Do we have reasons to obey the law?∗

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Abstract

Instead of the question, ‘Do we have an obligation to obey the law?’ we should first ask the easier question, ‘Do we have reasons to obey the law?’ This paper offers a new account of what Hart called ‘content independent’ legal reasons in terms of the normative grounding relation. This account is useful on its own, to get clear on what it means to obey the law because it is the law. It also helps us avoid a certain recent skeptical challenge, which claims that we could not, even in principle, have such reasons. Once we understand content independence in this way, we can see further that we very plausibly do have content-independent, genuinely normative reasons to obey the law, because it is the law. In light of this, I argue, we may reject the challenge posed by the philosophical anarchist.

Introduction

When we ask whether we ought to obey the law, we often mean to ask the more precise question, ought we to obey the law because it is the law? It is important to ask this more precise question because in one natural but trivial sense, we ‘obey the law’ whenever we perform some act to which the law’s demands merely happen to agree. We might, that is, do the thing the law demands for reasons unrelated to the law itself, such as because we believe it is a requirement of morality that we do this thing, or because of some threat, or because it is the thing we most want to do. But to do as the law demands for these sorts of reasons would not be to obey it in any important sense; such ‘obedience’ would no more count as obeying the law than would unwitting conformity to some ancient code, or fictional regulations, or foreign rules of etiquette, count as obedience to them.1 When we ask whether we ought to obey the law in the relevant sense, we are asking if we should do as the law demands because it is what the law demands.

We often also mean to make the question more precise in another way. In another natural sense, to obey the

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1Ancient, fictional, and most foreign laws, admittedly, make demands only on certain ancient, fictional, and foreign people, and so it might be objected that, by contrast, your unwitting compliance with a law making demands on you would indeed count as obeying it. Imagine however that I have written down in a notebook some laws which I intend everyone, including you, to follow, and suppose that one of my laws demands that you rise before noon on weekdays. If you, unaware of my notebook’s ‘laws’, rise at 8 A.M. on Monday, we would still rightly resist the claim that you were in doing so obeying my law, except in some very trivial sense.
law because it is the law is to count the fact that the law demands we do some act as among our motivations, or motivating reasons, for doing it. But this is not the relevant sense of ‘because’ nor the relevant kind of reason. We often do not mean to ask whether, in obeying some law, our motivating reason was composed in some part by the fact of the law’s demand. Nor do we mean to ask which reasons would, in certain ideal circumstances, or should motivate us to act. Instead, we mean to ask whether the law makes genuinely normative, moral demands on us, whether or not we are motivated by them, such that we may truly say that we morally ought to do the thing it demands. More concisely, we are asking whether the law gives us moral reasons for action that are genuinely normative and, as Hart and others have called them, ‘content independent’.2

My answer to these more precise questions is Yes: we do very often have moral reasons to obey the law, because it is the law, in the genuinely normative, content-independent sense. This answer goes against a strong current in political and legal philosophy which has led many to endorse philosophical anarchism,3 the family of views often expressed by some combination of the claims (1–3):

1. Any reasons we may seem to have to do as the law demands are really just reasons to do as we ought full stop, independent of the law, in virtue of our ordinary moral obligations; or

2. Whatever conditions would morally obligate us to do as the law demands are not met, and maybe could not be met, by the law; or

3. Any such apparent reasons are merely prudential reasons to act so as to avoid being fined or punished by the state.

The law, on any of these views, is simply not normatively significant.4

Separately, some have been recently convinced that there can be no content-independent reasons to obey the law, or at least that no successful account of what such reasons might amount to has yet been given.5 This separate conclusion only strengthens the appeal of the philosophical anarchist’s claim, by undermining the very possibility of having a moral reason to as the law demands because it is what the law demands.

We should not, I believe, be philosophical anarchists, nor should we be skeptics about the possibility of the content independence of reasons given by the law. I believe a successful account of what it is to be a

2Hart is widely credited with first introducing the notion of content independence of legal reasons. See Hart, Essays on Bentham, 254–55. I give first a loose characterization of the idea and then a more precise one later in the paper.

3Matthew Noah Smith goes so far as to write that “there may be a consensus amongst moral and political philosophers that there is not today any existing obligation to obey the law.” See Smith, “Political Obligation and the Self,” though see note 4. Similar claims can be found in Gur, “Actions, Attitudes, and the Obligation to Obey the Law,” Klosko, “Are Political Obligations Content Independent?”, and Edmundson, “State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law.”

4I do not here address Wolff’s early anarchist view, which focuses on the agential costs of following an authority’s directives, nor Smith’s recent defense of a related view. To address these views, distinctive as they are, would require a separate paper. As Smith notes, moreover, that view “has never had much traction” in the literature (though his paper is an attempt to revive it). See Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism; Smith, “Political Obligation and the Self.”

genuinely normative, content-independent moral reason to obey the law can be given and I believe that once it is properly understood, we can see further that we very plausibly have many such reasons, and that these reasons may, together with others and sometimes even on their own, obligate us to obey the law.

In what follows, I shall defend these beliefs. I begin with some preliminary remarks about reasons, morality, and the law (Section I), followed by a discussion of the idea of content independence (Section II). I discuss and reject a recent challenge to the very possibility of content independence before giving my own view, which is that content independence is best understood in terms of the normative grounding relation. My account of content independence is, I believe, a very natural one, but it has not yet appeared in the literature. I then defend against some objections (Section III). Following this discussion, I ask whether we might have such reasons to do as the law demands (Section IV). I conclude that, very plausibly, we do, and that it is implausible that we do not. This gives us, I argue, sufficient reason to reject strong versions of the anarchist’s challenge. Finally, I address weaker but more commonly held versions of anarchism, and argue that we should reject the challenge posed by those views as well (Section V).

I.

It may help to begin with some preliminaries, if only because the literature on legal obligation has suffered, in my view, from some unclarity about reasons, and because the view I adopt is not neutral. I follow Scanlon and Parfit in using the ‘purely’ or ‘genuinely’ normative concept of a reason, according to which a reason for us to φ may be helpfully redescribed as a fact that counts in favor of our φ-ing. To have at least one reason to φ is the same as having ‘some reason’, or simply ‘reasons’ to φ, though we may have some reason to φ even when there is some other act that we ought to do instead, because the reasons favoring that act are stronger than our reasons to φ. When the balance of reasons counts decisively in favor of our φ-ing, in the sense that our reasons to φ outweigh any competing reasons not to φ, or to do some other act instead, we can say that we have ‘decisive reason’ to φ, which is one other way of saying simply that we ought to φ. If our reasons are such that we may permissibly φ, we say that we have ‘sufficient reason’ to φ.

When I speak of someone’s ‘having’ a reason to φ, I do not mean to imply anything about this person’s own awareness of her reasons, nor about her motivational states. In the way I use the term, a person’s having a reason to φ is just the same as there being a reason for her to φ, which is just the same as there being some fact that counts in favor of her φ-ing. Similarly, when I say that some fact ‘gives’ or ‘provides’ us a reason to φ, I mean only that that fact is a reason for us to φ, by counting in favor of our φ-ing. By extension, when I say that the law gives or provides us a reason to φ, I mean that the fact that the law demands that we φ is a

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8Some refer to these as ‘pro tanto’ reasons, as a way of indicating that these reasons can weigh together, outweigh, and be outweighed by other reasons. For my purposes here, writing ‘pro tanto’ in front of ‘reason’ does not add anything, as all of the reasons I discuss can weigh together, outweigh, and can be outweighed by other reasons.
reason for us to \(\phi\), or counts in favor of our \(\phi\)-ing.\(^9\)

I should add that I take myself to be discussing moral reasons, as distinct from merely prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, reasons of rationality, and so on. I do not take a view on the issue of what makes our moral reasons distinct from other kinds of reasons, but I assume that they are distinct at least inasmuch as there is a useful difference between putative moral reasons to obey the law and merely prudential ones to avoid, say, being punished.\(^10\) When I speak of our ‘obligations’ or ‘duties’, including our putative obligation to obey the law, I mean to refer to those things that we morally ought to do such that there is normally morally decisive reason that we do them.\(^11\) Whenever I use the terms ‘reason’, ‘obligation,’ and the like from here onward, except where explicitly noted otherwise, I mean to refer to moral reasons, obligations, and so on.

