INTERESTS, RELATIONSHIPS, IDENTITIES: Three Central Issues for Individuals and Groups in Negotiating Their Social Environment

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Abstract This chapter begins with a summary of a model, developed half a century ago, that distinguishes three qualitatively different processes of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. The model, originally geared to and experimentally tested in the context of persuasive communication, was subsequently applied to influence in the context of long-term relationships, including psychotherapy, international exchanges, and the socialization of national/ethnic identity. It has been extended to analysis of the relationship of individuals to social systems. Individuals’ rule, role, and value orientations to a system—conceptually linked to compliance, identification, and internalization—predict different reactions to their own violations of societal standards, different patterns of personal involvement in the political system, and differences in attitude toward authorities and readiness to obey. In a further extension of the model, three approaches to peacemaking in international or intergroup conflicts are identified—conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation—which, respectively, focus on the accommodation of interests, relationships, and identities, and are conducive to changes at the level of compliance, identification, and internalization.
INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, I submitted a 192-page essay to the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), entitled *Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: A Theoretical and Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Influence* (Kelman 1956). The essay was awarded the AAAS Socio-Psychological Prize for 1956.

I had planned to publish the theory and research reported in that essay in book form. In fact, I signed a contract with a major publisher, whose psychology editor considered the manuscript virtually ready for publication, requiring only an introductory chapter and minor editorial changes. I felt, however, that the book required some additional experimental work and further theoretical elaboration. Over the next few years, I did in fact carry out and supervise several additional experiments; I revised and expanded several chapters; and I stayed on top of the rapidly growing experimental literature. But the task grew larger and I allowed myself to be sidetracked by numerous other projects. As a consequence, the book has remained unpublished (at least so far!).

I did publish an article summarizing the theoretical model (Kelman 1961) and an abbreviated report of the original experimental test of the model (Kelman 1958). Also, elaborations of the model were presented in later publications (Kelman 1974, Kelman & Hamilton 1989). The 1958 and 1961 articles have been reprinted many times and frequently cited in textbooks and research publications. *Processes of Opinion Change* (Kelman 1961) was in fact selected as a “citation classic” some years ago. The model continues to be used as a framework for research, particularly in applied contexts.

Though, happily, the model has not been ignored or forgotten in the field, it did not follow the conventional career that I had in mind for it in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I did not publish the full original manuscript or the edited version that I was working on for some time, nor did I pursue the systematic experimental program designed to test the propositions derived from the model. Nevertheless, the model has continued to play a central role in my professional work across the years. For one thing, I have used it extensively in my teaching. Beyond that, I have drawn on it, expanded on it, and applied it in my theoretical and empirical work in several different domains over the years. Again and again, it has influenced my thinking on a variety of issues and emerged as an organizing framework in my efforts to conceptualize them.

This prefatory chapter gives me the opportunity to summarize some of the uses to which I have put my three-process model of social influence and to trace its evolution into a broader social-psychological model of the core issues that social entities—individuals, groups, organizations, societies, collectivities—must address as they negotiate their social environment.
THE ORIGINAL MODEL OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

A central focus of my work throughout the years—starting with my early research on the effects of persuasive communication on attitudes, continuing in my later work on the cognitive and affective impact of psychotherapy, socialization, and international educational and cultural exchange, and culminating in my more recent work on the effects of conflict resolution efforts on the relationship between former enemies—has been on the depth and durability of change produced by social influence.

In this vein, my doctoral dissertation (published in Kelman 1953) explored the relationship between public conformity to the position advocated in a persuasive communication and private acceptance of that position, as manifested by attitude change on a subsequent questionnaire. Seventh-grade students were exposed to a communication about comic books presenting a position that went counter to their initial attitudes and then asked to write essays presenting their own views. In the high restriction condition, they were strongly encouraged—via instructions and the offer of an attractive and assured reward—to support the communicator’s position. In the low restriction condition, both the instructions and the reward structure allowed the participants much greater freedom of choice. The results showed that conformity with the communicator’s position was highest in the high restriction group, but the amount of attitude change—as measured independently in before-and-after questionnaires—was highest in the low restriction group (even among those participants who wrote nonconforming essays).

Additional data from this study, along with research by other investigators, confirmed my view that public conformity to social influence and private acceptance of the opinions or positions advocated by the other represent qualitatively distinct processes, each with its own distinct set of determinants. As I explored a variety of real-life social influence situations, I became dissatisfied with this dichotomy. Close examination of some extreme cases, such as religious or ideological conversion of the “true believer” variety (cf. Hoffer 1951) and “brainwashing” or “thought reform” (cf. Lifton 1956), as well as of certain aspects of childhood and adult socialization and of psychotherapy, persuaded me that they could not be captured by the distinction between public conformity and private acceptance. They clearly go beyond overt conformity, producing changes in underlying beliefs, and yet these beliefs are not fully integrated into the person’s own value system and remain highly dependent on external support. These explorations eventually led me to distinguish three processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization—each defined by its own set of antecedent and consequent conditions.

Very briefly, compliance can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or a group in order to attain a favorable reaction from the other—either to gain a specific reward or avoid a specific punishment controlled by the other, or to gain approval or avoid disapproval from the other. Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or
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a group in order to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to
the other. The relationship may be based on reciprocity, where the person seeks to
meet the other’s expectations for his or her own role, which stands in a recipro-
cal relationship to the other’s role (or the expectations of a group whose members
stand in a reciprocal relationship to each other). Alternatively, the relationship may
be based on modeling, as in classical identification, where the person vicariously
seeks to take on the role (or part of the role) of the other—to be like or actually to
be the other person. Finally, internalization can be said to occur when an individual
accepts influence from another in order to maintain the congruence of actions and
beliefs with his or her own value system. Value congruence may take either the
form of cognitive consistency, where the induced behavior is perceived as con-
ducive to the maximization of the person’s own values, or the form of affective
appropriateness, where the induced behavior is perceived as continuous with the
person’s self-concept.

