A Model of Relative Thinking

PRELIMINARY: COMMENTS APPRECIATED

Benjamin Bushong
Harvard University

Matthew Rabin
Harvard University

Joshua Schwartzstein*
Dartmouth

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Abstract

Fixed differences look smaller when compared to large differences. This basic fact has implications for how preferences and choice can depend on the set of options a person faces. We propose a model of relative thinking where a person weighs a given change along a consumption dimension by less when it is compared to larger changes along that dimension. In deterministic settings, the model predicts attraction effects, but predicts meaningful bounds on such effects driven by the intrinsic utility for the choices. In risky environments, a person is less likely to exert effort in a money-earning activity if he had expected to earn higher returns or if there is greater income uncertainty. In a variant of the model, relative thinking induces a tendency to overspend, and for a person to act more impatient if infrequently allotted large amounts to consume than if frequently allotted a small amount to consume.

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*E-mails: bushong@fas.harvard.edu, matthewrabin@fas.harvard.edu, and josh.schwartzstein@dartmouth.edu. We thank Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch for research assistance. We thank Pedro Bordalo, Tom Cunningham, Erik Eyster, Drew Fudenberg, Xavier Gabaix, Botond Koszegi, Kristof Madarasz, Andrei Shleifer, Dmitry Taubinsky, and seminar participants at BEAM, Berkeley, ESSET, Harvard, LSE, Princeton, and Tennessee for helpful feedback.
“All brontosauruses are thin at one end, much, much thicker in the middle, and then thin again at the far end.”

— Ms. Anne Elk’s theory of the brontosaurus, from a Monty Python sketch

1 Introduction

The quote above is from a lesser-known Monty Python sketch, portraying an annoying scientist taking a very long time to reveal her theory of the brontosaurus, which ultimately consisted solely of the above quote. Although we may be underwhelmed by the empirical insight, we all believe her theory is obviously right. Yet in what sense is this so? The tapered shape of the brontosaurus we all picture is of the brontosaurus thin at the ends relative to the middle. But not in absolute terms: the brontosaurus’s front and back are surely thicker in absolute terms than a frog’s—even though we would not describe the frog as being thin at the ends. “Thin” is a relative term. Things appear smaller when compared to bigger things than when compared to smaller things.

The relative nature of judgment is a central theme of psychology. Beginning with Volkmann (1951) and Parducci (1965), research has explored how a given absolute difference can seem big or small depending on the range under consideration. This paper develops a simple model of range-based relative thinking that predicts how the options a person focuses on distorts choice away from maximizing the underlying “consumption utility” he faces. Applied to settings where utility can be characterized as separable across dimensions, we assume a person puts less weight on incremental changes along a dimension when outcomes along that dimension exhibit greater variability in the choice set he faces. We draw out the model’s general features and implications and compare our “range-based” approach with the seemingly related concept of diminishing sensitivity. The model does well at matching known context effects from psychology and marketing. But in contrast to the selective-illustration approach of much of the literature on context effects, we provide a more complete characterization of the effects of range-based relative thinking on choice across contexts. In the process, we clarify limits to context effects implied by the model, showing for instance necessary and sufficient conditions for there to exist no context that induces a person to choose a particular lower-utility option over a particular higher-utility option.

Our primary emphasis is on the model’s potentially important economic implications. In the context of discretionary labor choices, for example, the model says that a worker will choose to exert less effort for a fixed return when there is greater overall income uncertainty. We also develop predictions of a variant of our model about spending patterns over time, showing why relative thinking induces a tendency to overspend. A relative thinker on a limited budget appears more impatient the longer the horizon of consumption, the greater the uncertainty in future income, and (roughly) when he is less frequently allotted larger amounts to consume.
We present our model for deterministic environments in Section 2. A person’s “consumption utility” for a $K$-dimensional consumption bundle $c$ is separable across dimensions: $U(c) = \sum_k u_k(c_k)$. We assume, however, that a person makes choices according to “normed consumption utility” that depends not only on the consumption bundle $c$ but also the comparison set $C$—which in applications we will equate with the choice set. To do so, we follow a recent economic literature begun by Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) in assuming that the comparison set influences choice through distorting the relative weight a person puts on consumption dimensions. Normed consumption utility equals $U^N(c|C) = \sum_k w_k \cdot u_k(c_k)$, where $w_k$ captures the weight that the person places on consumption dimension $k$ given the (notationally suppressed) comparison set $C$. The weights $w_k > 0$ are assumed to be a function $w_k \equiv w(\Delta_k(C))$, where $\Delta_k(C) = \max_{\tilde{c} \in C} u_k(\tilde{c}_k) - \min_{\tilde{c} \in C} u_k(\tilde{c}_k)$ denotes the range of consumption utility along dimension $k$. Our key assumption is that $w(\Delta)$ is decreasing: the wider the range of consumption utility on some dimension, the less a person cares about a fixed utility difference on that dimension.\footnote{A similar theme has been heavily emphasized in recent neuroscience. Models of normalization, such as the notion of “range-adaptation” in Padoa-Schioppa (2009) or “divisive normalization” in Louie, Grattan and Glimcher (2011), tend to relate both the logic of neural activity, and the empirical evidence (reviewed in Rangel and Clithero 2012) on the norming of “value signals”, to the possible role of norming in simple choices. Fehr and Rangel (2011) argue that “the best and worst items receive the same decision value, regardless of their absolute attractiveness, and the decision value of intermediate items is given by their relative location in the scale.” Insofar as these models of value coding in the brain translate into values driving economically interesting choice, they may provide backing to the ideas discussed in this paper. Mellers and Cooke (1994) provide experimental evidence that trade-offs more generally depend on attribute ranges, where the impact of a fixed attribute difference is larger when presented in a narrower range. There is also a related marketing literature (see, e.g., Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999) on “price perceptions”, which presents suggestive evidence that whether a given price seems big or small depends on its relative position in a range. Soltani, De Martino and Camerer (2012), which we discuss below, provide behavioral evidence consistent with range-based normalization being responsible for classical decoy effects, like the “attraction effect”. Indeed, range-frequency theory (Parducci 1974) motivated Huber, Payne and Puto’s (1982) original demonstrations of such effects.}

In searching for flights on a flight aggregator like Orbitz, the model says that spending extra for convenience will feel bigger when the range of prices is $250 - $450 than when the range is $200 - $800. We also assume that $w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta$ is increasing, so that differences in normed utility are increasing in absolute magnitude when fixed as a proportion of the range: The $600 difference seems bigger when the range is $600 than the $200 difference seems when the range is $200. Finally, we assume that $w(\Delta)$ is bounded away from zero: large differences cannot loom arbitrarily small by expanding the range.

Section 3 explores context effects in riskless choice that are induced by relative thinking. When a person starts off indifferent between two 2-dimensional alternatives, the addition of a third to the comparison set influences his choices in ways consistent with experimental evidence. For example, our model predicts the “asymmetric dominance effect” proposed by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982): Adding a more extreme, inferior option to the choice set leads the person to prefer the closer of the two superior options, since the addition expands the range of the closer option’s
disadvantage relative to the other alternative by more than it expands the range of its advantage. Section 3 also characterizes some implications of our model for the limits of context effects based on bounds placed on the weighting function. Given a superior option \( c \) and inferior option \( c' \), we supply necessary and sufficient conditions on their relationship for there to exist any context where range effects induce the choice of \( c' \). Namely, there exist contexts where \( c' \) is chosen over \( c \) if and only if the sum of its advantages where normed as if \( c \) and \( c' \) were the sole options is greater than the sum of its disadvantages when normed as if the range were infinite on those dimensions. This implies that some inferior options, even if undominated, can never be “normed” into selection.

Section 4 extends the model to choice under uncertainty, letting us study range effects in both choices over lotteries and in situations where a person makes plans prior to knowing the exact choice set he will face. The key assumption in extending our model to risky choice is that it is not only the range of expected values across lotteries that matters, but also the range of outcomes in the support of given lotteries. Roughly, we summarize each lottery’s marginal distribution over \( u_k(c_k) \) in terms of its mean plus or minus a measure of its variation, and take the range along a dimension to equal the difference between the maximal mean-plus-variation among all lotteries, and the minimal mean-minus-variation.

In Section 5, we spell out the implications of our model in two central economic contexts. First, we flesh out direct implications of the Section 4 uncertainty model: People are more inclined to sacrifice on a dimension when it is riskier. For example, people are less willing to put effort into a money-earning activity when they either earn money simultaneously from another stochastic source, or if they faced a wider range of ex ante possible returns; in both cases, the wider range in the monetary dimension due to the uncertainty lowers their sensitivity to incremental changes in money. Similarly, people are less willing to put in effort for a fixed return when they expected the opportunity to earn more, because this also expands the range on the monetary dimension and makes the fixed return feel small.

Section 5 also extends the model to consider how a person trades off consumption across time. Applying the model to this environment requires assumptions on the degree to which the person thinks about consumption at different points of time as consumption across different dimensions, as well as on how he values any money left over for tomorrow from today’s perspective. We suppose that the person segregates out consumption today, but integrates consumption in future periods together into one “future” dimension and values money left over for tomorrow as if he optimally spends it to maximize consumption utility. Intuitively, the person thinks precisely about how he spends money today, but more abstractly about how he spends money left over for tomorrow. Under these assumptions, the range of future consumption utility tends to be larger than the range of current consumption utility and the person acts present-biased. More novelly, the degree of expressed present bias is increasing in factors that magnify the degree to which the range of future
consumption utility is greater than the range of current consumption utility, including the longer the horizon of consumption or the greater the uncertainty in future income. The model also implies that when a person has a fixed amount of money to spend on consumption over a finite number of periods then he will act more present biased at the beginning than the end of this window and is more likely to spend on a good if he can buy it at the beginning, even if he has to wait to consume the good.

The notion of proportional thinking built into range-based relative thinking is a frequent motivator of an alternative assumption: diminishing sensitivity. Kaheman and Tversky (1979) and subsequent variants of prospect theory assume that people exhibit diminishing sensitivity to changes the further those changes are from a reference point. Range-based relative thinking is different: we say that in the presence of greater ranges along a dimension, all changes along that dimension loom smaller. Many classical demonstrations of diminishing sensitivity confound the two effects: when zero is the natural reference point, both relative thinking and diminishing sensitivity say that the marginal dollar feels larger at $13 when $13 is the maximal loss than the marginal dollar does at $283 when it is the maximal loss. But diminishing sensitivity says that the difference between losing $12 vs. $13 feels bigger than the difference between losing $282 vs. $283, irrespective of the range of potential losses. Range-based relative thinking predicts the two will feel the same for any fixed range—but that the $12 vs. $13 difference will loom larger when $13 is the maximal potential loss than when $283 is the maximal potential loss. Turning back to the flight example above, diminishing sensitivity has nothing to say about when the difference between spending $400 and $300 for convenience feels larger or smaller. While diminishing sensitivity is independently a real phenomenon in both the psychophysics of perception and in choice behavior, we feel range effects are a distinct and important influence on perception and choice, and that some instances of relative thinking have been mistaken for diminishing sensitivity.

Because we posit that features of the choice context influence how attributes of different options are weighed, at a basic level our model relates to Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer’s (2012, 2013) approach to studying the role of salience in decision-making, as well as more recent models by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Cunningham (2013). We briefly compare the predictions of these models to ours in Section 3, and Appendix C shows in more detail how each of these models generates substantively different predictions to ours in some environments, because none universally share our property that fixed differences along a dimension loom smaller in the presence of bigger ranges. In many ways, the framework for our riskless model most closely resembles Koszegi and

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2Azar (2007) provides a theory of relative thinking built on diminishing sensitivity, where people are less sensitive to price changes at higher price levels. Contemporaneously, Kontek and Lewandowski (2013) present a model of range-dependent utility to study risk preferences in choices over single-dimensional lotteries. They assume that the outcomes of a given lottery are normed only according to the range of outcomes within the support of that lottery—other lotteries in the choice set do not influence a lottery’s normed utility. Thus, unlike our model, theirs is not
Szeidl’s (2013) model of focusing, and indeed elements of our formalism build directly from it. But it sits in interesting and uncomfortable relationship to their model: we say the range in a dimension has the exact opposite effect as it does in their model. Although some of their examples—as well as those in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013)—are compelling about how attentional and focusing issues can lead wider ranges to enhance the weight a person places on a dimension, we cannot share their intuition that such effects dominate relative-thinking effects in most of the two-dimensional economic-choice situations that we focus on in this paper. We sketch a framework for studying the interaction between focusing effects and relative thinking in Section 6, and conclude by discussing normative issues and shortcomings of the model.

2 Relative Thinking

We begin by incorporating relative thinking into classical models of reference-independent preferences when a person chooses from sets of riskless options. In later sections we extend the framework presented here to study choice under uncertainty, defining ranges as a function of available lotteries.

The agent’s “hedonic utility” for a riskless outcome is \( U(c) = \sum_k u_k(c_k) \), where \( c = (c_1, \ldots, c_K) \in \mathbb{R}^K \) is consumption and we assume each \( u_k(c_k) \) is strictly increasing in \( c_k \). The person does not maximize hedonic utility, but rather “normed” utility, which for a riskless option equals \( U^N(c|C) \) given “comparison set” \( C \).

Throughout this paper, we equate the comparison set with the (possibly stochastic) choice set, though the model setup is more general. When a person makes plans prior to knowing which one of context-dependent choice or valuation. Less closely related, Tversky (1969) considers a model of intransitive preferences where, in binary decisions, people neglect a dimension when the difference between alternatives on that dimension is sufficiently small. Rubinstein (1988) proposes a related model of how people choose between lotteries which vary in the probability and magnitude of lottery prizes that can account for the Allais paradoxes.

Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model does not study uncertainty; extending their model along the lines of our extension in Section 4 would be straightforward. The underlying psychology of our model is more closely related to Cunningham (2013). However, since Cunningham (2013) models proportional thinking in relation to the average size of attributes rather than as a percentage of the range, predictions depend on the choice of a reference point against which the size of options is defined. In our understanding of Cunningham (2013) as positing zero as the reference point, a person would be less sensitive to paying $1200 rather than $1100 for convenience if the choices ranged between $1100 and $1200 than if they ranged between $400 and $1300. Our model says the narrower range would make people more sensitive; models of diminishing sensitivity would say it would not matter (fixing the reference point). In this sense, while the motivation of Cunningham (2013) is the most similar to our model and a precursor to our model, we feel the average-level-based formalization captures something very different than our ranged-based formalization of relative thinking.

Although we do not emphasize normative implications through most of the paper, the labeling here of the un-normed utility as “hedonic” connotes our perspective that norming may influence choice without affecting experienced utility.

Equating choice and comparison sets gives us fewer degrees of freedom and allows us to make predictions based solely on the specified probability distribution over choice sets. In many situations, we think it is realistic to exclude
choice set he will face, options outside the realized choice set can matter. We will more carefully describe how this works when we consider choices over lotteries in Section 4.

Our model assumes that the comparison set influences choice through distorting the relative weight a person puts on each consumption dimension. Normed consumption utility equals

\[ U^N(c|C) = \sum_k w^N_k(c_k|C) = \sum_k w_k \cdot u_k(c_k), \]

where \( w_k \) captures the weight that the decision-maker places on consumption dimension \( k \) given comparison set \( C \).

We make the following assumptions on \( w_k \):

**Norming Assumptions:**

1. **N0.** The weights \( w_k \) are given by \( w_k = w(\Delta_k(C)) \), where \( \Delta_k(C) = \max_{c \in C} u_k(c_k) - \min_{c \in C} u_k(c_k) \) denotes the range of consumption utility along dimension \( k \).
2. **N1.** \( w(\Delta) \) is a differentiable, decreasing function on \((0, \infty)\).
3. **N2.** \( w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta \) is defined on \([0, \infty)\) and is strictly increasing, with \( w(0) \cdot 0 = 0 \).
4. **N3.** \( \lim_{\Delta \to \infty} w(\Delta) \equiv w(\infty) > 0 \).

The first two assumptions capture the psychology of relative thinking: the decision-maker attaches less weight to a given change along a dimension when the range of consumption utility along that dimension is higher. Following Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), the range of consumption utility here is simply the difference between the maximum value and the minimum value. Put differently, this assumption implies that a particular advantage or disadvantage of one option relative to another looms larger when it represents a greater percentage of the overall range.

Options from the comparison set when they lie outside the choice set. There are exceptions, however. For example, options faced in the past might enter into the comparison set even when people cannot plausibly attach positive probability to facing these options again in the future. Note also that, by equating choice and comparison sets, the comparison set can include dominated options. Yet we believe all qualitative results in this paper continue to hold when dominated options are pruned from comparison sets—that is, when for every \( c \in C \) and \( c' \neq c \in C \), there exists \( j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, K\} \) such that \( c_j > c'_j \).

While this formulation is sufficient for analyzing choice behavior in the way we do, as we discuss in Section 6 this formulation could be inadequate to do cross-choice-set welfare analysis. In that context, we could instead consider mathematically re-normalized formulations such as

\[ U^\text{N}(c|C) = \sum_k \min_{\hat{c} \in \hat{C}} u_k(\hat{c}_k) + w_k \cdot (u_k(c_k) - \min_{\hat{c} \in \hat{C}} u_k(\hat{c}_k)). \]

This re-normalization to \( \min_{\hat{c} \in \hat{C}} u_k(\hat{c}_k) \) may provide a more natural interpretation across contexts, since it implies that normed and un-normed decision utility coincide given singleton comparison sets.

Even if one somehow found natural units to choose within a dimension, the natural unit of comparison is utility rather than consumption levels given our interest in tradeoffs across dimensions. In terms of capturing the psy-
Assumption $N2$ assures that people show some sensitivity to absolute consumption utility differences. If a person likes apples more than oranges, then he strictly prefers choosing an apple when the comparison set equals \{(1 apple, 0 oranges), (0 apples, 1 orange)\}: While $N1$ says that the decision weight on the “apple dimension” is lower than the decision weight on the “orange dimension”—since the range of consumption utility on the apple dimension is higher—$N2$ guarantees that the trade-off between the two dimensions still strictly favors picking the apple. In particular, giving up 100\% the range on the apple dimension looms strictly larger than gaining 100\% the range on the orange dimension. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the decision weight is not too elastic with respect to the range. In the limiting case where $w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta$ is constant in $\Delta$, the agent only considers percentage differences when making decisions.