Additionally, it should be borne in mind throughout that we must always be careful to distinguish some reason for action \([r]\)\(^12\) from a ‘summary reason’ given by a set of reasons for that action that includes \([r]\) as one member among others of the set, lest we double count the reasons. Thus, to borrow Parfit’s example, the fact that some medicine is the cheapest and most effective may make it the best medicine, but when we talk of the reasons for some person to take this medicine, we would make a mistake if we claim that this person has three reasons to do so: that it is the cheapest, the most effective, and the best.\(^13\)

Finally, it is important to note one issue that I shall avoid discussing. My topic is the reasons and obligations of subjects to obey the law, and as my arguments will reveal, I think that this topic is largely separable from the related topic of the law’s authority. In one natural sense, when people claim that they are obeying the law ‘because it is the law,’ or that others should do so, and so on, they mean to make a claim about the authority of the law. Insofar as my claims are about that turn of phrase, they are not about this latter sense of that turn of phrase. In this paper, I shall remain silent on the question of what makes the law authoritative.

\(^9\)It may be natural to talk of some people ‘giving reasons’ to others, but for the purposes of this discussion such talk would be misleading and unhelpful. Facts supply reasons, and the only helpful sense in which people may give reasons to others is by helping create (as by promising or commanding) or by calling attention to (as by pointing out) such facts. For some discussion of these issues, see Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law.”

\(^10\)There is of course debate over the question of whether there are fundamentally distinct sources of normativity corresponding to these categories, about which I do not mean to take a stand here.

\(^11\)I use ‘normally decisive reason’ as a moderately ecumenical analysis of the concept of ‘obligation’; my commitment is only to the idea that obligations are functions of contributory reasons. This is compatible with some other ways of speaking about obligation and duty, as when Ross discusses our ‘prima facie duties’ to act in certain ways, and also with the idea that obligations are those acts which are, in view of the balance of reasons, morally required. Still, my use is a substantive commitment, and so alternative views of obligation may disagree with my claims later in the paper about the ways that our reasons to obey the law answer the further question of whether we are obligated to obey the law. Since my target in that part of the paper is the philosophical anarchist, and since I know of no anarchist position that understands obligation in a way that is incompatible with my commitment here, it would fall to the anarchist to develop such a position.

\(^12\)I use brackets to indicate facts: \('[r]’ means ‘the fact that \(r\)’.

We can now consider the idea of the content independence of certain reasons, including reasons given by the law. Roughly, the idea is that a reason to φ is content independent if the reason is given by facts unrelated to (or independent of) φ-ing itself, such as by an authoritative command to φ. In the case of content-independent ‘legal reasons’ — the reasons given by acts’ being prohibited, permitted, or required by the law — we say that such reasons are to do as the law demands, whatever the law demands, no matter the moral, rational, or perhaps even legal merits of what is demanded.\(^\text{14}\) Taken another way, the idea of content independence is the thing that we mean by ‘because it is the law’ when we discuss the claim that we have reasons to obey the law because it is the law.\(^\text{15}\)

The legal philosopher Paul Markwick has rightly questioned the idea that all reasons are, as such, either content dependent or content independent. Reasons are, I have claimed, facts that count in favor of actions. On this understanding, it is mysterious what it would mean to claim that some reasons bear the (as it would seem) fundamental property of content dependence while others bear the fundamental property of content independence. What is the content of a reason, other than the fact that constitutes it, or that fact’s propositional content? How could any reason be independent of that? And what would we add to the claim that \([r]\) is a reason for someone to φ by making the further claim that that reason is dependent upon or independent of \([r]\)? It is not clear that such a claim would even make sense.

Most of those who claim content independence for legal reasons do not take the content in question to be the content of the reason per se but rather the thing that the reason is a reason to do. Thus, for some reason to φ, the content of that reason is φ, or φ-ing.\(^\text{16}\) It is this that Markwick has in mind when he argues that legal reasons are not distinctively content independent. As I shall now argue, I think Markwick is correct in this view but also partly misled by his argument, so that he rejects the notion of the content independence of legal reasons altogether, as uninteresting or uninformative. I do think legal reasons are not distinctively content independent, but I do not think the notion is therefore uninteresting or uninformative. Rather, I think that by better understanding the sense in which legal reasons are often claimed to be content independent, and by seeing how such reasons are not so unlike other kinds of normative reasons, we can better see how we might have reasons to obey the law because it is the law.

In one paper, Markwick considers the following candidate condition for content independence of reasons:

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\text{If φ-ing’s F-ness is a reason to φ, this reason is content independent if and only if for any other act-type μ, there would be a reason to μ if F were a property of μ-ing.}\]

\(^\text{14}\)There may be limiting cases, such as when the law’s demands are grossly immoral or, perhaps, when the law’s demands are too demanding. I shall ignore such limiting cases for the purposes of this discussion.

\(^\text{15}\)This is a loose characterization; I offer a fuller characterization of the idea of content independence further on.

\(^\text{16}\)Strictly speaking, it thus seems both more accurate and clearer to refer to φ as the object of S’s reason to φ rather than its content, but it is probably too late to correct that particular error.

\(^\text{17}\)Markwick, “Law and Content-Independent Reasons,” 582. In this paper and in “Independent of Content,” Markwick often
We can restate this briefly as the claim that a reason to act is content independent just in case the reason is given by some property of the act such that, if another act had that property, it would also provide a reason to so-act.

This seems, at first glance, like a good account of content independence. If some act has the property of being required by the law, for instance, and if having this property provides a reason to so-act, then there will be a like reason to do any other act that also has the property of being required by the law. The reason given by the fact that an act is required by the law, then, would appear to be a content independent reason.

Markwick points out, however, that this condition seems to capture too many reason types. Many acts are morally required, for example, and thus share the property of being required by morality. The reasons given by the fact that these acts are morally required thereby meet the condition above for content independence. And yet moral reasons are not typically taken to be content independent. They are, rather, commonly taken to be content dependent. We can also ask, if moral reasons are content independent, then which reasons are content dependent? Unless we are moral particularists, the answer may seem to be none. The same point could be made about several other properties typically not thought to confer content independence upon the reasons they provide. Markwick gives two examples: the property of causing unnecessary suffering and the property of maximizing utility. Take the property of causing unnecessary suffering. That an act bears this property is a reason not to do it, and would be a reason not to do any other act bearing this property. Such a reason would thus meet the condition above for content independence. Yet such a reason, as Markwick notes, is commonly taken to be a clear example of a content-dependent reason. Likewise the property of maximizing utility. According to act utilitarianism, an act is required if and only if it maximizes utility, no matter any other features of the act (e.g. that doing it would break some promise, violate some people's rights, etc.). In other words, we might say, all and only utility-maximizing acts are required, regardless of their content. Yet surely, Markwick claims, no act utilitarian would claim that all such acts are required by content-independent reasons. For again, the question could be asked, if these reasons are content independent, then which reasons are content dependent? The objection, in brief, is that the fact that it is unclear which reasons might be content dependent casts doubt upon the viability and usefulness of the distinction between content dependence and independence, and further that it is “unclear how content independence is a property which distinguishes legal reasons in particular from reasons in general.”

