

EXTENDED NOTES FOR *TOWARD DEMOCRACY*

Note to Readers

The following notes, prepared with the help of Abigail Modaff of Harvard University, contain fuller documentation for James T. Kloppenberg, *Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought*, published by Oxford University Press in June, 2016. Page references within these notes refer to the print version of the book. As is indicated on p. 711 of that edition, many of the notes in this document contain a greater range of references and commentary than are available in the book. Readers will, however, find that a few of the notes that are followed by an asterisk in the print version do not differ from the notes in this document; those asterisks will be removed, and typographical errors corrected, in later printings of *Toward Democracy*.

Introduction

1. See the UNESCO report edited by Richard McKeon, *Democracy in a World of Tensions* (Chicago, 1951), 522. Influential assessments of the universality of democracy at the turn of the twenty-first century include Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” *Journal of Democracy* 10 (1999): 3–17; and the widely circulated report by Freedom House, *Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Political Change in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1999), which reported that the number of democratic nations had mushroomed from a mere handful in 1900 to over 60 percent by the end of the century. Although those nations contained less than 40 percent of the world’s population, the report confidently predicted that the further expansion of democracy, now praised if not

yet practiced everywhere, was only a matter of time. In Sen's formulation, the intrinsic, instrumental, and constructive value of democracy transcends cultural differences, which renders it the standard worldwide.

2. The revolution in historical scholarship in the 1960s was actually a return to an earlier historical practice, as Ellen Fitzpatrick made clear in *History's Memory: Writing America's Past, 1880–1980* (Cambridge, MA, 2002). For illustrations of the ways in which social history has transformed historical scholarship, see Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds., *American History Now* (Philadelphia, 2011); and for the developments in social theory that have returned social historians' interest to questions of meaning and value, see William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005).
3. Whenever possible I have cited widely available editions of these thinkers' writings. For American writers, I have usually cited volumes in the series published by the Library of America. When those editions are unavailable, I have usually cited standard scholarly editions of writers' complete works. When I quote from texts with multiple English translations, such as the writings of Montaigne, Rousseau, and Tocqueville, the notes indicate the rendering that I prefer. Readers should note that I have sometimes slightly altered translations when I think different word choices more accurately convey the author's meaning.
4. See Joel Isaac, James T. Kloppenberg, Michael O'Brien, and Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, eds., *The Worlds of American Intellectual History* (New York, 2016).
5. The same features of contemporary scholarship that make this book necessary have made it difficult to write. There is simply too much to know. Scholarship is proliferating too

fast for anyone to keep up, and the waves of resources becoming available electronically mean that the materials available to anyone connected to the internet will soon be almost unlimited. Of course, earlier scholars felt that they faced a similar challenge, but the scale of the problem has grown in the twenty-first century with the digitization of texts. That is why we need books of the sort that professional historians are understandably reluctant to write, books that encompass multiple cultures and multiple centuries. This awareness too is hardly new. In 1867 John Stuart Mill, one of the central figures in this study, said in an address at the University of St. Andrews that “every department of knowledge” has become “so laden with details” that anyone “who endeavors to know it with minute accuracy” is forced to “confine himself to a smaller and smaller portion of the whole extent.” Things had gotten even worse by 1918, when Max Weber observed that scholarship “has entered a stage of specialization unknown in the past” and predicted that it will “remain forever so.” If Mill and Weber were right a century and a century and a half ago, the situation has become even more serious now. John Stuart Mill, “Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrews,” in Mill, *Essays on Literature and Society*, ed. Jerome B. Schneewind (New York, 1965), 361. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” originally delivered as a lecture at the University of Munich in 1918, is reprinted in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen, 1958); the essay is most easily accessible to English readers in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. C. Wright Mills and Hans Gerth (New York, 1946), 129-56. See also Daniel Lord Smail, “History and the Telescoping of Time: A Disciplinary Forum,” *French Historical Studies* 34, no. 1 (2011): 1–5. Smail observes that historians in the twenty-first century, as a result of the “inflationary spiral of research overproduction,” are

in danger of being confined to the study of smaller and smaller topics because of the demands of expertise. That pressure also militates against trying to connect the past to the present, a danger threatening all historians concerned with the relation between the topics they study and their own day. See also Jo Guldi and David Armitage, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge, 2014); and Brad Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, MA, 2012). For the ways in which earlier generations of scholars coped with their version of this problem, see Ann Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven, 2010).

6. See for example these excellent recent studies: Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge, 1997); Pierre Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée: histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France* (Paris, 2000); John Dunn, *Democracy: A History* (New York, 2005); Nadia Urbinati, *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago, 2006); Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, 2011); and Alan Ryan, *On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present* (New York, 2012). On the differences between such scholarship and the discipline of intellectual history, see James T. Kloppenberg, “A Well-Tempered Liberalism: Modern Intellectual History and Political Theory,” *Modern Intellectual History* 10 (2013): 655–82; and for the method of historical analysis practiced in this book, James T. Kloppenberg, “Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of Pragmatic Hermeneutics,” *Modern Intellectual History* 9 (2012): 201–16.

7. On this point see Ian Hampshire Monk, “The Historical Study of ‘Democracy,’” in *Democratic Theory and Practice*, ed. Gram Duncan (Cambridge, 1983), 25–36; and George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, eds., *The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990* (New York, 1995), 1–30. Recent studies surveying the rise of democracy over the long term include John Markoff, “Where and When was Democracy Invented?”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (1999): 660–90; John Dunn, *Democracy: A History* (New York, 2005); Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge, 2007); and John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (New York, 2009).
8. Thomas Jefferson to Charles Jarvis, September 28, 1820, in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Paul L. Ford, 12 vols. (New York, 1905), 12:161–64.
9. The distinction between positive and negative freedom is attributable to the influential essay by Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” originally delivered as a lecture at the University of Oxford in 1958 and included in Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, 1969), 118–72. On autonomy see Richard Lindley, *Autonomy* (London, 1986); Lawrence Haworth, *Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics* (New Haven, 1986); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford, 1986); and Stein Ringen, *What Democracy Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government* (Princeton, 2007).
10. Finding ways to bridge that gap has been a major objective for champions of democracy precisely because both the ideal of deliberation and the awareness that language is slippery have always played a central role in democratic discourse. Recent additions to the voluminous literature on deliberative democracy include Jane Mansbridge et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” *Journal of*

Political Philosophy 18, no. 1 (March 2010): 64–100; and Charles Girard, “La démocratie doit-elle être délibérative?” *Archives de Philosophie* 74 (2011–12): 223–40.

11. The vocabularies of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, behaviorist social science, and evolutionary psychology have made it difficult for us to understand the meanings that our ancestors imputed to words such as autonomy and equality, liberty and justice. Many scholars since the late twentieth century have assumed that such concepts, as well as notions of ethical duty and salvation, are smokescreens obscuring the real motive of all human actions: self-interest. That assumption has led to the increasingly cynical unmasking of all claims to virtue, and it has prevented us from understanding or taking seriously the very different cultures that preceded our own. Historians need to recover the richness and complexity of eras incomprehensible in terms of our own flattened cultural lexicon, a world in which individuals took seriously not only their own personal aspirations but also the obligations that bound them to other people and, perhaps most importantly, to their God. See, for example, Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge, 2003); and Daron Acemoglu and James C. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2006). For a fine overview of social scientists’ attempts to discover universal laws governing democratization, which ranges from the pioneering work of Barrington Moore and Charles Tilly to more recent efforts, see Daniel Ziblatt, “How Did Europe Democratize?” *World Politics* 58 (January 2006): 311–38.
12. Our own standard analytical distinctions are unhelpful: the concept of a unitary liberal tradition in America is too flat and too static; the concept of statist traditions in Europe is similarly unnuanced. Likewise, concerns with individual rights on the one hand and

social justice on the other, often counterposed as American and European obsessions respectively, are simplifications that distort historical reality. On both sides of the Atlantic such concepts were seldom considered mutually exclusive or incommensurable, but instead were seen as inextricably linked. See James T. Kloppenberg, “*Requiescat in Pacem*: The Liberal Tradition of Louis Hartz,” in *The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz*, ed. Mark Hulliung (Lawrence, KS, 2010), 90–124.

13. In addition to avoiding familiar scholarly categories, this analysis rejects the assumptions beneath the Whig and the anti-Whig views common in much contemporary historical writing. The Whig interpretation of history treats change as a progressive process culminating in our current success. By contrast, I see the history of democracy less as a story of triumph or progress toward a definite telos than as a story of struggles with persistent obstacles, a story of some successes along with repeated failures. A hundred years ago—and more than a century after the American and French Revolutions—fewer than a third of the populations of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany could vote for their representatives in national legislatures. Women in these nations did not earn the vote until after World War I. Blacks and foreign workers in the North Atlantic world were routinely denied the privileges of citizenship until very recently. Even winning the formal right to participate in public life has rarely given socially disadvantaged groups effective leverage. Although the principle of popular sovereignty and practices of democratic government were formally established in the United States and much of Western Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, the struggle to realize the ideals of autonomy and equality continues today. Yet the opposite of Whiggish

smugness about progress is no better. Anti-Whig perspectives descending from Marx, Freud, Foucault, or Jeremiah can only offer visions of stasis, or of devolution from historical or imagined Edenic conditions located in primitive, pre-industrial, or otherwise non-modern-western utopias, that likewise skew our understanding.

14. One of the merits of recent poststructuralist criticism is the emphasis placed on the unstable meanings and the strategic significance of language and the often surprising twists texts take as they are disseminated to readers in multiple forms. But those insights can be carried too far: the awareness of instability need not make historical interpretation impossible, nor must it culminate in the cynical belief that ulterior motives render all statements of principle suspect and make “unmasking” our paramount objective. See Kloppenberg, “Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of Pragmatic Hermeneutics”; and James T. Kloppenberg, “Objectivity and Historicism: A Century of American Historical Writing,” *American Historical Review* 94 (1989): 1011–30.
15. Historians should be increasingly self-conscious about our own unexamined assumptions and subject them to critical scrutiny, and we should be cautious about imputing our own values to the historical process itself. See James T. Kloppenberg, “The Canvas and the Color: Tocqueville’s ‘Philosophical History’ and Why It Matters Now,” *Modern Intellectual History* 3 (2006): 495–521; Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (2010): 931–68; and Daniel Ziblatt, “How Did Europe Democratize?” *World Politics* 58 (2006): 311–38.
16. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), in *Writings*, ed. Nathan Huggins (New York, 1986). For an astute analysis of the ways in which Du Bois drew upon and

transformed Hegel's phenomenology, see Stephanie J. Shaw, *W. E. B. Du Bois and "The Souls of Black Folk"* (Chapel Hill, 2013); and on the issues of racial solidarity and transracial civic trust, see Tommie Shelby, *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity* (Cambridge, MA, 2005); and Danielle S. Allen, *Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since "Brown v. Board of Education"* (Chicago, 2004).

17. It is both ahistorical and inaccurate to assume that the power of religion has always been arrayed against or with the power of the people. In the eighteenth century, perhaps only the Anglo-American radical Thomas Paine and the French revolutionary Maximilien Robespierre spoke with as much enthusiasm for democracy as did the future Pope Pius VII, who preached in 1797 that democratic government is consistent with the message of the Christian Gospel. See R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America*, vol. 1, *The Challenge* (Princeton, 1959), 13–20.
18. See Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2007); Jürgen Habermas et al., *An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age* (Cambridge, 2010); and Peter Gordon, "Religion within the Bounds of Democracy Alone: Habermas, Rawls, and the Trans-Atlantic Debate over Public Reason," in Isaac, Kloppenberg, O'Brien, and Ratner-Rosenhagen, *The Worlds of American Intellectual History*.
19. The traditions of democratic discourse examined in this book are among the most complex and important parts of our cultural inheritance. Though I do not presume to offer a definitive judgment of their significance, I hope my interpretation of them enlivens discussion about the meanings of democracy and thereby helps to sharpen our understanding, not only of how the present has developed from the past, but of what

democracy should be in the future. Just as the ideals examined here emerged over time from conflicts among those with different convictions and different objectives, so our own ideals will continue to change in accordance with our own experience. If history provides valuable evidence with which to inform our ethical and political deliberations in an era marked by diversity and instability, as many contemporary philosophers contend, then it will remain one of the most important resources for democratic cultures.

I share the view of contemporary philosophers and cultural critics that we can no longer hope to find in reason or truth a bedrock on which to build a stable body of knowledge. In the natural sciences as in the human sciences, everything we know is provisional and subject to revision in light of new evidence. If all we have in the twenty-first century are the traditions we have inherited, we should at least try our best to understand them as well as we can. On this phenomenological approach to ideas, which originated with thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, William James, and John Dewey, see James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York, 1986); James T. Kloppenberg, “Democracy and Disenchantment: From Weber and Dewey to Habermas and Rorty,” in James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 82–99; William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, 2nd ed. (2000; Princeton, 2008); Rogers M. Smith, “Ideas and the Spiral of Politics: The Place of American Political Thought in American Political Development,” *American Political Thought* 3 (Spring 2014): 126–36; and Samuel Moyn, “Imaginary Intellectual History,” in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed.

Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (New York, 2014), 112–30. For variations on this argument concerning the importance of history for ethics, which indicate its appeal to thinkers of strikingly different persuasions, compare the following: Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Richard Rorty, “On Ethnocentrism,” in *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge, 1991), 203–10; and Jeffrey Stout, *Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents* (Boston, 1988).

Chapter 1

1. It was not uncommon, Montaigne observed, to see soldiers “hack and cut off other men’s limbs” and “sharpen their wits for the invention of unusual tortures and new forms of death” without any particular hatred or hope of gain. Instead innocent victims were slaughtered “for the sole purpose of enjoying the pleasing spectacle afforded by the pitiful gestures and motions, the lamentable groans and cries, of a man dying in anguish.” Surely, Montaigne concluded, such behavior represented “the extreme limit to which cruelty can attain.” Michel de Montaigne, “On Cruelty,” in *Essays*, trans. J. M. Cohen (London, 1958), 186; also in Montaigne, *The Complete Works*, ed. and trans. Donald M. Frame (New York, 1943), 383; hereafter cited as *CW*. On Montaigne see Felicity Green, *Montaigne and the Life of Freedom* (Cambridge, 2012). The standard biography in English is Donald M. Frame, *Montaigne: A Biography* (New York, 1965). See also David Lewis Schaefer, *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne* (Ithaca, 1990); David Quint, *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political Themes in the “Essais”* (Princeton, 1998); and the still-rewarding essay by Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Montaigne; or, the Skeptic,” in the series *Representative Men*, in Emerson, *Essays and Lectures*, ed. Joel Porte (New York, 1983), 690–709.
2. Montaigne, “On Physiognomy,” in *Essays*, 339–43; *CW*, 988–92.
3. Montaigne, “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End,” in *CW*, 3–6.
4. Because of Montaigne’s scandalous judgments, his books were confiscated by a papal censor on a trip to Rome in 1581. Even though he was known to oppose Protestantism and repeatedly urged obedience to Catholic authorities, Montaigne was forced to apologize for his errors in an audience at the Vatican. A century after his death was

struck, the Catholic Church finally placed his *Essays* on the index of banned books. Schaefer, *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne*, 13n28.

5. After listing various exotic practices said to be common in the new world, Montaigne concluded that there is evidently no behavior so strange “that custom has not planted and established it by law in the regions where she saw fit to do so.” Montaigne, “Of Cannibals,” in *Essays*, 105–19, and *CW*, 182–93; Montaigne, “Of Custom,” in *CW*, 93–108.
6. In Montaigne’s words, “assertion and dogmatism are positive signs of stupidity.” Montaigne, “On Experience,” in *Essays*, 352; *CW*, 999.
7. Montaigne, *Essays*, 355; *CW*, 1002. There is a fine discussion of this point in Schaefer, *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne*, 115–50, although I disagree with the conclusions he draws.
8. Montaigne, “On the Art of Conversation,” in *Essays*, 285–93; *CW*, 854–60.
9. I am indebted to the brilliant analysis of these themes in Quint, *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy*, 102–44; for Montaigne’s letter to Henry, see *CW*, 1332–4.
10. Many of Montaigne’s fellow aristocrats relished the turmoil of religious warfare. Chaos afforded the opportunity to consolidate their power in their own domains, whatever their size, at the expense of a weakened monarch. Many of them built walls to protect their towns; some based their choice of religion on calculations of power rather than conviction. Montaigne reasoned that submission motivated by fear—such as that shown by the earlier Mayor of Bordeaux—indicated weakness, whereas freely chosen obedience confirmed independence. As he put it when explaining his own response to the soldiers’ mutiny and the reasons why it succeeded, “to submit and entrust oneself to others is an

excellent way to win their heart and will.” But the submission must be done, Montaigne insisted, “freely and without the constraints of any necessity,” and the situation must “be such that we bring to it a pure and clean trust,” the outward sign of which would be “a countenance free of any misgiving.” Montaigne, “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End,” in *CW*, 3–6.

11. Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” in *CW*, 436; cf. Quint, *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy*, 103.
12. Montaigne, “On the Art of Conversation,” in *Essays*, 301; *CW*, 867.
13. Montaigne, “On Physiognomy,” in *Essays*, 318, 322; *CW*, 971, 974.
14. Leviticus 19:18; see also Exodus 22:21; Jeffrey Wattles, *The Golden Rule* (New York, 1996); and Jacob Neusner and Bruce Chilton, eds., *The Golden Rule: The Ethics of Reciprocity in World Religions* (London and New York, 2008).
15. Paul R. Mendes-Flor, *Love, Accusative and Dative: Reflections on Leviticus 19:18*, B. G. Rudolph Lectures in Judaic Studies (Syracuse, 2007).
16. Herodotus, *Histories*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford, 1998), 5.62–78; and see R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 11–18; and Christian Meier, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, trans. David McLintock (1970; Cambridge, MA, 1990).
17. Aristotle, *Politics* 1273b, trans. T. A. Sinclair, rev. Trevor J. Saunders (New York, 1981). On the importance of establishing a “middling” ideal in Athenian culture as a precondition for the emergence of democracy, see Ian Morris, “The Strong Principle of Equality and the Archaic Origins of Greek Democracy,” in *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, ed. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (Princeton,

- 1996), 19–48. On Solon’s role, cf. Robert W. Wallace, “Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece,” in Kurt A. Raaflaub, Josiah Ober, and Robert W. Wallace, *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 49–82; Kurt Raaflaub, “Homer to Solon: The Rise of the *Polis*: The Written Sources,” in *The Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. Mogens H. Hansen (Copenhagen, 1993), 41–105; and Meier, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*.
18. Josiah Ober, “The Original Meaning of ‘Democracy’: Capacity to Do Things, Not Majority Rule,” *Constellations* 15 (2008): 3–9.
 19. All scholars of Greek democracy rely on the pathbreaking work of J. W. Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens*, 2nd ed., rev. D. C. Macgregor (1891; Cambridge, 1933); and Mogens H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Cambridge, 1991). Recent collections that provide insight into the swirling controversies concerning Greek democracy include *Ancient Greek Democracy*, ed. Eric W. Robinson (Oxford, 2004); and Kurt A. Raaflaub, Josiah Ober, and Robert W. Wallace, *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, 2007). For a wider view, see Eric W. Robinson, *Democracy beyond Athens: Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age* (Cambridge, 2011).
 20. As was true of self-designated democracies from the ancient world through the end of the nineteenth century, the exclusion of women and the presence of slaves seemed to male Athenians so unproblematic as to be unremarkable. As a result, estimating their numbers is impossible, but every Athenian citizen probably owned at least one slave. Athenians took for granted both the legitimacy of imperial conquest and its fruits. Citizens were free to participate in the assembly and the law courts only because of the income generated by

empire and the work rendered by women and slaves. Yet the conditions that made popular government possible elicited no critical commentary from the men who celebrated democracy. See Moses Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (London, 1980); Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Concept of the 'Free Citizen' in Late Fifth-Century Athens," *Political Theory* 11 (1983): 517–44; Robin Osborne, "The Economics and Politics of Slavery at Athens," in *The Greek World*, ed. Anton Powell (London, 1995), 27–43; David Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1991); Roger Just, *Women in Athenian Law and Life* (London, 1989); and Marilyn Katz, "Women and Democracy in Ancient Greece," in *Contextualizing Classics: Ideology, Performance, Dialogue*, ed. Thomas M. Falker, Nancy Felson, and David Konstan (Lanham, 1999), 41–68.

21. For particularly spirited arguments concerning the decisive role played by institutions or by the people of Athens in establishing democracy in the time of Cleisthenes, see Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*; Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton, 1989); Josiah Ober, "'I Besieged That Man': Democracy's Revolutionary Start," in Raaflaub et al., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 83–104; and, for a critique of Ober's argument, Loren J. Samons, "Mass, Elite, and Hoplite–Farmer in Greek History," *Arion*, 3rd ser., no. 5 (1998): 99–123. On the later consolidation of democracy, see Kurt A. Raaflaub, "The Breakthrough of *Demokratia* in Mid-Fifth Century Athens," in Raaflaub et al., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 105–54; and for a sharp contrast between ancient Greek and modern democracies, see Cynthia Farrar, "Power to the People," in Raaflaub et al., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 170–95.

22. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 2.37, trans. Rex Warner (London, 1954), 145. For the idea of sharing equally in public life and the problem with “rights,” see R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens*; Martin Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1969); Martin Ostwald, “Shares and Rights: ‘Citizenship’ Greek Style and American Style,” in *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, ed. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, 49–61; Paul Cartledge and Matt Edge, “‘Rights,’ Individuals, and Communities in Ancient Greece,” and Robert W. Wallace, “Personal Freedom in Greek Democracies, Republican Rome, and Modern Liberal States,” in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Ryan Balot (Oxford, 2009), 149–16, 164–77; and especially Kurt Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, rev. ed., trans. Renate Franciscano (1985; Chicago, 2004).
23. See Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*; and Josiah Ober, *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory* (Princeton, 1996).
24. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.9.
25. Plato, *The Apology* 31e–32a, in *The Last Days of Socrates*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (New York, 2003).
26. Plato, *The Republic* 558c, in *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (Oxford, 1941). See also Jennifer T. Roberts, *Athens on Trial: The Anti-Democratic Tradition in Western Thought* (Princeton, 1994).
27. See Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in *Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays*, ed. Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (Lanham, MD, 2005), 185–202.
28. Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a25.

29. “Among all men, then, there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice.” Unfortunately, Aristotle concluded glumly, his ideal “middle constitution has never occurred anywhere, or only seldom and sporadically,” precisely because the conditions had never been right for it, and he gave no guidance about how it could be instituted. Aristotle, *Politics* 1296a7; see also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.8–9. Maria Mavroudi of the University of California pointed out to me that all of our understandings of Aristotle are shaped by the sources available to us. Our sense of the meaning of “democracy,” for example, varies according to whether the translation of *Politics* comes from an Arabic or a Greek text.
30. Aristotle, *Politics* 1317a40, 1318b6.
31. Aristotle, *Politics* 1317a40, 1317b17.
32. Aristotle, *Politics* 1725b, 1279a.
33. Aristotle, *Politics* 1317a40.
34. Aristotle, *Politics* 1317b17.
35. In short, “the inevitable result is this most valuable of principles in a constitution: ruling by respectable men of blameless conduct, and without detriment to the populace at large.” Aristotle, *Politics* 1318b6.
36. Aristotle rejected most of Plato’s ideas, just as his own student Alexander the Great seems to have ignored most of Aristotle’s teachings about moderation, yet Aristotle did agree with Socrates and Plato that philosophers should aim to discern universal norms from the particularities of experience. Although a wide range of political systems exists,

Aristotle observed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and customs vary even more widely, “only one system is by nature the best everywhere.” That ideal combination of aristocracy and democracy, the mixed polity, appealed to Aristotle because it filtered out of public life the narrow ambitions, petty jealousies, and self-interest that cause people to place their own advantage ahead of the public interest. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.6, 1135a, in *The Pocket Aristotle*, trans. W. D. Ross (New York, 1942). On the adequacy and accuracy of Aristotle’s characterization of classical Athenian democracy, see Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*; Peter J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian “Athenaion Politeia”*, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1993); and Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*.

37. Aristotle’s aspiration toward moderation, however, stood in dynamic tension with the spirit of open-ended inquiry and public argumentation that emerged in Greek democracy, the spirit apparent in the historical writing of Thucydides. From that dynamic relation emerged the pathbreaking achievements of Greek culture in mathematics, science, logic, and literature, all of which manifested a commitment to public discourse, critical analysis, and reasoned debate rather than the blind observance of inherited traditions or customs. Demosthenes, *Against Boeotus* 1.39.10–11; Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 2.65.1–11, trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1972); and on Isocrates, *Antidosis*, see Yun Lee Too and David C. Mirhady, trans., *Isocrates I* (Austin, 2000); and Darius W. Weil, “Cultured Nobility and the Ideal of the Stately Elm: The Debate on Classical Education in 19th-Century America” (unpub. senior thesis, Harvard University, Fall 2009).
38. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 5.89.

39. On these issues see Cynthia Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 126–91; G. E. R. Lloyd, *Demystifying Mentalities* (Cambridge, 1990); and their contributions to *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993*, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge, 1992).
40. Polybius, *The Histories* 6.3.5–8, 6.6.1–5, 6.10.1–14, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford, 2010). See Arthur M. Eckstein, *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius* (Berkeley, 1995).
41. By his own reckoning, Cicero aimed primarily to translate classical Greek ideas into Latin. He addressed a range of issues in his many speeches and in his writings on political and philosophical subjects, notably in *De re publica* (*On the Republic*); *De legibus* (*On the Laws*), which he left unfinished; and the ethical treatise he addressed to his son, *De officiis* (*On Duties*).
42. In contrast to Polybius, who argued for balancing aristocracy and democracy in the ideal constitution, Cicero's model followed the practice of Rome's republic: he advocated limiting the people's role to electing public-spirited individuals to the assembly. Whereas agrarian reformers following the lead of the Gracchi persuaded many in Cicero's day of the need for economic redistribution, Cicero resisted. Such measures, he reasoned, advanced the particular interests of some Romans—the poor—rather than the general interest of the public as a whole. Whereas the Greek city-states relied on sortition to ensure widespread popular participation in civic affairs, the limited role of the people in Rome's republic ensured government by its elite. Cicero believed the people deserved, and enjoyed, the liberty to choose their representatives and approve wars and laws. Cicero, *On Laws* 1.15.43; *On Duties* 1.10.31; *On the Republic* 1.53–54.

43. Cicero, *On Duties* 2.17. Recent studies of Cicero's thought include Yelena Barz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics* (Princeton, 2012); J. G. F. Powell, ed., *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford, 1995); and Walter Nicgorski, ed., *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame, 2012).
44. A recent introduction to the life and writings of Hillel is Joseph Telushkin, *Hillel: If Not Now, When?* (New York, 2010).
45. Matthew 22:34–40.
46. Galatians 5:13–15.
47. Colossians 3:18–4:1.
48. Philemon 1:15–20. On the broader context, see Kyle Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425* (Cambridge, 2011).
49. Acts of the Apostles 4:32–35.
50. Thessalonians 5:19–21.
51. See Wayne Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality* (New Haven, 1993). My interpretation of early Christian communities is indebted to Hans Küng, *The Catholic Church: A Short History* (New York, 2001).
52. Following that fateful step, the communities that had originally embraced outsiders, included women, slaves, and foreigners, and experimented with diverse forms of ritual and organization began to focus on doctrine more than practice, and on hierarchy rather than the equality of all believers. When the Emperor Constantine declared religious freedom in 313, Christians rejoiced. When Christianity became the official state religion of the empire under his sons, the faith had changed in less than a century from a persecuted cult of oppressed outsiders to a state dogma. In that success lay failure. When

Christianity became an accessory to the authority of the emperor, wealthy Romans began to share their wealth, but through a newly ambitious Catholic hierarchy and its institutions. Although some of that wealth made its way to the needy, much of it enriched and empowered the church. Many Christians abandoned the ideal of equality and began marching down the same path that Roman culture was taking toward corruption and dissolution. See Peter Brown, *Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West* (Princeton, 2012).

53. Cicero's vision of the good life, Augustine wrote, lifted his eyes from "evil without purpose" to a lifetime devoted to the study, clarification, and preaching of God's word. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City, NY, 1960), 70, 81. Still standard is Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (London, 1967).
54. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Gerald G. Walsh et al. (Garden City, NY, 1958), 72–75, 321.
55. Augustine, *City of God*, 425.
56. Acts of the Apostles 4:32–35; Augustine, *City of God*, 463–66.
57. Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 1, *Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493–1648* (Oxford, 2012).
58. On this particular dynamic, see William Huse Dunham, Jr., and Charles T. Wood, "The Right to Rule in England: Depositions and the Kingdom's Authority," *American Historical Review* 81 (October 1976): 738–61; and the sweeping account, along with a provocative case for "English exceptionalism," in J. R. Madicott, *The Origins of the English Parliament, 924–1327* (Oxford, 2010).

59. See Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge, 1979); Anthony Black, "The Individual and Society," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350–1450* (hereafter *CHMT*), ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1988), 588–606.
60. Leo IX quoted in I. S. Robinson, "Church and Papacy," in *CHMT*, 281. On the murky origins and later uses of the Donation of Constantine, see Janet Nelson, "Kingship and Empire," in *CHMT*, 230–31.
61. On William of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle, see David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (New York, 1962), 191–92; Jennine Quillet, "Community, Counsel and Representation," in *CHMT*, 526–27; and Walter Ullmann, *A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages* (Baltimore, 1965), 171.
62. Aquinas, *De regimine principum*, in *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings*, ed. A. P. D'Entrèves, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1959), 6.
63. Gregory the Great quoted in Küng, *The Catholic Church*, 65. The distinction between "descending" and "ascending" models is usually associated with the scholarship of Walter Ullman. Although often challenged as overly schematic, it remains useful if seen as an ideal type and understood in terms of an ongoing struggle rather than as a hinge between early and late medieval thought. For a classic statement of the distinction, see Walter Ullman, *A History of Political Thought* (Baltimore, 1965).
64. Henry of Ghent quoted in Anthony Black, "The Individual and Society," in *CHMT*, 597. See also Matthew Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford, 1999); James M. Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the*

Middle Ages (1992; Princeton, 2014); and Ptolemy of Lucca, *On the Government of Rulers*, ed. James M. Blythe (Philadelphia, 1997).

65. Even more fundamentally, and more controversially, Marsilius challenged the authority of the pope, and of religious leaders more generally, in the secular sphere. The apostles of Jesus, he argued, had reached decisions through the “method of common deliberation.” The later claims of popes to “universal coercive jurisdiction over the whole world” represented an illegitimate arrogation of power which now threatened the peace. Only by returning to the original emphasis that Jesus placed on rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s could the church escape corruption and reclaim its legitimate spiritual authority. The ideal community for Marsilius remained Christian and hierarchical. In his vision of a fulfilling civic life, as in those of other late medieval proponents of mixed government, individual believers would devote themselves to an ideal of benevolence patterned after the original apostolic community. Even though Marsilius drew on Aristotle’s *Politics* to challenge papal claims to temporal power, his ideal, like that of even the most radical scholastics such as Ptolemy of Lucca, remained a Christian polity. Marsilius of Padua, *The Defender of Peace*, ed. and trans. Alan Gewirth (New York, 1956), 32–33, 45. The most thorough analysis is Jeannine Quillet, *La philosophie politique de Marsile de Padoue* (Paris, 1970). See also J. A. Watt, “Spiritual and Temporal Powers,” *CHMT*, 421, 417. On the renegade Catholic writers who followed Marsilius in challenging papal authority between the Council of Constance in 1414–18 and the Council of Basel in 1431–47, see Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2, *The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge, 1978), 39–42.

66. See the discussion in Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge, 1997), 51–67; the quotation from Bruni appears on 43. For more detailed accounts, see John Najemy, *A History of Florence, 1200–1575* (Oxford, 2008); Daniel Waley, *The Italian City Republics*, 3rd ed. (1969; London, 1988); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (1975; Princeton, 2003); John P. McCormick, *Machiavellian Democracy* (Cambridge, 2011); and, on the uses Bruni and other Italian humanists made of Aristotle when developing their own concepts of republican government, James Hankins, “Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic,” *Political Theory* 38 (2010): 452–82.
67. Dante lectured the soul of Pope Nicholas III—“thou hast deserved thy doom”—for the sin of simony and condemned his corrupt and scheming successor Boniface VIII for raping the Church, the bride of Christ. Critics continued to level similar charges against the practices of the Church, which was ruled by a series of popes of monumental venality and incompetence. As rival popes excommunicated each other, married off their bastard children in regal pomp, and maneuvered like the crafty and amoral *Prince* of Machiavelli’s imaginings, unrest among believers simmered. Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, vol. 1, *Hell*, canto 19, trans. Dorothy Sayers (Harmondsworth, 1949), 188–91. On the roots of the Reformation in late medieval Europe, see Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1250–1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Haven, 1980). Recent overviews of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic response are Ulinka Rublack, *Reformation Europe* (Cambridge, 2007); and Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia, *The World of Catholic Renewal*, 2nd ed.

(1998; Cambridge, 2002). A more detailed account is Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The Reformation* (New York, 2004).

68. Thomas More, *Utopia*, ed. and trans. H. V. S. Ogden (Arlington Heights, IL, 1949), 33, 47–49, 83. See also Brendan Bradshaw, “More on *Utopia*,” *Historical Journal* 24 (1981): 1–27; Bradshaw, “The Controversial Sir Thomas More,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36 (1985): 535–69; Bradshaw, “The Christian Humanism of Erasmus,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 33 (1982): 411–47; and Bradshaw, “Transalpine Humanism,” in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700* (hereafter *CHPT, 1450–1700*), ed. J. H. Burns with Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1988), 95–131.
69. More, *Utopia*, 32–33, 75, 82.
70. Ulinka Rublack, *Reformation Europe* (Cambridge, 2007).
71. The peasants called for wider access to game and fish, wood and water, meadows and fields, the use of which, often denied by feudal law, was being further restricted by the movement to enclose open lands that was spreading across Europe. They protested against new fees, rents, laws, and services imposed by their lords. In short, they called for liberation from feudal bonds. Because “Christ has redeemed and purchased us without exception, by the shedding of His precious blood, the lowly as well as the great,” they declared, so “it is consistent with Scripture that we should be free and we wish to be so.” The peasants denied the charge of lawless anarchy leveled against them by priests and princes. “Not that we want to be absolutely free and under no authority. God does not teach us that we should lead a disorderly life according to the lusts of the flesh, but that we should live by the commandments, love the Lord our God and our neighbor.” The *Twelve Articles* concluded by adopting the logic of Luther’s own reply to those whom

Charles V had ordered to discipline him: “we will willingly recede from [any] article when it is proved to be against the word of God.” *Twelve Articles*, in *The Protestant Reformation*, ed. Hans Hillerbrand (New York, 1968), 63–66.

72. In Luther’s words, “the fact that the rulers are wicked and unjust does not excuse tumult and rebellion, for to punish wickedness does not belong to everybody, but to the worldly rulers who bear the sword.” Luther concurred with the peasants that “rulers do wrong when they suppress the gospel and oppress you in temporal things,” but he cautioned that it is the Christian’s responsibility to yield, to suffer as Jesus suffered, not to rebel. Denying that he was taking the side of the nobles, Luther nevertheless insisted that not one of the *Twelve Articles* “teaches a single point of the gospel, but everything is directed to one purpose; namely that your bodies and your properties may be free.” Because all the peasants’ demands concerned “worldly and temporal matters,” they had nothing to do with the Christian faith the peasants invoked to justify their cause. If they would be Christians, Luther concluded, they must abandon their demands and accept their condition: “For a slave can be a Christian, and have Christian liberty, in the same way that a prisoner or a sick man is a Christian, and yet not free.” The peasants’ insistence on freedom from all feudal constraints, by contrast, “would make all men equal, and turn the spiritual kingdom of Christ into a worldly, external kingdom; and that is impossible. For a worldly kingdom cannot stand unless there is in it an inequality of persons.” When Luther took his defense of hierarchy to the people, speaking in villages scattered through the German states, he found that his audience had turned hostile. He responded in kind in *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants* (1525). There, Luther confirmed that he saw no connection between his own invocation of conscience in repudiating

Church authority and the peasants' claims. He likened the rebels to mad dogs and urged their slaughter. Luther, *Friendly Admonition to Peace concerning the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants*, in Hillerbrant, *The Protestant Reformation*, 67–87; quotations from 73, 80, 83, 70.

