Bannerman and Townsman: Ethnic Tension in Nineteenth-Century Jiangnan

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BANNERMAN AND TOWNSMAN:
ETHNIC TENSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JIANGNAN*

Mark Elliott

Introduction

Anyone lucky enough on the morning of July 21, 1842, to escape the twenty-foot high, four-mile long walls surrounding the city of Zhenjiang would have beheld a depressing spectacle: the fall of the city to foreign invaders. Standing on a hill, looking northward across the city toward the Yangzi, he might have decried the masts of more than seventy British ships anchored in a thick nest on the river, or perhaps have noticed the strange shapes of the four armored steamships that, contrary to expectations, had successfully penetrated the treacherous lower stretches of China's main waterway. Might have seen this, indeed, except that his view most likely would have been screened by the black clouds of smoke swirling up from one, then two, then three of the city's five gates, as fire spread to the guardtowers atop them. His ears dinned by the report of rifle and musket fire and the roar of cannon and rockets, he would scarcely have heard the sounds of panic as townsmen, including his own relatives and friends, screamed to be allowed to leave the city, whose gates had been held shut since the week before by order of the commander of

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Source: *Dantuxian zhi, juan 6b-7a* (1877).
the Zhenjiang banner garrison. Yet above even this tumult, he could not have missed the sound of the three explosions that shook the ground when British miners blew up the western gate; and he could only watch as hundreds of red-coated soldiers overran the city. By now it would be midday, and the sun, already extremely hot earlier in the morning, would have been burning directly overhead, forcing him to seek the shade. An hour or so later, however, the sound of gunfire off in the distance would draw him back to witness a last, desperate street skirmish between bannermen and British troops. The defenders were soon overpowered, ending all hopes of saving the city, and the observer, now a refugee, would have had no choice but to set off and seek haven in the countryside.1 Had he remained inside the city, he would have witnessed even more terrible scenes, particularly in the garrison compound where the bannermen and their dependents resided. Within its walled confines, men cut the throats of their wives and children before falling upon their swords or rushing off to meet the enemy and death. One after another, entire families jumped down wells, took poison, or hanged themselves, rather than face defeat and disgrace.2

The fall of Zhenjiang was significant most obviously because it meant the Opium War was nearing an end. Though the Qing empire finally put together a respectable defense,3 the garrison troops ended up surrendering the city just the same after only half a day's fighting, leaving an even more vital spot—Nanjing, forty-five miles upriver—vulnerable to attack. While prior to the Zhenjiang drama the court had been determined to resist the foreigners no matter the cost, after this disaster, further such thoughts became unrealistic. One might well say that the Treaty of Nanjing, the first of the "unequal treaties," was decided by the loss of Zhenjiang, and it

1 This "observer's" account draws on Zhu Shiyun, Caojian riji (Diary from the Grass Room) (1852); reprinted in Yapian zhanzheng (YPZZ) (The Opium War), 6 vols., Qi Sihe et al., eds. Shanghai, 1954, 3:75-92. Zhu's memoir is the basis for Part IV of Arthur Waley, *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*, 1958.
3 The British, who in the entire course of their "China campaign" had met with virtually no serious organized resistance, were full of praise for the bravery and fighting ability of the enemy at Zhenjiang. The banner troops defending the walls, observed one of the British, kept up a "steady and well-directed fire," offering a "cool and determined," "inch-by-inch" resistance. He concluded further that if among the enemy there had been any acquaintance with modern weapons and military science, the taking of the city would have been nearly impossible. Ouchterlony, 367-373, 401-403.
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is in this context, as one chapter of the Opium War, that the fall of Zhenjiang has typically been portrayed.

In the present study we approach the events at Zhenjiang from a different angle. Locating the city within the Qing provincial Eight Banner garrison network, we use memoirs, official records, and archival materials to anatomize the situation that developed inside the city during the period immediately preceding the British attack. We follow the Manchu garrison commander’s hunt for traitors and the terror of mass arrests, which led to the collapse of civil authority, the implementation of martial law, and, ultimately, to the total deterioration of relations between the people of the city (who were Han Chinese) and the soldiers of the banner garrison (who were not). The aims here are three: first, by examining both the history of the Zhenjiang garrison as well as the events and personalities of 1842, we endeavor to explore local-level relations between bannermen and Han Chinese at various points during the Qing period, a relationship about which we know little, but which stands out as one particularly "Qing" element of the late imperial social landscape. This, plus a survey of the unusual historiography concerning the city’s fall, will, it is hoped, shed light on the status of urban banner garrisons as well as on the problem of ethnic tension in the Qing, a problem, as I attempt to show, which persisted throughout the dynasty. Finally, the paper seeks to question traditional concepts of ethnicity and assimilation and to propose new ways of addressing these problems during the Qing. As the ruling dynasty was forever sensitive about its image, materials on some of these issues are scarce. Secondary literature on the garrisons, furthermore, is virtually nonexistent. If this essay raises more questions than it manages to answer, it will at least have pointed to an approach to Qing history that, despite many successes at writing the history of China from a Chinese perspective, has still largely eluded Western historians: Qing history from a "Qing" perspective.

Tacking Down the Corners: Zhenjiang and the Jingkou Garrison

Martial prowess was without question a central strength of the early Manchu (Jurched) nation, and until the mid-nineteenth century remained one of the outstanding characteristics of Qing rule. One of the pillars of

4 Pamela Kyle Crossley's Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World (Princeton 1990), offers much insight into this subject and the subject of the Eight Banners generally. I am grateful to Professor Crossley for the opportunity to examine parts of her manuscript as I revised the present article.
this strength was of course the Eight Banners (baqi; jakûn gûsa), the
military/civil bureaucracy unique to the Qing, which formally governed
nearly all aspects of life for the Manchus, Mongols, and Hanjun enrolled
in its lists.5 Originally intended as the basis for an efficient mounted corps,
after the Qing conquest of China, the Eight Banners served to protect the
emperor and the capital, defend the Manchu homeland, and to provide
the dynasty with a military presence in the provinces through the mainte-
nance of garrisons (zhufang ying; seremseme tehe ba, tebunehe ba)6 at
numerous strategic locations. Though at first a temporary measure,7 the
garrison system gradually acquired de facto permanent status, and by the
middle 1700s banner garrisons had been established at eighteen cities
around the provinces. The largest garrisons, averaging a force of 2770
men, were in Jiangnan, along the southeast coast, and at Xi’an. Those in
the capital region, where they provided an outer defensive perimeter, were
numerous but relatively small, at only 150 soldiers each.8 Besides func-
tioning as a ready military force in case of unrest in some far corner of the
empire,9 the bannermen assigned to duty in the garrisons represented cen-
tral authority at the regional and local levels: "Sending Manchu soldiers to
garrison provincial cities was originally intended to awe and pacify those
areas," explains one 1744 edict in retrospect.10 As the Eight Banners was
the kind of idiosyncratic organization particular to "dynasties of conquest,"
the garrisons could symbolize the dynasty in a way that the civil

5 There exists a vast literature on the Eight Banner system in Chinese and Japanese. Two
basic works are Meng Sen, "Baqi zhidu kaoshi" (1936) and Mitamura Taisuke, Shinchô zenshi
no kenkyû (1965). In English the most complete treatment is in Wu Wei-p’ing, "The
Development and Decline of the Eight Banners" (1969). See also Pamela Crossley, Orphan
Warriors (1990); Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise (1985); and the first chapter of
Jonathan Spence, Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor (1966).
6 Manchu terminology here is taken from Hesei toktubuha jakûn gûsa kooli hacin-i bithe
(Statutes and Precedents of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained) 12 juan Laibo et al.,
eds. (1769).
7 Im 1981:12-13, 66.
8 Qinding Da Qing huidian (DQHD) (Collected Institutes of the Qing), 100 juan (1764): juan
96. Location and size varied, but the major posts were at Chengdu, Fuzhou, Guangzhou,
Hangzhou, Jingzhou, Nanjing, Qingzhou, Suiyuan, Xi’an, Zhapu, and Zhenjiang. Overall, in
the intramural garrisons, there were roughly 60,000 bannermen, or more than half of the to-
tal 107,000 bannermen stationed at all garrison locations across the empire (Sutô 1940:196-
197). The rest of the banner forces, numbering slightly over 100,000, were quartered in Beij-
ing.
9 Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu (Miscellaneous Notes from the Whistling Bamboo Pavilion)
(1880):10, "Zhufang." Banner garrison troops were often on campaign during the Shunzhi
and Kangxi reigns.
10 "Huangchao bingzhi" (Military Monographs of the Dynasty), National Palace Museum Ar-
chives, Taipei (n.d.): ch. 3, "xunlianmen, junling."
bureaucracy could not. The garrisons thus played a special role in the consolidation of the conquest.