If no reasons, or few reasons, are content dependent, or if we cannot use the property to distinguish legal reasons from reasons in general, we might urge along with Markwick that we give up on talk of content independence as an important feature of legal reasons altogether, as uninteresting or uninformative.

uses the phrase ‘a reason’ to φ to mean sufficient or decisive reason to φ. As I shall argue, however, it is much easier to argue that the law does not in all cases provide, on its own, sufficient reason to do as it demands, than to argue that it does not provide a reason, or any reasons, to so-act. We should consider the latter claim about reasons first, and only then move on to stronger claims about sufficient and decisive reasons. I should also say, though it is not important to my larger argument, that I think this condition in fact succeeds in picking out content-independent reasons, though it does not amount to much of an account of why it does so, or of what content independence is.

Part of the answer to Markwick’s challenge is to concede that content independence is not a distinctive property of legal reasons but to maintain that, when we claim of some reasons, including legal reasons, that they are content independent, we are making a claim that is nevertheless both interesting and informative. This is because to claim that

some property of an act gives us a reason to do that act, and gives this reason the property of being content independent

is, in my view, to claim nothing more than that

this property of the act is normatively significant, in the sense that an act’s having it gives us a reason to do that act regardless of any other facts about the act.

It is interesting and informative to claim of some reasons that they are content independent simply because it is interesting and informative to claim of some properties of acts that they are normatively significant, in the sense that they give us reasons to do those acts. It is both interesting, and would be highly informative if true, to claim that an act’s maximizing utility gives us a reason to do that act, as the act utilitarian’s main thesis claims. If we could truly make a similar claim of many other properties, this too would be highly informative and interesting. Such properties, to draw some candidates from the history of philosophy, include the property of being loved by the gods, the property of being required by the king, the property of being an act whose maxim everyone could will to be a universal law of nature, and many others, including the property of being demanded by the law. It would be informative and interesting if the property of being demanded by the law were normative, in the sense that an act’s having this property provided a reason to do that act whatever this act may be. This is why, even conceding that content independence is not a distinctive feature of legal reasons, we may nevertheless claim that it would be interesting and informative if some legal reasons bore that property.

It may seem, I should acknowledge now, that I have already conceded too much. If content independence is not a distinctive property of legal reasons, or if it is just another way of making the obvious claim that some reasons are given by normative properties of acts, then it may be hard to believe that I am indeed making a claim that is interesting or informative. But an important part of my thesis is that legal reasons are not as unlike other genuinely normative reasons as is commonly believed, and that when we claim that legal reasons are content independent, we are (at least) tacitly committing ourselves to this conclusion. Furthermore, I believe that understanding this can help to make sense of the ways in which the law may in fact be a source of genuinely normative reasons for action, such that we may truly claim that we have reasons to obey the law because it is the law.

To see how this is so, it will help to more fully explain my view of content independence. On my view, we should understand claims of content independence as normative grounding claims. When we claim that some
fact \([p]\) grounds another fact \([q]\), we can equivalently claim that

\([p]\) makes \([q]\) true, or makes it the case that \([q]\);

\([q]\) is true, or holds, in virtue of \([p]\);

\([q]\) depends on \([p]\); or

\([q]\) holds because of \([p]\).

The grounding relation is not, it is worth emphasizing, a causal relation, nor the supervenience relation, nor is it the same as specifying the necessary conditions for some fact to hold — though instances of these other relations may sometimes coincide with instances of the grounding relation. It is, rather, the relation of one fact’s making the case another fact and thereby non-causally explaining that fact. It is, appropriately to the current discussion, a dependency relation.\(^{19}\)

The relation is very familiar in normative theorizing, as when, for example:

1. Locke writes that “...this original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by vertue thereof, what Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that great and still remaining Common of Mankind ... is by the Labour that removes it out of that common state Nature left it in, made his Property who takes that pains about it”;\(^{20}\) or when

2. Ross asks “What makes acts right?” and answers that “the ground of the actual rightness of [an] act is that, of all acts possible for the agent in the circumstances, it is that whose prima facie rightness in the respects in which it is prima facie right most outweighs its prima facie wrongness in any respects in which it is prima facie wrong”;\(^{21}\) or when

3. Rawls writes that the principles generated in the original position “must hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons,”\(^{22}\) or when he writes that the basis of equality lies in “the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice”;\(^{23}\) or when

4. Cohen discusses the ‘Pareto claim’ that “inequality is indeed just when and because it has the particular

\(^{19}\)I call claims of content independence normative grounding claims only for emphasis and clarity; I do not mean to endorse Fine’s view that the normative grounding relation is importantly different from the metaphysical grounding relation or any other grounding relation. For more on this and on grounding in general, see Berker, “The Unity of Grounding”; Fine, “Guide to Ground”; and Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.”

\(^{20}\)Locke’s claim is that [The natural law of property still holds in what was before common] (partly) grounds [By labor of removing it, one may make one’s property any fish caught in the ocean]. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, sec. 2.30, my emphasis, Locke’s removed.

\(^{21}\)Ross, The Right and the Good, 46, my emphasis on ‘makes’.

\(^{22}\)Rawls’s claim is that [People are moral persons] partly grounds his two principles. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 114, my emphasis.

\(^{23}\)The claim here is that the fact that humans possess certain important features grounds both some further fact about humans’ moral equality and [Human beings ought to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice]. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 441, my emphasis.
consequence that it causes everyone to be better off”;

5. Some people claim that a person deserves some treatment because of this person’s prior acts or bad character.

The grounding relation is normatively indispensable; there are very many other such examples all around us.

The claim that legal reasons are content independent is a claim about which features of the law can make it the case that we have reasons to do as it demands. When we consider the claim that we ought to obey the law because it is the law, the ‘because’ there is the because of grounding. When we consider the claim that it is in virtue of being against the law that some act is wrong, rather than due to the ‘merits of the act itself’, we are considering the claim that some feature of the law that is not also a feature of the act demanded by the law is what makes the act wrongful, or what grounds its wrongness.

Put most simply, the claim is that

\[ \text{[The law demands that } S \phi \text{] grounds } [S \text{ has a reason to } \phi]. \]

To claim just that [The law demands that } S \phi \text{] grounds } [S \text{ has a reason to } \phi], however, may be misleading, for demands do not by themselves ground reasons for action. Rather, it is only in combination with the facts that legitimate those demands that they may do this. If the law’s demands can ground reasons for action, there must be some further feature of the law that gives its demands this force.

In many cases, it is worth noting, a legitimate demand may play no part at all in grounding a reason for action. This may be easiest to see by considering a basic case of promising. Suppose I have made you a promise that I will } \phi \text{, and that you subsequently demand that I fulfill my promise. We could not then claim that

\[ \text{[You demand that I fulfill my promise to } \phi \text{] grounds } [I \text{ have a reason to } \phi] \]

because it is not your demand but my promise which grounds the obligation: I would have a reason to fulfill my promise regardless of whether you demanded that I do so or not. More fully, it is in virtue of my having made a promise to you both that you may make a genuine normative demand of me that I fulfill my promise and that I have a reason to do so.

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24 Cohen discusses the claim that \[\text{[Some inequality makes each better off]}\] grounds \[\text{[Such inequality is just]}\]. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 89, my emphasis.

