” and an ideological embrace of slavery. The former framed capitalist profiteering, price-gouging, and hoarding as sins for which God was punishing the South and which had to be eradicated. The latter focused on slavery as a crucial element of God’s plan for the South. The institution of slavery became celebrated in songs, poems, books (including textbooks), paintings, and minstrel shows, which emphasized its centrality to Southern identity. In order to preserve the righteous image of the South and maintain the support for the nationalist cause among non-slave-owners, popular portrayals of slaves depicted them as supportive of the regime. This had the unintended effect of politically empowering slave leaders and generating calls for reform among some Southerners who sought to reconcile rhetoric with reality. A number of these reforms were instituted before the end of the Civil War.


Kohn examines the origins of American nationalism and its development in the context of the changing relationship between America and Britain, the emergence of America’s federal structure, the multi-ethnic composition of American society, and the growing role of America in international politics. He stresses the civic origins of the nation, united by the Lockean principles contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well as its privileged geographical location, lack of class divisions, dislike for England, and Western expansion. In the
decades after America’s founding, this unity was reinforced by a focus on internal improvements and industrial development and the emergence of a national literary tradition. Nonetheless, sectional loyalties, reinforced by the War of 1812, Western expansion, and Southern nationalism, continued to exist until Reconstruction. Ongoing immigration also strained American national identity, leading to the rise of nativism and the development of exclusionary policies in the early 20th century. Kohn concludes with a description of the rise of expansionist ideology in the late 19th century, United States’ involvement in the First World War, and the isolationisms of the inter-war period.


Two authors in this anthology make interesting contributions to scholarly understanding of American nationalism. Unlike most historical accounts that treat the American colonies in isolation, T. H. Breen frames the emergence of American self-consciousness in the context of rising English nationalism in Great Britain. He argues that it was England’s rejection of the colonists as social equals (and not vice versa) that created separatist sentiments in the U.S., which were framed in the defensive terms of natural rights liberalism. He compares the status of the colonists to that of Scots and the Welsh and cites emotional, and often racist, American protests over such treatment (e.g., John Adams’ statement, “We won’t be their Negroes.”). John Higham outlines the role of elites in formulating a coherent American identity, focusing in particular on the 19th-century hegemony of “genteel intellectuals,” who stressed the roots of America in its Anglo-Saxon settlement and conceived of the world through sharp evolutionary distinctions. He argues that the genteel consensus ruptured in the 1890s with the growing prominence of critical intellectuals of non-Anglo-American origin, including Veblen, Dreiser, Santayana, and Boas, who laid the foundations for a more inclusive and egalitarian American identity. Their efforts were built upon by early 20th century cultural pluralists, such as Bourne and Kallen.


McPherson argues that slavery and nativism were glaring exceptions to the civic nationalism of postcolonial America. In the antebellum period, the threat of nativism subsided and was replaced by a burgeoning Southern ethnic nationalism. Southern nationalists viewed themselves as fundamentally distinct from Northerners (even ethnically or racially), and reinforced their identity with symbolic references to the experiences of stateless European ethnic groups, such as the Poles and Hungarians, and the medieval conflict between Normans and Anglo-Saxons. In contrast, the North framed the South in strictly civic terms, describing the secessionists as “rebels”, “traitors”, and “despots”. For McPherson the outcome of the Civil War signaled a victory of civic over ethnic nationalism, at least in principle if not always in practice.

Merritt uses content analysis of four urban newspapers to determine when the colonists began to think of themselves as American rather than English. The prevalence of self-referential symbols increased considerably between 1735 and 1775 (most of them focusing on the land rather than the people), signaling the emergence of a collective identity. References to Americans, rather than to British colonists, emerged in 1764 and became increasingly widespread over the subsequent years. By 1770, over half of the instances of self-identification referred to Americans or America. New England newspapers were the first to adopt the practice, followed by the middle colonies and the South.


Minicucci argues that national improvement policies aimed at harmonizing local and regional economic interests were more important for nation-building than attempts to create a culturally unified “imagined community.” Economic integration policies, such as the American System, were championed, often unsuccessfully, by conservative minorities in the Federalist, Republican, and Whig parties. The democratic majority’s alternative strategy of local empowerment combined with a strong mass party system did not provide a lasting solution to the fundamental “problem of space” in the new republic (i.e., the danger of the development of factions with distinct geographic bases). The failure of economic development in the South and of the South’s economic integration with the North contributed to the subsequent conflict between the two regions.

Robertson, Andrew W. 2001. “‘Look on This Picture… And on This!’ Nationalism, Localism, and Partisan Images of Otherness in the United States, 1787-1820.” *The American Historical Review* 106:1263-1280.

Robertson documents the deep schism in American national identity that emerged in the 1790s around party affiliation, as the Federalists and the Republicans engaged in discursive (and sometimes physical) warfare in the public sphere, aided by a burgeoning popular press. By the end of the decade, the two factions developed into parallel, antagonistic “imagined communities,” each with its own interpretation of common national symbols and rituals. Their symbolic battles often involved the use of ethnic and racial labeling, intended to discredit the opposition’s commitment to the wellbeing of the country. Ironically, this partisan conflict inadvertently unified the American nation by temporarily overshadowing local interests and identities. Local loyalties re-emerged in the aftermath of the War of 1812, as party affiliation was supplanted by ethnic, religious, and regional sources of national identity.


Savelle traces the development of American nationalism during the Revolutionary era. Until the Revolution, and for many, until its final days, the colonists viewed themselves as loyal Britons. The difference between Whigs and Tories was not one of kind, but of degree: both were loyal to the Crown but the former were critical of its colonial policies and desired reforms (without necessarily sacrificing
existing loyalties). Even the Continental Congress showed considerable respect for the monarchy. However, the colonists also felt a “distinct consciousness of differentness and a certain smug self-satisfaction” which tied them to their individual regions. This sense of difference reinforced by Britain’s continued alienation of the colonies gradually drove a wedge between the Whigs and the Tories, and eventually between the colonies and the British Empire. However, colonial secession did not automatically produce the American nation—affiliations continued to be predominantly regional. As the Revolution progressed, a number of factors, including the fight against a common enemy, increased intercolonial contact, and a public debate about the fate of the West, pushed the colonists in the direction of national identity. This development was reinforced by intellectual elites who began weaving together an American mythos out of folk tales about pioneers, military heroes, Indians, and the vast American landscape, as well as traditionally English notions of individual liberty.

Samuel, Lawrence R. 1997. *Pledging Allegiance: American Identity and the Bond Drive of World War II.* Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. Samuel documents the U.S. government’s World War II bond campaign, which was designed to fund the military effort abroad and promoted by state propaganda, Hollywood celebrities, politicians, and everyday people. However, the author’s main argument is less about war financing than about the, partly intentional, social consequences of the bond drive, including the reaffirmation of American democratic pluralism, the fostering of social cohesion, and the nurturing of consumer culture, which would come to dominate the nation in the post-War years. Not only did the Roosevelt administration promote bond purchasing as a means to these secondary ends, but the consumption of bonds itself became a political process, as demonstrated by their widespread popularity among African Americans, who hoped that bonds would promote their upward mobility and help them stake a claim in the growing American economy. In the final analysis, World War II bonds turned out to be a poor investment, disappointing the hopes of many underprivileged Americans, but they helped shaped the social landscape of America of the 1940s and 1950s.

Starr, Paul. 2004. *The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications.* New York: Basic Books. In this rich analysis of the historical development of the media, Starr sets out a path-dependent argument that emphasizes the decisive role played by “constitutive choice[s]” made during times of national crises, typically by legislators. In the American case, one of the features of the post-Revolutionary liberal constitutionalism was the creation of a widespread postal network and the promotion of a free press. The government’s decision to discount the shipping costs for books and to base postal costs on weight in the mid-1800s further accelerated the spread of information around the country, setting it apart from many of its European counterparts. Similar choices promoted the growth of the telegraph and telephone, cinema, and radio and television broadcasting. By allowing the media to flourish, the state also created the conditions for uniting the heterogeneous population scattered across a vast territory under a common
national culture. Hence, The Creation of the Media is also a story of the creation of the American nation.

-------. 2007. Freedom's Power: The True Force of Liberalism. New York: Basic Books. Starr describes the development of American liberalism from its constitutional roots to its modern democratic form. Classical political liberalism was concerned primarily with civil liberty and freedom from arbitrary power. It was not yet fully democratic, since it did not guarantee political rights to all members of the society. A more democratic variant of liberalism emerged at the end of the 19th century, which rejected laissez-faire economic policy, embraced a positive view of freedom (i.e., freedom as the possibility of individual self-realization), supported more expansive state policies, and was more open to demands for formal and substantive equality. Both forms of liberalism coexisted during the “liberal consensus” of the 20th century, characterized by widespread agreement about the core liberal values among both political parties (although the Democrats were the primary proponents of modern democratic liberalism). However, the consensus eroded with the political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, which eventually caused the Democrats to lose their status as the majority party to an increasingly radical coalition of free-market and religious conservatives.

Weeks, William Earl. 1994. “American Nationalism, American Imperialism: An Interpretation of American Political Economy, 1789-1861.” Journal of the Early Republic 14:485-95. Weeks views American nationalism and imperialism as mutually-reinforcing ideologies that have shaped the nation’s identity since the Revolution. The practical advantages of an economic and political union led colonial elites to pursue the formation of a centralized authority over both domestic and foreign policy (via “internal imperialism”). Immediately after independence, Americans pursued both global commercial expansion and the exportation of their liberal principles of international law and commerce. This “international social movement,” supported by ideologies of Manifest Destiny and American-led human progress, engendered policy conflicts that ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

A large segment of the literature on American nationalism attempts to capture the essence of the country’s political culture. This tradition dates back to early commentators, like Tocqueville, Myrdal, and even Weber, whose accounts tended to abstract from individual and group attitudes and focus on the national “soul” – the underlying foundations of American culture. This approach persists to this day, relying primarily on institutional accounts, such as those produced by the three branches of the state, and on the statements and behaviors of national elites. A second variant of political culture research avoids the potential trap of excessive cultural generalizations by focusing on individual opinions and attitudes. In so doing, it draws heavily on findings in social and political psychology and public opinion research.

HISTORICAL AND SYNTHETIC ANALYSES

Hollinger distinguishes two elements of multiculturalism: pluralism and cosmopolitanism. The former, associated with Horace Kallen, emphasizes the autonomy of groups and the rigidity of their boundaries. The latter, associated with Randolph Bourne, favors voluntary affiliation and multiple group identities, and emphasizes the porous and dynamic nature of groups. Hollinger argues that multiculturalism has outgrown itself and advocates a rejection of pluralism in favor of a purely cosmopolitan “postethnic” perspective that maintains racial and ethnic distinctions solely for the purpose of addressing inequalities, but not as the basis for cultural classification. This view “supports on the basis of revocable consent those affiliations by shared descent that were previously taken to be primordial.”


Lieven argues that American political culture consists of two opposed traditions, one based on the American Creed and the other on radical nationalism. The former emphasizes the rational and universal values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law and, more recently, equality and racial tolerance (but not economic egalitarianism). Among the more negative aspects of the Creedal tradition, which typically becomes more pronounced in times of national crisis, is the belief that the United States is an exceptional, messianic nation. More extreme variants of this position serve as the basis for a radical enthoreligious nationalism that constitutes the second “soul” of American national identity. An antithesis of the liberal Creed, this exclusionary ideology has four historical roots: Anglo-Saxon and Scots Irish cultural heritage, the historical experience of the White South, fundamentalist Protestantism, and a history of racial and ethnic antipathies toward minority groups. Having identified these building blocks of American identity, Lieven traces their historical development from the 19th century until today.