Note that, for each of the three processes, I distinguish between two possible
underlying concerns that might motivate acceptance of influence: concerns about
specific rewards and punishments, or about approval/disapproval in the case of
compliance; concerns about meeting reciprocal-role expectations, or about en-
acting the role of the other in the case of identification; and concerns about the
cognitive consistency or the affective appropriateness of one’s behavior in the case
of internalization. These distinctions were originally made on a strictly ad hoc
basis to capture the range of motivations that underlie each process. On closer
examination, however, they suggest a crosscutting dimension in the analysis of
social influence: a distinction between two types of personal concerns that govern
the person’s reaction in the influence situation. On the one hand, reactions may be
governed primarily by instrumental concerns, such as assuring one’s attainment
of rewards and avoidance of punishments, living up to the expectations of one’s
role in a reciprocal relationship, and maximizing one’s values. On the other hand,
reactions may be governed primarily by self-maintenance concerns, such as man-
aging one’s public image, living up to one’s role models, and confirming one’s
self-concept. This distinction between two types of personal concerns prefigures
a more systematic crosscutting distinction in some of the extensions of the model
to be discussed below.

Each of the three processes of influence is characterized by a distinct set of
antecedent and consequent conditions, which are summarized in Table 1. On the
antecedent side, three qualitative features of the influence situation determine
which process is likely to ensue. To the extent that the primary concern of the
person exposed to influence (P) is with the social effect of her or his behavior,
that the influencing agent’s (O) power is based largely on means-control (i.e.,
ability to supply or withhold material or psychological resources on which P’s
goal achievement depends), and that the influence techniques are designed to limit
P’s choice behavior, influence is likely to take the form of compliance. To the
extent that P’s primary concern in the situation is with the social anchorage of her
or his behavior, that O’s power is based largely on attractiveness (i.e., possession
of qualities that make a continued relationship to O particularly desirable), and that the influence techniques serve to delineate the requirements of a role relationship in which P's self-definition is anchored (such as the expectations of a relevant reference group), influence is likely to take the form of identification. Finally, influence is likely to take the form of internalization if P's primary concern in the situation is with the value congruence of her or his behavior, if O's power is based largely on credibility (i.e., expertness and trustworthiness), and if the influence techniques serve to reorganize P's means-ends framework (i.e., P's conception of the paths toward maximizing her or his values).

Each of the processes generated by its respective set of antecedents corresponds to a characteristic pattern of thoughts and feelings accompanying P's adoption of the induced behavior. As a result, the nature of the changes produced by each of the three processes tends to be different (see the lower half of Table 1). Most important, perhaps, are the differences in the conditions under which the newly acquired behavior is likely to manifest itself. Behavior accepted through compliance

| TABLE 1 | Summary of the distinctions between the three processes of social influence |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Antecedents** | **Compliance**  | **Identification**  | **Internalization**  |
| 1. Basis for the importance of the induction | Concern with social effect of behavior | Concern with social anchorage of behavior | Concern with value congruence of behavior |
| 2. Source of power of the influencing agent | Means control | Attractiveness | Credibility |
| 3. Manner of achieving prepotency of the induced response | Limitation of choice behavior | Delineation of role requirements | Reorganization of means-ends framework |
| **Consequents** | **Compliance**  | **Identification**  | **Internalization**  |
| 1. Conditions of performance of induced response | Surveillance by influencing agent | Salience of relationship to agent | Relevance of values to issue |
| 2. Conditions of change and extinction of induced response | Changed perception of conditions for social rewards | Changed perception of conditions for satisfying self-defining relationships | Changed perception of conditions for value maximization |
| 3. Type of behavior system in which induced response is embedded | External demands of a specific setting | Expectations defining a specific role | Person's value system |

depends on surveillance: It is likely to manifest itself only when P’s actions are
directly or indirectly observable by O. Behavior accepted through identification,
though independent of observability by O, remains dependent on social support: It
is likely to manifest itself only when P’s relationship to O and the role associated
with it are brought into salience. By contrast, internalized behavior becomes in-
dependent of the external source and integrated into P’s own value system: It tends to
manifest itself whenever the values on which it is based are relevant to the issues
at hand (although, of course, it does not always prevail in the face of competing
value considerations and situational demands). Because of its interplay with other
parts of P’s value system, internalized behavior tends to be more idiosyncratic,
flexible, and complex.

The model can be tested experimentally by varying, in an influence situation,
one or more of the antecedents postulated for the three processes and observing
the effects on the consequents—in other words, by ascertaining whether the an-
tecedents and consequents match up as predicted by the model. Thus, the original
experimental test of the model (Kelman 1958) varied the source of the influencing
agent’s power and observed the effects on the conditions of performance of the in-
duced response. Black college freshmen were exposed to one of four tape-recorded
interviews dealing with an aspect of the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school
segregation. The four interviewees were introduced and presented themselves as,
respectively, high in means-control, high in attractiveness, high in credibility, and
(for the control condition) low in all three sources of power. Postcommunication
attitudes were measured on three separate questionnaires, filled out, respectively,
under conditions of (a) communicator surveillance and salience, (b) salience with-
out surveillance, and (c) nonsurveillance and nonsalience. As predicted by the
three-process model, the manifestation of change depended on surveillance for
the subjects in the means-control (compliance) condition, on salience for those in
the attractiveness (identification) condition, and on neither surveillance nor salience
for those in the credibility (internalization) condition.

In another experiment (Kelman 1960), participants listened to a tape-recorded
communication promoting a novel program in science education. The two experi-
mental communications augmented the basic message (used in the control condi-
tion) with information designed to vary the basis for the importance of the induction
and the manner of achieving prepotency of the induced response, so as to create
the antecedent conditions for identification and internalization, respectively (see
Table 1). In the role-orientation condition, positive reference groups were associ-
ated with acceptance of the message and negative reference groups with opposition
to it. In the value-orientation condition, additional information spelled out the im-
plications of the proposed program for maximizing the important value of personal
responsible. Several measures of the nature of change supported the hypothesis
that role orientation produces identification, whereas value orientation produces
internalization: In the value-orientation group, the manifestation of change was
less dependent on salience of the communicator, and the new attitudes tended to
be more flexible, more complex, and more readily generalized to other issues.
Although the three processes are distinguished in terms of the types of motivations that underlie them (the three types of concerns identified in Table 1) and the model has generally been grouped with the functional theories of attitudes, they do not correspond readily to the distinctions of the functional models (Katz 1960, Smith et al. 1956). Nor do they match up clearly with the dual-process models (Chaiken 1980, Petty & Cacioppo 1981) of attitude change (see Hamilton 2004, Wood 2000). On the other hand, there seems to be a readier fit of compliance and internalization with the distinction between majority and minority influence (cf. Maass & Clark 1983) and between identification and social influence within the theoretical framework of social-identity and social-categorization theory (Turner 1991).

