

Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?

Evidence from the Convention against Torture

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Abstract

Self-reporting on implementation is common in international regulatory agreements, yet we know almost nothing about how (or whether) it works. We argue self-reporting provides information for international and domestic audiences, with the potential to create pressure for agreement compliance. Using original data on reports submitted to the Committee Against Torture, we test for the influence of the review process on the pervasiveness of torture. Adopting a dynamic approach to strengthen our ability to draw inferences, we find that the review process in fact does help to reduce the incidence of torture in reporting countries. Moreover, local media attention spikes during the review process, consistent with a domestic mobilization mechanism. This is the first study to evaluate the effects of self-reporting on torture outcomes. Since many international agreements are based on self-reporting, the results have broad significance for international relations.

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I Introduction

Information gathering and monitoring are often theorized as critical tools to enhance cooperation between governments. Some accounts emphasize the role that information plays in facilitating reciprocity among states (Keohane 1984), while others highlight the importance of informing domestic audiences about state behavior (Dai 2005). The production, dissemination, and discussion of information are also critical if often implicit parts of socializing states into the standards and expectations of broader communities (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Goodman and Jinks 2013; Johnston 2001). From rationalist accounts that emphasize strategic behavior to more sociological approaches that rely on persuasion, cooperation is fundamentally a knowledge-based enterprise. Who produces such information—and the process by which it is evaluated and acted upon—is therefore central to international politics.

Empirically, a majority of international agreements in a broad range of issue areas rely upon some form of information provision in order to be effective. In fact, Barbara Koremenos found that a little over half of a random sample of treaties deposited with the United Nations (UN) create *some form* of monitoring, whether self-monitoring, third party surveillance, or a combination of both (Koremenos 2013, 2016). It is interesting to note, however, that governments themselves supply a striking amount of the information assessed under formal agreements. In the area of security, a recent comprehensive study of all arms control agreements found that a significant plurality—or some 86 of 224 agreements in history—provide for some type of self-reporting as the *most intrusive* form of monitoring (Vaynman 2014). Self-reporting is also a central pillar in international environmental agreements. For example, the G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Agreement depends almost exclusively on self-reporting by states parties (Aldy 2015). In the economic realm, a regularized review system within the World Trade Organization—the Trade Policy Review Mechanism—combines centralized policy reviews and state reports (Mavroidis 1992).

In short, self-reporting is central to the maintenance of most major international agreements. Across issue areas, the international community depends heavily on states to provide

the raw material for oversight. As Xinyuan Dai notes, “except in a few large and strong regimes, treaty organizations themselves rarely perform the function of information provision completely on their own” (Dai 2002: 405). As we discuss below, international human rights agreements are no exception. Nearly every major human rights treaty requires states parties to report to treaty bodies tasked with monitoring and reviewing information provided on implementation and compliance.

Our broad concern is to understand whether and how information produced largely by the regulated actors themselves (here states) has the capacity to elicit “pro-social” behavior. For purposes of tractability, we focus our inquiry on international human rights. How effective has the system of self-reporting been in improving human rights practices on the ground? Some claim that information—about compliance in particular—is the human rights regime’s primary tool to ensure that states fulfill their obligations (Dai 2007). Others disparage the entire process as a bureaucratic exercise with little to no substantive effect on compliance and they further characterize the record of state reporting to treaty bodies as shamefully inadequate (Hafner-Burton 2013). Yet we still know relatively little about this process or its potential influence on states’ actual human rights practices. Case studies are interesting, but to date they have been few in number, limited in geographic scope, and generally inconclusive about the connection between reporting and rights outcomes (McQuigg 2011). While an extensive literature explores self-reporting in domestic regulatory schemes (Kaplow and Shavell 1994), there is almost no systematic research into its effects internationally.

This article seeks to systematically examine the influence of self-reporting and periodic review on human rights outcomes within the treaty regime governing torture. In so doing, our goal is to shed light on a mainstay of international cooperation: information provision that relies primarily (though not exclusively) on the regulated actor. We argue that state reporting to external bodies can contribute to improved implementation of and compliance with international obligations via three mechanisms: the creation of bureaucratic routines that enhance the capacity to self-regulate; elite socialization; and the use of self-reported

information by domestic audiences. To evaluate these claims, we draw on original data on reports submitted to the anti-torture regime’s treaty monitoring body—the Committee against Torture (CmAT)—and use methods that strengthen our ability to draw inferences about the contribution of the reporting-and-responding process on torture prevalence. We find positive, systematic evidence that continued engagement in the “constructive dialogue” of report-and-review has produced modest human rights improvements on the ground. In short, self-reporting has some important, positive effects. This finding is critical to understanding the varying influences of international agreements, since rarely do they establish compliance systems that rely completely on independent sources of information.

This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief summary of the human rights periodic review process and the claims made about this system’s (un)importance. Part III theorizes the mechanisms through which self-reporting and periodic review could influence a government’s human rights practices. Part IV presents evidence on the likely effect of a country’s history of engagement with the treaty monitoring body on torture practices. Part V explores one potential mechanism through which reporting could influence outcomes—via domestic political activation and mobilization—and evaluates the extent to which evidence supporting this mechanism exists within a sample of Latin American countries. Part VI concludes.

II Reporting to the International Human Rights Regime

The legal regime for international human rights was designed to provide accountability through the monitoring of governments’ implementation of treaty obligations, as one potential pathway towards improved rights practices. To this end, every major human rights convention establishes an oversight committee, comprised of independent experts nominated and elected by states parties. By virtue of treaty ratification, states must submit to each committee periodic reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures

adopted to give effect to their human rights obligations.¹

Each treaty monitoring body then considers these reports in the presence of government representatives, through a “constructive dialogue” during which it engages representatives, acknowledges progress made, and identifies areas for improvement. At the conclusion of this dialogue, the committee issues a set of concluding observations containing non-binding recommendations for legislative reforms and other efforts a government should undertake to address shortcomings in its treaty obligations (O’Flaherty 2006: 36). This entire process is known as “periodic review,” with all state reports and committee recommendations made public.