A banner garrison was first established at Zhenjiang in 1655 in response to the need to strengthen defenses against Ming loyalist forces. This location was protected by the shallow, shoal-filled passage of the lower Yangzi, yet it was still conveniently close to the river mouth and the sea. The founding edict reads in part,

As Jingkou is a vital place ... you must keep the soldiers and horses in good order and enforce strict discipline. You are to apprehend any pirates and lead your troops to vigorously exterminate and guard against [them]. ... If the governor requests soldiers, you must decide how to aid in putting [the pirates] down.11

The commander of the garrison was titled "General who Pacifies the Seas" (zhenhai dajiangjun), an indication of the garrison’s maritime orientation. He was assisted by two garrison lieutenant generals (fudutong; meiren i janggin), who shared responsibility for the two troop divisions posted to the garrison, each consisting of fifteen hundred Han-martial bannermen (Hanjun; in Manchu, ujen cooha, "heavy troops," so called because of their artillery expertise). While it is not explicit why Hanjun were selected for assignment to Zhenjiang, it appears to have been usual policy in the early Qing to use Han-martial as garrison troops, especially for locations in the southern reaches of the empire.12

Since the Warring States period, military encampments had been fixed at Zhenjiang, and the city had figured as a strategic keypoint from the Sui through the Ming, becoming a link in the Ming weisuo system.13 Qing policy makers undoubtedly appreciated its strategic importance since only ten years earlier, in June 1645, Qing armies had, by capturing Zhenjiang, forced the capitulation of Nanjing and the flight of the Prince of Fu, the

11 Shizu shilu (SZSL): Da Qing lichao shilu (DQSL) (The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty), Shizu (Shunzhi) reign (Fengtian [Shenyang]): 1937; reprinted Taipei: Huawen, 1963:91:15a. No details were given on how the soldiers were supposed to quell piracy from horseback.

12 SZSL 127:15b. The garrisons at Fuzhou and Guangzhou were also manned by Hanjun. Manchu and Mongol bannermen were mostly reserved for duty in the capital area and the Northeast, though they did help fill the Hangzhou and Nanjing garrisons. This policy may have been linked to the reliance of the Shunzhi emperor on Han-martial bannermen to staff high provincial offices (Wakeman 1985:1020-1021). On the Hanjun see note 25 below.

Ming claimant. The consternation at court must have been great indeed when, in the summer of 1659, troops under Zheng Chenggong overthrew the Jingkou garrison and came very close to taking Nanjing itself before they were repulsed by a combined defense of Eight Banner and Green Standard Army soldiers. Though it failed this first crucial test of strength, the Jingkou garrison was quickly reestablished; its quarters, originally outside the city (on the site of the former Ming commandery training grounds), transferred to within the city walls.

The presence of bannermen within the city after 1659 fulfilled a primary purpose of the garrison system, the reinforcement of Qing political and social control on the local level. This task was one of the biggest challenges facing the early Qing government, especially in Jiangnan, the most prosperous area of the realm. Moreover, Zhenjiang, because of its location at the intersection of the Grand Canal and the Yangzi, played a vital role in the Jiangnan economy. Sometimes metonomized as the "throat" between north and south, the city oversaw shipments of tax grain to the capital; numerous warehouses and wharves lined the banks of both river and canal, and an army of boatmen earned their living piloting craft across the river on up to Yangzhou. Control of the city thus meant a great deal. Fortuitously for the new dynasty, taking over Chinese cities and managing Han populations was nothing new: by the time Zhenjiang banner troops moved into the city from the suburbs, "Manchus" and Han Chinese had been living together for several decades. One of the lessons of

14 Wakeman 1985:570.
15 In official documents, "Zhenjiang" generally referred to the city as the seat of civilian government, while "Jingkou" was reserved as the name of the military camp within the city.
17 SZSL 127:17a; ZJFZ 16:26a-b.
18 In Qing history, the label "Manchu" has long been used loosely to include all who participated as part of Qing military forces in the conquest of the Ming empire. However, as Wakeman points out, after 1631 "one can no longer speak of a war strictly between Chinese and Manchus"; properly speaking, the struggle became one between the "military elite of the northeastern frontier and the Ming court" (Wakeman 1985:196). The use of the term "Manchu" to denote those who entered Shanhaiguan on May 27, 1644 is therefore misleading. It is furthermore unsatisfactory in that it equates "Manchu" (Manzhou, Manju) and "bannerman" (qiren, gūsai niyalma). A more accurate use of "Manchu" would restrict its application only to those bannermen who could trace their ancestry to clans belonging to one of the Jurchen tribes inhabiting the Northeast in the Ming, the vast majority of whom were naturally enrolled in the Manchu Eight Banners. This in distinction to bannermen in the Mongol or Han-martial Eight Banners primarily, and Solon, Daghur, Sibe, Korean, and Russian bannermen secondarily. On these classifications, see also Crossley 1990:16ff; I do not accept her view that qiren is a late nineteenth-century neologism developed to cover anyone of any banner affiliation (1990:176). The term is amply attested in earlier (eighteenth century) materials as a general appellation for those in the banners.
this not-always-happy experience was that the two groups got along best when they kept their distance, and the banner garrisons incorporated this principle in their arrangement. In the case of Zhenjiang, Han-martial troops assumed exclusive occupation of the southwest quarter of town, expelling the Chinese from this part of the city and seizing their homes. They then built a wall, creating an enclosed area that was off limits to Han (Figure 1), much as the Inner City at Beijing was forbidden to Chinese living in the Outer City to the south. Similar occupation of large sections of Nanjing, Hangzhou, Xi'an, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou (though no wall was built here) loomed as tangible reminders of the strength of the new dynasty.

The edict establishing the Jingkou garrison cautioned that, "as before, strictly restrain the troops. They must not behave improperly or steal citizens' belongings. Also, they are not to interfere with or cause damage to agriculture on the pretext of pasturing [their horses]. You must make the soldiery and the populace get along peaceably and avoid bringing hardship to the locality." In issuing such commands, court policymakers clearly anticipated friction between garrison and city. Shi Tingzhu, the first garrison general at Jingkou and the man to whom the above orders were addressed, won the popular eponym "Buddha Shi" because he forbade his men (then still living outside the city walls) to ride their mounts into the city and warned them against disturbing shops or civilians. That the relationship between the garrison and the city was uneasy from the outset is revealed also by the following passage:

When large numbers of soldiers were first stationed in Jingkou, the people (min) were not accustomed to them. There were some among the country folk who were wrongly harmed by the soldiers and horses of the garrison. The people were scared witless.

19 Kitamura 1949; Ishibashi 1961; and Roth 1979.
20 ZJFZ 16:26a-b; 27:1b. A less common alternative to this modus operand was to build a separate Manchu suburb beyond the walls of the Han city, as was done at Qingzhou in Shandong.
21 SZSL 91:15b.
22 ZJFZ 34:33b. Shi (1599-1661), like all garrison generals at Jingkou for the next one hundred years, was a Han-martial bannerman. Despite a Chinese last name, Shi was actually a Manchu of the Guwalgiya clan, having joined Nurhaci in 1622. He was named commander of one of the two Chinese military detachments formed in 1637, the precursors of the Hanjun (Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao (Annual Tables of Qing Period Officials), 4 vols, Qian Shipu, ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980):2224-2289; Qingshi liezhuan (QSLZ) (Qing History Biographies), 80 juan (Beiping: 1928, reprinted Taipei:1966):5:35b; Hummel 1943-1944:797.
[Gao] Laifeng investigated their [the soldiers'] wrongdoings and reported them in detail to the garrison general, who put them aside and failed to pursue them. On another occasion [Gao] uncovered a case where people were fraudulently using the seal of the garrison general. He exposed their crime [but] they were released.23

No doubt such problems were due in large part simply to differences in military and civilian status such as one might find in any city with a resident military force. At the same time, one must recall that, for bannermen, their military status was intimately tied to their ethnic status. This aspect of garrison-town relations became apparent, for example, when troops of the Manchu Eight Banners were ordered temporarily to take over the Zhenjiang garrison in 1659. A Han Chinese official touring the area memorialized that this was not desirable because the population stood in great fear of the "habitual fierceness and cruelty" of Manchu troops, who tended, he said, to be "uncontrollable."24 The civilian population could hardly have been expected to forget the ethnic differences between themselves and the Qing bannermen, no matter their banner affiliation. The reverse being equally true, it is safe to say that bannerman-civilian relations in the early Qing were marked by definite ethnic overtones, though for Hanjun of diminishing proportions over time.25