The way the three-process model matches up with these other models reflects the fact that, from the beginning, it has been based on a distinction between three social-psychological processes, referring to three distinctive ways in which P interacts with or relates to O as P accepts influence from O. Thus, we can speak of P’s compliance to O’s demands, P’s identification with O’s expectations, and P’s internalization of O’s ideas.

INFLUENCE IN A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP

The formulation of the original model was geared to the experimental paradigm in which I planned to test it: a one-time and one-way persuasive communication, intended to influence a specific attitude or behavior of individual members of the audience. The model could readily be applied to any dyadic interaction episode in which one party (O) was exerting influence (deliberately or otherwise) on the other (P) and one can observe the nature and amount of change manifested by P. I was well aware that influence flows in both directions in social interaction, even (at least over time) in the mass media. But, for purposes of systematic analysis (within an essentially linear approach), I felt it necessary to specify O and P—the agent and the target of influence—for any given episode of interaction.

From the beginning, however, my interest was in extending the model, beyond the study of O’s influence on a specific behavior or attitude of P in the context of a particular interaction between P and O, to the study of O’s influence on a broader set of P’s behaviors and attitudes in the context of a longer-term relationship between P and O (or a set of Os). This interest was signaled in the conclusion of the report on my doctoral research, when I wrote that it has “some interesting implications for the study of reference groups and the process of internalization of group norms” (Kelman 1953, p. 212). In pursuit of this interest, I decided to study psychotherapy—and particularly group therapy—which I conceived as an influence situation extending over a period of time and designed to produce broad and deep changes in the attitudes and behavior patterns of the clients. Upon completion of my PhD in 1951, I received a postdoctoral fellowship for work in group therapy and accepted an invitation to spend the fellowship year at the Phipps Psychiatric
Clinic, Johns Hopkins Hospital, in Baltimore, where Jerome Frank and colleagues were conducting an extensive, systematic research program on group and individual psychotherapy. Frank’s evolving view of psychotherapy as essentially a social influence situation, in which the nature of the patient-therapist relationship is the major determinant of therapeutic change [see his *Persuasion and Healing* (Frank 1961)], provided me with a congenial setting for developing my model of social influence and extending it from the context of persuasive communication to the context of longer-term relationships between P and O conducive to broader changes in attitude and behavior.

In the end, I spent a total of three years at Johns Hopkins, dividing my time between the hospital and the university’s Homewood campus. It was during this period that I developed the three-process model of social influence and conducted the original—defining, as it were—experimental test of the model. In the development of the model, I focused much of my reading and thinking on a variety of contexts that are socially defined as influence situations: social contexts that are explicitly designed to exert influence, over an extended period of time, on broad patterns of attitudes and behaviors of a selected set of individuals. Most socially defined influence situations fall into one of two categories. They may be situations of socialization—including childhood, adult (or life-span), occupational/professional, and political socialization—that prepare individuals for roles within a society, group, or organization. Alternatively, they may be situations of resocialization—including, among others, psychotherapy, brainwashing or thought reform, religious or political conversion, assimilation or acculturation of immigrants, and international exchange—designed to move individuals, for one or another reason, from old to new roles with their accompanying beliefs and values. Reflection on what happens in these different influence settings contributed significantly to the development of the model—for example, as mentioned earlier, to my decision to add identification to the two processes with which I had started. By the same token, I subsequently applied the model to the analysis of changes in some of these real-life settings.

Thus, in an analysis of changes in group psychotherapy (Kelman 1963), I proposed that the three processes of influence “play a part in each of two phases of behavior change with which therapy is concerned…. and contribute to the achievement of a therapeutic effect” (p. 405). The two phases of behavior change that I differentiated here, drawing on an earlier analysis (Kelman 1952), refer to influence on the patient’s behavior (a) within the therapy situation and (b) outside of the therapy situation (while the therapy is still in progress). The argument is summarized in Table 2. A key point in distinguishing the two phases of change is that they may represent competing demands: Features of the therapy situation and the therapist’s techniques that are most conducive to change—to unfreezing old behavior and eliciting new behavior—within the therapy session may, at the same time, interfere with the generalization of this behavior to the patient’s everyday life (Kelman 1963). Thus, a major challenge to therapeutic practice “is to find the proper balance between forces toward change in within-therapy
TABLE 2  Types of influence involved in the production of therapeutic change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processes of influence</th>
<th>Type of patient behavior induced by this process</th>
<th>Therapist’s role in the induction of this behavior</th>
<th>Group’s role in the induction of this behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Directed to the patient’s behavior within the therapy situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Engagement in the therapeutic work (obeying the “basic rule”)</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>Sanctioning agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Commitment to the therapeutic situation</td>
<td>Accepting, permissive, expert listener</td>
<td>Facilitating agents; comparison reference group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>Occurrence of corrective emotional experiences</td>
<td>Transference object</td>
<td>Interaction objects; role reciprocators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Directed to the patient’s behavior outside of the therapy situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Experimentation with new actions</td>
<td>Imaginary interlocutor</td>
<td>Anticipated audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Adoption of the therapist’s and/or group’s standpoint for viewing the self and interpersonal relations</td>
<td>Role model; norm setter</td>
<td>Normative reference group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>Generalization of therapeutic insights to specific real-life situations</td>
<td>Auxiliary reality tester</td>
<td>Representatives of society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


behavior and forces toward change in extratherapy behavior” (p. 405). This distinction prefigures a central concept in my later work with problem-solving workshops in international conflict resolution: I argue that workshops have a dual purpose—change in the individual workshop participants and transfer of these changes to the political process—and that these two purposes may create contradictory requirements that must be balanced in workshop practice (Kelman 1972a, 1979, 2000).

Another real-life influence situation that was the focus of some of my research in the late 1950s and the 1960s was the international exchange experience. In two projects, my colleagues and I explored the impact of a sojourn in the United States on the images and attitudes of foreign students and professionals. Although we were clearly concerned with the depth and durability of change—and in fact, both studies included follow-up interviews and questionnaires a year after the participants’ return to their home countries—the research was not explicitly designed to test hypotheses derived from the three-process model. The model was of some use, however, in the formulation of questions and the analysis of findings.
Thus, in one analysis (Bailyn & Kelman 1962), we found it useful to distinguish two types of change in the professional self-images of exchange students and scholars whose experience in the host country was professionally involving and rewarding: a change in the internal structure of the self-image, which bore the characteristics of internalization, and a change in the social anchorage of the self-image, which met the criteria of identification. We also identified two parallel processes of maintenance of the original self-image—confirmation and resistance—among individuals whose exchange experience tended to be less involving and rewarding.