Periodic review was intended to play a central role in encouraging treaty implementation and compliance (Keller and Ulfstein 2012: 2; Kälin 2012: 16). But the system is often criticized as inadequate, ineffective, and even “in crisis” (Alston and Crawford 2000; Bayefsky 2001). Some point to the professional inadequacies of the “expert” committees (Hafner-Burton 2013: 102). Others note that states—even resource rich, democratic ones—don’t do what they are told to do by the experts (McQuigg 2011). Moreover, there is a growing sense among critics that the system as a whole is breaking under its own unwieldy weight (Hafner-Burton 2013: 99; Posner 2014). As the body of treaties has grown, so too have the treaty bodies to which states are expected to report. One result may be reporting fatigue, and it is common to point out that late and non-reporting is fairly widespread (Hampson 2007; Schöpp-Schilling 2007). For example, of the 154 states parties to the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the end of 2014, twenty-five (16.2%) had still not submitted their initial report (with Somalia’s initial report the latest at twenty years) and 66 (42.9%) had between one and five periodic reports overdue.²

Reports submitted to the CmAT vary considerably across countries and over time in

¹The Torture Convention requires states parties to submit an initial report within one year of ratification or accession, and subsequent periodic reports at least every four years. See Article 19(1), CAT.

²The number of overdue reports includes instances where the Committee has indicated that a revised date of submission (usually in the near future) is permitted. This represents one way in which the Committee has attempted to address both systematic late reporting and its own increased workload, deviating from the periodicity mandated in the Convention.

their structure and quality (Creamer and Simmons 2015). Quality reporting requires an institutional capacity to provide factual knowledge of, expertise in, and familiarity with the treaty regime and the reporting process, which some states have developed through their National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), independent governmental bodies specifically mandated to promote human rights. In fact, the existence of an NHRI significantly increases the probability that a government will submit its CAT report and that the report will be more responsive to CmAT recommendations (Creamer and Simmons 2015).

Domestic political characteristics and regional imitation also partly explain (non) submission, with new democratic governments or those that have recently undergone a democratizing transition less likely to report compared to countries that have not experienced a transition. However, when newly democratizing countries *do* report, the quality of their reports is generally high (Creamer and Simmons 2015). Reporting density within a state party's region substantially increases a government's probability of reporting, suggesting that as more neighboring states engage with the CAT regime, the expectation that governments should take their reporting obligations seriously increases.

Understanding why states report helps us identify how states 'select into' the process, but it provides no indication of whether the reporting regime helps improve human rights practices. Hafner-Burton seems to reflect an informal (though untested) consensus among commentators, that "the reports often don't seem to lead to results that matter" (Hafner-Burton 2013: 100). Yet others claim that the influence of the reporting and review process is positive, albeit diffuse and indirect, with NGOs, domestic actors, and other governments using the committees' concluding observations to pressure governments (Dai 2014). Before evaluating these claims in the context of the Torture Convention, the following section theorizes the mechanisms through which self-reporting could potentially impact treaty implementation and compliance.

III From Self-Reporting to Substantive Compliance

Critics of the periodic review process are right about a number of its shortcomings. States often neglect to turn in their reports on time, if at all; many are not self-critical; the oversight committees are swamped and render recommendations they cannot readily enforce. Even with these weaknesses, there are three major mechanisms through which self-reporting could still improve human rights practices: bureaucratic self-assessment and capacity development; elite socialization; and domestic political mobilization.

Internal self-assessment and capacity development

Self-reporting requirements prompt a government to collect and share information about human rights legislation, policies, and practices. Even if states are less than forthcoming within their reports, the domestic process of preparing a report could itself promote self-assessment (Kälin 2012: 39; Trindade 2000: 334). Ideally, all administrative bodies responsible for implementing a given treaty are involved in report preparation. In order to adequately fulfill their reporting duties, governments often “reorganize themselves in ways that may enhance the influence of individuals and bureaucratic units that are more sympathetic to external views,” providing further impetus for examination of the status quo (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009: 18). Compiling a report requires a government to engage in a comprehensive review of national legislation and administrative practices, which may reveal previously unnoticed gaps and encourage development of internal capacities to collect and analyze information.³ This process raises the probability of uncovering deficiencies and finding ways to adopt best practices. To the extent that reporting bolsters the capacity to self-monitor, it may in turn lead to self-enforcement.

³For the Torture Convention, the ministry responsible for foreign affairs typically takes the lead in report preparation, but often consults widely with federal and local agencies responsible for defense, security, civilian police forces, and the judiciary.

Socialization

Self-reporting can be a key transmission belt for elite socialization, especially when it is a step in a process of dialogue with the international community. The multilateral nature of the treaty regime and the transnational network it engenders enable discussion and sharing of ‘best practices’ to address common implementation and compliance problems (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009; O’Flaherty 2006). The treaty body draws on collective experiences to make recommendations that expand the range of options and information available to governments and publics (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009: 18). The periodic review process thus might contribute to improved practices through a mechanism of learning and problem solving, both by government officials and committee members. Through interaction with the treaty body, states get advice about the technical aspects of implementation and exposure to various policy options not previously known or considered. As governments report more frequently and render higher quality reports, they engage in a greater number of learning opportunities to improve their policies and practices. As Chayes and Chayes (1993: 303) argue, such processes are central to eliciting compliance and effectiveness (see also Joachim, Reinalda and Verbeek 2008: 11; Mitchell 1998: 113).

Treaty bodies also engage in a practice of “naming and shaming” by publicizing non-compliance and recommending proposals for reform. This may negatively affect a state’s reputation for “good behavior” internationally (Guzman 2002; Keohane 1997) or increase social pressures to comply (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 2013; Risse and Ropp 1999). Reporting also enables acculturation, as “[t]he very process of identifying, describing, and controlling human rights practices helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse through global and local levels” (Goodman and Jinks 2004: 697). Alternatively, reporting may simply be part of the ‘script of modernity’ expected of states (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008), and thus might not lead to any real normative or substantive change. Nonetheless, governments that mimic reporting ‘scripts’ likely are susceptible to broader acculturation pressures for implementation and compliance. Even if reporting is initially *pro forma*, it exposes governments

to community-identified best practices for treaty implementation and compliance, which if mimicked might still improve rights practices on the ground.

