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# Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America

EDITED BY

*Bernard E. Harcourt*

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## Chapter 10

## Should We Have Faith in the Churches?

### *The Ten-Point Coalition's Effect on Boston's Youth Violence*

*Jenny Berrien and Christopher Winship*

#### *Introduction*

During the 1990s, the number of homicides in Boston plummeted from 152 in 1990 to 31 in 1999. Perhaps even more impressive, for the twenty-nine-month period ending in January 1998, Boston had no teenage homicide victims. Homicide rates fell in other cities as well during the 1990s. For example, New York's homicide rate dropped from 30.7 per 100,000 to 8.7, a decline of 71.7 percent; Houston's rate dropped from 34.8 to 12.0, a decline of 65.5 percent; and Los Angeles's dropped from 28.2 to 14.8, a decline of 47.5 percent. Some cities, however, saw only minimal declines. For example, Phoenix's homicide rate fell from 13.0 to 11.7, a decline of 10.0 percent, and Baltimore's fell from 41.4 to 40.3, a drop of only 2.7 percent.<sup>1</sup> In most, if not all, of these cities, the reduction in homicide rates has been accompanied by even sharper declines in youth violence. Why has youth violence fallen so significantly in some cities but not in others?

Most likely, part of the decline in youth violence is due to the U.S. economy's strong performance in the mid- to late-1990s, as well as to a drop nationwide in the number of youths ages fifteen to twenty-four, the most crime-prone age group. But these factors are present in almost all cities and thus cannot explain the discrepancy. Additionally, similar declines in homicide rates did not occur in the mid- and late 1980s, when the U.S. economy was also strong. Further-

more, the drop in the number of youths ages fifteen to twenty-four—7.7 percent from 1986 to 1996—is simply too small to account for much of the improvement.<sup>2</sup>

The story of Boston's downward trend in violence is similar to that of other cities but is unusual in an important respect. Boston's distinction is that a group of ministers, the Ten-Point Coalition, is credited with playing a key role in reducing the city's homicide rate.<sup>3</sup> As far as we are aware, ministers have not been credited with major contributions to any other city's achievements in reducing the level of violence.

This essay addresses the question of whether the Ten-Point Coalition has in fact played an important role in the reduction of youth violence in Boston. At first glance, the answer appears to be no. Crime rates have dropped dramatically in other cities without significant involvement from clergy. Moreover, only three ministers with substantial additional commitments were centrally involved during the period when crime dropped most precipitously, suggesting that the total number of man-hours that the ministers have devoted to the cause is actually quite modest and not enough to account for the substantial observed changes. Finally, David Kennedy and his colleagues at the John F. Kennedy School of Government<sup>4</sup> at Harvard have documented how new police and probation policies and practices have led to more effective procedures for dealing with youth violence. The assertion that the Ten-Point Coalition has been fundamental to Boston's effort would seem at best to be good politics and public relations.<sup>5</sup>

*Our analysis has several goals.* First and most important, we show that, despite these observations, the Ten-Point Coalition has played an important role in reducing youth violence in Boston.

Second, we analyze why it has been difficult for police departments to effectively reduce violence. Racial conflict is a problem that must be considered when assessing violence reduction tactics in many cities. We argue, more generally, that any police action in the inner city is inherently problematic. The decision of whether to imprison a destructive youth is a tough choice: Either the community is left vulnerable to the youth's potentially violent tendencies or one of the community's own children loses his freedom. The lack of any intermediary institution in the inner city to ensure that such decisions are made in a fair and just way is enormously problematic. Reaching a consensus as to what constitutes legitimate and constructive police activity has been extremely challenging for many cities.

Our third goal is to suggest what types of policies are likely to be effective in reducing youth violence in the inner city *over the long run*. Although many cities have reduced youth violence successfully, the strategies utilized are often very aggressive, involving frisking and intimidating minority males. Our conjecture is that such strategies are not sustainable over the long term as inner-city residents conclude that the resulting sacrifice of civil liberties is simply too great.

Our argument has multiple parts. Our key assertion is that a principal barrier to reducing youth violence in the inner city over the long run is the hostile and highly confrontational relationship that exists in many cities between the police (and other agents of the judicial system) and the inner-city community. That relationship has made it nearly impossible to devise legitimate and effective long-term solutions to youth violence.

The second component of our argument is that many cities (including Boston in the past) pursue an approach that is likely to succeed in the short run but not over the long term. In some cases, inner-city residents become so frustrated by the high levels of violence in their neighborhood that they come to accept quite aggressive police tactics. Although such tactics may produce immediate results, eventually there is likely to be a community backlash. We examine the recent history of New York in this regard.

The third component of our argument is that the key contribution of the Ten-Point Coalition lies not so much in their work with at-risk youth as in how they have changed the ways in which Boston's law enforcement and inner-city communities relate to each other.<sup>6</sup> The coalition has done so by becoming an intermediary between the two parties. Ten-Point has achieved a balance between the community's desire for safe streets and its reluctance to see its children put in jail. In so doing, the coalition has created what we call an umbrella of legitimacy for police efforts to prevent and control crime. The coalition legitimizes police activities, first through a process of informal oversight and second by demonstrating its willingness to go to the press when police actions exceed the limits of tolerance. To avoid painting an overly rosy picture, we acknowledge that in Boston the relationship between the police and the community, especially its youth, is far from completely harmonious. Much of the transformation that has taken place has involved special units of the police department that are particularly sensitive to community needs and sentiments. The typical

beat cop, for the most part, appears not to have been part of this reformation. In some cases, street-level patrol officers continue to pursue the aggressive stop-and-frisk policies of the past. Only time will tell whether their behavior will change or whether it will instead undermine the legitimacy of the partnership that has been built between the police and the Ten-Point Coalition.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Boston Story*

Although Boston has never been considered a violence-plagued city to the extent that Los Angeles or New York has, in 1990 a record-breaking 152 homicides stunned Boston into realizing that it had a serious violence problem.<sup>8</sup> The roots of the problem took hold in the late 1980s when crack cocaine was introduced in Boston's inner city. As the crack market developed, so did turf-based gangs and gang violence. To protect their financial stakes in the booming crack-cocaine market, as well as to maintain "respect," gang members increasingly turned to firearms. A vicious cycle developed, in which individuals joined one gang to protect themselves from another gang. With firearms serving as the primary means of aggression, the level of violence grew to a rate and severity never before seen in the Boston area.