25 To take this last claim as an example, we can reformulate the claim that \text{Some person deserves some treatment} because of his prior acts as the claim that \text{The fact that some person deserves some treatment} is made true by the facts about his prior acts.

26 I have given only a few easy examples. A search of works in moral and political philosophy for the terms ‘in virtue of’, ‘makes it the case that’, and ‘when and because’ will give a sense of just how often the normative grounding relation is appealed to. Nor is this a distinctively contemporary or even modern phenomenon. When Plato’s Euthyphro asks whether acts are pious because the gods love them or loved by the gods because they are pious, he is asking a question about normative grounding. (Jay-Z asks the question poetically: ‘Is Pious pious cause God loves pious?’ He too is asking a question about grounding.)
By contrast, some demands may seem to by themselves ground reasons for action. Certain demands by those we love, for example, or to whom we otherwise have special obligations, may seem to be clear cases of this kind. If your child demands love and attention, for instance, it may seem that

[Your child demands love and attention] grounds [You have a reason to give your child love and attention].

But even in this case, it would be better to claim that your child’s demand together with your special obligations to your child ground your reason for action. To claim only that your child’s demand grounds your reason for action would be misleading, and to claim that your child’s demand by itself grounds your reason for action would be false.

Similar remarks apply to the law’s demands on us. In order to make plausible the claim that the law’s demands ground reasons for action, we need to identify some property or properties of the law in virtue of which its demands are genuinely normative and bear moral force. In other words, it is only in virtue of some normative property or properties of the law together with the fact that the law makes specific demands of us that we may come to have reasons to do as it demands. We should therefore consider the revised claim that

[The law has some properties {P}] and [The law demands that S φ] together ground [S has a reason to φ].

Note that we are now discussing the possibility of several facts together grounding a single fact. To understand this, it may help to make explicit my assumption that not all grounding relations between one fact and another are relations of full grounding; many are relations of partial grounding. One fact [p] partially grounds another [q] when [p] helps make [q] true, or helps make it the case that [q], or when [q] holds partly in virtue of, or partly because of, [p]. The fact that S has a reason to φ, for example, would partially ground the fact that S ought to φ, by contributing to the set of reasons for S to φ. The set of reasons such that S has more reason to φ than to do any alternative act fully ground the fact that S has decisive reason to φ, by fully making it the case that S ought to φ.27 The claim I wish to make may indeed be more fully stated as the claim that

Each of the facts [The law has some properties {P}] and [The law demands that S φ] partially ground, and together fully ground, [S has a reason to φ].28

27There are also many non-normative examples of the distinction between full and partial grounding, which may be clearer: [The apple is golden and delicious] is fully grounded by [The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] together, and partially grounded by each of those facts separately.

28One of the law’s properties is of course that it demands that S φ, and another is, presumably, that it demands that a certain set of people including but not solely consisting of S φ. The first would merely repeat [The law demands that S φ], since to make this claim is to make the claim that the law has the property of demanding that S φ, so would not in that case constitute additional partial grounding for [S has a reason to φ]. As for the second, to claim that that the wider [The law demands that a set of people {S, ...} φ] together with its instantiation [The law demands that S φ] grounds (if indeed it does ground) [S has a reason to φ] is not importantly different from simply claiming that the instantiation alone can do this work.
S's reason to φ is content independent because the *normative* grounds of the reason lie in facts about the properties \( \{ \mathcal{P} \} \) of the law, rather than in facts about φ-ing. In other words, it is the normativity of the law, rather than the normativity (or not) of φ-ing, which makes it the case that S has a reason to φ. When the law demands that S φ, and when the law is normative, S has a content-independent legal reason to φ.

III.

Understanding the claim that legal reasons provide content independent moral reasons for action as a claim about grounding helps make sense of a number of cases in which, intuitively, it may be unclear whether the law provides a genuinely normative, content independent moral reason to do as it demands. Imagine, for instance, a society in which the law is merely a codification of morality, such as the Israelite tribe under Moses: Moses’s tablets, we can imagine, were a codification of the independently normative moral truths given the Israelites by God. We might then imagine one Israelite appealing to another, more murderously inclined Israelite that the tablets forbid killing: “You mustn’t kill, because it’s against the law,” the one might say. What should we make of the first Israelite’s appeal to the second?

Let’s grant that the second Israelite in fact has a reason not to kill. If the first Israelite’s appeal is meant to make a claim about what grounds the second Israelite’s reason, then that claim is false, since the fact that ‘THOU SHALT NOT KILL’ is written on Moses’s tablets certainly does not ground the second Israelite’s reason not to kill — it is rather the moral prohibition on killing, given to the Israelites by God and recorded by Moses on the tablets, that does this. Just as the wind’s happening to spell out ‘THOU SHALT NOT KILL’ in the sand would not itself be a reason not to kill, etchings of God’s moral law in stone would not themselves provide reasons for action. Only speaking loosely may we claim that an act’s being prohibited by Moses’s tablets is a reason for the Israelites not to do it, and when we make such a claim, it must be either false or else, more charitably, be a shorthand way of making the more accurate claim that the act is prohibited by God’s law. This is because, in the case we are imagining, God’s prohibition is genuinely normative, whereas being codified on Moses’s tablets, or being written by the wind in the sand, is not.

More generally, when demanding that for each morally required act, S do that act, we would make a mistake by claiming that

\[
[\text{The law codifies morality}] \text{ and } [\text{The law demands that S } \phi] \text{ together ground } [S \text{ has a reason to } \phi].
\]

For it would be in virtue of φ-ing’s being morally required, rather than in virtue of the law’s demanding or codifying that S φ, that S has a reason to φ. These further facts about the law would add nothing to the normative grounds for S’s φ-ing, which is to say would not help to make it the case that S has a reason to φ. In the same way, if I told you truly that you ought morally to do some act, and even if I *always* told you truly what the thing was you ought to do, it would be in virtue of this act’s being a moral requirement, rather
than in virtue of my telling you so, that you ought to do it. In this way, the law cannot be said to provide content-independent reasons for action in cases in which it is merely a codification of more fundamental normative facts.

Similarly, we can, by understanding content independence as an idea about normative grounding, better understand the sense in which Markwick rightly claims that legal reasons are not *distinctively* content independent. The claim that legal reasons are content independent is no more than the claim that some *legal* property of these reasons, such as (say) that it was passed by a democratic assembly, or that it solves some coordination problem — rather than something about what it is these legal reasons are reasons to do — is what *makes it the case* that they are genuinely normative for those to whom they apply; just as, according to one widely held view, moral reasons are made genuinely normative not by facts about what they are reasons to do but by facts about morality, such as that the act for which the reason counts in favor would maximize utility, or is an act that no one could reasonably reject, or is an act that is in conformity with a maxim that could be willed to be a universal law, and so on. But we can also in this way understand why the further worry that, by failing to be distinctive, the content independence of legal reasons may be uninformative or uninteresting, is misplaced. For the claim that legal reasons are content independent is the important and substantive claim that the law, like morality, can be a source of genuinely normatively reasons for action, rather than merely a way of calling attention to reasons whose real normative force lies elsewhere.

It may be here objected that *any* normative force the law has must be had in virtue of some prior normative facts, and that in view of this, no obligation to do as the law demands may be said to hold in virtue of facts about the law. This objection may take two forms. On the first, the complaint is that the law is, like Moses’s tablets, a mere codification of some other normative facts, and that thus we may not properly claim that it is the *law* which grounds our reasons to do as it demands.