Finally, genuine persuasion is a real possibility. Many regime participants believe that authoritative bodies such as the CmAT have impartial knowledge and specialized expertise (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This may give them normative power, exercised through reasoned arguments, to persuade elites that they should comply with their human rights obligations (Checkel 2005; Risse 54). At the very least, reporting generates an ongoing dialogue between treaty bodies and government representatives about the *meaning* of compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995). Governments that engage more frequently, thoroughly, and candidly are likely to experience repeated persuasion attempts by the committee. The frequency and intensity of persuasion attempts experienced by states could lead to improved human rights practices over time, as governments respond to and engage with committee recommendations and perhaps even internalize their normative arguments.

Political Activation and Domestic Mobilization

Many theories of compliance with international law emphasize the availability of information to domestic publics. Arguably, a public commitment to comply with a human rights treaty raises domestic groups' expectations that they can demand such compliance (Simmons 2009). Xinyuan Dai (2007) argues that information produced by international bodies informs domestic audiences about the activities of their government and its compliance with international legal obligations. This information allows domestic constituencies to apply electoral and other forms of political pressure on government officials.

If a government voluntarily reports on its own efforts to remedy compliance shortcomings, this information has the potential to raise the expectations of domestic groups that they can legitimately demand these measures be put into practice. The reporting-and-response cycle (which includes increasingly robust and public 'shadow reporting' by civil society groups) serves to stimulate attention and perhaps even participation in the process of report drafting

and discussion. By mobilizing and empowering groups within and outside of government, reporting can have a catalytic effect in promoting policy reform. The committee’s concluding recommendations provide domestic constituencies with information needed to apply political pressure to encourage substantive compliance. Even when states are less than forthright, their reports provide a focal point for non-state actors to assess and criticize the information provided. In short, a formal report submission presents opposition parties, NGOs, and other rights constituencies with a visible occasion and target for mobilization. In this way, even incomplete or inadequately analyzed information is better than none at all.

IV Evidence: Reporting, Review, and Torture

This section examines how the *process* of periodic review and the *history* of a government’s engagement with international anti-torture institutions affect subsequent rights practices. Do states that regularly submit to the process of self-reporting and review subsequently engage in less torture or cruel and inhumane treatment than states that remain aloof from the process?

Self-reporting and periodic review is an ongoing and iterative process with potentially cumulative effects. It was never intended or designed to affect rights practices through a single report submission. Modeling the effects of a single-shot treatment is thus not the best approach to analyzing the dynamic nature of periodic review to the CmAT, since both the act of reporting and the evolving nature of the review process represent treatment variables of interest. Estimating the cumulative influence of the reporting and review process thus requires a different approach from conventional regression estimators for single-shot effects. This is because time-varying factors can be both pre-treatment confounders in one period and post-treatment variables in another period. Including them in a conventional regression model induces post-treatment bias, but failing to include them results in omitted variable bias (Blackwell 2013). To attempt to adjust for these confounders, we fit a Marginal

Structural Model (MSM) developed by Robins, Hernan and Brumback (2000) and recently introduced to political science by Blackwell (2013). These models are estimated using an Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) estimator, which permits adjustment for intermediate confounders while avoiding bias from conditioning on a post-treatment variable.

This approach entails two steps. First, we estimate a model for treatment in each time period, conditional on time-varying confounders and past reporting history. Because the decision to engage in the report-and-review process is binary, we estimate the probability of undergoing review with a logit model and the parameter vector for the model with a pooled logistic regression, with country-year as the unit of analysis. This permits us first to estimate the probability, in each period, that the unit received the treatment history that it did. Then we fit a regression model for the outcome, given treatment and treatment history, by weighting each observation with the inverse of its treatment probabilities calculated in the first step. Robins, Hernan and Brumback (2000) show that this weighting scheme adjusts for confounding by observed and time-varying confounders. Intuitively, weighting creates a hypothetical ‘super-population’ where the link between treatment and observable confounders is broken. The parameters of this weighted regression model brings us closer than ordinary regression to causal analysis, assuming we have not omitted important causal variables, though it does not completely overcome issues that arise due to selection into the self-reporting process based on unobservable factors. Given the paucity of viable solutions to that problem, however, we view this approach as a substantial improvement over traditional methods.

The weighting models estimating the probability of treatment (CmAT review at time t) include all potential confounders: covariates expected to influence both the decision to undergo periodic review and torture practices. Creamer and Simmons (2015) report that institutional capacity (existence of an NHRI), normative commitment (an Article 22 declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the CmAT to receive individual complaints), and reporting density within a state party’s region all substantially increase a government’s probability of

reporting. These variables also likely affect a government’s torture practices, so we include them and a number of additional confounders in the weighting model: logged GDP *per capita* and population (from the World Bank); the percentage of core international human rights treaties ratified; a country’s Polity IV score; and its torture score, as measured by its Latent Human Rights Protection Score (Fariss 2014).⁴ All time-varying covariates are lagged one year.

We also include five binary variables intended to capture relevant regional or domestic political characteristics: whether a country is a state party to a regional human rights mechanism; whether, since World War II or post-war independence, a country never scored an 8 or above on the Polity scale (never democratic); whether, since World War II or post-war independence, a country never scored below an 8 on the Polity scale (stable democracy); whether the country is undergoing or underwent a democratic transition (moving from below an 8 to an 8 or above on the Polity scale); and whether a country had undergone a democratizing transition (a yearly +3 or more units on the Polity scale) during either of the two previous years. In effect, we have taken every reasonable precaution to capture conditions that are themselves likely to reduce torture, including many that would reduce a government’s (unobservable) ‘will’ to do so, such as stability, democracy, and normative commitment.

In addition to these confounders, we include within the weighting models a set of treatment history variables; in this case, a state’s history of engagement with CmAT periodic review. This permits us to then estimate the average treatment effect of both the single-shot treatment of undergoing review and *the history of country’s engagement with the review process* on a government’s propensity to torture. These treatment history variables include: whether a country reported in the previous year; the number of reports previously submit-

⁴The Latent Human Rights Protection Scores use a dynamic modeling process to account for temporal biases in the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International and other reports used to measure human rights practices, specifically practices related to physical integrity rights and political repression. The score represents the number of standard deviations a given observation is from 0, which represents the average level of human rights protection within all observations. See Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014. We view these scores as preferable to the Cingranelli Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database.

ted; and the number of years since the last report due date.⁵ All weighting models include a linear time trend.