23 ZJFZ 34:34a.
24 SZSL 129:5a-6b. The emperor responded in a blistering rescript, "What is all this talk about the 'fierceness and cruelty' of Manchu soldiers? What is this talk about their unruliness? What country is Ma Tengsheng [the memorialist] from, anyway?" Ma was removed from office shortly thereafter—light punishment, in view of his offensive remarks (SZSL 132:10a-b).
25 The ethnic status of the Hanjun is a thorny question. Created in 1639-1642 along the same pattern as the Manchu and Mongol Eight Banners, the ranks of the Hanjun Eight Banners were composed mostly (the instance of Shi Tingzhu stands as a notable exception) of ethnic Han who had submitted to or been conquered by the Manchus. As many of the former had emigrated very early to Liaodong, it is impossible to draw strict lines between them and Manchus; Wakeman has applied to them the term "frontiersmen" (Wakeman 1985:41-46). For the Qing period, probably the most appropriate conception of Hanjun is as an ethno-military category distinct from Han (nikan), but of a status inferior to either Manchu or Mongol bannermen. I have chosen the literal English translation "Han-martial" over "Han bannerman," which implies that they were simply Han who happened to be bannermen, and over "Chinese-martial," which I believe muddles the sense of ethnic difference. Their particular ethnic identity appears to have survived to the end of the dynasty: a 1912 tract refers to the Han-martial as a "people (minzu) with no place to return to," looked down on by other bannermen and treated by the Han as outsiders (Yang Dunyi, Manyi huaxia shimo ji (Complete Account of the Turmoil Wrought by the Manchu Barbarians), 8 + 4 sections (Shanghai:1912):sec. 8:69b-70a). The vicissitudes befalling the Han-martial banners are detailed in an excellent article by Pamela Crossley, "The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-martial Banners" (Late Imperial China 10.1, June 1989), where she offers a different translation for Hanjun.
If Zhenjiang had grown accustomed to the presence of Han-martial bannermen, and they to Zhenjiang, the entire process needed repeating after 1760. The fundamental change in the composition of the Jingkou garrison which took place in that year meant a renewal of the ethnic issue. In what might be considered a third refounding, all 3,000 Han-martial bannermen were replaced by 1,800 Mongol bannermen from the Jiangning garrison at Nanjing. Simultaneously, the post of garrison general was eliminated and the Jingkou garrison subordinated to Jiangning. Hereafter, the commander of the banner troops at Jingkou, now exclusively Mongol in composition, was a garrison lieutenant general assigned from the all-Manchu Jiangning garrison.

This restructuring was part of a general mid-eighteenth century policy shift, when Han-martial bannermen at many garrison locations were replaced with Manchus and Mongols. Between 1754 and 1763 over 7,000 Hanjun were discharged from Zhenjiang, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou, and were replaced by about 4,500 Mongol and Manchu bannermen. In 1778, 1,500 Hanjun at the Xi'an garrison were also expelled from banner rolls, transferred to the Green Standard forces, and 1,000 Manchu bannermen sent from the capital to take their places; an unknown number of Hanjun from the garrison at Suiyuan met a similar fate. Certainly, the expulsion of the Han-martial was intended to help relieve the worsening livelihood of the greatly expanded Manchu and Mongol banner population by transferring jobs to these banners. At the same time, it is quite possible that Han bannermen were no longer believed to be adequate representatives of dynastic interests. The fact that,

27 It is worth noting that ethnic Manchus could belong to the Mongol banners; Mongols could sometimes also be enrolled in the more prestigious Manchu banners. Among officers there was professional mobility between banners, regardless of individual affiliation.
28 Dantuxian zhi (DTXZ) (Gazetteer of Dantu County), 60+4 juan, Shen Baozhen, Lu Yaodou et al, eds. (1877):20:11b.
30 Chen and Fu 1981:30.
of the *Hanjun* eliminated from the Jingkou garrison, one-third chose to become civilian residents of Zhenjiang\(^{33}\) suggests that many *Hanjun* garrison soldiers, who were prone to falling into the "soft" ways of Chinese society, identified closely with the locality. This would have been detrimental to Qing local control, and the substitution of Mongol or Manchu companies emerged as the preferred solution. The change in the ethnic identity of the garrison may have helped preserve its sense of separateness—though nothing in the record permits confirmation or rejection of this hypothesis—because, as the garrison’s disastrous fall in 1842 would reveal, ethnic differences remained quite clear two generations later.

*The British Are Coming!*

The concatenation of greed, ignorance, and stubbornness that led to the outbreak of war between England and China in the summer of 1840 is too well-known to warrant full rehearsal here.\(^{34}\) Having succeeded for a time in parrying British economic and military threats, by the first half of 1842 the Qing court faced dismal prospects. Ningbo had been occupied by the British since October of the previous year, and an attempt to free the city in March had failed to dislodge them. The English left on their own in May, only to overwhelm the garrison at Zhapu, a mere seventy miles from Hangzhou, shortly afterwards. In mid-June, the commercial centers of Shanghai and Wusong fell virtually without resistance. The picture grew bleaker still in early July when a British force of seventy-five ships and ten thousand men rendezvoused at the mouth of the Yangzi and began sailing up the river. Two years earlier a fleet had been sent up the coast, attacking strategic locations as it moved northward, until the mission reached Tianjin, where it created a panic but failed to force terms. This time the British were going for an arterial stranglehold: the expedition was to cut the Grand Canal, suppress traffic on the lower Yangzi, and, if need be, take Nanjing. All of this to force the Qing government to pay an indemnity for the opium which Commissioner Lin Zexu had destroyed, to grant freer terms of trade, and to cede Hong Kong. The only thing standing between the British and Nanjing, second city of the empire, was the banner garrison at Jingkou under the command of Garrison Lieutenant General Hailing.

\(^{33}\) *GZSL* 680:20a.

\(^{34}\) The reader is referred to the accounts in Fay 1975 and Graham 1978, upon which this summary relies.
Born into the Manchu Bordered White Banner, Hailing (1780?-1842), of the Gorolo clan, had been named to the post at Jingkou in January 1841, having arrived at the Jiangning garrison three months before. His early career appears ordinary enough, though he achieved some distinction during campaigns in 1813-1814 to suppress the Tianlijiao insurgency. He served in various minor garrisons, rising steadily in rank until 1835, when he was demoted for having become "addicted to the easy life" and neglecting his duties. Evidently mending his ways, he attained the prestigious rank of garrison lieutenant general in 1840. He was first commissioned to the Xi'an garrison, but for reasons unknown this order was changed one month later and he was sent to Jiangning. Given that troubles on the coast had already begun by this time, Hailing's appointment to Jingkou signified the court's trust in him not to let the barbarians break the "lock" of the Yangzi.

The city which Hailing was charged with protecting was among the richest in Jiangnan. One of the British called Zhenjiang the "prettiest Chinese town" he had yet seen: "The houses were all well kept, and the interior of many magnificent; the streets well-paved and clean; and open grassy spaces and gardens gave a grace and airiness not usually met with in walled cities." He reported further that every house in the "Manchu quarter" had flowers planted around it, a curious thing, given that fires and looting had reduced the town to rubble by the time the British arrived on the scene. The remark by another British observer, that those who fled left behind many valuables—"silks and satins lay about in such profusion that the only difficulty was to choose among them" —also attests to the

35 "Zhuanbao" (ZB) (Biographic Packets), National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei (n.d.): no. 1878-1; Qingshi gao (QSG) (Draft History of the Qing), 529 juan, Zhao Erxun et al., eds. (1928); reprinted Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977):372:11531; QSLZ 38:54b-55b. The biographic packet contains no information prior to 1810. I am guessing that Hailing was thirty by the time he attained the rank of lieutenant (xiaoqixiao) in that year.


37 Wei Yuan, "Daoguang yangsao zhengfu ji" (The Conquest by Foreign Ships During the Daoguang Reign), 2 juan (1876; in YPZZ 6:137-167):162; Yang Qi, Chu weicheng ji (Getting Out of the Beleaguered City) (Colophon dated 1891; in YPZZ 3:41-52):42.

38 This or, more commonly, "Tartar city," were the terms applied by the English to all Eight Banner garrisons. As already noted, the garrison force at Zhenjiang was drawn from the Mongol banners; the total population counted 9,000 men, women, and children (JKBQZ 1:2b).


40 Bernard and Hall:431.
city's affluence.

As defender of Zhenjiang, Hailing took his responsibilities seriously, displaying concern for the foreign menace in an early memorial from Jingkou. He outlined plans to intensify training for the roughly 1,200 men and officers under his command, vowing at the same time to exterminate all traitors. In autumn 1841, noting the large number of alien ships near the coast and anticipating a possible foreign advance up the Yangzi, Hailing requested funds to repair the city walls. When in September the English captured Dinghai, he was exceedingly alarmed, "prevented from sleeping and eating for several days and nights." He decided to ask for 4,000 reinforcements from the Northeast, Zhili, and Shandong. Such troops, he said, were one hundred times more valuable than soldiers from the south. A revealing comment on the differences that existed between bannermen. Furthermore, he planned to increase the size of the two "naval" installations at Shuishan and Guazhou under the jurisdiction of the Jingkou garrison. In another report to the throne in March 1842, Hailing expressed fears over the safety of rice shipments up the Grand Canal, a point which does not appear to have been raised by anyone else until the English were only a few miles from the city. In the same memorial he warned that although the river was difficult to navigate because of sand banks, a prevailing southeast wind meant that when the tide came in the waters rose considerably—so high that it was not possible to guarantee that British ships could not penetrate as far upriver as Zhenjiang.45 While the emperor seems to have concurred in the need to plan ahead, and especially in the need to guard against traitors, i.e., hanjian, who provided food and information to the British, little material support

41 CBYWSM 24:21b-22b.
42 "Gongzhongdang" (GZD(DG)) (Secret Palace Memorials), Daoguang reign, National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei: no. 4073 (18 October 1841). For a shortened version of this memorial and the imperial reply, see CBYWSM 35:20b-22a.
43 They proved useless in the resistance. The outpost at Shuishan, fifty li downstream from Zhenjiang, had been established in 1726 and was manned by Chinese Green Standard (liüying) soldiers. As the British slowly neared, the men at the station reportedly begged Hailing for ammunition but were turned down; when the British actually appeared, they fled at the first cannonade, leaving the narrow river passage undefended (DTXZ 20:12b-13a; Chen Qingnian, "Daoguang Yingjian po Zhenjiang ji" (The Taking of Zhenjiang by English Warships in the Daoguang Period), Hengshan xiangren leigao (1897; published 1920), juan 5:4a.
44 CBYWSM 43:32a; 55:2b-3b.
45 CBYWSM 43:31b.
46 CBYWSM 35:23b.
47 XZSL 348:27a-28b; 357:18a-b; 359:14a-b; 360:2a-b; 369:26a-b; 371:7a; 372:8a-9a; 373:16b-17a; CBYWSM 40:36b-37a.
actually came through. Only 400 men were eventually transferred to Jingkou—Manchu bannermen from the Qingzhou garrison in Shandong—one-tenth the number Hailing estimated he needed. Later accusations that Hailing was a "stupid, silly person," do not seem borne out by the foresight and attention to detail evidenced in these memorials. That defenses at Zhenjiang proved inadequate was as much the fault of those in the central military bureaucracy as it was of those in the local banner command.