73. Zwingli, *Jeremiah-Erklärungen* (1905–59), 14:424, quoted in Francis Oakley, “Christian Obedience and Authority,” in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 184.
74. Goodman wrote, “For though it was profitable to all men that Christ without any resistance should be crucified, being the sacrifice appointed of God the Father to salvation,” things had changed. God’s chosen people should no longer permit “the blasphemy and oppression of their superiors to overflow their whole country and nation, when both power and means is given unto them lawfully to withstand it.” God wills the preservation of his people, so Christians must oppose the ungodly rule of papists who defile God’s law. Christopher Goodman, *How Superiors Ought to Be Obeyed by Their Subjects: And Wherein They May Be Lawfully Disobeyed and Resisted*, ed. Charles H. McIlwain (1558; New York, 1931), chap. 9. See also Patrick Collison, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Oxford, 1982).
75. The most recent English edition of the most notorious of these monarchomach tracts is available as *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos: Or, Concerning the Legitimate Power of a Prince over the People, and of the People over a Prince*, ed. and trans. George Garnett (Cambridge, 1994). See also François Hotman, *Francogallia*, ed. R. E. Giesey, trans. J. H. M. Salmon (1573; Cambridge, 1972); Theodore Beza, *Du droit des magistrats*, ed. R. M. Kingdon (Geneva, 1971); and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos*, ed. H. Weber et al. (Geneva, 1979), 210, quoted in Robert N. Kingdon, “Calvinism and

Resistance Theory,” in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 213. Quentin Skinner discusses this literature in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2, *The Age of Reformation*, 302–48; and in “Humanism, scholasticism and popular sovereignty,” *Visions of Politics*, vol. 2, *Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge, 2002), 245–63. For a fascinating analysis of the strange career of *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos* in later centuries, when its meanings shifted as it was pressed into service, for multiple purposes, against a wide range of “tyrants,” see Kirstie McClure, “Reflections on Political Literature: History, Theory, and the Printed Book,” in *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800*, ed. David Armitage (Cambridge, 2006), 235–53.

76. Jean Bodin, *De republica libri sex* (Paris, 1586), 2.1.176, trans. Julian H. Franklin, in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 303.
77. Even for those Renaissance humanists drawn to the ideals that might make democracy possible, a group that included not only Montaigne but like-minded thinkers such as Justus Lipsius and Henrik Niklaus in the Netherlands, well-grounded fears of the popular frenzies that fed religious warfare made stable authority a necessity. On the French wars of religion, see Mack Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629*, 2nd ed. (1995; Cambridge, 2005); and Denis Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion* (Paris, 1990). Historians who pay attention to the meaning imputed to their own experiences by those they study are now less inclined than they once were to treat religious conflict as a surface manifestation of supposedly “deeper” economic or post-feudal conflicts. See Brad S. Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1999). On Lipsius and Niklaus in relation to

Montaigne, see Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1571–1651* (Cambridge, 1993), 1–119.

78. On the nature and long-term consequences of the Protestant Reformation, and how historians should understand it, see Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2007); Jerome Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1998), 15–57; Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, MA, 2012); Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad S. Gregory, eds., *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (Notre Dame, 2009); and Benjamin Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).

Chapter 2

1. The document establishing the government of Rhode Island, March 16–19, 1641, is in *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, 1636 to 1792*, 10 vols., ed. J. R. Bartlett (Providence, 1856–65), 1:111–13.
2. *The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630–1649*, ed. Richard S. Dunn and Laetitia Yeandle (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 142–43. See also David D. Hall, *Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New England* (Cambridge, MA, 1990); and Carla Pestana, *Quakers and Baptists in Colonial Massachusetts* (Cambridge, 1991).
3. Roger Williams to Anne Sadleir, ca. April 1652, in *The Complete Writings of Roger Williams* (hereafter CWRW), 7 vols. (New York, 1963), 239.
4. Winthrop's complicated relations with Williams are evident in Winthrop, *Journal*. The quotation from January 1636 is on 87.
5. Although the tone of Winthrop's discussion of Williams in his journal entries in January of 1636 suggests he shared other officials' contempt for Williams, Williams later claimed, in a letter written to John Mason on June 22, 1670, that the "ever honored Governor, Mr. Winthrop, privately wrote to me to steer my course to Narragansett Bay and Indians." The best evidence for Williams's version comes from the decision of the magistrates and clergy to criticize Winthrop for lax enforcement of the colony's laws immediately after Williams escaped from Salem. See Winthrop, *Journal*, 82–89; and cf. Williams's letter in Perry Miller, *Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition* (1953; New York, 1974), 227–35.
6. Roger Williams to John Winthrop, November 7, 1648, in CWRW 6:158–59.

7. Roger Williams, *Mr. Cottons Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered*, in *CWRW* 1:313.
8. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*, ed. Glenn W. Lafantasie, 2 vols. (Providence, 1988), 1:750.
9. Roger Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, ed. Howard M. Chapin, 5th ed. (1643; Providence, 1936), 9–10.
10. Roger Williams to John Winthrop, Jr., December 18, 1675, in *CWRW* 6:377–78.
11. Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 53.
12. Williams counseled the following policy, which guided his own interactions with the Narragansett: first, “kiss truth where you evidently, upon your soul, see it”; second, “advance justice”; third, “seek and make peace, if possible, with all men”; finally, “secure your own life from a revengeful, malicious arrow or hatchet.” Roger Williams to John Winthrop, May 28, 1647, in *CWRW* 6:146–47.
13. *Testimony of Roger Williams relative to the deed of Rhode Island, dated Providence 25, 6 (August 25), 1658*, in *CWRW* 6:305.
14. Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 138.
15. Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 16.
16. Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 143.
17. Williams, *A Key into the Language of America*, 7–8.
18. Williams, *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience Discussed and Mr. Cotton’s Letter Examined and Answered*, ed. Edward Bean Underhill (1644; London, 1848), 215. Williams remained sympathetic with Indians and critical of white settlers until the end of his life. Even though his own home in Providence was destroyed when

the Narragansett burned down the town after being drawn into King Philip's War, Williams acceded to the request that he meet with Narragansett leaders, whom he tried to convince not to embark on the planned attack on Plymouth. As Williams had warned, that attack ended in the almost total destruction of the Narragansett.

19. This common assumption has its roots in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, a book that became one of the standard sources for American historians and political scientists in the middle decades of the twentieth century. According to Tocqueville, Puritanism "was almost as much a political theory as a religious doctrine," and the New England Puritans "made it their first care to organize themselves as a society" as soon as they landed in the new world. As a result of their efforts, in Tocqueville's words, a "democracy more perfect than any of which antiquity had dared to dream sprang full-grown and fully armed from the midst of the old feudal society." See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York, 1969), 38–39. I will have much more to say about Tocqueville's understanding of American democracy in chapters 14 and 15. On the shifting status of Tocqueville's larger argument concerning America, and the ways in which it has been deployed for multiple purposes since its mid-twentieth-century resurgence, see James T. Kloppenberg, "Life Everlasting: Tocqueville in America," in Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), chap. 5. Among the earlier influential studies that stressed the central place of democracy in American history, see especially Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (New York, 1940); and Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York, 1943).

20. For striking contrasts with the work of earlier twentieth-century historians, see Jon Butler, *Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776* (Cambridge, 2000), who writes flatly, “Colonial politics was not democratic” (90); and Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York, 2001), who contrasts the hierarchy of the mainland to the democracy on board pirate ships (294–97). Like so much else in modern America, the tide began to turn in the mid–1960s, when scholars returned to the early twentieth-century progressive historians Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard and emphasized the presence and persistence of deference, hierarchy, inequality, and oligarchy in American history. For a fine analysis of those dynamics, see the warning against understanding seventeenth-century developments in terms of democracy in John M. Murrin, “Political Development,” in *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Baltimore, 1984), 408–56. Valuable as such cautionary reminders are, one can concede that no one set out to establish democracy in America and yet contend that the institutions that developed in England’s seventeenth-century North American colonies nevertheless incorporated more popular participation in government than prevailed anywhere else at the time. For a vigorous and influential argument that democracy has constituted no more than an example of the “make believe” on which all government rests, see Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York, 1988), in which he traces the process whereby the “old fiction, the divine right of kings” (15) gave way to the newer fiction of democracy.
21. Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” written in the spring of 1630, is reprinted in *Journal*, 1–11. These Puritans were looking backward, envisioning the fraternal

communities of early Christian saints, not forward toward the fractious—and eventually prosperous—world they would end up creating. On the powerful lure of a backward-looking sensibility in early seventeenth-century English Puritanism, see Theodore Dwight Bozeman, *To Live Ancient Lives: The Primitivist Dimension in Puritanism* (Chapel Hill, 1988). On the use of covenants, see David A. Weir, *Early New England: A Covenanted Society* (Grand Rapids, 2005); and for their roots in English Protestantism, see Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society, 1559–1625* (Oxford, 1982); and Collinson, *Godly People: Essays on English Protestantism and Puritanism* (London, 1983).

22. *The Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, vol. 40 (Boston, 1961), 12. According to Darrett B. Rutman, *Winthrop's Boston: A Portrait of a Colonial Town* (New York, 1965), the date in the manuscripts, August 27, 1630, is erroneous and was corrected in Fuller's letters to Bradford. Rutman gives July 30, 1630, as the correct date.
23. The Dedham Covenant is reprinted in *The Early Records of Dedham, Massachusetts*, ed. Don Gleason Hill, 7 vols. (Dedham, 1892), 3:2–3. For detailed analysis, see Kenneth A. Lockridge, *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years* (New York, 1970), 4–22. The Dedham Covenant, now available online, plays a large part in Lockridge's interpretation of Dedham's early incarnation as a “Christian Utopian Closed Corporate Community.” It is worth noting that Lockridge emphatically denies the presence of democracy in Dedham.
24. From the Puritans' perspective, Anglicans preserved too many remnants of Roman Catholic ritual, theology, and hierarchy. Presbyterians, although they shunned the pomp of Anglican liturgy and embraced the austerity of Calvinism, nevertheless envisioned

each congregation as part of a larger whole and opened their doors to all comers. See Stephen Foster, *The Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England Culture, 1570–1700* (Chapel Hill, 1991).

25. On the first and second meetings of the General Court, see Winthrop's *Journal*, 31–39, and the editors' note 73 on 31. A classic discussion of the implications of the covenant is the chapter entitled "The Social Covenant" in Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (1939; Boston, 1961), 398–431. See also Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 38–47.
26. These issues have vexed generations of medieval English historians. For a recent account notable for its clarity, see Madicott, *The Origins of the English Parliament*, 41–56, 139–47, 440–53.
27. John Winthrop, *The History of New England from 1630 to 1649*, ed. James Savage, 2 vols. (Boston, 1853), 1:91.
28. For Winthrop's account of this challenge, see Winthrop, *Journal*, 64–67. Two recent studies establish both the presence and the limits of these early assertions of popular authority in early Massachusetts. See Jason S. Maloy, *The Colonial Origins of Modern Democratic Thought* (Cambridge, 2008), 24–41, 114–35, who traces the roots of New England Puritans' use of the idea of magistrates' accountability from the ancient world through Protestant resistance theory in terms similar to those offered in chapter one above; and David D. Hall, *A Reforming People: Puritanism and the Transformation of Public Life in New England* (New York, 2011), who demonstrates the uses of popular sovereignty in early New England. Hall is at pains not to describe the Puritans as "democrats" or "proto-democrats." His evidence, however, makes clear both that the

early settlers of New England used variants of the term themselves and, even more significantly, that they self-consciously reined in the authority exercised by magistrates on behalf of the people. Although their conception of authority located sovereignty in God rather than the people, in its exercise on earth they effectively pioneered popular authority in both ecclesiastic and civil governance. See especially 13–28.

29. On the founding of town governments, see Rutman, *Winthrop's Boston*, 62–66; and Hall, *A Reforming People*, 53–95; and on their East Anglian inheritance, see David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (Oxford, 1989), 181–205.
30. “Att the Genrall Court, holden att Newe Towne, March 3, 1635,” in *Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay*, ed. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, 5 vols. (Boston, 1853), 1:172. The date in Shurtleff’s edition is 1635 on the old date system, 1636 in the new, which accounts for the discrepancy between the dates given in Rutman, *Winthrop's Boston*, 67; and Lockridge, *A New England Town*, 38. See also Kenneth A. Lockridge and Alan Kreider, “The Evolution of Massachusetts Town Government, 1640–1740,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 23 (1966): 549–74. Writing about Dedham and Watertown, Lockridge and Krieder argue that town meetings displaced selectmen as the locus of power as the populations of these towns grew, wealthy men proliferated, and this new elite wanted to establish, then to consolidate, its power. In *A New England Town*, 194, Lockridge discusses changing interpretations of government in New England towns from the work of James Truslow Adams in 1921 to B. Katharine Brown in 1954–55. Lockridge downplays “democracy” so decisively because he understands by democracy the tolerance of dissent, the presence of individualism, and the representation of competing interest groups. He denies that Dedham was an oligarchy, but he considers it a

“most peculiar democracy” because the goal was consensus, not the balancing of competing powers that emerged from eighteenth-century constitutionalism. See *The New England Town*, 37–55. In the interim we have become much more aware of both the degree to which New England writers, such as John Adams in the 1770s, depended on seventeenth-century writers, such as Nathaniel Ward, and the degree to which mid-twentieth-century understandings of democracy diverge from those of eighteenth-century writers ranging from Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Paine to John Adams, James Wilson, and James Madison. See chapters 6 through 10 below.

31. William Perkins, *Epieikeia, or a Treatise on Christian Equity*, in *The Work of William Perkins*, ed. Ian Breward (Abington, 1970). A selection from Perkins’s *Treatise* is in *Puritan Political Ideas, 1558–1794*, ed. Edmund S. Morgan (Indianapolis, 1965), 59–73; the quoted passage appears on 71. On arbitration, mutuality, and equity, see also Hall, *A Reforming People*, 55–70, 89–95, 127–58; and Mark Fortier, *The Culture of Equity in Early Modern England* (Aldershot, 2005).
32. See Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 42; and Derek Hirst, *The Representative of the People? Voters and Voting in England under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge, 1975), for a thorough analysis of prevailing practices in seventeenth-century England.
33. See Robert J. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689–1776* (Westport, 1977); B. Katherine Brown, “The Controversy over the Franchise in Puritan Massachusetts, 1654 to 1774,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 33 (1976): 212–41; John Frederick Martin, *Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill, 1991),

167–75; Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York, 2000), 5–7; and Hall, *A Reforming People*, 92–95.

34. See John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony* (New York, 1970); Lockridge, *A New England Town*; and John Demos, *Circles and Lines: The Shape of Life in Early America* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
35. Winthrop, *Journal*, 90. On the disputes between Dedham's town meeting and its selectmen, see Lockridge, *New England Town*, 38–50.
36. On the stifling of dissent, see Jane Kamensky, *Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in Early New England* (New York, 1997).
37. Winthrop, "A Declaration in Defense of an Order of Court Made in May, 1637," in Morgan, *Puritan Political Ideas*, 144–49.
38. Winthrop, *Journal*, 268–69, 280–84.
39. Winthrop, *Journal*, 284.
40. Winthrop, "Model of Christian Charity," in *Journal*, 1–11.
41. Winthrop, *Journal*, 278.
42. Winthrop, *Journal*, 165. On the one hand New England Puritans were tireless in regulating economic activity, as illustrated in the case of Robert Keayne and in their efforts to fix wages and prices, in their zeal to limit conspicuous consumption through sumptuary laws, and especially in the relentless criticism of wealth and ease that thundered from their ministers' pulpits. On the other hand, though, they did work hard, perhaps twice as many hours as most other workers at the time, and their labors bore fruit. They extracted enough from the rocky soil, the forests, and the icy waters of New England not only to survive in the wilderness but to establish flourishing commercial

enterprises. From the beginning they resisted any English claims on that wealth. Prosperity might have made them uneasy, but they were determined to decide how to deal with the anxiety themselves. Winthrop, *Journal*, 165. On Keayne see Bernard Bailyn, “The ‘Apologia’ of Robert Keayne,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser., 7 (1950): 568–87; and the fine discussion in Stephen J. Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England* (New York, 1995), an indispensable guide to these issues.

43. Lord Saye and Sele and Lord Brooke abandoned their lands in America and decided to stay in England. Ambivalent as Winthrop was about the turbulence of Massachusetts, he affirmed that the Bay Colony would have no hereditary aristocracy. See “Certain Proposals Made by Lord Say, Lord Brooke, and Other Persons of Quality, as Conditions of Their Removing to New-England, with the Answers Thereto,” in *The History of the Province and Colony of Massachusetts Bay*, ed. Lawrence S. Mayo, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1936), 1:410–13; *The Correspondence of John Cotton*, ed. Sargent Bush Jr. (Chapel Hill, 2001), 245; and Winthrop, *Journal*, 192.
44. Edward Winslow, *Good Newes from New England* (1624; Bedford, MA, 1996), 70. For the best analysis of these complicated issues, and a fine guide to the enormous literature that has piled up, from Adam Smith and Karl Marx to Max Weber and R. H. Tawney, in the fields of history, economics, and sociology, see Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth*.
45. Such improvisations from the beginning balanced the deeply felt desire for stability against the equally deeply felt desire for a civil sphere governed according to the principle of Christian love. For that reason the founding compacts emphasize both the importance of obedience to legitimate authority and the importance of grounding such

authority on the sovereign will of the people, joining together in a covenant to frame a government consistent with the sovereign will of God. It is possible to emphasize one or the other of those dimensions of these compacts, the yearning for order or the yearning for popular government, and to overlook the other, but the founding documents of New England communities reveal that both impulses were present everywhere. See David D. Hall, “Narrating Puritanism,” in *New Directions in American Religious History*, ed. Harry Stout and D. G. Hart (New York, 1997), 51–83, for an especially clear statement of this position.

46. John Robinson’s letter to the Pilgrims emigrating to the new world is printed in William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, ed. Francis Murphy (New York, 1981), 57.
47. John Robinson, *Mr. Bernard’s Counsels of Peace Debated*, in *The Works of John Robinson*, ed. Robert Ashton, 3 vols. (Boston, 1851), 2:140–41.
48. John Robinson, *A Just and Necessary Apology of Certain Christians*, in *Works* 3:42–43.
49. “The Mayflower Compact,” in *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America*, ed. Francis Thorpe (Washington, DC, 1909), 1841. As Jason Maloy points out in *The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought*, 100, Robinson’s idea of a popular compact derived not only from Proverbs 11:14, “in the multitude of counsellors there is safety,” and from “a radically populist reading of Matthew 18:17,” but also from a maxim of Roman law: *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus comprobetur*, “what touches all should be approved by all.”
50. Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, 83.

51. *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England*, ed. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff and David Pulsifer, 11 vols. (Boston, 1855–61), vol. 2, *Laws, 1623–1686*, 6, 7, 3; John D. Cushing, ed., *The Laws of the Pilgrims* (Wilmington, 1977), 21.
52. “Agreement among the Settlers,” in *Remarkable Providences*, ed. John Demos, rev. ed. (1972; Boston, 1991), 230–31.
53. The distinctiveness of these compacts becomes clearer when they are compared with others that explicitly recognized the continuing sovereignty of the English monarch. For example, the forty-one men who signed the “Combinations of the Inhabitants Upon the Piscataqua River For Government” in 1641, located also in what became New Hampshire, took a quite different approach from the founders of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Dedham, Providence, or Exeter. In the absence of civil government, these merchants and fur traders noted, various “Mischiefs and inconveniences” had befallen them. Because “his gracious Majesty” had “settled no order for us,” they felt compelled to “combine ourselves into a Body Politick.” But their stated purpose, which might seem at first glance conventional enough, nevertheless distinguished their compact from others formed in Puritan New England. They desired a government “that wee may the more comfortably enjoy the Benefit of his Majesties Laws and doe hereby actually engage ourselves to submit to his Royall Majesties Laws.” They did indicate that they might in addition formulate “such laws as shall be concluded by a major part of the Freemen of our Society,” but they stipulated that such laws would be administered “in behalf of his Majestie” and obeyed inasmuch as they “be not repugnant to the Laws of England.” They promised to abide by the government they were authorizing provisionally, or at least “till his excellent Majestie shall give other orders concerning

us.” The conspicuous presence of King Charles and the conspicuous absence of references to the will and law of God set off the Piscataqua proclamation. “The Combinations of the Inhabitants Upon the Piscataqua River for Government, 1641,” in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, 2445. On the broader question of the relation between English and colonial law, see Mary Sarah Bilder, *The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).

54. The state of Connecticut proudly designates itself the “Constitution State” because the “Fundamental Orders” can be considered the first constitution written in North America. The Connecticut framers’ first article signaled the assumptions common to all the Puritan founding documents. “Well knowing that where a people are gathered together,” they began, “the word of God requires that to maintain the peace and union of such a people there should be an orderly and decent Government established according to God.” As a sinful people they would require rules. Those rules, to be legitimate, must be in accordance with God’s will and established by the people’s elected representatives. The law would derive its spirit from the Bible and its force from popular assent. The government of Connecticut was to include deputies chosen by the towns, who would represent them in the General Court. When new towns were established, these too would be entitled to representation proportional to their populations. In contrast, though, both to Massachusetts and to the community established later that year in New Haven, only the Governor, among all the elected officials, was required to be a church member. “The Fundamental Orders of 1639” is printed in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, 531. New Haven, under the leadership of John Davenport, decided that only church members should be eligible for election, because only church members could be counted

on to govern according to the true will of the people, the will of God. See “The Fundamental Agreement, or Original Constitution of the Colony of New Haven, June 4, 1639,” in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, 523–4.

55. Proverbs 11:14. Hooker stated those principles shortly after the unfolding of the Antinomian crisis; it seems likely he wanted to indirectly chastise Winthrop and the Massachusetts church elders for unjustly exercising their power over Hutchinson and other dissenters. Jason Maloy, in *The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought*, 100, points out that “Pilgrim pastor” John Robinson was fond of invoking the same phrase. For Maloy’s analysis of Hooker’s contributions to the emergence of the democratic idea that public officials are accountable to the people, see 148–60. For Hooker’s election sermon of 1638, see *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society* 1 (1860): 20.
56. Commentators who associate democracy with toleration of dissent and diversity have a conception of order, authority, membership, will, and liberty different from that of Winthrop and Hooker. For both of them, the compact establishing the town, like the covenant establishing the congregation, could survive only if the cement of mutual dependence remained the spirit soldering together individuals’ disparate inclinations. Self-government required such unity. Thomas Hooker, *A Survey of the Summe of Church-Discipline* (London, 1648), pt. 1, 50; and see the discussion in Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (1956; New York, 1964), 44–47.
57. Thomas Hooker to John Winthrop, n.d. [fall 1638], *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society* 1 (1860): 14; and see the interpretation of Hooker’s and Pynchon’s exchange in Maloy, *The Colonial Origins of Modern Democratic Thought*, 144–51.

58. John Davenport, *A Discourse About Civil Government in a New Plantation Whose Design Is Religion* (Cambridge, 1663), 14–16. This text, long attributed to John Cotton, is now known to be Davenport's thanks to Bruce Steiner, "Dissension in Quinnipiac: The Authorship and Setting of *A Discourse About Civil Government in a New Plantation Whose Design Is Religion*," *New England Quarterly* 54 (1981): 14–32. See also Michael Kammen, *Deputies and Libertyes: The Origins of Representative Government in Colonial America* (New York, 1969), 25–26; Hall, *A Reforming People*, 116–18; and on the equitable distribution of wealth and the persistence of hierarchy in early New England, Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 166–80.
59. Winthrop, *Journal*, 168.
60. Winthrop, *Journal*, 189. On the similarities and differences between Winthrop's and Ward's conceptions of magistrates' authority, see Maloy, *The Colonial Origins of American Democratic Thought*, 114–25; Hall, *A Reforming People*, 36–38; and David D. Hall, *Ways of Writing: The Practice and Politics of Text Making in Seventeenth-Century New England* (Philadelphia, 2008), chap. 5.
61. Winthrop, *Journal*, 198–99.
62. Although it is tempting to locate that commitment in a form of skepticism similar to Montaigne's, it derived instead from the tradition of English common law and Paul's counsel to the Thessalonians that they should "test everything" and "hold on to what is good." 1 Thessalonians 5:21. An excellent guide to the literature on *The Body of Liberties* is Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth*, 371–72.
63. "The Plantation Agreement at Providence, August 17–September 6, 1640," in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, 3205–7.

64. "The Document Establishing the Government of Rhode Island, March 16–19, 1641," in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, 3207–9.
65. John D. Cushing, ed., *The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1647–1719* (Wilmington, 1977), 12; and see G. B. Warden, "The Rhode Island Civil Code of 1647," in *Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays in Early American History*, ed. David Hall et al. (New York, 1984). David Hall, *A Reforming People*, 125–56, demonstrates the myriad ways in which most New England towns self-consciously practiced a Christian ethic of love, mutuality, and equity in determining how to make and enforce law and distribute land to residents and newcomers.
66. See Michael Kammen, *Deputyes and Libertyes*, 13–19, 92–101; Warren Billings, "The Growth of Political Institutions in Virginia, 1634–1676," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 31 (April 1974): 225–42; Billings, *A Little Parliament: The Virginia General Assembly in the Seventeenth Century* (Richmond, 2004); Peverill Squire, *The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States, 1619–2009* (Ann Arbor, 2012), 11–71; Maloy, *Colonial Origins of American Democratic Thought*, 62–85; and the brief overview in Jack P. Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 2011), ix–18.
67. Ralph Hamer, *A true discourse of the present estate of Virginia and the successe of the affaires there till the 18 of June, 1614* (London, 1615). See also the discussion in Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), 83; and Maloy, *The Colonial Origins of American Democratic Thought*.
68. Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 124.

69. On the failure of the short-lived Puritan colony of Providence, founded on an island off the coast of Nicaragua, to provide the private ownership of land and the institutions of self-government characteristic of New England, and the consequent failure of Providence to survive without turning to slave labor, see Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island, 1630–1641: The Other Puritan Colony* (New York, 1993).
70. Winthrop, *Journal*, 67.
71. “The Charter of Maryland, 1632,” in Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions, 1677–86*; the passage quoted appears on 1679. See also D. W. Jordan, *Foundations of Representative Government in Maryland, 1632–1715* (Cambridge, 1987).
72. *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly*, January 1637–38 to September, 1644, *Archives of Maryland*, vol. 1 (Baltimore, 1883), 1–39; the quotation concerning Fenwick’s appearance is on 32. The Calverts have usually been portrayed as dedicated strictly to a religious vision or as cagey entrepreneurs focused on profit-making. For an interpretation that presents them as devout but practically-minded Catholics, see John D. Krugler, *English and Catholic: The Lords Baltimore in the Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore, 2008). On the rules developed for the Maryland assembly in relation to those of England, see Squire, *The Evolution of American Legislatures*, 47–51.
73. For overviews of the similarities and differences as well as the common patterns, see Kammen, *Deputyes and Libertyes*, 11–31; and Squire, *The Evolution of American Legislatures*, 11–71.

Chapter 3

1. Charles I quoted in David Wootton, ed., *Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England* (Harmondsworth, 1986), 337.
2. On Hobbes and the ancient republican ideas of popular government derived from Aristotle and Cicero and (perhaps) embedded in English common law, see Quentin Skinner, “Classical Liberty, Renaissance Translation, and the English Civil War,” in Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 2, *Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge, 2002), 308–43. As Skinner points out, the first English translation of Aristotle’s *Politics* appeared in 1598 and became widely known in the following decades, precisely at the time when the Roman republicans Cicero and Tacitus also began to be invoked frequently by English writers. Illustrative examples of the standard tendency to resist the claim that struggles over democratic ideas were at the heart of the conflicts of the 1640s include Ian Hampshire-Monk, “The Historical Study of ‘Democracy,’” in *Democratic Theory and Practice*, ed. Graeme Duncan (Cambridge, 1983), 25–36; Russell L. Hanson, “Democracy,” in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge, 1989); and Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide, and Republic: The English Experience,” in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderin, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2002), 1:323–25. For a thoughtful and careful discussion of the reasons why twentieth-century commentators—most of whom identified democracy with universal suffrage, multi-party politics, dissent from religious beliefs, the representation of individuals rather than households, and often direct participation and radical social and economic egalitarianism—have resisted Hobbes’s characterization of the significance of democratic

ideas in mid-century England, and of the reasons why it might be necessary for historians to reconsider that inclination, see David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700* (hereafter *CHPT, 1450–1700*), ed. J. H. Burns with Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), 412–42.

3. *Wee have brought our hogges to a faire market; with some remembrances of the estates and conditions of Church, King, kingdome, Parliament, Armie, and citie of London. And the one, and onely way to cure all our miseries described* (London, 1648), 1–2.
4. James I, *The Trew Law of Free Monarchy: or the Reciproock and Mutuall Dutie Betwixt a Free King and His Naturall Subjects*, in *The Political Works of James I*, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge, MA, 1918), 53–70.
5. See J. G. Edwards, *The Second Century of the English Parliament* (Oxford, 1979); and J. C. Holt, “The Prehistory of Parliament,” in *The English Parliament in the Middle Ages*, ed. R. G. Davies and J. H. Denton (Manchester, 1981), 1–28.
6. Guy Coquille, *Les oeuvres de Maistre Guy Coquille*, 2 vols. (Bordeaux, 1703), vol. 2, pt. 2, 124–25. Pierre Charron, *De la sagesse...*, in *Of Wisdome Three Bookes*, trans Samson Lennard (London, 1615), 247–48. On French constitutionalism, see Nannerl O. Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1980), esp. 135–44 on Charron; Howell J. Lloyd, “Constitutionalism,” in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 254–97; and Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge, 1993), 82–94.
7. See Otto Gierke, *The Development of Political Theory*, trans. B. Freyd (1929; New York, 1966); and Julian Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics,” in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 298–328.

8. See Mark Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed: Britain, 1603–1714* (New York, 1996), 34–64; Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, 2000), 66–88; Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*; and Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600* (Cambridge, 1992).
9. John Fortescue, *De laudibus legum Anglie*, ed. and trans. S. B. Chrimes, 2nd ed. (1942; Cambridge, 2011), 25.
10. Thomas Smith, *De Republica Angolorum*, ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge, 1982), 57. See also Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed*, 60–62. For contrasting accounts of how Parliamentary selection worked in the early seventeenth century, see Derek Hirst, *The Representative of the People? Voters and Voting in England under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge, 1975), who contends that elections were already contests based on issues and objectives; and Mark Kishlansky, *Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1986), who argues that elections were processes of reaching consensual agreement among elites and did not begin to be contested or competitive until after 1640. On the origins of the idea of the covenant, see Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society, 1559–1625* (Oxford, 1982).
11. John Rushworth, *Historical collections of private passages of state, weighty matters in law, remarkable proceedings in five Parliaments. Beginning the sixteenth year of King James, anno 1618. And ending the fifth year of King Charles, anno 1629...*, vol. 1 (London, 1721), 40–43.

12. *Debates in the House of Commons in 1625*, ed. Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Westminster, 1873), 18–19. On Thomas Scott, see Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (1972; New York, 1984), 34–35.
13. The most influential portrait of the dangers represented by dissenting Puritans was Richard Hooker, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, ed. W. Speed Hill, 4 vols. (1553 or 1554; Cambridge, MA, 1977–82). See also Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 146–53; J. P. Sommerville, “Richard Hooker, Hadrian Saravia, and the Advent of the Divine Right of Kings,” *History of Political Thought* 4 (1983): 229–45; and Andrew Delbanco, *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 28–44.
14. A widely read account by Robert Burton published in 1624, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, expressed a common concern: “Who is not sicke, or ill disposed,” he asked, “in whom doth not passion, anger, envy, discontent, fear and sorrow raigne?” Such sentiment flowed inevitably from the endless news of “warre, plagues, fires, inundations, massacres, meteors,” and other calamities, “of townes taken, cities beseiged in France, Germany, Turkey, Persia, Poland, etc.” In so many nations, “so many men slain.” Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (Oxford, 1621), 15, 3.
15. In 1625 Robert Phelips echoed the anxieties of those who witnessed Parliament’s dissolution in 1614: “We are the last monarchy in Christendome,” he warned, “that retayne our originall rightes and constitutions.” Only if Parliament resisted the threat of Charles’s arbitrary rule, and the underlying danger of popery, could those rights be preserved. Robert Phelips in Gardiner, *Debates in the House of Commons in 1625*, 110.
16. Thomas Gataker, *Of the Nature and Use of Lots*, 2nd ed. (London, 1627), 36–45. Given the recent surge of interest in probability, Gataker’s *Of the Nature and Use of Lots* has

been reissued in a contemporary edition edited by Conall Boyle (Exeter, 2008). On the appropriateness of lot for selecting officers, the “most equall and indifferent” means that permits “no corruption or partialitie,” see 205–6. On the shift from lot to election that accompanies the increasing emphasis on consent as the basis of legitimacy, see Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge, 1997), 84–98.

17. John Pym’s speech at Manwaring’s impeachment, June 4, 1628, is reprinted in *The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary*, ed. John Phillips Kenyon (Cambridge, 1986), 14–16. See also Robert Ashton, “Tradition and Innovation and the Great Rebellion,” in *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, 1980), 212. On the broader issues, see J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1987); and J. A. Guy, “Origin of the Petition of Right Reconsidered,” *Historical Journal* 25 (1982): 289–312.
18. John Selden in *Commons Debates 1628*, vol. 3, *21 April–27 May 1628*, ed. Robert C. Johnson, Mary Frear Keeler, Maija Jansson Cole, and William B. Bidwell (New Haven, 1977), 33. For a nuanced account of the religious basis of Selden’s ideas about civil and natural law, and his reasons for allying with Parliament against the king in the controversy over the militia in 1642, see Richard Tuck, “‘The Ancient Law of Freedom’: John Selden and the Civil War,” in *Reactions to the English Civil War, 1642–1649*, ed. John Morrill (London, 1982), 137–61; and see also Margaret A. Judson, *The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603–1645* (New Brunswick, 1949); and Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, 296.

19. The Petition of Right is reprinted in Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 168–71. For a vivid account of the controversies and power struggles that provoked and followed it, see Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed*, 90–133.
20. The Protestation is reprinted in *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625–1660*, ed. Samuel Rawson Gardiner (Oxford, 1889), 84–85.
21. Samuel Brooke quoted in Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590–1640* (Oxford, 1987), 57. On the persistence of royalism, see Jason McElligott and David L. Smith, eds., *Royalists and Royalism during the English Civil Wars* (Cambridge, 2007).
22. *Winthrop's Journal: History of New England, 1630–1649*, ed. James K. Hosmer, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), 2:186, 301; and “Fundamentalls of the Massachusetts [*sic*],” in *The Hutchinson Papers*, ed. William H. Whitmore and William S. Appleton, 2 vols. (Albany, 1865), 1:231.
23. Charles I, *His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament* (1642), in Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 171–74.
24. Henry Parker, *Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses* (London, 1642), 8, 15. See also Judson, *The Crisis of the Constitution*, chap. 10; and Michael Mendle, *Henry Parker and the English Civil War: The Political Thought of the Public's “Privado”* (Cambridge, 1995). On Parker's use of Greek and Roman ideas of liberty, see Quentin Skinner, “Classical Liberty, Renaissance Translation and the English Civil War,” in Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 2, *Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge, 2002), 334–37.

25. Henry Parker, *Jus Populi; or, A discourse wherein clear satisfaction is given as well concerning the right of subjects as the right of princes shewing how both are consistent and where they border one upon the other: as also, what there is divine and what there is humane in both and whether is of more value and extent* (London, 1644), 61. See also the discussion of *Jus Populi* in Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 231–32.
26. Hunton conceded that cultures ruled by absolute monarchs might never challenge the king's authority. But James's and Charles's claims to absolute sovereignty Hunton dismissed out of hand. Since the time of the German tribes chronicled by the Roman historian Tacitus, English traditions circumscribed monarchs within the boundaries of law, a practice Magna Carta only confirmed. England was both a limited and a mixed monarchy, with authority divided between the King, the aristocracy as represented in the House of Lords, and the people as a whole in the Commons. Given that framework, Charles's champions had no case: Parliament had a positive duty to resist the King's violations of law. The Crown, by countering that resistance with arms, forced Parliament to respond in kind. If possible, Hunton concluded, conflicts should be resolved through negotiation. But if violence made deliberation impossible, then "every person must aid that part which, in his best reason and judgment, stands for public good against the destructive. And the laws and government which he stands for, and is sworn to, justify" such resistance. Philip Hunton, *A Treatise of Monarchy...* (1643), in Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 175–211.
27. Hunton, *A Treatise of Monarchy*, 195, 203, 204.
28. Michael Hudson, *The Divine Right of Government: 1. Naturall, and 2. Politique...* (London, 1647), 91; and for a fuller discussion of polyarchy, see 89–99.