In a second step, we fit an inverse-probability weighted MSM to estimate the effects of CmAT review (the treatment) and the review process (treatment history variables) on Human Rights Protection Scores at year $t + 2l$. Because we have few priors about *when* we should expect the reporting process to affect torture practices on the ground, we estimate its relationship with a government’s human rights record two years following review, as significant reforms of deficient legislation and practices often cannot occur instantaneously. All models include a linear time trend. Confidence intervals were obtained using a cluster bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage weighting and MSM fitting procedure, clustering on country.⁶

Figure 1 plots the estimated single-shot CmAT review and review history effects along with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. We find that while the single, instantaneous effect of review at time t is statistically indistinguishable from 0, there is a significant (at $p < 0.05$) effect of review *history* on human rights practices at time $t + 2$. We estimate that a country that goes through one additional reporting and review cycle as a states party to the Torture Convention will, on average, have a Human Rights Protection Score that is approximately 0.18 units greater than a country that refrained from undergoing review.

To summarize, governments that engage in more dialogue with the CmAT are less likely to engage in frequent physical integrity rights violations over time. The very fact of participating in the review process may provide an opening for constructive engagement with the treaty monitoring body that promises small and incremental improvements over time. This opening seems to have important consequences, even if the quality of initial reporting is not especially high.

⁵Following Blackwell (2013) and Cole and Hernan (2008), we conduct a preliminary model check based on the final distributions of the stabilized weights for each year. See Online Appendix Figure A1. The stabilized weights’ means at each point in time are all close to 1, with their upper bounds relatively low, indicating we have estimated a set of fairly well-behaved weights.

⁶We ran the bootstrap for 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution for the MSM parameter estimates.




Figure 1: Estimated history effects of CAT review. Lines denote 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals (20,000 iterations, clustering on country).

How sensitive are these results to the possibility of unobserved confounding factors for which we have not successfully controlled? Figure 2 presents results for a sensitivity analysis procedure as described in Blackwell (2013). Suppose states that participate in CmAT review are truly better human rights performers for reasons we have not addressed than states who do not participate in CmAT review. This parameter, denoted by α , represents the ‘unexplained’ difference between treated and untreated countries in the underlying propensity to respect physical integrity rights. Positive values of α denote situations where treated countries have better human rights records than control, while negative values of α assume treated countries have worse human rights records. $\alpha = 0$ denotes the original effect estimate. Sensitivity analysis varies α across a range of values and re-estimates the treatment history effect after adjusting for the assumed amount of unobserved confounding. This allows us to estimate about how much confounding it would take to lose confidence in the finding that reporting history improves physical integrity rights.

The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that when countries that self-report and undergo CmAT review have *systematically better* rights practices than countries that do not, the estimated effect of undergoing an additional CmAT review loses significance at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$). A slight amount of confounding renders the effects of the reporting process just outside scientific standards of certainty. However, the results do hold for moderate




Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for review history effect. Dotted and dashed lines denote 90% and 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals respectively (20,000 iterations, clustering on country).

amounts of confounding with slightly relaxed confidence intervals. For example, when $\alpha = 0.07$, a little under half of the treatment effect size, the estimated positive effect of review history remains statistically significant at $p < 0.10$. In other words, even if we were to posit that countries undergoing review had systematically better human rights records than non-review countries by an amount equal to a third of the estimated effect size, we would still conclude with moderate confidence that repeated engagement with the CmAT has a positive effect on a country's human rights record. These findings support the conclusion that it is the constructive dialogue with the CmAT as an ongoing process—one made possible by iterative report submission and conversation—that holds the potential to improve rights practices on the ground.

V Mechanisms: Mobilization in Latin America

Prompt and frequent engagement within the CAT regime tends to reduce governments' propensity to torture, but what mechanisms might account for the findings of the previous section? One potential pathway is through the development of an *internal capacity* to collect and analyze information by the state bureaucracy itself, as a first step toward self-enforcement. If this were the whole story, however, we would expect to see effects from self-reporting alone, which we do not find. Rather, the findings discussed in the previous section provide evidence for a second pathway of *dialogue and socialization*: not simply reporting, but review, followed by response, along with shadow reporting, recommendation making, and the provision of further information.

The process of dialogue initiated through self-reporting and review—particularly the recommendations issued by the CmAT—may also mobilize domestic demands for closer scrutiny of torture laws and practices. For this *public mobilization* mechanism to be at work, we would expect the process to be publicly *visible* (Kälin 2012: 41). If elite dialogues at the international level work because they become broadly politically relevant at the local level, we should observe their footprint in public discussions and debate.

To evaluate whether this is the case, we turn to an analysis of local media. We focus on Latin America, a region in which torture has historically been a serious issue and where reporting to the CmAT has varied across countries and over time (Online Appendix Table A2). Combined with its history of relatively democratic institutions, active civil society, and meaningful press freedom, Latin America is a plausible candidate to investigate the potential for the periodic review process to acquire some level of publicity and focus public attention on torture practices.

We are fully aware that press coverage is not the same thing as political mobilization. Due to space constraints, it is not possible to establish every causal step in the mobilization chain: the effect of media on civil society demands, the expression of these demands, their influence on policies, and policy influences on actual torture practices. Here, we want to establish the *plausibility* of the publicity/mobilization channel, which depends at least initially on publicly available information that self-reporting has taken place and the issues on which it has focused.

For these reasons, we searched the major local press outlets for sixteen Latin American countries for awareness and discussion of the reporting and review process.⁷ Using five specific combinations of search terms in Spanish and Portuguese,⁸ we collected all news articles mentioning the Convention Against Torture, the CmAT, and/or the periodic review process. We only collected and coded articles published by a newspaper within and about the reporting state. We did not collect media stories for states prior to their ratification of the CAT, but we did search for them regardless of whether a state had in fact met its reporting obligation(s).