Because Boston law enforcement agencies had little experience with turf-based violence and criminal gang activity, their initial response to the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was disorganized. Until 1990, police department policy directed officers and administrators to publicly deny the existence of a gang problem. Many current Boston police officers have vouched for the fact that the department had no policy for combating gang violence in the late 1980s. Without an in-depth understanding of the problem or a plan of attack, police officers engaged in a fall-back to the aggressive, riot-oriented tactics of the 1960s. In addition, because homicide cases traditionally were handled on a case-by-case basis, the police department focused primarily on making the "big hit" and arresting the "big player," rather than addressing the uniquely group-based quality of gang violence.

In 1988, the City Wide Anti-Crime Unit (CWACU), traditionally responsible for providing support across district boundaries, was permanently assigned to the most violent neighborhoods of Boston's inner city. In 1989, the police department issued a statement that any

individual involved in a gang would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Thus, the department finally acknowledged the existence of a gang problem. But to what effect is another matter. According to one police captain, the CWACU was expected to "go in, kick butts, and crack heads" and adopted a mentality that "they could do anything to these kids" in order to put an end to their violence. This attitude resulted in highly aggressive and reportedly indiscriminate policing tactics.

### *Community Backlash*

Two events in 1989, the murder of Carol Stuart and the stop-and-frisk scandal, focused community attention on the police department's initial approach to the violence crisis. Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was murdered in the primarily African American neighborhood of Mission Hill. Her husband, Charles Stuart, who was with her at the time of her death, reported that a black male committed the crime. Relying on Stuart's account, the Boston police department "blanketed" the neighborhood searching for suspects. There were widespread reports of police abuse, as well as coerced statements that implicated a black male suspect, William Bennet. Stuart himself was later alleged to be the perpetrator of the crime, but he committed suicide before an investigation could be completed. The department's reliance on Stuart's dishonest claim and the overall mishandling of the murder investigation created an atmosphere, especially within the African American community, of extreme distrust of and disillusionment with the Boston police department.

The stop-and-frisk scandal intensified these sentiments. A precinct commander's description to the media of the department's approach to preventing gang-related violence as a "stop-and-frisk" campaign shocked the community and solidified the Boston public's suspicion of the police.<sup>9</sup> There is some dissension within the police department about the extent to which its policy was to indiscriminately stop and frisk all black males within high-crime areas, a practice known as "tipping kids upside down." According to several officers, they targeted individuals who either had been spotted previously performing some illegal activity or were known gang members. However, officers also acknowledged that, because it often was difficult to "distinguish the

good guys from the bad guys," the approach was critically flawed. In addition, current members of the police force agree that there were "bad seeds" in the police force who acted far too aggressively in certain cases. Accusations of stop-and-frisk tactics led to a court case in the fall of 1989 in which a judge threw out evidence acquired in what he considered an instance of unconstitutional search and seizure.<sup>10</sup>

The bad press surrounding the Stuart case and the stop-and-frisk scandal led to the disbandment of the CWACU in 1990. It should be noted, however, that Boston police had begun to see some rewards from their aggressive street policies as Boston's homicide counts fell from 103 in 1991 to 73 in 1992.<sup>11</sup> Despite the apparent short-term efficacy of these heavyhanded tactics, most officers acknowledged that the department's aggressive actions during this time brought community mistrust to an extreme level.

The Boston press began to question the police department's ability to manage even routine policing activity. In 1991, the *Boston Globe* published a harshly critical four-part series called "Bungling the Basics,"<sup>12</sup> which detailed a succession of police foul-ups during the previous few years. The series highlighted serious failings in the department's Internal Affairs Division. Misguided investigations, problematic policing, and bad press eventually led to the appointment of the St. Clair Commission to conduct a thorough review of the Boston police department and its policies.<sup>13</sup>

At this point, the Boston police department began a desperately needed image and structural overhaul to deal with the negative publicity. "Bad-seed" cops were weeded out. The disbanded CWACU was reorganized into a new unit, the Anti-Gang Violence Unit (AGVU), which embraced a "softer" approach. The aggressive and indiscriminate—though admittedly effective—street tactics of the past were sharply curtailed. Perhaps as a result, the decrease in homicides during 1991 and 1992 was followed by a sharp increase in murders to ninety-eight in 1993.<sup>14</sup>

The release of the St. Clair Commission's report in 1992 spurred further structural changes at the highest level. The report cited extensive corruption within the department and recommended major changes.<sup>15</sup> In 1993, Boston's Mayor Raymond Flynn resigned, and the New York Transit Police Department's Bill Bratton stepped in to replace the departing police commissioner, Mickey Roache.

*Innovation in Police Practices*

Bratton instilled a new philosophy and commitment to innovation to the Boston police department. Fundamental shifts occurred in overall operations. According to current police officers, the neighborhood policing tactics that formerly "just existed on paper" and had never been implemented under Roache were actively pursued under Bratton. Many officers also agreed that the new administration was simply more open-minded and willing to break away from embedded policing practices.

The newly organized AGVU looked for innovative ways to manage gang activity. The unit targeted areas where it had failed during the past few years. It realized that community support was vital and therefore strove to employ "squeaky-clean" policing strategies in order to win back the public's trust. Its appreciation of the need for collaboration inspired the AGVU to pursue an increasingly multi-agency approach to combat youth violence. In 1993, the AGVU underwent an administrative change, becoming the Youth Violence Strike Force but retaining the same key members.<sup>16</sup>

Other agencies within Boston's law enforcement network were also being revamped. Officers in the probation department became disillusioned by the "paper-shuffling" nature of their jobs. The dangerous levels of violence within certain Boston districts had driven probation officers to all but abandon their presence in the streets and visits to probationer homes. Consequently, the enforcement of curfew, area, and activity restrictions was entirely absent. Lacking enforcement, probation came to be regarded by the law enforcement community as a "slap on the wrist" that had little effect in the battle against youth violence.

In response to these frustrations, a few key individuals within Boston's probation and police departments collaborated to develop an experimental effort called "Operation Night Light." This effort began when three probation officers and two police officers ventured out in a patrol car on the night of November 12, 1992. During this first night, they encountered several youths who were violating the terms of their probation. As the Night Light team continued these "after-dark" enforcement tactics, youths quickly realized that they no longer could disregard the terms of their probation because their PO might, for example, show up at their house after curfew to check on them. Opera-

tion Night Light has since become an institutionalized practice of Boston law enforcement agencies and has been widely praised by policy experts and the media across the country.