29. John Lilburne, *Regall Tyrannie discovered* (London, 1647), is discussed in *Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution*, ed. Don M. Wolfe (New York, 1944), 7–18, 154. A good recent collection of Leveller writings is *The English Levellers*, ed. Andrew Sharp (Cambridge, 1998), which contains a fine introduction and bibliography, an excellent selection of texts, and short biographical portraits of the leading Levellers.
30. In his denunciation of Lilburne, *A Letter of Due Censure...*, dated June 21, 1650, Parker ridiculed Lilburne's defense. "The Judges because they understand Law, are to be degraded and made servants to the Jurors; but the Jurors, because they understand no Law, are to be mounted aloft...The Judges because they are commonly Gentlemen by birth, and have had honorable education, are to be exposed to scorn; but the Jurors, because they be commonly Mechanicks, bred up illiterately to handy crafts, are to be placed at the helme." Parker quoted in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 5n6. The most recent comprehensive study of the Levellers is Rachel Foxley, *The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution* (Manchester, 2013). Historians disagree concerning the appropriateness of using the term "democracy" with reference to the Levellers. David Wootton, in "Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution," *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 412–42, warns against anachronism; Andrew Sharp, in his introduction to *The English Levellers*, vii–xxii, defends the use of the term "Leveller democrats" and considers it fair to characterize the Levellers as "liberal democrats" under "impossible circumstances."
31. Parliament, Lilburne argued, had done well to challenge the king's pretensions to absolute sovereign power, because "there is no reason why any man shou'd be bound expressly to any one forme" of government "farther than his Judgement and conscience doe agree thereunto." But invoking precedents was no longer enough: just as individuals

can change their minds, “so ought the whole Nation to be free therein even to alter and change the publique forme, as may best stand with the safety and freedome of the people.” That call for a fresh start, a reorientation based not on historical experience but on reason and justice, carried Lilburne beyond Montaigne’s circumspection toward the discourse of autonomy and equality, a language Levellers frequently employed to justify their demands for religious toleration and popular government. Lilburne, *The Free-mans Freedom Vindicated* (London, 1646), 11.

32. *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens*, July 7, 1646, is reprinted in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 112–30; and see Overton, *A Pearle in a Dounghill*, quoted in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 8–9.
33. Richard Overton, *An Arrow Against All Tyrants and Tryany [sic]* (London, 1646), 3–4; John Lilburne, *Londons Liberty In Chains...* (London, 1646), 4; Lilburne, *The Charters of London* (London, 1646); and see Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 11–14.
34. Against the claims of many prominent historians who have sought to minimize the significance of the Levellers’ ideas or their grounding in ancient republican thought, S. D. Glover presents convincing evidence to the contrary in “The Putney Debates: Popular versus Elitist Republicanism,” *Past and Present* 164 (August 1999): 47–80. Glover demonstrates the existence of a popular strain of classical republicanism that sought to empower the poor instead of merely the propertied. He shows that Leveller leaders such as Lilburne, Overton, Waldwyn, and Wildman explicitly invoked classical and Renaissance texts from that tradition in their writings, from *Vox Plebis* (November 1646) through the 1650s. See also Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Burlington, 2004).

35. Lilburne, *Regall Tyrannie discovered...*, 99.
36. Anonymous (Overton?), *A New Found Strategem...* (London?, 1647), 9.
37. *A Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations...from Fairfax, and the Generall Councel of the Army* (London, 1647), 8.
38. John Lilburne, *Rash Oaths unwarrantable*, May 31, 1647, in *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke*, ed. C. H. Firth, 2 vols. (London, 1992), 1:6–7, 38. See also Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 28–29, 133–34.
39. Cromwell in Firth, *The Clarke Papers* 1: 209.
40. The full title of this celebrated pamphlet expresses the thrust of Overton's argument: *An Appeale, From the degenerate Representative Body the Commons of England assembled at Westminster: To the Body Representing The free people in general of the several Counties, Cities, Townes, Burroughs, and places within this Kingdome of England, and Dominion of Wales* (London, 1647); it is reprinted in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 156–88.
41. Overton, *An Appeale*, 163–65.
42. Overton denied that he or his friend Lilburne were disloyal. Instead it was their accusers, those in Parliament who had burned petitions and ignored Magna Carta, who were guilty of "High Treason." Parliament had justified its war against the king by invoking the rights and duties of Englishmen to oppose arbitrary rule. Now the army must do the same: "it was not the end of our undertaking to pull downe one kinde of oppressors to set up others more desperate and dangerous," to remove "a wicked Counsell from the King, and then to set up and tollerate [*sic*]" an even "more traiterous [*sic*] and wicked" Parliament. The army must "amputate" the "corrupt putrified Members from the *Body*

Representative.” Parliament’s “reall Apostacy” from its “true *representative capacity*” meant that the people, “this *naturall Body*, by vertue of its instinctd [*sic*], inherent naturall Sovereignty [*sic*], may *create*, or *depute* any *person* or *persons* for their *Deputy* or *Deputies*” to achieve “the suppression of injustice and tyranny” and the “recovery of liberty and freedom.” Parliament having betrayed the people, England now swarmed “with such Monsters in nature and humanity, overspreading the whole Land with these tyrannies and oppressions.” Unless the army took immediate action, “nothing but bondage, tyranny, and oppression remaineth for the inheritance of us, and our children after us.” Overton, *An Appeale*, 158–63, 176–83.

43. Overton, *An Appeale*, 182.

44. Overton, *An Appeale*, 173.

45. Among the reforms Overton endorsed, prohibiting compulsory adherence to the Presbyterian covenant held pride of place: no secular authority should impose a particular religious belief. But Overton wanted more than freedom of conscience for all Englishmen. All trials should be fair and “speedy,” all courts bound by standing laws translated from Latin into English, and all “Mayors, Sheriffes, Justices of peace, &c. may be left to the free Election of the people, in their respective places, and not otherwise to bee chosen.” Overton, *An Appeale*, 189–190, 194.

46. Overton, *An Appeale*, 188.

47. Overton’s political arguments rested on a more sturdy philosophical foundation than did those of many Leveller writers. His conceptions of popular sovereignty and reciprocity flowed from the idea of individual autonomy that he shared with some but hardly all dissenting Protestants. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between Overton’s

politics and his metaphysics, as laid out in his anti-dualist *Mans Mortalitie* (1643), and an instructive comparison of his ideas with Milton's, see Nicholas McDowell, "Ideas of Creation in the Writings of Richard Overton the Leveller and *Paradise Lost*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66 (January 2005): 59–78. McDowell provides a much broader analysis of the backgrounds and arguments of those engaged in the battle of ideas that raged during these years in *The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution, 1630–1669* (Oxford, 2003).

48. Although disagreements persist, most historians of seventeenth-century England agree that it was the innovations of the Stuart monarchy that prompted the traditionally-minded English to the protests that led to civil war, revolution, and republic. Wrenching as the conflicts were, the Restoration came so easily because the vast majority of the people of England had never abandoned their loyalties to the monarchy and the Church of England. So many aspects of English history and culture were tangled together in the clashes of these years that neither class interpretations nor interpretations emphasizing contingencies and/or the personal choices by central figures can stand without taking the other factors into account. For incisive discussions of the competing lines of interpretation of these issues, see Robert Ashton, "Tradition and Innovation and the Great Rebellion," 208–23; Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 1992); and Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution* (Oxford, 2003).
49. Other pamphlets laid out the radical goals of many ordinary soldiers and expressed their misgivings about their officers' commitment to their cause. The soldiers had reason to be wary. Despite Cromwell's effort to alter the balance of power in the House of Commons through a show of the army's force, Presbyterians continued to dominate Parliament.

Convinced that only a small fraction of soldiers shared the Levellers' views, Cromwell considered a Presbyterian-dominated Parliament a greater threat to his fellow Independents than the King, with whom he recommended beginning negotiations. *The Case of the Army*, October 15, 1647, in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 198–224.

50. *An Agreement of the People*, November 3, 1647, is in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 225–34; the quotations are from 228.
51. Cromwell in Firth, *The Clarke Papers* 1:236–37.
52. Cromwell in Firth, *The Clarke Papers* 1:277–78.
53. Thomas Rainsborough in Firth, *The Clarke Papers* 1:271. It is worth noting that the Putney debates were unknown until they were published in this collection in 1891. To locate the Putney debates in the wider context of the transformation of English politics from consensus to conflict, see Mark Kishlansky, “Consensus Politics and the Structure of Debate at Putney,” and David Underdown, “Commentary,” in *The Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism*, ed. Margaret Jacob and James Jacob (Boston, 1984), 70–85, 127–129, respectively. For a clear analysis of the army's ideology, centering on the ideas of individual liberty, the integrity of Parliament as the authentic voice of the people, and a commitment to the common good over private interests, see Mark Kishlansky, “Ideology and Politics in the Parliamentary Armies,” in Morrill, *Reactions to the English Civil War*, 163–83.
54. The Putney debates of October 29, 1647, are reprinted in Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 285–317. Rainsborough's celebrated opening speech is on 285. See also A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647–1649) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents* (1938; Chicago, 1951).

55. Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 291–92.
56. Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 292–93.
57. Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 296–97.
58. Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 294.
59. Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 198–99.
60. John Lawmind (the pseudonym chosen by John Wildman), *Putney Projects*, December 30, 1647, 44, British Library, E. 421 (19).
61. Thomas Edwards, *Gangraena* (London, 1646), pt. 3, preface.
62. Anonymous (attributed to Winstanley), *More Light Shining in Buckingham-shire* (London, 1649), 16.
63. See the preface to Firth, *The Clarke Papers*, li, where these phrases appear in “a letter from the Agents to the regiments which they represented, dated November 11.” There has been some disagreement about the meaning of the category “servants.” If it included apprentices and wage workers, then only the self-employed would be enfranchised if “servants and paupers” were ruled out. In response to the claims of some of the Levellers’ later radical critics, Wootton cogently argues in “Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution,” in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 432–433, that such a modest aim would hardly have been worth the effort. But if the Levellers did want more than that, it remains hard to say what they wanted because different individuals expressed different goals at different times, and for that reason it is crucial to attend to specific texts.
64. On the *Declaration By Congregationall Societies*, November 22, 1647, see Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 58n11.

65. As if the Levellers' situation wasn't awkward enough at the time, historians of the seventeenth century have tended ever since to reproduce those judgments. See the fine discussion of these issues in Wootton, "Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution," in *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 430–34.
66. On Corkbush, see G. E. Aylmer, *Rebellion or Revolution: England from Civil War to Restoration* (Oxford, 1986), 86–90.
67. John Lilburne, *An impeachment of high treason against Oliver Cromwell...* (London, 1649), 23.
68. Ireton in Firth, *The Clarke Papers* 2:98.
69. *Agreement of the People* (1647), in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 227.
70. Richard Overton in *The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653*, ed. William Haller and Godfrey Davies (Gloucester, MA, 1964), 231. On Walwyn and Montaigne, see *CHPT, 1450–1700*, 440–41.
71. *An Agreement of the People* (January 15, 1649), in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 333–50.
72. Jason Peacey, ed., *The Regicides and the Execution of Charles I* (New York, 2001).
73. See the incisive discussion of private interest and the common good in the *Declaration* of June 14, 1647; the *Remonstrance* of June 23, 1647; the *Declaration* of August 2, 1647; the *Remonstrance* of November, 1648; and the *Declaration* of December 6, 1648 in Mark Kishlansky, "Ideology and Politics in the Parliamentary Armies," in Morrill, *Reactions to the English Civil War*, 163–83, esp. 179–81.
74. John Cook, *A compleate collection of the lives speeches private passages, letters and prayers of those persons lately executed...* (London, 1661), quoted in J.C. Davis,

“Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution,” *Historical Journal* 35, no. 3 (1992): 507–30. The quotation appears on 521.

75. The four Leveller leaders proposed that Cromwell and Ireton should choose two associates who would join them to deliberate on their objections to the officers’ *Agreement*. If that group failed to reach consensus (as they must by then have known they would), the Levellers proposed submitting the matter to arbitration by four members of the House of Commons, two chosen by Cromwell and Ireton and two by the imprisoned Levellers. Although nothing came of their suggestion, it is striking how clearly it mirrors the proposal enacted in Rhode Island in 1640. Like their fellow dissidents in New England, the Leveller leaders had confidence that deliberation would generate agreement on their own democratic principles.
76. The third *Agreement of the People*, April 14, 1649, in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 400–10.
77. William Walwyn, *Manifestation*, April 14, 1649, in Wolfe, *Leveller Manifestoes*, 388–96.
78. William Walwyn, *Walwins Wiles* (1649), in Haller and Davies, *The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653*, 302.
79. Walwyn, *Manifestation*.
80. William Walwyn, *The Power of Love* (London, 1643), 43. The other Leveller leaders shared Walwyn’s Puritan convictions. In June of 1649, reflecting from his cell in the Tower on his career as a firebrand, Lilburne noted that he had labored for “Divine Laws” rather than liberation from them. To that end “I should not be the servant of men (to serve their lusts and wills) but entirely and solely the servant of God.” He sought to glorify God “with my body, in righteous and just actions among the sons of men, as well as in my

soul, in speculation, imagination or adoration.” John Lilburne, *The Legall Fundamentall Liberties of the People of England* (1649), in Haller and Davies, *The Leveller Tracts*, 403. See also Davis, “Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution”; Davis, “The Levellers and Christianity,” in *Politics, Religion and the English Civil War*, ed. Brian Manning (London, 1973), 225–50; William M. Lamont, *Godly Rule: Politics and Religion 1603–1660* (London, 1969); and the sources collected in *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638–1647*, ed. William Haller, 3 vols. (New York, 1965).

81. John Lilburne, *Strength out of Weaknesse...* (London, 1649), in Haller and Davies, *The Leveller Tracts*, 21–22. The question of the role of religion in the English Civil War has been the subject of much scholarly debate. Without contending that everything turned on religion at a time of widespread religious faith, an analytical night in which all cows are black, it is nevertheless worth emphasizing that because the Church of England was “by law established” after 1604, all arguments concerning law in England were inevitably arguments about the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of the church as well as the monarchy. For a judicious discussion of these issues, which takes as its point of departure John S. Morrill, “The Religious Context of the English Civil War,” in Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), see Glen Burgess, “Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61 (1998): 173–201.
82. Walwyn, *Manifestation*.
83. On Katherine Chidley, who championed women’s rights against the authority of their husbands but conceded that women must nevertheless remain subservient, like men, to

God's will, see Ian Gentles, "London Levellers in the English Revolution: The Chidleys and their Circle," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 29 (1978): 281–309.

84. Oliver Cromwell has obviously attracted enormous attention. J. S. Morrill, ed., *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (London, 1990), contains useful essays. Overviews include Aylmer, *Rebellion or Revolution?*; and Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed*.
85. Harrington's writings are available in many editions, including *The Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge, 1977); see 332–33 on the importance of liberty of conscience in *Oceana*. Twentieth-century interest in Harrington was piqued by Zera Fink, *The Classical Republicans* (Evanston, 1945); intensified as a result of J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton, 1975); and has continued to increase ever since. Recent discussions include Mark Goldie, "The Civil Religion of James Harrington," in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 1987); and Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, 2000). On Harrington's contributions to republican thinking about imperial expansion, ideas that would prove influential in later American debates about these issues, see David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 125–39. Harrington and his close associate Marchamont Nedham also figure prominently in Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1998), in which these "neo-Roman" republicans are depicted as prizing "negative liberty" and rejecting the Aristotelian notion that human fulfillment requires participation in the public realm. For a contrasting argument that emphasizes the role of Aristotle and particularly Plato in Harrington's ideas, see Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*

(Cambridge, 2004), 87–126. Work on the anti-democrat Hobbes, now often characterized as the founder of our own disenchanted, secular conceptions of the scope and purpose of liberal political theory, is vast. Works notable for their effort to contextualize Hobbes's writings include Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*; and the essays collected in Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 3, *Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge, 2002).

86. *The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630–1649*, ed. Richard S. Dunn and Laetitia Yeandle (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 84–85, 94, 109–13, 118–22. On Vane's ideas, see David Parnham, *Sir Henry Vane, Theologian: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Religious and Political Discourse* (Madison, NJ, 1997); Michael P. Winship, *Making Heretics: Militant Protestantism and Free Grace in Massachusetts, 1636–1641* (Princeton, 2002); and Andrew Delbanco, *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge, MA, 1989). On Vane's life after his return to England, see Violet A. Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger: A Study of Political and Administrative History* (London, 1970), which includes, as Appendix F, "The Character of Sir Henry Vane by Algernon Sidney," 275–83.
87. On Hugh Peter, the standard biography remains Raymond P. Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter, 1598–1660* (Cambridge, MA, 1954). For Peter's role in creating and enforcing the New England Way, see David Hall, ed., *The Antinomian Controversy, 1636–1638: A Documentary History* (1968; Middletown, CT, 1990); and Philip Gura, *A Glimpse of Zion's Glory: Puritan Radicalism in New England, 1620–1660* (Middletown, CT, 1984). More generally, on the shaping of the New England Way in relation to English Puritanism, see Stephen Foster, *The Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England Culture, 1570–1700* (Chapel Hill, 1991); and Darren Staloff,

The Making of an American Thinking Class: Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in Puritan Massachusetts (New York, 1998).

88. For Milton's writings on all these subjects, see *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven, 1953–82). Two of Milton's texts, *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, published two weeks after Charles I was put to death in 1649, and *A Defense of the People of England* (1651), are available in Milton, *Political Writings*, ed. Martin Dzelzainis (Cambridge, 1991); a third, *The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660), is reprinted in *The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts*, ed. Joyce Lee Malcolm, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1999) 1:505–25. A fine collection of recent essays on Milton's political ideas is David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Milton and Republicanism* (Cambridge, 1995).
89. Milton, *An Apology against a Pamphlet...* (London, 1642). See also Davis, "Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution."
90. Milton, *Areopagitica*, in Milton, *Prose Writings*, ed. K. M. Burton (New York, 1958), 149–50.
91. Milton, *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, in Dzelzainis, *Political Writings*, 3–48. See especially 8–13, 16–17, 207. In the words of Martin Dzelzainis, Milton's "assertions of the right of self-determination are about as categorical as can be imagined." See Martin Dzelzainis, "Milton's Classical Republicanism," in Armitage et al., *Milton and Republicanism*, 20. Although Dzelzainis's introduction to his edition of Milton's *Political Writings* provides a brilliant textual analysis and historical contextualization of Milton's arguments in *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, I believe he exaggerates the extent of

Milton's "secularism" and understates his reliance on religious arguments and ideas, the importance of which the text makes unmistakable. Although Milton shifted his focus away from the "inferior magistrates" emphasized by continental resistance theorists, and by Presbyterians John Knox and George Buchanan, to emphasize the legitimacy of popular sovereignty, he remained careful to locate the origin of the people's authority in the will of God. The presence of arguments concerning reason and nature in Milton's text need not rule out the persistence of religious arguments as well. Although the contributors to *Milton and Republicanism* make a persuasive case for the uses to which Milton put arguments drawn from both classical and Renaissance humanism, that evidence should not blind us to his continuing—and, I believe, at least equally important—reliance on his understanding of the Hebrew and Christian Bible as the word of God. For another illustration of the persistent, anachronistic attempt to see in Milton's writings an unconscious secularism struggling to be born, see Quentin Skinner, "What Does It Mean to Be A Free Person?" *London Review of Books*, May 22, 2008, 16–18.

92. Milton, *Eikonoklastes*, in Wolfe et al., *Complete Prose Works* 3:542.
93. The best guide to, and explanation of, these subtle changes in Milton's arguments is Dzelzainis' introduction to Milton, *Political Writings*, especially x–xxv. He points out, on 33n140, that Milton might already have seen a draft of Salmasius's work when he revised *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* only eight months after the first edition appeared.
94. Milton, *A Defense of the English People*, in Dzelzainis, *Political Writings*, 67, 251, 252.
95. Milton, *A Defense of the English People*, 80; see also 156–57, 184–91.
96. Milton, *A Defense of the English People*, 194; see also Dzelzainis' introduction, xxiv–xxv.

97. Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way*, 509–10. See also Quentin Skinner, “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery,” in Skinner, *Visions of Politics* 2:286–307, in which Skinner credits Milton with having drawn on Roman critiques of monarchy, which enabled him “to add significantly to previous discussions about the relations between individual liberty and the true greatness of kingdoms and state” (302).
98. Only the people as a whole can secure the public good, which no single individual, no matter how virtuous or wise, can see as they do. By choosing the best among them for office, the multitude was exercising its judgment wisely. “The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a full and free Councel of their own electing, where no single person but reason only swaves.” Only children would choose freely to renounce their own liberty and make their wills subservient to the “patronage and disposal” of a “single person.” Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way*, 510–12.
99. A characteristic judgment on the “patrician social prejudices” that tarnished Milton’s “radical intellectual convictions” appears in the influential study by Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down*, 401. See also Hill, *Milton and the English Revolution* (London, 1977).
100. Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way*, 514–17.
101. In Milton’s judgment, “liberty of conscience,” which “above all other things ought to be to all men dearest and most precious,” is much more effectively secured by republican than monarchical government. Moreover, “the civil rights and advancements of every person according to his merit” is likewise likelier in a republic, and both spiritual and civil freedom “may be best and soonest obtained, if every county in the land were made a little commonwealth.” Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way*, 520–23.

102. On this theme of multiple traditions, see especially Steven Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment Nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (June 1998): 705–36; and Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 290–97, for persuasive statements of the case. In an incisive review essay in *English Historical Review* 112 (September 1997): 949–51 that discusses recent scholarship concerning these issues, including Markku Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1995); the essays in Skinner, *Milton and Republicanism*; and a new edition of Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, ed. Hans Blom, Eco Haitsma, Julier and Ronald Janse (Cambridge, 1996), Scott writes: “every republican combined several political languages, and most bridged in the process the intellectual terrains of humanism, Christianity and law (among others).” Scott concludes that English republicanism was “a moral philosophy of self-government” that was “Greek in origin, with Roman and Christian accretions (allowing for considerable variety around a common core).” Puzzlingly, the most erudite of British historians, Quentin Skinner, in *Liberty before Liberalism*, for reasons neither self-evident nor articulated, continues to ignore the evidence of such blending, particularly the vitality and appeal of Christian ideals, and to stress instead the idea of “neo-Roman liberty.”
103. The literature on Hobbes is vast. See in particular Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*, 279–348; Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, vol. 3, *Hobbes and Civil Science*; and, on Hobbes’s American connection, N. R. Malcolm, “Hobbes, Sandys, and the Virginia Company,” *Historical Journal* 24 (1981): 297–321.

104. See Scott, *England's Troubles*, 46–48; and Charles Carlton, *Going to the War: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651* (London, 1992). Things could have been even worse, as they were in Europe's wars of religion: see Barbara Donagan, "Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War," *American Historical Review* 99 (October 1994): 1137–66; and Benjamin Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
105. Judicious assessments of the consequences of the Civil War, which illustrate the range of historians' judgment, include Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down*; Lawrence Stone, "The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century," in Pocock, *Three British Revolutions*, 23–108; Aylmer, *Rebellion or Revolution*; Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed*; and Scott, *England's Troubles*.
106. Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way*, 523.
107. The speech Vane gave before his execution was reprinted often by dissidents after the Restoration. It appears with Vane's trial record in Malcolm, *The Struggle for Sovereignty*, 2:531–62. See also Parnham, *Sir Henry Vane*; Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan*; and Winship, *Making Heretics*, 245–46.
108. Edwin S. Gaustad, *Liberty of Conscience: Roger Williams in America* (Grand Rapids, 1991), 137–40; Perry Miller, *Roger Williams* (Indianapolis, 1953), 192–95; Ola E. Winslow, *Master Roger Williams: A Biography* (New York, 1957); and John M. Barry, *Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul: Church, State, and the Birth of Liberty* (New York, 2012), 341–57. As David Hall points out in *A Reforming People: Puritanism and the Transformation of Public Life in New England* (New York, 2012), 49–50, English reformers "fell significantly short of what the colonists had

accomplished.” In England “the Leveller program was never adopted—not by the Long Parliament, which refused all suggestions that it dissolve, nor by the commonwealth and protectorate.” In the political sphere, “the accomplishments of the colonists became the fullest embodiment of the animus against arbitrary rule, monarchical authority, monopolies, and other forms of special privilege, and, on the side of state-building, the fullest realization of ‘fundamental liberties,’ the empowering of legislative representatives, and the principle of consent.”

Chapter 4

1. See Scott Sowerby, *Making Toleration: The Repealers and the Glorious Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2013); Julian Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty? England, 1689–1727* (Oxford, 2000), 25; and Jonathan Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
2. No alternative forms of worship, whether Presbyterian, Quaker, or Roman Catholic, were permitted. All Members of Parliament were required to participate in Anglican sacraments. Church and government officials, restored to their seats of authority, saw threats of renewed Puritan or Papist plots in even the slightest deviations from these new norms; even gathering more than twenty signatures to support a petition now constituted a crime. In both religion and politics, ideas and practices common in preceding decades were suppressed. On the Restoration, see generally Lawrence Stone, “The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century,” in *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, 1980), 23–108; Mark Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed: Britain, 1603–1714* (London, 1996); Paul Seaward, *The Cavalier Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1661–1667* (Cambridge, 1989); and Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty? England, 1689–1727*. For detailed accounts of the emergence of radical challenges to the restored monarchy, see Richard Greaves, *Deliver Us from Evil: The Radical Underground in Britain, 1660–1663* (Oxford, 1986); Greaves, *Enemies Under His Feet: Radicals and Nonconformists in Britain, 1664–1667* (Stanford, 1990); Greaves, *Secrets of the Kingdom: British Radicals from the Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688–89* (Stanford, 1992); Jonathan Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677* (Cambridge, 1988); Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the*

- Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683* (Cambridge, 1991); and Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, 2000).
3. On Filmer, see Peter Laslett's introduction to Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha*, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford, 1949); and Peter Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man versus the Whig Myth," *William and Mary Quarterly* 5 (October 1948): 524. For the *Presentment of the Grand Jury of Ossulston* (1662), see Tim Harris, *London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II* (Cambridge, 1987), 144.
 4. Vane's speech, delivered June 6, 1662, was published—anonously, of course—several times in the decades that followed. It is reprinted, together with the record of his trial, in Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed., *The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts*, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1999), 2:531–62.
 5. William Bedloe, *A Narrative and Impartial Discovery of the Horrid Popish Plot...* (London, 1679), 2. On anti-Catholicism, see Jonathan C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, 1994).
 6. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, "Two Seasonable Discourses concerning this Present Parliament" and "A Letter from a Person of Quality, to His Friend in the Country," both from 1675, are reprinted in Malcolm, *The Struggle for Sovereignty* 2:592–602, 606–49.
 7. *Vox Populi; or, the Peoples Claim to their Parliaments Sitting To Redress Grievances, and Provide for the Common Safety; by the Known Laws and Constitutions of the Nation* (London, 1681), is reprinted in Malcolm, *The Struggle for Sovereignty* 2:651–69.

8. “Manus haec inimica tyrannis / Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietam.” Like so much in Sidney’s life, even the provenance of this celebrated motto is uncertain. He never acknowledged having written the second line, and the first line may be a quotation from an unknown source. See the discussion in Chester N. Greenough, “Algernon Sidney and the Motto of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 51 (1917–1918): 262; and Alan Craig Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America* (Princeton, 1991), 34–35. On the resurrection of classic texts in resistance theory during the 1680s, see Kirstie McClure, “Reflections on Political Literature: History, Theory, and the Printed Book,” in David Armitage, ed., *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2006), 235–53.

Sidney has received considerable attention recently. Biographies include John Carswell, *The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney* (London, 1989); and Paulette Carrive, *La pensée politique d’Algernon Sidney* (Paris, 1989). Studies in which Sidney’s ideas receive more detailed analysis include Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677*; Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683*; and Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*.

9. Sidney to Bulstrode Whitelock, November 13, 1659, in *Sydney Papers, consisting of a journal of the Earl of Leicester, and original letters of Algernon Sydney*, ed. Robert Blencowe (London, 1825), 169–73; Sidney to [his father] the Earl of Leicester, July 28, 1660, in *Sydney Papers*, 189–94.
10. Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, ed. Hans W. Blom, Eco Haitsma Mulier, and Ronald Janse (Cambridge, 1996), 188. See also Sidney, “The Character of Sir Henry Vane,”

reprinted in Violet A. Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger* (London, 1970), 278–82. For Sidney’s inscription, “Sit Sanguinis Ultor Justorum,” see Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677*, 171.

11. Sir George Downing to Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, June 23, 1665, in T. H. Lister, *Life and Administration of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon...*, 3 vols. (London, 1837), 3:388; and William Scot to Lord Arlington, c. August 18–21, 1666, in Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, 42.
12. Sidney, *Court Maxims*, 44, 197.
13. Sidney, *Court Maxims*, 4, 15.
14. Sidney, *Court Maxims*, 24.
15. The “light of nature and reason in man” has “its beginning in God,” so “Plato and the other great masters of human reason” need not be contrasted to scripture. The learned might invoke “Littleton and Coke” and advise studying the common law, but Sidney counseled instead reading only ancient philosophers and “above all” the Bible, “being the dictate of God’s own spirit.” Sidney, *Court Maxims*, 123, 125.
16. Sidney, *Court Maxims*, 4, 12.
17. Algernon Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, ed. Thomas G. West (Indianapolis, 1990), 192.
18. See the illuminating discussion in Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide, and Republic: The English Experience,” in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2002), 1:307–27, esp. 326n13.

19. On Sidney's exile and the reasons for his return to England, see Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, 30–45; and cf. Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677*, 239–45; and Carswell, *The Porcupine*, 156–61.
20. Our own anxieties regarding low turnout make us worry less about vote buying than about voter disinterest. But ignoring the reasons for seventeenth-century republicans' misgivings about popular government, or assuming that they betray anti-democratic bias, blinds us to the less than salutary practices that enabled those with resources to purchase their neighbors' support. The late 1670s were, after all, the period when the word "sham" entered the English language to describe deceitful practices common in public life. Not all complaints about "corruption" rested on fantasies of conspiracy. See William Penn [using the pseudonym Philanglus], *England's Great Interest In the Choice of this New Parliament, Dedicated to All Her Freeholders and Electors* (London, 1679), 1. On the question of elections, the corruption of the franchise, and the transformation of electoral politics from rituals endorsing consensus candidates to competition between rivals, see Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton, 1986), 594; Gordon Schochet, "Radical Politics and Ashcraft's Treatise on Locke," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50 (July–September 1989): 503–6; and Mark Kishlansky, *Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1986).
21. "I must confess," Sidney wrote, "I do not know three men of a mind, and that a spirit of giddiness reigns among us, far beyond any I ever observed in my life." Sidney to George

Savile, May 5, 1679, in *Letters of the Honourable Algernon Sidney* (London, 1742), 53–54.

22. “Things are so entangled, that liberty of language is almost lost; and noe man knowes how to speake of any thing, least [*sic*] he that is spoken unto may be of a party contrary unto him, and that endeavours to overthrow what he would set up.” Those intrigues caused Sidney to be accused by royal spies of treason. He was suspected of allying with Shaftesbury in the Exclusion Crisis, which now seems false; of participating in the Rye House Plot, which also seems false; and third, of helping to write seditious pamphlets challenging the legitimacy of the king’s repeated dissolutions of Parliament, which was almost certainly true. Sidney to Benjamin Furly, October 13, 1680, in *Original Letters of John Locke, Alg. Sidney, and Lord Shaftesbury*, ed. T. Forster, 2nd ed. (1830; London, 1847), 98. One of those pamphlets, *A Just and Modest Vindication of the proceedings of the Two last Parliaments* (London, 1682), was reprinted as *The design of enslaving England discovered by the incroachments upon the powers and privileges of Parliament by K. Charles II* (London, 1689); it has been attributed to William Jones and Robert Ferguson as well as Sidney.
23. Detailed accounts of this crisis, and Sidney’s role in it, include Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683*; and Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 434–53.
24. George Jeffreys, *The Tryal of Algernon Sydney*, in *Sydney on Government*, ed. J. Robertson (London, 1772), quoted in Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 362.
25. The efforts of some twentieth-century scholars either to tease out defenses of capitalism or to insist on the primacy of civic republicanism as the animating principles of radicals in the 1670s and 1680s are no longer persuasive. Sidney and his contemporaries saw the

world neither in terms of a market economy nor a classical polis but above all in terms of their understanding of the responsibilities of Protestant Christians. Although they valued property and civic virtue, and different individuals placed varying degrees of emphasis on different aspects of the radical creed, almost all of them discussed those values in relation to the overarching framework provided by their religious faith. For more detailed and contextualized discussions of these issues, and treatment of the historiographical controversies between “liberal” and “republican” interpretations that now seem to me largely resolved, see Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, 3–11, 122–30; and Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 290–97, 352–55.

26. “Liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of another, and by the name of slave we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master.” Sidney, *Discourses*, 17.
27. Sidney, *Discourses*, 102–3.
28. Sidney, *Discourses*, 99, 166.
29. Sidney, *Discourses*, 478–79.
30. Sidney, *Discourses*, 13.
31. Sidney, *Discourses*, 396–97, 502–7; and see the illuminating discussion of this important point in J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (1966; Berkeley, 1971), 13–17.
32. Sidney argued that a single national assembly was superior to the federal arrangements in Switzerland or the United Provinces, because in such nations individual cantons or provinces could dig in their heels against the others and insist on their own interest without having to confront the discrepancy between that interest and the broader interest

of the nation as a whole. Although fully cognizant of its costs, Sidney preferred the English system, which was premised on the awareness that “every county does not make a distinct body, having in it self a sovereign power, but is a member of that great body which comprehends the whole nation. ‘Tis not therefore for *Kent* or *Sussex*, *Lewis* or *Maidstone*, but for the whole nation, that the members chosen in those places are sent to serve in parliament.” Sidney, *Discourses*, 451.

33. Sidney, *Discourses*, 443–44.

34. Sidney, *Discourses*, 559.

35. In ways that will become clear, that conviction sparked a disagreement between Sidney and William Penn, and developments in Pennsylvania would demonstrate the profound wisdom of Sidney’s more prudent assessment of human potential. Sidney, *Discourses*, 461, 451, 173; and cf. 149–50, 357, and 524–25.

36. Sidney, *Discourses*, 548.

37. Just as “the meanest piece of wood or stone, being placed by a wise architect, conduces to the beauty of the most glorious building,” so are men, on their own and as individuals, merely “rough pieces of timber or stone” to be transformed into a durable and valuable creation by a “skillful builder” who must “cleave, saw or cut” the raw materials he is given. Without those materials, and without the vision of those builders, there is nothing. Sidney, *Discourses*, 83–85.

38. The jury that judged Sidney guilty was not exactly a jury of his peers, which would have been, in his words, a jury drawn from “the principal knights and gentlemen that were freeholders in Middlesex.” Instead it consisted of “a rabble of men of the meanest callings, ruined fortunes, lost reputation, and hardly endowed with such understanding, as

is required” to reach a verdict concerning the most trivial of offenses. It was, he complained, a jury of men lacking autonomy, experience in public affairs, and the ethic of mutuality that Sidney prized—in short, individuals of the sort most likely to favor absolute monarchy and least likely to embrace Sidney’s republican values. Facing execution, Sidney thought he deserved better. For *The Apology of A. Sydney, in the Day of his Death*, in *Sidney on Government*, see Scott, *England’s Troubles*, 448.

39. When rulers violate the public good, the people retain the right to resist: “those laws were to be observed, and the oaths taken by them, having the force of a contract between magistrate and people, could not be violated without danger of dissolving the whole fabrick.” Sidney, *The Very Copy of a Paper Delivered to the Sheriffs, upon the Scaffold on Tower-Hill, on Friday Decemb. 7, 1683* (London, 1683), 2.
40. Free nations “are governed by their own laws and magistrates according to their own mind.” Only the enslaved are content with aristocracy or monarchy, having either “willingly subjected themselves” or “by force brought under the power of one or more men, to be ruled according to his or their pleasure.” Sidney, *Discourses*, 440; see also 502–3.
41. The most influential of such misreadings were those of Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson, who approached Locke from opposite vantage points. On Strauss see James T. Kloppenberg, “The Place of Value in a Culture of Facts: Truth and Historicism,” in David A. Hollinger, ed., *The Humanities and the Dynamics of Inclusion since World War II* (Baltimore, 2006), 126–58. On Macpherson see Joseph Carens, ed., *Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C. B. Macpherson* (Albany, 1993).