The final assumption, $N3$, bounds the impact of relative thinking: a given difference in consumption utility is never rendered negligible by norming, and arbitrarily large differences are arbitrarily large even when normed. These bounds provide the requisite structure for our characterization results in later sections. While we assume that $N0$-$N2$ hold throughout the paper, we specifically highlight which results rely on $N3$ since the limiting behavior of $w(\cdot)$—whether $w(\infty) = 0$ or $w(\infty) > 0$—only matters for a subset of the results and we view our assumption on this behavior as more tentative than our other assumptions.

The notation and presentation implicitly builds in an important assumption: The weight on a dimension depends solely on the utility range in that dimension, with a universal $w(\Delta)$ function that implies a no-degree-of-freedom prediction once a cardinal specification of utilities is chosen—with the important restriction to dimension-separable utility functions.\footnote{In Appendix B we discuss a method for determining both $u_k(\cdot)$ and $w(\cdot)$ from behavior, which closely follows the approach in Koszegi and Szeidl (2013). The elicitation assumes that we know how options map into consumption dimensions and that we can separately manipulate individual dimensions. It also imposes the norming assumptions $N0$ and $N2$ — assumptions shared by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) — but not our main assumption $N1$ that $w(\cdot)$ is decreasing; rather, the elicitation can be used to test our assumption against Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) that $w(\cdot)$ is increasing. The algorithm elicits consumption utility by examining how a person makes tradeoffs in “balanced choices”, for example between $(0, 0, a, b, 0, 0)$ and $(0, 0, d, e, 0, 0)$, where asumption-}

\chophysics, using utility may miss neglect of diminishing marginal utility: a person faced with 100 scoops of ice cream may treat the difference between 2-3 scoops as smaller than if he faced the possibility of getting 5 scoops, even though he may be satiated at 5 scoops.

\footnote{Once $w(\cdot)$ is fixed, affine transformations of $U(\cdot)$ will not in general result in affine transformations of the normed utility function. As such, like other models that transform the underlying “hedonic” utility function, either $U(\cdot)$ must be given a cardinal interpretation or the specification of $w(\cdot)$ must be sensitive to the scaling of consumption utility. Our formulation also assumes additive separability, though we could extend the model to allow for complementarities in consumption utility to influence behavior similarly to how Koszegi and Szeidl (2013, footnote 7) suggest extending their focusing model.}

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tions N0 and N2 guarantee that the person will choose to maximize consumption utility. After consumption utilities have been elicited, the algorithm then elicits the weighting function \( w(\cdot) \) by examining how ranges in consumption utility influence the rate at which the person trades off utils across dimensions.

For numerical illustrations, we will sometimes consider the parameterized model

\[
w(\Delta) = (1 - \rho) + \rho \frac{1}{\Delta^\alpha},
\]

where \( \rho \in [0, 1) \) and \( \alpha \in [0, 1) \). When \( \rho = 0 \) or \( \alpha = 0 \), the model corresponds to the classical, non-relative-utility model, where a person only considers level differences when making trade-offs. When \( \rho > 0 \) and \( \alpha > 0 \), a marginal change in underlying consumption utility looms smaller when the range is wider. Compared to the underlying utility, people act as if they care less about a dimension the wider the range of utility in that dimension. Note that Assumptions N2 and N3 hold: N2 requires \( \alpha < 1 \) when \( \rho > 0 \) and N3 requires \( \rho < 1 \) when \( \alpha > 0 \). In the limit case as \( \rho \to 1 \) and \( \alpha \to 1 \), the actual utility change on a dimension from different choices does not matter, just the percentage change in utility on that dimension. While we will not separate their effects, together \( \rho \) and \( \alpha \) can be thought of as parameterizing the degree of relative thinking.

The model implies a form of proportional thinking. For any two consumption vectors \( c', c \in \mathbb{R}^K \), define \( \delta(c', c) \in \mathbb{R}^K \) as a vector that encodes utility differences between \( c' \) and \( c \) along different consumption dimensions: For all \( k \),

\[
\delta_k(c', c) = u_k(c'_k) - u_k(c_k).
\]

Let \( d(c', c|C) \in \mathbb{R}^K \) denote a vector that encodes proportional differences with respect to the range of consumption utility: For all \( k \),

\[
d_k(c', c|C) = \frac{\delta_k(c', c)}{\Delta_k(C)}.
\]

**Proposition 1.** Let \( c', c \in \mathbb{R}^K \). Then for all \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \), \( U^N(c'|C) - U^N(c|C) \) is strictly increasing in

1. \( \delta_k(c', c) \), fixing \( d_k(c', c|C) \).
2. \( d_k(c', c|C) \), fixing \( \delta_k(c', c) \).

Part 1 of Proposition 1 says that a person’s willingness to move from consumption vector \( c \) to consumption vector \( c' \) is increasing in the absolute advantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \). But Part 2 says the willingness to move to \( c' \) is also increasing in its relative advantages, measured in proportion to
the range. For example, a person’s willingness to put in \( e \) units of effort to save \( \$X \) on a purchase is greater when the relative amount of effort, measured in proportion to the range of effort under consideration, is lower or the relative amount of money saved, measured in proportion to the range of spending under consideration, is higher. In this manner, the model is consistent with evidence used to motivate relative thinking, such as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) famous “jacket-calculator” example, based on examples by Savage (1954) and Thaler (1980)—where people are more willing to travel 20 minutes to save \( \$5 \) on a \( \$15 \) purchase than on a \( \$125 \) purchase—so long as not buying is an option.\(^9\) Diminishing sensitivity could also explain this pattern, but relative thinking makes the further prediction that traveling 20 minutes to save \( \$5 \) on a purchase seems more attractive when it is also possible to travel 50 minutes to save \( \$11 \). When not buying at all is an option, the additional savings does not expand the range in the money dimension, but does expand the range of time costs and therefore makes traveling 20 minutes seem small.\(^10\)

Proposition 1 is also consistent with van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler’s (2012) evidence that game show contestants are more willing to cooperate in a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma when the gains from defecting are much smaller than they could have been: if any non-pecuniary benefits from cooperating are fairly flat in the stakes relative to the monetary benefits from defecting, making the stakes small relative to what they could have been also makes the benefits from defecting appear relatively small. Finally, it is consistent with field evidence on contrast effects, such as Simonsohn and Loewenstein’s (2006) and Simonsohn’s (2006) findings that, all else equal, someone moving from Manhattan to Pittsburgh is willing to initially spend more on rent (and commute further) than someone moving from Alabama to Pittsburgh: while the range along other dimensions may be similar, the New York transplant likely assesses a fixed price (or commuting

\(^9\)Like explanations based on diminishing sensitivity, ours also relies on the idea that people narrowly bracket spending on a given item. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) fix total spending in their example—they compare responses across two groups given the following problem, where one group was shown the values in parantheses and the other was shown the values in brackets:

Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for \(( \$125 ) [ \$15 ]\), and a calculator for \(( \$15 ) [ \$125 ]\). The calculator salesman informs you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale for \(( \$10 ) [ \$120 ]\) at the other branch of the store, located 20 minutes drive away. Would you make the trip to the other store?

If people broadly bracketed spending on the two items, then the range of spending would be the same across the two groups, and our model would not be able to account for the difference in the propensity to make the trip.

\(^10\)Contrasting the following example with and without the brackets may also help build intuition: “Imagine you’re about to buy a \([ \$50 ]\) calculator for \$25 [by using a 50% off coupon, which was unexpectedly handed to you when you entered the store]. A friend informs you that you can buy the same calculator for \$20 at another store, located 20 minutes drive away. Would you make the trip to the other store?” Range-based relative thinking predicts that people would be less likely to make the trip in the bracketed condition. Diminishing sensitivity can explain this as well but only if we take the reference price to equal the expected price paid rather than zero. However, if we adopt the reference price to equal the expected price paid, diminishing sensitivity can no longer explain the original jacket/calculator pattern.
time) difference relative to a greater range.\textsuperscript{11,12}

Another property of the model is that the decision-maker’s choices will be overly sensitive to the number of distinct advantages of one option over another, and insufficiently sensitive to their size. Consider the following consumption vectors

\[
c^1 = (2,3,0) \\
c^2 = (0,0,5),
\]

and assume linear utility. When \( C = \{c^1, c^2\} \), then the decision-maker will exhibit a strict preference for \( c^1 \) over \( c^2 \) despite underlying consumption utility being equal: \( 2w(2) + 3w(3) > 5w(5) \), since \( w(\cdot) \) is decreasing by assumption \( N1 \), implying that \( 2w(2) + 3w(3) > 5w(3) > 5w(5) \).

More starkly, consider a limiting case of assumption \( N2 \) where \( \Delta w(\Delta) \) is constant in \( \Delta \), so the decision-maker cares only about proportional advantages and disadvantages relative to the range of consumption utility. When comparing two consumption vectors that span the range of consumption utility, each advantage and disadvantage represents 100\% of the range and looms equally large. Comparing the two vectors thus reduces to comparing the number of advantages and disadvantages in this case. Appendix A.1 develops a more general result on how, all else equal, relative thinking implies that the attractiveness of one consumption vector over another goes up when its advantages are spread over more dimensions or its disadvantages are more integrated.\textsuperscript{13}

The person’s sensitivity to how advantages are spread over dimensions means that, in cases

\textsuperscript{11}Proposition 1 also connects to what is sometimes called the “denominator effect”: people’s willingness to contribute to help an in-need group is increasing in the proportional impact of the intervention. Roughly, it has been found that people’s willingness to pay to save 10 lives from a disease is higher when 20 lives are at stake than when 100 lives are at stake (e.g., Baron 1997).

\textsuperscript{12}The contingent-valuation literature also discusses similar effects in the context of interpreting apparent scope neglect in stated willingness to pay (WTP). For example, Desvouges et al. (1993) asked people to state their willingness to pay to avoid having migratory birds drown in oil ponds, where the number of birds said to die each year was varied across groups. People were completely insensitive to this number in stating their WTP: the mean WTPs for saving 2000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds were $80, $78, and $88, respectively. Frederick and Fischoff (1998) provide a critical analysis of interpretations of such insensitivity—coined the “embedding effect” by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992). While some have been tempted to interpret such evidence as reflecting standard considerations of diminishing marginal rates of substitution, others have argued more plausibly that the insensitivity could reflect range-like effects where, even if the underlying willingness-to-pay function is linear, the displayed willingness-to-pay across subjects could be highly concave. Indeed, studies have found that people are much more sensitive to quantities in within-subject designs. Hsee, Zhang, Lu and Xu (2013) apply a similar principle to develop a method to boost charitable donations. Interestingly, people have argued that within-subject designs may also not accurately elicit true WTP, again because of range-effects. As Frederick and Fischoff (1998, page 116) write:

\begin{quote}
we suspect that valuations of any particular quantity would be sensitive to its relative position within the range selected for valuation but insensitive to which range is chosen, resulting in insensitive (or incoherent) values across studies using different quantity ranges.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13}Appendix A.1 also discusses this result in light of evidence by Thaler (1985) and others on how people have a tendency to prefer segregated gains and integrated losses, though the evidence on losses is viewed as far less robust.
where the dimensions are not obvious, it may be possible for the analyst to test whether a person treats two potentially distinct dimensions as part of the same or separate hedonic dimensions. To take an example very similar to one provided by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013, Appendix B), suppose the analyst is uncertain whether a person treats a car radio as part of the same attribute dimension as a car. The analyst can test this question by finding: The price \( p \) that makes the person indifferent between buying and not buying the car; the additional price \( p' \) that makes the person indifferent between buying the car plus the car radio as opposed to just the car; and finally testing whether the person would buy the car plus the car radio at \( p + p' \) dollars. If the person treats the car radio as part of the same attribute dimension as the car, then he will be indifferent. On the other hand, if he treats it as part of a separate attribute dimension then he will not be indifferent, where the direction of preference depends on whether \( w(\Delta) \) is decreasing or increasing. Under our model, a person who treats the car radio as a separate attribute will strictly prefer buying the car plus the radio at \( p + p' \) dollars because relative thinking implies that the person prefers segregated advantages.

3 Contextual Thinking and Choice-Set Effects

3.1 Classical Choice-Set Effects

The relative-thinker’s preference between two alternatives depends on the set of alternatives under consideration. To avoid cumbersome notation, assume each \( c \) is measured in utility units throughout this discussion. Consider 2-dimensional consumption vectors, \( c, c' \), which have the property that \( U(c) = c_1 + c_2 = c'_1 + c'_2 = U(c') \), where \( c'_1 > c_1 \) and \( c'_2 < c_2 \). That is, moving from \( c \) to \( c' \) involves sacrificing some amount on the second dimension to gain some on the first. When \( c \) and \( c' \) are the only vectors under consideration, the relative-thinker is indifferent between them: \( U_N(c' | \{ c, c' \}) - U_N(c | \{ c, c' \}) = w(c'_1 - c_1) \cdot (c'_1 - c_1) - w(c_2 - c'_2) \cdot (c_2 - c'_2) = 0 \). What happens if we add a third consumption vector \( c'' \)?

First, we consider the impact of adding an inferior option to the choice set. The area to the left of the diagonal line in Figure 1 illustrates how the addition of an inferior \( c'' \) influences the

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14 This feature of the model also means that choice behavior can exhibit cycles. To take an example, suppose utility is linear and consider \( c = (2, 2, 0) \), \( c' = (4, 0, 0) \), and \( c'' = (0, 0, y) \). A relative thinker expresses indifference between \( c \) and \( c' \) from a binary choice set (because this is a “balanced choice”), as well as between \( c' \) and \( c'' \), and \( c'' \) from a binary choice set. This same example illustrates that we have to be careful in how we elicit preferences when people are relative thinkers. Interpreting the third dimension as “money” and the first two dimensions as attributes, the person would express indifference between the attribute components of \( c \) and \( c' \) if asked to choose between them but appear to place a greater dollar value on \( c \). Under the view that \( U(\cdot) \) is the correct welfare metric, the binary choice elicitation yields the more accurate conclusion in this example.

15 In Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model, such a person will strictly prefer not to buy at this price because of their bias towards concentration. Likewise, diminishing sensitivity does not share this prediction with a reference point of zero, but rather implies that the person would be indifferent.
preference between \(c\) and \(c'\). When \(c''\) falls in the lighter blue area in the bottom region, where this area includes options that are dominated by \(c'\) as well as options that are dominated by neither \(c\) nor \(c'\), its addition expands the range on \(c'\)'s disadvantageous dimension by more than it expands the range on its advantageous dimension, which leads the relative-thinker to choose \(c'\) over \(c\). Symmetrically, when \(c''\) falls in the darker grey area in the left region, its addition expands the range on \(c'\)'s advantageous dimension by more than it expands the range on its disadvantageous dimension, which leads the relative-thinker to choose \(c\) over \(c'\). Finally, when \(c''\) falls in the white area in the middle region, its addition does not affect the range on either dimension and the relative-thinker remains indifferent between \(c\) and \(c'\).

Figure 1: The impact of adding \(c''\) to the comparison set on the relative-thinker’s choice from choice-set \(\{c, c'\}\), assuming each option is measured in utility units.

To illustrate, consider a person making a choice between a medium-quality smart phone and a more expensive high-quality phone, where the choice can be represented as being between (money, quality) consumption vectors \(c = (-100, 100)\) and \(c' = (-200, 200)\). When the choice is between those two phones, the relative thinker is indifferent between them. However, when an even-higher-quality but too-expensive “decoy” phone is added to the choice set, such as \(c'' = (-300, 250)\), this pushes the relative thinker to choose the high quality phone \(c'\): Now spending $100 more in money to gain $100 in quality is spending a mere 50% of the range in money to gain 67% of the range in
quality.

The patterns illustrated to the left of the diagonal line in Figure 1 are consistent with the experimental evidence that adding a third, inferior, “decoy” alternative to a choice set predictably increases subjects’ propensity to choose the “closer” of the two initial alternatives. Perhaps most famously, experiments have found that adding an alternative that is clearly dominated by one of the initial options, but not the other, increases the preference for the induced “asymmetrically dominant” alternative. This effect, called the asymmetric dominance effect or attraction effect was initially shown by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982), and has been demonstrated when subjects trade off price vs. quality or multiple quality attributes of consumer items (e.g., Simonson 1989), the probability vs. magnitude of lottery gains (e.g., Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer 2012), and various other dimensions including demonstrations by Herne (1997) over hypothetical policy choices and Highhouse (1996) in hiring decisions. Consistent with our model, similar effects (e.g., Huber and Puto 1983) are found when the decoy is not dominated but “relatively inferior” to one of the two initial alternatives. There is also evidence that context effects are more pronounced when the decoy is positioned “further” from the original set of alternatives so as to increasingly expand the range of one of the dimensions (Heath and Chatterjee 1995; Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer 2012).

Next, consider what happens when the comparison set can differ from the realized choice set, which will allow us to analyze how adding a superior option to the comparison set influences the relative-thinker’s choice between \( c \) and \( c' \). The area to the right of the diagonal line in Figure 1 illustrates how adding a superior option to the comparison set influences the relative-thinker’s preference between \( c \) and \( c' \). In the grey area to the right of the line (the blue area can be symmetrically analyzed), where this area includes options that dominate \( c' \) as well as options

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16While initial demonstrations by Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) and others involved hypothetical questionnaires, context effects like asymmetric dominance have been replicated involving real stakes (Simonson and Tversky 1992, Doyle, O’Connor, Reynold, and Bottomley 1999, Herne 1999, Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer 2012). They have also been demonstrated in paradigms where attempts are made to control for rational inference from contextual cues (Simonson and Tversky 1992, Prelec, Wernerfelt, and Zettelmeyer 1997, Jahedi 2011)—a potential mechanism formalized by Wernerfelt (1995) and Kamenica (2008). Closely related is the “compromise effect” (Simonson 1989), or the finding that people tend to choose middle options.

17Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) suggest a mechanism similar to ours to account for attraction effects and asymmetric dominance, though Huber and Payne (1983) argue that it is difficult to explain the evidence as resulting from “range effects” because the likelihood of choice reversals seems to be insensitive to the magnitude of the range induced by the position of the decoy. Wedell (1991) shows something similar, and Simonson and Tversky (1992) cite all this evidence as “rejecting” the range hypothesis. However, meta-analysis by Heath and Chaterjee (1995) suggest that range effects do in fact exist in this context, as have more recent studies, such as Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer (2012).