⁷The countries for which a reliable searchable media database existed include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We identified the top three newspapers (by circulation) using www.pressreference.com, supplemented with queries to regional and country experts or citizens. It was not possible to search electronically all three outlets for every single year since the CAT entered into force, but in each case we searched as many years as possible from CAT inception to the present, supplementing with information from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) for earlier years. See Online Appendix Table A2 for further information.

⁸Translated equivalents of: ‘convention against torture,’ ‘committee against torture,’ ‘committee’ + ‘torture,’ ‘convention’ + ‘torture,’ and ‘torture.’

Each article was then coded for whether it mentioned the focal state’s CAT obligations, its relations with the CmAT, and/or the reporting and review process specifically. If the ‘constructive dialogue’ with the CmAT is invisible domestically, we would expect little to no reference to any of these topics in the local press. But if such dialogue matters to domestic audiences, we should see a spike in press references, followed by a somewhat higher degree of attention to CAT and the CmAT during or after the review year.

The media evidence suggests the reporting process reverberates throughout much of the region. Figure 3 demonstrates strong evidence of a spike in attention by the local press to the review process in particular during the year of CmAT review (0) for each state. Moreover, attention to the CmAT *continued after the formal review was concluded*. In the year following review, the press continued to report on the recommendations issued by the committee, but also covered CAT obligations generally much more than was the case in the pre-reporting years.




Figure 3: Domestic Media Coverage of the Torture Convention in Latin America.

Figure indicates the number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the CAT, the CmAT, or the in-person periodic review and/or the concluding observations and recommendations issued by the CmAT (Review/Recs). Total articles within each country’s searchable time period were summed and averaged over sixteen Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Articles are centered around the year of review (0).

Figure 4 takes a closer look at four states. Mexico and Venezuela top the totals with more than thirty articles in their respective national presses the year of their CAT review. The press in Mexico in particular sustained interest in the implications of the review process in the following year. With every submission, media attention focused on how the CmAT responded to Mexico’s reports, often praising it on areas of progress (for example, efforts to train law enforcement on human rights protections) but making increasingly detailed recommendations for better implementation and compliance.⁹




Figure 4: Domestic Media Coverage of the Torture Convention Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Figure indicates the number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the CAT, the CmAT, or the in-person periodic review and/or the concluding observations and recommendations issued by the CmAT (Review/Recs). References are averaged over the number of CmAT reviews (CAT reports) undertaken by each country within its searchable time period. References are centered around the year of review (0). For Colombia and Mexico, the searchable period is 1995-present, and covered 3 CmAT reviews for each country. For Nicaragua, the searchable period is 2009-present, and covered 1 CmAT review. For Venezuela, the searchable period is 1998-present, and covered 3 CmAT reviews.

Given such intense interactions, it is not surprising that the Mexican press has mentioned

⁹In response to Mexico’s combined 5th and 6th report (2012), the CmAT appears to have made at least 56 separate recommendations.

the CmAT extensively over the years. Since 2005, when systematic electronic search became possible for the major Mexican papers, *El Universal*—Mexico’s moderate left paper—has published twenty-one articles that referenced the CAT in some way. Eleven of these referenced the CmAT, of which eight were specifically about the periodic review process or CmAT recommendations. Again, we see media coverage clustered in time around the CmAT’s list of recommendations.

Slightly to the political right and aimed more squarely at an elite business audience (though still decidedly independent and often critical of the government), *La Reforma* has published thirty-one articles referencing the CAT since 1995. Thirteen of these mentioned the CmAT, and eleven were specifically on the periodic review process or CmAT recommendations.¹⁰ Many were critical of the government’s submission or explicitly highlighted the differences between the government’s and ‘shadow’ reports submitted by civil society organizations.¹¹ *La Prensa*—with a wider circulation but with a reputation toward the more sensational—published fifteen articles referencing the CAT in some way since 2011, the first year for which systematic electronic search is possible. Fourteen of these articles reference the CmAT, all of which commented on the periodic review process and/or CmAT recommendations.

In Venezuela, media attention appears to have fallen off drastically after review years, but note that in this case twenty-five articles reported on the recent 2014 review (combining Venezuela’s third and fourth reports); thus, follow-on coverage is effectively right-censored. Moreover, Venezuela’s reporting has been spotty. Two years elapsed between its first and second reports, and then a dozen passed before Venezuela was heard from again. *El Universal* reported that the government had not complied with the recommendations of the CmAT in 1999, but it was the lone article we were able to find which noted the government’s delinquent

¹⁰ *La Reforma*, “Ve ONU en Mexico tortura sistematica,” 24 May 2003; “Espera Mexico dictamen del CAT,” 26 October 2012; “Priva impunidad en casos de tortura,” 3 November 2012; “Pide la ONU abolir arraigo,” 24 November 2012.

¹¹ *La Reforma*, “Denuncian que persiste la tortura en Mexico,” 28 April 1997.

reporting.¹² The CmAT and the periodic review process remained virtually invisible in the media until 2014, when the government's combined 3rd and 4th reports were under examination and some *twenty-five articles* covered the review. The pages of both *El Universal* (a somewhat conservative, business-oriented newspaper) and *El Nacional* (slightly more to the left) were saturated with news of the proceedings, reporting on claims and counter-claims. Since Venezuela had not undergone review in a dozen years, many articles were simply explanatory,¹³ but shadow reports, criticisms by the Church, and other critical voices were represented as well.¹⁴ Plenty of editorial comment thought that the government and police had a lot to answer for within the review process.¹⁵

Nicaragua appears to display a pattern opposite to Venezuela's. In this case we have a problem of left-censoring, since both of that country's major national newspapers, *El Nuevo Diario* and *La Prensa*, were only searchable from 2009, the year of Nicaragua's first and only CmAT review.¹⁶ Many of the articles that reference the CAT regime are highly critical; uncharacteristically, several of them link the CmAT with the view that Nicaragua's 2006 ban on abortions under all circumstances is in violation of its obligations under the CAT.¹⁷

Press reports in Colombia exhibit the pattern we would expect to observe if the reporting process matters to domestic audiences: a spike in the year of review, strong attention the following year, and then moderate sustained attention that exceeds pre-review levels thereafter. Colombia has submitted four reports to the CmAT, each one more overdue than the previous one, with their most recent submission in 2008. *El Tiempo* has a prolific history of publicizing the reporting and response process over the last twenty years. It has published

¹²*El Universal*, "Detener primero Averiguar después," 16 May 1999.