Preparations, such as they were, were complete by the time British ships reached Shuishan on July 12. With Jingkou's Mongol bannermen and the Manchu bannermen from Shandong, Hailing had 1,600 soldiers within the city. 1,000 Green Standard soldiers from Sichuan under Provincial Commander-in-chief Qishen were camped outside the walls (now in good shape), and 1,000 further reinforcements led by Hubei Commander-in-chief Liu Yunxiao were a day's march from the city. But as the foreign ships continued upriver unhindered, it was suddenly feared that defenses were too thin: by July 14, the phrase "urgent crisis" (weiji) began to be applied to the situation. Eleventh-hour memorials were dispatched to try to secure more troops, but "all around were heard the songs of Chu." Cannon emplacements along the river were abandoned. Strings of fireboats assembled at great effort could not be effectively maneuvered, burning dramatically but harmlessly. Hailing received orders to lead his men out of the city and engage the British the moment they came ashore; instead he remained safe within its walls. Indeed, as Governor-general Niujian and Jiangning Garrison General Dejubu realized, there was very little else for Hailing to do but wait for the enemy to come to him and to hope that his ammunition held out.

When the first ships reconnoitered Zhenjiang on July 16, not a shot was fired on them. Perplexed, the British concluded that Qing troops had withdrawn. Three days later the entire fleet had collected opposite the city, which "appeared to have been entirely deserted; not a living creature was to be seen on the walls or buildings; no flags were flying ... no guns were seen ... no smoke rising from the houses." Since there was no

48 XZSL 372:35b-36a.
49 Wei: 162.
50 Crossley makes much the same point concerning the defeat at Zhapu (1990:117-118).
51 CBYWSM 54:37a-38b.
52 Zhu: 77.
53 CBYWSM 54:43b.
54 Bernard and Hall: 421.
55 Ouchterlony:337.
activity on the shore there was no one to impress for information and no way to ascertain whether even here, at this crucial juncture of the river, they would be suffered to pass without a fight. One of the British present wrote of something "ominous" about the silence in which they waited. They stayed on the far side of the swollen river, out of reach of the occasional fire directed their way (the army had not left after all), and planned to occupy the city by force on the morning of July 21. Though no resistance was expected, as the Chinese Repository reported events later, "on the whole, perhaps, the scenes of this day, July 21st, 1842, were more remarkable than those of any other day since the war began."

**Hailing Takes Charge**

The situation inside the city offered a powerful contrast to the apparent lack of activity observed by the British. If the Chinese accounts are at all to be believed—and there is sufficient independent corroboration between texts to trust their general veracity—pandemonium prevailed. Rumors of the approaching foreign ships and news of the occupation of Wusong and Shanghai had produced, not surprisingly, widespread fear among the people; even more unsettling was the discovery that the citizens of Yangzhou had bought off the British, leaving Zhenjiang as the remaining natural target. Toward the end of June, intending perhaps to provide the well-to-do an opportunity to move their wealth to a safer place, Hailing ordered the most prosperous families to leave town. In early July, he ordered all bannermen, including those posted at artillery fortifications near the eastern docks, to move inside the city. From this time on, bannermen were not to set foot outside the walls. Such a step meant that the coast would be left undefended and that public order in the suburbs would slowly deteriorate. It also announced Hailing's basic strategy: sit tight and hold the fort.

The inherently passive character of such a defense, called by some (possibly cynically) the "Iron Lock Scheme" (tiesuo zhi ji), hardly instilled

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56 Ouchterlony:348.
57 Chinese Repository (Hong Kong) XI.9 (September 1842):519.
58 Later nineteenth-century chroniclers of the Opium War, Liang Tingnan, Wei Yuan, and Chen Qingnian, also used these accounts. While this is certainly no guarantee of complete accuracy, it does vouch for authenticity.
59 Fa Zhirui, Jingkou fencheng lu (Record of the Collapse of the City of Jingkou), (1843; in YPZZ 3:53-74):61.
60 Zhu:75.
61 Zhu:75; Yang:41.
62 Fa:54.
confidence in the populace. For many, remaining in the city meant certain disaster if the garrison fell, while flight held at least the hope of survival. Daily, more and more people decided to leave while the leaving was good, even at the risk of being robbed by bandit gangs prowling the roads leading from the city. Some paid exorbitant rates to boatmen to ferry them upriver where they might stay with relatives in the countryside, while others, anxious to avoid river pirates, tried to escape in flimsy leaking craft they had purchased for small fortunes. Nor were ordinary residents the only ones afraid. The district magistrate, prefect, and circuit intendant all moved their families out as well. The garrison commander himself apparently had already taken the precaution of sending his wife, concubine, and children to live in a nearby town as soon as the alarming news of the June 18 massacre of Manchu troops at Zhapu had reached him. By July 14, about half the the population of Zhenjiang had fled. Nonetheless, the streets were impassable the next day as even more people continued to escape.

Apart from the threat posed by the nearing foreign warships there was significantly more behind the Zhenjiang exodus: this was the standing order given to all bannermen to ferret out hanjian. The policy had taken force on July 9. On that day, Hailing ordered his men to disperse across the city and arrest all suspected traitors. Their powers thus expanded, bannermen began "picking people off the street, calling them hanjian ... throwing them into jail and putting them in chains. No appeals were allowed." Banner soldiers took the opportunity to loot as they patrolled, the allure of rewards for the capture of spies leading as well to other indiscriminate crimes: "Whenever women or children saw banner soldiers, they became frightened and tried to run away. The soldiers chased and killed them, then reported their 'achievements' to the commander to collect their rewards;" the funds for these bounties came from the prefectural treasury, now under Hailing's control. One witness recorded his escape down a narrow alley from a group of Manchu and circuit intendant all moved their families out as well. The garrison commander himself apparently had already taken the precaution of sending his wife, concubine, and children to live in a nearby town as soon as the alarming news

63 Fa:54-57; Zhu:75.
64 Yang:41; Zhu:75.
65 Fa:60; Yang:42.
66 Zhu:75.
67 Zhu:75; Fa:64.
68 CBYWSM 55:20a.
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64 Yang:41; Zhu:75.
65 Fa:60; Yang:42.
66 Zhu:75.
67 Zhu:75; Fa:64.
68 CBYWSM 55:20a.
69 Fa:64.
70 Zhu:77-78; Yang:42.
71 Fa:64.
To make matters worse, the same day (July 9) that Hailing began the wholesale arrest of traitors, he cut the time the city gates were to be kept open from twelve to eight hours. The economic and psychological effects of such a move were devastating. Earlier in the year, when hours first became somewhat irregular and the gates would close before dark, slight fear began to spread; the result now was panic. Why this should be so is soon apparent if one considers that, like highways, railroad stations and airports in modern cities, gates functioned as the main conduits for human and commercial traffic in and out of Chinese cities. Closing the gates early or at unpredictable hours destabilized economic activity both regionally—merchants from other places found themselves unable to make transactions and were stranded outside the walls—and locally, since it killed business in the commercial areas near the entrances to the city. Moreover, since the opening and closing of the gates generally occurred at fixed hours, to change those hours was tantamount, in an age that did not know the wristwatch, to tampering with time itself. It also made leaving the city problematic. One account, describing the scene of the morning of July 15, is particularly vivid:

Those fleeing from the city were as numerous as ants. [As] my home is outside the walls, crowds of people stopped to rest temporarily by my residence. Their boxes, baskets, and bags covered the ground completely. All were waiting for their families to finish coming out, and then they would take a boat or a cart and leave. Suddenly the gates were closing. Some who had just emerged went back in again, and some wanted to get out but couldn't. Others there were, of whose family members only one or two had gotten out—the rest of the family was still inside the walls. They looked at each other, sighing pathetically, unable to utter a sound.