Interagency collaboration to address the issue of youth violence has become standard practice in Boston. The participation of researchers (primarily David Kennedy and his associates at the Kennedy School of Government) also served a vital role in bringing about a fundamental overhaul of Boston's policing strategies. The Boston Gun Project, which began in 1995, was a three-year effort to address youth violence that brought together a wide range of agencies, including the police department; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the probation department; the Boston school police; the Suffolk County district attorney; and many others. The Boston Gun Project was innovative, not only because it involved collaboration but also because it used research-based information to address the problem of youth violence from a new angle. The Gun Project was able to attack the problem on the supply side by cracking down on dealers in illicit firearms and on the demand side by targeting 1,300 individuals who, although they represented less than 1 percent of their age group citywide, were identified by project research as responsible for at least 60 percent of the city's homicides.

In 1994, another collaborative effort to reduce gun violence, Operation Scrap Iron, was initiated to stem the illegal transport of firearms into Boston. Through targeted efforts, gun trafficking was essentially shut down within certain areas of the city. Other tactics, such as "area warrant sweeps," utilized an interagency team to target dangerous areas of the city with intense pressure. In some cases, police arrested all residents with outstanding warrants within particular housing projects. Multiagency teams of youth and street workers provided follow-up support to the remaining residents once the police presence subsided. As one police officer noted, these strategies made sure that "everyone was involved and brought something to the table. Everyone had a piece of the pie and, therefore, would get the benefits."<sup>17</sup> Even more impressive is that, according to this same police officer, not one civilian complaint was filed in response to the sweep tactic.

By mid-May 1996, the culmination of this collaborative work emerged with the implementation of Operation Cease-Fire. Cease-Fire fully institutionalized interagency collaboration among Boston's crime-fighting agencies. Additionally, Cease-Fire extended its collaboration

to involve key community members, primarily from faith-based organizations. Together, these groups worked to identify the gangs responsible for violence in specific hot spots around the city. Subsequently, the group executed a forceful intervention by implementing "zero-tolerance" enforcement within the specific targeted area and sending an explicit message to gang members themselves that violence would no longer be tolerated.

### *Community-Based Change*

Members of Boston's religious community were among the most vocal and publicized critics of the police department's earlier aggressive tactics. The Reverend Eugene Rivers, in particular, became a controversial media figure during those years because of his harsh criticism of both local law enforcement agencies and the city's black leaders. It is therefore quite remarkable that these religious leaders later emerged as active participants in such law enforcement initiatives as Operation Cease-Fire.

Boston's African American faith-based organizations did not begin working together until 1992. Until then, they had been following separate agendas, and their activities generally did not involve much street-oriented action to address youth violence within their community. Rivers did establish street outreach efforts to gang members and other community youth, but his repeated criticism of other clergy leaders made his effort a lone endeavor. A single tragic event, in May 1992, finally spurred collaborative action among Boston's African American clergy.<sup>18</sup> Violence broke out among gang members attending a funeral for a youth murdered in a drive-by shooting. The shootout and multiple stabbings in the Morning Star Baptist Church threw the service and the congregation into chaos.

The brazenness of the attack—within the sanctuary of a church—captured the attention of Boston's African American church community and incited it to action. Clergy realized that they could no longer hope to serve their community by remaining within the four walls of their church and ignoring the situation on the street. Instead, they needed to extend their concept of congregation to include youth and others in the surrounding troubled neighborhoods. The incident inspired the founding of the Ten-Point Coalition, a group of some forty

churches, with the Reverends Ray Hammond, Jeffrey Brown, and Eugene Rivers III as key leaders.<sup>19</sup> The coalition drew up and published the Ten-Point Proposal for Citywide Mobilization to Combat the Material and Spiritual Sources of Black-on-Black Violence as a call to churches to participate in the effort to address the violence crisis in their communities.<sup>20</sup>

The creation of the Ten-Point Coalition marked the official beginning of Boston's African American religious community's organized involvement in the youth-violence epidemic. This move represented a dramatic shift in the extent of local faith-based collaboration. In contrast, as late as 1992, relations between the African American community leaders and Boston's law enforcement agencies remained contentious. Rivers was constantly "in the face" of Boston law enforcement officials and had gained a reputation as a "cop basher" in police circles. In carrying out his mission to be a support for local youth, Rivers maintained a constant presence in the streets of Dorchester and interacted with the same kids that the AGVU kept an eye on. As an aggressive advocate for local youth, both in and out of the courts, Rivers had many confrontations with members of the police force. But this initial antagonism eventually subsided and was replaced with effective collaboration.<sup>21</sup> The combined effect of a few important events and the revamped police approach spurred this turnaround.

In 1991, Rivers's house in Four Corners, one of the most violent areas of Dorchester, was shot at in the first of two attacks. Though he and his family were not harmed, the incident made him painfully aware of the dangers of carrying out a solitary campaign against youth violence. From this point forward, Rivers increasingly sought allies in the religious and law enforcement communities.

In the past, the Ten-Point Coalition, and especially Rivers, had habitually and severely criticized the Boston police department. When the Ten-Point Coalition was formed in 1992, the public stature and the media influence of Reverend Rivers and other key clergy members such as Ray Hammond and Jeffrey Brown increased. Wielding its power effectively, Ten-Point partnered with another community-based organization, the Police Practices Coalition, to establish a community-based police-monitoring group. The number of positive interactions with law enforcement increased, convincing the clergy that the department was indeed interested in reform. To acknowledge the department's progress, the ministers instituted a Youth Community Award to publicly

honor "good cops." These improved interactions between the African American clergy and law enforcement led to important collaborative efforts, such as the previously described Operation Cease-Fire.

### *Current Relations*

The later part of the 1990s was a period of intensive cooperation between the police and the clergy involving a variety of joint efforts. A primary venue for this collaboration has been weekly meetings held at the Ella J. Baker House (the social-service arm of Rivers's Azusa Church.) These meetings bring together a wide array of agencies and community groups to share information and to brainstorm ways to address troubling developments within the community. Beyond these scheduled meetings, informal cooperation plays an important role in ensuring quick responses to tense situations and effective distribution of resources to problematic "hot spots" in the city. Some of the key issues that have been addressed are the burgeoning membership among Boston youth in national gangs such as the Bloods, Crips, and Folk; sexual harassment among youth traveling on the MBTA subway trains; and the eruption of violence among the city's Cape Verdean communities. Presentations in Boston's schools, home visits by police/clergy teams, and community meetings are just some of the tactics that have been developed and carried out by this collaborative team to address community concerns.