42. Among the pioneers of this now-standard way of reading Locke were Peter Laslett, John Dunn, and James Tully. See Laslett's introduction to his edition of Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1960; Cambridge, 1963), 15–135; John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government"* (Cambridge, 1969; Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political Theory* (Cambridge, 1985), 13–67; James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries* (Cambridge, 1980); and Tully, "Locke," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700* (hereafter *CHPT, 1450–1700*), ed. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), 616–52. More recent collections of criticism include Richard Ashcraft, ed., *John Locke: Critical Assessments* 4 vols. (London, 1991); Vere Chappell, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Locke* (Cambridge, 1994); and Peter R. Anstey, ed., *The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives* (London, 2003).
43. In his unpublished *Tracts* and his correspondence, Locke acknowledged his relief, at that stage in his life, that the monarchy had been restored. "The supreme magistrate of every nation, what way so ever created, must necessarily have an absolute and arbitrary power," he proclaimed in the *Tracts*. Lest there be any doubt about his own preferences, he later appended a preface in which he wrote, "As for myself, there is no one can have a greater respect and veneration for authority than I." Locke lamented that as soon as he was born, "I found myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto, and therefore cannot but entertain the approaches of a calm with the greatest joy and satisfaction." Given the tendency of sinful men to disobey, authority must be absolute and obedience unquestioning—at least in outward form. Yet another principal tenet of the dissenting tradition also shaped Locke's upbringing: no civil authority can dictate inner belief.

Locke's letters to his father and to Thomas Westrow are in *The Correspondence of John Locke*, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. (Oxford, 1976–1989), 1:136–37, 124–25.

44. Locke's elevated status as a Carolina "landgrave" and the accompanying grant of four thousand "baronia," which he and his associates no doubt imagined to be a considerable expanse of fertile land, never yielded him a penny. It has long been known that Locke owned stock in the Royal African Company and profited from the slave trade. On the relation between this fact and his later political writings, cf. Jeremy Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2002), 198–206; and David Armitage, "John Locke, Carolina and the *Two Treatises of Government*," *Political Theory* 32 (2004): 602–27.
45. Maurice Cranston, *John Locke: A Biography* (1957; Oxford, 1985), 202, 246–57.
46. Locke to the Earl of Pembroke, December 8, 1684, in Locke, *Correspondence* 2:664. Attempting to explain to Pembroke why he was not in France but in Holland, known for decades as the preferred refuge for English political as well as religious dissenters, the abstemious Locke offered a singularly unconvincing reason: he was there for the beer.
47. Locke, *Correspondence* 3:634. See also the excellent discussion of these issues in Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty?*, 30–34.
48. Locke to Clarke, April 19/29, 1687, *Correspondence* 3:173. In a letter to William Molyneux written January 19, 1694, Locke wrote, "Every one, according to what way Providence has placed him in, is bound to labour for the public good, as far as he is able, or else he has no right to eat." *Correspondence* 4:786. Of all the scholarship devoted to this issue, I have found particularly valuable John Dunn, "Individuality and Clientage in the Formation of Locke's Social Imagination," in Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political*

Theory: Essays, 1979–1983 (Cambridge, 1985), 13–33; Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, esp. 214–61; and Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, 1989), esp. 159–76, 234–47.

49. “Every man has an immortal soul,” Locke wrote, “capable of eternal happiness or misery,” and nothing matters more than “doing those things in this life, which are necessary to the obtaining of God’s favor.” Indeed, “the observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind,” precisely because “there is nothing in this world that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity.” Sincere faith “cannot be imposed on any church by the law of the land.” “To believe this or that to be true, does not depend upon our will.” Locke, *Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis, 2010), 11–15, 44–45.
50. Locke first expressed this conviction, which he reached in the early 1670s, in *A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country*. Not coincidentally, he left for France immediately after that tract was published anonymously in 1675. The *Letter* is included in the appendix to Locke, *Political Essays*, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1997), 360–65, even though its authorship remains contested. Goldie writes, “No place of publication or name of publisher is given; there is no extant manuscript. The tract was included in Pierre Desmaizeaux’s *Collections of Several Pieces of Mr. Locke* (1720) and in later editions of Locke’s *Works*.” There is no other evidence to establish Locke’s authorship. Because Desmaizeaux contended that Shaftesbury dictated the text to Locke, some scholars have attributed it to Shaftesbury. Goldie concludes “there is little doubt the tract reflected Locke’s views,” a judgment shared by Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government*, 120–23.

51. Locke's eloquent defense of toleration notwithstanding, those inclined to invoke Locke as a champion of religious freedom should note that he considered both Catholics and atheists beyond the pale, even though his argument in the *Letter Concerning Toleration* might seem explicit in its inclusion of Catholicism. Civil government could not compel belief, Locke reasoned, but neither could religious believers ignore the laws of civil government. Locke feared, as did his fellow English Protestants, that Catholics would obey only laws decreed by the Pope. The point of the Whigs' strategy of exclusion, of the failed rebellion of 1685, and of the Revolution of 1688 was to prevent England from becoming Catholic. Even if as a faith Roman Catholicism deserved to be tolerated, Catholics' supposed susceptibility to treason made them too dangerous to accept. Atheists likewise could not be trusted, Locke argued, but for a different reason. Since atheists did not consider each individual a child of God, and therefore sacred, they had no reason to treat others with respect, and since they did not believe in damnation, they had no reason to keep promises and every incentive to lie, cheat, and steal. Recent commentators have explored the possibility that Locke's principles might have been extended to include not only Roman Catholics but non-European native peoples. Plausible as those arguments seem, the historical Locke was rather less sympathetic with non-Protestant religions. Cf. Duncan Ivison, "The Nature of Rights and the History of Empire," in David Armitage, ed., *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory* (Cambridge, 2006), 191–211; and Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*, 218–23.
52. Locke's case against absolutism depends on arguments developed in *The Second Treatise*, in which he laid out his own principles of government. That makes *The First Treatise* hard to follow for readers not immersed in Filmer, and it corroborates the claim

that Locke was working on both books simultaneously in the late 1670s and early 1680s, at just the time when he was deeply engaged with Shaftesbury in the Exclusion Crisis. The case for Locke's substantial completion of both *The First Treatise* and *The Second Treatise* between 1679 and 1681 is made most persuasively by Peter Laslett in his introduction to his edition of *Two Treatises of Government*. For questions concerning the reliability of that dating, see Dunn, *The Political Theory of John Locke*, 47–57; and concerning the relative importance of the composition as opposed to the publication of *Two Treatises*, see Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*, 7–12. On the similarities and differences between Locke's and Sidney's refutations of Filmer, and on the changing contexts in which they wrote, see Scott, *England's Troubles*, 374–88.

53. Locke, *Second Treatise*, in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (1960; Cambridge, 1988), 268. All citations to the *First Treatise* and the *Second Treatise* are to the 1988 version of Laslett's edition. As these quoted phrases make clear, the argument of C. B. Macpherson concerning Locke's supposedly proto-capitalist defense of the accumulation and protection of property as the central thrust of *The Second Treatise* cannot survive reading the second page of the book, in which Locke defends the regulation of property on behalf of the public good as one of the principal purposes of law.
54. Locke, *Second Treatise*, 268–69.
55. In England, the people had established episcopal government in the domain of religion and Parliament in the realm of politics, and in both spheres Hooker considered those appointed the legitimate agents of the people. But Hooker denied that the sovereign people, having once established a particular form of government, enjoyed the right to

change that form; vesting sovereignty in them was a potentially explosive principle, as Leveller pamphleteers made plain. Indeed, publication of the final three volumes of Hooker's work was delayed for several decades, at least in part because his editors realized just how corrosive of royal and episcopal authority his arguments were. On Hooker, see Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge, 1993), 146–53.

56. To that ethic of reciprocity Hooker and Locke added the “relation of equality between our selves and them, that are as our selves,” a relation acknowledged in multiple “Rules and Canons” that “natural reason hath drawn for direction of Life.” Of such principles “no Man is ignorant.” Locke quoting from Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, the edition of 1676, in *Second Treatise*, 310–11. The entire quotation reads as follows: “it is no less their Duty, to Love others than themselves, for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; If I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every Man's hands, as any Man can wish unto his own Sual, how should I look to have any part of my desire herin satisfied, unless my self be careful to satisfie the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other Men, being of one and the same nature? to have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as men, so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me, shewed unto them; my desire therefore to be lov'd of my equals in nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural Duty of bearing to themward, fully the like affection; From which relation of equality between our selves and them, that are as our selves, what several Rules and Canons, natural reason hath drawn for direction of Life, no Man is ignorant.”

57. Locke, *Second Treatise*, 271.
58. For an excellent discussion of Grotius, which contextualizes his writings, shows his similarities to Locke (especially concerning religious toleration and the origin of property) and his differences from Hobbes, and explains why he remained skeptical about democracy and opted instead for an aristocratic republicanism, see Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*, 154–201.
59. See Grotius, *The Free Sea*, ed. David Armitage (Indianapolis, 2004); and Martine van Ittersum, “Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002).
60. Oldenbarnevelt was a prominent public official—for a time the chief minister of Holland, the most powerful among the United Provinces—and the decision of the States-General to arrest him and Grotius indicated that religious unrest in the United Provinces had escalated to a point near civil war. Oldenbarnevelt was convicted, in part on the basis of testimony given by his associate Grotius, and was martyred, just as Sidney was, for the cause of religious toleration. After his escape from prison, Grotius lived for the rest of his life in Paris, first on a royal pension for his services to the French government, then as an envoy from Sweden to France—except for a brief sojourn in 1631 back in the United Provinces, from which he was again expelled.
61. Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et gentium libri octo*, trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1934), 2:1010–11, 1064, 1077.
62. Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et gentium libri octo* 2:205. See also Istvan Hont, “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical

Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages Theory,’” in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 1987), 253–76.

63. On natural law theory, see Leonard Krieger, *The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law* (Chicago, 1965); and Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge, 1979); and, more briefly, and with greater attention to the importance for Grotius and Pufendorf of moral skeptics rather than late-medieval scholastics, Richard Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law,” in Pagden, *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, 99–119.
64. Locke, *Second Treatise*, 331–33.
65. Locke, *Second Treatise*, 329–32. At this stage of the argument Locke again invokes Hooker’s observation that monarchy, “the thing which they had devised for a Remedy, did indeed but increase the Sore, which it should have cured” (330).
66. Political theorists have debated the implicit logic of Locke’s fragmentary and scattered comments on the suffrage. Although I am persuaded by the claim that Locke’s arguments concerning the equality of all persons point in the direction of extending the franchise to all individuals regardless of property or gender, there is no evidence that Locke himself shared that view—or that he was unusual even among Whigs in believing that only men with a certain minimum amount of property would be allowed to vote. It is obvious that Locke falls short of our standard of universal suffrage, and of course he willingly embraced constitutional monarchy. By the standards of his day, however, his arguments for equality and popular sovereignty, although less radical than those of some Levellers, placed him among the more democratically inclined of English political writers—as the suspicions aroused by his unpublished writings and association with Shaftesbury

illustrate. John Marshall, *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (Cambridge, 1994), emphasizes Locke's aristocratic, Ciceronian outlook and denies he demonstrated any sympathy with democracy. For an overview of the competing interpretations on Locke and democracy, see Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*, 21–43, 108–50.

67. The problem was hard to fix because current arrangements suited those in Parliament. But “true reason,” not custom, should determine the number of representatives and their districts. It is “the interest, as well as intention of the People, to have a fair and *equal* Representative”; thus, replacing the existing system would earn “the Consent and Approbation of the Community.” Careful and continuing reapportionment of representatives Locke judged a high priority. “Whenever the People shall chuse their *Representatives upon* just and undeniably *equal measures* suitable to the original Frame of the Government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the Society.” Locke, *Second Treatise*, 372–74. For Shaftesbury's equally direct challenge to the existing system for electing Members of Parliament, see Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 56n1.
68. Locke, *First Treatise*, 211–16; *Second Treatise*, 363, 353. Among the most persuasive accounts of Locke's ideas concerning property are Tully, *A Discourse on Property*; Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's “Two Treatises of Government”*; Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*; and Thomas A. Horne, *Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain, 1605–1834* (Chapel Hill, 1990). Summing up a generation of responses to the claims of C. B. Macpherson and others, Horne writes, “In Locke's work, then, natural property rights cast four shadows over property rights in society. In the first,

the laws that regulated property must have been agreed to by representatives; in the second, those laws must be directed to the common good, which included not only the juridical requirements of nonarbitrariness but also the economic requirements of furthering growth; in the third, the law must make certain that no one starve; and in the fourth, a person about to starve because the previous requirement was not fulfilled could take what was needed” (63). Cf. the recent recapitulation of the now standard interpretation of Locke’s analysis of the relation between property and labor in Ivison, “The Nature of Rights and the History of Empire,” 197: “Cultivation and industry does not merely produce more stuff, but more opportunities for people to labor, and thus greater opportunities for more people to preserve themselves and serve God.” Steven Forde, *Locke, Science, and Politics* (Cambridge, 2014), provides a detailed account of the reasons why natural law, grounded in “divine command,” not individual property rights, provides the “bedrock or foundation” of Locke’s philosophy. For Locke, Forde concludes, the right to property rests on “the higher-order moral imperative to further the good of mankind as a whole.” See 1–10, 175–81.

69. Were the government to dissolve for any reason, Locke argued, power would logically revert to the people, who would then “constitute a new Form of Government.” Locke called the body exercising this ultimate power “the Commonwealth.” He did not necessarily mean by that term “a Democracy,” or any other particular form of government, but merely the “independent community” that maintains “the supreme power” in any political system. No part of that whole, whether a king, a body of aristocrats, or a representative assembly, should be mistaken for the people as a whole

because no “inferiour Power should prescribe to a Superiour.” Locke, *Second Treatise*, 354.

70. Such ideas circulated among the Levellers and other republicans during the era of the Civil War. Locke was familiar with the writings of Henry Parker and John Wildman and with the monarchomach tradition, which held that power reverts to the legislative assembly—in the English case, Parliament—in cases of usurpation or abuse of power. But the monarchomachs had stumbled over the issue that I have already identified: if sovereignty lay with the King-in-Parliament, then how and on what basis could Parliament itself challenge the King? Locke also knew the now-obscure writings of George Lawson, who went beyond the monarchomachs and criticized the Commonwealth for constituting its authority on the basis of the already discredited Parliament rather than attempting to establish its legitimacy by appealing directly to the English people. But Lawson had not envisioned sovereignty returning directly to the people; he thought that existing county courts might be the appropriate site of such popular gatherings and the ratification of the Commonwealth. On the influence of Lawson on Locke, see Julian Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 1978).
71. It is amusing to note that Locke refused assignment as Ambassador to the court of Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, on the grounds that he was unqualified because he could not hold his beer. Either his constitution had changed since he had claimed in 1684 that he had gone to Holland for the beer, or the explanation of 1689 was as specious as that he offered five years earlier. See Cranston, *John Locke*, 312.

72. Locke's letter to William Clarke, probably written in the late fall of 1689 or, more likely, the spring of 1690, and now in Oxford's Bodleian Library, is reprinted in its entirety at the conclusion of a fine article probing its meaning and significance: James Farr and Clayton Roberts, "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document," *Historical Journal* 28 (1985): 385–98.
73. Farr and Roberts, "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution."
74. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1979), bk. 1, chap. 4, par. 17, 95.
75. John Dunn, with Peter Laslett among the first commentators to stress the importance of Locke's religious faith, has argued vigorously that Locke's Christianity renders his political ideas—important as they were historically—unpersuasive in our "post-Christian" age. See for example Dunn's conclusion in *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 262–67. For contrasting judgments concerning the implications of Locke's religious convictions for us, see Taylor, *Sources of the Self*; and Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*, 240–43. I am grateful to Kenneth Winkler, editor of one of the standard abridged editions of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis, 1996), for his clarification of thorny issues concerning Locke's *Essay* and its interpreters.
76. Locke, *Essay*, bk. 3, chap. 11, par. 16, 517; bk. 2, chap. 11, par. 10, 159. See also the comprehensive discussion of these issues in Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality*, 50–81; and the admirably concise treatment in Ivison, "The Nature of Rights and the History of Empire," 194.
77. Locke, *Essay*, bk. 4, chap. 10, par. 6, 621.

78. “Such a submission as this of our *reason* to *faith*, takes not away the landmarks of knowledge; this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties, for which they were given us.” Locke, *Essay*, bk. 4, chap. 18, par. 10, 696.
79. See Locke, *Essay*, bk. 4, chap. 19, par. 12, 703; and Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 249–50.
80. Both Locke and many of his interpreters tend to write “Christianity” when they mean “Protestant Christianity,” a reflection of the unselfconscious anti-Catholicism prevalent in English culture since the sixteenth century.
81. Locke believed that rational capacity exists in every person, and his egalitarianism and his ethics flowed from that conviction. “God has furnished Men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow the Leisure.” All people, no matter how difficult their circumstances, should have time to think about the fate of their souls in eternity. “Were men as intent upon” the question of their salvation “as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life, who might not find many vacancies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.” Locke never doubted that all people share the capacity to reason, nor that such “power of abstracting” is as likely—or even likelier—among ordinary people than among those born to wealth or nobility. The much-studied Protestant ethic not only motivated ceaseless striving, it also devalued older aristocratic notions of honor and glory in favor of a higher assessment of the capacity of ordinary people and the sanctity of everyday life. Locke, *Essay*, bk. 4, chap. 20, par. 16, 717. For the relation between this

reassessment of ordinary life and the broader consequences of the Reformation, see Taylor, *Sources of the Self*.

82. Locke, *Essay*, bk. 4, chap. 20, par. 16, 717.
83. Locke's journal quoted in Cranston, *John Locke*, 265n1.
84. Locke, *Essay*, bk. 2, chap. 21, par. 52, 267; and cf. Locke's letter to Edward Clarke, April 19/29, 1687, discussed on pp. 155–56 above.
85. Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, ed. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford, 1989), 103. Cf. the following passage from 170: "Covetousness, and the Desire of having in our Possession, and under our Dominion, more than we have need of, being the Root of all Evil, should be early and carefully weeded out, and the contrary Quality of a Readiness to impart to others, implanted."
86. Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, 111, the same wording as that in the letter to Edward Clarke discussed on pp. 155–56 above.
87. John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity: As Delivered in the Scriptures*, ed. John C. Higgins-Biddle (Oxford, 1999), 89, 150. The book sparked a controversy because, as Locke tried to lay out what he considered the core beliefs of Christianity, he seemed to be rejecting important Anglican doctrines such as the trinity and original sin.
88. Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 149.
89. Locke, *Second Treatise*, 358.
90. See Locke's letter to William Molyneux, January 19, 1694, on the universal obligation "to labour for the public good." On Locke's conception of what follows from the duty to develop one's God-given capacities through strenuous, productive labor, see Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 251–54; and the incisive account of the relation

between Locke's religious faith and his political ideas in Duncan Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgment in Modern Political Thought* (Princeton, 2011), 20–58.

91. These passages come from two of the tracts printed in the spring of 1689, *A Brief Collection of Some Memorandums* and *A Letter to a Friend, Advising him, in this extraordinary Juncture, how to free the Nation from Slavery for ever*, both quoted in Lois G. Schworer, "The Bill of Rights: Epitome of the Revolution of 1688–89," in *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, 1980), 230–31. For a sampling of seven of the most influential of these tracts, see Malcolm, *The Struggle for Sovereignty* 2:847–1064.
92. "A Paper which was delivered to the house of Commons on Monday 28th January 1688 [i.e., 1689]...said to be written by the Marquis of Halifax" (Rawlinson Ms. D 1079, 8, Bodleian Library); and "Proposals to this present Convention," in *The Eighth Collection of Papers Relating to the Present Juncture of Affairs* (London, 1689), 33. The Convention included individuals who hailed from diverse backgrounds and professed a wide array of political convictions. Among the most influential was the former Leveller John Wildman. Imprisoned first by Cromwell, then by Charles II, and later under suspicion for his role in both the Rye House plot and Monmouth's rebellion, Wildman returned to England from his Dutch exile in the company of William of Orange. Wildman was elected a member of the Convention and named to the Committee that wrote the first Draft of the Declaration of Rights. He also produced an anonymous pamphlet, *Some Remarks upon Government*, which was among the dozens printed in the early months of 1689. Wildman, in his typical fashion, surveyed the options, weighing

the advantages and disadvantages of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and their “several Derivatives, Compounds, and Variations.” Although democracy appears preferable, all forms “have their Defects.” To solve the problems of the English case, Wildman suggested strengthening the power of Parliament and reforming the electoral system. In the present circumstances, Wildman urged the adoption of a monarchy. But, Wildman concluded ominously, his esteem for William of Orange did not extend to his “Posterity,” leaving open the question of whether England should embrace in principle what it was choosing in fact, an elective monarchy of the sort common elsewhere in Europe. Wildman’s pamphlet, *Some Remarks upon Government, and particularly upon the Establishment of the English Monarchy Relating to this present Juncture*, is reprinted in Malcolm, *The Struggle for Sovereignty* 2:868–901. See also the discussion of the Convention in Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York, 1988), 107–21; and Lois Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689* (Baltimore, 1981).

93. These judgments, of course, remain contested. Cf. Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty?*; and Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed*. These years also saw the first appearance of what might be called a women’s-rights sensibility, notably in the work of Lady Mary Chudleigh and Mary Astell. Astell’s *Essay in Defence of the Female Sex* (1706) urged the creation of separate schools in which young women might develop their God-given capacities. Astell’s conservative Anglicanism, her stridently Tory political sentiments, and her acceptance of women’s subservient role in marriage have made her a controversial figure in more recent feminist scholarship. See Mary Astell, *Political*

Writings, ed. Patricia Springborn (Cambridge, 1996); and the essays collected in Patricia Springborn, *Mary Astell: Theorist of Freedom from Domination* (Cambridge, 2005).

94. See Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, 1992); and David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000).
95. Derek Hirst, *The Representative of the People? Voters and Voting in England under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge, 1975); and Mark Kishlansky, *Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1986) offer contrasting interpretations. Lawrence Stone opts for Hirst's rosier view in "The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century," in Pocock, *Three British Revolutions*, 80–81. Whatever disagreement exists among historians concerning the extent of popular involvement in English politics in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there is general agreement that it diminished after 1721. See John A. Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform, 1640–1832* (Cambridge, 1973).
96. On politics after 1689, see Tim Harris, *Politics under the Later Stuarts: Party Conflict in a Divided Society, 1660–1715* (London, 1993). For influential accounts of how party politics worked, see John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge, 1976); and on the ways in which "influence" enabled the English oligarchy to seize control of politics and through that control to replace the chaos of the seventeenth century with a form of stability that lasted until the early nineteenth century, see J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London, 1967).
97. *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, quoted in Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty?*, 271.

98. James quoted in Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York, 1988), 125. As James saw more clearly than Morgan, the ability of representative assemblies to make trouble was considerably more than a fiction. See the concise account of these developments in David S. Lovejoy, “Two American Revolutions, 1689 and 1776,” in Pocock, *Three British Revolutions*, 244–62.
99. For the 1678 Petition from the Massachusetts General Court, see *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1628–1686*, ed. Nathaniel Bradstreet Schurtleff, 5 vols., (Boston, 1853–54), 5:200.
100. The petitions from 1683 and 1685 are in Schurtleff, *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay* 5:201, 495.
101. Wise and Dudley quoted in Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, vol. 2, *From Colony to Province* (1953; Boston, 1961), 156. The record of the court case against the Ipswich men, August 23, 1687, is in Gay Transcripts 3:59, 62–68, Massachusetts Historical Society. See also George A. Cook, *John Wise, American Democrat* (New York, 1952).
102. On Bulkeley, see Timothy Breen, *The Character of the Good Ruler: A Study of Puritan Political Ideas in New England, 1630–1730* (New Haven, 1970), 176–79; Brendan McConville, *The King’s Three Faces; The Rise and Fall of Royal America* (Chapel Hill, 2006), 94–95; Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England* (1936; New York, 1956), 200–5; Miller, *From Colony to Province*, 151–54.
103. Cotton Mather, *Declaration, of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and the Country adjacent* quoted in Morison, *The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England*, 199. On the Glorious Revolution in America, see Richard R. Johnson, “The

Revolution of 1688–9 in the American Colonies,” in *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact*, ed. Jonathan Israel (Cambridge, 1991), 215–40; and David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York, 1972). For a more comprehensive view of New Englanders’ complaints against Andros, see *The Andros Tracts*, ed. William Whitmore, 3 vols. (Boston, 1868–74).

104. Increase Mather quoted in Miller, *From Colony to Province*, 169. Breen, *The Character of the Good Ruler*, 134–79, argues that Puritan thinking shifted from an earlier focus on salvation to a great emphasis on property in the late seventeenth century. Robert Middlekauff, *The Mathers: Three Generations of Puritan Intellectuals, 1596–1728* (New York, 1971) explains the dissatisfaction felt by both Cotton and Increase Mather by stressing their sense of cultural loss, which the new charter merely ratified. The evidence, though, suggests both the persistence of piety and a change of circumstances as Boston was drawn more tightly into transatlantic economic and religious networks; on the coexistence of commercial activity with the persistence of Puritan zeal, see Mark Peterson, “*Theopolis Americana: The City-State of Boston, the Republic of Letters, and the Protestant International, 1689–1739*,” in *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500–1830*, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge, MA, 2009), 329–70.
105. For a recent discussion of voter eligibility in Massachusetts, see Richard Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia, 2004), 69–79. As Beeman points out, the percentage of those actually exercising the franchise was much lower than the percentage of those eligible to vote. Whether that fact testifies to the deference or disinterest of voters in Massachusetts, as Beeman notes, is difficult to

judge. The answer seems to have varied—then as it does now—according to place, time, and issues, with the electorate gradually becoming more independent and more engaged in the middle decades of the eighteenth century for reasons to be discussed in chapters 7 through 10 below.

106. For an excellent analysis of the relation between the Puritan tradition of covenant and the Charter of 1691, see John Brooke, *The Heart of the Commonwealth: Society and Political Culture in Worcester County, Massachusetts, 1713–1861* (Cambridge, 1989), 19–25.
107. Writing in support of Sidney’s candidacy for Parliament, Penn defended the “Right and Title to your own Lives, Liberties and Estates” and contended that “every man is a sort of little Sovereign to himself.” Also in 1679, Penn urged the principle of “governing on a ballance, as near as possible, of the severall Religious interests.” Penn lamented, as Sidney did, not only the imposition of Anglican beliefs and practices but also the perversion of the public will by the frauds that pervaded and poisoned English electoral politics. Whereas Penn, like Sidney, Locke, and earlier Leveller agitators, believed that the purpose of public life was to find, through the exercise of reason, the common interest, the widespread use of money and alcohol to win voters’ favor incited public participation at the expense of civic virtue. Penn considered “Civil Interest the foundation of Government.” He believed that by encouraging people to engage in hypocrisy as they declared their faith, and in corruption as they cast their votes, English practice submerged the principles of natural right under sordid calculations of personal advantage. Penn warned voters against “ambitious men” and “Prodigal or Voluptuous Persons” and urged them to seek those attuned to the common good: “The *Representative* of a Nation ought

to consist of the most Wise, Sober and Valiant of the People, not Men of mean Spirits or sordid *Passions* that would sell the *Interest* of the People that chuse them to advance their own, or be at the Beck of some great Man, in the hopes of a *Lift* to a good Employ; pray beware of these.” Penn believed a chasm lay between the narrow self-interest of petty politicians and the virtue of genuinely public-spirited statesmen, and he was equally confident the voting public could discern that gap. The early history of Pennsylvania would test those convictions. Penn, *One Project for the Good of England* (1679), in Penn, *Works*, 2 vols. (London, 1726), 1:482; and Penn [Philanglus], *Englands Great Interest in the Choice of this New Parliament* (London, 1679), 3.

108. [William Penn and Thomas Rudyard], *The Peoples Antient and Just Liberties*, quoted in Gary De Krey, “The First Restoration Crisis: Conscience and Coercion in London, 1667–1673,” *Albion* 25 (1993): 573. On Penn, see Gary Nash, *Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681–1726* (Princeton, 1968); and the wide range of essays in Richard S. Dunn and Mary Maples Dunn, eds., *The World of William Penn* (Philadelphia, 1986).
109. William Penn, *England’s Present Interest Considered* (1675), in *Works* 1:674.
110. See John E. Pomfret, “The Problem of the West Jersey *Concessions* of 1676/7,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser., 5 (1948): 95–105; and Pomfret, *Colonial New Jersey: A History* (New York, 1973).
111. Disputes over whether Penn was motivated primarily by his desire to provide a refuge for Quakers and others seeking freedom of conscience, by his desire to establish a form of government free of the corruption endemic to English politics, or by his desire to improve his own economic prospects are impossible to resolve. Penn doubtless hoped to achieve all three goals, which were probably not separable in his own mind. We know

from a letter Penn wrote to Sidney dated October 13, 1681, that Sidney was involved in helping Penn write the founding document of the colony of Pennsylvania. We also know that Penn believed Sidney had told “severall persons” that the final result had deviated from the original plan and yielded “the basest laws in the world, not to be endured or lived under, and that the Turk was not more absolute than I.” Unfortunately, we do not know how—or whether—Sidney replied or whether Penn’s complaint had any basis. See Penn’s letter, and the discussion of the issues involved, in Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, 232–34.

112. All lands would have to be purchased rather than simply seized from the Indians. Moreover, “all differences between the planters and the natives” must be resolved by a body of twelve mediators, “that is, by six planters and six natives; that so we may live friendly together as much as in us lieth, preventing all occasions of heart-burnings and mischief.” Like John Eliot and Roger Williams in New England, Penn never doubted the humanity or the capacity of Native Americans. In his plans for the colony he sought to secure for them the same rights to develop their land and the same legal protections that settlers would enjoy. Penn’s “Concessions to the Province of Pennsylvania” (1681) is in *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania, 1682–1776*, 6 vols. (Philadelphia, 1752), 1:xxiv–xxvi; and is reprinted in *Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History*, ed. Donald Lutz (Indianapolis, 1998), 266–70.
113. Penn, “Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania in America,” from *Votes and Proceedings* 1:xxvii–xxviii; reprinted in Lutz, *Colonial Origins*, 272–86.

114. Penn, “Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government.”
115. William Penn, *The Great Question to be Considered by the King, and this approaching Parliament...* (London, 1680), 4.
116. William Penn, “Some Account of the Province of Pennsylvania” (1681), in *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware, 1630–1707*, ed. Albert Cook Myers (1912; New York, 1956), 203–207.
117. Penn, “A Further Account of the Province of Pennsylvania” (1685), in Myers, *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware, 1630–1707*, 255–78.
118. William Penn to Thomas Lloyd, in Penn, *Letters* 3:50.
119. Locke’s journal, with his critical commentary on Penn’s Frame of Government, is quoted in Cranston, *John Locke*, 261–62; for other excerpts from Locke’s response to Penn, see Locke, *Letter Concerning Toleration*, xl, 182.
120. Cranston, *John Locke*, 298.
121. It is significant that Penn retained not only his executive authority but his vast land holdings in Pennsylvania. As the proprietor of the colony he retained the feudal right not to be taxed—which would become an issue of enormous symbolic importance in France. In other words, despite his bold claims that the public interest would guide the polity, Penn’s insistence on forcing his own personal interest down his people’s throats sparked the earliest battles in the colony and the effective disbanding of the upper house of the legislature. Less than two decades after Pennsylvania was founded, Penn’s decisions had produced a polity in which all effective legislative authority was vested in the popularly elected Assembly. William Penn, *Papers* 4:283. My analysis of early Pennsylvania politics is indebted to Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-*

Century America, 204–23; Pole, *Political Representation*, 76–97; James Lemon, *The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Baltimore, 1972), 12–19; Alan Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania* (Baltimore, 1994), 408–21; and Tully, *William Penn's Legacy: Politics and Social Structure in Provincial Pennsylvania, 1726–1755* (Baltimore, 1977).

122. Of course many fewer than were eligible actually voted, and rates of participation varied as widely as eligibility did. Although the number of voters rarely exceeded 50% of those eligible to vote, particular contests brought surges, local elections often attracted more voters than colony-wide elections did, and the percentage of those eligible who did vote tended overall to rise during the course of the eighteenth century. Rates of turnover among those elected likewise varied across colonies and over time, ranging from under 20% in Pennsylvania to over 60% in Rhode Island. The meaning and significance of voting also varied, just as it did in England and in the homelands of other immigrant groups. These figures come from Beeman, *Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America*, 22 (on England), 52 (on Virginia), 75 (on Massachusetts), and 103–6 (on New York); the figures on turnover are on 211. See also the table in Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 815.
123. See chapters 2 and 3 above.
124. John Davenport quoted in Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (1939; Boston, 1961), 421. See also Richard Bushman, *From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690–1765* (New York, 1970), 3–21.
125. On Gershom Bulkeley, see pp. 175–76 above.

126. The relation between the legislation enacted by colonial legislatures and British law was contested from the start and never clarified. The colonists from the outset treated their assemblies' decisions as law; British authorities contended that all colonial legislation was authorized by the monarch's grace and favor, which could be withdrawn at any time. On this persistent tension, which came to a head only in the 1770s, see Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States 1607–1788* (Athens, GA, 1986), 12–18, 28–42; and Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution*, 2–18.

Chapter 5

1. Perhaps the most widely known statement of the case for dramatic change is that of Paul Hazard in his still valuable study *The European Mind, 1680–1715*, trans. J. Lewis May (1935; New York, 1963), xv: “One day, the French people, almost to a man, were thinking like Bossuet. The day after, they were thinking like Voltaire. No ordinary swing of the pendulum, that. It was a revolution.” As Nannerl Keohane points out in *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1980), 12–13, both parts of Hazard’s contrast are almost equally exaggerated.

Scholarship on the Enlightenment is immense: a recent list of judiciously selected titles, limited to secondary works concerning political theory alone, runs to seventy densely packed pages. See *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought* (hereafter *CHECPT*), ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), 830–900. Still rewarding are two classics: Ernst Cassirer’s *The Philosophy of Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C. A. Koellen and James P. Pettegrove (1936; Princeton, 1951), a neo-Kantian’s attempt to rehabilitate reason from the critique of Martin Heidegger; and Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, 2 vols. (New York, 1966–69), which can be read as an equally ambitious attempt to rescue the secular, skeptical, and humane dimensions of eighteenth-century thought from critics such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, who denounced the legacy of the Enlightenment as a nightmare of totalitarian technocracy. Other valuable, and more recent, studies include Anthony Pagden, *The Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters* (New York, 2013), which champions the cause of secular reason against the threats Pagden sees in religion and communitarianism; and Michael L. Frazier, *The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice*

and Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today (Oxford, 2010), which counterposes sympathy and sentiment to scholars' usual emphasis on reason. Also important are three volumes by Jonathan Israel: *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford, 2001), which emphasizes the role of skeptics and materialists influenced by Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza; *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford, 2006), which carries forward Israel's contention that the principal values of the Enlightenment included not only reason, equality, and popular government, but also atheism, materialism, determinism, and the primacy of self-interest; and *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750–1790* (New York, 2011), which carries his analysis of these themes through the early stages of the French Revolution. As will become apparent from my analysis, I consider Israel's radical Enlightenment only a piece—important as it was—of a much broader and more multifaceted transatlantic phenomenon. Israel focuses primarily on radical thinkers in the Dutch, English, French, and Italian cultural orbits. The thinkers he examines had much less salience in North America than another group of thinkers to whom I will pay more attention.

An earlier study with a focus on the role of skeptical and anti-clerical ideas is Margaret Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London, 1981). On England, compare these views with that of Roy Porter, *Enlightenment: The Creation of the Modern World*, published in the U.S. as *The Creation of the Modern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment* (New York, 2000); on France, Daniel Roche, *France in the Enlightenment*, trans. Arthur

Goldhammer (Cambridge, 1998), and, on the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas through French salons as well as the provincial academies, Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca, 1994); on the German states, Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (London, 2005); on Scotland, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1983); and on America, Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976); and Robert A. Ferguson, *The American Enlightenment, 1750–1820* (Cambridge, MA, 1997). A fine collection of essays that highlights the distinctiveness of various national traditions, an inclination in recent scholarship that some interpreters consider overblown but that seems to me salutary, is Roy Porter and M. Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in National Context* (Cambridge, 1981). A handy reference work is John Yolton, ed., *The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment* (Oxford, 1991). An essay that simultaneously encapsulates his own ambitious attempt to establish the “radical Enlightenment” as the authentic Enlightenment and reviews the more recent attempt to survey the range and diversity of Enlightenment ideas is Jonathan Israel, “Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67 (2006): 523–45, a review of *Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment*, ed. Alan Charles Kors et al., 4 vols. (New York, 2003).