One may wonder if no one opposed this latter-day Draco. At least one did. When the arrests began and the jails filled up, the district magistrate, Qian Yangui, refused to go along with Hailing's demand that all hanjian be quickly tried and punished. Instead, he declared innocent and released nearly all of those placed in his custody. Hailing responded by accusing Qian of being a traitor himself, and threw him out of the city. A few

72 Fa:55.
73 Zhu:77.
74 CBYWSM 55:20b; Fa:65; Yang:42; Bei Qingqiao, "Duoduo yin" (Chanting Alas! Alas!) (1914; in YPZZ 3:175-235):216-217.
days later Hailing sent his men to Qian's residence to arrest his seven remaining assistants, and the magistrate's attempted return on July 17 was blocked by banner soldiers guarding the gates.\textsuperscript{75} The prefect and only other ranking civil official, Xianglin, was related to Hailing by marriage (his sister was betrothed to Hailing's son) and dared not stand up to the garrison commander.\textsuperscript{76} It was he who had permitted the prefectoral purse to fall into Hailing's hands,\textsuperscript{77} and any requests to leave which he allowed required the approval of Hailing.\textsuperscript{78} A brief visit on July 13 by Governor-general Niujian failed to change the configuration of power. The city was in the hands of the Manchu, Hailing.

Strangers Within the Gate

On July 15, one day before the public execution of the suspected traitors, the gates were opened for the last time, from 7 to 9 in the morning. Food was growing scarce, and most of what was available was requisitioned or confiscated to supply the garrison's needs.\textsuperscript{79} Arrests continued, though banditry went on almost unchecked. It was no longer a matter of controlling hanjian, or of confidence in the garrison's ability to defend the town against a foreign attack: the very policies being pursued by the garrison commander in the name of making Zhenjiang safe threatened the well-being of the remaining population: "The common people (baixing) ... were strictly forbidden to leave. If the city was lost, they would fall to the sword; if it didn't, they would die of starvation."\textsuperscript{80}

In the absence of any comprehensive statement from Hailing we cannot be entirely sure what drove an apparently competent, intelligent officer to such extreme measures. Possibly he was becoming psychologically unstable; at the very least we can be certain he was fearful. His troops were few, and his previous military experience had been confined to suppressing poorly-armed inland uprisings—now he confronted a plainly superior waterborne force. Given the circumstances, it is not so surprising he should have panicked. Beyond this, to understand more precisely what was happening in Zhenjiang, we might consider in more detail the problem of hanjian in the Opium War in general. As it first emerged in Guangzhou, the discovery of widespread treachery served handily to

\textsuperscript{75} Fa:65; Zhu:78.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{CBYWSM} 61:5; Fa:63; Yang:42.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{XZSL} 375:32a.
\textsuperscript{78} Fa:63.
\textsuperscript{79} Yang:49; Zhu:77.
\textsuperscript{80} Yang:46.
explain the court's failure to stop the barbarians. By believing that
without the help of quislings the foreigners would never have advanced as
far as they did, reassurance grew that the English were not so powerful
after all.\textsuperscript{81} Blame for defeat could then be thrown on those who treated
regularly with foreigners, especially merchants, who were mistrusted by
both gentry and officials. At a later stage in the war, however, Jiangnan
regional biases had produced a slightly different amalgam of the same atti-
dudes. Suspicion fell not only on merchants, but on Cantonese as a group
(and here the definition of "Cantonese" ought probably be interpreted
loosely to mean anyone from southeast China).\textsuperscript{82}

"Traitor fever" in Jiangnan was distinctive also in that it began before
the British arrived on the scene. Unlike Guangzhou, where it was largely
retributive, in Zhenjiang the hunt for hanjian was preventive in intent.
"The barbarians," it had been observed, "never leave their ships, and the
hanjian never leave the barbarians."\textsuperscript{83} If he could prevent Han spies from
getting near the foreigners, Hailing could prevent food, fresh water, and
above all, intelligence, from reaching the enemy. This plan, had it been
coupled with aggressive shelling from the river's shores, doubtless would
have been effective in halting or at least slowing British progress.\textsuperscript{84} How-
ever, suppressing traitors alone—not that all those being arrested in Zhen-
jiang were actually traitors, of course—was plainly insufficient. Why,
then, such emphasis on this strategy? In a slip (pian) enclosed with one
memorial, Hailing wrote that the main thing to fear from hanjian, besides
their selling food to the foreigners, was their going into hiding to await the
hour of attack, when they would emerge and aid the enemy's side (fu wei
nei ying). Explaining that he had already ordered an inspection using the
bao-jia lists, he went on to report that to keep spies out of the city, the sol-
diers at the city gates were instructed to be on the lookout for "unfamiliar
and suspicious people." Lastly, he was sending bannermen to make "care-
ful, thorough searches everywhere."\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} Wakeman 1966:48-51 ff.
\textsuperscript{82} CBYWSM 24:22a; XZSL 374:2a. It may have been assumed that all Cantonese were mer-
chants. Alternatively, because Guangzhou nationally had been the one point of continuous
contact with foreigners, Guangzhou natives may have been judged guilty of collusion with the
enemy merely by virtue of their birthplace.
\textsuperscript{83} XZSL 363:18b.
\textsuperscript{84} The British complained that absence of local informants hindered their artillery placement;
as a result, during the battle a landing party trying to move some guns into better position
was driven back with casualties by Qing fire (Ouchterlony:382-385).
\textsuperscript{85} GZD(DG) no. 5952 (sent 8 July 1842).
It is apparent from this account that Hailing was concerned not only with people leaving the city, but also with potential enemy collaborators entering. In this regard, the official reports on the fall of the Zhapu garrison acquire particular significance: they said that when the British attacked there, traitors rose within the city to join them, firing rockets upon the Manchu bannermen, causing them to disperse. The massacre of the Zhapu garrison, we know, weighed heavily on Hailing's mind. Apart from offering a preview of the probable fate awaiting him and his men, one surmises that the reported turning of the city against the garrison at Zhapu reminded Hailing of his status as a Manchu soldier in a Chinese city, stirring in him fear of a massacre at Zhenjiang. He resolved to prevent this by making impossible the formation of any similar conspiracy against the Jingkou garrison. Ironically, by terrorizing the population as he did, he ended up setting the garrison against the town, intensifying the very sort of divisiveness he was hoping to forestall.

This was a confrontation on two levels: military versus civilian (jun-min), and bannerman versus townsman (qiren-shimin), both divisions expressing an opposition between superior and inferior in the power structure. Where they differ is that in the first opposition, emphasis was on the bearing of arms, while in the second, recalling our earlier characterization of garrison-city relations, it was on ethnic status. One might question whether this characterization still applied to the situation nearly two hundred years after the founding of the garrison, and sixty years after the transfer of Mongol bannermen to Jingkou. If it did, then where the security of bannermen was affected, the divisiveness represented by acts of Han Chinese collaborators and informants should have been interpreted to some degree as an expression of enmity toward the "strangers" living in the garrisons. And indeed, in the testimony of eyewitnesses we find just this: "The mutterings of the hanjian toward the barbarian bandits were wrongly taken by the garrison lieutenant general to be [intended] against the Manchus and Mongols." Ethnic bias had prevailed also among Manchu officials in Guangzhou, who were convinced that "thousands of Chinese were potential, if not actual, collaborators." Yet there were mitigating circumstances at Guangzhou: hanjian were thought to have become so because extended intercourse with foreigners had brought about their "spiritual degeneracy." At Zhenjiang there were no foreigners, so the problem

86 XZSL 371:6b.
87 Yang:42, "hanjian dui yifei yan fudutong wu yiwei dui Manzhou Menggu yan ..."
89 Wakeman 1966:50.
could not be framed in these terms. Instead, the issue of hanjian assumed dimensions that were less ethical, more ethnic: "traitors" were traitors because they would betray the garrison and deliver Manchu and Mongol bannermen up for slaughter. Whereas in Guangzhou the ethnic situation was only potentially explosive, in Zhenjiang, where Hailing not only believed, but acted in the conviction that a cabal against qiren was afoot, the lid blew off.

Apart from his own sharpened sensitivities, Hailing's obsession with hanjian, leading him to intimidate, imprison, starve, even murder Zhenjiang's non-banner inhabitants, greatly heightened the sense of ethnic separateness among the Chinese of Zhenjiang, who came to feel that the Manchu commander had it in for them: "The city was shut and the markets were closed as well; the hungry had no place to buy rice, not even any place to get bobo." People suspected that the garrison commander would not stop until he had killed all the Han. While it is not clear how many people shared this quasi-genocidal fear, the above writer was not alone in his perception of the confrontation. On July 25, a report filed five days earlier by Changzhen Circuit Intendant Zhou Xu reached the capital in a memorial from Dejubu:

The locality is in [a state of] emergency. Protecting the city is urgent, but the city should guard the people, and cruel measures are inappropriate. Zhenjiang has been closed since the eighth day of the month [July 15], and people's hearts are apprehensive ... from the walls the soldiers have fired cannon and guns upon the commoners, calling them hanjian, ignoring the pleas of the innocent. Every day people are arrested and scores are punished on the spot (lishi zhengfa). There are many false accusations. Han within the city are not permitted to walk on the streets, nor in the evenings to walk in the areas near the outside of the city wall. The defamatory [remarks] flying on the streets are unbelievably shocking.