This type of collaboration has continued into the new century; however, the accompanying reduction in Boston's violence has not continued as expected. In 2000, the number of homicides in Boston rose to thirty-eight and in 2001 it exploded to sixty-eight, an increase of more than 100 percent since 1999. Although good evidence is not available, many of these homicides appear to be "hits" involving individuals recently released from prison. Whereas the shootings of the early and mid-1990s involved "hot-blooded" turf wars, with youth shooting at each other across streets, many of the homicides in 2001 involved "cold-blooded" executions, with many more occurring indoors and clearly involving individual targets.<sup>22</sup>

As one might expect, Boston is working hard to deal with its new violence problem. The clergy have called for a reinvigoration of their past collaboration with the police department.<sup>23</sup> The police depart-

ment has launched what it calls Boston Strategy II.<sup>24</sup> The department states that the key component of the new effort is "the collaboration and partnerships between the police, community, and clergy."<sup>25</sup> The new effort has three components: focused efforts on enforcement, intervention, and prevention. The enforcement effort involves warrant apprehension efforts, efforts to disrupt firearm trafficking, and gang and drug investigations. Intervention comprises prison reentry programs run jointly by police, clergy, and individuals from other agencies; revitalization of an earlier police/probation program, Operation Night Light; Operation Homefront, which involves visits to the home of high-risk individuals by teams of police and clergy; and revitalization of Operation Cease-Fire. As in the past, the current effort has involved forums where police and clergy meet with gang members and demand that they end their conflicts. In addition, it has involved major sweeps where members of one particular gang are arrested for drugs and guns, often on federal charges. Prevention efforts involve a host of new and existing programs, including youth service officers, summer jobs, a junior police academy, and summer camps.<sup>26</sup>

### *The Judicial System and the Inner City*

We now turn to the question of why police departments and judicial systems have been unable to deal with past or current youth violence in so many cities. Observers have pointed out that inner-city communities in America's major cities often consider themselves to be at war with the local police and local government, and they frequently compare the police to an occupying military force. The reasons for this perception are well known. While the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles is the most publicized incident of the past decade, almost every major city has its own stories of police brutality. In Boston, the most recent case occurred in January 1995. Michael Cox, a black undercover policeman, was brutally beaten by four uniformed policemen who mistook him for a suspect. In the previous year, police mistakenly broke into the home of Accelynne Williams, a retired black minister, during a drug bust. Williams died of a heart attack brought on by the forced entry. We have already discussed the Stuart case and the stop-and-frisk scandal, additional instances of allegations of racially biased and overly aggressive policing tactics.

As disturbing as such incidents are, the response of inner-city residents has at times been nearly as troubling. Although in most cities inner-city residents are disproportionately the victims of crime (crimes often committed by their fellow residents), they have become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with police or to support police activities. In *Race, Crime, and the Law*, Randall Kennedy describes the growing alienation of black inner-city residents from the criminal justice system. He describes how the black criminal has been glorified in the movies and through gangster rap and records such as "Cop Killer." His point is that excesses of the criminal justice system, both past and present, have led inner-city minorities to see the system as totally lacking legitimacy and, at the extreme, to treat criminals as political dissidents and martyrs.<sup>27</sup>

If Randall Kennedy's portrayal of minority attitudes toward police and the judicial system is even moderately accurate, as we believe it is, it should not be surprising that police have found it difficult to deal with youth violence in our inner cities. When police expect no cooperation from residents, they tend to choose aggressive broad-based tactics that only further alienate community residents. Moreover, the negative publicity they receive undermines their political support. By alienating inner-city residents, the police also lose their best potential source of community surveillance.

Randall Kennedy contends that, although considerable improvements are needed in our justice system, much progress has been made. Certainly, the tense and often dangerous conditions that the police have to work in make it difficult for them to handle potentially explosive situations in a sensitive manner. We would like to suggest an additional reason. Inner-city residents have conflicting goals. On the one hand, they, like all Americans, want safe neighborhoods. On the other hand, they do not like seeing young men from their communities put in jail. As Glenn Loury has noted, "the young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto are still 'our youngsters' in the eyes of many of the decent poor and working-class black people who are often their victims."<sup>28</sup> Given those conflicting desires, making decisions about whether a particular youth should be arrested or jailed is difficult. Allow him to remain in the community and perhaps endanger other neighborhood residents? Or send him to jail, depriving him of his freedom and removing yet another young man from the com-

munity? Neither option is appealing. Parents, neighbors, and other residents are likely to disagree sharply, and a decision-making process that would be widely perceived as fair may be unattainable.

Most inner cities simply do not have institutions that are capable of dealing with these questions in a way that would be perceived as just by both residents and society at large. The police, in addition to their history of racism, are biased in favor of safe streets by any means necessary. Social workers, street workers, and community organizers typically are sympathetic to the kids. Residents themselves are likely to differ depending on who is in trouble and their relationship to the suspect.

We argue that, in Boston, the ministers of the Ten-Point Coalition have become an intermediary institution through which decisions can be made that are perceived as fair. Through their advocacy of at-risk youth and their interventions in potentially inflammatory situations, the Ten-Point ministers have gained the legitimacy needed to convince residents that they will protect the interests of the community. They have created what we term an umbrella of legitimacy for police to work under. The police are sheltered from broad public criticism while engaged in certain activities that are deemed by the ministers to be in the interest of the community and its youth. However, indiscriminate or abusive police tactics that are deemed outside the umbrella are publicly attacked.

#### *The "Heavy-Handed Approach": New York*

New York City has perhaps received more media attention than any other city for its accomplishments in reducing violent crime. Like Boston, New York has substantially reduced its annual number of homicides (from 2,245 in 1990 to 664 in 1999, a decline of more than 70 percent). Unlike Boston, however, clergy have not played a central role in New York's violence reduction efforts. How, then, can we explain New York's success? A fully adequate answer to this question would require a study at least as extensive as the one that we have completed of Boston. However, from newspaper accounts and other secondary sources, it is possible to construct a plausible, though not a tested, answer.