18Some experimentalists (e.g., Soltani, De Martino and Camerer 2012) induce such a wedge between choice and comparison sets by having subjects first evaluate a set of alternatives during an “evaluation period” and then quickly make a selection from a random subset of those alternatives during a “selection period”. For concreteness, we can consider the situation where the person makes plans prior to knowing which precise choice set he will face and makes choices from \( \{c, c'\} \) with probability \( 1 - q \) and makes choices from \( \{c, c', c''\} \) with probability \( q \)—under this interpretation, which will be formally justified in Section 4. Figure 1 illustrates the relative-thinker’s choice when \( \{c, c'\} \) is realized and \( q > 0 \).
that dominate neither $c$ nor $c'$, the addition of $c''$ to the comparison set expands the range of $c'$'s advantageous dimension by more than it expands the range of its disadvantageous dimension, pushing the relative-thinker to choose $c$ from \{\(c, c'\)\}.

To illustrate, consider a student deciding whether to take an odd job (say, RAing for an economist) that pays $100 with commensurate cost in terms of foregone leisure, so we can think of him as choosing from the choice set \{(100, −100), (0, 0)\}. The analysis says that the student is less likely to choose to work if his comparison set includes a similar job that pays $125, because this expands the range on the money dimension, and makes $100 seem like a lower return to effort.

These results connect with a smaller experimental literature that examines how making subjects aware of a third “decoy” alternative—that could have been part of the choice set but is not—influences their preferences between the two alternatives in their realized choice set. While the overall evidence seems mixed and debated, as far as we are aware the cleanest experiments from the perspective of our model—for example, that make an effort to control for rational inference from contextual cues—have found that including “asymmetrically dominant” (or “close to dominant”) decoys to the comparison set decreases experimental subjects’ propensity to choose the asymmetrically dominated target when the decoy is not present in the choice set (e.g., Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer 2012). Relatedly, Jahedi (2011) finds that subjects are less likely to buy a good (for example, an apple pie) if they are aware that there was some probability they could have bought two of the same good for roughly the same price (for example, that there was some probability of getting a two-for-one deal on apple pies).

### 3.2 The Limits of Choice-Set Effects

The first portion of this section showed that relative thinking implies some classical choice-set effects. We now provide bounds for choice-set effects that result from relative thinking. Given any two options $c$ and $c'$, the following proposition supplies necessary and sufficient conditions on their relationship for there to exist a choice set under which $c'$ is chosen over $c$.

**Proposition 2.**

1. Assume that each $u_k(c_k)$ is unbounded above and below. For $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^K$ with $U(c') \geq U(c)$,
either \(c'\) would be chosen from \(\{c, c'\}\) or there exists \(c''\) that is undominated in \(\{c, c', c''\}\) such that \(c'\) would be chosen from \(\{c, c', c''\}\).

2. Assume that each \(u_k(c_k)\) is unbounded below. For \(c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^K\) with \(U(c) \neq U(c')\) there is a \(C\) containing \(\{c, c'\}\) such that \(c'\) is chosen from \(C\) if and only if

\[
\sum_{i \in A(c', c)} w(\delta_i(c', c)) \cdot \delta_i(c', c) + \sum_{i \in D(c', c)} w(\infty) \cdot \delta_i(c', c) > 0, \tag{1}
\]

where \(A(c', c) = \{k : u_k(c'_k) > u_k(c_k)\}\) denotes the set of \(c'\)'s advantageous dimensions relative to \(c\) and \(D(c', c) = \{k : u_k(c'_k) < u_k(c_k)\}\) denotes the set of \(c'\)'s disadvantageous dimensions relative to \(c\).

Part 1 of Proposition 2 shows that if \(c'\) yields a higher un-normed utility than \(c\), then there exists some choice set where it is chosen over \(c\). This part only relies on \(N0\), or in particular that the person makes a utility-maximizing choice from \(C\) whenever the range of utility on each dimension is the same given \(C\), or whenever \(\Delta_j(C)\) is constant in \(j\). The intuition is simple: so long as utility is unbounded, one can always add an option to equate the ranges across dimensions. For example, while we saw before that the relative thinker prefers \((2, 3, 0)\) over \((0, 0, 5)\) from a binary choice set, this finding says that because the un-normed utilities of the two options are equal there exists a choice set containing those options under which the relative thinker would instead choose \((0, 0, 5)\). In particular, a person would always choose \((0, 0, 5)\) from \(\{(2, 3, 0), (0, 0, 5), (5, -2, 0)\}\).

The second part of the proposition uses the additional structure of Assumptions \(N1-N2\) to supply a necessary and sufficient condition for there to exist a comparison set containing \(\{c, c'\}\) such that the person chooses \(c'\) over \(c\). For intuition on where condition (1) comes from, it is equivalent to asking whether \(c'\) would be chosen over \(c\) when the comparison set is such that the range over its advantageous dimensions are the smallest possible (i.e., \(u_i(c'_i) - u_i(c_i)\)), while the range over its disadvantageous dimensions are the largest possible (i.e., \(\infty\)). In the classical model (with a constant \(w_k\)), this condition reduces to \(U(c') > U(c)\). In the limiting case—ruled out by \(N3\)—where \(w(\infty) = 0\), the condition is that \(c'\) has some advantageous dimension relative to \(c\) (i.e., is not dominated). More generally, the difference in un-normed utilities between the options cannot favor \(c\) “too much” and \(c'\) must have some advantages relative to \(c\) that can be magnified. Specifically, examining the necessary and sufficient condition (1) yields the following corollary:

\[U(c') - U(c) + \sum_{i \in A(c', c)} \left(\frac{w(\delta_i(c', c))}{w(\infty)} - 1\right) \cdot \delta_i(c', c) > 0,\]
Corollary 1.

1. If \( c \) dominates \( c' \), where \( c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^K \), then there does not exist a \( C \) containing \( \{c, c'\} \) such that \( c' \) would be chosen from \( C \).

2. Consider \( c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^K \) where the total advantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \) satisfy

\[
\delta_A(c', c) \equiv \sum_{i \in A(c', c)} \tilde{\delta}_i(c', c) = \tilde{\delta}_A \text{ for some } \tilde{\delta}_A > 0.
\]

Then, additionally assuming N3, there exists a finite constant \( \tilde{\delta}_A > 0 \) for which there is a \( C \) containing \( \{c, c'\} \) such that \( c' \) is chosen from \( C \) only if the total disadvantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \) satisfy

\[
\delta_D(c', c) \equiv -\sum_{i \in D(c', c)} \tilde{\delta}_i(c', c) < \tilde{\delta}.
\]

The first part of the corollary says that dominated options can never be framed in a way where they will be chosen over dominating alternatives. The second says that it is only possible to frame an inferior option in a way that it is chosen over a superior alternative if its disadvantages are not too large relative to its advantages. To illustrate the findings, consider the parameterized model with \( \rho = \alpha = 1/2 \) and alternatives of the form

\[
c = (0, 0, \ldots, 0, y)
\]

\[
c' = \left(\begin{array}{c}
x \\
\frac{x}{K-1} \times \frac{x}{K-1} \times \cdots \times \frac{x}{K-1}
\end{array}\right)_{K-1 \text{ times}},
\]

for example \( c = (0, 11) \) and \( c' = (8, 0) \). Table 1 shows, for various combinations of \( K \) and \( x \), the maximal value of \( y, \tilde{y} \), such that there exists a comparison set \( C \) containing \( \{c, c'\} \) where \( c' \) would be chosen over \( c \). To illustrate, the first cell of the table tells us that we have \( \tilde{y} = 10.83 \) when \( c' = (8, 0) \), so while there is a comparison set where \( (8, 0) \) is chosen over \( (0, 10) \)—e.g., from \( \{ (8, 0), (0, 10), (8, -\bar{u}) \} \) for \( \bar{u} \) sufficiently large—there is no comparison set where \( (8, 0) \) is chosen over \( (0, 11) \).

There are three main things to note from Table 1. First, \( \tilde{y} \) exceeds \( x \): it is possible to find comparison sets where inferior options are chosen over superior options. Second, illustrating part 2 of Corollary 1, \( \tilde{y} \) never exceeds \( x \) by more than a finite factor: substantially inferior options can never be chosen over superior options. Third, \( \tilde{y} \) goes up with \( K \): it is easier to find comparison sets where inferior options are chosen when their advantages are spread over more dimensions.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\)To illustrate, while the model says that there is no comparison set where \( (8, 0) \) is chosen over \( (0, 11) \), there is a comparison set where \( (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) \) is chosen over \( (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11) \). (See the cell in the fourth row, first column.) Proposition 7 in Appendix A.1 generalizes this point.
Table 1: The maximal value of \( \bar{y} \), such that there exists a comparison set containing \( c = (0,0,\ldots,0,y) \) and \( c' = \left( \frac{x}{K-1}, \frac{x}{K-1}, \ldots, \frac{x}{K-1}, 0 \right) \) where \( c' \) would be chosen, for different combinations of \( K \) and \( x \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( x = 8 )</th>
<th>( x = 16 )</th>
<th>( x = 24 )</th>
<th>( x = 32 )</th>
</tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>37.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>( K = 3 )</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21.66</td>
<td>30.93</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( K = 6 )</td>
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<td>24.94</td>
<td>34.95</td>
<td>44.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( K = 9 )</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27.31</td>
<td>37.86</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( K = 12 )</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>29.27</td>
<td>40.25</td>
<td>50.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table assumes \( w(\Delta) = (1 - \rho) + \rho \frac{\Delta}{2} \alpha \) for \( (\rho, \alpha) = (1/2, 1/2) \).
For each combination of \( (K, x) \), we calculate \( \bar{y} \) by solving \( \bar{y} = \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} \cdot (K - 1)^\alpha \cdot x^{1 - \alpha} + x \), where this expression is derived from (1).

Taken together, the proposition and corollary say that the impact of the comparison set is bounded in our model. In particular, if \( U(c') > U(c) \) then it is always possible to find a comparison set under which the agent displays a preference for \( c' \) over \( c \), but only possible to find a comparison set under which the agent displays a preference for \( c \) over \( c' \) under precise conditions, given by (1).24

### 3.3 Comparison to Other Approaches

Our basic results on choice-set effects are not shared by Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) or other recent models, including Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Cunningham (2013), that likewise model such effects as arising from features of the choice context influencing how attributes of different options are weighed. It is easiest to compare the models in the context of a specific example. Suppose a person is deciding between the following jobs:

- **Job X.** Salary: 100K, Days Off: 199
- **Job Y.** Salary: 110K, Days Off: 189
- **Job Z.** Salary: 120K, Days Off: 119,

where his underlying utility is represented by \( U = \text{Salary} + 1000 \times \text{Days Off} \). A relative thinker would be indifferent between jobs \( X \) and \( Y \) when choosing from \( \{X, Y\} \), but instead strictly prefer

\[ 24 \text{Our discussion interprets (1) as characterizing features of alternatives that influence when we could see choice-reversals as a function of the comparison set. Alternatively, fixing alternatives, we can interpret (1) as making predictions about who is susceptible to choice-reversals if we have access to signals indicating the strength of someone’s unnormed preference for one option over another. Returning to the example from the introduction, we might expect business travelers traveling on their own dime to nevertheless care a lot about convenience, in which case (1) can be interpreted as saying that they would choose to spend $400 instead of $300 for a more convenient flight, independent of the range of prices. Consistent with this idea, Shah, Shafir, and Mullainathan (2014) provide evidence that lower-income experimental participants display fewer choice-reversals in trade-offs involving money, for example in a variant of the Tversky and Kahneman (1981) jacket/calculator problem. One interpretation is that they are less likely to be close to the margin for such choices.} \]
the higher salary job Y when choosing from \( \{X, Y, Z\} \). Intuitively, the addition of Z expands the range of Y’s disadvantage relative to X—days off—by more than it expands the range of Y’s advantage—salary. Per Figure 1, our model produces the classic attraction effect in all such examples.\(^{25}\)

As we discuss in greater detail in Appendix C, Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer’s (2013) salience model does not robustly share such predictions. They assume that attribute \( i \) of option \( c \) attracts more attention and receives a greater “decision weight” than attribute \( j \) when it is further from the average level the attribute in proportional terms. Thus, their model says that adding \( c'' \) to the blue area of Figure 1 may make the vertical dimension more salient and lead to \( c \) being chosen while adding \( c'' \) to the grey area may make the horizontal dimension more salient and lead to \( c' \) being chosen.\(^{26}\) In particular, their model implies that the addition of Job Z will lead people to choose Job X by making Days Off the salient dimension.

Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model is simpler to compare because it also assumes that decision weights are solely a function of the range of consumption. But, since it makes the opposite assumption on how the range matters, namely that decision weights are increasing in the range, it makes opposite predictions to ours in all two-dimensional examples along the lines illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) predictions on how adding inferior option \( c'' \) to \( \{c, c'\} \) influences the person’s choice between \( c \) and \( c' \) when initially indifferent, which can be compared to our predictions illustrated in the area to the left of the diagonal line in Figure 1.\(^{27}\) Their model says that adding a more extreme, inferior, option to the choice set leads the person to prefer the further of the two superior options, since the addition expands the range of the

\(^{25}\)Our basic results on choice-set effects can also be summarized as suggesting a particular way in which the relative thinker expresses a taste for “deals” or “bargains”. The addition of the “decoy” job Z makes Job Y look like a better deal in the above example—while getting 10K more salary in moving from Job Y to Job Z requires giving up 70 days off, getting 10K more salary in moving from Job X to Job Y only requires giving up 10 days off. But our model fails to capture some behavioral patterns that may reflect a taste for bargains. Jahedi (2011) finds that subjects are more likely to buy two units of a good at price \( \$p \) when they can get one for slightly less. For example, they are more likely to buy two apple pies for \$1.00 when they can buy one for \$0.96. While a taste for bargains may undergird this pattern, our model does not predict it: adding one apple pie for \$0.96 to a choice set that includes not buying or buying two apple pies for \$1.00 does not expand the range on either the money or the “apple pie” dimensions.

\(^{26}\)As Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) note, their model accommodates the attraction effect when people choose between options that vary in quality and price. For example, people will choose \( (70, −20) \) from \( \{(70, −20), (80, −30)\} \) but will instead choose \( (80, −30) \) from \( \{(70, −20), (80, −30), (80, −40)\} \) since the addition of the decoy option \( (80, −40) \) makes the price of the middle option not salient because it equals the average price. However, their model also robustly accommodates the opposite effect — call it the “repulsion effect” — in these situations. In particular, the person will choose \( (70, −20) \) if the price of decoy is made larger so price becomes salient for the middle option. For example, the person will choose \( (70, −20) \) from \( \{(70, −20), (80, −30), (80, −70)\} \).

\(^{27}\)Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) apply their model by first pruning dominated options from the comparison set, so, strictly speaking, their model says that the addition of a dominated option \( c'' \) to the choice set has no effect on the person’s preference between \( c \) and \( c' \). This does not change the fact that their model makes opposite predictions to ours in cases where \( c'' \) is inferior but undominated, as can be seen by focusing attention only on the regions of Figures 1 and 2 where \( c'' \) is undominated.
closer option’s disadvantage relative to the other superior alternative by more than it expands the range of its advantage and hence attracts attention to its disadvantage. Like Bordalo Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013), their model says that adding Job Z will lead people to choose Job X because its addition draws attention to Days Off. The predictions of their model in two-dimensional examples seem hard to reconcile with the laboratory evidence on attraction effects summarized above. One possibility we explore in Section 6 is that “focusing effects”, along the lines that Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) model, may be more important in choice problems involving many dimensions than in two-dimensional problems like these.

Figure 2: Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) predictions on the impact of adding an inferior \( c'' \) to the comparison set on the person’s choice between \( c \) and \( c' \), assuming each option is measured in utility units.

Cunningham (2013) assumes that a person is less sensitive to differences on an attribute dimension when the choice set contains options that, on average, have larger absolute values (relative to some implicit reference point) along that dimension. His model yields opposite predictions to ours whenever adding an option moves averages and ranges in opposite directions. For example, his model implies that adding \( c'' \) to the bottom blue area of Figure 1 will make a person who was originally indifferent choose \( c \). His model says that the addition of Job Z will push people to choose Job X by bringing down the average on Days Off while bringing up the average on Salary, making
people more sensitive to differences in Days Off relative to Salary.

None of these models, including ours, capture certain strong forms of the compromise effect (Simonson 1989). In our model, a person who is indifferent between 2-dimensional options \( c, c', \) and \( c'' \) without relative thinking will remain indifferent with relative thinking: he will not display a strict preference for the middle option. Likewise, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) observe that their model does not mechanically generate a preference for choosing “middle” options. Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Cunningham (2013) likewise cannot generate these effects and it remains an open question what types of models (such as those discussed in the next paragraph based on inference about products) might qualitatively and quantitatively explain them.

An alternative interpretation for why trade-offs depend on ranges along consumption dimensions—giving rise to the sorts of choice-set effects we emphasize in this section—is that this follows as a consequence of inference from contextual cues, broadly in the spirit of mechanisms proposed by Wernerfelt (1995) and Kamenica (2008). In some circumstances, a person who is uncertain how to value an attribute dimension may rationally place less weight on the dimension when its range is wider, perhaps by guessing that hedonic ranges tend to be similar across dimensions, and therefore guessing that the hedonic interpretation for a change in a dimension is inversely related to the range in that unit. While we believe that such inference mechanisms likely play an important role in some situations, evidence suggests that they do not tell a very full story. There is evidence of range effects in trade-offs involving money and other dimensions that are easily evaluated, such as in Soltani, De Martino, and Camerer (2012), where people make choices between lotteries that vary in the probability and magnitude of gains. Mellers and Cooke (1994) show that range effects are found even when attributes have a natural range that is independent of the choice set, for example when they represent percentage scores, which naturally vary between 0 and 100.

The distinct predictions of our approach are seen even more clearly once we consider richer environments.