¹³*El Universal*, "Naciones Unidas evaluará al país por lucha contra tortura," 29 September 2014; "Presentarán casos de tortura y trato cruel ante comisión de la ONU," 3 November 2014.

¹⁴*El Universal*, "Gobierno y activistas debatirán sobre la tortura en la ONU," 6 November 2014; "Tortura ante la ONU," 9 November 2014.

¹⁵*El Nacional*, "Comité contra la Tortura exigió explicaciones sobre los colectivos," 7 November 2014; *Últimas Noticias*, "Comité de la ONU: Situación del sistema penitenciario venezolano es 'una tragedia'," 28 November 2014.

¹⁶Although Nicaragua was one of the first countries to sign the CAT in 1985, it did not complete the ratification process until July of 2005, with its first report due in 2006 and submitted in 2007.

¹⁷*El Nuevo Diario*, "Estado de Nicaragua violenta a las mujeres," 27 May 2009; "Plantón de mujeres en la CSJ," 29 May 2009.

eighteen articles on the CAT, fourteen of which made specific mention of CmAT recommendations for Columbia, criticizing the state in particular on out-of-control security forces,¹⁸ practices by the military that amount to torture,¹⁹ and the failing judicial system.²⁰ Other news sources were more difficult to search systematically, but there is still evidence they covered the periodic review process as well. When dialogue over Colombia's fifth report became quite drawn out between 2008 and 2012, references to the CAT became more common.

Several other states demonstrate similar patterns to those displayed in Figure 4. In Argentina, some fifteen articles in *La Nacion* (from 2004 to the present) and ten in *Clarín* (from 1997 to the present) referenced the CAT, twelve of which discussed the process of periodic review or the CmAT's specific torture recommendations. These are Argentina's two most important papers, well respected, and with significant circulation.²¹ The timing of these articles is consistent with the mobilizing power of review and dialogue: they are clustered in years just after Argentina's reports are discussed at the CmAT and approximately when recommendations were issued (1997/98, 2004/05, and 2010).

The Chilean press has also reported on the periodic review process, often mere days after Chile's reports were examined by the CmAT. In May 2009—two days after CmAT's review of Chile's report—*La Tercera* reported on an exchange between the International Federation of Human Rights and the government about Chile's compliance with international standards and obligations under the CAT.²² In 2010, CmAT recommendations that Chile reform its anti-terrorism law were noted in *El Mercurio*.²³ Paraguay turned in four reports over the years, but access to searchable news media coverage was not available until the CmAT

¹⁸ *El Tiempo*, "Combatir mas la tortura le pide naciones unidas a Colombia," 14 December 1995.

¹⁹ *El Tiempo*, "A la ONU le preocupan medidas del president," 28 November 2003.

²⁰ *El Tiempo*, "Debate por efecto de extradicion de ex jefes 'paras' a E.U. en ley de Justicia y Paz," 26 November 2009.

²¹ World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, World Press Trends, Country Report: Argentina (2010).

²² *La Tercera*, "Federación de DDHH acusa 'rebajas en exceso' de penas a crímenes de lesa humanidad en Chile," 7 May 2009; "Ministerio de Justicia refuta dichos de federación de DDHH sobre tortura en Chile," 7 May 2009.

²³ *El Mercurio*, "Relator de la ONU reitera llamado para reforma a Ley Antiterrorista," 25 September 2010.

discussed its fourth report in 2011. The media provided fairly significant coverage (nine articles) of this review, some predominantly praising the government’s policies and others notably more critical.²⁴ Overall, Paraguay’s fourth periodic report represents a case of dense media coverage concentrated right around the time of CmAT review and recommendations.

Countries with far less coverage of the CmAT review process included Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Brazil has generally been much less cooperative with the CmAT than other countries in the region, and Brazilian media has pretty much ignored the lone set of CmAT recommendations. Still, there have been indirect references in the press to the recommendation to ratify the Optional Protocol authorizing individual complaints,²⁵ as well as criticism of Brazil’s reporting delinquency.²⁶ Similarly, we found in Ecuador’s top two newspapers only seven articles within the past decade that mention the CAT and only four that specifically covered CmAT review and recommendations, despite the fact that systematic media searches were available for Ecuador’s last two reports.

Peru has had superficial but improving engagement with the CmAT over time. Peru’s reporting quality improved noticeably from the 1990s to the 2000s, although their reports tended to be a couple of years late, to the point that it became necessary to combine reports in 2012 in order to ‘catch up.’ We found only five references to the CmAT review process in the Peruvian press. Next door, Bolivia has turned in only two reports (the second was seven years late, but of higher quality than the first). Four media articles have mentioned the CmAT, one of which is highly critical of the fact that human rights were in retreat in Bolivia and used the CmAT recommendations to bolster demands for changes in the penal code.²⁷

This review of the media suggests that information and mobilization is one likely causal

²⁴For example, *La Nacion*, “Paraguay presentó Informe sobre derechos humanos,” 4 November 2011; *ABC Color*, “Valoran iniciativas a favor de los DD.HH.,” 6 November 2011.

²⁵*O Globo*, “Lula cria comitê para combater a tortura no Brasil,” 26 July 2006.

²⁶*Folha de Sao Paulo*, “Direitos Humanos: Lula assina decreto que cria comitê de combate à tortura,” 27 July 2006.

²⁷*El Deber*, “ONU pide a Bolivia tipificar delito de tortura conforme a ley internacional,” 31 May 2013; “Tóásó se queja en la CIDH y la ONU exige ley contra la tortura,” 1 June 2013; *El Deber*, “Aumentan torturas y abusos a manos de policias y militares,” 8 September 2014.

mechanism linking the reporting process to torture moderation. The press records for Latin America generally demonstrate the expected spike in reporting within local news media around the time the CmAT reviews government reports and issues its recommendations for improvement.²⁸ Interestingly, we found little publicity when reports were actually submitted. In many cases and indeed on average, newspapers have given the process of review and CmAT recommendations the kind of airing one would expect for the process to mobilize domestic pressures for change. While this is not proof of every step in the mobilization mechanism—a discussion we cannot pursue here—this evidence is consistent with the importance of dialogue in stimulating public discussions upon which such mobilization could plausibly develop.