I have applied the three-process model more systematically to the development of national or ethnic identity—i.e., the process of socialization of individuals into membership in a national or ethnic (or indeed other identity) group. National identity is a collective product that is acquired by individual members of the collectivity in the course of their socialization and incorporated into their personal identities to different degrees and in different ways. A social-influence analysis of the acquisition of national identity can address two issues: (a) the adoption of the specific elements of the national identity, i.e., of the beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations that make up the national identity as a collective product; and (b) the development of an orientation to the nation itself (Kelman 1997a, 1998). I propose that the specific elements can be adopted via the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization. The antecedents and consequences of adopting identity elements at each of these levels (postulated in Kelman 1998) can be readily derived from the original model, as summarized in Table 1. On the consequent side, I distinguished between authentic identity, which is largely based on internalization; vicarious identity, largely based on identification; and conferred identity, largely based on compliance (p. 12). I made it clear, however, that a person’s identity is generally composed of all three types of elements, and that these build on and interact with each other in a variety of ways.

My analysis of the second issue in a person’s acquisition of national identity—the development of an orientation to the group itself—also draws on the three-process model. It distinguishes between three types of orientation to the group (or bases of integration in it)—rule, role, and value orientation—which correspond to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively (Kelman 1997a, 1998). This analysis essentially applies an earlier framework for conceptualizing patterns of personal involvement in the political system (Kelman 1969, Kelman & Hamilton 1989) to the involvement of individuals in a national, ethnic, or other identity group. I return to that framework below after I discuss a reconceptualization of the three processes of influence, moving from a focus on the relationship (short-term or long-term) between P and O in the influence situation to a focus on the relationship of the individual to the social system that provides the context of the influence. The reconceptualization—which yielded the distinction between rule, role, and value orientation—allows for extension of the model to the analysis of the involvement of individuals in larger social systems: societies, organizations, groups.
My original model of social influence conceptualized it at the level of social interaction, focusing on the relationship between P and O in the influence situation—or in the array of situations in which P interacts with a set of Os in a long-term relationship, such as socialization or resocialization in all their varieties. For many purposes, this level of analysis is entirely appropriate and can yield useful, empirically testable propositions. However, in my continuing effort to define what precisely distinguishes the three processes from each other and, in particular, in my increasing focus on legitimate influence in authority relationships, I became convinced of the importance of bringing the social context of the influence relationship explicitly into the analysis. “Social influence always occurs within a larger social context. Even interactions between strangers on a train or between friends and lovers are defined and at least minimally structured by the larger society. Participants enact prescribed roles and their interaction is governed by the expectations associated with those roles. Many social influence situations are more thoroughly embedded in the organizational or societal context than these informal relationships. They represent episodes in the functioning of social units—part of the process whereby the society or organization...socializes and controls its members and carries out its daily business, and whereby the members advocate policies, protest against existing practices, or seek to advance their personal or subgroup interests” (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, p. 87).

The three processes can thus be reconceptualized with reference to the social system—society, organization, or group—within which they are generated and to which a person's acceptance of influence is directed. When viewed in the context of a particular social system, each process represents a distinct way in which P meets the demands of the system and maintains personal integration in it (Kelman 1974, Kelman & Hamilton 1989). Compliance represents adherence to the rules or norms of the system (including its laws and customs)—i.e., the behavioral requirements it sets for its members. In accepting influence via this process, members assure themselves of continued access to rewards and approval (and avoidance of penalties and disapproval) contingent on adherence to system rules. Identification reflects an orientation to the role of system member and/or other roles within the system, not just as a set of behavioral requirements, but as an important part of P's self-definition. In accepting influence via this process, members are meeting the expectations of their system roles, thus maintaining their desired relationship to the system and their self-concept as fully embedded in these roles. Finally, internalization reflects an orientation to system values that the individual personally shares. In accepting influence via this process, members live up to the implications of these shared values, thus maintaining the integrity of their personal value framework.

In short, viewed in terms of linkage of the individual to the social system, the three processes suggest different ways in which people may be integrated in a
society, organization, or group: via adherence to its rules, involvement in its roles, and sharing of its values. Rules, roles, and values are three components of any social system that are interrelated but analytically separable. Each of these components constitutes a set of standards for the behavior of individual members—criteria against which the quality of their performance as members can be evaluated. Compliance, identification, and internalization are, in effect, designed to meet each of these standards, respectively.

Conceptualizing social influence in terms of properties of the social system helps to bridge analyses of social influence, which proceed from the point of view of the individual (the target of influence), with analyses of social control, which usually proceed from the system point of view (Kelman 1974, Kelman & Hamilton 1989). The operation of rules, roles, and values in socialization and social control is illustrated in an analysis of people’s emotional reactions when they find themselves deviating from societal standards in the domain of responsibility or of propriety (see Table 3). Deviations in the domain of responsibility typically involve actions that cause harm to others, while deviations in the domain of propriety involve behavior deemed inappropriate for someone in the actor’s position or for any socialized member of the society. Deviations from standards in either of these two domains may take the form of violations of rules, role expectations, or values, depending on the level at which a given standard has been socialized (compliance, identification, or internalization) and is represented in the person’s cognitive structure.

Each of the six types of deviation from societal standards distinguished in this analysis is hypothesized to arouse a distinct set of concerns and emotional reactions in the person (as summarized in Table 3 and discussed in detail in Kelman 1974 and 1980). Moreover, in each of these six situations, people can be expected to use distinct strategies for dealing with the emotion that has been aroused, for rectifying the situation, and for avoiding or minimizing the consequences of the violation of standards. Specific hypotheses about people’s emotional reactions

**TABLE 3** A classification of types of discrepant action in terms of the societal standards from which they depart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of standards from which P’s action has departed</th>
<th>Behavioral dimension on which P’s departure from societal standards has occurred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External rules or norms (compliance based)</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role expectations (identification based)</td>
<td>Social fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social values (internalized)</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aCell entries refer to the dominant emotional reactions that each type of discrepant action is hypothesized to arouse.

in each case and their ways of coping with them are derived from the three-process model. Several of these hypotheses were tested and largely confirmed in Nancy Adler’s doctoral research, which explored the behavioral, cognitive, and emotional responses of women undergoing abortion (Adler 1974, 2004).