According to Pei, American nationalism (or patriotism – he views the two as synonymous) is fuelled by civic voluntarism and everyday rituals, such as the Pledge of Allegiance, which stem from private decisions rather than state coercion. Unlike other national traditions, American nationalism is based on the political ideals of a common universalistic creed rather than on notions of ethnic or cultural superiority (hence, attacks on the U.S. are seen as attacks on its values); it is “triumphant rather than aggrieved;” and it is forward-looking (characterized by a missionary spirit and a short collective memory). These traits lead to two paradoxes: a) despite being highly nationalistic the nation does not see itself as such and b) its policymakers misunderstand the importance of more traditional nationalisms abroad, as evidenced by the history of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Vietnam War, Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, etc.). The latter issue undermines
the international legitimacy of the U.S. and contributes to anti-American sentiments worldwide.


Smith critiques Huntington’s neo-Tocquevillian creedal exceptionalism position, arguing that America’s political system has always been based in part on ascriptive notions of citizenship and not just on liberal ideology. During the 19th century, American political discourse was in fact dominated by a mix of three distinct perspectives: liberalism (focused on the universal rights of individuals), republicanism (focused on community self-governance), and ethnoculturalism (focused on the continued dominance of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant majorities). Smith illustrates the tension between these perspectives with two examples of Supreme Court cases: *Bradwell v. the State* and the *Chinese Exclusion Case*. The former denied females the right to practice law while the latter prevented Chinese laborers from re-entering the US. Both cases favored an ethnocultural view of citizenship over the liberal imperatives of the Bill of Rights and both relied on republican arguments about states’ rights. These cases, and many others like them, demonstrate that ethnocultural ideology was not merely a symptom of the “idea versus institution” gap, but rather a coherent and stable alternative to liberal and republican political positions.


Smith argues that creedal accounts of American identity and political culture, such as Tocqueville’s, Myrdal’s, and Hartz’s, fail to explain the prominent and persistent role of exclusionary ideologies based on ascriptive characteristics in American public discourse, policy, and public opinion. He critiques the three authors and their intellectual followers for their dismissal of such inegalitarian tendencies as mere aberrations from mainstream liberal and republican ideologies or as inescapable components of liberalism itself. Smith proposes an alternative model that recognizes the existence of a coherent and fully elaborated inegalitarian ethnocultural tradition in American thought, alongside the widely accepted liberal and republican traditions. Unlike liberalism and republicanism, ethnoculturalism is a powerful source of group solidarity and identity “that has inherent and transcendent worth, thanks to nature, history, and God” (and its appeal is not limited to white men). The tension between the three paradigms has shaped American culture and politics since the nation’s founding. As a result, cultural and political development cannot be viewed in a linear manner or as entirely dominated by any one of the three ideologies. Instead, it has progressed in fits and starts through ongoing conflict and compromise, as evidenced by the historical sequence of Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights era. Inegalitarian policies were dismantled “only through great struggles, aided by international pressures during World War II and the Cold War; and it is not clear that these struggles have ended.”
In his analysis of all federal statutes, federal district, circuit, and Supreme Court decisions, as well as Congressional debates pertaining to American citizenship between 1798 and 1912, Smith advances a model of multiple nationalist traditions (liberal, democratic republican, and inegalitarian ascriptive). These traditions have been historically used to different degrees by American elites in order to constitute a population that sees itself as distinct and to convince that population of particular leaders’ legitimacy as its representatives. Smith argues that liberal and republican ideologies have often proved insufficient for these purposes, causing politicians to turn to ethnocultural arguments. This model contradicts the neo-Tocquevillian approach by positing that all political parties have historically offered a mix of the three traditions in different combinations and that all three have been involved in historical conflicts. Furthermore, it rejects the notion that the ethnocultural paradigm was a mere exception to the liberal or republican rule. Smith views citizenship law as emblematic of the elite struggles over the social boundaries of the American nation and provides a detailed overview of its development from the Revolution to World War I.

Spencer sketches a brief history of nativism and cosmopolitan liberalism, arguing that historically the two paradigms have shared a common understanding of national identity and agreed on the importance of immigration, but have differed in their perceptions of the threat posed by immigrants to American culture. As a result of World War II and the intellectual battle against “scientific racism”, cosmopolitanism came to prevail, at least with respect to white immigrants. The omission of people of color from the new inclusive American nationalism led to the civil rights revolution of the late 1950s and early 1960s, whose claims were framed in the language of the American Creed. However, according to Spencer, this rhetoric was supplanted in the aftermath of the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. by an anti-assimilationist, separatist ideology of multiculturalism, which demanded equality of results in place of equality of opportunity. The emergence of minority nationalisms, ostensibly characterized by claims of moral superiority, has played a divisive role in American society, threatening its common culture and solidarity. Spencer concludes by calling for a return to cosmopolitan liberalism and warns of the potentially dire consequences of continued reliance on minority nationalist multiculturalism.

Walzer examines the historical bases of American national identity, arguing that although America has always been more or less culturally pluralist, it has also been united by coherent political principles. This simultaneous “cultural manyness” and “oneness of citizenship” has generated ongoing tensions, producing exclusionary movements such as the “nativist” Know-Nothings of the mid-19th century. Walzer argues that exclusionary claims were typically rooted in
political, not ethnic, concerns (i.e., they questioned the civic virtue of immigrants and racial minorities). Rather than striving for the elimination of specific groups, nativist groups sought their exclusion from citizenship, at least until their members acquired sufficient “practical education in democratic virtue.” For this variant of Rousseauian republicanism, public (i.e., political) life takes precedence over private (i.e., social) activities and allegiances. In contrast to the republican approach, pluralists like Horace Kallen, have supported a hyphenated American identity, in which citizens are free to emphasize either side of the hyphen but not to impose it on others. For pluralists, emotional satisfaction is not derived from politics, but rather from other activities made possible by the political structure. Walzer’s own position is closer to that of the pluralists, with the important caveat that America does in fact have a distinct cultural and ethnic identity, based on its nonexclusive character which has supplanted exclusionary republican citizenship. Americans do not have to choose one side of the proverbial hyphen over the other – politically and culturally they simultaneously exist on both sides of it. Although over generations most people become American-Americans (“with much passion invested in the becoming”), ongoing immigration maintains the cultural pluralism that gives America the distinction of being a perpetually “unfinished society.”

**POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SURVEY RESEARCH**


The article identifies three competing nationalist ideologies in the United States: cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism. The authors argue that cosmopolitan liberalism functions as a national myth that facilitates national integration, but that it may be threatened by the intensification of ethnic and religious consciousness. Nativism has waxed and waned throughout American history, typically rising with new waves of immigration and declining in times of international military conflict, while a particularistic multiculturalism emerged from the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The article analyzes public adherence to the three ideologies using the 1981 California Survey and 1992 National Election Study, demonstrating that nativism and multiculturalism are both minority perspectives and that the majority of Americans espouse cosmopolitan liberal values.


Citrin et al. examine popular ideas about national identity in the context of the changing ethnic composition of the United States and examine their association with perceptions of threat posed by Hispanic and Asian Americans. They find a general consensus in the sample about the core features of American identity (“Americanism”), which consist of a mix of liberal and ethnocultural ideas (some variance exists with respect to income, education, age, and ideology). Attitudes toward minorities are generally ambivalent and are not affected by measures of personal contact and perceived economic threat. Finally, support for specific
public policies depends on their framing and is correlated with Americanism (i.e., a measure of agreement with the dominant view of American identity). These results are consistent with symbolic politics theory, which emphasizes the importance of emotionally salient cultural attitudes over rational cost-benefit calculation in explaining political attitudes and behavior.


Citrin et al. trace the development of “official English” policies and place them in the historical context of recurring nativist responses to immigration. They examine elite and popular positions in the debate by comparing legislative responses with public opinion polls. Using the symbolic politics approach, the authors argue that opposition to bilingual education is driven by attitudes about American identity rather than by material interests. The results of correlation and regression analyses confirm this hypothesis. In contrast to legislators, most survey respondents see English proficiency as central to being an American and favor “English only” policies. The degree of support for the policies is affected by ethnicity, the “Americanism” index, and feelings toward ethnic minorities. It is not affected by economic outlook, perceived personal impact of ethnic change, party affiliation, and ideology.


Citrin et al. examine the relative importance of national and ethnic identification, inter-group differences in the perceived content of American identity, and the impact of these differences on policy preferences. They draw on social identity theory, which posits that individuals have multiple identities with which they identify cognitively and affectively, and symbolic politics theory, which links subjective conceptions of national identity with policy preferences. They argue that the affective dimension of national identity includes patriotism (i.e., “feelings of closeness to and pride in one’s country and its symbols”) and chauvinism (“an extreme and bounded loyalty, the belief in one’s country’s superiority, whether it’s right or wrong”) and categorize the specific content of national identity as either liberal, nativist, or multicultural (defined as either pluralist or based on primarily ethnic identification). Using the 1996 General Social Survey and the 1994-1995 Los Angeles County Social Surveys, the authors demonstrate that both black and white Americans exhibit strong national identification and a high degree of consensus about the content of American identity. Both groups also reject the idea that ethnic identities should take precedence over national loyalties. Most whites do not identify strongly with their ethnicity, but those who do are more likely to oppose government policies that aim to help black Americans. The strength of national identification has no impact on this particular domestic policy preference. However, stronger national identification was associated with increased opposition to immigration and multiculturalism and increased support
for military spending and policies limiting foreign influences on domestic politics, demonstrating the tension between nationalism and multiculturalism.


Huddy and Khatib argue that existing measures of patriotism suffer from validity problems: the NES “symbolic patriotism” scale conflates patriotism and ideology, while Schatz and Staub’s “constructive patriotism” scale measures both love of country and political activism, is not coded properly, and does not clearly differentiate constructive patriotism from the more ideological “blind patriotism.” The authors draw on social identity theory to generate a measure of “national identity” (“a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation”), which is non-ideological and theoretically associated with increased political involvement by way of heightened adherence to group norms. Their analyses of two student surveys and the national identity module of the 1996 GSS confirm that their measure is related to but distinct from other measures of patriotism, is unrelated to ideology and partisanship, and is positively correlated with attention to politics, knowledge of current events, and voter turnout.


Hutcheson et al. analyze the frequency and valence of statements about American national identity in 210 *Newsweek* and *Time* articles published in the weeks following 9/11. The study focuses on statements made by three types of sources – government and military elites, non-governmental elites, and citizens – and by the journalists themselves. The authors argue that political elites frequently use nationalistic language to generate popular support for their policy objectives. This form of “strategic communication” is particularly prominent in times of national crisis, when the public is especially attentive to news content. The content of such communication typically includes references to widely recognizable symbols and ideals, calls for unity across social boundaries, and a simultaneous exoneration of the national community and demonization of the purported enemy. Content analysis of the *Newsweek* and *Time* articles demonstrates that after 9/11 political and military elites were more likely than non-political elites and regular citizens to make statements related to national identity, with the president mentioning the theme 97 percent of the time (members of Congress were less likely to do so than other politicians). Non-governmental elites brought up national identity less frequently than political elites, but more frequently than citizens. The comments made by politicians and military leaders were overwhelmingly affirmative of American national identity, while non-governmental elites were more likely to approach the events of 9/11 from analytical and, in some cases, critical standpoints. The valence of citizens’ comments varied with the specific topic in question, but in most cases was more consistent with political than non-political elites. Finally, the overall tone of the magazine articles was closely aligned with the statements of politicians and military officials. The authors cite three possible explanations for the latter
finding: the ethnocentrism of journalists, the lack of alternative perspective among their political sources, and the response of the media to the (perceived or actual) expectations of readers and viewers.