To answer this first version of the objection, it is important to understand the sense in which one fact’s grounding another provides a non-causal *explanation* for the second fact. [The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] together ground and thereby *explain* [The apple is golden and delicious]. Similarly, according to act utilitarians, the claim that [The act would maximize utility] grounds and thereby *explains* [The act is required]. By contrast, if we imagine some person who always speaks truly, [This person says that the apple is golden and delicious] would not ground [The apple is golden and delicious], because this person’s claim, though true, would *not* explain [This apple is golden and delicious]. Nor would, for the act utilitarian, [This person says that the act is required] ground or explain [The act is required]. To *explain* in this non-causal way seems to be part of what it is to *ground*.

Now compare two similar cases. In the first, suppose that some king’s dictates are independently normatively binding on his subjects, and suppose further that those dictates are published in a book of codes. In one sense, we could plausibly claim that [This act is prohibited by the codebook] grounds [This act mustn’t be
done], but only insofar as [This act is prohibited by the codebook] refers not to the physical book but to the abstract collection of dictates recorded there, so that [This act is prohibited by the codebook] is a shorthand for [This act is prohibited by the king’s dictates]. This is like the way in which we can only truly claim that an act’s being prohibited by Moses’s tablets grounds our reasons not to do this act if we more fully mean that it is God’s prohibition, which the tablets record, that grounds our reason not to do this act. In this way, there is an important (if loose) sense in which we may properly say that an act’s being prohibited by the codebook non-causally explains the fact that we mustn’t do this act.

In the second case, suppose that some unofficial observer privately records the king’s dictates in a notebook. In contrast with the first case, we could not then plausibly claim that [This act is prohibited by the notebook] grounds [This act mustn’t be done], because the notebook is a mere private record of the king’s dictates, and [This act is prohibited by the notebook] could not plausibly be a shorthand for the claim that the act is prohibited by the king. It is more like the wind writing ‘THOU SHALT NOT KILL’ in the sand, or like, when I truly tell you that you ought not to do some act, it is not my telling you so that explains the fact that you ought not to do it. There is no sense in which being prohibited by the notebook non-causally explains the fact that some act mustn’t be done.

When we claim that

[The law has some properties \{P\}] and [The law demands that S $\phi$] together ground [S has a reason to $\phi$]

we are, as in the first case, making a non-causal explanatory claim. There will be further facts which ground the fact that the law has such properties, as well as, more pertinently, further facts about what makes those properties give the law normative force. If there are such properties of the law, however, which together with its demands ground reasons for us to obey it, we may properly say that those facts ground reasons for action, and we may properly refer to such reasons as reasons to obey the law, because it is the law.

A second version of this objection argues that, when we claim that some properties of the law help ground a reason for us to do as it demands, we ought instead to claim that it is those properties, or whatever grounds them, that ground our reasons to do as the law demands, rather than the law itself. If some facts about the democratic origins of a law, for instance, are what make it the case that we have a reason to do as it demands, then, according to this objection, we should say that it is those origins, rather than the law itself, which give us such a reason. We should, on this objection, follow the normative grounding ‘all the way back’, and then make any grounding claims in terms of those fundamental normative grounds.

One answer to this objection is to agree that we may often be able to make grounding claims in terms of other, more fundamental grounds by following the chain of grounding ‘back’, but to deny that such a move is always better. Indeed, it may on many occasions be worse to do this. When claiming that
[The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] together ground [The apple is golden and delicious]

it may not help, or it may be unnecessary, to reformulate the claim in terms of the very many further facts which ground [The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] separately. The same may be said of the facts that ground our reasons to obey the law.

Another answer to this objection is to remark that, even if some property of the law, such as its democratic origins,29 is what helps make it the case that we have a reason to do as the law demands, the fact that the law has such a property could not on its own, or fully, ground such a reason. In other words, although we might make the specific claim that

[The law’s origins are democratic] partially grounds [S has a reason to φ],

it would be misleading to claim simply that [The law’s origins are democratic] grounds [S has a reason to φ] because it is not only the fact that the law has this property, but also the fact that the law demands that S φ — that is, S as a specific subject and φ as a specific act — which together fully ground the fact that S has a reason to φ. Alternatively, though we might, in the case we are imagining, truly claim that

[The law’s origins are democratic] fully grounds [Subjects of the law have a reason to obey the law],30

we would, in order to make a specific claim about what grounds S’s reason to φ, need to claim that

[The law’s origins are democratic] and [The law demands that S φ] together ground [S has a reason to φ].

We could not then, as this version of the objection urges, make the grounding claim only in terms of some fact or set of facts about the law’s properties. And we should therefore not say that it is the law’s origins, rather than the law itself, which give us a reason to do as it demands.

It should be said too that when considering which properties {P} may help ground our reasons to do as the law demands, not just any properties will do. For, as I have argued, the property that the law codifies morality could not partly ground a reason for action. The properties in question must be, rather, distinctive properties of the law in order to be able to help ground a reason to obey the law, in the way that, for

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29The bare fact that some law has ‘democratic origins’ is, of course, not on its own a plausible candidate for the kind of fact that could, together with the fact that the law demands that S φ, ground the fact that S has a reason to φ. I use this only as an easy example, and as a shorthand for a more complex but plausibly legitimating fact about the provenance of the law. Similar remarks apply to my claims below about the sense in which a law’s democratic origins might, for instance, be thought to be a distinctive property of the law.

30Whether we could in fact truly claim that [The law’s origins are democratic] fully grounds [Subjects of the law have a reason to obey the law] depends very much on the more precise, ‘unpacked’ meaning of [The law’s origins are democratic] and in what way that property might be thought to be normatively significant. It should be noted, of course, that the mere fact that some people vote on some question is often not normatively significant at all.
example, we might call some law’s democratic origin, or its being part of a certain kind of fair system of social cooperation, or its being issued by a lawgiving body whose authority was consented to, such distinctive properties. While we could make the grounding claim only in these terms, we could also usefully summarize this grounding claim as a claim about why we have reasons to obey the law, because it is the law. In other words, we may call the reasons grounded in these ways legal reasons, and we may claim that learning we have such reasons tells us something important about the normativity of the law rather than merely about some other familiar sources of normativity. If we learn that democratic lawmaking, or legal fair play, or consent to the law can help ground such reasons, we learn something not only about the normativity of democracy, fairness, or consent, but about the law itself.

IV.

Even if it may be claimed, as I’ve argued it may, that there could be genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons for action given by the law, it remains to be shown that such reasons do in fact exist (or, as I shall more modestly claim, that it is very plausible that such reasons exist). We can turn finally, then, to the question of whether, and in what sense, we might truly claim about the law that it provides such reasons.

According to

\textit{Strong philosophical anarchism}: the law provides no moral reasons to do as it demands, because it demands it.

And according to what we may call

\textit{Weak philosophical anarchism}: the law provides no such obligations.

On versions of both views, the law’s failure is because, it is claimed, (1) the law merely codifies preexisting moral demands; or because (2) the law provides only prudential reasons, by threatening punishments; or because (3) the law does not or could not live up to the standards required for it to be normatively significant. None of these anarchist views, I claim, are plausibly true.

My principal target in this section is strong philosophical anarchism, though some of what I say toward the end of this section will bear on the weak view as well. I turn specifically to weak philosophical anarchism, which merits separate treatment, in the next section.