In further pursuit of a subplot of this chapter, let me point out that the dimension crosscutting the three sources of standards—the distinction between the domains of responsibility and propriety—seems to correspond to the crosscutting distinction that arose serendipitously in my definition of each of the three processes of influence. As noted earlier, a person’s reaction in an influence situation may be governed primarily either by instrumental or by self-maintenance concerns. Such concerns are conducive to responsible and role-appropriate behavior, respectively—both of which are critical to the smooth and effective functioning of societies and organizations. Rules, roles, and values provide standards for motivating and evaluating behavior in both of these domains.

The differing reactions to violations of standards anchored in rules, roles, and values suggest how the three processes of influence might affect the exercise of social control. From the point of view of a society’s or organization’s interest in social control, identification—with its associated emotions of guilt and shame—would appear to be the most effective avenue of socialization. “Individuals operating at the level of compliance are ‘insufficiently’ socialized. Their adherence to social norms depends on surveillance, which makes them less reliable and more difficult to control. Individuals operating at the level of internalization are, in a sense, ‘excessively’ socialized from the point of view of agencies charged with social control. Since societal standards are integrated with their personal value systems, they tend to make their own judgments about the validity of authoritative demands. Their conformity to such demands is, thus, more conditional. Individuals operating at the level of identification are likely to conform to authoritative demands with less surveillance than those at the level of compliance and with less questioning than those at the level of internalization” (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, pp. 115–16).

Conceptualizing social influence in terms of the linkage between the individual and the social system is most useful for the analysis of influence in the context of legitimate authority. I turn next to the extension of the three-process model to this context—starting, specifically, with the relationship of individuals to the national political system.

PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the 1960s, I collaborated with Daniel Katz and several of our students at the University of Michigan in a study of nationalism and the involvement of individuals in the national political system (DeLamater et al. 1969; Katz et al. 1964, 1970). The work focused on qualitative differences in the ways in which individuals adopt nationalist ideology and relate to the political system. As I continued to think
about the issue, I noted some parallels between the qualitative distinctions that our research had identified and the three processes of influence. Eventually, I came up with a typology that distinguished six patterns of personal involvement in the national system, yielded by a crosscutting of two qualitative dimensions (Kelman 1969). The formulation was later modified to conform to the terminology of rule, role, and value orientation, which we had found useful in other contexts (Kelman & Hamilton 1989). The scheme, summarized in Table 4, is based on the assumption that different individuals and groups within a population may relate themselves in different ways to the political system. The six patterns are not meant to be mutually exclusive; although different patterns may be predominant for a given individual or subgroup, various combinations of them are possible and likely.

The rows of Table 4 refer to two sources of an individual’s attachment or loyalty to the political system: Individuals are sentimentally attached to the state to the extent that they see it as representing them and reflecting the population’s (and their own) ethnic and cultural identity. Individuals are instrumentally attached to the state to the extent that they see it as meeting the population’s (and their own) needs and interests. At the societal level, the distinction is reminiscent of Durkheim’s (1947) distinction between the mechanical solidarity of more traditional societies and the organic solidarity of more industrialized societies. At the individual level, sentimental and instrumental attachment correspond to the two types of concern that may govern a person’s reaction in an influence situation: self-maintenance and instrumental concerns, which, as noted earlier, cut across the three processes of influence.

The columns of Table 4 distinguish three types of political orientation, defined in terms of the three components of a social system through which members may be bound to it: rules, roles, and values, which are linked to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively. They represent three different ways
in which sentimental and instrumental attachments may be channeled to produce loyalty and support to the state. In *Crimes of Obedience* (Kelman & Hamilton 1989), we spell out how sentimental attachment and instrumental attachment to the political system play themselves out in each of the three ideal types of rule-oriented, role-oriented, and value-oriented citizens (pp. 120–22).

Central to this analysis of personal involvement in the political system is the concept of legitimacy, which, in essence, refers to the moral basis of the system’s authority: its perceived right to make demands on its members and to expect their loyalty (Kelman 2001). Thus, when defined in terms of the legitimacy of the political system, the two types of attachment refer to the bases or the ultimate sources of its perceived legitimacy: To be sentimentally attached to the system means to perceive it as legitimate and entitled to the population’s loyalty because it represents them and reflects their identity; to be instrumentally attached to the system means to accord legitimacy and loyalty to it because it meets the needs and interests of the population. The three orientations refer to the processes and criteria by which perceived legitimacy is generated, assessed, and maintained: For the three orientations, perceived legitimacy depends on the system’s capacity, respectively, to uphold societal rules and preserve security and order; to sustain societal roles and assure the status of the nation and its citizens; and to advance societal values and pursue policies reflective of them.

Rule, role, and value orientations are not mutually exclusive. Like the three processes of influence to which they are linked, they are likely to manifest themselves at some level in all individuals, depending on the situation in which they find themselves, the particular relationship that is brought into play, and the circumstances of the moment. Nevertheless, they may help to highlight systematic differences in the way in which individuals define their roles as citizens and relate themselves to the political authorities. These differences can be clarified by treating the orientations as ideal types and postulating their implications for the citizen-authority relationship. Table 5 summarizes the defining characteristics of the three ideal types of political orientation and some of the social and psychological tendencies associated with each. In essence, the three orientations represent different conceptions of citizenship and civic responsibility, which are elaborated in *Crimes of Obedience* (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, pp. 267–76; see also Kelman 1993).