## 4 Uncertainty

We now enrich the model to allow for uncertainty, where the decision-maker chooses between lotteries on \( \mathbb{R}^K \), and the choice set is some \( \mathcal{F} \subset \Delta(\mathbb{R}^K) \). This captures standard situations where a decision-maker chooses between monetary risks, but also situations where a decision-maker makes plans prior to knowing the exact choice set he will face. For example, if the decision-maker makes plans knowing he faces choice set \( \{c, c'\} \) with probability \( q \) and choice set \( \{c, c''\} \) with probability \( 1 - q \), his choice is between lotteries in \( \mathcal{F} = \{(1, c), (q, c'; 1 - q, c), (q, c; 1 - q, c''), (q, c'; 1 - q, c'')\} \). Since the earlier definition of the range of consumption utility along a dimension only applies to riskless choice, we need to extend the definition to address such situations.
Perhaps the simplest formulation would be to take the range along a dimension to equal the range induced by \( \tilde{C} = \{ c \in \mathbb{R}^K | c \text{ is in the support of some } F \in \mathcal{F} \} \), in which case the range in the above example would equal \( \Delta_k = \max_{\tilde{c} \in \{c,c',c''\}} u_k(\tilde{c}) - \min_{\tilde{c} \in \{c,c',c''\}} u_k(\tilde{c}) \). A problem with this formulation is that it treats low and high probability outcomes the same: The range along a dimension is the same whether \( q \approx 1 \) and the person knows with near certainty that \( c'' \) will not be an option and when \( q \approx 0 \) and the person knows with near certainty that \( c' \) will not be an option. To take another example, it would not capture an intuition that \$10 \) feels like a lower return to effort when \$15 \) was not just possible, but probable.

Another option would be to take the range along a dimension to equal that induced by \( \tilde{C} = \{ c \in \mathbb{R}^K | c = E[F] \text{ for some } F \in \mathcal{F} \} \), where \( E[F] = \int c \cdot dF(c) \) is the expected value of \( c \) under \( F \). In this case, the range along a dimension in the above example would be the range implied by \( \tilde{C} = \{ c, (1-q) \cdot c + q \cdot c', q \cdot c + (1-q) \cdot c'' \} \). While this formulation would successfully treat high and low probability outcomes differently, it has the issue that only the range of expected values across lotteries would determine the range used to norm outcomes, and not the range of outcomes in the support of given lotteries.\(^{28}\)

To construct the range along a dimension in a way that both depends on probabilities as well as within-lottery ranges, we summarize every lottery’s marginal distribution over \( u_k(c_k) \) by the mean plus or minus its variation around the mean, where variation is measured by something akin to the standard deviation around the mean, and then take the range along a dimension to equal the difference between the maximal and minimal elements across the summarized distributions. The actual measure of variation we use is the \( L \)-scale or 1/2 its mean difference, also known as 1/2 the “average self-distance” of a lottery.\(^{29}\)

Formally, given a comparison set \( \mathcal{F} \), we define the range along dimension \( k \) to equal

\[
\Delta_k(\mathcal{F}) = \max_{F \in \mathcal{F}} \left( E_F[u_k(c_k)] + \frac{1}{2} S_F[u_k(c_k)] \right) - \min_{F \in \mathcal{F}} \left( E_F[u_k(c_k)] - \frac{1}{2} S_F[u_k(c_k)] \right),
\]

where \( E_F[u_k(c_k)] = \int u_k(c) dF(c) \) equals the expectation of \( u_k(c_k) \) under \( F \), and \( S_F[u_k(c_k)] = \int \int [u_k(c'_k) - u_k(c_k)] dF(c') dF(c) \) is the “average self-distance” of \( u_k(c_k) \) under \( F \), or the average distance between two independent draws from the distribution. Note that the range along a dimen-

\(^{28}\)This formulation would say that a person would norm outcomes the same way when choosing between lotteries \( \{(1/2,-100);1/2,110\}, \{1/2,-10;1/2,15\} \) as when choosing between \( \{(1/2,-20;1/2,30),(1/2,-10;1/2,15)\} \) since \( 1/2(-100)+1/2(110)=1/2(-20)+1/2(30) \); our intuition is that he would instead be less sensitive to a fixed difference in the former case.

\(^{29}\)We believe very little of our analysis would qualitatively change if classical standard deviation or other notions of dispersion were used. Yitzhaki (1982) argues that the mean difference provides a more central notion of statistical dispersion in some models of risk preference since it can be combined with the mean to construct necessary conditions for second-order stochastic dominance. Koszegi and Rabin (2007) show it to be especially relevant for models of reference-dependent utility, which also means that this definition may facilitate combining our model with reference dependence.
sion collapses to the previous riskless specification when all lotteries in $\mathcal{F}$ are degenerate. Note also that when $K = 1$ and $\mathcal{F} = \{F\}$ is a singleton choice set, then we have $\Delta(\mathcal{F}) = S_F[u(c)]$.

Given the comparison set, the decision-maker evaluates probability measure $F$ over $\mathbb{R}^K$ according to:

$$U^N(F|\mathcal{F}) = \int U^N(c|\mathcal{F})dF(c),$$

where $U^N(c|\mathcal{F}) = \sum_k w(\Delta_k(\mathcal{F})) \cdot u_k(c_k)$ as in the riskless case. We continue to assume the weights $w_k$ satisfy $N0$-$N2$, where the definition of the range in $N0$ is expanded to the more general definition of (2).

To build more intuition, consider the following examples.

**Example 1.** The decision-maker makes plans knowing he faces choice set $\{c, c'\}$ with probability $q$ and choice set $\{c, c''\}$ with probability $1 - q$, so $\mathcal{F} = \{(1, c), (q, c')1 - q, c\}, (q, c; 1 - q, c''\}, (q, c; 1 - q, c'')\}$. Supposing $c = (0, 0), c' = (-1, 1), c'' = (-1, 2)$, the range along the first dimension is $\Delta_1(\mathcal{F}) = 1$ and the range along the second is $\Delta_2(\mathcal{F}) = 2 - q^2 \in [1, 2]$. Importantly, the range along the second dimension is decreasing in $q$ and tends towards 1 (resp. 2) as $q$ tends towards 1 (resp. 0), illustrating that high and low probability outcomes are treated differently (and in the intuitive direction) in our formulation. □

**Example 2.**

$$\mathcal{F} = \{(1/2, -100; 1/2, 110), (1/2, -10; 1/2, 15)\}$$

$$\mathcal{F}' = \{(1/2, -20; 1/2, 30), (1/2, -10; 1/2, 15)\}.$$

In this case, the range given $\mathcal{F}$ is $\Delta(\mathcal{F}) = 105$ and the range given $\mathcal{F}'$ is $\Delta(\mathcal{F}') = 25$. The range is larger in the case of $\mathcal{F}$ than $\mathcal{F}'$, illustrating that the range of outcomes in the support of given lotteries matters, not just the range of average outcomes across lotteries. □

## 5 Economic Implications

This section develops some applications of the model. We first consider how uncertainty influences the rate at which people substitute utils across dimensions and go on to study choice over time.

\[\text{Proof} \text{ of Lemma 1 in Appendix D establishes that, for any lottery } F, E[F] + 1/2 \cdot S(F) = E_F[\max\{c, c'\}], \text{ and we can similarly establish that } E[F] - 1/2 \cdot S(F) = E_F[\min\{c, c'\}], \text{ This provides an alternative expression for } \Delta_k(\mathcal{F}): \]

$$\Delta_k(\mathcal{F}) = \max_{F \in \mathcal{F}} E_F[\max\{u_k(c_k), u_k(c'\}]] - \min_{F \in \mathcal{F}} E_F[\min\{u_k(c_k), u_k(c'\}]].$$
5.1 Uncertainty Across Dimensions

Consider a simple example where somebody chooses how much effort to put into a money-earning activity, and has two consumption dimensions—money and effort. But he also earns money from another stochastic source. His utility is given by

\[ U = r \cdot e \pm k - f \cdot e, \]

where \( e \in \{0, 1\} \) denotes his level of effort, \( r \) equals the return to effort, \( f \) represents the cost to effort, and \( \pm k \) indicates an independent 50/50 win-k/lose-k lottery.

A person maximizing expected utility would choose \( e^* = 1 \) if and only if \( r/f \geq 1 \). Notably, his effort is independent of \( k \).

Our model of relative thinking says that increasing \( k \) will decrease effort: the more income varies, the smaller will seem an additional dollar of income from effort, and so the less worthwhile will be the effort. To see this, note that the range in consumption utility along the income dimension is \( r + k \), while the range along the effort dimension is \( f \). Normed utility then equals

\[ U^N = w(r+k) \cdot r \cdot e \pm k - w(f) \cdot f \cdot e, \]

so expected normed utility equals \( EU^N = w(r+k) \cdot r \cdot e - w(f) \cdot f \cdot e \). The person then works so long as

\[ \frac{r}{f} \geq \frac{w(f)}{w(r+k)}, \]

where the right-hand-side of this inequality is increasing in \( k \), and greater than 1 for large enough \( k \). This implies that, in contrast to the expected-utility maximizer, the relative thinker is less likely to work when \( k \) is larger: increasing uncertainty on a dimension decreases his sensitivity to incremental changes in utility along that dimension.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\)If marginal utility over money is convex, as is often assumed in explaining precautionary savings using the neoclassical framework, then income uncertainty will have the opposite effect. In such a case, expected marginal utility is increasing in income uncertainty, so higher income uncertainty will increase the propensity to exert effort to boost income. If the less conventional assumption of concave marginal utility is made, then more uncertainty would, as in our model, decrease the value on money. But in either case, the effects would be calibrationally small for modest increases in uncertainty. Loss aversion, by constrast, makes a bigger and less ambiguous opposite prediction to ours. Consider a situation in which people are able to commit in advance to take effort. Applying the concept of choice-acclimating equilibria (Koszegi and Rabin 2007), loss aversion predicts no impact of higher income uncertainty on the propensity to exert effort when gain-loss utility is piece-wise linear: The decision is determined solely by consumption utility. Consider a second situation in which the opportunity to exert effort comes as a surprise and the person thus previously expected to not exert effort. In this case, loss aversion predicts that the presence of a 50/50 win-k/lose-k lottery over money increases the person’s willingness to exert effort: Returns to effort are shifted from being assessed as increasing gains to partially being assessed as reducing losses.
To state a more general result, for lotteries \( H, H' \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}) \), let \( H + H' \) denote the distribution of the sum of independent draws from the distributions \( H \) and \( H' \). Additionally, for lotteries \( F_i \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}) \), \( i = 1, \ldots, K \), let \( (F_1, \ldots, F_K) \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}^K) \) denote the lottery where each \( c_i \) is independently drawn from \( F_i \).

**Proposition 3.** Assume \( K = 2 \) and each \( u_i(\cdot) \) is linear for \( i = 1, 2 \).

1. For \( F_1, F_2 \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}) \) and \( G_1, G_2 \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}^+) \), if \( (F_1, F_2) \) is chosen from \( \{ (F_1, F_2), (F_1 - G_1, F_2 + G_2) \} \), then \( (F_1, F_2') \) is uniquely chosen from \( \{ (F_1, F_2'), (F_1 - G_1, F_2' + G_2') \} \) whenever \( F_2' \) is a mean-preserving spread of \( F_2 \) and \( F_2' \neq F_2 \) or \( G_2' \neq G_2 \).

2. For \( F_1, F_2 \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}^+) \), suppose the person faces the distribution over choice sets of the form \( \{ (0, 0), (-\bar{x}, \bar{y}) \} \) that is induced by drawing \( \bar{x} \) from \( F_1 \) and \( \bar{y} \) from \( F_2 \). For \( x \in \text{Support}(F_1) \) and \( y \in \text{Support}(F_2) \), if \( (0, 0) \) is preferred to \( (-x, y) \) given the resulting comparison set, then \( (0, 0) \) is strictly preferred to \( (-x, y) \) if the comparison set is instead derived from the distribution over choice sets induced by drawing \( \bar{x} \) from \( F_1 \) and \( \bar{y} \) independently from \( F_2' \), where \( y \in \text{Support}(F_2') \), \( F_2' \neq F_2 \), and either (i) \( F_2' \) is a mean-preserving spread of \( F_2 \) or (ii) \( F_2' \) first order stochastically dominates \( F_2 \).

Part 1 of Proposition 3 generalizes the above example and says that if the person is unwilling to sacrifice a given amount from one dimension to the other, he will not do so if the second dimension is made riskier. Notably, the proposition extends the example by allowing the person to influence the amount of risk he takes. To illustrate, consider a simple modification of the example where exposure to risk goes up in effort, and utility equals \( U = e \cdot (r \pm k) - f \cdot e \). The proposition says that, again, the worker is less likely to exert effort when the amount of income uncertainty, \( k \), is higher: the wider range in the monetary dimension reduces the worker’s sensitivity to incremental changes in money.

Part 2 says that a person never becomes more willing to transfer a given amount of utility from one dimension to a second when the background distribution of potential benefits on the second dimension becomes more dispersed or shifted upwards. For example, if a person is indifferent between exerting effort \( e \) to gain $100 if he made plans knowing $100 is the return to effort, he will not exert effort if, \textit{ex ante}, he placed equal probability on earning $50, $100, or $150. And such a person will be even less likely to exert effort for $100 if he were \textit{ex ante} almost sure to be paid $150 (rather than $50 or $100) for effort, since this change further expands the range on the money dimension and makes earning $100 feel even smaller.

These predictions of our model contrast with those of other choice-set dependant or relative-thinking models with which we are familiar. While we know of no strong evidence in favor of
our predictions, field and laboratory findings provide suggestive supporting evidence. There is evidence, for instance, that insuring farmers against adverse weather shocks (e.g., drought) can significantly increase their willingness to make high marginal return investments, for example in fertilizer use or weeding and cultivation.\textsuperscript{32} While this investment response could in principle result from risk aversion if investment returns negatively covary with the marginal utility of consumption—for example, investment in fertilizer could have a lower return when rainfall and consumption are low and the marginal utility of consumption is then high—it may also in part result from similar mechanisms to those we highlight: Our model predicts a positive investment response \textit{even when investment returns are uncorrelated with the newly insured risk}, thus broadening the set of circumstances where we would expect expanding insurance coverage to boost profitable investment.

Suggestive evidence in support of the prediction also arises from laboratory findings on relative pay and labor supply. Bracha and Gneezy (2012) find that the willingness to complete a task for a given wage is inversely related to previous wages offered for a related task. People are less likely to show up to complete a survey for either $5 or $15 if they were previously offered $15 to complete a related survey than if they were previously offered $5.\textsuperscript{33} Although a cleaner test of our model’s predictions would more directly manipulate expectations, this is consistent with the model if, as seems plausible, expectations of future wages are increasing in the size of previous wages: Increasing the probability attached to a higher wage offer increases the range attached to money, thereby increasing the reservation wage.

Proposition 3 applies to tradeoffs beyond those involving effort and money. For example, it could be that $U = c_1 + c_2$, where $c_1 \in \{0, 1\}$ represents whether the person has a good, such as shoes, and $c_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ represents dollar wealth. In this case, Part 2 says that the person will be more likely to buy when prices are more uncertain \textit{ex ante}. For example, if a person is indifferent between buying and not buying at price $20 if he knew that $20 would be the price, then he strictly prefers to buy at $20 if, \textit{ex ante}, he placed equal probability on the price being $15, $20, or $25. Part 2 also says that the person will be more likely to buy at a fixed price when he expected higher prices. In other words, people’s reservation prices will go up in expected prices, which may shed light on why retailers can benefit from advertising high list prices for goods they are trying to sell: making goods occasionally available at inflated list prices makes the regular “discounted” price feel smaller.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{33}And, as one would expect and as embedded in our model, people like high wages: People are more likely to show up to complete a survey for $15 if they were previously offered $15 than to show up to complete a survey for $5 if they were previously offered $5.

\textsuperscript{34}Bordalo Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012) offer a related psychological account based on the idea that advertising high prices can draw people’s attention away from paying the regular price by bringing it closer to average in the set of
5.2 Making Tradeoffs Across Time

We now turn to how relative thinking may induce impatient-seeming time preference by a person who trades off consumption across periods of time. Intuitively, the same level utility benefit of spending $10 more today represents a greater proportional benefit relative to the range of today’s utility than it does relative to the range of future utility. This is for at least two reasons: uncertainty will impact future utility more than current utility, and—given concave utility—the indirect utility of being able to spend some fixed amount in the future is greater than the indirect utility of having to spend that amount today. “Range-based present bias” generates many comparative-static predictions not implied by quasi-hyperbolic discounting due to factors that magnify the extent to which the range of future utility is larger than the range of current utility. Present bias increases with longer horizons of consumption and with greater uncertainty in future consumption. The model also says a person will act less present-biased if he is frequently allotted a small amount to consume than if he is infrequently allotted a large amount, and will act more impatient on paydays than on later days in a pay period. Notably, the overspending induced by range-based present bias can be on goods that are not immediately consumed: a person is more likely to buy a good if he can buy it on a payday, even if he has to wait to consume the good.

A simple example helps us see some of these predictions. Imagine a person has $10,000 to spend over 100 days and he is deciding how much money to take out of an ATM machine to spend today. Assume his instantaneous consumption utility in period \( t \) is \( \sqrt{c_t} \) and that he does not discount. Further suppose for a moment that, while at the ATM, the person treats each period as a separate consumption dimension and there is no uncertainty. With these assumptions, the range of consumption utility equals \( \sqrt{10000} - \sqrt{0} = 100 \) along each dimension and no present bias will be induced. While we return later to the important role of uncertainty, for now we reconsider the idea that separate days are treated as separate dimensions. We think an alternative assumption is not only more realistic, but also both central to understanding intertemporal choice, and implicit in other models more than is recognized. In particular, suppose a person at the ATM treats “today” as one dimension and integrates all other periods together into another “future” dimension. With this more natural assumption, the range of consumption utility on the “today” dimension remains 100, but the range of consumption utility on the “future” dimension becomes larger: assuming that the maximum of the range comes from optimally spending $10,000 over 99 days and the minimum comes from (optimally spending) $0 over 99 days then the range equals \( 99 \cdot \frac{\sqrt{10000}}{99} - \sqrt{0} = 300 \cdot \sqrt{11} \). As a result, the person effectively discounts the future by prices under consideration. This explanation does not seem to mesh with the fact that sellers loudly advertise discounts, which presumably draws buyers’ attention to prices. In our model, sellers are motivated to draw people’s attention to the existence of high prices to make sales prices feel smaller. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer’s explanation also says that making the list price very high would actually backfire by drawing attention to price by pushing the regular price further from the average.
Generalizing this example (but still for simplicity abstracting from discounting and positive interest rates), suppose the person has $I$ to allocate across $(c_1, \ldots, c_T)$, where each $c_t$ represents consumption in period $t$. Assuming the person’s consumption utility is $\sum u(c_t)$, where $u(0) = 0, u'(\cdot) > 0$, and $u''(\cdot) < 0$, then a person who is not a relative thinker will consume $c_t = I/T$ for all $t$.