The authors distinguish two forms of identification with one’s country: patriotism (which is theoretically associated with group solidarity, individual interest in national welfare, and good citizenship) and nationalism (which is theoretically associated with “authoritarianism, intolerance, and warmongering”). They hypothesize that the relative dominance of these two interrelated views of national identity depends on the historical and political context. When group belonging is framed in terms of common goals during times of national threat, such as 9/11, heightened patriotism should be associated with higher levels of tolerance but not higher levels of nationalism. In contrast, when group belonging is framed in terms of essential traits that differentiate the group from others, patriotism should be associated with heightened nationalism and lower tolerance. The authors test their assumptions using a survey conducted shortly after 9/11, which contained a priming manipulation intended to capture the two forms of group belonging. Their empirical results confirm their predictions, suggesting that nationalism and patriotism are indeed interrelated but distinct psychological constructs whose relative salience is situationally contingent.


Parker uses data from the 2002 California Patriotism Pilot Study to demonstrate an empirical distinction between blind and symbolic patriotism. The former refers to an uncritical support for the American nation-state and its policies (captured by the slogan “America right or wrong”), which functions as a means of satisfying people’s psychological needs for self-esteem, safety, and prestige (hence the association of this type of patriotism with projections of inferiority onto minority groups). In contrast, symbolic patriotism entails identification with the core values of a nation’s political culture (e.g., freedom, equality, and limited government) and the symbolic representations of those values (e.g., the flag, the nation anthem). This form of patriotism typically develops during childhood socialization and tends to function as an end in itself. Results of a confirmatory factor analysis suggest that a two-factor solution is preferable to a single-factor solution (although the latter yields a reasonable fit as well), providing evidence for the existence two distinct variants of patriotism. Subsequent structural equation modeling demonstrates that blind patriotism is negatively associated with support for free speech and due process, while symbolic patriotism has the opposite effect on free speech and no effect on due process. Both types of patriotism are associated with a lack of support for the right to bail for individuals suspected of treason (the effect is larger for symbolic patriotism). Finally, respondents who espouse blind patriotism tend to hold negative views of racial
and religious minorities, while symbolic patriots are more likely to embrace all groups, including Islamic fundamentalists and Arabs.


Parker challenges the frequently reported finding that blacks and Latinos exhibit a lower level of patriotism (i.e., attachment to the nation) than whites by arguing that the meaning of “patriotism” varies across these groups. Comparison of factor analysis results demonstrates that the three groups share a view of patriotism as a three-dimensional concept, consisting of conventional, constructive, and blind components (following Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999, reviewed below). However, factor loadings and inter-factor correlations vary systematically between the groups. Whites are the only ones with consistently high loadings on all three factors. The largest discrepancies between them and the minority groups are found along the constructive patriotism dimension (i.e., a critical approach to the nation inspired by a patriotic desire to improve it). Furthermore, while the three factors are mutually exclusive for whites, they are mutually reinforcing for blacks and Latinos (the magnitude of correlations is higher for the latter group). Simultaneous analysis of the data for the three groups performed using structural equation modeling confirms these findings. Parker argues that the inter-group differences in the meaning of patriotism, captured by the dissimilar characteristics of its latent dimensions, challenge accepted conclusions about the groups’ divergent propensities for patriotic sentiments. He attributes the differences to blacks’ and Latinos’ experiences of discrimination, which make them less likely to believe in the possibility of meaningful social reform (hence their weak factor loadings on the constructive patriotism dimension). However, in contrast to whites, these two groups succeed in reconciling the seemingly contradictory tenets of the three variants of patriotism.


Perrin analyzes letters to the editor, published in 17 newspapers immediately prior to and following 9/11, to investigate the effect of national threat on authoritarian nationalist discourse, which consists of both authoritarian and anti-authoritarian arguments. His results demonstrate a significantly greater prevalence of both authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism after 9/11. The strongest tendency toward authoritarianism was found in the South, while the weakest was found in the Northeast and particularly in New York. Perrin concludes that the increase in both forms of authoritarian discourse suggests that this binary theme is an integral part of “the backbone of [American] political culture.”


Rahn presents a model of national identity that emphasizes the understudied emotional dimension of group affiliation in addition to the well documented
Bonikowski: Literature Review --17---

cognitive dimension. She develops the concept “public mood” to signify the diffuse, and potentially unconscious, affective state generated by people’s membership in a nation (though other levels of analysis are also possible). This state is both individual and collective, since contact with “the nation” tends to occur through mass-mediated information systems. Rahn distinguishes public mood from “patriotism,” a term which she argues suffers from chronic ambiguity. A more relevant, though also distinct, concept is “national identity” – the psychological salience and centrality of belonging to a nation, and the sense of solidarity stemming from it. Using data from the 1988 GSS, Rahn investigates the relationship between the two dimensions of public mood (valence and arousal), the centrality of national identity, and a series of sociodemographic variables. Age has a positive effect on national identity and public mood, living abroad leads to less central attachment to national identity but higher valence and arousal, and region and race are both strongly associated with national identity. Valence of public mood is reciprocally related to the centrality of national identity, while arousal follows from identity. Next, Rahn uses data aggregated from three surveys to test the hypothesis that the centrality of national identity can lead to action (via perceptions of role-appropriate actions and emotional arousal from identity commitments). Her findings suggest that centrality of national identity has a positive impact on religious and secular giving and blood donation (examining the reverse causal direction, she finds that participation in voluntary groups is negatively related to the centrality of national identity, while political knowledge is positively associated with it).


Rusciano argues that national identity emerges from a negotiation between a nation’s view of itself (Selbstbild) and its perceived international reputation (Fremdbild). He uses the International Social Survey to compare the national identities of 23 countries. Scales of Selbstbild and Fremdbild are derived from a factor analysis. The former yields a high correlation with measures of pride in the nation and the state and the latter with measures of tolerance for diversity and openness to foreign languages. The two scales themselves are negatively correlated. All six measures are then correlated with a nation-level measure of religion (Protestant, Catholic, or mixed). The results suggest that the more Catholic the nation, the more consistent is the relationship between Selbstbild, national, and state pride, while the more Protestant a nation, the more consistent is the relationship between Fremdbild, tolerance, and openness to foreign languages. Also, the more Catholic the nation, the weaker the relationship between Selbstbild and Fremdbild.


The article compares elite reactions to the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks and examines public opinion data in the aftermath of the latter. Following symbolic politics theory, Schildkraut hypothesizes that convergence between elite and mass responses to issues of race, ethnicity, and identity is unlikely to occur. The results
of a general overview of public discourse as well as a more systematic content analysis of newspaper editorials demonstrate the dominance of incorporationist conceptions of national identity among elites in 2001, which contrast with the predominantly ethnocultural responses to Pearl Harbor. With respect to policy positions, no newspaper editorials supported racial profiling after 9/11, compared to 32 percent after Pearl Harbor. An analysis of public opinion polls yields very different results: popular sentiments after 9/11 were characterized by a latent ethnoculturalism and as such were similar to public reactions to Pearl Harbor. The polls demonstrated increased support for immigration and civil liberties restrictions, including policies targeted specifically at Arab Americans. The presence of ethnocultural views was negatively associated with education and favorable views of Islam and positively correlated with approval for George W. Bush and personal fear of future attacks.


Schildkraut uses content analysis of focus group responses to investigate the relationship between different conception of American nationalism and attitudes toward Official English policies and English-only ballots. She uses Smith’s (1988, 1993, 1997) classification of American national identity consisting of liberalism (belief in universal individual rights and small government), civic republicanism (emphasis on responsibilities of citizenship), and ethnoculturalism (support and rejection of idea that American identity is based on ascriptive characteristics). An additional category of incorporationism (view of American as nation of immigrants) emerges out of the focus groups. The results demonstrate that the four versions of national identity are polysemic – each is consistent with both support for and opposition to Official English policies. Only civic nationalism is associated with opinions about English-only ballots.


Schildkraut uses survey and focus group data to examine the relationship between different conceptions of American national identity and support for Official English policies. She identifies four variants of nationalism, based in part of the work of Rogers Smith: liberal, republican, ethnocultural, and incorporationist. These ideologies are in tension with one another, but they are also internally conflicted. Ethnoculturalism is often disguised in coded language and coexists with both republicanism and liberalism (though more frequently with the former). Incorporationism is typically linked with liberalism, but it is in fact a distinct philosophy which emphasizes cultural diversity (it is contrasted with separatist multiculturalism which receives no support in Schildkraut’s data). The impact of these perspectives on policy preferences depends on the specific symbols evoked in popular discourse, as well as their subjective interpretation by different segments of the population. Each perspective can be used to either support or oppose Official English policies.

Schatz et al. distinguish blind patriotism (“rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism”) from constructive patriotism (“characterized by ‘critical loyalty,’ questioning and criticism of current group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change”), arguing that the two concepts correspond to analytically distinct dimensions of positive identification with and affect toward the nation. Factor analysis of data from a survey of undergraduate students confirmed the existence of the two latent dimensions of patriotism, both of which are correlated with national attachment (the correlation coefficient for blind patriotism was higher than for constructive patriotism). Of the two, only blind patriotism was significantly correlated with political ideology, party identification, and academic achievement. Consistently with the authors’ hypotheses, predictors of blind patriotism included nationalism (a perception of national superiority and desire for national dominance), feelings of national vulnerability, and fears of cultural contamination by external groups, while constructive patriotism was associated with political information gathering and feelings of political efficacy. Finally, blind patriotism was associated with a preference for symbolic behaviors (e.g., teaching Pledge of Allegiance in schools) over instrumental behaviors (e.g., teaching the structure of U.S. government in schools), while constructive patriotism was not associated with a preference for either.


Skitka uses nationally-representative survey data to determine whether the decision of the vast majority of Americans, including prominent leftist radicals and activists, to display the U.S. flag after 9/11 was motivated by patriotism (“love of country and attachment to national values”) or nationalism (“uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities combined with a belief in the superiority and dominant status of one’s nation”). Displaying the flag was associated with higher age and income, lower education, and greater perception of personal threat. The strongest predictors of flag display included heightened in-group identification (but not out-group derogation), engaging in other value-affirming behaviors (e.g., donating blood or money), and self-reported patriotism. In contrast, nationalism was only weakly related to the use of the flag. The results were consistent across all regions of the country.


Sullivan et al. trace the historical development of the term “patriotism” and use Q-methodology to identify its underlying dimensions. Their analysis generates five ideal-types of patriotism: iconoclastic (rejects political symbols and supports active critical involvement in political life), symbolic (influenced by slogans and rituals and uncritically accepts the US), instinctive environmental (embraces
political symbols and supports protest and civil disobedience in support of ecological causes), capitalistic (economic growth blended with love of country), and nationalistic symbolic (embraces political symbols, sees critique of government authority as unpatriotic, and supports religious conception of American manifest destiny). They examine the impact of these varieties of patriotism on political involvement and on presidential voting preferences using a survey administered to residents of the Twin Cities. The results demonstrate that iconoclastic patriots tend to be highly politically active, followed by instinctive environmentalists. After patriotism (more specifically, the pledge of allegiance and flag burning) became a central issue in the Dukakis-Bush presidential campaign, Bush gained 15 percent among symbolic patriots and 17 percent among instinctive environmentalists, but his support did not increase substantially among the iconoclasts and capitalistic patriots. The authors argue that these effects could not have been observed with a more traditional one-dimensional measure of patriotism.