Given the attention accorded Israel’s analysis of the strand of the Enlightenment that he identifies with democracy, it seems to me important to emphasize the extent to which the only enduring democracy to emerge from the eighteenth century, that of the United States, took shape with almost no contributions from the thinkers Israel identifies

as the central figures in eighteenth-century European thought. Israel's standard for democracy, a secular and libertarian direct democracy that rules out the forms of representative democracy embraced by most figures in the moderate Enlightenment on both sides of the Atlantic, was rejected by the vast majority of eighteenth-century thinkers. For that reason most historians of the Enlightenment consider Israel's claims for the centrality of the radical Enlightenment, notwithstanding the extraordinary scholarship on which his arguments rest, an anachronistic analytical synecdoche. Especially incisive review essays on Israel's work are Anthony LaVopa, "A New Intellectual History?: Jonathan Israel's Enlightenment," *Historical Journal* 52 (2009): 717–38; and Darrin M. McMahon, "What Are Enlightenments?" *Modern Intellectual History* 4 (2007): 601–16.

2. Recognition of the limited penetration of enlightened ideas is hardly a recent development. Classic statements of the case for continental Europe, England, and America include Robert Darnton, "In Search of Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas," *Journal of Modern History* 43 (1971): 113–32; J. H. Plumb, "Reason and Unreason in the Eighteenth Century: The English Experience," in *Some Aspects of Eighteenth-Century England*, ed. J. H. Plumb and Venton Dearing (Los Angeles, 1971), 3–26; Kenneth Lockridge, *Literacy in Colonial New England: An Enquiry into the Social Context of Literacy in the Early Modern West* (New York, 1974); and May, *The Enlightenment in America*. More recent studies include Ferguson, *The American Enlightenment*; Richard van Dülman, *The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment Culture in Germany*, trans. Anthony Williams (London, 1992); and Harvey Chisick, *The Limits of Reform in the*

Enlightenment: Attitudes Toward the Education of the Lower Classes in Eighteenth-Century France (Princeton, 1991). For persuasive essays demonstrating the persistence of religious practices, the ways in which various religious denominations accommodated and incorporated enlightenment ideas, and the resistance such reformers often encountered—as much from ordinary people as from elites, as much from Protestants as from Catholics—see James E. Bradley and Dale Van Kley, eds., *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe* (Notre Dame, 2001).

3. These two French terms express the conviction of many champions of Enlightenment that they were engaged in a project that was both an exercise in philosophical inquiry and something broader than that, a project that would bring to European cultures the illumination of reason through the efforts of writers who were hardly technical or professional philosophers but rather men and (at least toward the end of the eighteenth century) women of letters. Both terms have become so firmly entrenched in English discourse that they do not require translation. Perhaps precisely because the Enlightenment in Great Britain and its colonies remained generally less self-conscious, more moderate, and less committed to the desirability or the possibility of dramatic cultural change, these words—and the German *Aufklärer*—convey more effectively than do any equivalent English terms the ambition and the self-confidence of many continental partisans of Enlightenment. The popularization of the terms dates at least from the widely read studies of Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment*, vol. 1, *The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism* (1966; New York, 1977); vol. 2, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom* (1969; New York, 1977); and his earlier *The Party of Humanity: Essays in the French Enlightenment* (1954; New York, 1963).

4. This complex relation is captured neatly in the ambivalence of one of the most radical figures of the early Enlightenment, Baruch Spinoza, whom Jonathan Israel describes, with some exaggeration, as “effectively...the first major European thinker in modern times—though he is preceded here by Johan de la Court and [Franciscus] Van den Enden—to embrace democratic republicanism as the highest and most fully rational form of political organization, and the one best suited to the needs of men.” Israel concedes, however, that although Spinoza saw the superiority of democracy as an ideal, in practice he recommended that the people, inclined as they were to excess and therefore likely either to become tyrannical themselves or to acquiesce in the rule of a tyrant, ought simply to obey the existing laws of their nation. Among existing regimes, the “quasi-aristocracy” of post-1688 England stood out as the best available option. To Spinoza, as to other figures in the radical Enlightenment, the risks of democracy in practice outweighed its attractiveness in theory. See Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment*, 14–22, 72–77, 258–62, 270–74. For a judicious discussion of the relation between Spinoza’s skepticism and political reform, see Richard H. Popkin and Mark Goldie, “Scepticism, Priestcraft, and Toleration,” in *CHECPT*, 70–109.
5. Voltaire, *Letters concerning the English Nation* (London, 1778), 46; excerpts included in the useful collection edited by Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology* (New York, 1973), 147–74. For Voltaire’s assessment of Newton, see his letter to the abbé d’Olivet, Oct. 18, 1736, in *Correspondence*, ed. Theodore Besterman, 13 vols. (Paris, 1977–), 1:281.
6. Joseph Addison, *Spectator* 1, no. 44 (March 12, 1711).

7. Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, to Jean Le Clerc, *The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury* (1900), quoted in Roy Porter, *The Creation of the Modern World*, 3; and see 487–88n9 for Shaftesbury's claim that the difference between the tragic days of religious enthusiasm and the polite society of the eighteenth century lay in the Revolution of 1688.
8. Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit*, vol. 1 of *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.*, ed. John M. Robertson (1900); excerpted in *British Moralists, 1650–1800*, ed. D. D. Raphael, 2 vols (1969; Indianapolis, 1991), 1:167–88; the passages quoted are from bk. 2, pts. 1 and 2, on pp. 175, 188. See also Lawrence E. Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, 1994); and Jerome Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1998), 285–309.
9. Voltaire, *Political Writings*, ed. and trans. David Williams (Cambridge, 1994), 59–60.
10. That such offices, primarily judicial but to a degree legislative, could be bought and sold occasioned understandable criticism. Montesquieu defended the practice because he deemed it preferable to enhancing even further the power of the monarchy—and the possibility of corruption—by making such offices appointive. By custom, royal decrees became law only when registered by the provincial parlements. A parlement could—and sometimes did—simply ignore such decrees, thereby providing a check against royal absolutism prized by many aristocrats in a nation still rooted in its diverse local traditions.

11. See Mark Hulliung, *Montesquieu and the Old Regime* (Berkeley, 1976). The standard life of Montesquieu remains Roger Shackleton, *Montesquieu: A Critical Biography* (Oxford, 1961). Also valuable are Melvin Richter's *Introduction to The Political Theory of Montesquieu* (Cambridge, 1977), 1–109; and the characteristically incisive study by Judith Shklar, *Montesquieu* (Oxford, 1987). On Montesquieu's place in the French Enlightenment and his standing among contemporary English commentators, see also Norman Hamson, "France," in Porter and Teich, *The Enlightenment in National Context*, 40–42.
12. Or did it? Montesquieu also wrote a supplement to the fable that he never published, in which the tale ended with an intriguing twist. After the first king chosen by the Troglodytes died, from his "secret sorrow" over his people's folly, they selected an equally wise successor, who engaged one of his subjects in an illuminating dialogue about the fate of virtue under monarchy. Should the king continue to exemplify virtue and resist the temptation to value wealth himself and reward those who have it, then all need not be lost. The wise citizen advised the new king that "it will be you alone who decides whether wealth is or is not to be harmful to your people. If they see that you would rather have wealth than virtue, they will soon fall into the same habit; in this matter your attitude will determine theirs." As always, "the foundation of your people's virtue" is, as Shaftesbury also observed, "their education. Change this education, and those who are not bold enough to be criminals will soon be ashamed of being virtuous." The king should strive, as the citizen saw it, to make both poverty and extravagance "equally shameful." The king, persuaded, announced to his people, "you are about to acquire the use of riches; but I declare to you that if you are not virtuous you will be one

of the unhappiest nations on earth.” As things stood, the king’s status derived from his virtue, but if his subjects sought “to distinguish yourselves only by riches,” then the king would have to do the same in order to preserve their respect. The king’s closing words to his people suggest why Montesquieu, the more or less loyal subject of a monarch living in the unrivaled splendor of Versailles, chose to leave these pages unpublished: “At present it is within myself that I find all my riches; but then you would have to wear yourselves out to make me rich, and would not benefit from the wealth which you valued so highly: it would all go into my treasury. Oh Troglodytes! there could be a noble bond between us: if you are virtuous so shall I be; if I am virtuous, so will you be.” Applied to France, the converse stung; Montesquieu’s prudence dictated discretion.

But perhaps Montesquieu considered a more straightforward critique of the avarice and corruption of the French—monarchy, aristocracy, and common people alike—less effective than the image of the weeping Troglodyte king contemplating the uncertain fate of his once virtuous nation. The parallel uses of virtue in the novel, wielded by the eunuchs in the seraglio as a weapon to shame Usbek’s wives into feigning devotion and embodied in the Troglodytes’ benevolent social order, showed Montesquieu’s awareness that ideas and practices have different meanings and significance in different conditions. The value of the fable lay in its open-endedness; the consequences of shifting from self-government to monarchy remained fuzzier in the published book than in the unpublished supplement. Montesquieu, *Persian Letters*, ed. and trans. Christopher J. Betts (New York, 1973). The fable of the Troglodytes is on 53–61, Montesquieu’s unpublished supplement on 286–87; other quotations are taken from 166, 219. Michael Sononscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2007),

contains a detailed discussion of the continuity and change in Montesquieu's ideas concerning the implications of luxury for government on 95–172.

13. On Fénelon, see Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France*, 332–46; Michael Sonenscher, *Sans-Culottes: An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2008), 202–59; and Patrick Riley's introduction to his edition of Fénelon, *Telemachus* (Cambridge, 1994).
14. On Mandeville, see E. J. Hundert, *The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society* (Cambridge, 1994); and Donald Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996), 57–89.
15. Montesquieu, *Considerations on the Causes of the Romans' Greatness and Decline*, in Melvin Richter, *The Political Theory of Montesquieu* (Cambridge, 1977), 53.
16. On the wide range of responses to *The Spirit of the Laws*, see the amusing discussion in Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 173–74; and on the reasons for that diversity, see Duncan Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgment in Modern Political Thought* (Princeton, 2011), 59–116; and more generally Aurelian Craiutu, *A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1740–1830* (Princeton, 2012).
17. On the forms of despotism practiced in families as well as in slave societies, see Hulliung, *Montesquieu and the Old Regime*. But as Shklar points out in *Montesquieu*, 97–98, Montesquieu's commitment to geographical determinism complicates his otherwise straightforward judgment that slavery is always and everywhere evil.

18. Only those voters willing to state their preference in public, as citizens did in Athens, possessed sufficient virtue to participate in electoral politics. Those seeking anonymity had surrendered their autonomy to scoundrels: “by rendering the suffrages secret in the Roman republic, all was lost.” Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. Franz Neumann, trans. Thomas Nugent (1748; New York, 1949), 12; and see Richter, *The Political Theory of Montesquieu*, 336n22.
19. “The constitutions of Rome and Athens were excellent—the decrees of the senate had the force of laws for the space of year, but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by the consent of the people.” Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 13, 15.
20. The French term *moeurs*, central to Montesquieu and later to Rousseau and Tocqueville, presents a challenge to all translators. Sometimes it is best rendered by the English word “customs,” at other times by “manners,” at other times by “morals.” It refers to the bundle of practices that constitute a culture and give it a distinctive quality related to, but not reducible to, its laws, religion, and ethical convictions.
21. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 40–45, 120–21. On the debts Montesquieu owed to Plato, to the history of Rome, and more proximately to Harrington’s *Oceana* for his emphasis on the indispensability of economic equality for self-government, see Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (Cambridge, 2007), 159–76.
22. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 109–11, 149–51.
23. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 151–62.
24. Such a representative government Montesquieu judged superior to ancient democracies, which suffered from “one great fault”: “the people had a right to active resolutions, such as require some execution, of which they are absolutely incapable” as a mass. “They

ought to have no share in the government but for the choosing of representatives, which is within their reach.” He declared that “few can tell the exact degree of men’s capacities,” yet all are “capable of knowing in general whether the person they choose is better qualified than most of his neighbors.” Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 307–11, 154–55.

25. Duty as Montesquieu conceived of it took diverse forms, including religious and ethical virtue as well as political virtue, as he was at pains to indicate to critics who misunderstood him. Although as critical of Catholicism as he was of other forms of absolutist rule, atheism never tempted him personally, and he appreciated the instrumental value of religion as a spur to virtue. Israel discusses the accusation that Montesquieu was infected by the spirit of Spinozism, and notes Montesquieu’s explicit and detailed refutation of the charge and avowal of his own Christian faith, in *The Radical Enlightenment*, 12.
26. Montesquieu’s ambivalence is examined persuasively in Hulliung, *Montesquieu and the Old Regime*; and Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty*.
27. For Montesquieu’s reply to his critics, first printed as the preface to the posthumously published edition of *The Spirit of the Laws* that appeared in 1757, see Neumann, *The Spirit of the Laws*, lxvii–lxix; and cf. Richter, *The Political Theory of Montesquieu*, 319n1.
28. Jean le Rond d’Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*, ed. and trans. Richard N. Schwab and Walter E. Rex (Indianapolis, 1963), 99–100.
29. D’Alembert explained the end of the Roman republic by linking Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters* and his *Considerations*: after Rome’s citizens became accustomed to imperial

luxury, they “felt the necessity” of “subjecting themselves to masters, once they felt their liberty to be a burden”—precisely the logic of the fable of the Troglodytes. D’Alembert’s eulogy is reprinted in *Oeuvres Complètes de Montesquieu*, ed. André Masson, 3 vols. (Paris, 1950–1955), vol. 1; see also Richter, *The Political Theory of Montesquieu*, 55.

30. Catholics in France as well as Christians elsewhere in Europe adapted to the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment without adopting a secular or skeptical orientation. See the essays in Bradley and Van Kley, *Religion and Politics in Enlightened Europe*. On the transformation of the Bible during the eighteenth century, when in response to radical criticism it was transformed for many readers from a source of religious truth to a cornerstone of Western culture, see Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, 2005).
31. Jean le Rond d’Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*, ed. and trans. Richard N. Schwab and Walter E. Rex (Indianapolis, 1963), 6–7, 36, 74–84.
32. D’Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse*, 22. If d’Alembert’s *Preliminary Discourse* provides one authoritative statement of the editors’ mission, a crucial passage in Diderot’s article on the topic “encyclopedia” shows how carefully he balanced confidence in reason against his awareness of its limits. In an encyclopedia, which must be the work of multiple contributors because no individual can encompass all knowledge, one must attempt “to explain the reasons that lie at the roots of things,” at least “when these exist.” Likewise one “must assign causes when they are known, indicate effects when these are certain,” and “resolve difficulties by the direct application of fundamental principles.” It is important not only to “expose errors” and “discredit prejudices” but to “demonstrate truths,” at least when those options are available. When reasons, causes, effects,

fundamental principles, and truths elude us, we should be content “to doubt and to wait.” Diderot warned against replacing one form of dogmatic certainty with another. Yet he remained confident the book would do its work “promptly upon good minds” and more subtly, “secretly and unobtrusively, upon all minds.” Eventually the *Encyclopedia* would generate “the power to change men’s common way of thinking.” Denis Diderot, “Encyclopedia,” from *The Encyclopedia*, in *Rameau’s Nephew and Other Works*, trans. Jacques Barzun and Ralph H. Bowen (Indianapolis, 1956), 294.

33. Voltaire, *Essay on Manners and Spirits of Nations*, excerpted in *The Portable Enlightenment Reader*, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York, 1995), 375. On the aspiration to uniformity and the philosophes’ awareness of its limits, see David W. Bates, *Enlightenment Aberrations: Error and Revolution in France* (Ithaca, 2002); and Henry Vyverberg, *Human Nature, Cultural Diversity, and the French Enlightenment* (Oxford, 1989).
34. Voltaire, *Histoire du parlement de Paris*, ed. J. Renwick (Oxford, 2005), 467. On the role of the provincial academies and the Enlightenment, see Roche, *France in the Enlightenment*.
35. In his *Preliminary Discourse*, D’Alembert had surprisingly little to say about politics, perhaps because he considered it among all the arts and sciences “the most difficult study of all.” But its difficulty did not deter him from offering a miniature version of social contract theory. He rooted political authority in the original experience of men prior to the origins of government, where the weak come to know the injustice of rule by the strong. “Thus the evil we experience through the vices of our own species produces in us the reflective knowledge of the virtues opposed to these vices, a precious knowledge of

which we might perhaps have been deprived if a perfect union and equality had prevailed among men.” Our understanding of natural law thus originates not in God’s will, as Locke believed, but in conscience, which d’Alembert later described as “a result of natural law and of our conception of good and evil. One could call it evidence of the heart, for, although it differs greatly from the evidence of the mind which concerns speculative truths, it subjugates us with the same force.” D’Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse*, 36, 12–13, 44–45, 26.

36. Although the phrase “*laissez-faire, laissez-passer*” did not originate with the physiocrats, it became the slogan associated with their campaign to reorganize the French economy, and French politics, by circumventing feudal arrangements and counter-productive policies of taxation and clientage. In order to bypass large landowners, small farmers, merchants, clerics, and provincial parlementaires, all of whom resisted the physiocrats’ repudiation of centuries-old arrangements protecting the French people from famine, it was necessary to rely on top-down decision-making. Early efforts to implement these doctrines, facilitated by rare soul-searching following France’s defeat by Britain in 1763, led to experimentation along physiocratic lines under the ministry of the duc de Choiseul. Early efforts to liberalize the grain trade in the late 1760s were stymied by two developments, the return of famine at the end of the decade and the critique of physiocratic theory advanced by the abbé Galiani in his *Dialogues on the Grain Trade* (1770), which together persuaded prominent philosophes such as Voltaire to renounce Quesnay’s ideas. On the physiocrats, see Philippe Steiner, *La ‘science nouvelle’ de l’économie politique* (Paris, 1998); Jean-Claude Perrot, *Une histoire intellectuelle de l’économie politique: XVIIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1992); T. J. Hochstrasser,

“Physiocracy and the Politics of *Laissez-Faire*,” in *CHECPT*, 419–42; and Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 173–222.

37. In Turgot’s words, “manners are gradually softened, the human mind takes enlightenment, separate nations draw nearer to each other, commerce and policy connect at last all parts of the globe”—in sum, humanity “marches always, although slowly, toward still higher perfection.” Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, “A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind,” in *Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics*, ed. and trans. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge, 1973). So deep was Turgot’s commitment to the idea of perfectibility that he broke from his friend David Hume over the latter’s skeptical assessment of the idea. On the Turgot-Hume relationship, see Richard H. Popkin and Mark Goldie, “Scepticism, Priestcraft, and Toleration,” 88–89. In Turgot’s article “Fondations” in the seventh volume of the *Encyclopedia*, he denounced the tendency of France’s traditional corporate bodies to defend group interests against the good of the nation. The rights of individual citizens, by contrast, are “to be respected as sacred by society as a whole.” Turgot’s individualism extended well beyond Locke’s. The rights of citizens, as he conceived of them, “exist independently of society; they form its necessary elements.” Individuals enter society only “to place themselves, with all their rights, under the protection of these same laws to which they sacrifice their liberty. But private bodies [*corps particuliers*] do not exist of themselves nor for themselves; they have been formed for society; and they must cease to exist the moment that they cease to be useful.” Turgot, “Fondations,” in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers...* (Paris, 1751–1765), 7:75. Turgot’s *Reflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses* (1766), in which he distinguished between the

productivity of capital and that of land, offered a brief for taxing land in order not to drive up interest rates. Turgot, *Reflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*, ed. Joel-Thomas Ravix and Paul-Marie Romani (1766; Paris, 1997); and see Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 281–90.

38. Because the mature economic conditions necessary for free trade were not yet in place, Turgot considered it necessary at times to provide public employment, support food imports, revise taxes temporarily, and prevent land owners from removing tenants during the crisis. Those steps succeeded in mitigating the worst effects of the famine.
39. Turgot tried to explain his rationale in a treatise intended for widespread circulation. In the words of his contemporary François Métra, Turgot adopted “the tone of a father who explains to his children the measures he has taken for their welfare and who desires that their submission be as enlightened as it is willing.” But that paternal confidence proved misplaced, as it so often does. See Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 2001), 17–39; and Keith Michael Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975), 55–64.
40. On Turgot’s and Condorcet’s elaborate plans for a system of assemblies ranging from the local to the national—assemblies designed to be consultative rather than determinative—see Baker, *Condorcet*, 56–57, 193, 208–14, and the discussion of these issues in chapter 11 below.
41. Denis Diderot, “Political Authority,” in *The Encyclopedia*, ed. and trans. Stephen J. Gendzier (New York, 1967), 185–88.
42. Denis Diderot, “Citoyen,” in *Encyclopédie*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 17 vols (Paris, 1751), 3:489.

43. Diderot spelled out the implications of the general will for ethics with little more precision: “the general will in each individual is a pure act of understanding that reasons in the silence of the passions about what man can demand of his fellow man and about what his fellow man can rightfully demand of him.” Diderot, “Natural Rights,” in *The Encyclopedia*, 170–75. If that passage suggests that Diderot remained content with some version of Shaftesbury’s moral sense, his posthumously published *Rameau’s Nephew* unsettles that conclusion. In that dialogue, Diderot presented himself debating a cynical young atheist who disputed Diderot’s contention that helping others brings happiness. For whatever reason—perhaps because he had been living with musicians and poets—the young man confessed that he lacked whatever internal sense Diderot thought would generate satisfaction from benevolence. In other later works, Diderot presented challenges to the idea of a moral sense, but he always returned to his observation that people take pleasure in doing good to others. He countered the psychological egoism of the radical philosophe Helvétius with another formulation of his conviction that only a few deviant individuals, such as the “violent reasoner” he presented in the essay “Natural Rights,” lack the moral sense, so we should not reason from exceptions to a general rule. But, outside of these scattered assertions, Diderot did not develop a coherent theory of ethics or politics. He preferred writing fiction and dialogues to treatises for a reason: he found the play of conflicting positions, and the chance to play devil’s advocate, more rewarding than the elaboration of philosophical arguments. In that preference, at least, he was consistent. On Diderot’s ethics and his other late writings, including the “Conversation of a Philosopher with the Maréchale de ****” of 1774, see Jerome Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*

(Cambridge, 1998), 466–70; and cf. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, 1989), 319–33.

44. On the history of the book itself, from conception to distribution, see Robert Darnton, *The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the Encyclopédie* (Cambridge, MA, 1979).
45. On the 1770 decree against d'Holbach, see Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy*, 413.
46. In *De l'esprit* (1758), Helvétius vociferously denied the existence of God and left no room for an eternal reward to prod individuals toward virtue. That was the job of the legislator: "It is plain that morality is only a frivolous science if one does not blend it with politics and legislation." Helvétius, *De l'esprit* (1758; Paris, 1973), 2:xv, 139. In his other major work, the posthumously published *De l'homme* (1772), Helvétius declared that sociability springs not from any "innate quality" such as the moral sense or an inner light or divine spark; instead "The love of men for their brethren is the effect of the necessity of mutual assistance, and of an affinity of wants, dependent on that corporeal sensibility, which I regard as the principle of our actions." Motivating virtue requires laws that penalize vice and reward virtue, which Helvétius defined as "the desire for the general happiness," thereby shifting men's habits although still appealing to their desire to maximize their own experience of pleasure. In such a system, he predicted, republican government securing stable property relations would promote, through appeals to the universal human quality of vanity, sufficient "mutual assistance" to prevent the equally universal impulse to dominate from defining all social relations. Helvétius, "Sociability," in *A Treatise on Man: His Intellectual Faculties and His Education*, ed. and trans. W. Hooper, 2 vols. (London, 1810), 1:124–40; quotations from 134, 140.

47. Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, *Système social: ou principes naturels de la morale et de la politique...*, 2 vols. (1781; Hildesheim, 1969), 1:7–8.
48. The feudal system, according to Holbach, sanctified hierarchy as God's will and left the ordinary people "crushed and degraded." Yet even absolute monarchs were secure only when commanding "happy subjects." For that reason rulers must listen to the people or their representatives, "citizens more enlightened than the others," otherwise the nation could be manipulated by "ambitious and dishonest" individuals, such as Guise in France or Cromwell in England, who brought "frightful convulsions" under the "pretext of preserving public welfare." Holbach advised instead "a constitution that would allow each order of the citizens to have *representatives* and to speak in the assemblies dedicated to public welfare." Holbach shared with Turgot and Condorcet, among other philosophes, a distinctive view of representative government. He argued that distinct social orders, including the clergy, the nobility, the magistrates, the merchants, and the farmers, required their own representatives because members of these orders, self-interested as humans always are, can never know the interests of the others. Only a king could transcend particular interests and represent the interests of the nation as a whole. In his book *L'Ethocratie, ou le gouvernement fondé sur la morale* (1776), Holbach called for a monarchy advised by a representative assembly of the sort he outlined in the *Encyclopedia*. According to Holbach, an absolute monarch is "the unique *representative* of his nation." In limited monarchies, by contrast, sovereign power is shared, as it is between the king and parliament in Britain. In France, the Estates General consisted of the nobility and the clergy. The third estate was "destined to represent the people," but, Holbach noted drily, "these national assemblies have been discontinued since the year

1628.” Why did royal absolutism arise in place of the Estates General? Holbach’s history of French government opened with the invasion of “happy brigands” from cold northern regions. These conquerors treated the natives “as a kind of cheap cattle.” Their heritage of domination had persisted in the “pretension of the nobility,” who continued “to regard their fellow citizens as vanquished slaves.” Slowly these pagan warriors embraced the Christianity of their underlings, which led to the emergence of a powerful clergy that eventually joined the monarch and the nobility as the people’s representatives. Holbach, “Representatives,” in *The Encyclopedia*, 214–22; and see Alan C. Kors, *D’Holbach’s Coterie* (Princeton, 1976).

49. See Robert Darnton, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York, 1995); and Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, 28–35.
50. If enlightened despotism was not the answer to the questions of government, what was? Voltaire’s articles on law and the state in his *Philosophical Dictionary* are amusing, but they offer only equal-opportunity indictments of legal codes. What about forms of government? “The ants,” Voltaire observes, are “an excellent democracy,” since everyone is equal and each works “for the happiness of all,” but beavers are even better builders. Monkeys are “mountebanks” and thus the species most resembling humans, particularly in “our gift of imitation, the triviality of our ideas, and our inconstancy.” In answer to the question “which is the best?” in his entry “States, government,” Voltaire offers only a parody of Montesquieu, a fictional dialogue between two educated Indians who observe how hard it is to explain the fall of Rome, the keys to virtue and honor, and the link between climate and government. They agree that few republics have existed,

and even fewer have prospered, because “men seldom deserve to govern themselves.” The dialogue closes as they resolve to keep looking for the ideal state, where people obey the laws, a place neither of them has ever seen. Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, 42, 58, 190–94, 272–73, 281–88, 322, 386–94, 398–400.

Striking a balance between Voltaire’s condemnation of religious doctrine and practice, on the one hand, and his own frequently expressed, albeit pared-down, theism, on the other, is challenging. For a comprehensive study of the first two centuries of controversy concerning his religious ideas, see René Pomeau, *La religion de Voltaire*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1969).

51. On these issues, see Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe*.
52. Voltaire, *Idées républicaines*, in *Oeuvres de Voltaire* (Paris, 1869), 5:396–403.
53. Voltaire to d’Alembert, October 16, 1765, in *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, vol. 43, *Correspondance avec M. d’Alembert* (Paris, 1821): 331–33.
54. On Rousseau’s life, the best sources are his *Confessions* (1781), ed. and trans. J. M. Cohen (London, 1953), quotations from 34, 40; the fine two-volume biography by Maurice Cranston, *Jean-Jacques: The Early life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712–1714* (New York, 1983) and *The Noble Savage: Rousseau, 1754–1762* (Oxford, 1991); and the classic study by Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 2nd ed. (1957, 1971; Chicago, 1988).
55. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 106, 205.
56. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 225–26.
57. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 252–57; and cf. Cranston, *Jean-Jacques*, 141–55. Initiated into the wonders of music along with other mysteries by Mme. de Warens, the precocious

Rousseau wrote an opera entitled *La Découverte du nouveau monde*, inspired perhaps by the departure of his uncle Bernard for South Carolina. The libretto offered an early version of the figure of the “noble savage” and the sentimentalizing of nature later considered characteristic of Rousseau’s mature work. While a member of the Mably household, Rousseau also produced his first treatise on education. This Locke-like plea to replace Greek and Latin with subjects linked to pupils’ experience, reinforced by an ingenious system of rewards and punishments later elaborated in Rousseau’s *Emile*, was no doubt inspired by reflections on his own demoralizing experience of failure in tutoring his young pupils.

58. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 306.
59. During this period Rousseau also provided the research notes necessary for M. and Mme. Dupin to compose their three-volume critique of Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws*, a tome in which they defended an odd mixture of royalist and bourgeois positions including the necessity of absolute monarchy, the desirability of equal rights for women, the magical power of commerce, and the indispensability of the tax-farming from which they made their fortune. Although dependent on his patrons’ largesse and thus compelled to contribute to their projects, Rousseau soon made clear that he shared few of their ideas.
60. It is worth noting that this question, stated in these words by the Academy of Dijon, is often rendered in the way that Rousseau himself rendered it in the opening paragraph of his essay: “Has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended to purify or corrupt morals?” By introducing “or corrupt,” Rousseau was already signaling the dramatic departure he had in mind. On this point see the editor’s notes to Rousseau, *The First and*

Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York, 1964), 66–67n7.

61. In light of the intellectual trajectory Rousseau followed from that moment, which carried him in the opposite direction from Diderot's growing confidence in science and progress and his increasingly materialist skepticism, an almost classical symmetry attends the circumstances of Rousseau's illumination en route to visit his friend. His account of this life-changing incident shows the distance he had traveled from his early affinity with ancient stoicism. Whether or not his new sensibility deserves the vexed label "romantic," its rapturous excess demonstrates why variants of the adjective "Rousseau-esque" soon entered most European languages to convey the onset of irresistibly powerful emotions almost beyond expression. Rousseau to Malesherbes, January 12, 1762, *Correspondance complète de J.-J. Rousseau*, ed. and trans. R. A. Leigh, 14 vols. (Geneva, 1965-1995), 10:24-29; and see the introduction by Roger D. Masters to Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 8. The passage begins as follows: "if anything resembled a sudden inspiration, it is what that advertisement stimulated in me: all at once I felt my mind dazzled by a thousand lights, a crowd of splendid ideas presented themselves to me with such force and in such confusion, that I was thrown into a state of indescribable bewilderment. I felt my head seized by a dizziness that resembled intoxication. A violent palpitation constricted me and made my chest heave. Unable to breathe and walk at the same time, I sank down under one of the trees in the avenue and passed the next half hour in such a state of agitation that when I got up I found that the front of my jacket was wet with tears, although I had no memory of shedding any."
62. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 327; and cf. Cranston, *Jean-Jacques*, 226–29.

63. It is striking that Rousseau referred to Voltaire as “famed Arouet,” choosing to avoid Voltaire’s pen name because it symbolized to him the abandoning of artistic authenticity in the quest for mere celebrity. See Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 53, 72–73n41. On Rousseau’s critique of Mandeville’s myopic emphasis on self-interest, which Rousseau thought blinded Mandeville to the “social virtues” that grew from pity, see Pagden, *The Enlightenment*, 92–95.
64. Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 36, 51; and cf. 46–47.
65. Rousseau’s self-conscious adoption of a virtuous simpler life has struck many commentators as a hollow attempt to justify his abandonment to a state orphanage of the five children he and Thérèse had together. Rousseau justified this step both as necessary because of his poverty and as a reflection of his belief that Plato was right and children should be raised in common, by the state. See Cranston, *Jean-Jacques*, 239–61; and d’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse,” 103–5. For the fullest account of the process by which Rousseau gradually became estranged from the rest of the philosophes, see Hulliung, *The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes* (Cambridge, 1994).
66. On the contrast between Rousseau’s two ideals, the rustic simplicity of family life in a Swiss mountain village and the austere, disciplined civic republicanism of Sparta, see Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1969), who points out that the question of whether such ideals can be reconciled has been at the heart of modern political theory.
67. Rousseau, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. B. Gagnebin, M. Raymond, et al., 5 vols. (Paris, 1959–95), 4:245; and see the discussion of this issue in Robert Wokler, “Rousseau’s Reading of

the Book of Genesis and the Theology of Commercial Society,” *Modern Intellectual History* 3, no. 1 (2006): 85–94. The *Second Discourse* opens with Rousseau warning his readers to disregard “facts” and “history.” Rousseau surely wanted to appease the censors; his account of human development could not be reconciled with Genesis. He might also have wanted to refrain from declaring whether his portrait of the state of nature should be taken as speculation or as an accurate account premised on evidence from existing Native American or African cultures. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 193–200.

68. In his notes to the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau wrote, “man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it. What then can have depraved him to this extent, if not the changes that have befallen his constitution, the progress he has made, and the knowledge he has acquired?” Even if we admire the achievements of modern society, “it is nonetheless true that it necessarily brings men to hate each other in proportion to the conflict of their interests, to render each other apparent services and in fact do every imaginable harm to one another.” Throughout the *Second Discourse* Rousseau refers to reports of American Indian cultures, and he concludes by invoking Montaigne’s essay “On Cannibals.” On the other hand, Rousseau deliberately and repeatedly used the evasive modifier “perhaps” in relation to the state of nature: “for it is no light undertaking to separate what is original from what is artificial in the present nature of man, and to know correctly a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably never will exist, and about which it is nevertheless necessary to have precise notions.” *Second Discourse*, 92–93; and cf. 108–41, 180–81. The qualifier might suggest either that humans—like all other animals—developed gradually from a primitive condition, that the state of nature was

possible but unlikely historically, or that it serves only as a fictional, heuristic, or mythic device. On these issues, and the ways in which diverse readings of Rousseau's "perhaps" have shaped competing interpretations of his *oeuvre*, see Christopher Kelley, "Rousseau's 'Peut-etre': Reflections on the Status of the State of Nature," *Modern Intellectual History* 3, no. 1 (2006): 75–83.

69. Voltaire to Rousseau, August 30, 1755, in *Correspondance complète de J.-J. Rousseau*.
70. Rousseau explicitly rejected Hobbes's bleak portrayal of life in the state of nature, but he conceded that the pity operating among savages evaporated through a natural, inevitable, and irreversible process set in motion by the workings of both instinct and reason, the engine of human perfectibility. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 141. See also Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France*, 429–32.
71. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 133.
72. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 150–60.
73. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 163–70.
74. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 167–68.
75. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 168–72.
76. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 202.
77. We cannot understand Rousseau's writings historically unless we bracket Robespierre and Napoleon, Burke and Carlyle, to say nothing of Hitler and Stalin. On this much-discussed point, see the judicious treatment in Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 29–30, 382n20.
78. Rousseau, *Emile: or, On Education*, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York, 1979), 444–46, 473, 325. For a comprehensive analysis of *Emile*, see Roger D. Masters, *The Political*

Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1968), 3–105. Masters considers *Emile* the best entry into Rousseau’s overall philosophy as well as the source of his clearest and most explicit arguments concerning education and religion, which are presented directly in the section of *Emile* entitled “Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar,” 266–313. For a cogent brief analysis of Rousseau’s ethical philosophy, see Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy*, 470–82. Rousseau’s concept of internalized norms of course illustrates for some contemporary readers the rationale behind modern regimes of oppressive surveillance examined by Michel Foucault, a reading that relies implicitly on naïve conceptions of the desirability and possibility of a life without discipline.

79. Rousseau, *Emile*, 235, 289–90; see also 233–36 for the relation between the experience of friendship and the development of an ethical sensibility, and the relation between morality and justice: “Those who want to treat politics and morals separately will never understand anything of either of the two.”
80. *Emile* is the story of an isolated child growing up in a world largely without politics. His development mirrors the transformation of society from the state of nature to the degraded state of civilization. His education counteracts that tendency and teaches Emile how to transmute the primitive impulse of pity into a mature ethic of reciprocity, thereby keeping at bay the fatal danger of self-love. Rousseau’s paeans to the innocence of childhood and his celebrations of play and reverie reversed traditional views of children as miniature adults. His portraits of women, by contrast, merely reinforced male dominance and helped usher in a new, romantic ideal of swooning women dependent on their fathers, lovers, and husbands. The political implications of the tutor’s plan remain opaque until he briefly discusses “the science of right” in the concluding pages.

Transferring to a civic setting the tutor's maxim to place duty before inclination is the challenge Rousseau would tackle in the *Social Contract*. Rousseau, *Emile*, 211–36. For criticism of the distance separating Rousseau's view of gender roles from our own, see Susan Muller Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, 1979), 99–196; and Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, 1988).