As the history of Boston in the early 1990s has shown, aggressive police tactics can lead to substantial reductions in crime. But, in Boston, community criticism eventually caused the department to abandon these tactics. We believe that the recent New York story in important ways parallels the earlier Boston history.<sup>29</sup> Using aggressive tactics, New York is seeing great reductions in its level of violence. The question is whether these policies are sustainable over the long run.

Crime reduction emerged as a central issue on the agenda of New York's former mayor, Rudy Giuliani. His campaign to crack down on "quality-of-life" violations, coupled with sustained attacks on violence and the drug market, gained national attention. Significant increases in money and manpower facilitated the implementation of various labor-intensive strategies to reduce violence. Some notable examples of such approaches have been the successful and innovative uses of computers to target and attack hot crime spots, as well as a "model block" program that focuses intense attention on a particular city block until crime is shut down in the defined area.

In the model block program, the police first implement an "all-out drug sweep," then create "checkpoints at both ends of the street, post officers there around the clock, paint over graffiti and help residents organize tenant groups and a block association."<sup>30</sup> Between two and eight police officers patrol the block twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for the two months following the initial occupation of the block. Once it is determined by police officials that drug activity is sufficiently suppressed and formal community organizations are solidified, "model block" status is achieved, meaning that crime has been sufficiently shut down in that particular block.<sup>31</sup>

For some people, the extreme nature of this type of strategy is justified by its demonstrated success. A *New York Times* article reported the achievements of the model block strategy in Washington Heights, a 250-block area that became the "nation's largest wholesale drug market" with the introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s.

Four "model blocks" have been created within this neighborhood. And slowly, the fear has begun to lift on 163rd Street. People who for years would only leave their apartments in a hurry have begun to step outside merely to be outside—first by peering out of a doorway, then by taking a seat on a stoop, then finally taking the plunge by striking up a conversation with a stranger next door.<sup>32</sup>

For some community residents, the relief of escaping self-imprisonment and fear justifies any means necessary to achieve it. This form of community response, as well as the positive shift in homicide statistics, speaks well for New York's tough strategy.

These aggressive policing strategies are often credited with bringing about the dramatic drop exhibited in New York's homicide statistics. "New York has enjoyed a significant drop in crime that can't be easily explained by sociological factors," said Mark H. Moore, a criminologist at Harvard University. "Therefore, the claim that this might be the result of police activity looks pretty good."<sup>33</sup> However, the tactics are often controversial: "The frisking of low-level offenders has been sharply criticized by some civil libertarians and is one reason for a two-year jump in abuse complaints."<sup>34</sup>

Public gratitude for the city's crackdown on crime appears to be counterbalanced by anxiety about the high level of police presence in their neighborhoods. The familiar, routine presence of drugs and gangs is sometimes viewed as the lesser of two evils when compared to the oppressive and aggressive actions of the police. "Many more (African American individuals) would associate themselves with demands for law and order if they did not fear racially prejudiced misconduct by law enforcement officials."<sup>35</sup>

New York's crime rate successes do not appear to have led to improved relations between the inner-city community and the police. According to the *New York Times* report on model blocks in Washington Heights cited earlier,

Wary of one another, people hardly put their faith in the police. Tensions between the two have been worse in Washington Heights than anywhere else in the city, from the full fledged riots that followed a police officer's fatal shooting of an unarmed man in 1992, to the April 1997 death of Kevin Cedeno, shot in the back by an officer who was named "cop of the month" by his colleagues soon after. "At least the drug dealers are not here to hurt you—they're here to make a profit," said Yvonne Stennett, who heads the Community League of West 159th Street . . . increasingly aggressive police tactics have convinced many law-abiding residents that officers see them as criminal suspects first.<sup>36</sup>

African American community leaders throughout the city have echoed these complaints.

In May 1998, the Reverend Calvin O. Butts III, a prominent Baptist minister from Harlem, went so far as to call Mayor Giuliani a "racist who is on the verge of creating a fascist state in New York City."<sup>37</sup> Butt's harsh criticism was reportedly "something bubbling up" for a long time but was triggered by the city's layoff of six hundred workers from Harlem Hospital.<sup>38</sup> Leaders in the black community viewed this move as just another action reflecting the city government's unfair targeting of poor minority communities. Although some of the city's black leaders did not condone Butts's labeling of the mayor as a racist, they often echoed his complaints regarding Giuliani's treatment of the black community. Several prominent blacks have used confrontational language to criticize policies they asserted were harmful to their community; both Al Sharpton and David N. Dinkins, the former mayor, said that they have been leveling essentially the same charges against the Giuliani administration for years.<sup>39</sup> Community outcry against tactics has been fueled by well-publicized cases of alleged and in many cases proven police brutality and corruption.

In 1997, a now infamous group of police officers in the New York Thirtieth Precinct, in Harlem, known as "Nannery's Raiders" in honor of their sergeant, was indicted for an extreme example of corruption: breaking into apartments to steal cash and drugs, which they either used or sold.<sup>40</sup> Also in 1997, four New York police officers were accused of beating and abusing Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, because he was black; they reportedly used racial epithets during the incident.<sup>41</sup> September 1998's "Million Youth March" also brought claims of discriminatory and abusive policing tactics:

Reacting to the violent end to the otherwise peaceful Million Youth March, community leaders, Harlem residents and other New Yorkers yesterday blamed Mayor Rudolph Giuliani for the melee, some accusing him of creating a military siege that might have caused a bloodbath except for the attendees restraint. "The heroes were the people of Harlem. If they hadn't been as restrained and acted with such courage and dignity, there would have been a carnage," said author Cornell West. "They were dealing with a whole process of contempt and disrespect from the Giuliani administration, mediated through the police. . . ." Panelists agreed that it was the police, not march organizer Khallid Abdul Muhammad, who touched off the fracas that broke out around 4 P.M., when the rally was scheduled to end. Police in heli-

copters buzzed the crowd and officers in riot gear mounted the stage at precisely 4 P.M., the hour which a court order had set for the rally to end.<sup>42</sup>

The response to these incidents indicates great skepticism by some regarding current policing tactics in New York City. Former Mayor Giuliani remains a staunch supporter of his police department. However, the increasingly expressed sentiment that the city's impressive crime drop does not justify the accompanying loss in civil liberties may eventually force the city's administration to reevaluate its position. The maintenance of current NYPD strategies over the long term may well become impossible.<sup>43</sup>

### *An Umbrella of Legitimacy*

The relationship between the Boston police and the Ten-Point Coalition has progressed from hostility to stable cooperation.<sup>44</sup> The thesis of this essay is that the cooperative relationship established between the Boston police and the coalition has been instrumental in reducing the level of youth violence in two significant ways. Most important, Ten-Point has given increased legitimacy to appropriate police activities within the inner city. Second, the coalition's community surveillance may have increased police effectiveness.