\footnote{We can also see in this way how some putatively or apparently normative properties of the law might fail to be truly normative. If a democratic lawmaking process, and the laws it produces, are justified because those laws are more likely to accurately reflect underlying moral demands, this may ground a reason to believe that we ought to do as the law demands, but it could not itself ground a further reason to so-act. It is also worth remembering that we are searching for non-prudential reasons to obey the law. We could imagine that one property of the law is that some tyrant will harshly punish anyone in its domain who doesn’t obey it. The fact that the law has this property, together with the fact that it demands that S φ, would give S a reason to φ. But such a reason would be merely prudential; and while it would be in one sense content independent, that would be because the tyrant’s threat is content independent, not because the law is. In other words, the normative force of that reason would come from the tyrant’s threat, not from some distinctive property of the law.}
As I have argued, for there to be a content-independent reason to obey the law is just for the law to have some properties which, together with the law’s making demands on us, give us reason to obey those demands. If the law has some such normative properties, then when it demands that we \( \phi \), it would not, as (1) claims, merely codify some preexisting moral reason to \( \phi \) — it would, rather, add to our balance of moral reasons to \( \phi \). Likewise, if the relevant properties of the law are moral properties, then the reasons it grounds for us to \( \phi \) are likewise moral ones, and so we cannot claim, with (2), that our law-given reason to \( \phi \) is a merely prudential one. And if the law’s properties make it the case that we have reasons to do as it demands, then we cannot claim, as (3) does, that the law does not live up to the standards required for it to be normatively significant.

But the success of these responses to the anarchist depend on the law’s having some such properties. We may then turn to the question,

Which property or properties of the law, together with its demanding that we act, may plausibly give us a moral reason to so-act?

It is worth emphasizing that I shall pursue only the modest goal of attempting to show that certain properties of the law very plausibly help give us genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons for action, rather than attempting to mount a conclusive argument that they do so. That they do so is, I believe, so very plausible that it renders the opposite view — that they do not — implausible. And if it is implausible that the law does not give us content independent moral reasons to do as it demands, as I believe it is, then we may dismiss the challenge posed by strong philosophical anarchism, as I believe we should.

My strategy is as follows. I shall briefly, if somewhat tediously, sketch the ways in which leading theories of political and legal obligation may be easily and plausibly recast as theories of political and legal reasons. When the aim of these theories is to provide reasons rather than obligations to obey the law, they are very much more plausibly true. And if any one of them is in fact true — that is, if any such theory in fact identifies a normative property of the law — then the strong anarchist view is false. My judgment, which I invite the reader to share, is that it is so very plausible that the law has some such normative property that I find it hard to believe that it plausibly does not. I shall also suggest that these views, in combination and sometimes on their own, ground obligations to obey the law. This, if true, counts against weak philosophical anarchism as well.\(^{32}\)

Before beginning, let me make one disclaimer. By discussing the ways in which various theories of political

\[^{32}\text{For those unconvinced or unimpressed by arguments from plausibility of this kind, it should also be said that the arguments I offer here also have a separate dialectical dimension. I argue that many well-known principles of political obligation may be recast as sources of reasons to obey the law. Yet one anarchist strategy has been to argue that individual candidate principles of political obligation fail to generate such an obligation. (See e.g. Christino’s presentation of anarchism in “Authority.”) Since reasons generated by these principles may be combined to form an obligation, it is not enough to argue that these principles alone fail to ground obligations. That is, we cannot conclude, if we believe that principles of political obligation fail, that there is no political obligation. The anarchist project is thus importantly incomplete.}\]
obligation may be recast as theories of political reasons, I might seem to suggest that we should recast these theories in this way. But I wish to make no such suggestion. \[33\] I claim only that the strong plausibility that at least one of these recast (and so weakened) theories identifies a normative property of the law is reason enough to reject the anarchist’s challenge.

Now, I should first point out that many of the leading non-voluntarist theories of political and legal obligation may be recast in this way. Fair play theories provide a clear example. When Nozick objects, for instance, that we cannot come under an obligation to others simply because they have conferred some benefit upon us, \[34\] we may answer that the conferral of certain benefits may nonetheless generate some reasons for us to participate appropriately in the system of benefits. Such an answer is plausible even in his famous public address system case: when it is your turn, you are, let us agree, not obligated to perform, but if you have enjoyed the fruits of the cooperative enterprise, then you may plausibly have some reasons of fairness to do your part in the future. In the analog case of the state, this may result in reasons of fairness to obey the law.

Or, to take a similar example, when George Klosko claims that

1. If some state is a cooperative enterprise, and

2. If this state, through its laws, provides its citizens with presumptively beneficial, fairly distributed goods;

He might conclude either that

3. The state’s citizens have an obligation of fairness to obey its laws

or instead, more modestly, that

4. The state’s citizens have reasons of fairness to do as its laws demand.

Klosko’s conclusion is in fact (3) but it needn’t be. (4) is a weaker conclusion, and is thus easier to establish and open to fewer objections. It is also, I think, much more immediately plausibly true. The reasons given by (4) may or may not amount to an obligation to do as the law demands, but would certainly provide us with some reasons, by counting in favor of our doing so.

Note here one important fact, which is that for theories like this fair play theory to successfully give us genuinely normative content-independent legal reasons for action, it must be some part of the law that provides us with the goods receipt of which grounds our reasons to obey the law’s demands. That is to say, if we have reasons in virtue of some principle of fairness to do our part in some collective enterprise, those reasons are only legal reasons of the kind we have been here discussing if the product of the collective

\[33\] Klosko, in “Multiple Principles of Political Obligation,” argues for such a patchwork view as a general theory of political obligation. See also Wolff, “Pluralistic Models of Political Obligation.”

\[34\] Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 90–95.
enterprise is in some way secured by the law. Otherwise, our reasons to do our part will be just that, and any specifically legal demand that we do so will merely restate those reasons rather than giving us new, additional ones.

Other non-voluntarist theories of political and legal obligation may be similarly recast in this way, including theories built around principles of gratitude, samaritanism, and natural duty. That is because all such theories identify some moral principle that, they argue, is operative in virtue of the existence or some other feature of the law. Any such theory, as in the case of fair play theories, may more easily establish that the moral principles they identify provide some reason to obey the law than that they provide normally decisive reasons to do so.

A similar point may be made about theories attempting to ground an obligation to obey the law in the fact of some law’s democratic provenance. Such theories claim that

\[ [L \text{ was generated by a democratic process}] \text{ and } [L \text{ demands that } S \phi] \text{ together ground } [S \text{ has an obligation to } \phi] \]

Naturally, however, we might instead make the more modest claim that

\[ [L \text{ was generated by a democratic process}] \text{ and } [L \text{ demands that } S \phi] \text{ together ground } [S \text{ has a reason to } \phi] \]

In these claims, of course, \([L \text{ was generated by a democratic process}]\) stands in for a more complex statement of the feature or features had by democratic laws in virtue of which those subject to them may be obligated or have reason to do as they demand. When Thomas Christiano argues, for instance, that (roughly)

Democratically created laws treat each citizen equally with respect to certain questions about what we together should do, regarding which no one has greater claim or standing to give an answer than any other,\(^{35}\)

he is arguing that it is this more specific feature of democratically created laws which in part grounds our obligation to obey those laws.

This is not, I should say again, the place to engage in a discussion of whether Christiano’s claims, or those of other democratic theorists, about democratic political obligation succeed, nor do I here mean to endorse either Christiano’s claim to that effect or my suggested weaker version of that claim. Rather, I mean only to claim that Christiano’s argument provides one plausible account of the source of genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons to do as the law demands (in this case, in democratic states).

Some consent theories may also be recast in this way. According to consent theories

\(^{35}\)Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy.”
S is obligated to obey L just when and because some combination of (1–4) holds:

1. *ordinary consent*  
   S has consented to do as L demands; or  

2. *tacit consent*  
   S has tacitly consented to do as L demands; or  

3. *conditional consent*  
   S would so-consent if S knew all the facts, deliberated rationally, and so on;  
   or  

4. *normative consent*  
   S should so-consent.  