81. Rousseau, "Political Economy," in Rousseau, *On the Social Contract, with "Geneva Manuscript" and "Political Economy"*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York, 1978), 209–11, 229–36.
82. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 211–15.
83. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 214–16.
84. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 216–18.
85. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 220.
86. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 223–24.
87. Rousseau, "Political Economy," 224–31.
88. Rousseau was restating one of the crucial arguments of the *First Discourse* that Diderot resisted. Although that disagreement was only one of many sources of their growing personal disaffection, Diderot's rejection of Rousseau's historicist argument in "Political Economy" was perhaps among the reasons he printed another article, taken from the writings of Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger, under the heading "Political Oeconomy" in the tenth volume of the *Encyclopedia*. On this issue see the detailed analysis in Robert Derathé, *Jean-Jacque Rousseau et la science politique de son temps* (Paris, 1979), esp. 248–94.

89. Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript,” in Rousseau, *On the Social Contract, with “Geneva Manuscript” and “Political Economy,”* 157–63. See also Masters’ notes on the entire “Geneva Manuscript,” 202–8; and cf. Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*, 257–76; and Derathé, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps*, 55–62.
90. See R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800*, vol. 1, *The Challenge* (1959; Princeton, 1969), 119.
91. For an insightful discussion of these issues, see the treatment of Rousseau and democratic theory in Nadia Urbinati, *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago, 2006), 6–16, 60–100. As she points out, those who treat Rousseau as having shown the impossibility of democracy in any context other than a simple rural village have tended to divide into two camps. On the one hand, “realists” study how elites take and hold power—how they actually govern—in so-called “democracies.” On the other hand, self-designated democratic theorists construct visionary schemes, versions of a utopian participatory democracy that, although attractive, make all other versions of representative government seem either second-best or utterly unsatisfactory. This condition, I believe, has sapped the energy from democratic reform movements in the United States and western Europe for the last half century. Although I have some disagreements with Urbinati’s analysis of Rousseau’s writings on democracy, I agree with her diagnosis of the state of contemporary democratic political theory. On this issue, see also C. Girard, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la démocratie délibérative: bien commun, droits individuels et unanimité,” *Lumières* 15 (2010): 199–221.

92. As astute translators have pointed out, Rousseau not only had an alternative that lacked the ambiguity of his chosen formulation (viz., the French verb “*naître*,” to be born); he also employed that alternative when he wanted to avoid the ambiguity he preferred for the opening of the book. Cf. the discussion of this question by Masters in *On the Social Contract*, 10–11, 36n18, explaining his rendering of the sentence as “Man is/was born free”; and the discussion in the long-standard English translation, apparently based on an anonymous eighteenth-century version, edited by J. D. H. Cole, *The Social Contract and the Discourses*, now further revised and expanded by J. H. Brumfitt and John C. Hall (1913; London, 1973), 349n2.
93. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 53–55; Rousseau’s emphasis.
94. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 55. Though not universally accepted, this interpretation of the general will has had distinguished champions over the years, beginning of course with Kant and continuing into the twentieth century. Particularly persuasive and influential versions include Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. Peter Gay (New York, 1964); Patrick Riley, *Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel* (Cambridge, 1982); and Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*, the interpretation I find most persuasive.
95. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 55–56.
96. Madison identified a similar problem; for his solution, see chapters 8 and 9 below.
97. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 61–67.
98. Rousseau’s emphasis on the generality of the general will and his anxiety about the negative consequences of individualism and partial associations, although sometimes

overblown by his critics, are real enough. Why did they matter so much to him? Some interpreters have emphasized the psycho-dynamics of Rousseau's own insecurity and the paranoia of his final years. Alternative explanations focus on the longstanding Catholic and French traditions of locating authority in God or in the mystical body of Christ, or in scientific exaltations of Nature, or in philosophical paeans to Reason, or in the French veneration of the semi-divine figure of the King—anywhere but in the competing wills of individuals, which would be human, idiosyncratic, and perhaps irrational. The alternative of establishing political legitimacy through human volition, rooted in Augustine's appropriation of Cicero's and Seneca's voluntarism for his version of Christian political theory, was deepened in the political thought of Nicolas of Cusa but reached maturity only in Locke's *Second Discourse*, where civil society originates in the free choice of individuals. See Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*; and Patrick Riley, *The General Will before Rousseau* (Princeton, 1986).

99. Rousseau's letter to Mirabeau is quoted in Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France*, 443. See also her discussion of this issue on 460–63, which depends on the seminal work of Patrick Riley in *Will and Political Legitimacy* and *The General Will before Rousseau*. See also Riley's discussion of these thorny issues in his article "Social Contract Theory and Its Critics," in *CHECPT*, 347–75; and cf. Martyn P. Thompson, "The History of Fundamental Law in Political Thought from the French Wars of Religion to the American Revolution," *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1103–28; and Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*, 306–9. Rousseau's attempt to remove legitimacy from faulty individual wills and locate it in the ethical ideal of the general will has struck many commentators as oppressive, others as necessitating direct

democracy that would engage all citizens, all the time, in political activity. For the reasons that Keohane, Riley, Thompson, and Masters make clear, I believe both judgments are mistaken.

100. Rousseau, *Geneva Manuscript*, 168; and cf. Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*, 285–86, 290.
101. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 67–71.
102. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 67, 71–75.
103. Only the island nation of Corsica, Rousseau concluded, met the criteria for establishing a democracy, and he sketched the beginnings of a constitution for Corsica in 1769, a project he never completed or published. Yet when he was asked, late in life, to come to the island and serve as its legislator, he declined, explaining that his personal constitution made him ill-suited to a life of political engagement rather than contemplation. Cf. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 75; and Rousseau, *Confessions*, 598–602.
104. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 84–85; and cf. *Emile*, 465–66.
105. René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’Argenson, *Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France* (Amsterdam, 1764), 8, 27–28. See also Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France*, 376–91, 445–46.
106. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 111–12. On this contentious issue, cf. the varying assessments in Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 233–39; and Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, 73–79.
107. Building upwards from the local level to the national in Poland would require making the decentralization of authority more systematic. Individuals could connect more effectively with officials in their own towns than in the distant capital, and the regional

representative assemblies might more effectively produce laws consistent with the people's will than could any king. Thus Rousseau advised instituting frequent elections and the rotation of representatives instructed by the electorate. Rousseau denied that his plan was inconsistent with the *Social Contract*: the constitution for Poland, he insisted, was “deduced” from the “principle” of the *Social Contract*. Rousseau, *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, in *Rousseau: Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Frederick Watkins (London, 1953), 193–95; and cf. Masters' note in Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 149n105. On the consistency between Rousseau's ideas for Poland and the *Social Contract*, see also John Pappas, “*Les Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et le Contrat social: contradiction ou adaptation?*” in *Rousseau et Voltaire en 1778* (Geneva, 1981); and cf. Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990), 235–38.

108. Rousseau, *Constitutional Project for Corsica*, an incomplete and unpublished manuscript, in *Rousseau: Political Writings*, 277–330. See also James Miller, *Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy* (New Haven, 1984), 127–31. Miller provides a forthright account of Rousseau's plans for Poland and Corsica, even though the evidence he presents from the plans quite clearly contradicts his own broader argument concerning Rousseau's preference for direct democracy and his ostensible distrust of representation.
109. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 79. See also Helena Rosenblatt, *Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749–1762* (Cambridge, 1997).
110. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 80. See also, on Fabri's machinations, Jules Vuy, *Origine des idées politiques de Rousseau*, 2nd ed. (1889; Geneva, 1970); and on Rousseau's

relation to the leading factions of popular political reform in Geneva, see Richard Whatmore, “Rousseau and the *Représentants*: The Politics of the *Lettres écrites de la montagne*,” *Modern Intellectual History* 3, no. 3 (November 2006): 385–413.

111. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 82–83.

112. Rousseau’s *Discourses* had made clear why he considered individuals of his day capable of civic virtue, yet unlikely to achieve it. Encouraging them to participate on a daily basis might merely heighten their commitment to their own narrow interests rather than broadening their understanding of the general will. In *Emile* he showed how difficult it would be, in the corrupted conditions of a culture driven by egocentrism and oriented toward competition, to educate even a single individual to a life of virtue. Viewed in light of those works, the moderation of Rousseau’s recommendations for political reform and his preference for a constitutional democracy “tempered” by reliance on elected assemblies should come as no surprise. Rousseau, architect and champion of the abstract ideal of the general will, believed that goal was most likely to be achieved in practice not through a “pure” democracy—suitable only to gods—but through the institutions of representative democracy. This was the means best suited to lubricating the inevitable frictions of politics to approximate as nearly as possible the ethical and political ideal he designated the general will. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 79, 81–82, 85; see also Rosenblatt, *Rousseau and Geneva*, 132–35; and on the more general question of the reasons why Rousseau resisted the idea of representatives in the *Social Contract* but elsewhere endorsed the idea of delegates, see the formulations in Urbinati, *Representative Democracy*, 65–100; and Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 230–39.

113. On the 1766 quarrel between Hume and Rousseau, see E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1980), chap. 35; and Donald Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996), 52–56, which includes a reprint of the 1766 illustration *The Savage Man* poking fun at Rousseau’s squabbles with Hume and Voltaire.
114. The two thinkers did have one thing in common: just as Rousseau was the least characteristic figure of the French Enlightenment and its most searing critic, so Hume—although he ranks today as the most influential eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher—was equally out of step with his British contemporaries. In fact, more because of his atheism and his philosophical skepticism than his cultural and political conservatism, Hume was something of a scandal in eighteenth-century Britain. David Hume, *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, in Hume, *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. rev., ed. P. H. Niddich (Oxford, 1978), 2:270; see also David Miller, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought* (Oxford, 1981), 120.
115. On Hume’s politics, see Duncan Forbes, *Hume’s Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge, 1975), which shows how and why Hume distanced himself from the Whigs’ principles and program without thereby becoming a Tory; and Miller, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought*, who demonstrates the links between Hume’s skepticism and his political writings and shows that he can be placed within either the “liberal” or “conservative” traditions only by ignoring crucial aspects of his thought and its complex development over time.

116. David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” (1752), in Hume, *Political Essays*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, 1994), 221–33. This edition is particularly helpful, since Haakonssen’s notes clarify the revisions Hume made over the years, which are crucial to understanding the development of his political thought. Forbes, *Hume’s Philosophical Politics*, 134–36, stresses the importance of Hume’s revisions and shows how they complicate efforts to disentangle his aspirations to provide a “science of politics” from his clear engagement with the changing political developments of his day, the “vulgar Whiggism” that he grew to detest by the time of his death in 1776.
117. David Hume, *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Abdication of James the Second* (1688), 6 vols. (Indianapolis, 1983), 5:569.
118. David Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742), in *Political Essays*, 70–72.
119. David Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts” (1752), in *Political Essays*, 102.
120. David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government” (1741), in *Political Essays*, 16.
121. David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament” (1741), in *Political Essays*, 24.
122. David Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742), in *Political Essays*, 59.
123. David Hume, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science” (1741) in *Political Essays*, 5.
124. David Hume, “Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic” (1741), in *Political Essays*, 28.
125. David Hume, “Of Parties in General” (1741), in *Political Essays*, 34–36.
126. David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament” (1741), in *Political Essays*, 24.

127. David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government,” 17–19; “Of the Independency of Parliament,” 26; “Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic,” 31–32.
128. David Hume, “Of the Original Contract” (1748), in *Political Essays*, 186–201.
129. Douglass Adair, “‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth *Federalist*,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (June 1957): 343–60, is among the most widely cited pieces of scholarship on the Constitution and the process of ratification. Cf. my discussion of Madison in chapters 9 and 10 below.
130. The required rotation in office that Harrington stipulated was, according to Hume, “inconvenient,” and its agrarian law “impracticable.” The excess power lodged in its Senate, Hume warned, “provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances,” because the Senate could quash legislation before it was ever even debated by the people’s representatives in the legislature. Readers familiar with Hume’s essays would expect next a restatement of his favorite refrain, with which, in fact, the essay begins: it is never wise to “tamper” or “try experiments” with established institutions of government. David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” (1752), in *Political Essays*, 221–33.
131. David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” 221–33. See the discussions of this essay in Forbes, *Hume’s Philosophical Politics*, 168–92; Miller, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought*, 151–62; Richard Teichgraeber III, “Free Trade” and *Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations”* (Durham, 1986), 75–120; Don Herzog, *Without Foundations: Justification in Political*

Theory (Ithaca, 1985), 189–201; and John B. Stewart, *Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy* (Princeton, 1992).

132. David Hume, “Of the Coalition of Parties” (1758), in *Political Essays*, 206–12.

133. David Hume, “Of the Origin of Government” (1777), in *Political Essays*, 20–23.

134. See Teichgraeber, “*Free Trade*” and *Moral Philosophy*, 84.

135. Fletcher quoted in Nicholas Phillipson, “The Scottish Enlightenment,” in Porter and Teich, *The Enlightenment in National Context*, 23; see also Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1983); and Richard B. Sher, *The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and Their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, and America* (Chicago, 2006). One illustration of the shift toward commerce and culture is the chapter entitled “Of Political Society” in Hume’s *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, which deals briefly with international relations and social relations but has little to do with politics or law, a reflection of Hume’s aversion to abstract theories and his preference for established traditions and an orientation characteristic of Scottish Enlightenment thought more generally. The literature on the revaluation of commerce, and its relation to the rise of the British Empire, is immense. See for example Teichgraeber, “*Free Trade*” and *Moral Philosophy*; Winch, *Riches and Poverty*; Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*; and David Armitage, *The Intellectual Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000).

136. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725), in Raphael, *British Moralists, 1650–1800* 1:265, 272.

137. Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 274, 284. On Hutcheson, see Henning Jensen, *Motivation and Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory* (The Hague, 1971); Teichgraeber, "Free Trade" and Moral Philosophy, 29–74; T. P. Miller, "Francis Hutcheson and the Civil Humanist Tradition," in *The Glasgow Enlightenment*, ed. Andrew Hook and Richard B. Sher (East Linton, East Lothian, 1995); and J. Moore, "The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment," in *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990).
138. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold, 2 vols. in 1 (Indianapolis, 2004), 134–35.
139. Francis Hutcheson, *System of Moral Philosophy*, 3 vols. (London, 1755), 1:77. It should also be noted that Hutcheson dismissed arguments for divine-right monarchy and endorsed the people's right to resist tyranny. Less concerned with anarchy than with oppression, he did not share Hume's ambivalence concerning popular government: "In all ages there has been too much patience in the body of the people, and too stupid a veneration for their princes or rulers." We have too little evidence to rule out republican or democratic government as impractical. "For each one free kingdom or state," we have "many monstrous herds of miserable abject slaves or beasts of burden, rather than civil polities of rational creatures." Just as the moral sense enables individuals to identify benevolence and respond to it, so that sense enables them to exercise better judgment in public life than earlier thinkers had credited them with possessing.
140. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. Dugald Stewart (London, 1853), 3; or in the more recent and accessible Glasgow edition, ed. D. D. Raphael and J. I. Macfie

(Oxford, 1976), 1. The page references in the following notes are to the Raphael and Macfie edition.

141. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 137.

142. Smith never moved as boldly toward atheism as Hume did; whether his caution reflected his own deep uncertainty—or merely prudence induced by the abuse Hume endured—cannot be known conclusively. On this vexed question I have followed the fine discussion in Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, 129–30, 299–300n79; but cf. James Moore, “Natural Rights and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in *CHECPT*, 307–10, for evidence of Smith’s religious faith.

143. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 152.

144. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 233–34.

145. For a fascinating account of Smith’s review of Rousseau’s *Second Discourse*, which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1756, see Robert Wokler, “Rousseau’s Reading of the Book of Genesis and the Theology of Commercial Society,” *Modern Intellectual History*, 3 (2006): 85–94. Wokler indicates why Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* should be read not only as a critique of Mandeville and a revision of Hutcheson but also as a direct reply to the *Second Discourse*, and he shows tantalizing evidence that Smith also took his image of “the invisible hand” from Rousseau. On the relationship between Smith and Rousseau more generally, see Istvan Hont, *Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith* (Cambridge, MA, 2015).

146. Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein (Oxford, 1978), 435.

147. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 25–28; and see Donald Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision* (Cambridge, 1978), 158.
148. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, bk. 4, chap. 7, pt. 3; see also Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics*, 155, and, more generally, Winch's discussion of Smith's "Thoughts on America," 152–63.
149. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 25–28; and see Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics*, 159–60.
150. On this decades-long process of resolving the so-called Adam Smith problem, related in some respects to the transformation of our understanding of the relation between Locke's philosophy and his politics, see Hont, *Politics in Commercial Society*; Knud Haakonssen, *The Science of a Legislator: The National Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith* (Cambridge, 1981); Charles Griswold, *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1999); Teichgraeber, "Free Trade" and Moral Philosophy; Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*; and especially Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics*.
151. On the legacy of Adam Smith, see Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics*, and Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*.
152. For a recent overview, see Moore, "Natural Rights and the Scottish Enlightenment."
153. David Hume, *The History of England* 5:146–47.
154. Hume quoted in Ernest C. Mossner, "Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729–1740: The Complete Text," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 9 (1948): 504.
155. J. Y. T. Grieg, ed., *The Letters of David Hume*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), 2:237; and see Donald W. Livingston, "Hume, English Barbarism, and American Independence," in

Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Princeton, 1990), 133–47.

156. Grieg, *The Letters of David Hume* 2:300–1.

157. Grieg, *The Letters of David Hume* 2:302–3.

158. Grieg, *The Letters of David Hume* 2:308.

159. Grieg, *The Letters of David Hume* 2:286.

160. Denis Diderot, *Oeuvres politiques*, ed. P. Vernière (Paris, 1963), 491. See also Durand Echevarria, *Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (1957).

Chapter 6

1. The literature on the American Enlightenment is rich and varied. A wide-ranging collection of documents is *The Enlightenment in America, 1720–1825*, ed. Jose R. Torre, 4 vols. (London, 2008). For overviews of the secondary literature and current controversies, see Carolyn Winterer, “What Was the American Enlightenment?” in *The Worlds of American Intellectual History*, ed. Joel Isaac, James T. Kloppenberg, Michael O’Brien, and Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen (New York, 2016); Nathalie Caron and Naomi Wulf, “American Enlightenments: Continuity and Renewal,” *The Journal of American History* 99 (2013): 1072–91; and Susan Manning and Francis D. Cogliano, eds., *The Atlantic Enlightenment* (Aldershot, 2008), especially Manning and Cogliano’s introduction, “The Enlightenment and the Atlantic,” 1–19. Older works include Donald H. Meyer, *The Democratic Enlightenment* (New York, 1976); Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976); Donald Lundberg and Henry F. May, “The Enlightened Reader in America,” *American Quarterly* 28 (1976): 262–94, part of a special issue devoted to the question of the American Enlightenment; J. R. Pole, “Enlightenment and the Politics of American Nature,” in *The Enlightenment in National Context*, ed. Roy Porter and M. Teich (Cambridge, 1981); Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America* (Cambridge, 1990); Donald Lutz, *A Preface to American Political Theory*, which includes a detailed appendix listing the sources cited by American writers; James T. Kloppenberg, “Enlightenment,” in *A Companion to American Thought*, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and James T. Kloppenberg (Oxford, 1995); David S. Shields, *Civil Tongues and Polite Letters in British America* (Chapel Hill, 1997); James T.

Kloppenber, “The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse” and “Knowledge and Belief in American Public Life,” in James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 1–58; Dana Comi, “‘In the Shade of Solitude’: The Mind of New England Women, 1630–1805” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2003); Darren Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founders* (New York, 2005); and Caroline Winterer, *The Mirror of Antiquity: American Women and the Classical Tradition, 1750–1900* (Ithaca, 2007).

2. This realization has sparked a competition between champions of the so-called “social” and “ideological” interpretations of the Revolution that now impedes historical understanding. The literature that has transformed historians’ understandings of the Revolution is vast and growing rapidly. A fine social history of the struggle is Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York, 2005). See also Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 1979); Staughton Lynd, *Antifederalism in Dutchess County, New York: A Study of Democracy and Class Conflict in the Revolutionary Era* (Chicago, 1962), one of the earliest social histories of the Revolution; and three of the more recent, Benjamin L. Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (New York, 2007); Ray Raphael, *A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence* (New York, 2001); and Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord* (New York, 2002). Other examples include Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts* (New York, 1977); Paul

Gilje, *The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763–1834* (Chapel Hill, 1987); Steven Rosswurm, *Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and the “Lower Sort” During the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (New Brunswick, 1987); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, 2000); on women, Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1980); and Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800* (Boston, 1980); on Indians and African Americans, Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Steven Kaplan and Emma Nogrady Kaplan, *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution* (Amherst, 1989); David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, 1975); and Sylvia Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, 1991). Two collections are Alfred F. Young, ed., *Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism* (DeKalb, 1993); and Ronald Hoffmann and Peter J. Albert, eds., *The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social Movement* (Charlottesville, 1996). A cogent argument for integrating social, intellectual, and cultural history is William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005).

3. The two leading historians often characterized by their critics as offering an “ideological” or idea-centered explanation of the American Revolution have insisted on the necessity of a multi-dimensional account that attends to social, economic, and political as well as

intellectual history. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, *Faces of Revolution: Personalities and Themes in the Struggle for American Independence* (New York, 1990), ix–xiii; Gordon Wood, preface to the 1998 edition of *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (1969; Chapel Hill, 1998), v–xiii; and Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992). Another attempt to resolve this conflict redefines it in terms of a broad “political class” of Americans actively engaged in political activity; see Lutz, *A Preface to American Political Theory*, 104–11. Yet the either-or approach persists; see two reviews of Gary Nash’s excellent book *The Unknown American Revolution*: Thomas Slaughter in *Reviews in American History* (Fall 2006); and Woody Holton in *The American Historical Review* (June 2006).

4. On the dying gasps of royalism and its transformation into the president’s executive privileges, see Brendan McConville, *The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776* (Chapel Hill, 2006); and Eric Nelson, *The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding* (Cambridge, MA, 2014).
5. Recent years have seen an upsurge of scholarly interest in Franklin. The most detailed biography, based on exhaustive research, is J. A. Leo Lemay, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin*; of the projected seven volumes, the first two, covering the years 1706–47, have been published (Philadelphia, 2006).
6. Franklin’s article in the *Gazette*, October 9, 1729, in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard Labaree et al., 41 vols. to date (New Haven, 1959–), is quoted in Alan Houston’s edition of Franklin, *Autobiography and Other Writings on Politics, Economics, and Virtue* (Cambridge, 2004), 51. A comprehensive and up-to-date critical

edition of Franklin's classic is *Benjamin Franklin's Autobiography*, ed. Joyce E. Chaplin (New York, 2012).

7. Franklin's debts to Milton as well as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and his aversion to the moral egoism of Hobbes and Mandeville, manifest themselves in *A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain* (1725)—which was written in response to William Wollaston's *The Religion of Nature Delineated*—and in Franklin's "Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion" (1728). For a detailed discussion of these issues see Douglas Anderson, *The Radical Enlightenments of Benjamin Franklin* (Baltimore, 1997), 33–89; and on Franklin's lifelong reverence for God and adherence to Christian beliefs, see Joyce E. Chaplin, *The First Scientific American: Benjamin Franklin and the Pursuit of Genius* (New York, 2006), 29, 59–62, 337, 362.
8. For the controversy surrounding the Reverend Hemphill and Franklin's defense of his preaching, see Franklin, *Papers* 2:37–125; and cf. the discussion in Houston's introduction to Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, xxi–xxii.
9. As imperfect creatures, Franklin believed, we should concede the limits of our knowledge: "surrounded as we are on all sides with Ignorance and Error, it little becomes poor fallible Man to be Positive and dogmatical in his Opinions." Only forbearance could prevent conflict in a culture awash with conflicting forms of religious enthusiasm. Franklin, "Dialogue between Two Presbyterians," printed in the *Gazette*, April 10, 1735, in *Papers* 2:27–33, and in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 167–71; the quotation is from 171. See also Anderson, *The Radical Enlightenments of Benjamin Franklin*, 81. For an overview of the general "sacralization" of the landscape of colonial America and the proliferation of diverse sects, which occurred in two waves, 1680–1710 and 1740–70, see

Jon Butler, *Becoming America: The Revolution Before 1776* (Cambridge, 2000), 185–212.

10. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 79.
11. Voltaire, “Virtue,” *Philosophical Dictionary*, ed. Peter Gay (New York, 1962), 398–400.
12. Hume quoted in Darren Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment* (New York, 2005), 21. Women as well as men were avid readers of Addison and Steele’s *Spectator* in the 1740s. A family portrait by John Greenwood, *The Greenwood-Lee Family*, painted in 1747 and held by Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, shows a woman reading the *Spectator*. As Dana Comi notes in “‘In the Shade of Solitude’: The Mind of New England Women, 1630–1805,” 117–18, in the seventeenth century the woman would have been shown reading the Bible. As Comi points out, it is difficult to reconcile evidence concerning the increasing Anglicization of America during the middle decades of the eighteenth century with Jon Butler’s contention, in *Becoming America*, that the colonies were diverging from Britain during these years. On 125–30, she suggests persuasively that the more prosperous and urban regions were becoming more Anglicized, in part as a result of the greater availability of polite literature and manners, while at the same time more remote regions were developing in quite different directions.
13. Not that there was any necessary contradiction: so popular were Franklin’s publications and so successful his associated enterprises that he prospered beyond his hopes. By the age of forty-two, he had become one of the richest men in Pennsylvania, sufficiently wealthy that he could retire from his business enterprises to enjoy the refined life of a gentleman—which he did, of course, by continuing to devote himself selflessly to public

- affairs and to the self-conscious cultivation of his growing international prestige. See Gordon S. Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 2004), 51–60.
14. From Homer and Virgil to *Athenian Sports*, Cicero, and Tacitus; from Montaigne, More, and Bacon to Milton, Harrington, Sidney, and Locke; from Montesquieu and Voltaire to Defoe and Hume; and from Increase and Cotton Mather to a wide range of Christian devotional literature, extant catalogues from 1641 and 1647 show the interests of a readership with strikingly wide-ranging and eclectic tastes. Extracts from these catalogues are reprinted in the appendix to Anderson, *The Radical Enlightenments of Benjamin Franklin*, 221–29. For a fuller list, see Edwin Wolfe, “Franklin and His Friends Choose Their Books,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 80 (1956): 11–36.
 15. On the American Philosophical Society, formed from the amalgamation of the Quakers’ American Society and the Pennsylvania proprietors’ Philosophical Society, see May, *The Enlightenment in America*, 211–28; and James E. McClellan III, *Science Reorganized: Scientific Societies in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1985). On Franklin’s role in the transatlantic community of eighteenth-century scientists, see Chaplin, *The First Scientific American*.
 16. “The *Principal End* of Education is,” according to Hutcheson, “to *form us wise and good Creatures, useful to others and happy ourselves*.” In Locke’s words, “‘Tis VIRTUE, then, direct VIRTUE, which is to be *aim’d at* in Education. All other Considerations and Accomplishments are nothing in Comparison to this.” Franklin, *Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pennsylvania*, in *Papers* 3:397–420, with quotations from 419–290; reprinted in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 203–14.

17. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 78–79.
18. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 76–77.
19. Franklin admitted that politics usually devolves into the pursuit of self-interest, but he thought moving toward the common good would be possible if Christian benevolence replaced sectarian dogma and the humility of Jesus and Socrates replaced arrogance. The aptly named Michael Welfare, among the founders of the Protestant denomination known as the Dunkers, embodied those virtues for Franklin. “Calumniated” by other sects because they never published “the Articles of their Belief and the Rules of their Discipline,” the Dunkers resisted taking that step because, in Welfare’s words, they saw “that some Doctrines which we once esteemed Truths were Errors, and that others which we had esteemed Errors were real Truths.” With God’s help, “our Principles have been improving,” but the Dunkers feared that “if we should once print our Confession of Faith, we should feel ourselves as if bound and confin’d by it, and perhaps be unwilling to receive farther Improvement.” For Franklin, the Dunkers’ fallibilism pointed toward the political and cultural orientation he sought to advance. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 96–97.
20. “Manus haec inimica tyrannis / Ense petit placidam sub libertatae quietem,” *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 20, 1755; the quoted passages are drawn from Sidney’s *Discourses concerning Government*, ed. Thomas G. West (Indianapolis, 1990), 209, 205. On this incident, and on the role played by Sidney in Pennsylvania politics before 1760, see Alan Craig Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America* (Princeton, 1991), 231–36.

21. Franklin, *Plain Truth, and Form of the Association into which Numbers are daily entering, for the Defence of this City and Province—With Remarks on Each Paragraph*, in *Papers* 3:180–204, 205–11, reprinted in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 180–92, 193–99. See also Franklin’s own account of the process of forming the militia, and his role in it, in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 91–96. In the words of Edmund S. Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, 2002), 67, this “first exercise in state-making” showed “already the commonsense, democratic principles” that Franklin “would display nearly thirty years later” in his contributions to the writing of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
22. Franklin, “Appeal for the Hospital” (August 8, 1751), in *Papers* 4:150.
23. William Penn, “Some Account of the Province of Pennsylvania” (1681), in *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware, 1630–1707*, ed. Albert Cook Meyers (1912; New York, 1956), 208. Thomas Penn quoted in Bernard Bailyn, *The Origin of American Politics* (New York, 1967), 158; Anon. [Joseph Galloway], *A True and Impartial State of the Province of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1759), 38.
24. See, for example, Richard R. Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia, 2006); and Alan Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania* (Baltimore, 1994).
25. See A. G. Roeber, “Constitutions, Charity, and Liberalism by Default: Germany and the Anglo-American Tradition,” in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States*, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James Henretta (Cambridge, 2002), 73–90; Roeber, “‘The Origin of Whatever Is Not English among Us’: The Dutch-speaking and German-speaking Peoples of Colonial British America,” in *Strangers Within the Realm:*

Cultural Margins of the First British Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill, 1991), 220–83; and Roeber, *Palatines, Liberty, and Property: German Lutherans in Colonial British America* (Baltimore, 1993). See also Martin Lodge, “The Crisis of the Churches in the Middle Colonies, 1720–1750,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 95 (1971): 195–220; and Randall Balmer, *A Perfect Babble of Confusion: Dutch Religion and English Culture in the Middle Colonies* (New York, 1989); and Nina Reid Maroney, *Philadelphia’s Enlightenment, 1740–1800: Kingdom of Christ, Empire of Reason* (Westport, 2001).

26. Franklin, *Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, People of Countries, &c.*, in *Papers* 4:234; and *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 221. See also Franklin, *Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind*, 225–34; Houston’s introduction to *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, xxxii; and Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin*, 72–80.
27. Franklin, *Observations*, in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 217–21. In the first version of the essay, Franklin wrote that “every Slave” is “*by Nature* a Thief.” In the revised version of 1769, in which he omitted the slur against Germans, he altered “*by Nature*” to read “from the nature of slavery.” Franklin eventually admitted that slavery is morally wrong, yet he never emancipated his own slaves. See Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin*, 38–39, 304–14. I do not share the view that slavery represented simply an extreme form of the instrumental rationality characteristic of Enlightenment thinkers. Like the rejection of women’s equality, the acceptance of race-based slavery showed the limits of eighteenth-century conceptions of reason and the boundaries of the principles of autonomy and equality, not their hollowness. Women and nonwhites eventually won—to a still-limited degree—equal protection under the law not by repudiating those principles but by demanding that

they be extended to all people. For a contrary view, and a convincing argument concerning the widespread racism of many eighteenth-century thinkers, see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., *Race and the Enlightenment* (Oxford, 1997).

28. John Woolman, *Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes* (1754; New York, 1976); Anthony Benezet, *Epistle of Caution and Advice concerning the Buying and Keeping of Slaves* (Philadelphia, 1754). On early antislavery efforts, see David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York, 2006). Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 42, refers to the publication of Woolman's and Benezet's books in 1754 as "one of those rare moments in history when an ideological tectonic-plate shift occurred."
29. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 109. The Plan of Union is in *Papers* 5:374–91; it is reprinted in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 238–55. Cf. the discussions of the Albany Plan in Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin*, 80–92; and Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin*, 72–78. On the origins of the idea of a federal union in the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, three thinkers familiar to Franklin, see Alison Lacroix, *The Ideological Origins of Federalism* (Cambridge, 2010).
30. On Franklin in the international network of scientists, see Chaplin, *The First Scientific American*.
31. Franklin's letter to Benjamin Rush and Jonathan Potts, December 20, 1766, in *Papers* 13:530. The passage from *The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush* is quoted in Andrew Hook, "Scottish Thought and Culture in Early Philadelphia," in *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Princeton, 1990), 236–37.

32. Franklin, *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 139–42. On the depth of Franklin’s loyalism and the circuitous path that took him from being “the king’s man” to becoming a partisan of American independence, see Gordon Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 2004).
33. Franklin to Robert Livingston, July 22, 1783, in *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Henry A. Smith, vol. 9 (London, 1906), 59–73; the quotation is on 61. In a letter to Richard Morris, March 7, 1783, Franklin characterized Adams as “a certain mischievous madman” (*Writings* 9:17).
34. Wise has been a lightning rod for many historians. Cf. the balanced treatment of the different—albeit likewise self-consciously tough-minded—mid-century interpretations by Perry Miller and Raymond Stearns in Breen, *The Character of the Good Ruler*, 251–61; the crafty acknowledgment and dismissal of the significance of Wise’s *Vindication* in Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 141–43; and the tortured reading in Brendan McConville, *The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America*, 45–48. Seth Cotlar contends that Wise’s *Vindication* “marks the first time that an American publication deployed the term ‘democracy’ to characterize an aspect of colonial rule.” Although that claim is perhaps overstated, it signals Wise’s significance. Seth Cotlar, “Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland, 1750–1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 15.
35. John Wise, *A Vindication of the Government of New England Churches* (Boston, 1717), 33.
36. Wise, *A Vindication*, 33–35.

37. Wise, *A Vindication*, 36–39.
38. Wise, *A Vindication*, 46–51.
39. On Walpole and his critics, see Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783* (Oxford, 1989), 9–57. On *Cato's Letters* and *The Craftsman*, see Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge, MA, 1959); Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*; and Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics*, 40–52.
40. Many Americans resisted the appeal of Trenchard and Gordon not because of their politics but because of their lack of piety. See Mark A. Noll, *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Oxford, 2002), 61–63.
41. The unintended consequences of the Awakening are a central theme in Noll, *America's God*, 1–157. On the Awakening's international dimension, see Susan O'Brien, "A Transatlantic Community of Saints: The Great Awakening and the First Evangelical Network, 1735–1755," *American Historical Review* 91 (1986): 811–32.
42. Elisha Williams, *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants. A Seasonable Plea for the Liberty of Conscience and the Right of Private Judgment, in Matters of Religion, Without any Controul from human Authority* (Boston, 1744), reprinted in *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805*, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Indianapolis, 1991), 55, 62.
43. Williams, *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants*, 56–60.
44. Williams, *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants*, 57–58, 40, 93. According to John Dunn, Williams exemplified the distinctively American use of Locke's writings. "A sharper insight into the radical implications" of Locke's ideas "came with Elisha

Williams's anonymous pamphlet of 1744. In the emotional context of the Great Awakening, Locke's dignified intellectual insistence on autonomy of judgment becomes sharply radical" and "all the lineaments of authority were wrenched aside. Locke's notions of toleration were fused with a brilliant presentation of his theory of government, and a doctrine of startling originality appeared...When the cool epistemological individualism of the scholar's closet was fused with the insistent Puritan demand for emotional autonomy, the two became transmuted into a doctrine which in the radicalism of its immediate and self-conscious social vision could not have been conceived anywhere else in the eighteenth-century world." See Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America," in *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. John Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 73–74. The legitimacy of the people's chosen representatives—and the implicit illegitimacy of lawmakers not chosen by the people, such as Parliament in relation to the American colonists—was a standard theme of New Yorker William Livingston's *Independent Reflector* (1752–53), republished and edited by Milton M. Klein (Cambridge, MA, 1963).

45. *Independent Advertiser*, January 11 and February 8, 1748, quoted in Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, 88. On the question of whether England's North American colonies were becoming more Anglicized, as they became more tightly bound to the consumer goods they imported from England, or more Americanized, as they developed a self-conscious sense of themselves as a distinct people, the obvious answer seems to me "yes." Even as the more prosperous elements of the seaboard colonies showed signs of becoming more interested in, and better able to afford, the emblems of gentility associated with the English gentry, other colonists were chafing under the

greater inequality that such luxuries made increasingly evident. For an excellent discussion of the historiography on the issue of Anglicization, and a resolution of the problem that I find persuasive, see Jon Butler, *Becoming America*, 131–84, esp. 154. Now that evidence of a “consumer revolution” extends back as far as the early Renaissance, it may be time to retire the concept altogether and acknowledge that ever more people have been buying ever more things in the West for half a millennium now.