If one were in search of legitimacy, there could perhaps be no better source than through partnership with clergy representatives. Throughout society, ministers have unique moral standing. They are expected to be fair and to protect the interests of the less fortunate; because of that, they often are asked to be problem solvers and to adjudicate between conflicting parties. In the inner city, the churches are among the last formal institutions committed to the welfare of their neighborhoods, and, within the black community, ministers often have been looked to for leadership. In the case of the Ten-Point Coalition, two of the three core ministers live in Boston's inner city, and all three are well known for their extensive work with inner-city youth, factors that give the coalition considerable credibility in speaking for Boston's inner-city community. That is not to say that Ten-Point is universally viewed as the legitimate representative of the black community in Boston. There have been many conflicts between Ten-Point, particularly Reverend Rivers.

Nevertheless, the *Boston Globe* has printed numerous stories praising the coalition, which also has received considerable symbolic and financial support from Cardinal Bernard Law, head of the archdiocese of Boston, and from the Jewish Community Relations Council, the agency principally concerned with social justice issues within Boston's Jewish Federation. All of this has contributed significantly to Ten-Point's perceived legitimacy within Greater Boston.

The new relationship between the police and Ten-Point is built on a number of assumptions, each of which can support legitimate police activity. We discuss five: youth violence needs to be dealt with as a criminal problem; some kids need to be jailed for both their own good and for the good of the community; a small number of youth constitute most of the problem, and the ministers will work with the police in identifying them; the ministers will participate in the decisions about what happens to specific individuals; and, if the police use indiscriminate and abusive methods in dealing with youths, the ministers will take the story to the media.

The first assumption is that, although poverty, single-parent households, poor schools, and other conditions may be factors in youth violence, any effort to reduce violence in the short run must treat it as a criminal problem. In the talks that ministers routinely give in schools and other locations, they make it clear to the kids that they have two choices. If they go straight, the ministers will help them succeed in school, find jobs, and deal with those kids who are trying to pressure them to stay with the gang. However, if they decide to participate in gang activities, the ministers will do their utmost to see them put in jail. The ministers emphasize that the last thing they want to do is to preside over a kid's funeral—that if a kid is going to be involved in a gang, it is safer for him to be in jail than on the street.

Implicit in the "choice" that the ministers offer is a second assumption—that some kids are so out of control that they should be put in jail. It is not apparent that the ministers held that belief initially, and the police doubted the ministers' willingness to support the incarceration of some individuals. Interview after interview with both police and ministers indicates that cooperation became possible only after the ministers publicly acknowledged (Reverend Rivers most vocally) that some kids needed to be put in jail. There was no explicit agreement about what constituted a sufficiently "out-of-control" kid. Cooperation between law enforcement officers and the ministers emerged

through negotiations over the particular circumstances under which certain kids should be committed. With improved communication and the acknowledgment of a common objective, both parties began working with the same definition of the problem. The primary issue that remained was what should be done in particular circumstances.

A third assumption is that only a small number of youths are responsible for most of the violence. As noted, David Kennedy placed the estimate at 1 percent of the youths' age group—1,300 youths.<sup>45</sup> That is why standard stop-and-frisk procedures can be so oppressive: for every hundred kids stopped, only one is truly part of the problem. It takes only a few kids shooting off guns to terrorize a whole neighborhood. A part of the agreement is that the ministers will work with the police to identify those kids who truly are problems, thereby informally providing remote surveillance for the police.<sup>46</sup> The information they provide makes police efforts more effective; targeting also increases police legitimacy by ensuring that the police focus on the right youth, employing appropriate measures.

The fourth assumption is that the ministers will work with the police in identifying problem youth. This is not a matter of ascertaining who are the most dangerous individuals. Generally, these individuals are known to the police, the ministers, and the community at large. Rather, it is a process of ongoing assessment as to which youths have the potential to get into serious trouble in the future. This work is done in both formal meetings and informal conversations, as each party attempts to understand and evaluate the youth it is working with. Through these conversations, the police and the ministers come to a shared understanding of the youth that then forms a basis for deciding on when and for whom interventions will occur.

A fifth assumption is that the ministers will participate in determining how particular individuals are treated by the legal system. In some circumstances, that means that the ministers will contact the police and ask to have certain kids arrested; the ministers may also help the police locate them. In some cases, the ministers will encourage judges to sentence troubled youths to alternative programs or to regular "check-ins" at their churches, rather than to time in jail; in others, the ministers will appear in court to argue for a stiff sentence.

These understandings between police and the ministers constitute what we term an umbrella of legitimacy for police activity. However, it is an umbrella that provides coverage only under specific conditions:

when police focus on truly problematic youth; when they deal with these youth in what is perceived as a fair and just way; and when these steps are taken in cooperation with the community through the ministers.

Activities that fall outside these boundaries will be publicly criticized in the media, which is the fifth assumption. The ministers' past criticism of the police in the *Globe* is well remembered. Furthermore, Reverend Rivers, the most outspoken of the ministers, is known for his willingness to criticize anyone, whether the police, the Urban League, or Harvard's Department of Afro-American Studies. The ministers are able to provide informal oversight of police actions in part because they are ministers, in part because they are community members and leaders, and in part because they have exhibited a willingness in the past to be highly critical of the police.