To see what a relative thinker might choose we need to sort out many issues. The above example illustrates the importance of the degree to which relative thinkers think about consumption at different points of time as different dimensions. Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and the application of their model by Canidio (2014) assume that a person treats each period as a separate consumption dimension, and by examining natural cases where choices have a big impact on immediate utility but a dispersed impact on future utility, their model of overweighting big dimensions induces present bias. We think a more natural assumption about the treatment of the future is that the person integrates consumption in future periods together into one “future” dimension. Intuitively, the person thinks precisely about how he spends money today, but thinks more abstractly about how he spends money left over for tomorrow. We view our assumption that people combine future spending on different items on different days into one aggregate “utility of spending dimension” as not being new, but rather as bringing out into the open and clarifying a tacit assumption made by us and previous models that money is a dimension. Any conclusions about whether range-based relative thinking or Koszegi and Szeidl-style focusing induces present-bias crucially depends on whether the person indeed integrates future consumption. One way to separate out the predictions would be to examine the impact of framing manipulations aimed at influencing the extent to which the person segregates future consumption. For example, an experiment could compare how much a person spends out of the $10,000 today when he is first asked to write down how much he plans to spend in each of the 100 days to how much he spends today if he is first asked to just write down how much he plans to spend today. To the extent that this manipulation has the desired effect of getting a person to segregate versus integrate future consumption, we predict the person will spend less today in the first (segregated) treatment, while Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) predict he will spend more.

Yet it is not clear exactly what the utility of future spending is: How does the person, from today’s perspective, value money left over for tomorrow? We make the extreme assumption that he values it as if he optimally spends it to maximize consumption utility. That is, in period $t$ a

\[ \tilde{\beta} = w(300 \cdot \sqrt{11})/w(100) < 1, \] and acts present-biased.

This implicitly assumes that the person is “naive” to the fact that he will not actually spend money left over for tomorrow to maximize continuation consumption utility. While this simplifies the analysis, we suspect that our qualitative results do not depend on this assumption and would continue to hold if the person valued money as if he were “sophisticated” about his future spending behavior. In particular, the range in future consumption utility would continue to be greater than the range of current consumption utility when there are at least two remaining periods after...
person values having \( I_{t+1} \) to spend from tomorrow on at \( V_{t+1}(I_{t+1}) = \max_{c_{t+1}, \ldots, c_T} \sum_{k=t+1}^T u(c_k) \), where the \( c_k \) satisfy \( \sum_{k=t+1}^T c_k = I_{t+1} \). From today’s perspective, the range of consumption utility on the “today” dimension is then \( u(I_t) - u(0) = u(I) \) and the range of consumption utility on the “future” dimension is \( V_{t+1}(I_t) - V_{t+1}(0) = V_{t+1}(I_t) = (T-t)u\left(\frac{I_t}{T-t}\right) \). In period \( t \) the relative thinker then chooses the \( c_t \) that solves

\[
\max_{c_t \in [0,I_t]} w(u(I_t)) \cdot u(c_t) + w(V_{t+1}(I_t)) \cdot V_{t+1}(I_t - c_t).
\]

The person in period \( t \) chooses consumption \( c_t \) as if he were a naive quasi-hyperbolic \((\beta, \delta)\) discounter (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999) with \( \delta = 1 \) and “effective \( \beta \)” equal to

\[
\tilde{\beta}_t \equiv \frac{w(V_{t+1}(I_t))}{w(u(I_t))} = \frac{w((T-t)u(\frac{I_t}{T-t}))}{w(u(I_t))}, \tag{3}
\]

so assuming an interior solution the person chooses the \( c_t \) that solves\(^{36}\)

\[
u'(c_t) = \tilde{\beta}_t V_{t+1}'(I_t - c_t) = \tilde{\beta}_t u'\left(\frac{I_t - c_t}{T-t}\right) \cdot \]

The effective \( \tilde{\beta}_t \) parameterizes the degree to which the relative thinker acts present-biased in period \( t \): It is the degree of present bias that an analyst with knowledge of \( u(\cdot), I_t, \) and \( \delta = 1 \) would estimate to match the person’s choice of consumption \( c_t \) in period \( t \) if he ignored relative thinking.

---

\(^{36}\)Our analysis assumes no “true” quasi-hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999) which is not realistic. With \((\beta, \delta) = (\beta, 1)\), the range of consumption utility the person attaches to different temporal dimensions can differ even if he assesses separate days as separate dimensions, but the degree to which the person integrates consumption in future periods still matters for predictions. Returning to the above example, under the assumption that the person segregates all future consumption dimensions, then the range of consumption utility in future periods is \( \beta \cdot 100 < 100 \), so range-based relative thinking counteracts present-bias (but does not reverse it under \( N2 \)). Conversely, under our assumption that the person integrates together all future consumption, the range of consumption utility in future periods is \( \beta \cdot 300 \cdot \sqrt{T1} \), so range-based relative thinking reinforces present-bias. If the person truly does discount as a naive quasi-hyperbolic discounter with parameters \((\beta, \delta) = (\beta, 1), \beta < 1 \), then the effective \( \tilde{\beta} \) becomes

\[
\tilde{\beta}_t = \beta \cdot \frac{w(\beta V_{t+1}(I_t))}{w(u(I_t))} = \beta \cdot \frac{w(\beta(T-t)u(\frac{I_t}{T-t}))}{w(u(I_t))}.
\]

The analysis would proceed similarly; in particular, the person continues to choose the \( c_t \) that solves

\[
u'(c_t) = \tilde{\beta}_t V_{t+1}'(I_t - c_t) = \tilde{\beta}_t u'\left(\frac{I_t - c_t}{T-t}\right) \cdot \]
Comparative statics on $\tilde{\beta}_t$ thus identify factors that shape the degree to which a relative thinker acts (and looks) present-biased.

**Proposition 4.** Define $\tilde{\beta}_t$ as in Equation (3), and suppose $t \leq T - 1$ and $I_t > 0$. Then:

1. $\tilde{\beta}_t \leq 1$ with equality if and only if $T - t = 1$.
2. Fixing $I_t$, $\tilde{\beta}_t$ is strictly decreasing in $(T - t)$.
3. If $u(\cdot)$ is unbounded above and N3 holds, $\lim_{I_t \to \infty} \tilde{\beta}_t = 1$. If $u(\cdot)$ is bounded above then, in the limit as $I_t \to \infty$, $\beta_1 < \beta_2 < \ldots < \beta_{T-1} = 1$.

Part 1 of Proposition 4 says that the relative thinker acts present biased in all periods except the second-to-last, when he acts to maximize consumption utility given remaining income, which means that he splits $I_{T-1}$ equally between $T - 1$ and $T$. Part 2 says that, fixing remaining income, he acts more present biased the more periods remain. These results follow from the fact that the degree to which the range of consumption utility is larger in future periods than today is increasing in the number of remaining periods, where these ranges are the same when there is only one remaining period. Part 3 says that relative thinking has little influence on the degree to which the person acts present-biased when he has sufficiently large income and utility is unbounded above. Intuitively, when the range of consumption utilities today and tomorrow are sufficiently large then a given incremental change in consumption utility looms similar in proportional terms across the ranges. On the other hand, when utility is bounded above then a person who has sufficiently large income unambiguously acts less present-biased when there are fewer remaining periods.

These results suggest that people can act less present-biased if they are frequently allotted a small amount to consume over a few periods instead of a large amount to consume over many periods, and that they will act more present biased towards the beginning than the end of a consumption window. To illustrate, Proposition 4 tells us that a person who is given $2y > 0$ to consume over two days will consume $y$ each day, while a person who is given $4y$ to consume over four days will consume more than $y$ on the first day.\(^{37}\)

While difficult to test empirically, these results connect to evidence of “first-of-the-month effects”, where people appear to spend more on “instantaneous consumption” (e.g., fresh food or entertainment) following monthly receipt of income (Stephens 2003, 2006; Huffman and Barenstein 2005) or government benefits like food stamps (Shapiro 2005; Hastings and Washington

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\(^{37}\)We can make sharper statements about how the degree of present bias depends on the “pay frequency” when people have isoelastic utility $u(c) = \frac{1}{1-\theta}c^{1-\theta}$, $\theta \in (0, 1)$, and the weighting function is in our parametric class $w(\Delta) = (1 - \rho) + \rho/\Delta^\alpha$. For example, when $I = yT$ ($y > 0$ and $T \geq 2$), then for $\rho = 1$ we have $\tilde{\beta}_1 = \frac{1}{(T - 1)^{\alpha \theta}}$, which is clearly decreasing in $T$: a person will act more impatient when he is first given a large amount to consume over many periods than when he is first given less to consume over fewer periods. When $\rho < 1$, then $\tilde{\beta}_1$ is not monotonically decreasing in $T$ (continuing to take $I = yT$), but in natural specifications it appears to not start increasing until $T$ is “fairly large”. For example, when $(\alpha, \rho, \theta) = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)$, then $\tilde{\beta}_1$ is decreasing in $T$ for all $T$ less than 30.
Shapiro (2005) and Huffman and Barenstein (2005) argue that the decrease in consumption over the course of the benefit month is calibrationally difficult to explain with models of exponential discounting because it would require counterfactually steep discounting. They argue that the patterns are instead reasonably consistent with models of present-bias, and Shapiro (2005) makes the policy recommendation that food stamps should be distributed more frequently and in smaller amounts. Our model is consistent with this evidence, but makes the further prediction that households will appear less present-biased in their consumption decisions towards the end of the benefit month, and that they would also appear less present-biased if government benefits or paychecks were distributed more frequently. In our model, a more frequent allocation would not only give people less of an opportunity to misbehave but would additionally limit their desire to misbehave. To the best of our current knowledge, these predictions have not been explored.\(^ {38} \)

Simplifying the model to two time periods, we now turn to another aspect of intertemporal choice that may be heavily influenced by relative thinking: Situations in which a person can spend on multiple consumption goods each period. Suppose there are \( n \) goods, \( g = 1, \ldots, n \), and the person can spend on goods \( 1, \ldots, j < n - 1 \) in the first period and on \( j + 1, \ldots, n \) in the second. For example the person may find herself in a store that only sells goods \( 1, \ldots, j \) in the first period and in a store that only sells the remaining goods in the second.

Our key assumption here is that the person continues to segregate consumption of goods that he considers buying today but to integrate the consumption of goods he can only buy in the future. When the person is deciding whether to buy a candy bar for price \( p \) at a store he does not precisely think about what else he could consume with \( p \) tomorrow, but rather has a more abstract sense of the marginal utility of \( p \) tomorrow. Our interpretation stresses when a good is purchased, not necessarily when it is consumed. For example, a person may purchase tickets to a concert that he goes to at a later date. As noted above, we believe that something like this distinction must underlie examples from the context-dependent literature where money is treated as a single dimension. The range of consumption utility the person attaches to a good purchased today is then \( u_g(I/p_g) - u(0) = u_g(I/p_g) \), while the range of consumption utility the person attaches to a good purchased tomorrow is \( V(p,J) - V(p,0,J) = V(p,1,J) \). Here \( I \) denotes the person’s income, \( p \) the price of good \( g \), and \( V(p,1,J) \equiv \max_{c_{j+1},\ldots,c_n} \sum_{g=j+1}^{n} u_g(c_g) \) subject to \( I = \sum_{g=j+1}^{n} p_g c_g \) represents the indirect utility of money tomorrow from today’s perspective.

\(^ {38} \)Recall that, as with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, a person may simultaneously act very present-biased in period \( t \) and not change his consumption by much between \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). Consumption will likely drop off slowly towards the beginning of a budget window. Also, we only predict that the relative thinker will act less present-biased towards the end of a budget window with respect to trade offs among remaining days of that budget period. Because the person’s marginal utility of income for instantaneous consumption will rise, he may favor income received at the end of a pay cycle quite heavily over future income. If a relative thinker were asked the question of the sort Shapiro (2006) analyzed, “What is the smallest amount of cash you would take today rather than getting $50 one month from today?”, he would likely seem to be extremely impatient.
The person then chooses consumption in the first period to solve

$$\max_{c_1, \ldots, c_j} \sum_{g=1}^{j} w(u_g(I/p_g)) \cdot u_g(c_g) + w(V(p, I, j)) \cdot V \left( p, I - \sum_{g=1}^{j} p_g c_g, j \right),$$

subject to each $c_g \geq 0$ and $\sum_{g=1}^{j} p_g c_g \leq I$.

To simplify the analysis, suppose the goods are symmetric, so the price and utility functions of all goods are the same, where we normalize the common price to equal 1 and assume the common utility function satisfies $u(0) = 0, u'(\cdot) > 0, u''(\cdot) < 0$. In this case, absent relative thinking the person will spread consumption equally across all goods: $c_g = I/n$ for all $g$. What happens with relative thinking?

In the first period, the relative thinker attaches weight $w_1 \equiv w(u(I))$ to all goods purchased in the first period and weight $w_2 \equiv w((n - j) \cdot u(I/(n - j)))$ to all goods purchased in the second, where $w_2 < w_1$ under the assumption that $j < n - 1$. The relative thinker thus looks impatient: he spends more than $I/n$ on all goods purchased in the first period and less than $I/n$ on all goods purchased in the second. Since the relative thinker segregates the consumption of goods purchased today but integrates the consumption of goods purchased in the future, the range attached to the consumption of goods purchased today is smaller and the relative thinker attaches more weight to a given incremental change in consumption utility. A relative thinker will spend more on concert tickets that go on sale the same day he receives a cash windfall than that go on sale later, even if he does not attend the concert until later.

Finally, we consider situations in which income in the second period is uncertain and return to the case where there is only a single consumption good. Specifically, income in the first period is given by $y$ while income in the second is given by $y \pm k$ where $\pm k$ denotes a 50/50 gain $k$, lose $k$ lottery and we assume $k < y$. The person can borrow and save at zero interest rate, but cannot borrow more than he can pay back in the second period in the event of the “bad” state. The most he can consume in the first period is then $2y - k$ and the range of first period consumption utility equals $\Delta_{t=1} \equiv u(2y - k) - u(0) = u(2y - k)$. Using the formula for the range under uncertainty, i.e., the formula for $\Delta_f(\mathcal{F})$, one can calculate that the range of second period consumption utility equals $\Delta_{t=2} \equiv \frac{1}{4} \cdot [3u(2y + k) + u(2y - k) + u(k)]$.

The relative thinker then chooses $c_1$ to solve

$$\max_{c_1 \in [0,2y-k]} w(\Delta_{t=1}) \cdot u(c_1) + w(\Delta_{t=2}) \cdot 1/2 \cdot [u(2y - k - c_1) + u(2y + k - c_1)],$$

39The maximum of the range is achieved through the lottery $F = (1/2, 2y - k; 1/2, 2y + k)$ and equals $E_F[u] + 1/2 \cdot S_F[u] = 3/4 \cdot u(2y + k) + 1/4 \cdot u(2y - k)$. The minimum of the range is achieved through the lottery $G = (1/2, 0; 1/2, k)$ and equals $E_G[u] - 1/2S_G[u] = 1/4 \cdot u(k)$.
so he chooses $c_t$ as if he were a quasi-hyperbolic $(\beta, \delta)$ discounter with effective discount factor

$$\tilde{\beta} = \frac{w(\Delta t=2)}{w(\Delta t=1)}. \quad (4)$$

Since $\Delta t=2$ is increasing in $k$ while $\Delta t=1$ is decreasing in $k$, the person’s effective discount factor is decreasing in $k$. Summarizing:

**Proposition 5.** Defining $\tilde{\beta}$ as in Equation (4), then $\tilde{\beta} \leq 1$ and $\partial \tilde{\beta} / \partial k < 0$.

Proposition 5 says that the person acts as if he discounts the future by more when future income is more uncertain. The intuition is that the range of second period consumption utility goes up with income uncertainty while the range of first period consumption utility goes down, leading a given incremental change in second period consumption to loom smaller and a given incremental change in first period consumption to loom larger.

While the relative thinker discounts the future by more when future income is more uncertain, it is in general ambiguous whether this leads him to consume more in the first period because of standard precautionary savings motives. To see this, the first order condition for optimal first period consumption (assuming an interior solution) equals:

$$u'(c_1) = \frac{w(\Delta t=2)}{w(\Delta t=1)} \left[ 1/2 \cdot u'(2y-k-c_1) + 1/2 \cdot u'(2y+k-c_1) \right].$$

When $u''' > 0$ and the standard precautionary savings motive is present, the bracketed term in the right-hand-side of this first order condition is increasing in $k$, which battles against the relative thinking effect by pushing the person to consume less in the first period. Again, however, it is the case that if an analyst knows (or thinks he knows) $u(\cdot)$ and infers the person’s discount factor to match first period consumption then he will infer a smaller discount factor the more uncertain is second period income.

Proposition 5 identifies a sense in which relative thinking should robustly lead to impatience, regardless of how the person segregates or integrates consumption across time periods. Uncertainty means that the person’s current choices determine today’s consumption utility but generate a lottery over future consumption utility.

### 6 Discussion and Conclusion

We believe that the type of range-based relative thinking that we have incorporated into the model above is one of the most acknowledged aspects of human perception and judgment, and corresponds to strong intuitions about the choices people make. Yet the connection between the basic
psychology and the model we have developed, and, in turn, the economic implications, may not be so sharp. We conclude the paper by discussing some of the shortcomings of the model, emphasizing missing elements and countervailing intuitions. We assess which conclusions might be misleading, and suggest some potential for improvements.