Of course, if S has consented to obey the law, it may often be accurate to claim that S is obligated to do as it demands, because S’s consent grounds a normally decisive reason to do so. But it is worth emphasizing with respect to conditional and normative consent theories that these theories may be much more plausible as theories of the sources of reasons to so as the law demands rather than the sources of obligations to do so. It is much more plausible, for example, to argue that the fact that S would consent under certain circumstances to obey the law gives S a reason to obey the law, than to argue that S’s conditional consent gives S an obligation to obey the law.

There is one other plausible source of genuinely normative, content-independent reasons to obey the law that I wish to take some time over here, because I believe it may be of particular importance. This source is the law’s often unique and important role in coordinating our political lives.

It will help to consider the case of traffic laws. Those of us who drive each have some moral reasons *not* given by the law to drive in certain ways: these can be helpfully summed up by saying that we have all the summary reason to *drive safely*. One of the reasons summarized by this reason is the reason we all have to drive on one side of the road; another is to drive at a safe speed. But these reasons are in an important sense underdetermined: *which particular* side of the road we should all drive on, and *which particular* speed we should all drive at, are questions that our reason to *drive safely* itself is silent on. If we are driving, say, on many highways in the United States, we have reasons to drive on the *right* side of the road and to drive in the vicinity of 65 MPH. But when we are in other places and on other roads, these reasons change. And wherever we are, these more determinate reasons are grounded by facts about the law.

This last claim might be doubted. The speed at which we have reason to drive on some road, for instance, is determined partly by the road itself, by the capabilities of our cars, and by how fast and how many others are traveling. It may seem that the legal speed limit is superfluous, or that it merely formalizes these other reasons. But this argument neglects the further reason we all have to drive in the vicinity of some single, particular speed. Which speed this is may be *limited* by the road, our cars, and how many of us there are, but this speed is not *fully determined* by these facts. The law accomplishes this latter task.

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36 See e.g., Enoch, “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy.”

37 Hobbes’s view may be of this kind. Recently the view has been most notably developed by Estlund, Democratic Authority, to whom the term “normative consent” is also due.
Similarly, it may be rightly pointed out that the law is not a necessary ground of our reasons to drive on this or that side of the road. If there were no law concerning which side of the road to drive on, people might just work out for themselves some convention. If they did, these people would have a reason to drive on whichever side of the road that convention dictated. Equally, if the law in some place demanded that we all drive on the left, whereas in fact everyone followed the practice of driving on the right, each driver would have most reason to drive on the right — and it is plausible to think that each driver would have no reason to drive on the left.

But this is not an objection to the view I am here defending. I do not claim that the law is a necessary ground for our reasons to drive on one side or another, or to drive at a certain speed; I am claiming only that it is in fact the ground of many of our actual such reasons. It is not enough to say that we each have a reason to drive on the side of the road on which most other drivers drive. We together must at some point take some actions or decisions which determine the particular side that is. This could take the form of legislation, or it could be established through more complex patterns of convention and coordination. In the actual case of the United States, I submit that it is the law that secures the relevant convention; it is the fact that the law demands that we drive on the right which partially grounds our reason to drive on the right. In other words, we cannot state the facts which ground

[We each have reason to drive on the right side of the road in the United States]

or

[We each have reason to drive near 65 MPH on certain highways in the United States]

without making reference to the fact that the law demands that we do so. We may thus, as I argued earlier, call our reasons to drive in these ways content-independent moral reasons given by the law. 38

It is worth adding that reasons given by the coordinative function of the law such as these may be, I believe, quite weighty reasons. Very seldom will I have sufficient reasons to drive on the side of the road other than the side demanded by the law. I think it is indeed fair to say that we are obligated to drive on the side of the road demanded by the law, and we are so-obligated because it is what the law demands.

We can next observe that traffic laws are not a special case, but rather one of very many sets of laws whose purpose is to coordinate our political lives. I shall not defend this claim at length here, except to mention that much of the basic structure of society — basic rights and liberties, schemes of property, schemes of taxation, the organization of families and firms, and so on — is plausibly underdetermined in the way I have been discussing, and is more fully determined by the law; and so the reasons we may have with respect to

38 Cases like this one raise some difficult further issues, about the way in which the grounding and causation relations interact, and about the importance of the law’s authority for its ability to obligate. Although I shall not pursue these issues here, I do take them up elsewhere [XXX].
these domains of the law will be at least partly grounded by the law’s demands. If determinate reasons of this kind are indeed genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons for action given by the law, then it seems that they are quite widespread and quite forceful.

Many (if not all) of these theories of political obligation, then, may be recast as theories of political reasons. It is very plausible, I think, that at least one of these recast theories succeeds. We should believe, in other words, that there are some genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons given by the law. The anarchist can not then plausibly claim that the law provides no such reasons; we should feel comfortable dismissing the challenge posed by strong philosophical anarchism.

V.

Can we likewise reject the challenge posed by weak philosophical anarchism? I shall now consider two versions of that weaker view — one which claims that the law could not obligate us, and another which claims that the law provides no general obligation to obey its demands. For each, I press from two sides: from one side, I ask whether the view’s claims are plausibly true; and from the other, I ask, regardless of the truth of its claims, whether the view merits the name ‘anarchism.’

According to the first version of weak philosophical anarchism,

The law does not obligate us to do as it demands, because it demands it.

This anarchist concedes that the law might be a source of content-independent moral reasons to do as it demands but denies that these reasons ever amount to obligations. ‘Reasons come cheap,’ this anarchist might offer as a slogan. Moreover, this anarchist might note, when the law demands that we φ, it claims for itself the power to obligate us, not merely the power to give us reasons. Even by the law’s own lights, then, it may seem to fail to live up to the standards set for it.

An easy, if perhaps unsatisfying, answer to this version of the view is that it may not be a form of anarchism at all. If the law only ever gave us reasons, but not obligations, to do as it demands, then we might be justified in revising the claims the law makes for itself, as well as the nature of its demands. On this revised view, the law would not so much demand that we φ as claim that we have some reason in virtue of it to φ, in the sense that we would thereby have some reason to do so. Such a revision might have further consequences.  

39David Lewis mentions this in Convention, and there is also a sizeable jurisprudential literature concerning coordination, convention and the law: see inter alia Gans, “The Normativity of Law and Its Co-Ordinative Function”; Ullmann-Margalit, “Is Law a Co-Ordinative Authority?”; Postema, “Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law”; Green, “Law, Co-Ordination and the Common Good”; Green, The Authority of the State, ch. 4; and Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 30. Marmor, “The Dilemma of Authority.”, admits that coordination problems can ground obligations, but also claims that this cannot explain the full extent of the law’s normative power. Like Ripstein, I disagree. On Ripstein’s construction of Kant’s political philosophy, nearly all of our political duties are ‘determined’ in this way by the state and the state’s laws. For some considerations along these lines, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom, as well as Pallikkathayil, “Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity”; Julius, “Independent people”; and Julius, “Public Transit.”
for the permissible responses to those who disobey the law: if it does not obligate us, then the case for penalties and punishments is clearly weakened. But even if all this is conceded, then the anarchist position is reduced to the view that the claims the law makes for itself must be revised. It is not clear to me that this position is ‘anarchic.’