Theiss-Morse uses Q-methodology (with statements derived from four democratic theories: elitist, pluralist, citizenship, and participatory) and survey analysis to examine popular perceptions of good citizenship. Factor analysis of the Q results yield four dimensions: representative democracy (belief in the value of participating actively in electoral politics), political enthusiasm (strong support of all forms of political involvement, from letter writing and voting to civil disobedience), pursued interests (ambivalence about political involvement, trust in political elites, and emphasis on interest-group activity), and indifference (cynical and apathetic attitude toward politics). The former two dimensions are empirically associated with Democratic Party affiliation and liberal ideology, while the latter two tend to be associated with a conservative outlook. A comparison of the espoused values and political behavior confirms the validity of the four-category model.

**SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF THE NATION: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION**

Nationalism is often classified as either ethnic or civic. In the former variant, group identity is formed around common ethnic roots while in the latter variant it coalesces around a set of shared political and moral values. Despite the prevalence of this dichotomy, some scholars challenge its empirical accuracy and analytical utility, arguing that no nationalist tradition can be understood without examining the development and use of both ethnic and civic nationalizing discourses and the social, political, and economic exclusions justified by them. This claim is particularly interesting with respect to the American case, which has long been viewed as a paradigmatic example of civic nationalism. Despite the nation’s diverse population and egalitarian political creed, the domination of racial and ethnic minorities by the white majority has been a prominent feature of American history. The readings in this section explore the tension between civic ideals and the reality of racial and ethnic exclusion in the United States.

Blum argues that American nationalism, Protestantism, and whiteness were deeply intertwined prior to the 1850s. However, the “white republic” became fractured during the Civil War, as the North and the South came to view each other as two fundamentally different peoples. Their mutual demonization, often expressed in religious terms, and the prospect of full recognition of African Americans in the North seemed to make the regional conflict irreconcilable and offered great hope for racial equality. However, in the decades following the Civil War, the North’s emphasis shifted dramatically from racial to sectional reconciliation, leading to a revival of white, Protestant ethnic nationalism. The new unity was reinforced by the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 and the rise of American imperialism. Religion played a crucial role in all of these developments: many congregations supported the African American cause in the 1860s and thousands of Protestant missionaries traveled to the South to aid blacks during Reconstruction, but equally importantly, Protestant elites, including Henry Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Dwight Moody, helped shift the attention away from racial equality and supported American imperial efforts. “As the United States barged into the twentieth century, the supremacy of whiteness, the supremacy of the United States, and the supremacy of Christ had again become viewed as one in the same.”


This article investigates the relationship between individual-level national pride and prejudice against immigrants. The authors begin by positing a theoretical distinction between patriotism (“attachment to one’s nation, its institutions, and its founding principles”) and nationalism (“belief in national superiority and dominance”). This distinction is supported by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of data from six data sets (including the GSS, ISSP, and World Values Survey). Following Allport’s insight that in-group loyalty does not necessarily imply out-group hostility, the authors hypothesize that nationalism is more likely than patriotism to lead to prejudice. In addition to standard sociodemographic covariates, their analysis includes a number of potential confounding factors drawn from extant social psychological approaches to out-group attitudes (authoritarian personality theory, realistic conflict theory, frustration-aggression theory, and social dominance theory). By using Bollen’s two-stage least-squares estimator in conjunction with structural equation modeling, de Figuieredo and Elkins are also able to tackle problems of measurement error and reverse causality. The results of the study demonstrate a strong positive effect of nationalism on prejudice. In contrast, patriotism is not significantly related to prejudice, despite the fact that it too reflects a positive affect for the nation. Other variables that predict prejudice include number of prior generations born in the U.S., authoritarianism, education, and frustration with one’s ability to achieve desirable life goals.

The article examines conscious and unconscious associations between American identity and ethnicity using Implicit Association Tests (IATs) and survey instruments. The results demonstrate a widespread agreement about the key features of American identity (civic values, patriotism, and nativism) and overt commitment to egalitarianism and inclusiveness. However, in explicit ethnic-national comparisons, Asian Americans are seen as less American than whites and blacks. Furthermore, IAT subjects consistently pair whites with American symbols far quicker than blacks or Asians. This effect holds even when whites are compared with black Olympic athletes (despite an explicit consensus that the latter are “more American”) and when famous Asian Americans are compared with European whites. These implicit biases seem to be internalized by Asian Americans, who view themselves as less American than whites, and who use resources other than their ethnicity to construct their American identity. These results support the cultural exemplar model, rather than the social dominance model, because African Americans are seen as more American than Asian Americans.


The authors examine the construction of symbolic boundaries in the nationalist discourse of the Populist Movement using correspondence and interpretive analyses of Populist publications. Following Brubaker, they argue that ethnic and civic nationalisms contain both inclusive and exclusive elements, but that their criteria of exclusion vary. Their results demonstrate that Populists framed “Americanness” in predominantly civic terms (for instance, by focusing on citizenship) and separated it from their discussions of race and ethnicity. However, they tended to frame their own identity in racial terms, preferring the term “white” to “American”. An interpretive analysis of the same materials reveals that the civic framing of American identity was racialized in discussions of “alien” (e.g., Jewish) forces that ostensibly oppressed the American farmer. The authors conclude that in the American context, conceptions of the collective self tend to be vague and predominantly negative, that is, defined in contrast to collective “others” whose identities are easier to articulate.


According to Gerstle, American nationalism has always contained two contradictory themes: a universalistic civic creed and an exclusionary ideology of ethnoracial supremacy. Although the two ideologies began to be reconciled in the 1960s, their echoes are still present in contemporary American nationalism. Gerstle demonstrates both themes in the biography of Theodore Roosevelt. Despite Roosevelt’s explicit support for white supremacy, epitomized by his idealized view of the American backcountry woodsman, Roosevelt thrived on boundary crossing and genuinely believed in the civic idea of the melting pot, albeit one that often (but not always) excluded blacks and Asians. His occasional
gestures of good will toward African Americans, such as his lunches with Booker T. Washington, earned him the tentative respect of black elites and the scorn of white Southerners, while his founding of the Progressive Party in 1912 helped pave the way for women’s suffrage. As Gerstle concludes, “the kind of restrictive definition of social order called for by the racial nationalist tradition proved too constraining on human imagination. As committed as Roosevelt was to celebrating the United States as a white nation, he never felt entirely comfortable living within such racially rigid borders.”


Gerstle traces the development of civic and ethnoracial nationalism in the U.S. political, intellectual, and cultural discourse between 1890 and 2000. He argues that the two strands of nationalist ideology were deeply embedded in the “Rooseveltian nation” of the first decade of the 20th century. Ethnoracial nationalism gained popularity during the First World War, as policymakers introduced severe restrictions on immigration. Subsequently, the New Deal reforms empowered traditionally marginalized groups, marking a considerable victory for civic nationalism. Nonetheless, most elites, including liberal ones, continued to advocate ethnic assimilation to the “Nordic” cultural model. Although the Second World War integrated Americans of European descent through common battlefield experiences, Japanese internment and the continued racial segregation of the armed forces perpetuated existing inequalities. During the Cold War era civic nationalism gained new ground with immigration reform and declining racial and ethnic discrimination, particularly in the North. However, at the same time, the Red Scare led to witch hunts against alleged communists, many of whom were European-born Americans. The Rooseveltian nation, characterized by the dual nationalisms, was finally dismantled by the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The subsequent decade of confusion and drift produced two opposed ideological movements: multiculturalism, which emphasized subnational group affiliations, and reborn conservatism. In the 1990s, elements of these movements became united in the civic liberalism of the Clinton administration, which promoted racial equality and cultural toleration, while celebrating the nation and emphasizing the responsibilities of citizenship.


In response to Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We, the authors challenge the notion that a homogenous ethno-linguistic culture is necessary for a successful democracy and cite historical examples of the dangers posed by an ethno-religious conception of American identity. In contrast, they argue that the most important aspect of American identity is the nation’s capacity for self-critique and change. From this point of view, the growth of the U.S. Latino population is not a cultural threat, as alleged by Huntington, but rather a sign of the nation’s continued transformation. The outcome of this transformation depends as much
on America’s openness as it does on the actions of the immigrants themselves. Furthermore, according to Fraga and Segura, what is often forgotten in immigration debates is the role of American business leaders and policymakers in attracting undocumented workers to the U.S. and maintaining their marginal status vis-à-vis the welfare state (which in itself serves as an incentive for hiring low-wage Hispanic workers).


Higham identifies three varieties of nativism (anti-Catholicism, anti-radicalism, and racial nativism) and traces their development between the Civil War and the 1920s. The original nativist Know-Nothing movement lost its popularity during the Civil War, largely because of immigrants’ valiant service in the Union army. The post-war economic boom and the continued need for immigrant labor kept nativism at bay until the 1880s, when growing economic inequalities gave rise to anti-Catholic and anti-radical sentiments among fraternal organizations, the temperance movement, and organized labor. These sentiments grew into a nationwide nativist fervor during the 1890s, due to an economic depression, increased immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, imperialist jingoism, and growing Anglo-Saxon ethnic nationalism. The economic prosperity of the 1910s contributed to a renewed calm in ethnic relations and the emergence of cosmopolitanism and Progressivism. The two exceptions to the decade’s nativist respite were the anti-anarchist panic that followed the assassination of President McKinley and the gradual growth of racial nationalist ideology, which combined Anglo-Saxon romanticism with a new scientific racism. Racial nationalism became dominant during the depression of 1914 with state-level restrictions on immigrant workers and anti-immigrant violence. World War I shifted the attention to anti-radical nativism aimed primarily at German-Americans, which resulted in numerous exclusionary policies (including the Sedition Act and German internment) and the emergence of the 100 Percent Americanism movement. The Big Red Scare and the Great Depression helped spread categorical suspicion to other ethnic groups and culminated in a series of unprecedented immigration restrictions, including the Johnson-Reed Act. Nativism waned again in the late 1920s, but the previous decade’s legal reforms would continue to shape American immigration policy throughout the 20th century.


Huntington challenges the traditional dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism, arguing that the latter category conflates ethnicity (and race) with cultural nationalism. It is this cultural nationalism, specifically one that is rooted in Anglo-Protestant values that Huntington advocates in his book. He claims that the core culture of the United States is based on the religious beliefs of the English settlers codified in the American Creed. Historically, immigrants have had to assimilate to this culture in order to become American citizens. Although the salience and substance of American national identity has fluctuated over time
(for instance, its racial and ethnic foundations have been ostensibly eliminated), a series of recent historical developments are threatening its very existence. These developments include: continued Latin American and Asian immigration, growth of transnational diasporas that channel foreign national interests, geographical concentration of Spanish-speaking immigrants and the prevalence of Spanish in general, popular embrace of multiculturalism and diversity, elite commitments to cosmopolitan and transnational identities, and the collapse of the USSR, which had served the role of a nationally-unifying enemy. According to Huntington, these trends threaten to destroy America, because a civic creed alone is an insufficient basis for national unity. Huntington offers four possible scenarios for the future, strongly favoring the revival of the religious culture of the Anglo-Protestant settlers, as well as a continued adherence to the American Creed.