Although it incorporates the range of possible outcomes in a more nuanced way, and also embeds a form of diminishing sensitivity that can play out similarly to relative thinking, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012, 2013) develop variants of a model built on the premise that a wider range of outcomes may focus people’s attention on a given dimension. As we saw above, that is in clear tension with the form of relative thinking we emphasize. Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) formulation is even more directly in opposition to ours. We do not doubt that salience and focusing are important. Indeed, we would interpret virtually any illustration of how features of the environment can draw people away from assigning the normatively appropriate values to advantages and disadvantages—including effects captured by our model—as channeling the psychology of salience. The distinction, to take an example, is that our model posits that a gain of $10 is less salient when a person is contemplating gaining large amounts of money than when he is contemplating gaining small amounts—not more salient. We think, in fact, that the compelling intuition that bigger dimensions draw more attention than smaller dimensions can be reconciled with our model by a sharper focus on the nature of that intuition: the full range of possibilities along a dimension is no doubt more noticeable to people when the range is wider. In an intuitive sense that is true in our model via the assumption that \( w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta \) is increasing in \( \Delta \). And it is certainly an interpretation of the rational model, too, since \( \Delta \) is obviously increasing in \( \Delta \). Models such as Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) embed a stronger assumption—that the bigger the range on a dimension the more attention people pay to a fixed change on that dimension.\(^40\)

As fundamental as relative thinking is, we feel the attention-grabbing aspect to bigger ranges can also be compelling, and may do battle with relative thinking. Without greater structure, it is then hard to predict the net effect of how expanding the range ultimately distorts decisions away from maximizing consumption utility. Yet we believe that there are natural intuitions for when each of the two effects may dominate. Our analysis above largely highlights examples where people’s decisions are likely guided by a particularly salient trade-off—between money and effort, money and quality, risk and return, etc. Per Figure 2 in Section 3, we believe that many of the sharp, direct

\(^40\)We also suspect the type of relative-thinking effects we emphasize are likely to matter more systematically—and more independently of framing and elicitation techniques—than some of the attentional and focusing issues, and that our model may provide both more pinned-down and more realistic general implications across settings than those other models. But we provide little evidence that would warrant confidence in that general statement. Indeed, one of the purposes of articulating a formal model of range-based relative thinking is to facilitate further research on its implications and interactions with other effects.
predictions of range-based focusing models like Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) contradict evidence and intuition in two dimensions. But both our analysis and the laboratory and other evidence may be misleading by “sampling” only from situations where people’s attention is directed to the relevant dimensions. In more realistic situations where dimensions may be neglected, the bigger-range-increases-incremental-weight hypothesis might be the dominant force, perhaps by approximating the idea that people stochastically notice or pay attention to dimensions according to their range. In this light, it is notable that most of the examples provided by Koszegi and Szeidl address trade-offs across many dimensions—and that virtually none of our examples consider more than 3 dimensions. With more “dimensions”, the idea that people may concentrate their attention on dimensions with wider ranges can have more intuitive traction.

This suggests that focusing effects might be based not only on ranges but also on the number of dimensions. A crude formulation capturing these intuitions might hold that people pay attention only to the two dimensions with the greatest ranges, and make choices according to range-based relative thinking, applied as if those are the only two dimensions. Less crudely, we might suppose that other dimensions are partially attended to, but get decreased weight when their ranges are smaller. Consider the following “more continuous” formulation that channels this intuition, while maintaining the idea that people pay equal attention to dimensions when there are only two.

Suppose that we order dimensions \( k = 1, 2, \ldots, K \) (where \( K \) can be either finite or infinite) such that \( \Delta_k \geq \Delta_{k+1} \). Then, choosing parameter \( \chi \in [0, 1] \), let \( \phi_k \) be the “wannabe focus weight” on dimension \( k \) as given by \( \phi_{k+1} = \chi \cdot \phi_k \) for \( k < K \), \( \phi_K = \phi_{K-1} \), and \( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \phi_k = 1 \). The actual focus weights would be modified to take into account exact ties, where \( \Delta_k = \Delta_{k+1} \), to say that the true focus weights are \( g_k \) such that \( \sum_{k=1}^{j} g_k = \sum_{k=1}^{j-1} \phi_k \) for all \( j \) where \( \Delta_j > \Delta_{j+1} \), and \( g_j = g_{j+1} \) where \( \Delta_j = \Delta_{j+1} \). Then we would designate that instead of the weighting functions \( w_k \) being given by \( w_k = w(\Delta_k(C)) \) as defined in our Norming Assumptions N0-N3, they are instead given by \( w_k = g_k \cdot w(\Delta_k(C)) \).

This implies (by brute-force construction) that any range effects when only two dimensions are being compared will be determined solely by relative thinking. But if there are at least three dimensions, the focus weights can matter. If we assume \( \chi = .5 \), for instance, three dimensions with utility ranges \((3, 2, 1)\) would get focus weights \( (g_1, g_2, g_3) = (\frac{4}{5}, \frac{2}{5}, \frac{2}{5}) \); dimensions with utility

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41 In models such as Gabaix (2014) and Schwartzstein (2014), the range of potential realizations on some dimension of concern might naturally be related to the likelihood that people pay attention.

42 By incorporating both focusing and relative thinking effects in one model, the framework we propose has a bit of the flavor of Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer’s (2013) approach to salience. But it will differ by preserving the predictions of our model in all 2-dimensional cases. The focusing part of the model is related to models of rational attention, such as Sims (2003), Gabaix (2014), and Woodford (2012), where people are more likely to attend to “more important” dimensions. But, crucially—and unlike Koszegi and Szeidl (2013)—it is inspired by the idea that people have a limited “attentional budget”, which is a central component of only some of these models (e.g., Sims 2003 but not Gabaix 2014).
ranges \((3, 3, 1)\) would get focus weights \((g_1, g_2, g_3) = \left(\frac{3}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{1}{8}\right)\); and dimensions with utility ranges \((3, 1, 1, 1)\) would get focus weights \((g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, g_5) = \left(\frac{4}{8}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{8}\right)\). Comparing the first two examples illustrates that focus weights increase in the range when the increase influences the ranking of ranges across dimensions; comparing the second and third illustrates that this formulation shares Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) key feature that people pay less attention to advantages which are more spread out. In this (admittedly crude) formulation, relative thinking will dominate in two-dimensional choices or whenever an increase in the range does not influence the ranking of ranges across dimensions. While big differences can draw attention (bigger \(\Delta_k\) increases \(g_k\)), range-based relative thinking will dominate conditional on the allocation of attention (bigger \(\Delta_k\) decreases \(w_k\), conditional on \(g_k\)).

Another conspicuous omission from our model is reference dependence. This is most notable above and in Appendix C when we compare range-based relative thinking to diminishing sensitivity as embedded in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012, 2013). While they generally posit “zero” as the reference point, more generally one may want to define the reference point across contexts to study the interaction between relative thinking and reference-based effects like diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. Bushong, Rabin, and Schwartzstein (2014, in progress) integrate relative thinking with reference-dependent preferences, following a variant of prospect theory along the lines of Koszegi and Rabin (2007). The model integrates the two in a particular way—norming both consumption utility and the sensations of gains and losses—that generates an additional prediction that exposure to bigger risks makes a person less risk averse. For example, if a homeowner is required to purchase some sort of insurance policy, then adding policies with higher deductibles and lower premia to an existing menu can only lead a person to choose higher deductible policies. The analysis sheds light on evidence of certain context effects in risky choice, such as Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, and Thaler (2008), whereby people display less risk aversion in small to medium stakes decisions when they expect to have the option to take risks that involve bigger stakes.

Our model shares another set of limitations with other models of context-dependent preferences. Like other models, ours takes as given the options a person considers at the time of

\[\text{Returning to the example from the introduction, an observer may pay more attention to a brontosaurus than a frog if confronted with both and, as a result, may be more likely to notice a small imperfection, like a wart, on the brontosaurus. In this case, focusing effects can dominate relative thinking effects. An observer who is instead confronted only with a brontosaurus or only a frog may pay similar amounts of attention in the two situations, and may be more likely to notice the wart on the frog since it stands out more in the context of the frog’s smaller body. In this case, relative thinking effects dominate.}\]

\[\text{The results in Bushong, Rabin and Schwartstein (2014, in progress) focus more on how relative thinking interacts with loss aversion than on how it interacts with diminishing sensitivity, but the model could also be used to study the latter question.}\]

\[\text{One further omission is noteworthy since it is specific to our model. Our model is inspired by the psychological research underlying range-frequency theory (Parducci 1965), but does not include a notion of “frequency”—that is, on}\]
choice. As the jacket-calculator example from earlier sections illustrates, our explanation hinges on people narrowly bracketing spending on a given item. While such narrow bracketing—stressed by authors such as Tversky and Kahneman (1981); Benartzi and Thaler (1995); Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999); Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006); Barberis and Huang (2009); Rabin and Weizsacker (2009) and others—is consistent with the psychological evidence, there is little by way of general and systematic analysis of the extent, patterns, and implications of bracketing. Although we discussed in Section 5 some of the issues of bracketing and the entangled issues of how people integrate dimensions, the analysis there also made salient the centrality of such assumptions to predictions, and highlights the need to develop more satisfactory models.

Perhaps a more fundamental limitation is one that pervades the entire choice-set-dependent literature: a near-silence on the question of what exactly lies in the “comparison set”. Rarely are the “comparison sets” posited in the literature truly the choice sets that people face. For example, we can buy a car with or without a car radio ... but we can also buy another car. We think the intuition underlying most examples in papers on context-dependent preferences clearly relies on reasonable notions of what a person “might” do, but this remains to be formalized more carefully. We have tried to exclude any examples where our predictions are sensitive to options that might reasonably be added to the comparison set, though it is hard to evaluate our success in doing so – or quite what success would mean.

Treating the comparison set as exogeneous can give misleading impressions on how context-dependent preferences will impact choices in market situations, where firms have an incentive to influence the comparison set through the products that they market. Appendix A.2 contains results, in fact, that we think should give pause on how results about decoys are interpreted in our model—and in other context-dependent models. We show that, for any option $c$, there exists a choice set $C$ containing $c$ such that $c$ will be chosen and, for any expansion of that set, only options that yield “approximately equivalent” un-normed utility to $c$ or better can be chosen. This means, roughly, that once $C$ is available no decoys can be used to leverage range effects to make a consumer choose any option inferior to $c$. In certain market contexts, this indicates that, even though firms with inferior products might be able to use decoys to draw business away from a passive firm’s superior product, the superior firm would prevail in an equilibrium where all firms can choose decoys. This suggests the importance of considering the market structure, as well as the marketing and production technologies, in thinking about how context-dependent preferences influence market outcomes.

A final limitation of the model concerns not so much an omission in the framework necessary how norming can depend not only on ranges but also the distribution within the ranges. Such frequency effects may matter for choice, but we do not understand them very well, and suspect that such effects are largely separable from the range-based effects we emphasize here.
to make predictions, but rather a limitation to the questions asked. The analysis emphasizes the behavioral implications of the model. The welfare interpretation that seems most consonant with our presentation—that relative thinking influences choice but not hedonic utility—seems realistic in many situations. However, in some situations it seems plausible that the way choices are hedonically experienced depends on how they were normed. For example, in situations involving risk, the difference between losing $10 and $5 may feel smaller when losing $100 was possible. The model does not provide guidance on when relative thinking reflects a mistake or corresponds to true experienced well-being.

A Further Definitions and Results

A.1 Spreading Advantages and Disadvantages

Section 2 supplied examples on how the relative attractiveness of consumption vectors depends on the extent to which their advantages and disadvantages are spread out. To develop formal results, consider the following definition.

**Definition 1.** $c''$ spreads out the advantages of $c'$ relative to $c$ if there exists a $j \in E(c', c) = \{i : u_i(c'_j) = u_i(c_i)\}$, $k \in A(c', c) = \{i : u_i(c'_j) > u_i(c_i)\}$, and $\epsilon < \delta_k(c', c)$ such that

$$(u_1(c''_1), \ldots, u_K(c''_K)) = (u_1(c'_1), \ldots, u_K(c'_K)) + \epsilon \cdot (e_j - e_k),$$

where $e_i$ is the unit vector whose $i$'th element is 1. Analogously, $c''$ integrates the disadvantages of $c'$ relative to $c$ if there exists $j, k \in D(c', c) = \{i : u_i(c'_j) < u_i(c_i)\}$ such that

$$(u_1(c''_1), \ldots, u_K(c''_K)) = (u_1(c'_1), \ldots, u_K(c'_K)) + \delta_k(c', c) \cdot (e_j - e_k).$$

In words, $c''$ spreads the advantages of $c'$ relative to $c$ if $c''$ can be obtained from $c'$ by keeping the total advantages and disadvantages relative to $c$ constant, but spreading its advantages over a greater number of consumption dimensions. Conversely, $c''$ integrates the disadvantages of $c'$ relative to $c$ if $c''$ can be obtained from $c'$ by keeping the total advantages and disadvantages relative to $c$ constant, but integrating disadvantages spread over two dimensions into one of those dimensions.

**Proposition 6.** If $c''$ spreads out the advantages of $c'$ relative to $c$ or integrates the losses of $c'$ relative to $c$, then $U^N(c' \{c, c'\}) \geq U^N(c | \{c, c'\}) \Rightarrow U^N(c'' \{c, c''\}) > U^N(c | \{c, c''\}).$

Proposition 6 says that, all else equal, the attractiveness of one consumption vector over another goes up when its advantages are spread over more dimensions or its disadvantages are integrated. This connects to the evidence initially derived from diminishing sensitivity of the prospect theory.
value function that people prefer segregated gains and integrated losses (Thaler 1985), though the evidence on integrated losses (see Thaler 1999) is viewed as far less robust.\textsuperscript{46} Thaler gives the following example of a preference for segregated gains: when subjects are asked “Who is happier, someone who wins two lotteries that pay $50 and $25 respectively, or someone who wins a single lottery paying $75?” they tend to believe the person who wins twice is happier. This principle suggests, for example, why sellers of products with multiple dimensions attempt to highlight each dimension separately, e.g., by highlighting the many uses of a product in late-night television advertisements (Thaler 1985).

Turning to losses, Thaler (1985) asked subjects the following question:

Mr. A received a letter from the IRS saying that he made a minor arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed $100. He received a similar letter the same day from his state income tax authority saying he owed $50. There were no other repercussions from either mistake. Mr. B received a letter from the IRS saying that he made a minor arithmetical mistake on his tax return and owed $150. There were no other repercussions from his mistake. Who was more upset?

66% of subjects answered “Mr. A”, indicating a preference for integrated losses. There is other evidence that urges some caution in how we interpret these results, however. Thaler and Johnson (1990) find that subjects believe Mr. A would be happier if the letters from the IRS and state income tax authority were received two weeks apart rather than on the same day. Under the assumption that events on the same day are easier to integrate, then this pattern goes against a preference for integrated losses. Similarly, while Thaler and Johnson find that subjects say a $9 loss hurts less when added to a $250 loss than alone (consistent with a preference for integrating losses), they also say that it hurts more when added to a $30 loss than alone (inconsistent with such a preference). While the overall evidence appears broadly consistent with the predictions of Proposition 6, the evidence on losses is ambiguous.

The model more broadly implies that it is easier to advantageously frame items whose advantages are more spread out:

\textsuperscript{46}Note that, in contrast to diminishing sensitivity of the prospect theory value function, Proposition 6 does \textit{not} imply the stronger result that the attractiveness of one consumption vector over another increases in the \textit{degree} to which its advantages are spread or its losses are integrated. For example, while Proposition 6 implies that if $A = (x,0,0)$ is weakly preferred over $B = (0,0,y)$ from a binary choice set, then $A(\epsilon) = (x-\epsilon, \epsilon, 0)$ is strictly preferred over $B$ from a binary choice set, it does not imply that if $A(\epsilon)$ is weakly preferred over $B$, then $A(\epsilon')$ is strictly preferred over $B$ for $0 < \epsilon < \epsilon' < x/2$. The intuition is that, in moving from $(x,0,0)$ to $(x-\epsilon, \epsilon, 0)$, $A$’s advantage of $x$ over $B$ is unambiguously assessed with respect to a lower range: portion $x-\epsilon$ of the advantage is assessed with respect to range $x-\epsilon$ rather than $x$ while portion $\epsilon$ is assessed with respect to range $\epsilon$ rather than $x$. On the other hand, in moving from $A(\epsilon)$ to $A(\epsilon')$, there is a trade-off where portion $\epsilon$ of the advantage is now assessed with respect to the \textit{increased} range of $\epsilon'$. Getting the unambiguous result appears to rely on further assumptions, for example that that $w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta$ is concave in $\Delta$. 

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Proposition 7. Assume that \( u_k(\cdot) \) is unbounded below for each \( k \). Let \( c, c', c'' \in \mathbb{R}^K \) where \( c'' \) spreads out the advantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \). Supposing there is a \( C \) containing \( \{ c, c' \} \) such that \( c' \) is chosen from \( C \), then there is a \( \tilde{C} \) containing \( \{ c, c'' \} \) such that \( c'' \) is chosen from \( \tilde{C} \).

A.2 Prophylactic Decoys

Section 3.2 established one way in which the impact of the comparison set is bounded in our model. This section establishes another: for any option \( c \), there exists a choice set containing \( c \) such that \( c \) will be chosen and, for any expansion of that set, only options that yield “roughly equivalent” utility to \( c \) or better can be chosen.

Proposition 8. Assume N3 and that \( u_k(\cdot) \) is unbounded below for each \( k \). For any \( c \in \mathbb{R}^K \) and \( \varepsilon > 0 \), there exists some \( C_\varepsilon \) containing \( c \) such that the person would be willing to choose \( c \) from \( C_\varepsilon \) and would not choose any \( c' \in \mathbb{R}^K \) with \( \delta_A(c', c) = 0 \) or \( \delta_A(c', c) > 0 \) and

\[
\frac{\delta_D(c', c)}{\delta_A(c', c)} - 1 > \varepsilon
\]

from any \( \tilde{C} \) containing \( C_\varepsilon \).

Proposition 8 says that, for any option \( c \), it is possible to construct a choice set containing \( c \) as well as “prophylactic decoys” that would not be chosen, but prevent expanding the choice set in ways that allow sufficiently inferior options to \( c \) to be framed as being better. With unbounded utility, it is always possible to add options that make the ranges on dimensions sufficiently large such that further expanding the choice set will not make some dimensions receive much larger decision weights than others. For example, if \( c = (1,8,2) \) and \( \bar{u} > 0 \), then \( c \) is chosen from \( C = \{ (1,8,2), (1,8-\bar{u},2-\bar{u}), (1-\bar{u},8,2-\bar{u}), (1-\bar{u},8-\bar{u},2) \} \) and, as \( \bar{u} \to \infty \), it is impossible to expand \( C \) in a way that significantly alters the ranges along various dimensions and allows an inferior option to \( c \) to be chosen.\(^{47}\) One potential application of this result lies in thinking about product market competition. For example, a firm that wishes to sell some target product can always market other products that would not be chosen, but prevent other firms from introducing options that frame sufficiently inferior products as superior.

These ideas may be seen more clearly when we start from two options rather than one. A simple corollary is that when one option \( c \) has a higher un-normed utility than another \( c' \), it is possible

\(^{47}\)By a fairly similar logic, our model also says that people maximize un-normed consumption utility when decisions involve sufficiently large stakes: Supposing each \( u_k(\cdot) \) is unbounded, one can show that for all comparison sets \( C \), there exists a \( \bar{t} > 0 \) such that if \( c' \) is an un-normed utility-maximizing choice from \( C \), then \( t \cdot c' \) is a normed utility-maximizing choice from \( t \cdot C \) for all \( t > \bar{t} \). One intuition is that absolute differences scale up with \( t \), but proportional differences do not, so absolute differences dominate decision-making as \( t \) gets large.
to find a comparison set including those options such that the person chooses $c$ from that set and where it is not possible to expand the set in a way that will reverse his preference.