The impunity with which bannermen treated the people tended also to exacerbate ethnic tension. Before the city was closed, Chinese who wanted to leave were deprived of their possessions as they made their way through

90 A kind of Manchu pastry (efen) made from bean flour, here meaning probably mantou.
91 Yang:42-43.
92 CBYWSM 55:20a-b; XZSL 375:31b-32a, in abridged form.
the forest of soldiers lining the approaches to the gates. Their women were insulted. Some were further humiliated by being forced to stoop or crawl as they walked past bannermen who held their swords low above the heads of those processing between them: "Anyone who lifted his head slightly received a cut." The morning of the British attack, even as the battle for the city was being fought, a group of soldiers removed the earthen rampart and opened the gates at the south end of town to allow their parents, wives, and children to escape while there was still time. Seeing that the bannermen were, by this action, admitting defeat, hundreds of Han residents gathered behind them and waited their turn to leave. But when they tried to follow, "the banner soldiers threatened them mortally with guns and sharp swords, saying, 'How should you people think of getting out this way?'." When the city did fall, there were reports of Chinese residences stormed by bannermen desperate for refuge, who killed anyone still at home and tried to hide; in other cases, the Chinese cursed them and chased them away. The Chinese soldiers assigned to help protect Zhenjiang were maltreated, too, having to scrounge for food—a few days before the battle one witness saw mounted troops gnawing on raw eggplant—because the markets were closed and the garrison provided no rations. Another reported seeing a large group of soldiers approach the walls one night, complaining loudly of the lack of food: "They threatened to fire on and attack the city, abduct Hailing and eat him alive, and otherwise insulted him in a thousand ways." On the eve of the British attack, then, Zhenjiang had split into two camps, bannerman and Han. Martial law prevailed: watches ceased to be beat, the gates remained closed twenty-four hours a day, and the only way out was to bribe a soldier to allow one to rope down the wall. When Hubei Provincial Commander Liu Yunxiao arrived at Zhenjiang with his troops on July 16, the suburbs were in chaos. He took immediate steps by decapitating two offenders, slicing the ears off a third, and flogging a number of others. The heads and ears were displayed, restoring a semblance of order, but Liu's negotiations with Hailing were less successful.

93 Yang:42.
94 Fa:68.
95 CBYWSM 56:21b, 61:4b; Fa:68.
96 Yang:43.
97 Zhu:79.
98 CBYWSM 55:27a, where the term jieyan is used.
99 Zhu:78.
100 Fa:64.
101 Zhu:77.
Though the garrison commander admitted Liu to the city and heard his arguments, he remained adamant on his closed-city policy, declaring that he would make Zhenjiang an "Iron Fortress" (jincheng tangchi), invulnerable to barbarian attack. Even if the suburbs were destroyed, Hailing reasoned, the city itself would be unaffected.\(^{102}\) What he really anticipated can only be guessed at. Two pronouncements were circulated on July 19, one instructing civilians (who had no food) to collect bricks and water jugs with which they might defend themselves in case fighting came down into the streets.\(^{103}\) In the face of that, the other proclamation that same day could have offered little comfort:

> The barbarian ships have intruded into the river. Though we have fired cannon to force them to retreat, they have patrolled as far as the north shore [i.e., above the city]. Their strength is in naval fighting; therefore we will wait until they come ashore outside the wall where the Councillor [Qishen] and the Provincial Commander [Liu Yunxiao] will attack with their joint forces. I will charge out of the city and close the attack. A great victory is certain. Hailing.\(^{104}\)

Most of Zhenjiang's inhabitants no doubt shared the sentiments of one who wrote, "there is nothing for us to do but wait, our hands tied, to die."\(^{105}\)

**Dynastic Hero, Local Villain**

In the event, the British victory came quickly, the city's defenses collapsing within a few hours as described in the opening section. The Chinese troops under Liu Yunxiao and Qishen, most of whom had to prepare for battle on empty stomachs,\(^ {106}\) fled without a fight—their generals led the retreat on horseback. The British were thus free to concentrate efforts on overcoming the startling opposition they encountered at the walls. The fighting was savage, but like all contests between Qing and western armies, military technology made a crucial difference. A last stand was fought around 2 p.m., rousing Gough, the British commander, from a nap. It was beaten back, though not without losses.\(^ {107}\) On the Chinese side,

\(^{102}\) Zhu:77.
\(^{103}\) Zhu:79.
\(^{104}\) Fa:65.
\(^{105}\) Zhu:78.
\(^{106}\) CBYWSM 56:22b.
\(^{107}\) Bernard and Hall:429-430; Ouchterlony:389. The 168 casualties suffered by the British at Zhenjiang were the greatest of any engagement of the Opium War. Half of the 34 deaths were reported from sunstroke (Bernard and Hall:432).
preliminary reports on the day’s actions showed at least 400 bannermen dead or wounded, and final totals must have been considerably higher.¹⁰⁸ Thousands of garrison refugees were scattered in nearby towns, and their attempt in early August to move back was frustrated by British soldiers guarding the city.¹⁰⁹ Those who had not fled, hoping perhaps to save some of their property, in the end had to hide, some in the city’s waterways and ponds, only to emerge later, "the duckweed still stuck all over their faces, [looking like] blue-faced ghosts. Having lost their possessions and their homes, it was difficult to tell whether it was they or those who had died in battle who had left this world."¹¹⁰

One of the most interesting aspects of the aftermath of the fall of Zhenjiang, and a further comment on the role of hanjian, was the change in the perception of the informant. Immediately after the city fell, the story began circulating that someone had gone over to inform the English of the internal state of affairs, urging them to act quickly. "To delay," he is supposed to have pleaded, "would on the contrary bring more harm to the people." This "turncoat," a monk, claimed to have been released by a Qingzhou banner captain who had confided in him that,

Commander Hai[ling] is killing people every day and sees everybody as a traitor. Yet still he is not satisfied. Today he wants [us] Qingzhou soldiers to ... patrol the four gates, killing anyone we happen to meet. After killing everybody on the streets, we are to do a house-by-house search, executing all whom we find. In just a few days no more commoners will be left. With only banner soldiers left inside, they can defend the walls without worry. I can’t bear to see your corpse, [so] I’ll help you escape by rope. Go quickly!¹¹¹

Such a story helped explain the city’s fall: since the British were thought to have been ignorant of the existence of the vulnerable northern gate,¹¹² the attack there the morning of the battle came as a surprise, and the monk thus held responsible for enlightening the enemy.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Zhu:85.
¹¹⁰ Yang:43.
¹¹² JKBQZ 1:14b-15a.
¹¹³ Guochao qixian leizheng chubian (Classified Compendium of Antique Documents of the Dynasty (First Compilation), 484 juan, Li Heng et al, eds. (1890):374:24a-b; Chen:6a, 7b.
This conforms with the Guangzhou hanjian pattern, with the telling exception that nowhere is the Zhenjiang informant labeled a traitor. In fact, quite the opposite: "Fortunately, the Qingzhou troops let slip the word, otherwise, the lives of all in the city would have been imperiled."\[114\] This leads one to wonder whether the British capture of the city was held to be a fall or a liberation. For the bannermen, the answer is obvious. But for the Chinese of Zhenjiang, the longer Hailing had to prepare his defenses, the greater their chances of being picked up as hanjian, or of running out of food. Other sources aver likewise that, "the people were only afraid that the English barbarians would not take the city."\[115\] Such feelings emphasize that the Han inhabitants of Zhenjiang feared the garrison commander's next move, hoping anxiously for an end to the internal siege, even to the point of welcoming the victory of the new foreigners over the old.

The other theme dominant in the legacy of Zhenjiang's fall is the fate of the garrison commander, on which subject there are two schools of opinion. The official version states that Hailing, his wife, and a grandson hanged themselves in Hailing's offices; their bodies were reported to be badly burned from fires that broke out after the sack of the banner quarter.\[116\] The corpses of Hailing and his wife were later positively identified by personal effects that escaped destruction—his silken robe, her gold ring.\[117\] When the British visited the garrison offices they found Hailing's secretary, who told them that Hailing himself had set the fire after returning from the final unsuccessful pitched battle.\[118\] According to another report, Hailing prepared for death by turning northward to express gratitude for imperial benevolence, and then gave orders to put the compound to the torch.\[119\] On July 31 the Daoguang emperor issued an edict praising Hailing for his noble sacrifice and instructing that he be accorded the honors due a lieutenant general (dutong; gūsai ejen). In addition he granted Hailing a posthumous title, ordered a shrine built in memory of him and his martyred wife and grandson, and requested that the surviving members of Hailing's family be brought to the capital for an audience when their period of one hundred days' deep mourning was over.\[120\]

\[114\] Yang:48.
\[115\] Bei:217. The author was a one-time aide to the Manchu official, Yijing.
\[116\] CBYWSM 56:21a. Evidently some family members had rejoined Hailing in the garrison before July 21.
\[117\] ZB no. 1878-3.
\[118\] Ouchterlony:404-405; Loch:123-124.
\[119\] JKBQZ 1:7b.
\[120\] CBYWSM 56:23a-b; XZSL 370:8b-9a. One might note here that the one hundred-day mourning period observed in the Eight Banners was much shorter than the two-year period observed by Chinese civil officials. Moreover, once a bannerman had completed his mourning he was assured of immediate reassignment, either to his original post (if in the capital) or
The sheen of Hailing's glorious sacrifice was soon tarnished. A memorial from Shandong Censor Huang Zonghan impeaching Hailing for "unspeakable malfeasance" and dereliction of duty arrived in the capital in early August. Huang's catalogue of wrongdoings unearthed few excesses not already touched on above, and few probably not already guessed at by the court from the reports received in late July from Dejubu. He blamed Hailing's policies for turning Han against bannerman and explained to the court that the city fell, "not because there was insufficient strength to resist, but because the hearts and minds of the people were dissipated." In the end, an inquiry undertaken by Qiying, though it acknowledged that innocent people were killed, confirmed that Hailing took proper steps in closing the city and exterminating hanjian, in essence forgiving any errors he may have committed.