Kaufmann challenges the widely accepted view that the United States is a quintessential civic nation. He argues that American nationalism has always been fundamentally ethnic, rooted in the Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition. Its liberal ideology has functioned as a rhetorical boundary marker intended to set the U.S. apart from other nations, thereby reinforcing American ethnic particularism. Kaufmann describes the rise of American ethnic nationalism during the late colonial era, when the population was “over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British, and 98 per cent Protestant” and four historically distinct cultural regions were united by a common New-England-influenced ethnic identity. In the Revolutionary period, this nascent collective identity was primarily reinforced by religious and cultural narratives (the “Anglo-Saxon myth-symbol complex”), rather than liberal political theory. Over the subsequent decades, non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups were incorporated into the nation through cultural assimilation. Periods of increased immigration, particularly from regions outside of northern Europe, invariably generated nativist responses by such groups as the Populists, trade unions, and patriotic societies, which sought to protect American culture from foreign influences. A liberal opposition to the ethno-cultural view of American identity emerged in the 1930s, but it was not until the rights-based movement era of the 1960s and 1970s that a more cosmopolitan civic nationalism gained dominance and replaced the ethnic-civic collective double consciousness.


In contrast to both the civic exceptionalist view of American national identity advocated by “consensus” historians and the critical ethno-cultural perspective prevalent in more recent sociological and historical scholarship, Kaufmann argues that the U.S. has always been characterized by a pervasive “double consciousness” of Anglo-Protestant ethnocentrism and liberal universalism. This dualism was challenged in the early 20th century and split into two opposed ideological camps by the 1920s. Kaufmann analyzes the presence of the “double consciousness” in 18th- and 19th-century literature and political discourse,
Protestant church ideology, and Anglo-Saxonist historical scholarship. To explain its existence and eventual decline, he selectively draws on three causal narratives: the inclusive character of Anglo-American ethnic nationalism (with respect to northern European ethnic groups), the dualistic heritage of Anglo-American Protestantism based in the New Testament, and the increasing institutional reflexivity produced by modern surveillance, record-keeping, and rational bureaucratic practices.


Scheckel argues that national identity is shaped by both remembering a shared past and forgetting the violence that accompanied the founding of a nation. In the case of the United States, this violence was propagated primarily against the Indians; hence the early 19th century, when decisions were made about the legal status of surviving Indian tribes, was a crucial period in the development of American identity. As the Jackson administration was removing the Cherokees from Georgia in direct violation of Supreme Court rulings, American writers were shaping a national literary tradition that linked the rise of the nation to (an ostensibly natural) Indian decline. They mourned for a disappeared peoples inevitably carried away by a wave of progress, which made possible American expansion. This founding myth served to expiate national guilt over the Indian genocide and root the nation in a distant romanticized past.


Schneider analyzes the use of nationalist rhetoric in 1996 Congressional immigration debates. The presence of resident aliens and undocumented immigrants, who partake to varying degrees in American social citizenship but are excluded from political citizenship, has led to legitimacy problems for elected politicians. As a result, politicians representing regions with a high concentration of non-citizens have supported inclusive citizenship policies, while those representing constituencies with lower percentages of immigrants have rigidly adhered to existing immigration laws. In the 1996 debates, most liberal policymakers supported their claims by portraying the U.S. as a nation of immigrants, while their conservative counterparts linked “good” citizenship to a small nuclear family, paying taxes and using welfare state programs sparingly, and skilled work, thereby implicitly criticizing the behavior of immigrant minorities, who allegedly do not possess these qualities. Each of these narratives contained its own contradictions. Immigrants were expected to have a strong work ethic, but not be willing to work in bad conditions (policymakers favored immigration restrictions and guest worker programs over the improvement of work conditions); to embody family values, but only according to a particular definition of the family (many proposals called for restricting family reunification policies to immediate members of nuclear families); and to pay taxes but not participate in redistributive government programs (policy proposals called for political citizenship requirements for program participation). All of these
arguments attested to policymakers’ adherence to a free market ideology that favors a small and passive state.


Schulman challenges the accepted distinction between civic and ethnic nations, respectively identified with the West (i.e., Western Europe and the U.S., where the state preceded the nation) and the East (i.e., Germany and Eastern Europe, where the nation preceded the state). He distinguishes three variants of national identity, which progressively decrease in their level of inclusiveness – civic, cultural, and ethnic – and uses survey data to evaluate the prevalence of the first two variants in the general attitudes and policy preferences of the majority ethnic groups of 15 countries. His analysis of popular criteria of national belonging suggest that the East and the West are far less distinct than is often assumed, with some Eastern European countries favoring formal citizenship, subjective feelings of belonging, and respect for political institutions and the law, all of which are ostensibly aligned with civic nationalism, more than their Western counterparts. Furthermore, even though Eastern countries are more supportive of territorial definitions of the nation (defined as the importance placed on length of residence and place of birth), linguistic competence, and the importance of religion and tradition, a number of Western countries also score high on these measures. With respect to policy preferences, Western countries favor assimilation and oppose multiculturalism more than their Eastern counterparts. Schulman concludes that Western nationalism is far more cultural and Eastern nationalism is far more civic than is commonly recognized by scholars.


Sidanius et al. examine the relationship between ethnic and national attachment in American and Israeli attitude surveys to test three models of nationalism: the melting pot perspective, multiculturalism / ethnic pluralism, and the group dominance perspective. Their factor analysis reveals four dimensions of national attachment in the United States: patriotism (“love for and respect of the nation and its symbols”), nationalism (“desire for national superiority and dominance over other countries”), attachment to place, and concern for co-nationals. Due to data limitations only the first two dimensions are used in the cross-national comparison. Although Jewish-Arab relations in Israel tend to be identified with the group dominance model and white-black relations in the U.S. are often thought to epitomize the melting pot or pluralist models, the results demonstrate that the relationship between ethnic and national attachment in both nations is stronger among high-status than low-status groups, which is consistent with the group dominance perspective. Dominant groups are more patriotic and nationalistic and exhibit a more positive association between national and ethnic group attachments than subordinate groups. Furthermore, patriotism among whites in the U.S. is associated with racial prejudice, while among blacks it is associated with egalitarianism. A more in-depth analysis of the American data
demonstrates that African Americans are the least patriotic ethnic group, that nationalism is positively associated with group dominance and ethnic attachment for all ethnic groups, and that patriotism is negatively associated with group dominance and ethnic attachment among subordinate groups. The results lend partial support to both the ethnic dominance and melting pot perspectives.

**NATIONALISM AND RELIGION**

Common ethnic roots, whether real or imagined, have served as the basis of most nation-building projects and in many cases the power of ethnocentric ideology has been enhanced by its fusion with religious dogma. In fact, for some nations, such as Poland or Israel, the ethnic and religious foundations of national identity are virtually inseparable. In this respect, the American case is (at least ostensibly) paradoxical. On one hand, the religious diversity of the United States along with its liberal creed and explicit constitutional separation of church and state are suggestive of a secular nationalist tradition. Yet, on the other hand, the relative piousness of the population and the abundance of religious national symbols in the United States are unmatched among other prosperous, industrialized nations. Furthermore, conservative nationalist discourse, which often gains prominence during times of national crisis, is invariably intertwined with religion, typically of the fundamentalist Protestant variety. The readings in this section examine the historical and contemporary relationship between religion and national identity in the United States. Most of them date back to the “civil religion” debate that had dominated the sociology of religion in the 1970s (for an overview of the rise and decline of the academic discourse about civil religion, see Mathisen, James A. 1989. “Twenty Years after Bellah: Whatever Happened to American Civil Religion?” Sociological Analysis 50:129-146.).


In his classic 1967 article Robert Bellah defined civil religion as the transcendental, religious self-understanding that exists in every nation alongside its organized religious denominations, providing the population with a collective moral compass and source of social solidarity. Civil religion employs sacred symbols and rituals, such as the flag, presidential inaugurations, or national holidays, all of which are infused with religious meaning, often conjured up by references to God and national destiny. Given the constitutional separation of church and state in the U.S., American civic religion relies on abstract religious signifiers, leaving specific denominational practices to the private realm. Nonetheless, its distinctive feature is a belief that ultimate sovereignty belongs not to the people but to God and that the nation has the “obligation, both collective and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.” In *The Broken Covenant,* Bellah further develops this thesis by arguing that civil religion in America is under threat from an increasingly unchecked individualism promoted by consumer culture, profit-seeking corporations, and a largely unresponsive government. In search of possible remedies, he examines the collective myths that have sustained public religion throughout American history. He contrasts the traditions of New England Puritanism and 18th century Enlightenment thought, both of which stressed individuals’ communitarian responsibilities and virtuous citizenship, with
Lockean utilitarianism, which has progressively undermined the transcendental meaning of the American founding myth. Bellah argues that communitarian beliefs, which have persisted in spite of the individualistic onslaught, must be infused with new life by contemporary social movements (he sees new religious youth movements of the 1970s as potential agents of progressive social change).

This analytical anthology of historical documents (political, theological, journalistic, academic, and artistic) illustrates the development of American civil religion over the last three centuries. For Cherry, the main theme that emerges from the texts is the recurrent role of a messianic conception of national destiny as a motivating factor in the evolution of American self-understanding. While the belief in the nation’s God-given mission has been unwavering, the specific content of that destiny has varied considerably over time. Cherry focuses on its manifestation in three realms: national symbols, institutions, and the relationship between civil religion and organized religious denominations.

Dohen’s book examines the historical embrace of American nationalism by the American Catholic church. The author argues that America has always been a messianic nation in which national identity has been deeply intertwined with religious faith. However, while Americans have always been suspicious of irreligion, they have been quite ambivalent about the specific content of the religious beliefs of their fellow citizens. This religious pluralism was made possible by the widespread value consensus about the nature of the American nation, the practical difficulties of restricting religious practices across a vast territory and a diverse population, as well as the Pietist emphasis on the personal nature of religious belief. The resulting blend of nationalism and diverse religions “emptied of religious content” has created “an amalgam that serves as a common religion.” Dohen argues that the American Catholic church unquestionably accepted this common religion and adjusted its own practices to its demands for two primary reasons: the Irish nationalism of the early Catholic bishops (which enabled an easy transfer of loyalty to American nationalism) and the clergy’s desire to publicly affirm its loyalty to the nation in response to anti-Catholic nativism and the popular perception of split political loyalties of European immigrants. She concludes with seven hypotheses about the general role of religion in pluralist societies, which posit a strong relationship between nationalism and diluted religious dogma, with the former always taking precedence over the latter.

This article offers a thorough review of the literature on American civil religion in the years following the publication of Bellah’s “Civil Religion in America” in 1967. It focuses on five specific questions: what is American civil religion, what has been its history, what is its relationship to churches, what is its institutional base, and why civil religion exists in the first place. Hammond defines civil
religion as “any set of beliefs and rituals, related to the past, present, and/or future of a people (‘nation’) which are understood in some transcendent fashion.” American civil religion frames the nation as both exceptional and messianic, as well as the ultimate agent of human redemption. Although it is thoroughly ecumenical with respect to religious denominations, it is intolerant of secularizing movements, such as atheism or communism, and disparaging toward “those who are un-American or incompletely American” (with the exclusionary boundary shifting over time). A number of the reviewed sources view the religious tone of much of American civil discourse as rooted in the nation’s historically pluralistic approach to religion, which has made religion attractive to a wide spectrum of political positions, from conservatives to liberals and radicals. The religiosity of the population is further reinforced by the presence of religious symbols and rituals in public education. As a final point of note, Hammond cites Coleman’s (1970) typology of civil religions, which includes the American model, where civil religion is distinct from both the state and the church, secular nationalism (e.g., the Soviet Union), a church-sponsored variant (e.g., Buddhism in Sri Lanka), and a state-sponsored variant (e.g., Shinto Japan).