**Corollary 2.** Assume the conditions of Proposition 8 hold. For any $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^K$ with $U(c) > U(c')$, there exists some $C$ containing $\{c, c'\}$ such that the person would be willing to choose $c$ from $C$ and would not choose $c'$ from any $\tilde{C}$ containing $C$.

Again, applying the result to think about product market competition, this result says that if a firm has a superior product to a competitor then, with unbounded utility, it can always add inferior decoys that lead the consumer to choose its target product, and prevent the competitor from adding decoys that frame its inferior product as superior. To take an example, consider $c = (8, 2)$ and $c' = (4, 7)$. For concreteness, we could imagine cars where $c$ has better speed and $c'$ has better comfort. Starting from a binary choice set, the speedy car producer may be able to get consumers to buy its inferior product by adding similarly speedy but really uncomfortable decoy cars. However, Corollary 2 tells us that the comfortable car producer can always add prophylactic decoy cars that prevent the speedy car producer from being able to do this. These prophylactic decoys, such as $(-\bar{u}, 7.1)$ for $\bar{u}$ large, would “double-down” on the comfortable car’s speed disadvantage, protecting this disadvantage from being framed as all that bad.

In some natural market contexts, this result suggests that a battle of decoys will end and the superior firm will win. A superior firm can always add options that protect its target product and, once it does so, the inferior firm has no incentive to add further decoys. This result also suggests that relative thinking may influence the options that are offered to market participants by more than it influences ultimate choices. One implication is that to test for the existence of relative thinking in the field, it may be less valuable to directly look for evidence of anomalous choice behavior than to examine firms’ product lines, and in particular the products that are marketed but have very low market share. Another implication is that theoretically analyzing the impact of relative thinking on choices for a fixed choice set may give a misleading impression of how choices are ultimately

---

48 The key assumption is that the superior firm can add decoys that make the range on its disadvantageous dimensions sufficiently large that the inferior firm cannot add its own decoys that significantly magnify the relative weight placed on its advantageous dimensions. This can be satisfied with bounded utility as well, so long as lower bounds of utilities along the superior firm’s advantageous dimensions weakly exceed lower bounds along its disadvantageous dimensions. If we were to relax assumption $N3$ that $w(\infty) > 0$ then, with unbounded utility, we could instead observe a form of “instability” where it is possible to expand any set $C$ from which $c$ is chosen so that $c'$ is chosen and vice-versa.

49 We suspect a similar result also holds for Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model under natural restrictions on the “focusing weights”, though the prophylactic decoys would look different.

50 These conclusions depend on the market structure as well as the technologies that are available to firms. Monopolists may have an incentive to market decoys that get consumers to buy inferior products. In competitive situations, consumers may still buy inferior products if prophylactic decoys are prohibitively costly to market, for example if they must be built in order to market them or if there is sufficient consumer heterogeneity that some consumers will actually demand these products if they are offered. A more complete analysis of competition with decoys, which is left for future work, would need to grapple with such issues.
distorted away from those that maximize un-normed consumption utility. Instead, we may want to examine how the choice set endogeneously varies with relative thinking.

B  Eliciting Model Ingredients from Behavior

This section outlines an algorithm for eliciting \( u_k(\cdot) \) and \( w(\cdot) \) from behavior. The elicitation essentially follows the steps laid out by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) to elicit the ingredients of their model and we will closely follow their presentation. Their algorithm works for us because our model shares the feature that people make consumption-utility-maximizing choices in “balanced” decisions, which allows us to elicit consumption utility by examining choices in such decisions. We then elicit the weighting function \( w(\cdot) \) by examining how bigger ranges influence the person’s sensitivity to given differences in consumption utility.

We assume \( N0 \) and \( N2 \) (but do not impose \( N1 \)) and follow Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) by assuming that we know how options map into attributes, that we can separately manipulate individual attributes of a person’s options, and that the utility functions \( u_k(\cdot) \) are differentiable. We also, without loss of generality, normalize \( u_k(0) = 0 \) for all \( k \), \( u_1'(0) = 1 \), and \( w(1) = 1 \). We depart from Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) by assuming \( w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta \) is strictly increasing (Assumption \( N2 \)), while they make the stronger assumption that \( w(\Delta) \)—or \( g(\Delta) \) in their notation—is strictly increasing. We will see that their elicitation algorithm still works under our weaker assumption and, in fact, their elicitation can be used to test our assumption that \( w(\Delta) \) is decreasing against theirs that \( w(\Delta) \) is increasing.

The first step of the algorithm is to elicit the utility functions \( u_k(\cdot) \). Restricting attention to dimensions 1 and \( k \), consider choice sets of the form

\[
\{(0, x + q), (p, x)\}
\]

for any \( x \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( p > 0 \). For \( p > 0 \), set \( q = q_x(p) \) to equal the amount that makes a person indifferent between the two options, so

\[
w(u_1(p) - u_1(0)) \cdot (u_1(p) - u_1(0)) = w(u_k(x + q_x(p)) - u_k(x)) \cdot (u_k(x + q_x(p)) - u_k(x)),
\]

which implies that

\[
u_1(p) - u_1(0) = u_k(x + q_x(p)) - u_k(x)
\]
because \( w(\Delta) \cdot \Delta \) is strictly increasing in \( \Delta \). Dividing by \( p \) and letting \( p \to 0 \) yields

\[
u'_1(0) = u'_k(x) \cdot q'_x(0),
\]

which gives \( u'_k(x) \) (using the normalization that \( u'_1(0) = 1 \)) and the entire utility function \( u_k(\cdot) \) (using the normalization that \( u_k(0) = 0 \)). Intuitively, this step of the algorithm gives us, for every \( x \), the marginal rate of substitution of attribute 1 for attribute \( k \) at \((0,x)\)—this is \( q'_x(0) = u'_1(0)/u'_k(x) \)—which yields the entire shape of \( u_k(x) \) given the normalization that \( u'_1(0) = 1 \). We can then similarly recover \( u_1(\cdot) \) through using the elicited utility function for some \( k > 1 \).

The second step of the algorithm elicits the weights \( w(\cdot) \), where we can now work directly with utilities since they have been elicited. Focus on dimensions 1, 2, and 3, and consider choice sets of the form

\[
\{(0,0,x_0), (1,x-p,0), (1-q,x,0)\},
\]

for any \( x \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), where \( x_0 > 0 \) is sufficiently low that \((0,0,x_0)\) will not be chosen and whose purpose is to keep this option from being dominated by the others and from lying outside the comparison set (this is the only step of the algorithm where having more than two attributes matters). For some \( p \in (0,x) \), we now find the \( q = q_x(p) \) that makes the person indifferent between the second two options in the choice set, requiring that \( p \) is sufficiently small that \( q_x(p) < 1 \), so

\[
w(1) \cdot 1 + w(x) \cdot (x-p) = w(1) \cdot (1 - q_x(p)) + w(x) \cdot x.
\]

This implies that \( w(x) \cdot p = w(1) \cdot q_x(p) \) and, by the normalization \( w(1) = 1 \), gives us

\[
w(x) = \frac{q_x(p)}{p}.
\]

In this manner, we can elicit the entire weighting function \( w(\cdot) \). Intuitively, for all \( x \), this step of the algorithm elicits the marginal rate of substitution of utils along a dimension with weight \( w(x) \) for utils along a dimension with weight \( w(1) \), which yields exactly \( w(x) \) given the normalization \( w(1) = 1 \).

With this elicited weighting function, we can, for example, test our assumption that \( w(\cdot) \) is decreasing against Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) that \( w(\cdot) \) is increasing. To illustrate, suppose dimensions 1 and 2 represent utility as a function of the number of apples and oranges, respectively, where utility is elicited through the first step of the algorithm. Ignoring the third dimension for simplicity, if we see that the person strictly prefers \((1/2 \text{ utils apples}, 3 \text{ utils oranges})\) from the choice
\{(0 \text{ utils apples}, 0 \text{ utils oranges}), (1 \text{ utils apples}, 2.5 \text{ utils oranges}), (1/2 \text{ utils apples}, 3 \text{ utils oranges})\},

then \(w(3)/w(1) > 1\), consistent with Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), while if the person instead strictly prefers \((1 \text{ utils apples}, 2.5 \text{ utils oranges})\) from this choice set, then instead \(w(3)/w(1) < 1\), consistent with our model.

C More Detailed Comparison to Other Models

As noted in the introduction, the basic feature of our model—that a given absolute difference looms smaller in the context of bigger ranges (Volkmann 1951, Parducci 1965)—is not shared by Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012, 2013) or other recent approaches by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Cunningham (2013), who model how different features of the choice context influence how attributes of different options are weighed. To enable a detailed comparison between the approaches, we present versions of their models using similar notation to ours, and compare the models in the context of simple examples along the lines of the one introduced in Section 3.3.

All of these models share the feature that there is some \(U(c) = \sum_k u_k(c_k)\) that is a person’s consumption utility for a \(K\)-dimensional consumption bundle \(c\), while there is some \(\hat{U}(c|C) = \sum_k w_k \cdot u_k(c_k)\) that is the “decision consumption utility” that he acts on. The models by Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012, 2013), Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), and Cunningham (2013) differ from each other’s, and from ours, in how they endogeneize the “decision weights” \(w_k > 0\) as functions of various features of the choice context, and possibly the option \(c\) under consideration. Specifically, their models assume the following:

Alternative Model 1 (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012, 2013)). Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer’s (2013) model of salience in consumer choice says that for option \(c\), \(w_i > w_j\) if and only if attribute \(i\) is “more salient” than \(j\) for option \(c\) given “evoked” set \(C\) of size \(N\), where “more salient” is defined in the following way. Ignoring ties and, for notational simplicity, assuming positive attributes (each \(u_k(c_k) > 0\)), attribute \(i\) is more salient than \(j\) for \(c\) if \(\sigma_i(c|C) > \sigma_j(c|C)\), where \(\sigma_k(c|C) \equiv \sigma\left(u_k(c_k), \frac{1}{N} \sum_{c' \in C} u_k(c'_k)\right)\) and \(\sigma(\cdot, \cdot)\), the “salience function”, is symmetric, continuous, and satisfies the following conditions (thinking of \(\bar{u}_k = \bar{u}_k(C) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{c' \in C} u_k(c'_k)\)):

1. Ordering. Let \(\mu = \text{sign}(u_k - \bar{u}_k)\). Then for any \(\varepsilon, \varepsilon' \geq 0\) with \(\varepsilon + \varepsilon' > 0\),

\[\sigma(u_k + \mu \varepsilon, \bar{u}_k - \mu \varepsilon') > \sigma(u_k, \bar{u}_k).\]
2. **Diminishing Sensitivity.** For any $u_k, \bar{u}_k \geq 0$ and for all $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\sigma(u_k + \varepsilon, \bar{u}_k + \varepsilon) \leq \sigma(u_k, \bar{u}_k).$$

3. **Homogeneity of Degree Zero.** For all $\alpha > 0$,

$$\sigma(\alpha \cdot u_k, \alpha \cdot \bar{u}_k) = \sigma(u_k, \bar{u}_k).$$

The ordering property implies that, fixing the average level of an attribute, salience is increasing in absolute distance from the average. The diminishing-sensitivity property implies that, fixing the absolute distance from the average, salience is decreasing in the level of the average. Note that these two properties can point in opposite directions: increasing $u_i(c)$ for the option $c$ with the highest value of $u_i(\cdot)$ increases $(u_i(c) - \bar{u}_i)$, suggesting higher salience by ordering, but also increases $\bar{u}_i$, which suggests lower salience by diminishing sensitivity. Homogeneity of degree zero places some structure on the trade-off between these two properties by, in this example, implying that ordering dominates diminishing sensitivity if and only if $u_i(c)/\bar{u}_i$ increases.

More generally, using Assumptions 1-3, it is straightforward to show the following:\(^{51}\)

For option $c$, $w_i > w_j \Leftrightarrow \sigma(c|C) > \sigma_j(c|C) \Leftrightarrow \frac{\text{max}\{u_i(c_i), \bar{u}_i(C)\}}{\text{min}\{u_i(c_i), \bar{u}_i(C)\}} > \frac{\text{max}\{u_j(c_j), \bar{u}_j(C)\}}{\text{min}\{u_j(c_j), \bar{u}_j(C)\}}$,

(BGS)

where the level of $w_i$ depends only on the salience rank of attribute $i$ for option $c$ in comparison set $C$.\(^{52}\) An interpretation of condition (BGS) is that attribute $i$ of option $c$ attracts more attention than attribute $j$ and receives greater “decision weight” when it “stands out” more relative to the average level of the attribute, where it stands out more when it is further from the average level of the attribute in proportional terms.

**Alternative Model 2 (Koszegi and Szeidl (2013)).** Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model of focusing

\(^{51}\)As Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) discuss, Assumption 2 (Diminishing Sensitivity) is actually redundant given Assumptions 1 and 3 (Ordering and Homogeneity of Degree Zero).

\(^{52}\)Specifically, letting $r_i(c|C) \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ represent the salience rank of attribute $i$ for option $c$ given comparison set $C$ (the most salient attribute has rank 1), Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013, Appendix B) assume that the weight attached to attribute $i$ for option $c$ is given by

$$w_i = \frac{\delta^{r_i(c|C)}}{\sum_k \delta^{r_k(c|C)}},$$

where $\delta \in (0,1]$ inversely parameterizes the degree to which the salience ranking matters for choices.
specifies that the decision weight on attribute $k$ equals

$$w_k = g(\Delta_k(C)), \quad g'(\cdot) > 0,$$

where $\Delta_k(C) = \max_{c' \in C} u_k(c'_k) - \min_{c' \in C} u_k(c'_k)$ equals the range of consumption utility along dimension $k$, exactly as in our model. However, the weight on a dimension is assumed to be increasing in this range, $g'(\Delta) > 0$, which directly opposes Assumption N1 of our model. An interpretation of condition (KS) is that people focus more on attributes in which options generate a “greater range” of consumption utility, leading people to attend more to fixed differences in the context of bigger ranges.

**Alternative Model 3** (Cunningham (2013)). Cunningham (2013) presents a model of relative thinking in which a person is less sensitive to changes on an attribute dimension when he has encountered larger absolute values along that dimension. Cunningham’s model is one in which previous choice sets, in addition to the current choice set, affect a person’s decision preferences, so we need to make some assumptions to compare the predictions of his model to ours, and in particular to apply his model when a person’s choice history is unknown. We will apply his model assuming that the person’s choice history equals his current choice or comparison set $C$. It is then in the spirit of his assumptions that the decision weight attached to attribute $k$ equals

$$w_k = f_k(|\bar{u}_k(C)|), \quad f'_k(\cdot) < 0 \forall k,$$

where $\bar{u}_k(C) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{c' \in C} u_k(c'_k)$ is the average value of attribute $k$ across elements of $C$ and $N$ is the number of elements in $C$. Formulation (TC) says that a person is less sensitive to differences on an attribute dimension in the context of choice sets containing options that, on average, have larger absolute values along that dimension.

To illustrate differences between the models, return to the example introduced in Section 3. Suppose a person is deciding between the following jobs:

**Job X.** Salary: 100K, Days Off: 199  
**Job Y.** Salary: 110K, Days Off: 189  
**Job Z.** Salary: 120K, Days Off: 119

Cunningham (2013) considers a more general framework where utility is not necessarily separable across dimensions, and makes assumptions directly on marginal rates of substitution. Part of his paper considers implications of weaker assumptions on how “translations” of histories along dimensions influence marginal rates of substitution, rather than average levels of attributes along dimensions. We focus on his average formulation because it enables sharper predictions across a wider range of situations: it is always possible to rank averages, but not always possible to rank histories by translation.
where his underlying utility is represented by $U = \text{Salary} + 1000 \times \text{Days Off}$. First, we will consider the person’s choice of jobs when he is just choosing between $X$ and $Y$, and then we will consider his choice when he can also choose $Z$.

As noted in Section 3.3, our model predicts that the person will be indifferent between jobs $X$ and $Y$ when choosing from $\{X, Y\}$, but instead strictly prefers the higher salary job $Y$ when choosing from $\{X, Y, Z\}$. None of the three other models share our prediction in this example. The predictions of Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) model were presented in Section 3.3. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer’s (2013) predicts that a person will strictly prefer choosing the higher salary job $Y$ from $\{X, Y\}$: Using condition (BGS), we see that salary is more salient than days off for both options in $\{X, Y\}$—salary is more salient than days off for $X$ since $105/100 > 199/194$, and salary is more salient than days off for $Y$ since $110/105 > 194/189$—so the person places greater decision weight on salary and chooses the higher salary option. Intuitively, by diminishing sensitivity, a 5K utility difference relative to the average on the salary dimension stands out more than a 5K utility difference relative to the average on the days off dimension, as the average on the salary dimension is lower. Like Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) predict that the person will reverse her choice to $X$ from $\{X, Y, Z\}$: Using condition (BGS), the addition of $Z$ leads days off to be salient for all options—days off is more salient than salary for $X$ since $199/169 > 110/110$, days off is more salient than salary for $Y$ since $189/169 > 110/110$, and days off is more salient than salary for $Z$ since $169/119 > 120/110$—so the person places greater decision weight on days off and chooses $X$. Intuitively, their model says that the addition of job $Z$, which is a relative outlier in terms of days off, causes the days off of the various options to really stand out. Like Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), the salience-based prediction of Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) in this two-dimensional example seems at odds with intuition generated from laboratory evidence on attraction or range effects.

Cunningham’s (2013) formulation does not pin down what a person chooses from $\{X, Y\}$ (since the function governing the decision weights can vary across $k$), but says that if the person is initially indifferent between $X$ and $Y$, then the addition of $Z$ would lead him to choose $X$: Since the addition of $Z$ brings up the average on the salary dimension and brings down the average on the days off dimension, condition (TC) tells us that it leads the person to care less about salary relative to days off, thereby making $X$ look more attractive than $Y$. Cunningham’s average-based formulation yields opposite predictions to our range-based formulation when, like in this example, adding an option impacts averages and ranges in different directions.