Zhenjiang's residents favored their own version of the fate that befell the garrison commander. Accounts claimed (with a stereotypical ring) that as defenses crumbled, far from going to an honorable suicide, Hailing in fact escaped from the city, ignoring pleas that he lead his men in a last attack. During his investigation of the situation in Zhenjiang, Qiying noted that the area was rife with rumors about Hailing's disappearance into the countryside, including one that he had taken the tonsure and was holed up in a monastery. Other reports refer to a violent confrontation between garrison troops and townspeople just before the British attack. In one of the more fantastic versions, it is related that the entire population of Zhenjiang turned against the garrison commander, "arising in a fury and surrounding him," at which point Hailing had his troops open fire. In the end, the mob is said to have taken justice into its own hands and put Hailing to death. The drama of this imaginary jacquerie strengthens the impression of the breakdown of social order and underscores the polarization within the city.

Whatever the truth was—the evidence in the British reports would tend to indicate that Hailing in fact died in the line of duty—profound ambivalence regarding Hailing has persisted through the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Several eyewitness accounts of the city's collapse were circulated in defiance of an apparent attempt by the dynasty to gloss over the most sensitive aspects of the disaster,¹²⁸ and Wei Yuan publicized his contempt for Hailing—who, lest it be forgot, was designated a dynastic martyr—in a chapter appended to the popular Shengwu ji. Local historian Chen Qingnian, writing in the late nineteenth century, noted both sides of the debate concerning Hailing, but left the verdict to future historians.¹²⁹ The inscription at the shrine built in Hailing's memory mourns the "cruelty of the people's hearts," that they rejoiced at his death. Yet even this tribute to the late garrison commander gives three reasons why Hailing "could only have died" (bude busi) and five reasons why he "ought to have died" (burong busi).¹³⁰ An early twentieth-century local gazetteer describes this shrine as follows:

The shrine is in memory of the Jingkou garrison commander, Garrison Lieutenant General Hailing, who wronged the nation and brought calamity to the people in the year ren-yin of the Daoguang reign. He paid for his foolishness with his life.¹³¹

Hailing appears in addition in two other gazetteers, one a minor two-juan affair put together by the Jingkou garrison (which found worth repeating the gossip that Hailing fled Zhenjiang after the defeat and hid in the countryside as a monk),¹³² and the other the Xu Dantuxian zhi, published in 1930. The editors wrote regarding the supposed martyrdom of Hailing that, "up to today, local people have their doubts about it."¹³³ Even a history of Zhenjiang written as recently as 1984 reserves caustic language for Hailing's "erroneous thinking" and the resulting confrontation between bannerman and Han.¹³⁴ Hailing's crimes evidently surpassed even the ability of the emperor to whitewash: for the people of this small city on the lower Yangzi, his infamy well outlasted the dynasty.

¹²８Yang:51.
¹²９Chen:10b.
¹³¹ Dantuxian zhi zhiyu (Collected Addenda to the Gazetteer of Dantu County), 21 juan, Li Enyuan, Li Bingrong, eds. (1918):2:35b.
¹³² JKBQZ 1:7b.
Conclusion: Bannerman and Han in the Qing

It has been one aim of this study to show that ethnic tension was a persistent element in urban Qing society, most especially in those cities garrisoned by Eight Banner soldiers. As we saw in the first section, the initial settlement of bannermen in Zhenjiang in 1655 and their resettlement in 1659 were events accompanied by numerous difficulties, including not least the friction brought on by contrasting ethnic backgrounds. The reorganization of the garrison in 1760 saw the replacement of Han-martial by Mongol bannermen; not only did this change reflect ethnically-influenced thinking at the center, but it likely meant a renewal of ethnic awareness locally. In 1842, as depicted above, relations between the garrison and the city deteriorated completely, a deterioration which took place partly along ethnic lines, and we have tried to show how the events surrounding the fall of Zhenjiang were given ethnic interpretations both by survivors of the city's fall and by local historians.

The reader may rightly wonder if a similar sort of confrontation might not have taken place had the garrison troops been Green Standard soldiers and the commander a Han Chinese himself. Doubtless this is possible. In such a case, however, the "we-they" dichotomy would have been simply the opposition between military and civilian—the commander could not have taken the actions of hanjian to be ethnically-inspired plotting against the garrison, nor would the citizens have had reason to fear that "the commander would not stop until he had killed all the Han." The fact that the Jingkou garrison was staffed by bannermen and that bannermen were ethnically distinct from the townspeople meant that ethnicity was a category that could be, and was, called upon to express the tension between garrison and town in certain situations.

The limit of the focus here prevents coming to any definitive conclusions about the frequency or seriousness of ethnic tension between bannermen and Han Chinese during the Qing period. One is inclined to think that for the most part such tension was latent, but this may simply reflect the reality the dynasty was trying to project, or the fact that we have not looked hard enough. At present the most that can be said is that ethnic tension was unquestionably in evidence in Zhenjiang in 1842. Yet, given the existing historiography, even this modest assertion requires further explanation. After all, weren't all "Manchus" completely sinified by the nineteenth century?

This line of thinking, long dominant in the scholarship, stems from an ethnocentric view of the history of China, one which makes its interpretations from the vantage point of the Han people to whom is attributed
absolute assimilative power. The cherished assumption of the inherent superiority of Han culture and institutions upon which this view is predicated is surely overdue for retirement. Too much is known about the historical development of China under the Liao, Jin, and Yuan to continue to ascribe—to the genius of the central plain. As for the Qing, since over forty years ago when Franz Michael first pointed it out in English, it has been a favorite axiom of Western historians that the real reason for the success of the Qing state was its borrowing of "traditional Confucian forms" from the Ming, and little attention has been paid to the "non-Confucian" elements of Manchu rule. While this is understandable—historians of China are naturally more familiar with things Chinese—the extension of the principle has led to an oversimplified picture of interethnic relations and to the conclusion that all bannermen were sinified (hanhua) during the Qing in an irresistible decline ending with their "disappearance" into Chinese society after the 1911 revolution.

The matter is ticklish. For one thing, it is nonsense to dispute the utility of institutions inherited from the Ming, because they were a vital legacy and an important factor in Qing success (as were Yuan institutions, one might add, in Ming success). Yet at least as important a factor were the differences between Ming and Qing, differences having their origins in the separate ethnic styles of the Chinese and the Manchus. In this connection, the main problem has been that for the vast majority of bannermen there is no doubt that assimilation did take place: the atrophy of the Manchu language and widespread martial declension are only two of the more apparent examples of this process. This having been said, the fact is that ethnic identity is a sensibility not easily suppressed or overthrown. Few would be willing to deny its importance in the present, and we ought to be wary of dismissing it as an irrelevant factor historically. A better understanding of Qing rule will result, it is proposed, through an improved understanding of ethnic interaction in Qing China.

One reason that historians have had difficulty with ethnicity is that a sophisticated theoretical grasp of the concept has been lacking. Partly this

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135 As exemplified in Yao 1960, where the cultures of all nationalities that have come to be included in the modern Chinese polity are labeled "sub-cultures" of the primary "Han-Tang" culture.

136 Michael 1942.

137 Hsiao 1955:66; Manzu jianshi:185; Kanda:271-272, 296. Crossley discusses this issue also, citing Wittfogel, Feng, and Wright (1990:224-225). Recently, Chinese scholars have come to realize that the nature of assimilation (minzu ronghe) is more complex than previously assumed; see, for example, Liu 1984.
is because of the influence of the tradition-bound view of sinification, and in part also because of discomfort in handling terms such as "people," "nationality," "race," and "ethnic group" (in Chinese, zu or minzu). "People" is vague (the min without the zu), while "nationality" is confusing because it implies modern ideas of self-determination, citizenship, or formal registration as a minority group. "Race" accentuates descent and physical characteristics, neglecting cultural and psychological factors. The term "ethnic group" (with its attendant forms, "ethnic," "ethnic identity," "ethnicity") seems least objectionable. Though it, too, has its modern sociological usage, "ethnic group" calls also on a Greek root, ethnos, which would seem reasonably close to zu and to the modern Chinese minzu.