In a marked departure from Durkheimian sociology of religion, Thomas argues that the Second Great Awakening of the nineteenth century was not a product of social anomie, but of the individualistic nationalism that accompanied the national integration of the American market. Capitalist expansion in the United States gave rise to and was justified by an ideology of individual entrepreneurship, rational decision-making, and the moral imperative of national economic growth, which was reflected in two isomorphic movements: Republicanism and revivalism. These movements defined the reality of the period, shifting the public mood of America away from a pessimistic Calvinism and toward a Methodist triumphalism. This new cultural climate helped shape the plethora of newly founded organizations and institutions, which in turn ensured the continued persistence of individualistic ideology.

Tuveson analyzes the historical role of messianic ideology in American civil religion as a source of justification for the nation’s (relatively) consistent expansionist foreign policy. He argues that “apocalyptic Whiggism,” that is, the view of the United States as a nation chosen by God to wage war between good and evil, led American political leaders to launch recurrent international diplomatic and military campaigns to “redeem” the world. This perspective was fuelled by the dual belief in the political importance of the global balance of power and the dangers stemming from the sins of humanity (he also acknowledges the role of purely economic factors). Tuveson traces the intellectual history of apocalyptic Whiggism in political and religious speeches, popular art, and national symbols, focusing not only on their content but also on the conditions of their production. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of
historical watersheds in American history, like the Civil War and the World Wars, as moments of acute collective self-reflection that reanimated the apocalyptic national discourse.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1990. *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rejecting the simplistic theoretical alternatives of secularization and stagnation, Wuthnow marshals a variety of historical evidence and public opinion data to argue that the symbolic boundaries of religion in the United States have undergone a dramatic transformation in response to political, demographic, technological, and cultural changes following the Second World War, of which the expanding scope of the state and the dramatic increase in average educational attainment have been the most important. As a result, Americans have become increasingly self-conscious about religion and reliant on its ability to solve personal problems, denominational institutions have lost much of their control over religious expression, public discourse has come to depend less on overtly religious language, and religion has increasingly become private and symbolic in response to the continued dominance of scientific rationality. Traditional denominational divisions have been replaced by profound political polarization, which has given rise to two contrasting variants of American civil religion, one liberal/progressive and one conservative/orthodox. Because of the ongoing vitriolic partisan conflict, civil religion has lost much of its ability to unite the population. This creates the possibility that the nation will come to increasingly rely on other legitimating myths, such as a quasi-religious faith in personal growth, material success, and, especially, scientific and technological progress.

**NATIONALISM AS SYMBOLIC PRACTICE**

While some see nationalism as rooted in primordial ethnic or religious traditions, others understand it as a social construct which is constantly reproduced by symbolic practices. In the latter perspective, examining the views of political elites or the contents of official documents is not sufficient for gaining an understanding of nationalism. Instead, attention must be paid to contextually-embedded everyday rituals that employ potent symbols of national belonging, such as flags, national anthems, historical figures, and commemorative dates. By analyzing the production and interpretation of such symbols, researchers in this tradition attempt to gain a better understanding of the processes that have shaped national identification throughout American history.

Bodnar, John. 1992. *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bodnar traces the construction of public memory in the U.S. by examining the tension between official and vernacular narratives. Official memory is shaped by elites to “stimulate loyalty to large political structures” and as such tends to downplay disorder and dramatic social change (such as citizen protests or military defeats) and stress historical continuity (typically framed as steady progress), social order embedded in existing institutions, and citizenship duties over citizenship rights. The public enacts the official rituals, but often inscribes in them its own, typically micro-level, vernacular interests. Bodnar goes on to describe the shifting dynamic between the nation-state, business, regional
interests, and vernacular culture throughout American history. He argues that the nation-state dominated public rituals from the Revolution until 1820, when sectional interests became more prominent. Regional variation continued until the South’s defeat in the Civil War. In the final decades of the 19th century business came to occupy a central role in sponsoring and shaping national celebrations (in the interest of post-war reconciliation), but its role was strongly contested by an increasingly class-conscious public. During World War I, the nation-state consolidated its power and succeeded in nationalizing public culture to the detriment of vernacular interests, particularly those of ethnic minorities. This continued until the 1960s and 1970s when the “‘decorum of the liberal consensus’ was shattered.”


Frank’s book describes the history of economic nationalism in the U.S., focusing on the recurrent calls for the mass purchase of American products. These “Buy American” movements typically emerged during times of economic crisis and were deeply intertwined with racist attitudes toward ethnic minorities, particularly those of Asian descent. The earliest form of such economic nationalism was the Boston Tea Party and the subsequent nonimportation campaign. However, more contemporary Buy American campaigns stemmed largely from the tariff debate of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and first flourished during the Great Depression under the leadership of William Randolph Hearst, Jr. and national labor unions. The second wave of the campaigns was launched in the early 1980s by the United Auto Workers, local unions, and, interestingly, by American corporations themselves, who sought to increase their domestic sales only to reinvest the profits abroad. In the first half of the 1990s, economic recession and controversial statements by Japanese politicians led to widespread calls for economic nationalism among the public, resulting in the most powerful Buy American movement to date. However, this movement soon dissipated as it became faced with the reality of a globalized economy after the passage of NAFTA and GATT. Frank concludes that both the protectionism and free trade positions overlook crucial issues of fair trade and worker’s rights in an increasingly global labor market, which are finally being confronted by contemporary labor unions.


Pettegrew examines the construction of American nationalism and patriotism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by analyzing Memorial Day celebrations and Civil War battle memoirs in the North and South. Although some late-19th century Memorial Day rituals involved exaltations of the battlefield experience (e.g., those by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.), most framed the Civil War in moral terms and strove for national reconciliation. The latter approach mourned the dead from both sides of the conflict and emphasized the political nature of the war and the mutual respect between soldiers of the Union and the Confederacy.
Hence, the Civil War became a tool for merging divergent group identities into a single, unified nationalism, “more tangible and powerful than if the Civil War had not been fought.” In contrast to official Memorial Day celebrations, popular Civil War literature avoided lofty political and ideological issues and instead focused on the experience of the battlefield, either colored with romanticism (typically in fictional accounts) or characterized by a mix between the gruesome reality of wartime violence and a “culmination of manhood” that transcended ordinary existence (typically in soldiers’ memoirs). Both the official and the vernacular interpretations of the Civil War gave rise to nationalist martial heroism during the Spanish-American War (which added to it an element of righteousness derived from liberating the oppressed) and the lead-up to the First World War. This nationalism sought to overcome ethnic differences through an inclusive emphasis on Anglo-Saxon identity united against a common enemy and was accepted by dominant elites as well as many ethnic and racial minorities themselves, who saw military service as intrinsically tied to American citizenship.


Schwartz argues that the rapid rise of George Washington to the status of national hero occurred before his assumption of leadership of the Revolutionary army and therefore cannot be viewed as a direct result of his military achievements. Instead, his iconic persona was the product of collective sacralization: Washington became the totemic symbol of the new nation itself, with all of its hopes, dreams, and political ideals. Over the course of the Revolution and its aftermath, the source of social solidarity shifted from religious organizations to political institutions, although the latter became infused with a similarly religious sentiment (this argument is reminiscent of the civil religion literature reviewed in a subsequent section of this bibliography). Despite late-18th century attacks on his reputation and subsequent historical revisionism, Washington’s role as the singular symbolic representation of the American nation has persisted, thanks to the work of reputational entrepreneurs (including Washington himself) and, presumably, the institutionalization of his memory in public education.


Spillman compares national identity in the U.S. and Australia, as expressed in the two nations’ centennial and bicentennial celebrations. Her analysis covers the varied symbolic repertoires of the two countries, organizational conflicts surrounding cultural production, and two elements of the national “discursive field”: concern with the internal coherence of the nation and with its position in international relations. Concern with international standing was prominent in both countries during their centennials, but one hundred years later remained important only in Australia. The opposite was true of internal national coherence: it was prominent in both countries in the 19th century but mattered only in the U.S. in the 20th century. During its bicentennial, the U.S. continued stressing its founding moment and pride in its political culture, while Australia primarily emphasized the natural richness of its land. In both countries diversity became a
Bonikowski: Literature Review --34---

central issue, while narratives of progress and prosperity waned in importance. Spillman attributes these differences to changes in the relationship between dominant and peripheral groups within both countries (the U.S. bicentennial occurred in the aftermath of the civil rights movement and sought to unite a broad array of interests) and changes in the relative importance of internal and external sources of identity (America’s international dominance was unquestionable in the 20th century, while Australia continued to be dependent on other nations). She concludes with a critique of the simplistic civic-ethnic dichotomy, arguing that it glosses over important within-category variation.


Waldstreicher examines the role of local celebrations and their reproduction in the press in constructing a consensus-based American identity in the 1760s and 1770s. Prior to independence, American colonists used festive traditions inherited from English culture as sites for political contestation, as evidenced by street theater during the Stamp Act crisis, political toasts in local taverns, and the tarring and feathering of Tories. The coverage of these rituals by the press gave them extra-local significance and encouraged copycat efforts throughout the colonies. After the Declaration of Independence, rituals of dissent gave way to mass celebrations, which were viewed by the elites as crucial expressions of public assent to the new political order. Once again, newspaper reports proved to be essential, since they identified the “people” themselves as the authors of independence and encouraged the diffusion of their rituals throughout the nation; they “taught patriotic feeling and action even while demonstrating that such virtue already predominated.” The festive nature of these events and the typically vague and indeterminate press descriptions of the “people” involved in them were crucial in downplaying economic and political divisions in the interest of national unity. Much of this surface-deep consensus disappeared by the 1790s.


The book examines the role of public celebrations in facilitating the development of American nationalism. Waldstreicher explicitly defines nationalism as a set of practices and political strategies rather than simply an ideology, and argues that the latter conception tends to lead researchers on fruitless searches for an essential psyche of the nation. He argues that American nationalistic rituals have always been deeply politicized and that the mass media were instrumental in popularizing them and shaping their character. During the Revolutionary era, the colonists used traditional British rituals to create (and physically enact) a consensus patriotism that glossed over important class and regional differences. The 1790s were dominated by deep partisan conflict between the Federalists and the Democratic Republicans, with both using common festivities, such as the Fourth of July, to advance their political goals. During the first decade of the 19th century, celebrations focused increasingly on the electoral cycle with grassroots party activism playing a major role in their organization. At this time politics
became professionalized and participation in political rituals became largely limited to white male voters. Partisan conflict subsided in the 1810s and gave way to sectionalism, with local elites using celebratory rites, whose content was disseminated to other regions of the country by the press, to advocate their own visions for America’s future.


Zelinsky distinguishes between the nation ("that real or supposed community of individuals who are convinced they share a common set of traditions, beliefs, and cultural characteristics") and the state ("a political apparatus that claims or exerts absolute sovereignty over a given territory and its inhabitants") and argues that America was a nation before it became a nation-state. This gradual shift can be observed in national symbols, organized into more or less coherent myths, which have served as common referents for the diverse inhabitants of the American nation. Zelinsky catalogs a large variety of such symbols, including "ideolons" (i.e., paradigmatic fictional or real figures), performances (from national holidays to organized sports), artistic products, and elements of the natural and built landscape. His analysis documents the historical development of a civil religion which gradually lost its distaste for state power and embraced a nationalism blended with strong statism, particularly in the aftermath of the Civil War. This civil religion weakened in the 1970s, creating the possibility for a post-nationalist society, characterized by new regionalisms, ethnic revivals, religious fundamentalism, and technologically-driven globalization.
References


Robertson, Andrew W. 2001. “‘Look on This Picture… And on This!’ Nationalism, Localism, and Partisan Images of Otherness in the United States, 1787-1820.” The American Historical Review 106:1263-1280.