46. William Shirley to Lords of Trade, December 1, 1747, in *Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731–1760*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln, 2 vols. (New York, 1912), 1:418.
47. In the words of Robert Middlekauff, “by the middle of the eighteenth century the churches and the sects were well on their way towards a democratic Christianity—democratic in governance and spirit. Both religious governance and the evangelical and democratic attitudes of laymen, and frequently of clergy, profoundly affected the larger society—in a sense were embedded in that society. In these pre-Revolutionary years a congregational democracy formed in many of the churches whatever their formal structure. Nowhere in the colonies, not even in the colonies where the Church of England was established, did the English practice [enforcing tithes, selling avowdsons, buying presentations, renting pews] prevail.” In Middlekauff’s words, “The faith in individual autonomy that gave congregational democracy its being did not stop with religion: it made democrats as well as Christians and entered virtually all aspects of colonial American life.” Middlekauff, “Democracy in America before Tocqueville,” Harmsworth Lecture, Oxford University, 1997. On the uniqueness of the American combination of republicanism and Protestantism, see Noll, *America’s God*, 1–157.

48. George Whitefield, *Britain's Mercies, and Britain's Duties* (Boston, 1746), 10–11, 21. On the importance of anti-Catholicism as the factor uniting British colonists who otherwise might have remained locked in mutual distrust, see the overstated but indispensable study by Jonathan C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, 1994).
49. Charles Chauncy, *Civil Magistrates must be just, ruling in the Fear of God* (Boston, 1747), 53, 55, 33–34.
50. Jonathan Mayhew, *A Discourse concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers: With some Reflections on the Resistance made to King Charles I* (Boston, 1750), 29–30, 32, 39. This sermon has long been identified as one of the seminal statements of religious and political resistance in the colonies. It is the first selection in *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776*, vol. 1, 1750–1765, ed. Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, MA, 1965). Bailyn emphasizes its influence in his introduction to the pamphlets, 204–11, and in *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 52, 92–93, where he also notes Mayhew's reliance on the ideas of the liberal Anglican Bishop Benjamin Hoadly. For a spirited challenge to the influence of Mayhew's sermon and an incisive analysis of its roots in a longstanding Puritan tradition, see Chris Beneke, "The Critical Turn: Jonathan Mayhew, the British Empire, and the Idea of Resistance in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Boston," *Massachusetts Historical Review* 10 (2008): 23–56; and Mark Noll, *America's God*, 79–80. On the lingering loyalty to British monarchy, see the spirited—if clearly overstated, given the ultimate path Americans chose to take—

arguments in McConville, *The King's Three Faces*; and Eric Nelson, *The Royalist Revolution*.

51. It is not surprising that Jonathan Israel, who treats Spinoza as the fountainhead of Enlightenment and dismisses all theists as temporizers or champions of forms of Counter-Enlightenment, has little room in his multi-volume study for American thinkers. If all attempts to make the Enlightenment celebration of reason compatible with religious faith were incoherent, then—all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding—there was no American Enlightenment. As Henry May pointed out decades ago, the “skeptical Enlightenment” of Spinoza and Hume exerted almost no influence in America, whereas the “moderate Enlightenment” of Locke, Newton, Montesquieu, and the Scottish philosophers of common sense was of crucial importance.
52. See Knud Haakonssen, “Scottish Common Sense Realism,” in Fox and Kloppenberg, eds., *A Companion to American Thought*, 618–20; Norman Fiering, *Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context* (Chapel Hill, 1981); Mark Noll, “The Rise and Long Life of the Protestant Enlightenment in America,” in *Knowledge and Belief in America: Enlightenment Traditions and Modern Religious Thought*, ed. William M. Shea and Peter A. Huff (Cambridge, 1995), 88–124; and Mark Noll, *Princeton and the Republic, 1768–1822* (Princeton, 1989).
53. This discussion is indebted above all to the brilliant analysis in Noll, *America's God*, 31–157, which brings together an unrivaled number of specialized studies of American religion. On the role of Locke's Protestantism in shaping American responses to his work, see Jerome Huyler, *Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era* (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Joshua Foa Dienstag, “Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean

Sympathy in Early American Thought,” *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 497–511; and Dienstag, “Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders,” *Journal of Politics* 58 (1996): 985–1009.

54. When Adams entered Harvard, the class was ranked according to the eminence of each student’s family. Because Adams’s mother was a member of the Boylston family, he ranked near the middle of the class. His father’s lineage and the economic standing of his family would have placed him near the bottom of the class. Even though his father sold ten acres of land to finance John’s education, without a partial scholarship he would have been unable to attend Harvard.
55. Instead Adams was appalled, even as an adolescent, by Calvinist theology, which he later characterized as “Frigid.” Briant at times exchanged pulpits with Jonathan Mayhew, and Adams was powerfully drawn to their unorthodox version of Protestantism. John Adams to Nathan Webb, September 1, 1755, in *Papers of John Adams*, ed. Robert J. Taylor et al., 17 vols. to date (Cambridge, MA, 1977–), 1:1. Adams wrote that one of the ministers he met in Worcester told Adams “very civilly” that he “supposed that I took my faith on Trust from Dr. Mayhew.” See *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*, ed. L. H. Butterfield, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1962), 1:14–15. Adams later wrote to Jefferson that he had read and reread Mayhew’s *Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers* “till the Substance of it was incorporated into my Nature and indelibly engraved on my Memory.” John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, July 18, 1818, *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*, ed. Lester J. Cappon, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1959), 2:527.

56. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography*, 1:42–43; Adams to Samuel Quincy, April 22, 1761, in *Papers* 1:49.
57. See C. Bradley Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty* (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 7–8, on the Worcester reading club; and David McCullough, *John Adams* (New York, 2001), 38, on teaching.
58. Adams to Jonathan Sewall, February, 1760, in *Papers* 1:42. On the importance of Locke, see Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty*, 11–23; and John R. Howe, *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams* (Princeton, 1965), 16–17.
59. Draft of a letter from Adams to Jonathan Sewall, in *Diary and Autobiography* 1:123.
60. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:43.
61. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:117; John Adams, *The Earliest Diary of John Adams*, ed. L. H. Butterfield et al. (Cambridge, 1966), 66.
62. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:43.
63. Adams to Charles Cushing, April 1, 1756, in *Papers* 1:12.
64. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:25.
65. Adams, *Earliest Diary*, 71.
66. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:31.
67. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:222.
68. Adams was aware of his own vanity—and equally aware of others’ failures to achieve the humility that eluded him. See Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:22–24, 33–34, 37, 221–22.
69. Jefferson’s letter appears in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian Boyd, 41 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950–), 11:94.

70. In his diary entry dated “January 1759,” Adams resolved to allow “no Girl, no Gun, no Cards, no flutes, no Violins, no Dress, no Tobacco, no Laziness, decoy you from your Books.” He vowed to study “Roman, grecian, french, English Treatises of natural, civil, common, Statute Law” and achieve “an exact Knowledge of the Nature, End, and Means of Government” by studying “Seneca, Cicero, and all other good moral Writers,” including “Montesque, Bolinbroke, [illegible], &c. and all other good, civil Writers, &c” and internalize the choice of Hercules, a life of “Industry, temperance, and Honour.” See John Adams, *Revolutionary Writings, 1755–1775*, ed. Gordon S. Wood (New York, 2011), 36–37.
71. John Adams to Nathan Webb, October 12, 1755, in *Revolutionary Writings, 1755–1775*, 3–4.
72. Abigail Adams has been the subject of considerable attention in recent decades. Of the multiple studies that examine her as an embodiment of republican womanhood, as a proto-feminist, or—least convincing of all—as a shrewish wife and nagging mother, I have found most useful the powerful study by Edith Gelles, *Portia: The World of Abigail Adams* (Bloomington, 1992).
73. See Jill Lepore, *The Book of Ages: The Life and Opinions of Jane Franklin* (New York, 2013).
74. Rev. Mather Byles quoted in the fine study by Dana Comi, ““In the Shade of Solitude””; see especially 143, 19–58, 69–116. See also Kamensky, *Governing the Tongue*; and Laurel Ulrich, *Good Wives: Images and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern New England, 1650–1750* (New York, 1980).

75. John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 29, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, ed. L. H. Butterfield, 10 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1963), 1:316–17; and cf. the discussion of James Warren and his wife Mercy Otis Warren in Comi, ““In the Shade of Solitude,”” 171–72. On the broader themes of republican motherhood, to be addressed later in this chapter, see Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1980).
76. Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, December 11, 1773, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:89. See also Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 2007), 21–22, 59–60.
77. Abigail Adams to John Adams, November 27, 1775, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:329.
78. On these tenants’ revolts and the struggles between back country farmers and coastal or English landlords, see Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York, 2005) 3–8, 88–114.
79. *Boston Gazette*, May 5, 1760.
80. Adams to William Tudor, March 29, 1817, in *Works* 10:247–48; and Adams’s account of the writs of assistance case in *Diary and Autobiography* 3:276.
81. Samuel Sewall, *The Selling of Joseph* (Boston, 1700).
82. Sven Beckert, Katherine Stevens, et al., *Harvard and Slavery* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).
83. Only when one looks at the corrupt practices of British elections and patronage politics, or generalizes from the equally corrupt practices of many southern colonies, where an elite of white male slave holders managed to persuade a majority of less affluent white males to perpetuate their power, might one lose sight of the very different norms and

political practices of the middle and New England colonies and the more rough-edged but equally democratic politics characteristic of the backcountry.

84. James Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved* (Boston, 1764); and see Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 63–64; and Clark, *Language of Liberty*, 117–18. For the argument I am challenging here, an argument that I concede makes sense of British and southern politics, see Morgan, *Inventing the People*. Note in particular his portraits of corrupt electoral practices in England and America on 202–6; and cf. his concession on 146–47: “most of the evils which the commonwealthmen denounced did not exist in the colonies; most of the remedies they proposed were already in practice there. The sovereignty of the people in the colonies, insofar as it was embodied in representation, had not departed so far from fact as to induce the kind of protest evoked in England. And the fact that the representatives in most colonies (except Rhode Island and Connecticut [because there were no royal governors there, and the colonial assemblies ruled more or less without opposition]) were engaged in controversies with governors whom the people had no hand in choosing served only to heighten the representatives’ identity with the people who did choose *them*.” Much as I respect Morgan’s scholarship, I believe he is extrapolating from his brilliant and convincing argument concerning slaveholders’ hegemony in *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975) and applying that model to the colonies as a whole, even though he admits that pattern did not extend beyond the parts of the South dominated by big planters.
85. On the relation between English law and colonial law and the persistent tensions concerning the legitimacy of colonial courts and legislation in relation to Britain, see

Mary Sarah Bilder, *The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830* (Chapel Hill, 2005). On the relation between Otis's arguments and the changing conceptions of law in Britain and the colonies, see Bailyn, *Pamphlets* 1:446–66; and Jack P. Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 2011), 19–35. As Wood notes in *The Creation of the American Republic*, 264n8, 262–66, these are murky issues indeed.

86. See Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin*, 128–44.
87. Adams in *Boston Gazette*, August 29, 1763.
88. On the Stamp Act, see J. L. Bullion, *A Great and Necessary Measure: George Grenville and the Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763–1765* (Princeton, 1982); and on the colonial response, Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, 2nd ed. (1953; New York, 1963).
89. Otis, *Vindication of the British Colonies*, in Bailyn, *Pamphlets*; and cf. the discussion of Otis's *Vindication* in Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 78–79, 85, 186; and Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 292–95. As Bailyn points out in *Ideological Origins*, 204–6, Otis's reasoning owed a clear debt to Grotius's argument for natural law.
90. "If those now so considerable places are not represented," Otis observed, "they ought to be." See the discussion of this point in Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 168–69.
91. Daniel Dulany, *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies* (Boston, 1765), 7.

92. Jack P. Greene and John Phillip Reid consider this unresolved conflict over law, which only begins to come into focus in the 1760s and 1770, the most important cause of the American Revolution. See Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution*; and John Phillip Reid, *Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Law* (Madison, 1993). On Otis's admission that "it is our duty to submit" and the criticism that plea elicited, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 206–7. Although I believe their claims outrun their evidence, one of the strongest arguments in McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, and Nelson, *The Royalist Revolution*, concerns the depth of almost all North American colonists' sense of themselves as the king's loyal subjects, a self-conception that persisted until the outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1775.
93. Mayhew had remained embroiled in controversy after his 1750 sermon. From 1762 to 1764 he played a leading role in the controversy surrounding the efforts of the Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in America, a campaign that New England Puritans interpreted less as a mission to America's Indians than as a direct challenge to their own faith. New Englanders saw in the Society's activities an ominous signal that the Church of England was planning to plant episcopacy in America. Mayhew's ringing defenses of New England Congregationalism in defiance of the Society further enhanced his stature. On Mayhew's sermon on August 25, 1765, preached on the text "I would they were even cut off which trouble you, for brethren ye have been called unto liberty," and its consequences, see Bailyn, *Faces of Revolution*, 127–30. On Mayhew's earlier criticism of British authority, see note 44 above.

94. To a member of his congregation Mayhew confessed that he had been goaded into the sermon by his critics and that he wished he had never delivered it. For the remaining months of his life—Mayhew died on July 9, 1766—he worked to balance his intemperate defense of liberty against his abhorrence of anarchy and his concern for social order. Mayhew's letters to Hutchinson and Samuel Clarke are quoted in Bailyn, *Faces of Revolution*, 128–32.
95. Mayhew, *The Snare Broken: A Thanksgiving Discourse...* (Boston, 1766), reprinted in Sandoz, *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805*, 233–66; the quotations are from 247–49.
96. Mayhew's sermon vividly displayed his own inner conflict, versions of which were felt by countless New Englanders who cherished both liberty and law. It would be better, Mayhew concluded, "if one had wings like a dove," to "fly far away, and remain alone in the wilderness, where he might be at rest, than to live in a society where there is no order, no subordination; but anarchy and confusion reign." Mayhew, *The Snare Broken*, 258–59, 262–63.
97. For a concise and suggestive account of the forms of popular unrest of which the Stamp Act protests might be considered an example, see Edward Countryman, "Social Protest and the Revolutionary Movement, 1765–1776," in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Oxford, 1991), 184–97.
98. John Adams, *A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law*, in *Papers* 1:111.
99. Adams defended the erudite, liberty-loving founders of New England, who established "ecclesiastical and civil government, in direct opposition to the canon and feudal systems." Ridiculing the Puritans as ascetic killjoys, already a popular diversion, was but

“foppery and affectation.” By uncoupling religious from civil authority and establishing self-government in both domains, the Puritans had dismantled the “feudal inequalities and dependencies” that had sustained the “subordination” of the many by a handful of priests and aristocrats. Adams, *A Dissertation*, in *Papers* 1:113–16.

100. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 116.

101. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 120–121.

102. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 121.

103. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 123–24, 126. Adams’s celebration of the freedom of speech in New England, of course, overlooked the even longer tradition of silencing religious dissenters. On that tradition see Kamensky, *Governing the Tongue*.

104. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 122, 126–27.

105. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 128.

106. Adams, *A Dissertation*, 128. On how typical Adams’s use of Sidney was in comparison to other American writers in the mid-1760s, including Otis and Mayhew, see Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, 236–42.

107. John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, August 24, 1815, in *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 455; John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, February 13, 1818, in *Works* 10:282–83.

108. On the colonists’ blending of different traditions, see James T. Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,” *Journal of American History* 74, no. 1 (June 1987): 9–33, reprinted in Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 21–37, 183–92. The complaint about the incongruence of such multiple languages appears in Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” *Journal of American History* 79

(1992): 11–38. For my response to Rodgers, see Kloppenberg, “Premature Requiem: Republicanism in American History,” *The Virtues of Liberalism*, 59–70. For an earlier argument concerning the colonists’ reliance on a wide range of intellectual traditions, which often strike contemporary readers as inconsistent, see for example Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 7–8: “Mingled with their historical citations were repeated references to the natural-law writings of Enlightenment philosophers and the common-law writings of English jurists—both contributing to a more obviously rational, rather than an experiential, understanding of the nature of politics. And for those who continued to confront the world in religious terms the revelations of scripture and the mandates of covenant theology possessed a special force that scarcely contradicted but instead supplemented the knowledge about society reached through the use of history and reason. It seemed indeed to be a peculiar moment in history when all knowledge coincided, when classical antiquity, Christian theology, English empiricism, and European rationalism could all be linked. Thus Josiah Quincy, like other Americans, could without any sense of incongruity cite Rousseau, Plutarch, Blackstone, and a seventeenth-century Puritan all on the same page. However imprecise, confused, and eclectic the colonists’ gleanings from history and quotations from philosophers may seem to us, they represented to eighteenth-century Americans the experience and reason of the Western world. To most of the Revolutionaries there was no sense of incompatibility in their blending of history, rationalism, and scripture; all were mutually reinforcing ways of arriving at precepts about human and social behavior.” Wood concludes, “few American ministers saw any need to deny the Enlightenment for the sake of religion.”

109. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 1:263.

110. “Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their Representative” (1765), in Adams, *Papers* 1:137–39.
111. “Instructions of the Town of Braintree,” 138, 139–40.
112. On these issues cf. Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution*, 139–86; Reid, *The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution*, who describes the question of instructions in the colonial assemblies as a “riddle of customary practices” (103); Pole, *Political Representation*, 9–75, 277–78; Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 253, 362–69; and Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 98. Whereas Greene, Reid, Pole, and Wood emphasize the complex cultural transformation involved in the shifting and competing conceptions of representation being debated during these crucial years in Britain and North America, for Nash the building of the public gallery in Boston simply shows that “the genteel” now needed “the crowd,” an observation both accurate and inadequate for reasons made clear by the other authors.
113. Adams, “The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym,” no. 2, January 20, 1766, in *Papers* 1:164. Adams used much the same language writing in his diary on December 18, 1765; see *Diary* 1:263.
114. Adams, “The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym,” no. 2, 167–69, 163, 170; and no. 3, January 27, 1766, in *Papers* 1:170.
115. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 3:287.
116. The final sentence of Adams’s final essay as the Earl of Clarendon, January 27, 1766, rebukes his antagonist for “exploding the whole system of popular power with regard to the Americans.” Adams, *Papers* 1:170; and see also Steven Conway, “From Fellow-

Nationals to Foreigners: British Perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739–1782,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 59 (2002): 83–84.

117. Benjamin Franklin, Examination before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Commons (1766), in *Papers* 13:124–58; the quotation is from 153.
118. Franklin to Lord Kames, February 25, 1767, in *Papers* 14:62–70, and in *Autobiography*, ed. Houston, 281–85. This is the central argument of Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution*; and Reid, *The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution*.
119. Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, November 19, 1767, Thomas Hutchinson Letterbooks 26:215–19, Massachusetts Historical Society.
120. Thomas Gage to the Earl of Hillsborough, October 31, 1768, published in the *Providence Gazette and Country Journal*, April 29, 1769; *Georgia Gazette*, June 14, 1769; *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*, July 31, 1769.
121. Bernard Bailyn, in *The Origins of American Politics* (New York, 1968), notes repeatedly that English officials identified the colonists’ excessive “democracy” as the source of their unruliness, yet he denies just as often that the colonists themselves wanted democracy. Commitment to self-government and loyalty to George III coexisted uneasily during the decade from 1765 to 1775, but British officials’ perceptions were grounded in the reality of the colonial assemblies’ effective exercise of power rather than a paranoid or conspiratorial fantasy. When the colonists disputed the authority of Parliament, they did not turn to the authority of the king but to that of their own elected legislatures, which had been exercising effective power in the colonies for a period longer than the life of anyone alive in the 1760s and 1770s.

122. “Populus” [Samuel Adams], *Boston Gazette*, March 14, 1768.
123. Johnson’s report also suggests dimensions of popular activism less frequently addressed in more recent celebrations of the role of the crowd: an inclination toward racism and xenophobia that, like most colonists’ equally rabid anti-Catholicism, crossed the boundaries of class and region. William Johnston to the Earl of Dartmouth, November 4, 1772, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed. E. B. O’Callaghan (Albany, 1853), 8:314–17.
124. As Adams put it, in a “free Country” counsel “ought to be the very last thing that an accused Person should want,” and “every Lawyer must hold himself responsible not only to his Country, but to the highest and most infallible of all Trybunals.” Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 3:293.
125. Adams and Quincy reasoned that because the question of which soldiers fired the fatal shots could not be answered, reasonable doubt concerning individuals’ guilt meant that all the accused must be acquitted. Much has been made of Adams’s claim that the soldiers had been provoked by a “motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes and mulattoes, Irish teagues, and outlandish jack tarrs.” But the strategic calculation embedded in that characterization seems as clear as that of his invocation of the right to counsel. Adams and his allies understood the importance of distinguishing between the activities engineered by the Sons of Liberty and lawless acts of mob violence. As Samuel Adams had made clear, defending in public (as opposed to inciting) “mobs,” “confusions,” and “tumults” played into the hands of the British authorities and undercut the agitators’ credibility with their resentful but still mostly law-abiding fellow colonists. Adams, *Legal*

Papers of John Adams, ed. L. K. Wroth and H. B. Zobel, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1965), 3:266, 270.

126. Joseph Warren, *An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1772, At the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston; To commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770*, reprinted in the *Newsletter* of the Roxbury Latin School, October 2001, 14–18.
127. John Adams, “Notes for an Oration at Braintree,” in *Papers* 2:58. It is unknown whether Adams ever delivered the speech. On Adams’s debts to Harrington for his ideas about the relation between economic and political equality, see Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, 209–10.
128. Adams, “Notes for an Oration at Braintree,” 59, 57.
129. From the time that Queen Elizabeth granted Walter Raleigh the charter of Virginia, Adams argued, no English monarch had made a declaration concerning the extent of Parliament’s authority as audacious as Hutchinson’s. Adams compiled multiple examples to demonstrate “that the Colonies were not intended or considered to be within the Realm of England, though within the Allegiance of the English Crown.” If Parliament’s authority extended to the colonies, then those who fled religious persecution would not have been free of it, yet they established their own congregations in defiance of both Parliament and the Church of England. If the colonists’ own representative assemblies were not sovereign, then the “Charters would necessarily induce that Solecism in Politics *Imperium in Imperio*,” for two powers could not govern the same body. If Parliament controlled the colonies, then James I could not have declared that “America *was not annexed to the Realm*, and it was not fitting that Parliament should make laws for those Countries.” His son Charles I could not have denied England’s authority to regulate

fishing off the American coast, declaring as he did that “the Colonies were *without the Realm and Jurisdiction of Parliament*.” If Parliament’s power were supreme, Charles II would not have declared a revenue law valid in 1679 “*with the Consent of the General Assembly of Virginia*.” Finally, if Hutchinson’s claims for Parliament were accurate, then the Massachusetts charter would not specify that its people were to be governed “by Laws made by Persons in whose Elections they from Time to Time have a voice.” With his characteristic exhaustiveness, Adams was working to construct an iron-clad case against Parliament by piling up citations from English law, founding charters, and colonial practice. Adams, “Answer to His Excellency’s Speech at the Opening of the Session,” in *Papers* 1:324–25.

130. Adams, entry of April 30, 1771, in *Diary and Autobiography* 2:7.

131. Adams also pointed out that Hutchinson had quoted Edward Randolph, no friend of colonial presumptions, who had admitted in 1676 that “no Law is in Force or Esteem” in New England “but such as are made by the General Court,” and the magistrates of New England “reserve to themselves a Power to alter, evade and disannul any Law or Command, not agreeing with their Humour or the absolute Authority of their Government, acknowledging no Superior.” John Adams, “Answer to His Excellency’s Speech at the Opening of the Session,” in *Papers* 1:324–25.

132. Adams, “Answer to His Excellency’s Speech at the Opening of the Session,” 329.

133. Hutchinson had given Adams an irresistible opening by invoking the “Doctrine of Feudal Tenure.” Adams surveyed historical precedents from King John to King George, opinions of legal authorities from Coke to Blackstone, and the tradition of natural jurisprudence. He summed up his argument with a lengthy passage from Richard Hooker, “as quoted by

Mr. Locke,” to the effect that feudal claims to absolute authority are contrary to God’s will; legitimate authority comes only from popular consent. Adams, “Answer to His Excellency’s Speech at the Opening of the Session,” 332, 334–35.

134. See Conrad E. Wright, *Revolutionary Generation: Harvard Men and the Consequences of Independence* (Amherst, 2005).

135. Franklin, “The Colonist’s Advocate: VI, 29,” January 29, 1770, in *Papers* 17:47–48. The passage quoted is from Sidney, *Discourses*, chap. 3, sec. 8, p. 288.

136. Franklin quickly went on the attack, writing two satirical articles on the folly of British colonial policy. The first offered, in the words of its title, “Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One.” The blueprint was easy to follow: if current measures regulating—and stifling—colonial trade were allowed to stand, and if the colonists’ grievances were not addressed, Britain would soon find itself with no colonies left to govern. The second, “An Edict by the King of Prussia,” accomplished with the deftness of a rapier thrust what Adams sought to achieve through his lawyer-like bludgeoning of Hutchinson’s position. Franklin’s gambit was to suggest that the Prussian monarch had at least as good a case against England as England had against the colonies, and the colonies would be as fully justified in ignoring Parliament as the English would be were their Teutonic forbears to come seeking compensation for their unrewarded and unappreciated forays into the British Isles. Franklin, “An Edict by the King of Prussia,” September 22, 1773, in *Papers* 20:413–18.

137. See the brief but brilliant account of this chapter in Franklin’s life in Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin*, 139–51. Wood contends that this cathartic experience changed Franklin’s attitude toward England and America, and his sense of

himself, forever. When he returned to Philadelphia in the spring of 1775, he was estranged from the British Empire and committed to the cause of American independence.

138. Gouverneur Morris to John Penn, May 20, 1774, in *American Colonial Documents to 1776*, ed. Merrill Jensen, vol. 10 of *English Historical Documents* (London, 1955), 861–63. Cf. Nash’s account of this process of popular mobilization in *The Unknown American Revolution*, 91–103; and Wood’s quite different discussion in *The Creation of the American Republic*, 76–77: by the middle of the eighteenth century, Wood writes, “even in so stable a colony as Virginia,” the evidence indicates “that more and more groups, with more broadly based grievances and more deeply rooted interests than those of the dominating families, were seeking under the prodding of popular spokesmen a larger share in the wielding of political authority.” By shifting the focus of colonial politics from internal tensions to “the issue of British authority, the controversy with the mother country at first tended to obscure these developments and to drown out the quarrels Americans had among themselves. British policy and the Whig ideology worked in tandem to blur America’s internal jealousies, jealousies between North and South, between city and country, and [quoting Ambrose Serle’s 1776 observations concerning New York] ‘jealousies naturally arising from the variety of private interests in the Planter, the Merchant, and the mechanic.’ For a moment in 1774–76 the imperial contest absorbed and polarized the various differing groups as never before in the eighteenth century and made the Americans a remarkably united people.” Whether this process was driven primarily by class consciousness, as Nash contends, or by a combination of economic conflict, eroding family-based hierarchies under the pressure of colonial policy,

and Whig ideology, as Wood argues, seems to me impossible to determine conclusively. Instead economic, social, political, religious, and ideological factors were all at work, and they all worked against British authority. For a brief period, preexisting divisions and resentments seemed less significant than the threats represented by the Intolerable Acts.

139. The Quebec Act preserved the privileges of the Catholic Church, which inflamed the anti-Catholic sensibilities of Puritans, Quakers, Lutherans, and many other Protestants, especially those whose faith had been reinvigorated by the egalitarian thrust of the Great Awakening. The Quebec Act adopted French civil law, another sensible accommodation to Quebec's existing institutions that alarmed other English colonists. Now jury trials—not guaranteed by French law—might be in jeopardy: the Justice Act immunized British officials from local juries in Massachusetts. The Quebec Act stipulated that the colony be governed by appointed rather than elected officials, and it allocated to Quebec some of the territory in the old Northwest claimed by other colonies. John Adams later wrote that “the apprehension of Episcopacy” contributed “as much as any other cause, to arouse the attention, not only of the inquiring mind, but of the common people” in the 1760s and 1770s. Although by the early nineteenth century, Adams observed, few still acknowledged its power, the centrality of religious fervor in eighteenth-century public life “was a fact as certain as any in the history of North America.” The logic Adams described explains the colonists' reaction to the Quebec Act: “if parliament can erect dioceses and appoint bishops, they may introduce the whole hierarchy, establish tithes, forbid marriages and funerals, establish religions, forbid dissenters, make schism heresy, impose penalties extending to life and limb as well as to liberty and property.” John Adams to Jedediah Morse, December 2, 1815, in *Works* 10:185. The religious fervor

animating much colonial criticism of the Quebec Act is clear from the evidence amassed in Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832*, evidence neglected in most studies of the 1770s. If Clark's claim that the American Revolution was the last of the wars of religion is overstated, it is nevertheless a valuable corrective to the equally overstated claims of many historians that religious issues were of little significance in the 1770s. Writing about colonial reactions to the Quebec Act, Clark concludes, "The virulence and power of popular American anti-Catholicism is the suppressed theme of colonial history, and the studies which seriously address it are forgotten books" (273). For a valuable survey of these issues, see the range of interpretations offered by the contributors to Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., *Religion in a Revolutionary Age* (Charlottesville, 1994). Lutz, in *A Preface to American Political Theory*, 135–39, notes that the Bible was the single most widely cited book in the revolutionary era; that it was primarily through the writings and sermons of Protestant ministers that Locke became salient; and that the idea of natural law appealed to most eighteenth-century Americans precisely because they deemed it consistent with revelation.

140. *The American Journal of Ambrose Serle, Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776–1778*, ed. Edward H. Tatum Jr. (San Marino, 1940), 149–50.

141. Patrick Henry quoted in Nash, *The Unknown Revolution*, 90–91. On these developments and their significance, see David Ammerman, *In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774* (Charlottesville, 1974); Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (New York, 1972); Richard D. Brown, *Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts: The Boston Committee of Correspondence and the Towns*,

1772–1774 (Cambridge, MA, 1970); and Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1979).

142. Adams's "Novanglus" letters are in *Papers* 2:380.

143. Adams, *Papers* 2:328, 300.

144. Adams, *Papers* 2: 313, 319.

145. Adams, *Papers* 2:327, 323–24. For a persuasive argument that traces the entire controversy, and the ensuing struggle for independence, to exactly this issue, see Greene, *The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution*. According to Leonard and other Tories on both sides of the Atlantic, "There is no medium between absolute independence and subjection to the authority of parliament." If so, Adams conceded, then the colonies would indeed be "as fully convinced of their independence, their absolute independence, as they are of their own existence, and as fully determined to defend it at all hazards, as Great Britain is to defend her independence against foreign nations." But Adams rejected Leonard's premise. The colonies wanted only to continue making their own laws governing their internal affairs. They would happily allow Parliament to continue regulating colonial trade. Adams, *Papers* 2:335.

146. Adams quoted Locke: when men have entered into "society and civil government" and established laws "among themselves"—as the colonists had done for over a century—"those who set up force again, in opposition to the laws, do *rebellare*, that is, do bring back again the state of war, and are properly, rebels." Adams, *Papers* 2:292–93.

147. Adams, *Papers* 2:230–31; John Adams to Abigail Adams, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:131. Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty*, provides the

most detailed account of Adams's "Novanglus" essays, and much of my analysis parallels his. I do not, however, share his judgment that Adams invoked the idea of natural law rather than divine law, a distinction as difficult to sustain in Adams's writings as it is in Locke's *Second Treatise*.

148. One of the most poignant arguments in the essays of "Massachusettensis," concerning the all-but-certain anarchical consequences of the doctrines of equality and popular sovereignty, serves as the conclusion to Bernard Bailyn's brilliant *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 318-19. As Bailyn points out, the fears expressed by Leonard and other Tories such as the Anglican minister Jonathan Boucher echoed those issued long before by Filmer and other royalists, and they were given new life in the aftermath of the French Revolution, as we will see in chapter 12 below. As Bailyn makes clear, the arguments of Adams and others for democratic government never went unchallenged even at the height of revolutionary fervor in America.

149. Adams, *Papers* 2:287.

150. If Parliament's recklessness prompted the colonists to withdraw their consent from Britain's monarchy, they would again enter the state of nature. Adams understood that some colonists, including those discussed by Eric Nelson in *The Royalist Revolution*, looked to the King for relief from Parliament. But Adams explicitly denied Leonard's claim that the effect of the controversy was to "build up absolute monarchy in the colonies." Nelson first stated his provocative argument in "Patriot Royalism: The Stuart Monarchy in American Political Thought, 1769-1775," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 6, no. 4 (October 2011): 533-72. For responses to Nelson that I find persuasive, see Gordon S. Wood, "The Problem of Sovereignty," Pauline Maier, "Whigs

against Whigs against Whigs: The Imperial Debates of 1756–1776 Reconsidered,” and Daniel Hulsebosch, “The Plural Prerogative,” in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 6, no. 4 (October 2011): 573–87. Wood quotes the above passage from Adams’s “Novanglus” letters on 577n13. For Nelson’s reply to his critics, see 588–96.

151. Alexander Hamilton, “A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress, from the Calumnies of their Enemies,” December 15, 1774, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 27 vols., ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York, 1961–87), 1:47; Hamilton, “The Farmer Refuted,” February 23, 1775, in *Papers* 1:105. On this point see also Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson*, 58–59.

152. James Iredell, *Address to the Inhabitants of Great Britain* (n. p., 1774).

153. James Wilson, *Considerations on the Nature and the Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament* (1774), in *Collected Works of James Wilson*, ed. Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 2007), 1:3–31. Wilson drafted *Considerations* in 1768, but he chose to publish it in 1774, at the moment when his argument would resonate with those flowing from the pens of other colonial writers. See Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 350–51. Bailyn discusses Wilson’s argument, which he considers the culmination of a gradual transformation of colonial ideas concerning the indivisibility of sovereignty and the shift of its location from Parliament to the people, in *Ideological Origins*, 189–229.

154. Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin, March 13, 1768, in *Papers* 15:74–78.

155. The most thorough single-volume account of Jefferson’s life and thought remains Noble Cunningham, *In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson* (Baton Rouge, 1987). For a discussion of the myriad studies and interpretations of Jefferson, see Kloppenberg,

The Virtues of Liberalism, 38–51. On Sally Hemings, a slave who was Jefferson's deceased wife's half-sister and the mother of several of his children, and who was finally freed only after Jefferson's death by his daughter Martha (who was also Sally's niece), see Annette Gordon-Reed, *The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family* (New York, 2008).

156. The phrases quoted come from the best source on Jefferson's early life, his own "Autobiography, 1743–1790," completed in January of 1821, in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 3–18.
157. Jefferson, *A Summary View*, in *Writings*, 105–10. In his "Autobiography," Jefferson offered a slightly different version of his rationale, which resembled even more closely Adams's reasoning in his "Novanglus" essays: because the right to expatriation is grounded in natural law, "our emigration from England to this country gave her no more rights over us" than the emigrations of Danes and Saxons gave those nations sovereignty over England (9).
158. Jefferson, "Autobiography," 10.
159. Jefferson, "Autobiography," 118.
160. Jefferson denied flatly the king's claim to any land in America and proclaimed that "all the lands within the limits which any particular society has circumscribed around itself are assumed by that society," subject only to their decisions. As with other powers of the sovereign people, the choice is theirs. Thus it "may be done by themselves" directly, "assembled collectively," or done "by their legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority." But if they chose neither of these options, then "each individual of

the society may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will give him title.” Jefferson, “Autobiography,” 118–20.

161. In this case Jefferson’s public actions proved as good as his private words. After he returned from the Congress in Philadelphia that declared the colonies independent in the summer of 1776, his first priority was to undertake the revision of Virginia’s laws, and his first target was the law of primogeniture. Although it took a decade to complete, he judged this reform among his most significant achievements. The passage of commentary on Montesquieu from Jefferson’s commonplace book is quoted in Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, 204. See more generally *The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson: A Repertory of His Ideas on Government*, ed. Gilbert Chinard (Baltimore, 1926). On the consequences of Jefferson’s insistence on partible inheritance, see Holly Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: ‘Ancient Feudal Restraints’ and Revolutionary Reform,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 54, no. 2 (April 1997): 307; and her broader argument concerning the transformative effect of these changes in *By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority* (Chapel Hill, 2005).

