

Debmalya MANDAL

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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Computational Social Choice, Crowdsourcing, Peer Prediction, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Multiagent Systems.

EDUCATION

- Aug 2014 - Present PhD in COMPUTER SCIENCE
John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Advisor: Prof. David C. Parkes
GPA: 3.9/4.0 [| Courses](#)
- Aug 2011 - Jul 2013 Master of Engineering
Dept. of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India
Thesis: "Allocation Rules for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions"
Advisor: Prof. Y. Narahari
GPA: 7.6/8.0 (First Class with Distinction) [| Courses](#)
- Jul 2007 - Jun 2011 Bachelor of Engineering
Dept. of Computer Science and Technology
Bengal Engineering and Science University, Shibpur, India
GPA: 89% (First Class with Honors)

WORK EXPERIENCE

- Aug 2013 - Jun 2014 Project Associate at
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India
Worked on designing algorithms for crowdsourcing

TEACHING

- Spring 2016 Teaching Fellow for ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION (CS 136)
Harvard University
- Spring 2013 Teaching Assistant for GAME THEORY AND MECHANISM DESIGN (E1 254)
Indian Institute of Science

PUBLICATIONS

- Debmalya Mandal, Matthew Leifer, David Parkes, Galen Pickard, and Victor Shnayder. *Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Tasks* (Accepted at **CrowdML-NIPS'16**)
- Debmalya Mandal, and David Parkes. *Correlated Voting* (**IJCAI'16**)
- Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, and Yadati Narahari. *A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks* (**AAMAS'15**)

4. Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, and Yadati Narahari. *Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers (AAMAS'15)*
3. Rohith D. Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, and Y. Narahari. *A Stackelberg Game Approach for Incentivizing Participation in Online Educational Forums with Heterogeneous Student Population (AAAI'15)*
2. Praphul Chandra, Yadati Narahari, Debmalya Mandal, and Prasenjit Dey. *Novel Mechanisms for Online Crowdsourcing with Unreliable, Strategic Agents (AAAI'15)*
1. Debmalya Mandal, and Yadati Narahari. *A Novel Ex-Post Truthful Mechanism for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions (AAMAS'14)*

WORKING PAPERS

3. Debmalya Mandal, and David Parkes. *Bayesian Voting Games.*
2. Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, Zhe Feng, Nisarg Shah, and David Parkes. *Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users.*
1. Debmalya Mandal, Yang Liu, David Parkes, and Nisarg Shah. *Incentivizing Pairwise Comparisons in Recommender Systems.*

GRADUATE COURSES

At Harvard University

Mechanism Design and Approximation
Social and Economic Networks
Repeated and Stochastic Games
Social Data Mining
Statistical Learning Theory

Combinatorial Optimization
Randomized Algorithms
Pseudorandomness
Theory of Probability

At Indian Institute of Science

Game Theory
Machine Learning
Optimizations for Machine Learning
Real Analysis
Program Analysis and Verification

Design and Analysis of Algorithms
Probability and Statistics
Linear Algebra and Applications
Compiler Design
Operating Systems