Bonikowski: Literature Review --39---


American Nationalism

Data Inventory

Bart Bonikowski
Department of Sociology
Princeton University
April 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 4

Publicly Available Data.................................................................................................................. 5
  ABC News September 11th Adult Poll (2002)................................................................... 5
  ABC News September 11th Teen Poll (2002)................................................................. 5
  ABC News/Washington Post Six Months after September 11th Poll (2002)............ 5
  American National Election Studies (1992)................................................................. 6
  American National Election Studies Pilot Study (1991)................................................ 7
  American National Election Studies Pilot Study (1998)................................................ 7
  Field (California) Polls (1988).................................................................................... 8
  Field (California) Polls (1991).................................................................................... 8
  Gallup/CNN/USA Today September 11th Anniversary Poll (2002)........................ 9
  Los Angeles County Social Survey (1992, 1994-1998)............................................... 10
  Newsweek Poll: Civil Liberties and Terrorism (2001)................................................. 11
  Newsweek Poll: July 4th Jitters (2002) .................................................................. 11
  NPR/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Immigration Study (2004)......................................................................................................................... 12
  WABC-TV/New York Daily News Patriotism Poll (1986)............................................ 12
  Washington Post September 11th Poll (2002)............................................................ 13

Proprietary Data............................................................................................................................ 14
  A Lot To Be Thankful For Survey (1998).................................................................. 14
  AARP Patriotism Survey (2006).............................................................................. 14
  Citizen's Flag Alliance's Flag Survey (1998).............................................................. 14
  Hamilton College Patriotism Poll (2003)................................................................. 15
  Harwood Institute Political Conduct Survey (2002)............................................... 15
INTRODUCTION

The most frequent approach to measuring American nationalism, utilized primarily in public opinion polls, consists of asking respondents to rate themselves on an ordinal scale of patriotism or national pride. Some studies, such as the Washington Post September 11th Poll and the Harwood Institute Political Conduct Survey, go a step further by gathering information about specific behaviors that respondents consider to be patriotic or particular aspects of American society of which they are especially proud. Many public opinion polls also gather data on the use of national symbols, such as the American flag, and participation in national rituals, such as the 4th of July, along with a wide variety of measures of attitudes regarding social, political, and economic issues. For the purposes of nationalism research, the most relevant of these issues include immigration, citizenship (e.g., the characteristics of “good” citizens), comparisons of the US with other nations, multiculturalism, and official language policies. In addition to self-reported levels of patriotism and national pride, some surveys (for instance, the American National Election Studies) attempt to disaggregate American national identity by asking respondents to specify what makes America unique or what specific traits make someone a “true” American, while others (for instance, the World Values Surveys) attempt to measure the relative salience of different levels of identification (e.g., local, regional, national, global). Finally, a number of studies employ content analysis rather than survey research to examine how elements of the nationalist discourse are reflected in the popular media.

The data in this review are organized into two categories: publicly available and proprietary. The former include data distributed by major providers whose collections are accessible to most university libraries, including ICPSR, Roper iPoll, and Polling the Nations, as well as data distributed online by individual researchers and institutions. Proprietary data include those used in important studies of American nationalism which have not been made available through the standard data distribution channels, as well as surveys indexed by Roper iPoll for which data are currently not available. Proprietary data were included with the assumption that interested researchers may be able to gain access to them by directly contacting the relevant research organizations or principle investigators. In both sections, the datasets are sorted alphabetically. In addition, the review includes an index that references all the major variables and research organizations mentioned in the dataset descriptions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABC NEWS SEPTEMBER 11TH ADULT POLL (2002)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong> September 5-8, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public access:</strong> Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Producer / Principal investigator:</strong> Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of data collection:</strong> Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coverage:</strong> National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variables:</strong> National pride, evaluation of political figures (general and on specific issues), optimism about US and self, problems facing US, impact of 9/11 (on nation, daily life, personal wellbeing), handling of 9/11 by US and other countries, civil liberties, suspicion toward Arabs, display of US flag, commemoration of 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls:</strong> Sex, age, education, religion, religiosity, party affiliation, political orientation, race, Hispanic origin, household composition, size of community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL:</strong> <a href="http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03553.xml">http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03553.xml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABC NEWS SEPTEMBER 11TH TEEN POLL (2002)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong> August 25-28, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public access:</strong> Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Producer / Principal investigator:</strong> Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of data collection:</strong> Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coverage:</strong> National (ages 12 – 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variables:</strong> National pride, optimism about US and self, plans for future, personal wellbeing, impact of 9/11 (on daily life, personal well-being, plans for future), understanding of Islam, prejudice against Muslims/Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls:</strong> Age, sex, education, household composition, size of community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL:</strong> <a href="http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03561.xml">http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03561.xml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST SIX MONTHS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH POLL (2002)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong> March 7-10, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public access:</strong> Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Producer / Principal investigator:</strong> Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of data collection:</strong> Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coverage:</strong> National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variables: National pride, evaluation of political figures, foreign policy, anti-terrorism campaign, terrorism prevention, impact of 9/11 (on nation, daily life, personal wellbeing), display of US flag

Controls: Age, sex, party affiliation, education, Hispanic origin

URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03431.xml

AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES (1992)

Date: September 1 - October 31, 1992
Public access: Yes

Producer / Principal investigator: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Unit of data collection: Individual

Coverage: National

Variables: National identity (characteristics of "true American"), multiculturalism, political attitudes and behavior (regarding campaigns, candidates, political figures, parties, government, specific political issues, political efficacy, voting, political system), civil liberties, attitudes toward specific groups

Controls: Large selection, including age, sex, marital status, employment, social class, residence (duration and characteristics), social networks, citizenship, political orientation, party affiliation (respondent's and parents'), income, religion, race, Hispanic origin, size of community, household composition

URL: http://www.electionstudies.org/

Citations: Sidanius et al. 1997; Citrin et al. 1994


Date: September 18 - November 4, 2002; September 7 - November 1, 2004
Public access: Yes

Producer / Principal investigator: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Unit of data collection: Individual

Coverage: National

Variables: Patriotism (US flag, national pride), political attitudes and behavior (regarding campaigns, candidates, political figures, parties, government, specific political issues, political efficacy, voting, political system), civil liberties, attitudes toward specific groups

Controls: Large selection, including age, sex, marital status, employment, social class, residence (duration and characteristics), social networks, citizenship, political orientation, party affiliation (respondent's and parents'), income, religion, race, Hispanic origin, size of community, household composition

URL: http://www.electionstudies.org/
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES PILOT STUDY (1991)

**Date:** June 4-31, 1991  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** National  
**Variables:** National identity (characteristics of "true American"), multiculturalism, political attitudes and behavior (regarding campaigns, candidates, political figures, parties, government, specific political issues, political efficacy, voting, political system), civil liberties, attitudes toward specific groups  
**Controls:** Large selection, including age, sex, marital status, employment, social class, residence (duration and characteristics), social networks, citizenship, political orientation, party affiliation (respondent's and parents'), income, religion, race, Hispanic origin, size of community, household composition  
**URL:** [http://www.electionstudies.org/](http://www.electionstudies.org/)

AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES PILOT STUDY (1998)

**Date:** September 8 - November 3, 1998  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** State (California, Illinois, Georgia)  
**Variables:** Public mood (feelings toward US), political attitudes and behavior (regarding campaigns, candidates, political figures, parties, government, specific political issues, political efficacy, voting, political system), citizenship, civil liberties, attitudes toward specific groups  
**Controls:** Large selection, including age, sex, marital status, employment, social class, residence (duration and characteristics), social networks, citizenship, political orientation, party affiliation (respondent's and parents'), income, religion, race, Hispanic origin, size of community, household composition  
**URL:** [http://www.electionstudies.org/](http://www.electionstudies.org/)

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL SURVEY (1991)

**Date:** June 3-6, 1991  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** CBS News  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual
Coverage: National

Variables: Patriotism (respondent's, change over time, politicians' sincerity), evaluation of political parties (on specific issues), economic state of US, Persian Gulf War, abortion, health care policy, free trade, foreign policy, AIDS, nuclear power, racial discrimination

Controls: Household composition, sex, region, state, community size, voter registration status, political orientation, religiosity, marital status, health insurance, religion, education, age, race, employment, and family income, employment, subjective economic wellbeing, party affiliation, political orientation, union membership, marital status, education, age, race, Hispanic origin, family income

URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/09863.xml

FIELD (CALIFORNIA) POLLS (1988)

Date: February 17-21, 1988
Public access: Yes
Producer / Principal investigator: Field Research Corporation
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: State (California)
Variables: National identity (what makes one American), social/economic consequences of immigration, affirmative action, evaluation of political figures, political candidate preferences, state political and economic issues, higher education, ethnic composition of California
Controls: Age, education, political orientation, party affiliation, religion, income, Hispanic origin, race, marital status, home ownership, sex, union membership, citizenship, voter registration, county

Citations: Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and Green 1990

FIELD (CALIFORNIA) POLLS (1991)

Date: May 30 - June 10, 1991
Public access: Yes
Producer / Principal investigator: Field Research Corporation
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: State (California)
Variables: National identity (what makes Americans distinct from other nations), English as official language, multiculturalism, evaluation of political figures, political candidate preferences, state political and economic issues, public schools, abortion, Satanism
Controls: Age, education, political orientation, party affiliation, religion, income, Hispanic origin, race, home ownership, sex, voter registration, county
**GALLUP/CNN/USA TODAY SEPTEMBER 11TH ANNIVERSARY POLL (2002)**

**Date:** September 2-4, 2002  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** Gallup Organization  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** National  
**Variables:** National pride, evaluation of political figures, confidence in government, anti-terrorism campaign, foreign policy, civil liberties, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, immigration, impact of 9/11 (on nation, daily life, personal wellbeing), general trust, media coverage of 9/11, display of US flag, suspicion toward Arabs, commemoration of 9/11, national unity  
**Controls:** Household composition, political party affiliation, political orientation, religiosity, sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, income, zip code, phone lines, state, region, voter registration  
**URL:** [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html)

**GALLUP NEWS SERVICE SURVEY: MAY OMNIBUS SURVEY, WAVE 4 (1991)**

**Date:** May 23-26, 1991  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** The Gallup Organization  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** National  
**Variables:** National pride, problems facing US, satisfaction with US (general and on specific issues), evaluation of political parties and figures, foreign policy, comparison of US with other nations (on specific issues), affinity toward other nations, national symbols and rituals (attitudes and use/participation), civic knowledge, interest in specific social/political issues  
**Controls:** Age, education, race, marital status, children, household income, political orientation, party affiliation, religion, employment, voter registration, size of community, region  
**URL:** [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html)

Date: 1996, 2004
Public access: Yes
Producer / Principal investigator: National Opinion Research Center
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
Variables: National identity (what makes one American, preference for US citizenship over others), good citizenship (only 2004), political/social/economic attitudes (e.g., environment, public health, crime, inequality, education, race relations)
Controls: Large selection, including employment, occupation, industry, marital status, education, race, region, nativity, household composition, sex, income, political orientation, political affiliation, religion, religiosity
URL: http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website
Citations: Citrin et al. 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Rahn 2004

Date: 1992, 1994-1998
Public access: Yes
Producer / Principal investigator: UCLA Institute for Social Science Research
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: County (Los Angeles)
Variables: Patriotism, display of and reaction to US flag, ethnic consensus/conflict, ethnic identification, immigration (economic and cultural consequences, policy, characteristics of legal/illegal immigrants), confidence in social institutions, racial discrimination, English as official language, satisfaction with LA, national unity, problems facing US, government spending
Controls: Race, ethnicity, party affiliation, political orientation, ancestry, place of birth, language, age, religion, religiosity, education, class
URL: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/SDA/lacssmain.html
Citations: Citrin et al. 2001

NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL SURVEYS: FIRST PATRIOTISM SURVEY (1983)
Date: June 13-18, 1983
Public access: Yes
Producer / Principal investigator: The New York Times
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
**Variables:** General satisfaction with US, patriotism, components/conditions of patriotism, national pride (features of US that make respondent most and least proud), display of US flag, civil liberties, attitudes toward government, buying American products, foreign economic competition, foreign policy, immigration

**Controls:** Household composition, sex, region, state, community size, employment, subjective economic wellbeing, party affiliation, political orientation, union membership, marital status, education, age, race, Hispanic origin, religion, family income

**URL:** [http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08366.xml](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08366.xml)

**NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL SURVEYS: SECOND PATRIOTISM SURVEY (1983)**

**Date:** November 18-22, 1983

**Public access:** Yes

**Producer / Principal investigator:** The New York Times

**Unit of data collection:** Individual

**Coverage:** National

**Variables:** General satisfaction with US, patriotism, displaying US flag, attitudes toward government, foreign economic competition, foreign policy

**Controls:** Household composition, sex, region, state, community size, employment, subjective economic wellbeing, party affiliation, political orientation, union membership, marital status, education, age, race, Hispanic origin, religion, family income

**URL:** [http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08366.xml](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08366.xml)

**NEWSWEEK POLL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND TERRORISM (2001)**

**Date:** September 20-21, 2001

**Public access:** Yes

**Producer / Principal investigator:** Princeton Survey Research Associates

**Unit of data collection:** Individual

**Coverage:** National

**Variables:** Patriotism and responses to 9/11 attacks, evaluation of political figures, impact of 9/11 (on national unity, economy, daily life), causes of 9/11, terrorism prevention, handling of 9/11 by US and other countries, civil liberties, airline industry

**Controls:** Party affiliation, age, education, Hispanic origin, race, region

**URL:** [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html)

**NEWSWEEK POLL: JULY 4TH JITTERS (2002)**

**Date:** June 27-28, 2002

**Public access:** Yes

**Producer / Principal investigator:** Princeton Survey Research Associates
**Unit of data collection:** Individual

**Coverage:** National

**Variables:** Religion and national identity, evaluation of political figures, Pledge of Allegiance, separation of church and state, terrorism prevention, impact of 9/11 (on personal safety, 4th of July activities), problems facing US, civil liberties

**Controls:** Sex, party affiliation, age, education, Hispanic origin, race, region, size of community

**URL:** [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html)

---

**NPR/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Immigration Study (2004)**

**Date:** May 27 - August 2, 2004

**Public access:** Yes

**Producer / Principal investigator:** ICR Survey Research Group

**Unit of data collection:** Individual

**Coverage:** National

**Variables:** National pride, national identification, American culture, satisfaction with US (general, economic situation), civil liberties, immigration (beliefs about the social/cultural characteristics, practices, and experiences of recent, legal, and illegal immigrants; immigrant integration; immigration policy; consequences for American economy and culture; contact with immigrants), immigration experiences and attitudes toward US among subsample of immigrants and their children

**Controls:** Citizenship, place of birth (respondents' and parents'), date of immigration, subjective economic wellbeing, household composition, marital status, political orientation, party affiliation, voter registration, religion, religiosity, education, age, race, Hispanic origin, income, language, telephone lines

**URL:** [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html)

---


**Date:** May 1986

**Public access:** Yes

**Producer / Principal investigator:** Chilton Research Services

**Unit of data collection:** Individual

**Coverage:** NYC

**Variables:** National pride, patriotism, national symbols and rituals (US flag, 4th of July, Statue of Liberty), civil liberties, immigration, civic knowledge

**Controls:** Nativity, year of immigration, citizenship, ancestry, Hispanic origin, age, sex, county

**URL:** [http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08583.xml](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08583.xml)
WASHINGTON POST SEPTEMBER 11TH POLL (2002)

**Date:** September 3-6, 2002  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** National  
**Variables:** National pride (on specific issues), evaluation of political figures (general and on specific issues), satisfaction with US, foreign relations and policy, impact of 9/11 (on nation, daily life), handling of 9/11 by US, media coverage of 9/11, civil liberties, confidence in government (general and on specific issues) and social institutions, general trust  
**Controls:** Sex, age, education, party affiliation, political orientation, race, Hispanic origin, size of community  
**URL:** [http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03556.xml](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03556.xml)


**Date:** 1980 (smaller selection of variables), 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005  
**Public access:** Yes  
**Producer / Principal investigator:** Ronald Inglehart, Michigan  
**Unit of data collection:** Individual  
**Coverage:** National  
**Variables:** National attachment (vs. local, regional, global), national pride (general and on specific issues), national priorities, confidence in social institutions, political/social/economic attitudes and behaviors (e.g., environment, voluntary associations, group preferences, health, life satisfaction, job preferences, meaning of life, gender roles), trust (general and toward specific groups)  
**Controls:** Religion, religiosity, marital status, household composition, political orientation, place of birth, duration in US, party affiliation, race, Hispanic origin, sex, age, employment, occupation, income, size of community, region  
**URL:** [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/)  
**Citations:** Inglehart and Carballo 1997
A LOT TO BE THANKFUL FOR SURVEY (1998)

Date: September 3-16, 1998
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: Public Agenda Foundation
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National (parents of school-age children)
Variables: National identity (elements, durability, existence of core culture, personal salience of specific ideals), good citizenship, civic knowledge and education, comparison of US with other nations, problems facing kids, immigrant integration, Spanish as second official language
Controls: N/A
URL: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

AARP PATRIOTISM SURVEY (2006)

Date: May 19-23, 2006
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: ICR Survey Research Group
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
Variables: Patriotism, national symbols and rituals (attitudes and participation), voting behavior
Controls: N/A
URL: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

CITIZEN'S FLAG ALLIANCE'S FLAG SURVEY (1998)

Date: August 1998
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: Gallup Organization
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
Variables: Flag-burning amendment, importance of flag, civil liberties
Controls: N/A
URL: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Public access</th>
<th>Producer / Principal investigator</th>
<th>Unit of data collection</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
POST-MODERNITY PROJECT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA:
SURVEY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE (1996)

Date: January 27 - April 14, 1996
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: Gallup Organization / James D. Hunter, University of Virginia
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
Variables: Social change in the US (improvement/decline of specific ideals, postive/negative changes in social norms), confidence in government, public policies, national pride, perceived characteristics of national elites, good citizenship, individual freedom vs. public good, civic education, attitudes toward homosexuality, conservative Christian movement, religiosity, other attitudes (abortion, gender roles, satisfaction with life, etc.), political orientation, voting behavior
Controls: N/A
URL: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

UCLA STUDENT SURVEY ON NATIONALISM (1993)

Date: Fall 1993
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: Jim Sidanius, UCLA
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: UCLA undergraduates
Variables: National pride, foreign relations, national symbols (flag, national anthem), affect toward Americans, ethnic attachment (importance of ethnicity, closeness to co-ethnics, ethnic organizations), ethnic relations, discrimination
Controls: N/A (but include education, social class, family income)
Citations: Sidanius et al. 1997

USA TODAY POLL (1990)

Date: December 29-30, 1990
Public access: No
Producer / Principal investigator: Gordon S. Black Corporation
Unit of data collection: Individual
Coverage: National
Variables: Threats to US democracy, good citizenship, importance of rights and freedoms, abortion, party affiliation, flag-burning amendment
Controls: N/A
URL: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
REFERENCES


INDEX

4th of July ........................................... 11, 12
9/11
   causes of ............................................. 11
   commemoration of ................................ 5, 9
   handling of .......................................... 5, 11, 12
   impact of ........................................... 5, 9, 11, 12
   media coverage of ................................... 9, 12
   responses to .......................................... 11
AARP ..................................................... 14
ABC News ............................................... 5
abortion ............................................... 7, 8, 16
affirmative action ........................................ 8
AIDS ..................................................... 7
airline industry ......................................... 11
CBS News ................................................ 7
Chilton Research Services ......................... 12
Citizen's Flag Alliance ............................ 14
civic education ......................................... 14, 15, 16
civic knowledge ......................................... 9, 12, 14, 15
civil liberties ........................................... 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16
CNN ......................................................... 8
discrimination .......................................... 7, 10, 16
economic competition, foreign .................. 11
economic state of US ................................ 7
elites ..................................................... 16
English as official language .................... 8, 10
ethnic attachment ...................................... 16
ethnic identification .................................. 10
Field Research Corporation ..................... 8
flag ...................................................... 6, 12, 14, 15, 16
   burning ................................................. 14, 16
   display of ............................................ 5, 9, 10, 11, 15
   importance of ....................................... 14
   reaction to ............................................ 10
foreign nations
   affinity toward ...................................... 9
   comparison of US with ............................ 9, 14
   economic competition with .................... 10
foreign policy .......................................... 5, 7, 9, 10, 11
foreign relations ....................................... 12, 16
free trade ................................................ 7
Gallup News Service .................................. 9
Gallup Organization ................................. 8, 9, 14, 15, 16
good citizenship ...................................... 9, 14, 16
Gordon S. Black Corporation ..................... 16
government
   attitudes toward ................................... 10, 11
   confidence in ....................................... 9, 12, 16
Hamilton College ...................................... 14
health care policy ..................................... 7
homosexuality ........................................... 16
ICR Survey Research Group .......................... 11, 14
immigrant integration .................................. 12, 14
immigration ............................................. 9, 10, 12
   consequences of .................................... 8, 10, 12
   experiences .......................................... 12
   policy ................................................... 10, 12
Islam, understanding of ............................ 5
Israeli-Palestinian conflict ........................... 9
Kaiser Family Foundation .......................... 11
Kane, Parsons & Associates ....................... 15
Kennedy School of Government .................... 11
minorities
   attitudes toward ..................................... 5
   multiculturalism ..................................... 6, 7, 8
   national anthem ..................................... 15, 16
   national attachment ................................ 13
   national identification ............................. 12
   national identity ..................................... 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14
   National Opinion Research Center ............... 9
   national pride ........................................ 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16
   national priorities .................................. 13
   national rituals ...................................... 9, 12, 14, 15
   national symbols .................................... 9, 12, 14, 15, 16
   national unity ....................................... 9, 10, 11
New York Daily News ............................... 12
New York Times ....................................... 7, 10
Newsweek ............................................... 11
NPR ....................................................... 11
nuclear power .......................................... 7
optimism about US .................................... 5
Parents Magazine ...................................... 15
patriotism ................................................ 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15
Persian Gulf War ....................................... 7
personal wellbeing .................................. 5, 9
plans for future ...................................... 5
Pledge of Allegiance ............................. 11, 15
political figures, evaluation of ... 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
  11, 12
political participation .............................. 15
political parties, evaluation of ............... 7, 9
prayer .................................................. 15
Princeton Survey Research Associates .... 11
problems facing US ................................. 5, 9, 10, 11
products
  buying American ................................. 10
Public Agenda Foundation ..................... 14
public mood ......................................... 7
satisfaction with US ......................... 9, 10, 11, 12
separation of church and state ............ 11
social institutions
  confidence in .................................. 10, 13
Spanish as second official language .... 14
Statue of Liberty .................................. 12
Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch ....... 5, 12
terrorism ............................................ 5, 9, 11
trust ..................................................... 9, 12, 13
USA Today ............................................ 8, 16
voting behavior ................................. 14, 15, 16
WABC-TV ............................................. 12
Washington Post ................................. 5, 12
Zogby International .............................. 15