VI Conclusion

Critiques of the reporting and review process undertaken by the human rights treaty bodies are far more common than rigorous assessments of their actual consequences. While we do not dispute that there are weaknesses in the reporting system, the evidence presented here contrasts strikingly with the bulk of the literature on state interactions with the expert treaty bodies. We have found evidence to suggest that dialogue between state representatives and international experts may indeed generate new ideas, advice, and *potentially* pressure for change in practice. The dialogue engendered through self-reporting may well have been important to making improvements on the ground that reduced the pervasiveness of torture in a number of countries (indeed, on average). Importantly, we found evidence that prompt and responsive interaction with the CmAT improves noticeably a country’s human rights record. As anyone would expect, the size of that improvement is not massive, but it is all the more believable for its modest size.

It is also important to stress what we did *not* find. We found evidence that interactive *histories* are important to such improvements; modeling one-shot effects provided much

²⁸We found little to no evidence of coverage of CmAT dialogue in some of the smaller states in Latin America, but had severe problems with electronic access to news databases. See Online Appendix for notes on Guyana, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

weaker evidence. Rather, the frequency and density of the reporting-and-dialogue process appear to be related to rights improvements. This is certainly far more realistic a finding than to expect last year's conversation with the experts to yield one-shot effects in the following year or so. We found that *iterative* and *interactive* histories are probably key: reporting *per se* does not produce the same results as a more intense back-and-forth between governments and the Committee appears to produce. Both reporting and review histories influence the probability of frequent torture, which suggests some potential for self-assessment and a greater role for constructive engagement in improving human rights practices around the world.

One reason for this finding may be that the review process gains a domestic audience through the national media. Far from finding that no one pays attention to this process outside the halls of Geneva, it turns out that in Latin America at least the review process literally piques (or peaks, as in Figures 3 and 4) the media's, and potentially the public's, interest. The national media in this region is replete with discussions and debates about what governments are telling the experts, how shadow reports shape the conversations, what the CmAT has asked, and how governments have responded. There is plenty of official excuse-making going on, but a surprising amount of government criticism as well. These patterns are consistent with a theory that treaties matter because discussing human rights engages interested domestic publics, who are in a better position, armed with legal rights and better information, to hold their governments accountable (Simmons 2009).

We hasten to add that the reporting regime is not a comprehensive solution to the world's worst human rights abuses. For one thing, we have only examined states that have ratified the CAT; even among the ratifiers it has proved impossible to coerce a meaningful conversation out of unwilling states. Perhaps picking up on this, the treaty bodies have initiated recently a procedure of reviewing delinquent states even in the absence of a report, which in some instances has prompted the government to show up for the in-person review. After all, constructive dialogue only has effects when it actually takes place. That said, the

results of this research suggest that the reporting and review system should be supported rather than disparaged. We agree with the critics who point out the problems of stretched resources and redundant processes. But a look at the evidence suggests that self-reporting has an important role to play in starting conversations that reverberate domestically and open possibilities for change. Given the lack of a central international authority dedicated to information production on a broad scale, these findings on self-reporting are of central significance for international governance.

The importance of these findings for international law and cooperation are profound. They suggest that systematic investigation into international information producing systems is highly warranted. Self-reporting has long been a staple of domestic regulatory governance, and abundant research has reported on both its promise and its limitations at the national level. It is crucial that scholars of international politics try to understand whether and how one of the main pillars for international regulation and cooperation—information dissemination and socialization processes initiated largely by self-reporting procedures—actually works.

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Online Appendix




Figure A1: Stabilized weights over the years by predicting (year of) CmAT Review (with Latent Human Rights Protection Score).

The black lines are the yearly means, the gray rectangles are the yearly inter-quartile ranges, and the thin gray lines denote the range of the weights. These weights appear well behaved as their means are close to 1.

Model includes as treatment-history variables: review in the previous year; number of previous CmAT reviews; years since last review. Model includes as time-varying covariates: logged GDP *per capita* and total population; Polity IV score; CIRI Torture score; regional reporting density (as percentage); core international human rights treaties ratified (as percentage); and a set of indicator variables capturing: existence of an NHRI; Article 22 declaration; membership within a regional human rights regime; never democratic (since WWII); stable democracy (since WWII); a democratic transition; and a political transition in a democratizing direction (+3 on the polity scale). All time-varying covariates lagged one year. Linear time trend included.

	Estimate	95% Bootstrapped CI
CmAT Review (year = t)	0.006	[-0.133, 0.182]
Number of Previous Reviews	0.179	[0.008, 0.388]
Years since Last Review	0.005	[-0.068, 0.043]
Reviewed in Previous Year	-0.087	[-0.287, 0.060]
Linear time trend	0.0003	[-0.031, 0.028]
Intercept	0.381	[-0.016, 0.815]

Table A1: Effect of CmAT Review and Review History on Latent Human Rights Protection Score. Linear regression point estimates reported. 95% confidence intervals obtained by using a cluster bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage weighting and MSM fitting procedure, clustering on country. We ran the bootstrap for 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution for the MSM parameter estimates. The dependent variable is Latent Human Rights Protection Scores, as described within Fariss (2014). All models include a linear time trend (years CAT regime in existence).