How are we to understand the Ten-Point Coalition's role within the inner city? Operating on the basis of these five assumptions, the coalition has created an umbrella of legitimacy for appropriate police activity. Activities carried out and decisions made under this umbrella are broadly seen by the community as being fair and just; those falling outside are brought to the attention of the media. Some youth have been sent to prison; others have been given second chances; and the vast majority are no longer being harassed on the street, or at least not as much as in the past. Because of the Ten-Point Coalition's involvement, the differential treatment of individual youth is more likely to be seen by the community as legitimate. Hard decisions are being made, but they are being made in a manner that is commonly viewed as fair and just.<sup>47</sup>

### Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that over the long run it is difficult if not impossible for police activity in the inner city to be successful unless it is viewed as legitimate and supported by local residents. Our argument goes further. Vigorous law enforcement initiatives and preventive tactics all play important roles in preventing and reducing youth violence.<sup>48</sup> We have argued also that police work dealing with youth violence is inherently problematic. Communities want safe streets, but they also want their kids to stay out of jail. Difficult choices

need to be made that are likely to be seen as unjust by some residents. In this environment, it is difficult to establish legitimacy for police actions, no matter what those actions are.

We claim that, in Boston, the Ten-Point Coalition has evolved into an institution that has at least partially ameliorated this dilemma. By supporting police activity that it believes to be beneficial to the community and criticizing activities that are not, it has created an umbrella of legitimacy for the police to work under. That in turn has allowed the police to effectively deal with youth violence by pursuing a strategy that targets the truly dangerous youth. We contend that this situation, which is far different from that in most major cities, has contributed significantly to the spectacular drop in homicide rates observed in Boston.

If our analysis is correct, it suggests that police need to create a strong community of partners who engage in a cooperative effort to deal with youth violence; there also must be a delineation of what constitutes legitimate police behavior. Police strategies can acquire true legitimacy within the inner city only if the community partner supports police tactics when they are appropriate, as well as publicly criticizes activities that are not. In this role, churches and ministers are ideal partners.

The goal of our research was to establish the plausibility of the claim that the Ten-Point Coalition made a critical contribution to the dramatic reduction in homicides exhibited in Boston during the 1990s. We have argued that the coalition's primary contribution to Boston's success most likely has not been a result of its street ministry, that is, its attempt to turn kids around through one-on-one counseling, but rather stems from its role in both controlling and legitimizing police activity.

While we believe that our research has established the plausibility of the Ten-Point Coalition's importance, interesting questions remain. More research is needed to uncover what facets of the ministers' work have been most important. Furthermore, we do not know exactly how the three core ministers have come to obtain the power and standing they enjoy in the Boston community. If their charisma has been the critical factor, it may be difficult to replicate the Ten-Point program in other cities. More generally, there is the question of why homicide rates and rate declines have varied among cities. Until we have a good understanding of what initiatives and factors have been important

overall in reducing homicide rates in Boston and elsewhere, it will be impossible to determine precisely the full extent of the coalition's contribution in Boston.

As the Ten-Point Coalition reaches its first decade, it does so against the backdrop of a rise in the number of adult homicides and juvenile homicides in Boston in 2001—to sixty-four and four, respectively—although the numbers are still below the 1992 levels.<sup>49</sup> The coalition remains a vigorous presence in Boston. As Reverends Hammond and Roberts have observed, "in the past year alone member churches and staff of the Boston Ten Point Coalition have made more than 200 visits to the homes of high-risk youths, made presentations to more than 3,000 young people in the Boston public schools . . . worked with more than 500 high-risk youths in Department of Youth Services facilities, walked the streets (especially after several homicides), participated in crisis response teams at the funerals of several victims, and begun the mentoring and reintegration of some 20 recently released ex-offenders."<sup>50</sup> On behalf of a maturing coalition looking to the future, Reverend Rivers has warned of the need for a retooled grassroots effort with greater police involvement.<sup>51</sup> The coalition has also cautioned that the present decade poses challenges different from those of the 1990s and that there will be a need for new initiatives that target an older, ex-offender population, as well as continuing interventions for high-risk youths.

The possibility that Boston has found an effective strategy for reducing youth violence without severely and broadly compromising the civil liberties of its inner-city residents is exciting. But only the future can tell whether our interpretation of the Boston story is correct. Proof or disproof of our assertions will emerge as Boston's partnership-based strategy is put to the test across the nation and produces or fails to produce substantial long-term reductions in youth homicide rates.

#### NOTES

Portions of this essay are adapted, with permission, from Jenny Berrien and Christopher Winship, "An Umbrella of Legitimacy: Boston's Police Department—Ten-Point Coalition," in Gary S. Katzmann, ed., *Securing Our Children's Future: New Approaches to Juvenile Justice and Youth Violence*, ch. 7 (Washington,

D.C.: Brookings/Governance, 2002). The research in this essay was supported by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. Kathy Newman provided us with extensive comments. Mary Jo Bane, Jim Quane, Gwen Dordick, John Dilulio, and David Kennedy made many useful suggestions, as did anonymous reviewers. Participants in colloquia at University of Illinois-Chicago, Northwestern University, and the Center for the Study of Public Values at Harvard University, as well as at the May 1998 Public-Private Ventures' Philadelphia-Boston conference provided constructive criticisms. Lynne Farnum and Suzanne Washington provided valuable editorial assistance. Of course, any mistakes are solely our responsibility.

1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1990–1999.
2. Many cities in which there have been declines have implemented community policing programs. These efforts typically try to be proactive rather than reactive in dealing with crime. Future research is needed to determine how important these new efforts might be in explaining differences across cities in the drop of homicide rates.
3. Charles Radin, "Reaching Up against Crime," *Boston Globe*, February 19, 1997, at A1.
4. David Kennedy, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31 (spring 1997): 449; David Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga, "Kids, Guns, and Public Policy," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59 (winter 1996): 147; David Kennedy, "The (Un)known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston," working paper, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1996. Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, and Anne M. Piehl, "Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 38:3 (2001): 195–225; and Boston Police Department, *Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing: Citywide Strategic Plan*, July 1996.
5. The most significant publicity that the Ten-Point Coalition has received was in *Newsweek*. In the June 1998 issue, the Coalition's work is the feature story and the Reverend Eugene Rivers's picture is on the front cover. The Ten-Point Coalition has also been the focus of a PBS documentary and of articles in *Time* (July 21, 1997 v. 150 n. 3), *Sojourners Magazine*, *Impact*, the *Weekly Standard*, and several national newspapers such as the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, the *New York Times*, and, frequently, the *Boston Globe*.
6. Other Boston ministers, such as the Reverends Bruce Wall and Michael Haynes, fellow members of the Boston Ten-Point Coalition, also have engaged in intensive street ministry during the past decade. However, as we discuss later, Reverends Rivers, Hammond, and Brown have been the key actors in

establishing a partnership with the police and in publicly establishing the legitimacy of their activities. As in other cities, there are many other groups in Boston involved in working with at-risk youth. Prominent examples are the Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Violence Prevention Program. Although these programs have almost certainly contributed to the dramatic reductions in crime we have seen in Boston, we believe that their direct impact on the overall homicide rate through one-on-one counseling of street youth, like that of the three Ten-Point ministers, has been modest.