For "ethnicity" I adopt its definition by Charles Keyes as a "cultural interpretation of descent," where descent includes both social and genetic aspects. In this sense, ethnicity is understood not as something immutable, but rather as being flexible and adaptable. Though it is limited by facts of ancestry, birth, and appearance (ascription), the better part of ethnicity is in fact taught, meaning that the individual takes and internalizes the various symbols of his ethnic identity (affection). Such symbols include homeland, language, religion, music, myths, and so on. These symbols combine to form what Edward Spicer has called a "persistent identity system," an essential feature of which is the individual's "belief in his personal affiliation" with what the symbols stand for. A final characteristic of such systems is that what is excluded from them is often just as important as what is included. Besides overt cultural features, then, the boundaries maintained by an ethnic group are of crucial importance.

Such a definition permits a historically-informed approach to the problem of ethnic style and ethnic interaction in the Qing. For one thing, it acknowledges the possibility of change. This is vital—it would be futile to

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138 Pamela Crossley states her reasons for preferring "race" as the proper analytical category in a 1987 article, "Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage" (Journal of Asian Studies 46.4). Having also struggled with this question, I confess that, whatever the similarities between Chinese zu and early modern English "race" or "folk," I am more comfortable using "ethnicity" as explained above to analyze the situation in the banners. Rhetorical clarity demands a rigorous distinction between these categories, and the interchanging of these terms as if they were synonymous (cf. Crossley 1990, 5, 185, and 221-223) would seem only to confuse the situation further.

139 Keyes 1981:5. Royce offers this definition for ethnic group: "a reference group invoked by people who share a common historical style (which may only be assumed), based on overt features and values, and who, through the process of interaction with others, identify themselves as sharing that style" (Royce 1982:27).

140 Spicer 1971:795-796.

141 Barth 1969.
try to prove that the symbols (much less the connotations) of Manchu ethnic identity in the early seventeenth century were the same as those in the early twentieth. Once the fact of ethnic change is admitted, one can see that it is neither a unidirectional nor a unitary process.\textsuperscript{142} A relevant example might be the loss of ability in Manchu among Manchu bannermen. Although they came to speak Chinese instead, this was a Chinese that, in the north, showed Altaic influence lexically\textsuperscript{143} and possibly structurally as well.\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, this definition, since it lays bare the affective dimension of ethnicity, enables one to explore ethnic differences not only between bannermen and Han, but also (though no such analysis is attempted here) the differences between bannermen. After all, banner society, to coin a phrase, was divided internally in a number of ways: Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial, capital and garrison, grand councillor and banner supernumerary. The realization dawns that not all bannermen shared the same ethnic identity\textsuperscript{145} and that these identities were not affected equally by the particular aspects of Chinese society they encountered. Finally, this definition allows us to dispense with the obsolete model of ethnic interaction as one of equilibrium punctuated by conflict, and replace it with a model of ethnic opposition as the norm. According to the oppositional model, differences between ethnic groups exist not so much in spite of contact with members of other groups, but rather because of such contact.\textsuperscript{146} In the words of one anthropologist, Fredrik Barth,

\begin{quote}
... ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations in which embracing social system are built.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

This paradigm frees us from the lockstep conclusion of previous thinking that because bannermen had to function in a society overwhelmingly

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{142} Banton 1981:35-36. That Manchu and Han-martial ethnic identity underwent significant change over time is recognized and described by Crossley (1990, 1988), raising questions over her choice of the term "race," which she characterizes as "immutable" and "genealogically-determined" (1988:65,n.5).
\textsuperscript{143} Okada 1980; Guan and Meng 1987.
\textsuperscript{144} Hashimoto 1986.
\textsuperscript{145} Evidence for this is seen in Zhenjiang in 1842, where discord was reported between Jingkou Mongol bannermen and the Manchu bannermen transferred from Qingzhou (Fa:68).
\textsuperscript{146} Examples of persistent identity systems which have survived in "contrasting sociocultural environments" are the Jewish, the Basque, the Irish, the Yaqui, the Navajo, and the Acadian, among others (Spicer:797, 799; Keyes:23).
\textsuperscript{147} Barth:9-10.
\end{footnotes}
populated by Han Chinese they inevitably were completely assimilated into that society. The premises of the model of ethnic opposition permit a more balanced and textured examination of the nature of assimilation (defined as the "reduction of cultural distance" between groups)\(^{148}\) of bannermen. To what degree and in what areas the ethnic identity of Qing bannermen actually persisted is a question that awaits a detailed examination of life in the Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial banners. That it persisted, however, seems beyond question. One preliminary observation should be made here, which is that we are speaking of ethnicity only within the banners, and only up until the early years of the Chinese republic. The growth of modern Mongol nationalism beginning in the 1890s, or the resurgence of Manchu ethnic awareness during the 1980s\(^{149}\) represent a different sort of ethnic identity, one formed as a means of attaining objective aims with respect to the state, or as an effort to recover and reconstitute elements of an identity hastily concealed or abandoned seventy years ago. While according to our definition above not for these reasons any less valid as ethnic identities, still they are to be distinguished from ethnicity in the banners during the Qing.\(^{150}\)

In sum, what is being proposed here is a reevaluation of the relationship between majority and minority in late imperial China, and a reassessment of the assumptions and conclusions of assimilation in China (sinification).\(^{151}\) The historical memories of the Chinese and of bannermen were not so short, and historical instances of "total assimilation"\(^{152}\) are in any event quite rare. Concluding from this that sinification was not a zero-sum game, we can be sure that it did not culminate in the elimination of all forms of ethnic identity in the banners and the substitution there of healthy, happy, Han people. Finally, despite the fact of assimilation among Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial bannermen, it should be clear from the case of Jingkou that bannermen neither viewed themselves as Han Chinese, nor did Han living in garrison cities such as Zhenjiang, even in the nineteenth century, view bannermen as being other than different. This difference in consciousness, emphasizing as it does the definite limits to sinification, suggests that the ethnic picture in Qing China was more complex than has been recognized and encourages a revision in our thinking.

\(^{148}\) Banton:50.

\(^{149}\) One might consider the rise in the number of those identifying themselves as Manchus in the last census (7 million in 1987, up from 2.65 million in 1978), the creation of four Manzu zizhixian, the founding of three new journals of Manchu studies, and the popularity of night courses in Manchu in the Beijing area as evidence of this resurgence.

\(^{150}\) Crossley 1990:222-223, 228; it might be pointed out, places them all in the continuum of an emerging "Manchu racial identity."

\(^{151}\) The reader is referred to the sensitive discussion by Crossley (on "sinicization") in the conclusion to Orphan Warriors.

\(^{152}\) Defined as the case in which "the migrant group or the descendants disappear into the larger society and lose their ethnic distinctiveness," (Keyes:16).
Glossary

baixing 百姓
baqi 八旗
baqi zidi 八旗子弟
bobo 铜锣
bude busi 不得不死
burong busi 不容不死
chuanshan 圆山
Dejubu 德布
dutong 都统
fu wei nei ying 伏為內應
fudutong 副都统
Hailing 海陵、海陵
hanhua 漢化
hanjian 漢奸
Hanjun 滿軍
Huang Zonghan 黃宗漢
Jiangnan 江南
Jiangning 江寧
jiejian 戒嚴
jincheng tangchi 金陵湯池
Jingkou 京口
junmin 軍民
lishi zhengfa 立時正法
Liu Yunxiao 劉元孝
lüying 綠營
mantou 飾頭
Manzhou 滿洲
Manzu zizhixian 滿族自治縣
min 民
minzu 民族
minzu ronghe 民族融合
Niujian 牛鑄
pian 片
Qian Yangui 錢燕貴
Qingzhou 青州
qiren 旗人
Qishen 齊慎
Qiying 曲英
Shi Tingzhu 石廷柱
shimin 市民
tiesuo zhi ji 鐵鎖之計
weisuo 衛所
weiji 危急
Xianglin 祥麟
xiaoqixiao 駙騎校
Zhapu 乍浦
zhenhai dajiangjun 鎮海大將軍
Zhenjiang 鎮江
Zhou Xu 周順
zhufangying 駐防營
zu 族
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DQSL. *Da Qing lichao shilu* (The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty). 1937. Shizu (Shunzhi), Shengzu (Kangxi), Gaozong (Qianlong), Xuanzong (Daozong) reigns. Fengtian (Shenyang): 1937. Reprinted Taipei: Huawen, 1963.

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GZSL. *Gaozong shilu*. See DQSL.

HCBZ. "Huangchao bingzhi" (Military Monographs of the Dynasty), "xunlianmen, junli" chapters. Held in National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei.

HCWXTK. *Huangchao wenxian tongkao* (Documentary Encyclopedia of Imperial Institutions). 300 juan. 1786.


JKW. "Jingkou zhufang geying jiangshi ji dutong Haigong wen" (Text for Sacrifices of the Officers and Men of the Jingkou Garrison in Memory of the Honorable Lieutenant General Hailing). In YPZZ 6:706-707.

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