Additional Information: Latin America Media Coverage of Self-Reporting

We found little to no evidence of coverage of CmAT dialogue in some of the smaller states in Latin America. In Guyana, for example, domestic media could only be searched systematically from 2009. While a couple articles reference the CAT, none mention the reporting process. Guyana has turned in only one report, in 2006, which was reviewed the same year. Panama is similar: it submitted three reports over the course of the late 1980s and 1990s, but of low quality and Committee feedback was minimal (amounting to a paltry three recommendations over a decade). We were not able to retrieve any press articles on the CmAT process involving Panama, Costa Rica (submitted two reports), and El Salvador (two reports). Uruguay has turned in three reports since ratifying the CAT in 1988, but we could find only one article in the major media that mentioned the CmAT review process, noting criticism of the government and in particular identifying the NHRI as the source of some of the information mentioned within the critical Committee review.²⁹ Guatemala had a strong reporting record (a total of five separate reports) and plenty of compliance recommendations to digest (twenty-seven from the most recent review alone), but we could find only one article that mentioned the CmAT review process. That article covers Committee criticisms, but also evinces some government confusion about the process.³⁰ Honduras, however, has only turned in one report, but when it was discussed by the CmAT in 2009, the press coverage was significant: we found five references in three different publications touching on issues from violence in prisons to torture at the hands of the armed forces.³¹ Interestingly, one extensive and critical article identifies the CmAT review as a “constructive dialog” and states that

²⁹ *El Pais*, “INAU respaldará al Sirpa tras duro informe de ONU,” 25 May 2014. There are several articles on other aspects of UN monitoring and oversight in *El Pais*, but this is the only one specifically on the CmAT. See for example “Plan de Mujica viola convenios,” 12 August 2012; “Consejos al sistema uruguayo,” 19 June 2011; and “Consejos al sistema uruguayo,” 25 May 2010.

³⁰ *Siglo Veintiuno*, “Comité contra la Tortura revisa caso de Guatemala,” 6 May 2006.

³¹ *La Tribuna*, “ONU denuncia abusos en las detenciones preventivas en Honduras,” 6 May 2009; “Piden desengavetar la Ley Penitenciaria,” 6 June 2009; *El Herald*, “Los hondureños viven aterrorizados por violencia,” 6 May 2009.

failure to comply with the UN recommendations exposes Honduras to “moral sanction.”³²

³²*El Herald*, “ONU conoce de tratos inhumanos,” 14 May 2009.

Table A2: CAT Periodic Review in Latin America

Report Number	Date Due	Date Submitted	Date Examined	Quality Score	Responsiveness Score	Publications Searched
Argentina						
1	June 1988	Dec 1988	Nov 1989	2	n/a	0
2	June 1992	June 1992	Nov 1992	0	0	0
3	June 1996	Sep 1996	Nov 1997	3	0	1
4	June 2000	July 2002	Nov 2004	6	3	2
5 & 6	June 2008	Not submitted				2
Bolivia						
1	May 2000	May 2000	May 2001	1	n/a	0
2	May 2004	Oct 2011	May 2013	5	3	4
Brazil						
1	Oct 1990	May 2000	May 2001	6	n/a	2
2	Oct 1994	Not Submitted				2
Chile						
1	Oct 1989	Sep 1989	Nov 1989	1	n/a	0
2	Oct 1993	Feb 1994	Nov 1994	3	0	0
3 & 4	Oct 1997	Feb 2002	May 2004	3	0	0
5	Oct 2005	Feb 2007	May 2009	3	1	2
6	May 2013	Not submitted				
Colombia						
1	Jan 1989	April 1989	Nov 1989	2	n/a	0
2	Jan 1993	August 1995	Nov 1995	3	0	1
3	Jan 1997	Jan 2002	Nov 2003	6	0	1
4	Jan 2001	Not submitted				1
5	Jan 2005	Jan 2008	Nov 2009	6	2	2
Costa Rica						
1	Dec 1994	Aug 2000	May 2001	6	n/a	0
2	Dec 1998	May 2006	May 2008	5	0	1
3	June 2012	Not Submitted				1
Ecuador						
1	April 1989	June 1990	Nov 1990/1	0	n/a	0
2	April 1993	April 1993	Nov 1993	4	2	0
3	April 1997	June 2003	Nov 2005	6	3	2
4, 5, 6	April 2009	Aug 2009	Nov 2010	6	3	2
El Salvador						
1	July 1997	July 1999	May 2000	5	n/a	0
2	July 2001	July 2007	Nov 2009	5	0	1
3	Nov 2013	Not submitted				
Guatemala						
1	Feb 1991	Nov 1994	Nov 1995	3	n/a	0
2	Feb 1995	Feb 1997	May 1998	6	0	0
3	Feb 2000	Jan 2000	Nov 2000	6	3	0
4	Feb 2003	Dec 2003	May 2006	6	3	2
5 & 6	Feb 2011	Jan 2012	May 2013	5	3	3
Guyana						
1	June 1989	June 2006	Nov 2006	1	n/a	0
2	Dec 2008	Not submitted				2
Honduras						
1	Jan 1998	April 2008	May 2009	4	n/a	3
2	May 2013	Not submitted				
Mexico						
1	June 1988	Aug 1988	April 1989	0	n/a	0
2	June 1992	July 1992	Nov 1992	3	0	0
3	June 1996	June 1996	April 1997	3	0	1
4	June 2000	Dec 2004	Nov 2006	6	3	2
5 & 6	Dec 2010	April 2011	Nov 2012	6	3	3
Nicaragua						
1	Aug 2006	June 2007	April 2009	6	n/a	2
2	May 2013	Not submitted				2
Panama						
1	Sep 1988	Jan 1991	April 1991	0	n/a	0
2	Sep 1992	Sep 1992	April 1993	0	0	0
3	Sep 1996	May 1997	May 1998	0	0	0
4	Sep 2000	Not Submitted				
Paraguay						
1	April 1991	Jan 1993	Nov 1993	2	n/a	0
2	April 1995	July 1996	May 1997	3	0	0
3	April 1999	June 1999	May 2000	3	0	0
4, 5, 6	April 2011	Oct 2010	Nov 2011	6	0	3
Peru						
1	Aug 1988	Nov 1992	Nov 1994	0	n/a	0
2	Aug 1993	Jan 1997	May 1998	2	2	0
3	Aug 1997	Dec 1998	Nov 1999	3	0	0
4	Aug 2001	Nov 2004	May 2006	6	3	2
5 & 6	Aug 2009	July 2011	Nov 2012	6	1	3
Uruguay						
1	June 1988	June 1991	Nov 1991	1	n/a	0
2	June 1992	March 1996	Nov 1996	3	3	0
3	June 1996	Sep 2012	April 2014	6	0	0
Venezuela						
1	Aug 1992	July 1998	April 1999	5	n/a	1
2	Aug 2000	Sep 2000	Nov 2002	1	3	1
3 & 4	Aug 2004	Sep 2012	Nov 2014			3