We can re-frame this example slightly to illustrate another point of comparison. Suppose that a person frames the jobs in terms of salary and vacation days, rather than salary and days off, where vacation days equal days off minus weekend days (with roughly 104 weekend days in a year). The idea is that the person’s point of reference might be to be able to take off all weekend days rather
than to take off no days. Then the problem can be re-written as choosing between the following jobs:

*Job X.* Salary: 100K, Vacation Days: 95

*Job Y.* Salary: 110K, Vacation Days: 85

*Job Z.* Salary: 120K, Vacation Days: 15,

where the person’s underlying utility is represented by \( U = \text{Salary} + 1000 \times \text{Vacation Days} \). This change in formulation does not influence the predictions of our model, or of Koszegi and Szeidl’s (2013), on how the person chooses from \{X, Y\} or from \{X, Y, Z\} because this change does not affect utility ranges along the different dimensions. On the other hand, this change does influence the predictions of Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013). Specifically, it alters the prediction of which choice the person makes from \{X, Y\} because diminishing sensitivity is defined relative to an (often implicit) reference point: With the new reference point, vacation days are now more rather than less salient for both options in \{X, Y\} because a 5K difference looms larger relative to an average of 90K than 105K, implying that a person chooses X rather than Y from the binary choice set.\(^{54}\) And while this particular change in the reference point does not alter the qualitative predictions of Cunningham (2013), a different change does: Suppose a person uses a reference point where all 365 days are taken off and each option is represented in terms of (Salary, Work Days), where utility is represented by \( U = \text{Salary} - 1000 \times \text{Work Days} \). In this case, Cunningham (2013) says that the addition of Z reduces the person’s sensitivity to work days, since it raises the average number of such days, while the earlier framing in terms of days off instead suggested that the addition of Z would increase the person’s sensitivity to work days since it decreased the average number of days off. In cases like this one where there is not a natural reference point—except, as one of the authors cannot help but point out, expectations—implicit-reference-point theories like Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) and Cunningham (2013) have more degrees of freedom in explaining observed patterns of behavior.

\(^{54}\)Specifically, given \( C = \{X, Y\} \), vacation days are salient for X since 95/90 > 105/100 and are salient for Y since 90/85 > 110/105.
To prove the second part of the proposition, Equation (5) establishes it suffices to show that, fixing \( \delta_k, h_k \equiv w\left(\frac{\delta_k}{d_k}\right) \delta_k \) is increasing in \( d_k \). When \( \delta_k < 0 \), we have that \( d_k < 0 \) and \( w(\cdot) \) is decreasing in \( d_k \) by N1, implying that \( h_k \) is increasing. Similarly, when \( \delta_k > 0 \), we have that \( d_k > 0 \) and \( w(\cdot) \) is increasing in \( d_k \) by N1, implying that \( h_k \) is increasing.

To prove the first part of the proposition it suffices to show that \( h_k \) is increasing in \( \delta_k \), fixing \( d_k \). Differentiating \( h_k \) with respect to \( \delta_k \), we have

\[
\frac{d}{d_k} h_k = w\left(\frac{\delta_k}{d_k}\right) + \frac{\delta_k}{d_k} w'\left(\frac{\delta_k}{d_k}\right),
\]

which is positive by N2.

Proof of Proposition 2. For the first part, suppose each \( c \) is measured in utility units. The result trivially holds whenever \( K = 1 \) or \( K = 2 \), since the person will always choose to maximize consumption utility from a binary choice set for such \( K \), so suppose \( K \geq 3 \). Let \( \bar{\Delta} = \max_j \Delta_j(\{c, c'\}) \) and \( m \) be a value of \( j \) satisfying \( \Delta_m = \bar{\Delta} \). Further, let \( \bar{c}_i = \max\{c_i, c_i'\} \) and \( c_i = \min\{c_i, c_i'\} \). Now construct \( c'' \) as follows:

\[c''_m = c_m\]

\[c''_k = c_k + \bar{\Delta} \quad \text{for some} \quad k \neq m\]

\[c''_i = \bar{c}_i - \bar{\Delta} \quad \text{for all} \quad i \neq k, m.\]

Note that \( c'' \) is not (strictly) dominated by \( c \) or \( c' \) since \( c''_k \geq c_k \).

Since \( \Delta_j(C) = \bar{\Delta} \) for all \( j \) by construction, the agent will make a utility-maximizing choice from \( C \). To complete the proof, we need to verify that this choice is in fact \( c' \), or \( U(c'') \leq U(c') \):

\[
\sum_i c''_i = c_m + c_k + \bar{\Delta} + \sum_{i \neq k, m} (\bar{c}_i - \bar{\Delta})
\leq \sum_{i=1}^{K} c_i + \bar{\Delta} \quad \text{(because} \quad \bar{c}_i - c_i \leq \bar{\Delta})
\leq \sum_i c'_i.
\]

For the second part, first consider the “if” direction. Suppose (1) holds, and let the comparison set equal \( \{c, c', c''\} \), where \( c'' \) is defined such that

\[
u_j(c''_j) = \begin{cases} 
u_j(c'_j) & \text{if} \ j \in A(c', c) \text{ or} \ j \in E(c', c) \\ -\bar{u} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}
\]

where \( \bar{u} > 0 \) and \( -\bar{u} < \min_k u_k(c'_k) \).
Lemma 1. For all non-degenerate distributions $F$ with support on $[x, y], y > x$, we have

$$[E[F] - 1/2 \cdot S(F), E[F] + 1/2 \cdot S(F)] \subset [x, y].$$
Proof. We have
\[
E[F] + 1/2 \cdot S(F) = E[F] + 1/2 \cdot \int \int |c - c'|dF(c)dF(c')
\]
\[
= E[F] + 1/2 \cdot \int \int 2\max\{c, c'\} - (c + c')dF(c)dF(c')
\]
\[
= E[F] + 1/2 \cdot [2E_F[\max\{c, c'\}] - 2E[F]]
\]
\[
= E_F[\max\{c, c'\}]
\]
\[
< y \text{ (for non-degenerate } F). \]

We can similarly establish that \(E[F] - 1/2 \cdot S(F) > x\) for non-degenerate \(F\). □

Remark 1. The proof of Lemma 1 establishes that \(E[F] + 1/2 \cdot S(F) = E_F[\max\{c, c'\}]\), and we can similarly establish that \(E[F] - 1/2 \cdot S(F) = E_F[\min\{c, c'\}]\). This provides an alternative expression for \(\Delta_k(\mathcal{F})\):
\[
\Delta_k(\mathcal{F}) = \max_{F \in \mathcal{F}} E_F[\max\{u_k(c_k), u_k(c'_k)\}] - \min_{F \in \mathcal{F}} E_F[\min\{u_k(c_k), u_k(c'_k)\}].
\]

Proof of Proposition 3. It will be useful to recall Lemma 1 in Koszegi and Rabin (2007): if \(F'\) is a mean-preserving spread of \(F\), then \(S(F) < S(F')\).

For the first part of the proposition, let \(\mathcal{F} = \{(F_1, F_2), (F_1 - G_1, F_2 + G_2)\}\) and \(\mathcal{F}' = \{(F_1, F_2'), (F_1 - G_1, F_2' + G_2')\}\). Since \((F_1, F_2)\) is chosen from \(\mathcal{F}\), we have
\[
U^N((F_1, F_2)|\mathcal{F}) - U^N((F_1 - G_1, F_2 + G_2)|\mathcal{F}) = w(\Delta_1(\mathcal{F})) \cdot E[G_1] - w(\Delta_2(\mathcal{F})) \cdot E[G_2] \geq 0,
\]
(6)

where
\[
\Delta_1(\mathcal{F}) = E[G_1] + \frac{1}{2}(S(F_1) + S(F_1 - G_1))
\]
\[
\Delta_2(\mathcal{F}) = E[G_2] + \frac{1}{2}(S(F_2) + S(F_2 + G_2)).
\]

Since \(F_2'\) is a mean-preserving spread of \(F_2\) or \(G_2'\) is a mean-preserving spread of \(G_2\), we also have that \(F_2' + G_2'\) is a mean-preserving spread of \(F_2 + G_2\), so Lemma 1 in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) tells us that \(\Delta_2(\mathcal{F}') > \Delta_2(\mathcal{F})\). Since it is also the case that \(\Delta_1(\mathcal{F}') = \Delta_1(\mathcal{F})\), Equation (6) then implies that \(U^N((F_1, F_2')|\mathcal{F}') - U^N((F_1 - G_1, F_2' + G_2')|\mathcal{F'}) > 0\) by NI.

It remains to show the second part of the proposition. Let \(\mathcal{F}(G_1, G_2)\) denote the comparison set when the decision-maker faces the distribution over choice sets of the form \(\{(0, 0), (-\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})\}\) that is induced by drawing \(\tilde{x}\) from \(G_1\) and \(\tilde{y}\) independently from \(G_2\), where \(G_1 \in \{F_1, F_1'\}\) and
\( G_2 \in \{ F_2, F'_2 \} \).

The range on each dimension equals the range when we restrict attention to the subset of \( \mathcal{F}(G_1, G_2) \) generated by the union of the lotteries associated with “always choose \((0, 0)\)” and “always choose \((-\bar{x}, \bar{y})\)”. The first of these lotteries yields \( E_F[u_k(c_k)] + \frac{1}{2} S_F[u_k(c_k)] = 0 \) along each dimension, while the second yields \(-E[G_1] + 1/2 \cdot S(G_1) \) along the first and \( E[G_2] + 1/2 \cdot S(G_2) \) along the second dimension.

By Lemma 1, the range on the dimensions are then

\[
\Delta_1(\mathcal{F}(G_1, G_2)) = E[G_1] + \frac{1}{2} S(G_1)
\]
\[
\Delta_2(\mathcal{F}(G_1, G_2)) = E[G_2] + \frac{1}{2} S(G_2).
\]

Consequently, \( \Delta_2(\mathcal{F}(F_1, F_2)) < \Delta_2(\mathcal{F}(F_1, F'_2)) \) whenever (i) \( F'_2 \) is a mean-preserving spread of \( F_2 \), as, in this case, \( E[F_2] = E[F'_2] \) and \( S(F'_2) > S(F_2) \) by Lemma 1 in Koszegi and Rabin (2007), or (ii) \( F'_2 \) first order stochastically dominates \( F_2 \), as, in this case, \( E[F'_2] + 1/2 \cdot S(F'_2) = E[F'_2][\max\{\bar{y}, \bar{y}'\}] > E[F_2][\max\{\bar{y}, \bar{y}'\}] = E[F_2] + 1/2 \cdot S(F_2) \), where the equality comes from Remark 1 and the inequality is obvious.

The result then follows from the fact that

\[
U^N((0, 0) \mid \mathcal{F}) - U^N((-x, y) \mid \mathcal{F}) = w(\Delta_1) \cdot x - w(\Delta_2) \cdot y
\]

is increasing in \( \Delta_2 \) by \( NI \). \[\square\]

**Proof of Proposition 4.** From Equation (3), we have

\[
\hat{\beta}_t = \frac{w\left(\left(T-t\right)u\left(\frac{h}{T-t}\right)\right)}{w(u(I_t))}.
\]

We establish points 1-3 in turn.

1. By strict concavity of \( u(\cdot) \), \( (T-t)u\left(\frac{h}{T-t}\right) \geq u(I_t) \) with equality if and only if \( T - t = 1 \). The result that \( \hat{\beta}_t \leq 1 \) with equality if and only if \( T - t = 1 \) then follows from the fact that \( w(\cdot) \) is strictly decreasing (\( NI \)).

2. By strict concavity of \( u(\cdot) \), \( (T-t)u\left(\frac{h}{T-t}\right) \) is strictly increasing in \( (T-t) \), which implies that \( \hat{\beta}_t \) is strictly decreasing in \( (T-t) \) by \( NI \).

3. If \( u(\cdot) \) is unbounded above and \( N3 \) holds then \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \hat{\beta}_t = w(\infty)/w(\infty) = 1 \).

Suppose instead that \( u(\cdot) \) is bounded above with \( \lim_{c \to \infty} u(c) = \bar{u} \). Then as \( I_t \to \infty \), \( \hat{\beta}_t \to \frac{w(T-t)\bar{u}}{w(\bar{u})} \), which is increasing in \( t \) by \( NI \).
Proof of Proposition 5. In text.

Proof of Proposition 6. First, consider the case where \( c'' \) spreads out the advantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \). In this case, there exists a \( j \in E(c', c) \), \( k \in A(c', c) \), and \( \epsilon < \delta_k(c', c) \) such that

\[
U^N(c'' \mid \{c, c''\}) - U^N(c \mid \{c, c''\}) = U^N(c' \mid \{c, c'\}) - U^N(c \mid \{c, c'\}) + w(\delta_k - \epsilon) \cdot (\delta_k - \epsilon) + w(\epsilon) \cdot \epsilon - w(\delta_k) \cdot \delta_k.
\]

Supposing that \( \epsilon \leq \frac{\delta_k(c', c)}{2} \) (the case where \( \frac{\delta_k(c', c)}{2} < \epsilon < \delta_k(c', c) \) is analogous), the result then follows from the fact that

\[
w(\delta_k - \epsilon) \cdot (\delta_k - \epsilon) + w(\epsilon) \cdot \epsilon - w(\delta_k) \cdot \delta_k \geq w(\delta_k - \epsilon) \cdot \delta_k - w(\delta_k) \cdot \delta_k > 0,
\]

by successive applications of \( N1 \).

Now consider the case where \( c'' \) integrates the disadvantages of \( c' \) relative to \( c \). In this case, there exists \( j, k \in D(c', c) \) such that \( U^N(c'' \mid \{c, c''\}) - U^N(c \mid \{c, c''\}) \) equals

\[
U^N(c' \mid \{c, c'\}) - U^N(c \mid \{c, c'\}) + w(|\delta_j(c', c) + \delta_k(c', c)|) \cdot (\delta_j(c', c) + \delta_k(c', c))
\]

\[- w(|\delta_j(c', c)|) \cdot \delta_j(c', c) + w(|\delta_k(c', c)|) \cdot \delta_k(c', c).
\]

The result then follows from the fact that

\[
w(|\delta_j(c', c) + \delta_k(c', c)|) \cdot (\delta_j(c', c) + \delta_k(c', c)) > w(|\delta_j(c', c)|) \cdot \delta_j(c', c) + w(|\delta_k(c', c)|) \cdot \delta_k(c', c),
\]

by \( N1 \) (recall that \( \delta_i(c', c) < 0 \) for \( i = j, k \)).

Proof of Proposition 7. From Condition (1) of Proposition 2 we want to show that

\[
\sum_{i \in A(c'', c)} w(\delta_i(c'', c)) \cdot \delta_i(c'', c) + \sum_{i \in D(c'', c)} w(\infty) \cdot \delta_i(c'', c) > 0.
\]

Since there is a \( C \) containing \( \{c, c'\} \) such that \( c' \) is chosen from \( C \), Condition (1) must hold for \( c', c \).

Noting that \( \sum_{i \in D(c'', c)} w(\infty) \cdot \delta_i(c'', c) = \sum_{i \in D(c', c)} w(\infty) \cdot \delta_i(c', c) \), it suffices to show that

\[
\sum_{i \in A(c'', c)} w(\delta_i(c'', c)) \cdot \delta_i(c'', c) \geq \sum_{i \in A(c', c)} w(\delta_i(c', c)) \cdot \delta_i(c', c),
\]

which can be shown via an argument analogous to the one we made in the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 8. The result is trivial for \( K = 1 \), so suppose \( K \geq 2 \). Let \( C_\varepsilon = \{ c \} \cup \{ c^1 \} \cup \ldots \cup \{ c^K \} \), where, for each \( j \in \{ 1, \ldots, K \} \), define \( c^j \in \mathbb{R}^K \) such that

\[
u_i(c^j) = \begin{cases} 
\nu_i(c_i) & \text{for } i = j \\
\nu_i(c_i) - \bar{\nu} & \text{for all } i \neq j,
\end{cases}
\]

supposing \( \bar{\nu} \) is sufficiently large that \( w(\bar{\nu}) - w(\infty) < w(\infty) \cdot \varepsilon \equiv e \).

By construction, \( \Delta_i(C_\varepsilon) = \bar{\nu} \) for all \( i \), so the person makes a utility maximizing choice from \( C_\varepsilon \), which is \( c \).

Also, for any \( \tilde{C} \) containing \( C_\varepsilon \), \( \Delta_i(\tilde{C}) \geq \Delta_i(C_\varepsilon) \), so \( w(\Delta_i(\tilde{C})) < w(\infty) + e \) for all \( i \). This means that, for any \( c' \neq c \in \tilde{C} \), we have

\[
U^N(c'|\tilde{C}) - U^N(c|\tilde{C}) = \sum_{i \in A(c',c)} w(\Delta_i(\tilde{C})) \cdot \delta_i(c',c) + \sum_{i \in D(c',c)} w(\Delta_i(\tilde{C})) \cdot \delta_i(c',c)
\]

\[
< (w(\infty) + e) \cdot \delta_A(c',c) - w(\infty) \cdot \delta_D(c',c),
\]

where this last term is negative (meaning \( c' \) will not be chosen from \( \tilde{C} \)) whenever \( \delta_A(c',c) = 0 \) or \( \delta_A(c',c) > 0 \) and \( \frac{\delta_D(c',c)}{\delta_A(c',c)} - 1 > \varepsilon \).

Proof of Corollary 2. This result is trivial if \( K = 1 \) or \( \delta_A(c',c) = 0 \), so let \( K \geq 2 \) and \( \delta_A(c',c) > 0 \). Since \( U(c) > U(c') \),

\[
\lambda \equiv \frac{\delta_D(c',c)}{\delta_A(c',c)} - 1 > 0.
\]

Let \( C = \{ c' \} \cup C_{\lambda'} \), where \( C_{\lambda'} \) is constructed as in the proof of Proposition 8 (letting \( \varepsilon = \lambda' \)), with \( \lambda' = \lambda - \eta \) for \( \eta > 0 \) small.

By Proposition 8, \( c \) would be chosen from \( C_{\lambda'} \) and \( c' \) would not be chosen from any \( \tilde{C} \) containing \( C_{\lambda'} \) and \( c' \), including from \( C \). It is left to establish that \( c \) would be chosen from \( C \), but this follows from the fact that \( U^N(c|C) - U^N(c'|C) = \sum_{i \neq j} w(\Delta_i(C)) \cdot \bar{\nu} \geq 0 \) for any \( c^j \in C_{\lambda'} \).
References