As already indicated, I have extended the framework for analyzing personal involvement in the political system to the analysis of personal involvement in a national or ethnic group—i.e., of the different manifestations of national or group identity (Kelman 1997a, 1998). I have also applied it to the analysis of several issues relating to the perceived legitimacy of the nation state: the obstacles to the development of loyalties to transnational institutions posed by the exclusive claim to legitimacy on the part of the national state and how these might be overcome (Kelman 1968); the potential effects—both positive and negative—of policies directed toward establishment of a common language on the development of perceived legitimacy and national identity in multilingual states (Kelman 1971); and the differences between black and white student protest movements in the 1960s.
TABLE 5  Characteristics and correlates of three types of political orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation from citizen</th>
<th>Rule orientation</th>
<th>Role orientation</th>
<th>Value orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Follow rules; avoid trouble</td>
<td>Meet citizen obligation to obey and support the government</td>
<td>Take active part in formulating, evaluating, and questioning policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation from government</td>
<td>Uphold rules; assure security and order</td>
<td>Uphold roles; assure national and personal status</td>
<td>Uphold values; pursue policies reflecting national principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in duties</td>
<td>Passive: minimal compliance (as necessary to protect interests)</td>
<td>Supportive: active part in carrying out policies</td>
<td>Evaluative: active part in formulating and assessing policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in benefits</td>
<td>Minimal: subsidiary and service roles; tenuous integration; low level of education and occupation</td>
<td>Moderately high: active role in conducting society’s affairs; comfortable integration; middle level of education and occupation</td>
<td>High: role in ownership and management of system; integration in establishment; high level of education and occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization process</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of morality in citizen action</td>
<td>Moral principles irrelevant</td>
<td>Moral obligation to government overrides personal morality</td>
<td>Personal moral principles must enter into consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of morality in state action</td>
<td>Moral principles irrelevant</td>
<td>Special set of moral principles applies Conventional</td>
<td>Moral principles fundamental Postconventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of moral reasoning</td>
<td>Preconventional</td>
<td>Reliable, enthusiastic</td>
<td>Firm but conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of support to government</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>Reliable fulfillment of role obligations</td>
<td>Internalized standards for evaluating consequences of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions for protest</td>
<td>Threat to security Liability to sanctions for nonperformance</td>
<td>Threat to status</td>
<td>Threat to values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reliable fulfillment of role obligations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in terms of the nature of their challenge to the legitimacy of the political system (Kelman 1970). In subsequent analyses of social protest movements, I have distinguished between rule-oriented, role-oriented, and value-oriented movements. Social protest arises when a segment of the population perceives the authorities, their policies, or the system as a whole to be illegitimate. The distinction between the three types of movements is based on the extent to which their challenge to legitimacy is primarily at the level of the integrity of the rules, roles, or values, and their struggle focuses primarily on resources, status, or policy, respectively.

Although my own thinking has largely dwelled on the nature of personal involvement in the nation and the state, the framework should be equally applicable to any other social unit—society, community, organization, institution—or any other identity group or collectivity that has a defined membership, some continuity over time, and a set of shared norms and expectations. I have applied it, for example, to an analysis of the university as a community, focusing on the central importance of legitimacy and participation to creating the sense of community (Kelman 1972b).

**SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY**

I have proposed that rule, role, and value orientation represent three ways in which an individual may be integrated in a social system and accept its legitimacy. Conceptually, they are linked to the three processes of influence in two ways. First, the orientations may differ in terms of the predominant process of influence whereby individuals are integrated in the system and socialized into their roles within it (see the fifth row in Table 5). Second, the orientations may differ in terms of the general way in which individuals relate themselves to the system’s demands and expectations—the quality (not necessarily the degree) of their support for government policies (see the ninth row in Table 5).

However, the three-process model may also be extended more directly to the analysis of individuals’ responses to specific influence attempts emanating from legitimate authorities. I differ from French & Raven (1959; see also Raven 1965) in viewing legitimacy not as a separate base of power, but as cutting across the three processes of influence, so that it might be associated with any of the three sources of power—means control, attractiveness, and credibility—differentiated in my original model. Accordingly, I hypothesized that rule, role, and value orientation should lead to different reactions to demands or requests from legitimate authorities, reminiscent of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively.

Before elaborating on this point, I should note that legitimate influence differs in one important respect from the standard type of influence that my original model envisaged, as exemplified by persuasive communications. In the standard influence situation, people are presumed to react on the basis of their personal preferences. Even when an influencing agent uses coercive power, people can be presumed
to comply because they prefer to avoid the consequences of noncompliance. In contrast, in situations of legitimate influence, P accepts O’s right to make certain demands or present certain requests and feels an obligation to accede to them. Examples of legitimate influence would be situations in which O asks P to follow through on an earlier promise or to reciprocate an earlier favor. But “the most clearly structured cases of legitimate influence... occur in the context of an authority relationship. In modern bureaucratic settings, such a relationship means that the authority holder is entitled to make demands (within specified domains) and the subordinate is obligated to accede to them by virtue of their respective positions within the political or organizational hierarchy” (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, p. 89).

Thus, in principle, legitimate authorities do not have to persuade subordinates that the behavior demanded of them is preferable for them, but merely that it is required. In practice, authorities usually buttress their demands with the capacity to coerce and the attempt to persuade and, moreover, choice and preference enter into people’s reactions to authority in a variety of ways (discussed in detail in Kelman & Hamilton 1989, pp. 91–97).

When legitimate authorities issue demands, they have to communicate to their subordinates or their citizenry that these are indeed demands, which system members are obligated to obey, rather than requests or suggestions whose acceptance is left to the members’ personal preference. One can distinguish three kinds of indicators that people may use to assess the obligatory character of the induced behavior, corresponding to the three processes of influence and the three types of political orientation: the existence of sanctions for disobedience; the invocation of national (or other group) symbols that bring the role of citizen (or group member) with its associated requirements to the fore; and the invocation of societal (or group) values that justify the demands. In “ordinary” influence situations, these different indicators would motivate compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively (see Table 1). In the context of legitimate authority, they serve primarily as cues to the obligatory character of the induced behavior. Nevertheless, we can distinguish reactions to demands from legitimate authorities that have the flavor of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively. All three types of reactions take place within a framework of legitimacy, but the perception of requiredness takes a qualitatively different form in each case. Moreover, the nature of the obedient response is likely to be different in the three cases: more calculative in the compliance-tinged reaction, more enthusiastic in the identification-tinged reaction, and more conditional in the internalization-tinged reaction.

At the level of individual differences, rule-, role-, and value-oriented individuals—given the qualitatively different ways in which they relate to authority—are likely to use different criteria in assessing the obligatory character of demands from authority, i.e., to be especially responsive to sanctions, symbols, and values, respectively. The nature of their reaction is also likely to be different, bearing the earmarks, respectively, of compliance, identification, and internalization. Furthermore, political orientation should be related to people’s readiness to challenge the legitimacy of authority demands and to the particular conditions under which such
challenges are likely to be mounted. Legitimate rule implies that there are criteria for challenging the legitimacy of demands from authority, but there are also great obstacles to mounting such challenges (cf. Kelman & Hamilton 1989, Ch. 5). Value-oriented individuals are more likely to challenge authority, and to do so when they consider official policies to be in violation of fundamental societal values. Both rule- and role-oriented individuals are likely to go along with authority demands; if they do challenge authority, the rule-oriented may be responding to implied threats to the integrity of the rules on which their security depends, and the role-oriented to implied threats to the integrity of the roles on which their status depends.