A more robust answer to this version of the objection is that it is nearly as plausible that the law sometimes obligates us to do as it demands as that it sometimes gives us reasons to do as it demands. Indeed, this formulation may undersell the point: it remains, in my view, entirely implausible to think that the law never obligates us to do as it demands. To see this, consider a case in which S’s preexisting moral reasons favor but do not count decisively in favor of φ-ing, such that we would not say that S is obligated to φ in virtue of those reasons (perhaps because some other considerations count against so-acting, or perhaps just because the strength of those reasons is in some other way insufficient). Now suppose that the law also demands that S φ, in a way that adds to the balance of reasons in favor of S’s φ-ing enough to make it the case that S has decisive moral reason to φ. The law, in this case, ‘tips the scales’ such that we may say S is obligated to φ.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 1:** A case of ‘contributory’ obligation by the law

Is it correct, in this case, to make the further claim that S is obligated to φ in virtue of the law? I think it is. For S’s obligation is partly grounded by the law’s demand, and the law is also a necessary ground of S’s obligation. There is a natural sense, then, in this case, in which we may say that S is obligated to obey the law, because it is the law. This version of weak philosophical anarchism would then fail.

But perhaps the anarchist would require not just that the law partly ground S’s obligation to φ, but that it sufficiently ground such an obligation — in other words, that any non-legal grounds be unnecessary for S to have an obligation to φ. We might, of course, worry that such a requirement is unreasonable; for why should we expect the law to sufficiently ground obligations to do those things it demands of us? But setting such worries aside, I think it is clear that even this further anarchist requirement may be plausibly met in some cases. To see this, notice again that the recast theories of political reasons discussed in the previous section, while perhaps each insufficient to ground an obligation, may be plausibly combined to form just
that. It might be, for instance, that the democratic origins of some law, together with the consideration owed in light of the benefits provided by the law, together with certain acts of tacit consent to the system generating the law, together with the fact that the law solves some coordination problem, _all together_ generate a content-independent summary reason to obey this law which rises to the level of an obligation. It is, in my judgment, very plausible that the coordination function of the law is sometimes _on its own_ sufficient to generate an obligation to obey, so I think it is extremely plausible that the law with all its putatively normative properties might sometimes accomplish this. If it does, then this strong anarchist claim too fails.

![Figure 2: A case of ‘sufficient’ obligation by the law](image)

According to the second version of weak philosophical anarchism, the anarchist claim is that although the law may in some cases give us reasons to do as it demands, and may even in some cases obligate us to do so, the law does not provide a _general obligation_ for us to do as it demands, because it demands it.

A similar way of making this anarchist’s claim would be to say that there is no general moral presumption in favor of obeying the law, because it is the law.

(Let us here understand the relevant notion of _generality_ to mean that the law’s obligations are sufficiently common, widespread, or unified — or some combination of these factors.)

Again it might be simply doubted whether this anarchist claim is true. I hope in this paper to have called attention to some underappreciated reasons to have such doubts. I argued in the previous section that the coordinative function of the law helps us determine many underdetermined moral obligations, and that when it does so we may properly say that we have these determinate obligations in virtue of the law. It is plausible that much of the basic structure of society — basic rights and liberties, schemes of property, schemes of taxation, the organization of families and firms, and so on — is importantly underdetermined in this way. If these claims are true, then our obligations to the law are quite wide-ranging and, I think it is clear, relevantly general. Separately, I also argued that we should consider the plausibility of a patchwork view of political obligation. Many of the individual principles of political obligation discussed in the previous section are
general in the relevant sense; and if we understand them as sources of reasons to obey the law, it is plausible that in combination they may amount to a general presumption of obedience to the law, or in other words a general obligation.

That the law obligates us generally is, then, I think very also plausible, particularly once we understand the possible sources of such an obligation. And that it does so is, in my judgment, sufficiently plausible to dismiss even this version of weak philosophical anarchism.

But that is not all there is to say. Even readers who do not share my judgment about the plausibility of the law’s ability to obligate us may rightly question the extent to which this version of weak philosophical anarchism properly merits the name ‘anarchism.’ It does not, recall, deny that the law can be a source of moral reasons to obey the law, because it is the law; nor does it deny that the law can, through such reasons, obligate us. It denies only that these obligations are sufficiently common, or widespread, or unified, so as to be able to call them ‘general.’ But if unity is the relevant generalizing factor — understanding unity to require something like that the obligating power of the law be grounded in a single normative property — then it is unclear what about a view that it fails to do so would merit the name ‘anarchism.’ If the law can, through multiple normative properties, generally obligate us, its failure to do so through a single property hardly seems to leave us in, or merit an attitude of, anarchy (to say nothing of why we should accept such a requirement in the first instance). Similarly, if the extent to which obligations to the law are widespread is at issue — understanding this to require that the law obligate across, say, the various domains of the law — then again it is unclear what about a view that it fails to do so would merit the name ‘anarchism.’ If we were to think, for instance, that the law only successfully obligates us with respect to taxation and traffic law, then again we could hardly say that the resulting situation, or the attitude merited, is anarchic. Rather, it would give us reason to revise the demands the law makes for itself in other domains, or restrict the ability of legislatures to make law in those domains, and so on. But again, this would not be anarchy. Indeed, it may be a virtue of an account of political obligation that, according to it, our obligations to obey the law vary in strength depending on their grounding principles and domains of application. (We might imagine such a view holding that the law’s demand that we pay income taxes generates reasons for obedience of a differing source and strength from its demand that we stop at red lights in the desert, and that the view’s ability to account for such a difference counts in its favor.) It is not clear, then, that these two generalizing conditions are good ones; and if they are, they seem to be what we might call ‘internal’ challenges to conceptions of political obligation rather than skeptical challenges to the very existence of such obligations. Only the latter though, it seems to me, would merit the name ‘anarchism.’

That the law might not obligate us commonly or frequently enough is the most difficult challenge for me to handle, not because I think it is doubtful that it does so but because whether it does so seems mainly a matter of judgment, about which it is more difficult to bring arguments to bear. But if the disagreement with the anarchist comes down to a judgment about the frequency of the law’s power to obligate, then I am
happy to argue the issue on those grounds. For as I have said, my own judgment is that is very plausibly does so quite often.

On all of these versions of the anarchist’s challenge, then, I think we have good reason to dismiss it. It is clear that we do have reason to obey the law, because it is the law, and that we sometimes — perhaps often — have obligations to do so. The question is then not whether we should be anarchists, but which particular view we should take about the strength and range of the law’s moral claim on us.

Conclusion

It may now help to sum up some of my main claims. I have argued that when we consider the question,

Do we have reasons to do as the law demands, because it is what the law demands?

we should understand the ‘because’ in the question as the because of grounding. On the view I have defended, if we have such reasons, it is because there is some property of the law that at least partially grounds the fact that we have such a reason. That is to say, the normativity of such reasons is grounded in the normative properties of the law, rather than in such properties of the thing the law demands we do. This, on my view, is what we should mean when we claim that the law may be a source of content-independent moral reasons to do as it demands.

I argued next that, once we see that this is what it is to be such a reason to obey the law, we can see that we very plausibly have such reasons, and that these reasons may also very plausibly amount to obligations. The very plausibility of these claims gives us good reason to reject the anarchist’s challenge. We need not be philosophical anarchists just because we doubt that any one theory of political and legal obligation has successfully established such an obligation. To have such doubts, as I argued, falls well short of anything properly called ‘anarchism.’ We could instead, I suggested, be engaged in the more modest enterprise of looking for reasons to obey the law, and then investigating their strength and the domains over which they range. In this way, I believe, we are likely to find a picture of our reasons for obeying the law that more accurately reflects our considered reflections.

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