7. Interview with public defender.

8. The information in this section is derived primarily from interviews conducted by the authors during the fall of 1997 with members of the Boston Police Department, Boston Probation Department, employees of the city's street worker program, and David Kennedy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's *Uniform Crime Reports* state that 143 homicides were committed in Boston in 1990; however, current Boston police statistics and current police officers report 152 homicides for that record-breaking year.

9. Interview with public defender.

10. "Events Leading to St. Clair Report," *Boston Globe*, January 15, 1992, at 23.

11. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1991-1992.

12. "Events Leading to St. Clair Report," 23.

13. *Ibid.*

14. The question of timing and causality here is complex. The most aggressive period of stop-and-frisk tactics ended in 1990; yet the homicide rate continued to fall in 1991 and 1992. If one believes that the causal connection is contemporaneous, then this is evidence of lack of a causal effect. However, if the causal effect of police enforcement is lagged, then this is evidence for a causal effect.

15. James D. St. Clair, *Report of the Boston Police Department Review Committee*, January 14, 1992.

16. David Kennedy, conversation, October 1997.

17. Kennedy, "Pulling Levers," 449.

18. Jenny Berrien, "The Boston Miracle: The Emergence of New Institutional Structures in the Absence of Rational Planning," senior thesis, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, March 20, 1998.

19. Robert A. Jordan and *Globe* staff, "Clergy's Anger Can Bring Hope," *Boston Globe*, May 16, 1992.

20. These pastors serve different types of congregations and have very personal styles. Reverend Rivers is the pastor of the Azusa Christian Community, which has a congregation of around forty members who live mostly within the Four Corners neighborhood of Dorchester. He is sometimes accused of running a storefront church because of the surprisingly small congregation.

Rivers also tends to be the most politically outspoken and controversial of the three ministers. Reverend Hammond oversees the Bethel AME church in Dorchester, a much more populous church that attracts people from a variety of neighborhoods. He is described as less controversial than Rivers but equally strong in his convictions and drive for social change. Jeffrey Brown is the pastor at the Union Baptist Church in Cambridge. Brown's congregation has several hundred congregants, but, like Rivers, he remains very active in street-based outreach.

21. Jordan, "Clergy's Anger Can Bring Hope," 13. See Berrien and Winship, "An Umbrella of Legitimacy," for a complete description of The Ten-Point Plan to Mobilize the Churches.

22. See Berrien, "The Boston Miracle," and Berrien and Winship, "An Umbrella of Legitimacy," for more detail.

23. Ray Hammond and Wesley Roberts, "Renewing Efforts against Violence," *Boston Globe*, February 19, 2002, at A11.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. Randall Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law* (Pantheon, 1997), 24-25.

28. *Ibid.*, 19.

29. Currently, Giuliani continues to have tremendous citywide support. We, therefore, may need to temper our argument to recognize his continued political popularity.

30. David Halbfinger, "Where Fear Lingers: A Special Report; A Neighborhood Gives Peace a Wary Look," *New York Times*, May 18, 1998, A1.

31. A much more in-depth discussion of New York City's Model Block program is available in "Community Policing without Communities: The New York Police Department's Citywide Model Block Program," a thesis by Katherine Anne Wagner-McCoy for the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies, Harvard College, March 1999. Christopher Winship was the adviser.

32. Halbfinger, "Where Fear Lingers."

33. Clifford Krauss, "New York's Violent Crime Rate Drops to Lows of Early 1970s," *New York Times*, December 31, 1995, section 1, at 1.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law*.

36. Halbfinger, "Where Fear Lingers."

37. Dan Barry, "Butts, Harlem's Prominent Pastor, Calls Giuliani a Racist," *New York Times*, May 21, 1998, at B1.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. Barbara Ross, "Dirty 30 Sergeant Gives Prison Term," (New York) *Daily News*, June 17, 1997, at 10.

41. Associated Press, "Protesters Rage/Demand Feds Probe Police Brutality," (New York) *Newsday*, September 13, 1997.

42. Merle English, "Leaders Fault Mayor for Melee," (New York) *Newsday*, September 7, 1998, at A3.

43. After this essay was completed, the Amadou Diallo killing occurred in New York. Diallo, a black immigrant street vendor, was shot forty-one times in the entryway to his apartment building by four policeman. He was unarmed at the time. His shooting resulted in months of public protests over the aggressiveness of New York Police Department's tactics.

44. See Berrien, "The Boston Miracle," for a detailed exposition.

45. David Kennedy, conversation, October 1997.

46. Some have been concerned that the ministers' role in identifying troublesome youth may allot them too much power, which is a legitimate fear. However, the Ten-Point Coalition's own standing in Boston is quite fragile; it has its enemies and vocal critics. As a result, it would be difficult for the ministers to abuse their power without consequences. Moreover, the remote surveillance function, while important in terms of utilizing the coalition's presence in the community and providing a channel of communication to law enforcement, is also limited. The coalition does not have prior review power over the routine arrest and enforcement activities of the Boston Police Department.

47. An important piece of research that has not been carried out is to interview a broad section of community residents to see whether the activities and decisions that are made collaboratively by the police and the coalition are seen as just and fair. At this point, our claim is based only on the fact that there has not been any public outcry over these activities in the *Boston Globe* or *Boston Herald* or in the local African American newspaper, the *Bay State Banner*. Jenny Berrien and Christopher Winship, "Lessons Learned from Boston's Police Community Collaboration," *Federal Probation* 63 (1999): 25-32.

48. Boston Police Department Statistics. See Corbett, chapter 6.

49. Hammond and Roberts, "Renewing Efforts against Violence." Reverend Roberts is the president of the Black Ministerial Alliance.

50. Douglas Belkin, "Rivers Seeks New Vigor for Coalition," *Boston Globe* January 11, 2002, at B2.

51. See Berrien and Winship, "Lessons Learned."