Lee Hamilton and I had the opportunity to examine some of the attitudinal correlates of the three political orientations as part of our research on U.S. public reactions to the trial and conviction of Lt. William Calley for his role in the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War (Kelman & Hamilton 1989). The research began with a national survey in 1971 (Kelman & Lawrence [Hamilton] 1972). Subsequently, in collaboration with Frederick D. Miller and later also with John D. Winkler, we developed scales for the three types of political orientation (as well as for sentimental and instrumental attachment), which we were able to include in a follow-up survey of the Boston population in 1976. The findings (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, Ch. 9) by and large supported our theoretical distinctions between the three types of political orientation. Value-oriented respondents stood out in their independent stance toward authority, their assertion of personal responsibility for actions taken under orders, their readiness to disobey illegitimate orders, and their support for resistance to the war and the draft. In contrast, both rule and role orientation were associated with a tendency to deny personal responsibility for actions taken under orders and a disposition to obey authoritative orders. The data suggest, however, that they represent two different paths to an obedient outcome, based on a view of obedience as a pragmatic necessity (with the flavor of compliance) for the rule-oriented and as a good citizen’s moral obligation (with the flavor of identification) for the role-oriented.

RULE, ROLE, AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS FROM THE SYSTEM’S PERSPECTIVE

Rules, roles, and values are properties of both the social system and the individual—which, I might add, make them useful concepts for social-psychological analysis. So far, I have looked at them primarily from the perspective of individual members of a social system, for whom they represent standards for their own behavior and vehicles for integration in the society or organization. One can also look at them from the perspective of the social system, keeping in mind that societies and organizations are not persons, but function through the agency of their individual members—present and past—and the social norms and cultural products they create. The functioning of social systems can be analyzed systematically with the help of such concepts as rules, roles, and values (as well as interests, relationships, and identities, which I introduce below).
In the first exposition of my model of personal involvement in the political system (Kelman 1969), I proposed that the prevalence of one or another of the three types of political orientation (or integration, as I described it at the time) “in a given society depends on such system characteristics as its stage of development and the particular requirements that it must meet at a given point in time” (p. 287). Thus, if the primary system requirement is to assure the conformity of the population, crucial to the smooth operation of the system during periods of relative quiet, the authorities are likely to promote and draw on rule orientation. If the primary requirement is mobilization of the population, crucial during periods of national crisis or major social and political change, they are likely to promote and draw on role orientation. Finally, if the primary requirement is consolidation of the population, crucial during periods of nation building or—in established nation-states—periods of serious internal division, the authorities are likely to promote and draw on value orientation.

In an entirely different context, I applied this framework to an analysis of the ethical issues raised by social-science research from the perspective of the larger society (Kelman 1982). I distinguished three levels at which the potential impact of social research may become a matter of societal concern and hence of concern to the social-science community itself (see Table 6): its impact on the concrete interests of the individuals and communities who participate in the research, on the quality of the relationship between the investigators and the research participants, and on broader societal values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of impact of the research</th>
<th>Concrete interests of participants</th>
<th>Quality of interpersonal relationships</th>
<th>Wider social values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harm and benefit</td>
<td>Injury (physical, psychological, material)</td>
<td>Stress and indignity (discomfort, embarrassment, feelings of inadequacy)</td>
<td>Diffuse harm (perversion of political process, inequity, manipulation, arbitrariness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy and confidentiality</td>
<td>Public exposure</td>
<td>Reduced control over self-presentation</td>
<td>Reduction of private space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed consent and deception</td>
<td>Impaired capacity for decision making</td>
<td>Deprivation of respect (lack of candor, choice, reciprocity)</td>
<td>Erosion of trust (cynicism, anomie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social control</td>
<td>Government regulation</td>
<td>Professional standards</td>
<td>Social policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conceptual link of these three types of potential impact of social research to the three processes of influence and the three types of system orientation becomes clear in the fourth row of Table 6, which refers to different forms of social control for insuring ethical conduct of social scientists. I propose that, insofar as our concern focuses on protecting the concrete interests of research participants, the most appropriate form of control is probably government regulation, establishing rules with which researchers and research organizations have to comply. Insofar as our concern focuses on the quality of the relationship between investigators and research participants, social control is exercised most effectively through the development and refinement of professional standards governing that relationship, which are incorporated as integral parts of the roles with which well-socialized professionals identify. Finally, insofar as our concern focuses on the impact of social research on wider social values, social control is most appropriately exercised through the processes by which social policy is formulated. Assessing the impact of social research on wider values is a legitimate part of the public debate—in which social scientists and their organizations themselves need to be active participants—about the amount and allocation of public support for social research and about the use of social-science data and findings in policy development and implementation.

PROCESSES OF PEACEMAKING

My work over many years has focused on international conflict and its resolution. Drawing, in particular, on the work of John Burton (1969), I have developed interactive problem solving, an unofficial approach to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts, based on social-psychological principles, and applied it to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other conflicts between identity groups (see, e.g., Kelman 1972a, 1979, 2000). There are obvious continuities between this work and my interest in processes of social influence. Interactive problem solving is in essence a process of mutual influence. At the macro level too, influence is a key component of my analysis of international conflict (Kelman 1997b) and negotiation (Kelman 1996).

In my work on international conflict, as in my work on social influence, “I have been concerned with the quality of change: its depth, durability, sustainability, and integration in the belief systems of individuals and societies” (Kelman 2004a, p. 267). In this spirit, I have proposed that an influence strategy based on threats and bribes is likely to induce changes only at the level of compliance, whereas a strategy based on responsiveness to the adversary’s needs and on reciprocity is likely to enhance the value of the relationship between the parties and therefore induce changes at the level of identification. As the relationship is transformed, the parties become better able to engage in joint problem solving, generating agreements that meet their needs and elicit their commitment and are therefore conducive to relatively stable and enduring changes at the level of internalization (see Kelman 1996, 1997b).
Although I have used the concepts of compliance, identification, and internalization in my discussions of influence processes in international conflict, I have only recently attempted to link them systematically to different types of peacemaking (Kelman 2004b). I am indebted to Nadim Rouhana (2004) for postulating conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation as three distinct processes, which are not designed to achieve the same endpoint (p. 174). My formulation of reconciliation, in particular, differs from Rouhana’s in several important respects. But the idea of thinking of reconciliation as a distinct process, commensurate with conflict settlement and resolution, struck me as a very useful tool for analyzing different approaches to peacemaking. Not surprisingly, I was intrigued by the correspondence between these three processes of peacemaking and my three processes of influence. Establishing this link, of course (no matter how pleasing it may be to me), is useful only if it can provide conceptual handles for distinguishing settlement, resolution, and reconciliation as qualitatively different (though not necessarily always empirically separate) processes with distinct antecedent and consequent conditions.

Briefly, I propose that conflict settlement involves a mutual accommodation of the parties’ interests, conflict resolution involves an accommodation in their relationship, and reconciliation an accommodation of their identities (Kelman 2004b). Conflict settlement yields an agreement that meets the interests of both parties to the extent that their relative power positions enable them to prevail or that third parties intervene on their behalf. The agreement may have the support of conflict-weary publics, but it is not likely to change mutual attitudes or the quality of the relationship between the two societies. As is the case with compliance as a form of social influence, the stability of the settlement ultimately depends on surveillance by the parties, outside powers, and international organizations. Nevertheless, conflict settlement may be a significant achievement in a destructive conflict with escalatory potential and—depending on the fairness of the negotiating process and outcome—may help set the stage for conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution at its best moves beyond interest-based settlement and its dependence on the balance of power. It yields an agreement that is arrived at interactively, so that the parties feel committed to it; that addresses both parties’ basic needs and fears so that it can sustain itself over time; and that builds a degree of working trust between the parties, so that it is less dependent on continuing surveillance. Conflict resolution represents a strategic change in the relationship between the parties, based on the recognition that stable peace and cooperation are in their mutual interest. They form a pragmatic partnership, in which each party is responsive to the other’s needs and constraints and committed to reciprocity. Conflict resolution generates public support to the agreement and encourages the development of new images. The new relationship, however, remains vulnerable to changes in interests, circumstances, and leadership. As is the case with identification as a form of social influence, the new relationship and the associated attitudes are developed alongside of the old attitudes and not fully integrated into a new worldview. This makes for some instability in the new relationship, since changing
circumstances may trigger the old attitudes—including fundamental distrust and negation of the other—in full force.

Reconciliation presupposes the transformation of the relationship between the parties produced by conflict resolution as I have described it. But it goes further in representing a change in each party’s identity. The primary feature of that change in identity is removal of the negation of the other as a central component of each party’s own identity. Such a change implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity, at least in the sense of acknowledging the legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily agreeing with it. What is essential to reconciliation is that each party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other—not an easy assignment in deep-rooted conflicts, such as that between Israelis and Palestinians, in which negation of the other has been a central element of the identity of each party (Kelman 1999). Reconciliation goes beyond the level of pragmatic partnership and enables the parties to internalize the new relationship, integrating it into their own identities and gradually replacing old attitudes with new ones. Old fears and suspicions may reemerge at times, but the relationship is less vulnerable to situational changes.

The view of reconciliation as identity change linked to the process of internalization has important implications for the nature of the change involved. Just as internalization represents a change in a given attitude as a way of maintaining the integrity of one’s own value system, reconciliation represents a change in more peripheral elements of identity as a way of strengthening the core of the identity. Indeed, I would argue that reconciliation, with its attendant change in the group’s identity and revision of its narrative, becomes possible only if the core of each group’s identity is confirmed in the process. A large part of the work of reconciliation is a process of negotiating identity, whereby each party is sufficiently reassured by the other’s acknowledgment of its identity so that it in turn becomes free to remove negation of the other as a central element of its own identity.

In sum, I am suggesting that the three-process model of social influence can help us specify the concerns that underlie the peacemaking processes of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation, respectively, and the quality and durability of the changes that each of these processes is likely to produce. Thus, conflict settlement can be said to produce changes at the level of compliance through accommodation of the parties’ interests, conflict resolution to produce changes at the level of identification through transformation of their relationship, and reconciliation to produce changes at the level of internalization through negotiation of their identities.

INTERESTS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND IDENTITIES

The distinction between the three processes of peacemaking suggests the three broad tasks that all social entities—individuals, groups, organizations, societies, collectivities—must perform as they negotiate their social environments and seek
to balance the requirements of self-maintenance and social order: protecting and promoting their interests, establishing and maintaining their relationships, and affirming and expressing their identities (Kelman 2004a, p. 267). The distinction between these three tasks was foreshadowed in my discussion of ethical issues in social research (Kelman 1982), summarized earlier in this chapter.

In managing their interests, relationships, and identities, individuals and groups must attend to the requirements of both social order and self-maintenance, and of ensuring the proper balance between them. These two sets of requirements capture the crosscutting dichotomies that have repeatedly emerged in the evolution of my original model: instrumental and self-maintenance concerns in the acceptance of influence, instrumental and sentimental attachment to nation or state, responsibility and propriety as domains of socially prescribed behavior. For example, individuals must coordinate their actions with others in pursuing their interests, performing their roles, and maximizing their values; and, across time and situations, they must ensure that they live up to their public images, their role models, and their self-concepts.

Interests, relationships, and identities are distinctly social-psychological concepts “in the sense that they refer to the relationship between individuals and the social system, and also in the sense that they refer to properties of both individuals and social systems. Individuals have interests, relationships, and identities, which they pursue and express through the various groups and organizations with which they are affiliated. The groups and organizations—formed, essentially, to serve their members—in turn develop their own interests, relationships, and identities, which become personally important to the members and which the members are expected to support” (Kelman 2004a, pp. 267–68).

The concepts of interests, relationships, and identities broaden the original three-process model of influence to capture interactions of individuals or groups with each other and with larger social systems, and their integration within these larger systems. The microprocesses of social influence can be subsumed under this broader framework by distinguishing three foci for the interaction between P and O: a focus on individual and group interests, whose coordination is governed by a system of enforceable rules with which individuals are expected to comply; a focus on the relationships between individuals or groups, which are managed through a system of shared roles with which individuals identify; and a focus on personal and group identities, expressing a value system that individuals internalize.

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