162. Jefferson, “Autobiography,” 32. It is important to keep in mind, as historians from Joyce Appleby and Forrest McDonald to Eric Nelson have pointed out, that Jefferson was not opposed to property *per se*. To the contrary, his goal was to enable as many (white) people as possible to own as much property as possible. His quarrel was with a landed gentry that controlled political authority as a result of their economic power. He never questioned the legitimacy, necessity, or desirability of personal property. For evidence of the persistence of the romantic myth that Jefferson was a uniquely radical egalitarian

democrat, cf. Richard K. Matthews, *The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View* (Lawrence, KS, 1984); and Michael Hardt, “Jefferson and Democracy,” *American Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (March 2007): 41–78. On the differing practices of politics in the northern and southern colonies, see Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America*; and Morgan, *Inventing the People*, chap. 8. For illustrations of the difference between the political authority of the American and British gentry, see Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People*; and Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People: England 1783–1846* (Oxford, 2006).

163. See Jefferson, “Autobiography,” 5. Jefferson’s plea for Thomas Howell quoted in Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 116.
164. Jefferson, *A Summary View*, 115–16. See also Gary B. Nash and Graham Russell Gao Hodges, *Friends of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, and Agrippa Hall: A Tale of Three Patriots, Two Revolutions, and a Tragic Betrayal of Freedom in the New Nation* (New York, 2008); and on visitors’ descriptions of life on Mount Vernon and Monticello, see Butler, *Becoming America*, 145–49. Abigail Adams to John Adams, September 22, 1774, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:161–62.
165. On the role white Virginia Protestants played in justifying slavery by creating the category of “hereditary heathenism” to exclude Indians and blacks, see Rebecca Anne Goetz, *The Baptism of Early Virginia: How Christianity Created Race* (Baltimore, 2012).
166. *The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution: The Journal and Other Writings of Charles Woodmason*, ed., Richard J. Hooker (Chapel Hill, 1969), 240–41.
167. Jefferson, *A Summary View*, 122.

168. Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, August 3, 1771, in *Writings*, 740–45. A comparison with Jefferson’s much shorter list of recommended books on society and government, presented in his letter to John Norvell, dated June 14, 1807, in *Writings*, 1176–79, reveals substantial continuity: remaining are Locke, Sidney, Smith, and Hume (despite his anti-republican “heresies”); new are, among others, Priestley, Say, Chipman, and *The Federalist*.
169. On this point see note 108 above.
170. On the folly of trying to separate the liberal, republican, and Christian dimensions of American political thought during these years, see Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism*, 3–70. For evidence of Jefferson’s deep albeit unconventional Christianity, see his letter to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803, in *Writings*, 1122–26. See also his letter to John Adams after the death of Abigail Adams, November 13, 1818, in Cappon, *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 529, in which Jefferson wrote “that it is of some comfort to us both that the term is not very distant at which we are to deposit, in the same cerement, our sorrows and suffering bodies, and to ascend in essence to an ecstatic meeting with the friends we have loved and lost and whom we shall still love and never lose again.”
171. *Pietas et gratulario* (Boston, 1761).
172. On literacy in the colonies and the central role of the Bible, the book most often quoted during these years, see May, *The Enlightenment in America*, 35.

Chapter 7

1. The oft-cited reply of ninety-one-year-old Levi Preston to the questions posed by historian Mellen Chamberlain in 1842 is quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (New York, 1965), 212–13. Although “old men’s recollections so long after the event,” as Morison conceded, “are not regarded by historians as good sources of history,” Preston’s judgment rings true.
2. “The Interest of America,” *Freeman’s Journal, or New-Hampshire Gazette* (Portsmouth, NH); “Spartanus,” *New York Journal*, June 20, 1776, in *American Archives*, 4th ser., 6:994; *Maryland Gazette*, August 15, 1776; instructions to the delegates of Mecklenburg County to the North Carolina Constitutional Convention, November 1, 1776, in *The Colonial Records of North Carolina...* (Raleigh, 1886–90), 10:870a; *Providence Gazette*, August 9, 1777.
3. For a convincing argument establishing that “democracy” and “republic” were used interchangeably in the debates over state constitutions during the early stages of the war for independence, see Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era*, trans. Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber, 2nd ed. (1973; Lanham, MD, 2001). Most historians emphasize the prevalence of “republic” and downplay the use of “democracy”; see for example Seth Cotlar, “Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800,” and Adam I. P. Smith, “The ‘Fortunate Banner’: Languages of Democracy in the United States, c. 1848,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, and Ireland 1750–1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 13–27 and 28–39. Smith points out on 29n4 that the online

directory of newspapers in the Library of Congress lists only twenty-nine newspapers with “Democrat” in the title and 342 with the variations on the name “Republican” for the period from 1790–1820. By the 1830–1860 period, 1,465 publications used some version of “Democratic” in their titles and 1,039 “Republican.” There is no doubt that usage varied from popular to elite publications, that it varied from Britain to America, and that it changed over time. But I see no reason to question Adams’s argument concerning the usage of the word democracy during the middle years of the 1770s, when Americans were writing their own constitutions and debating their new forms of non-monarchical, non-aristocratic government.

4. Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, January 27, 1766; “Humphrey Ploughjogger” to Philanthrop, ante 5 January 1767; “U” to the *Boston Gazette*, July 18, 1763, in *The Papers of John Adams*, ed. Robert Taylor, 17 vols. to date (Cambridge, MA, 1977–) 1:167–68, 179, 71; and see the discussions of Adams as either the friend of the common man or an aspiring aristocrat in Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992), 27, 237–38. On George Hewes, see Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution* (Boston, 1999); and Alfred F. Young, “Revolution in Boston? Eight Propositions for Public History on the Freedom Trail,” *Public Historian* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 17–41.
5. Andrew Burnaby, *Travels through the Middle Settlements in North America...*, 2nd ed. (London, 1775), 86, 118, 122. A discussion of this account opens the fine essay by Michael A. McDonnell, “The Struggle Within: Colonial Politics on the Eve of Independence,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, ed. Edward Gray

and Jane Kamensky (New York, 2013), 103–20. John Adams, *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*, ed. Lyman H. Butterfield et al., 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1961), 2:107.

6. Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin, Journal of Negotiations in London, March 22, 1775, in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard Labaree et al., 41 vols. to date (New Haven, 1959–), 21:582–83. Compare the discussions of this incident in Gordon Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 2004), 147–51; and Edmund S. Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, 2002), 214–19. On July 5, 1775, in a draft of a letter addressed to his lifelong friend William Strahan, Franklin cleverly registered his disillusionment: “You are a Member of Parliament, and one of that Majority which has doomed my Country to Destruction. You have begun to burn our Towns, and murder our People. Look upon your Hands! They are stained with the Blood of your Relations! You and I were long Friends: You are now my Enemy, and I am, Yours, B. Franklin.” See Franklin, *Papers* 22:85. Franklin never mailed this celebrated letter, which he displayed to some of his Philadelphia friends only to convince them he had decisively renounced mother England. See Wood, *Americanization*, 155–58.
7. John Adams to Isaac Smith, June 1, 1776, in *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850–56), 9:584.
8. Adams to James Warren, June 1, 1776, in *Works* 9:339.
9. Adams, *Autobiography*, in *Works* 3:16.
10. Adams, *Autobiography*, in *Works* 3:45; Adams to Abigail Adams, May 17, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, ed. L. H. Butterfield et al., 12 vols. to date (Cambridge, MA, 1963–), 1:110.

11. Gordon Wood, in *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (1969; Chapel Hill, 1998), contends that Adams's *Thoughts on Government* was “the most influential pamphlet in the early constitution-writing period” (203). Although an aged and disgruntled Adams later made even more exaggerated claims for its significance, it did play a decisive role in shaping American constitutionalism. See *Diary and Autobiography*, 3:358; and for the context of its writing, 331–32.
12. John Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in Adams, *The Revolutionary Writings of John Adams*, ed. C. Bradley Thompson (Indianapolis, 2000), 293. Adams wrote, “In New England the Thoughts on Government will be disdained because they are not popular enough; in the Southern colonies they will be despised and dissected because too popular.”
13. Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776), in Paine, *Collected Writings*, ed. Eric Foner (New York, 1995), 52–53.
14. Paine, *Common Sense*, 12–15. On Paine's familiarity with Milton and Sidney, see Caroline Robbins, “The Lifelong Education of Thomas Paine (1737–1809): Some Reflections upon His Acquaintance among Books,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 127 (1983): 135–42. On the issue of Hebraic republicanism and its role in the rise of anti-monarchical republican exclusivism, a strand distinct from the classical republicanism that has been the focus of scholars for a generation, see Nathan R. Perl-Rosen, “The ‘Divine Right of Republics’: Hebraic Republicanism and the Debate over Kingless Government in Revolutionary America,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 66, no. 3 (July 2009): 535–64; and, on the sources upon which Paine and others

drew, Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Thought* (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

15. Paine, *Common Sense*, 17, 9.
16. Paine, *Common Sense*, 23. On Rush, who described America at about the same time as the “only asylum for liberty in the whole world,” see Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York, 1976), 113. On earlier and other contemporary uses of the trope that America represented a haven for lovers of freedom fleeing oppression in Europe, see Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1967), 138–43.
17. Paine, *Common Sense*, 35–36, 43.
18. Paine, *Common Sense*, 8–9.
19. Paine, *Common Sense*, 8–9. The most thorough accounts of Paine’s arguments and their significance for the American Revolution are Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America*; Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, 1990); A. O. Aldridge, *Tom Paine’s American Ideology* (Newark, 1984); D. A. Wilson, *Paine and Cobbett: The Transatlantic Connection* (Kingston and Montreal, 1988); and Sophia Rosenfeld, *Common Sense: A Political History* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 136–80, a persuasive argument that raises important questions about the arguments of Paine and his allies.
20. Paine, *Common Sense*, 33.
21. Paine, *Common Sense*, 33–34.
22. Paine knew that some critics of British colonial policy, such as Edmund Burke, had no interest in popular sovereignty but nevertheless thought the colonies were heading toward

independence. Paine had certainly read the *Political Disquisitions* (1774–75) of the Scottish writer James Burgh, whom he cited in *Common Sense*. He was familiar with both the Court and Country wings of Whig radicalism. He had experienced firsthand the mobs that gathered in support of John Wilkes. The principal focus of English dissidents, however, was either corruption—if their emphasis was political, like Bolingbroke’s and Trenchard and Gordon’s—or the need to extend religious toleration to dissenting sects of Christians. On these crosscurrents in British political discourse, see Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism*; Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle* (Cambridge, MA, 1968); David Lieberman, *The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 1989); James E. Bradley, *Religion, Revolution and English Radicalism: Nonconformity in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society* (Cambridge, MA, 1990); Shelley Burt, *Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England, 1688–1740* (Cambridge, 1992); and Roy Porter, *The Creation of the Modern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment* (New York, 2000).

23. James Chalmers, *Plain Truth*, in *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776*, ed. Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, MA, 1965), 2:64; see also Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 287n56.
24. “To the People of Pennsylvania—Letter VI,” signed “Cato,” *Pennsylvania Packet*, April 15, 1776, in *American Archives*, 4th ser., 5:545; Charles Inglis, *The True Interest of America impartially stated in certain strictures on a pamphlet intituled Common Sense* (Philadelphia, 1776), 53, vii.

25. Inglis, *The True Interest*, 34; Gouverneur Morris quoted in Foner, *Tom Paine*, 85. On the differences in tone between Paine and other American pamphleteers, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 12–17. The criticism of Paine as an upstart illustrates the persistence in the colonies of loyalty to the principle of hierarchy, and above all to the King. On this dimension of American culture, see Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776* (Chapel Hill, 2007), a reminder that not all colonists shared Paine's opposition to monarchy. But if McConville's principal argument concerning the depth and breadth of royalism were accurate, the revolution never would have occurred. On Paine's critics, see also Perl-Rosen, "The 'Divine Right of Republics,'" 555–60.
26. For a survey of responses to Paine's *Common Sense*, see Foner, *Tom Paine*, 71–106.
27. John Witherspoon, "The Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Men," a sermon preached at Princeton, New Jersey on May 17, 1776, and reprinted in Ellis Sandoz, ed., *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805* (Indianapolis, 1991), 533–58; see 538–39 on Paine.
28. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 3:333.
29. On Paine's *Age of Reason* and its hostile reception in the United States, see Foner, *Tom Paine*, 246–49; and see chapter 12 below.
30. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 3:333; Adams to Abigail Adams, March 19, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:362–64.
31. Paine, *Common Sense*, 6–7.
32. John Adams, "Notes for an Oration at Braintree," Spring 1772, in *Diary and Autobiography* 2:56–57.

33. Adams to Horatio Gates, March 23, 1776, in *Papers* 4:59; Adams to Patrick Henry, June 3, 1776, in *Papers* 4:234–35. On the Massachusetts Constitution and the suffrage Adams had in mind, see chapter 9 below.
34. See John Adams's entries for September 5–6, 1774, in *Diary and Autobiography* 2:122–26; and cf. Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 36–40, on the diverse processes by which the thirteen colonies selected their delegations to the Continental Congress.
35. Some prominent recent critics of American democracy, including both Edmund S. Morgan and Robert Dahl, consider the provision in the Constitution that stipulates equal representation of all states in the United States Senate antithetical to democracy. Although many contemporaries, including James Madison and James Wilson, shared that view, it is noteworthy that such criticism takes for granted the individualism that Ward and many of his contemporaries challenged. Cf. Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York:, 1988); and Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, 1989); and see chapter 9 below.
36. Adams, "Thought on Government," 288–89.
37. Adams to James Warren, May 12, 1776, in *Papers* 4:26.
38. Adams, "Thoughts on Government," 289–90.
39. Adams to Abigail Adams, June 4, 1777, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 2:255.
40. For example, Gary Nash, a harsh critic of Adams, describes Henry as "a man with deeply democratic sensibilities." See Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York, 2005), 202.

41. Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee, May 20, 1776, in *Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches*, ed. William Wirt Henry, 3 vols. (New York, 1891), 1:411; Richard Henry Lee to Charles Lee, June 29, 1776, in *The Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, ed. James Curtis Ballagh, 2 vols. (1911-14; New York, 1970), 1:2-3.
42. Carter Braxton, "An Address to the Convention of the Colony of the Ancient Dominion of Virginia on the subject of government in general, and recommending a particular form to their consideration. By a native of that colony" (Philadelphia, 1776), 6, 15; Carter Braxton to Landon Carter, April 14, 1776, in *Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789*, ed. Paul H. Smith et al., 26 vols. (Washington, 1976-2000), 3:520-23.
43. The argument that a democracy was distinguished from a republic during these years has a long lineage, and it is accepted by the most influential historians who have written on this subject. For their arguments, see Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 282-301; and Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 222-26. Bailyn's position is offered as the simple truth of the matter in the most recent study of these issues, Richard R. Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia, 2004), 305n29. I believe that both Bailyn and Wood, whose books remain the best overall treatments of the development of ideas during the revolutionary era, underestimate the democratic quality of representative democracy and follow those writers, ancient and modern, friends and foes, who equate democracy with direct democracy and see representative democracy as either defective or second-best. Both Bailyn and Wood stress the distance between 1776 and the arguments in favor of the United States Constitution advanced in *The Federalist*, which Bailyn praises for its "realism" and Wood characterizes as "the end of classical politics" and the beginning of

liberalism. See Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 301; Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 606. For reasons I make clear in chapters 9 and 10 below, I do not share those judgments of *The Federalist*; and for a formulation of these issues closer to my own, cf. Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 103–14. Wood himself seems to have sharpened his sense of the problematic nature of the distinction. See his fine discussion of the reasons for the strategic construction of the difference between “democracy” and “republic” in the 1790s by Federalists—at that stage intent on distancing themselves from their opponents, the Jeffersonians who applauded the French Revolution—and Wood’s conclusion that they knew that their own nation had emerged as a result of a democratic revolution: Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992), 229–35. Moreover, I think it is important to understand why Paine, Adams, and many of their contemporaries considered representative democracy the only appropriate and workable form of government for a republic grounded on popular sovereignty. Despite the very real differences between Paine and Adams, differences that became much more pronounced after the outbreak of the French Revolution and in the aftermath of the divisions that event spawned throughout the Atlantic world, in 1776 both Paine and Adams considered themselves champions of representative democracy.

Consider what purposes it serves to accept the argument that there was a distinction from the beginning between republic and democracy. To those on the political right, that distinction discredits those who claim the United States should be more egalitarian: the founders wanted a (hierarchical) republic, not a (radical) democracy. To those on the left, it shows why the United States is not more egalitarian: the founders simply did not trust

the people. Both judgments, however, rest on the projection back into the 1760s and 1770s of a distinction that developed only during the late 1780s and hardened into dogma as a result of the French Revolution. From the 1770s until the present, by contrast, it has been taken for granted among European commentators that the American Revolution was a democratic revolution.

44. On the origins of democracy in Rhode Island and Connecticut, see chapter 2 above.
45. *Providence Gazette*, August 9, 1777. See also the discussion of this article in Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 104–5; and the entire analysis in Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 3–255.
46. Jonathan Sewall to General Frederick Haldimand, May 30, 1775, in *Colonies to Nation, 1763–1789: A Documentary History of the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York, 1975), 266; Ambrose Serle to the Earl of Dartmouth, November 8, 1776, quoted in Jonathan C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, 1994), 204. This passage neatly encapsulates Clark’s principal claim: the American Revolution was the last of the wars of religion, and the anti-Catholicism of American Protestants was its driving force. Although exhaustively researched and vigorously argued, Clark’s case seems to me overstated. I agree that religion was a central issue, but I believe he exaggerates the role of anti-Catholicism. Important as it was, anti-Catholicism did not prevent Americans from seeking support from both Spain and France or from welcoming the considerable assistance of the French army and navy, without which the decisive battles of the war could not have been won.
47. Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775, in Adams, *Works* 9:358.

48. The fullest account of colonial political practice is Richard R. Beeman, *The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia, 2004). The appendices contain the most comprehensive evidence on voter qualifications; days in session of, and laws enacted and petitions received by, colonial assemblies; the number of assembly elections; and the average turnover of legislators. As Beeman acknowledges, the only generalization permitted by the data concerns the wide variety of political practices in the colonies. For the analysis of Anglo-American political culture informing Beeman's account, see Morgan, *Inventing the People*, which, as I have noted, seems to me unduly dismissive of the consequences of the idea of popular sovereignty in shaping American public life. On the shift from absolutism to a public sphere in which new critical perspectives fueled political engagement, an account that might make more sense for the transition of the colonies to the United States than it does for Europe, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (1962; Cambridge, MA, 1989). On the universality of the rule of law in the United States, see Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 259–305.
49. James Wilson, "Speech Delivered in the Convention for the Province of Pennsylvania, in January, 1775," in *Collected Works of James Wilson*, ed. Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 2007), 1:37; and Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View of the Rights of British America," in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 118. See also J. Franklin Jameson, "The Early Political Uses of the Word Convention," *American Historical Review* 3 (1897–98): 477–87. For a masterful discussion of this crucial issue, which has informed my account here, see Wood, *Creation*

of the American Republic, 310–43. Wood demonstrates, with a convincing array of evidence, that the constitutional convention “became an extraordinary constitution-making body that was considered to be something very different from and even superior to the ordinary legislature—all so rapidly and so suddenly that it is difficult to recapture its origins. It was perhaps inevitable that the Americans’ conventions of 1774–1775, as the instruments of revolution and constitution making, should have eventually assumed an unusual importance in their eyes” (318). Wood concludes that the reliance on constitutional conventions might properly be considered the “most distinctive institutional contribution” of the American Revolution to the traditions of politics in the western world (342). Cf. R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*, vol. 1, *The Challenge* (1959; Princeton, 1969), 214. The colonists’ experience with constitutional conventions during these decisive years provided the background necessary for the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

50. Although Vermont, which patterned its Constitution on Pennsylvania’s, and Georgia both adopted unicameral systems, both of them preserved much of the spirit and the function of an upper house through the institution of executive councils. See Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 226n41; and Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 80–81, 90–91.
51. [Democritus], “Loose Thoughts on Government,” Purdie’s *Virginia Gazette*, June 7, 1776, in *American Archives*, 4th ser., 6:731. Willi Paul Adams writes that “the special need to protect property, a need that had been cited in support of special property requirements for the constituency of senators, played an astonishingly small role in

arguments for a bicameral legislature” (264), a claim borne out by Adams’s detailed appendix showing the property qualifications stipulated in the first state constitutions and election laws. See Adams, *The First State Constitutions*, 315–27. Novanglus [John Adams], *Boston Gazette*, January 30, 1775, in Adams, *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, ed. Gordon S. Wood (New York, 2011), 406; and see Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 179; and Joyce Appleby, “Liberalism and the American Revolution,” *New England Quarterly* 49 (1976): 23.

52. Jefferson, “Draft Constitution of Virginia,” in *Writings*, 343, 338; Jefferson, *Autobiography, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York, 1944), in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian Boyd, 41 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950–), 1:363, 560. In his draft, Jefferson proposed prohibiting the slave trade, a clause the convention excised.
53. Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 1776, in *Writings*, 755–58. The scheme that Pendleton suggested to Jefferson actually became law in Maryland, which provided for senators to be selected by a special electoral college, an unusual idea that was to persist in the United States Constitution. See Ronald Hoffman, *A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland* (Baltimore, 1973). On this issue see also Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 202–26; and Jackson Turner Main, *The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763–1788* (Madison, 1967).
54. Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” 290. Even Morgan, who emphasizes the “fictional” nature of the idea of popular sovereignty, concedes that wherever a wealth criterion for the senate was proposed in this first wave of state constitutional conventions, it was rejected. See Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 250. The distinction between the houses was

understood to consist in the tighter linkages between the people and their representatives in the lower house and the broader, more general, horizons expected of those selected for the senate. Although the distinctions might have broken down, or perhaps never did operate as expected, the aim of most constitution writers during these years seems to have been consistent with the ideas of Adams and Jefferson concerning the purpose of the upper house.

55. Jefferson to Pendleton, August 26, 1776, in *Writings*, 755–58. For fine overviews of these constitutions, see Donald Lutz, *Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early Constitutions* (Baton Rouge, 1980); and Adams, *The First State Constitutions*.
56. A long line of historians has singled out the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 as a product of popular agitation and lamented its replacement in 1790 as a repudiation of the people's will. See for example Robert L. Brunhouse, *The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776–1790* (Harrisburg, 1942); Paul Selsam, *The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy* (New York, 1971); Foner, *Tom Paine*, 124–44; Steven Rosswurm, *Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and “Lower Sort” during the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1987); and, for a particularly spirited recent example, Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 189–94. Adams did oppose unicameralism as unworkable and unwise. Writing to James Warren, May 12, 1776, he criticized “crude, ignorant Notions of a Government by one Assembly”: Adams, *Papers* 4:181–83. But the frequently quoted phrase “absurd democratical notions” does not appear in the editions of Adams's *Papers* or *Works*.

57. Thomas Smith to Arthur St. Clair, August 22, 1776, in Arthur St. Clair, *The St. Clair Papers*, ed. William Henry Smith, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, 1882), 1:374.
58. Demophilus [George Bryan?], *The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon, or English Constitution* (Philadelphia, 1776), 17.
59. Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, May 19, 1777, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 27 vols. (New York, 1961–87), 1:255.
60. Salus Populi, “Salus Populi to the People of North-America: On the Different Kinds of Government,” in *American Archives*, 4th ser., 5:180; *Pennsylvania Journal*, March 13, 1776.
61. [James Cannon], *To the Several Battalions of Military Associators in the Province of Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, June 26, 1776. On the consequences of this appeal to the unitary voice of the common people against those with education, see Rosenfeld, *Common Sense*, 152–80.
62. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, in *Federal and State Constitutions...*, ed. Francis Newton Thorpe, 7 vols. (Washington, 1909), 5:3083.
63. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 3086.
64. *Journals of the Continental Congress*, ed. Worthington Chauncy Ford et al., 34 vols. (Washington, 1904–37): 4:358.
65. In his *Autobiography*, Adams gave several reasons for declining to draft the Declaration. See Adams, *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, 613–14. For Jefferson’s own bare-bones account of the events of June 1776, which resulted in his authorship of the first draft of the Declaration of Independence, see his *Autobiography*, in *Writings*, 13–18. On the details of his cooperation with the other members of the committee charged with

writing the Declaration, which also included Adams, Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert Livingston, see Noble Cunningham, *In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson* (Baton Rouge, 1987) 46–48; Julian Boyd, *The Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text* (Princeton, 1945); and Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time*, vol. 1, *Jefferson the Virginian* (Boston, 1948), 215–31. I have discussed the literature on Jefferson and the Declaration in *The Virtues of Liberalism*, 29–37, 41–45. For fuller accounts of the origins of Jefferson’s Declaration in the dozens of resolutions written in towns and by colonial assemblies during the spring and summer of 1776, see Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence* (New York, 1997); and on its short-term and longer term international significance, David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).

66. Jefferson, *Writings*, 1501.
67. Samuel West, “A Sermon Preached Before the Honorable Council, And the Honorable House of Representatives of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, in New-England,” May 29, 1776 (Boston, 1776), in *The Pulpit of the American Revolution*, ed. John Wingate Thornton (Boston, 1860), 279, 281.
68. *Act of the Assembly of Rhode-Island repealing an act entitled “an Act for the more effectual securing to his Majesty the allegiance of his Majesty’s subjects in this his Colony and Dominion of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations,”* in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 5:1215.
69. “Declaration by the Delegates of Maryland,” in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 6:1506.
70. “Declaration on the subject of the independence of Pennsylvania on the Crown of Great Britain,” in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 6:1506.

71. William Henry Drayton, “Judge Drayton’s Address to the Grand Jury at Charleston, South Carolina,” in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 5:1025.
72. Drayton, “Judge Drayton’s Address,” 1033; Cheraws District Grand Jury, in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 6:514–15; and see Maier, *American Scripture*, 93–94, 262n84–85.
73. For the resolutions from the Massachusetts towns of Topsfield, Palmer, and Wrentham, see *American Archives*, ser. 4, 6:704, 702, 700.
74. George Mason, “Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, May 27, 1776, in *The Papers of George Mason*, ed. Robert A. Rutland, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1970), 1:283. See also the final draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, in Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions* 7:4077; and James Wilson, *Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament* (1774), in *Works* 1:4.
75. See for example Jon Butler, *Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 243–44. The opposite case can be almost equally overstated. See for example Clark, *The Language of Liberty*, 110–12, for an argument that “the denominational context” of Calvinism was responsible for the importance of natural law in American political discourse. For a broad overview of these issues, see Martyn P. Thompson, “The History of Fundamental Law in Political Thought from the French Wars of Religion to the American Revolution,” *American Historical Review* 91 (1986): 1103–28.
76. Only much later did some Americans begin insisting, incoherently, that there is something illegitimate about government taxing “their” property. Such preposterous ideas were unknown in the eighteenth century, when property holders’ reliance on government to secure property rights seemed too obvious to be controversial. For a provocative

discussion of the difference between “inalienable” and “adventitious” rights, originating in Aristotle and confirmed by Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Blackstone, see Morton White, *The Philosophy of the American Revolution* (New York, 1978), 214–29. On the thorny question of whether Jefferson meant in his rough draft to bind the new nation to securing the ends of government (security and happiness) or merely protecting the rights of individuals, and the unanswerable question of whether the final draft altered Jefferson’s meaning or reflected his own ambivalence, see White, 250–56. Brilliant and illuminating as White’s analysis of Jefferson’s draft is, his judgment that Jefferson’s own draft was “superior” to the final draft because of its greater analytical clarity and persuasiveness is the judgment of a philosopher and a partisan, not a historian. Although I share White’s political preference for a government the purpose of which would be to “aid and abet men in attaining the ends proposed by God” rather than simply “making secure rights which have been given by God,” I have not seen evidence demonstrating that Jefferson shared that preference.

77. When the issue of slavery was raised in the debate over the Declaration of Independence, most northern delegates agreed not to antagonize southerners committed to its perpetuation. Jefferson’s rhetorical strategy in his draft pivoted on the pinnacle of indignation reached when he condemned George III for the greatest of all his crimes, waging “cruel war against human nature itself” by authorizing that “assemblage of horrors,” the slave trade. Later explaining why Congress deleted his condemnation of this “execrable commerce,” Jefferson pointed to Georgia and South Carolina, which depended on continuing the slave trade, and the “tender” feelings of “our northern brethren” who profited from shipping slaves, even though fewer owned slaves

themselves. He neglected to point out that his fellow Virginia slave owners were at least as likely to resist critiques of slavery as any other members of the Congress. Even so, for the rest of his life Jefferson professed unhappiness with the deletions Congress made in his draft, particularly those in which he had excoriated George III for the slave trade. He shared with Adams a fierce trust in his own judgment, both as a writer and as a political strategist. Jefferson's draft is available in the text of the Declaration of Independence that he included in his *Autobiography*. See Jefferson, *Writings*, 19–24, and 16–18 for his account of the drafting and revising of the Declaration. On Jefferson's owning of slaves while complaining about the slave trade, see the incisive analysis in Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 210–12. Nash points out how many Americans—including Abigail Adams, James Otis, Thomas Paine, Arthur Lee, George Mason, and John Laurens, among others—had commented on the incongruity of slave holders complaining about slavery long before Samuel Johnson's familiar quip about “the loudest yelps for liberty” coming from “the drivers of Negroes.”

78. Historians have disagreed about whether Jefferson was more indebted to the ideas of Thomas Reid, who considered the moral sense a rational faculty, or Francis Hutcheson. The evidence, particularly for Jefferson's state of mind in 1776, is both inconclusive and less important than the realization that Jefferson, like the other members of the Continental Congress, believed that popular decision-making would be guided—and must be governed—by a universal moral code. Cf. White, who emphasizes Thomas Reid's influence in *The Philosophy of the American Revolution*; and Garry Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (Garden City, 1978), who stresses Francis Hutcheson's ideas. Both draw on Jefferson's later writings to sustain

their arguments, but White's case for the rational intuitionism of Reid (and Kames) seems to me better grounded in the evidence from the period in which Jefferson wrote the Declaration. See also Julian Boyd, *The Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text as Shown in Facsimiles of Various Drafts by its Author* (Washington, 1943); Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976), 405–6; Ronald Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's *Inventing America*," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 36 (1979): 505–9; and Daniel Walker Howe, "European Sources of Political Ideas in Jeffersonian America," *Reviews in American History* 10 (1982): 28–44. Despite all that has been written on the Declaration, there remains no clear indication of Jefferson's own reasons for preferring the wording in his draft over that of the final version. On the editing of Jefferson's draft, see the detailed account in Maier, *American Scripture*, 99–153. Vanity is almost always offered to account for Adams's unhappiness with others' tinkering with his writing or underestimating his importance; that factor might have played a part in Jefferson's judgment of the Declaration as well.

79. The chaplain of the Massachusetts legislature, William Gordon, had admonished New Englanders at the dawn of the Revolution that a republican society of "comprehensive benevolence" could be constructed only by following God's will. Jacob Duch  assured a Philadelphia congregation that only a God-fearing republic would serve as "the eminent example of every divine and social virtue." William Gordon, *A Sermon Preached before the Honorable House of Representatives* (Watertown, 1765), 22; Jacob Duch , *The American Vine, a Sermon Preached in Christ-Church, Philadelphia, before the Honorable Continental Congress, July 20, 1775* (Philadelphia, 1775), 29.

80. Adams, "Thoughts on Government," 288, 292–93.
81. John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 2:28.
82. Benjamin Rush to John Adams, August 8, 1777, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, ed. L. H. Butterfield (Princeton, 1951), 1:152.
83. Samuel Adams to John Scollay, December 30, 1780, in *The Writings of Samuel Adams*, ed. Harry Alonzo Cushing, 4 vols. (1904–8; New York, 1968), 4:238; Samuel Adams to John Langdon, August 7, 1777, in *Writings* 3:403. See also Wood's detailed discussion of these themes in *The Creation of the American Republic*, 95–124.
84. Nine of the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention, including most notably James Madison, had degrees from the College of New Jersey. I discuss the relation between Witherspoon and Madison in chapter 9 below.
85. John Witherspoon, *The Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Man*, 1776, in Sandoz, *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805*, 544. Witherspoon acknowledged that such praise of New England might strike readers as an odd, even convenient compliment in light of the war being fought. But he noted that his praise of New Englanders' "invincible fortitude" was nothing new for him: this paragraph, he wrote, "is copied from a sermon on Psal. lxxiv, 22, prepared and preached in Scotland, in the month of August, 1758."
86. Witherspoon contended that virtue also paid rewards of another kind. "Habits of industry prevailing in a society, not only increase its wealth, as their immediate effect, but they prevent the introduction of many vices, and are intimately connected with sobriety and good morals." Witherspoon's sermon offered a classic formulation of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of productivity, if not capitalism: "Industry, therefore is a moral duty of the

greatest moment, absolutely necessary to national prosperity, and the sure way of obtaining the blessing of God.” His readers had already embarked on the project of taking control of their own governments. They should remember that obedience to God’s will “is as much a natural mean, as a meritorious cause, of the advantage we wish to reap from it.” The struggle for independence enforced frugality, and for that reason it “stands in the most immediate connexion [*sic*] both with virtuous industry, and active public spirit. Temperance in meals, moderation and decency in dress, furniture, and equipage, have, I think, generally been characteristics of a distinguished patriot. And when the same spirit pervades a people in general, they are fit for every duty.” Witherspoon, *The Dominion of Providence over the Passions of Man*, 545–58. On Witherspoon, see also Jeffry H. Morrison, *John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic* (Notre Dame, 2005); Thomas P. Miller, “Witherspoon, Blair and the Rhetoric of Civic Humanism,” and Peter J. Diamond, “Witherspoon, William Smith and the Scottish Philosophy in Revolutionary America,” in *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh, 1990), 101–14, 115–32; and Mark Noll, *America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 2002), 106–13.

87. Witherspoon’s counsel was multiplied countless times throughout the colonies. For a splendid survey of sermons delivered by ministers from a variety of Protestant denominations, all of whom linked God’s will with the colonists’ struggles against Britain, and the colonists’ virtue with God’s willingness to help them prevail, see those published between 1773 and 1781 by John Allen, Isaac Backus, Samuel Sherwood, Moses Mather, Abraham Keteltas, Jacob Cushing, Samuel Cooper, and Henry Cumings,

reprinted in Sandoz, *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805*, 301–72, 439–558, 607–82. For discussions of the historical literature on the role of religion in the American revolution, see James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 21–46.

88. Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, January 19, 1780; and March 20, 1780, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, 3:268, 310.
89. Benjamin Rush, “Of the Mode of Education,” in Rush, *Essays, Literary, Moral, and Philosophical* (Philadelphia, 1798), 8.
90. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 72n58, details the educational provisions of many of the new constitutions.
91. Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” 292.
92. John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, 73. See also Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (Cambridge, 2004), 209; and Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 182.
93. John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 14, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:381; John Adams to Patrick Henry, June 3, 1776, in *Papers* 4:235.
94. Abigail Adams to John Adams, March 31, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:370.
95. See Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 288–90; Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800* (Ithaca, 1980), 191–93; and Judith Apter Klinghoffer and Lois Elkis, ““The Petticoat Electors’: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776–1807,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 12 (1992), 159–93.

96. John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 14, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:397–98.
97. Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 27, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:397–98.
98. James Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, 2nd ed. (London, 1765), 5, 7.
99. Abigail Adams to John Adams, May 7, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:402.
100. Although John agreed, at Abigail’s insistence, to allow their daughter Nabby to study Latin, he cautioned that she should keep it quiet, “for it is scarcely reputable for young ladies to understand Latin and Greek.” John Adams to Abigail Adams 2nd (i.e., Nabby), April 18, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:388. Adams also encouraged, and took pride in, Abigail’s own wide reading. He wrote to her from Passy, France, on December 2, 1778, “Have you ever read J. J. Rousseau? If not, read him—your Cousin smith has him. What a Difference between him and Chesterfield, and even Voltaire? But he was too virtuous for the Age, and for Europe. I wish I could not say for another Country.” Adams, *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, 172–74. For the evolution of historical understandings of Abigail Adams, which began to change dramatically in the 1970s when American feminists declared her a “Founding Mother,” see Edith Gelles, *Portia: The World of Abigail Adams* (Bloomington, 1992), 9–11. See also Dana Comi, “‘In the Shade of Solitude’: The Mind of New England Women, 1630–1805” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2003), 180–88, 190–93.

101. Abigail Adams to John Adams, March 31, 1776, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 1:367; John Adams to Colonel Ward, January 8, 1810, Adams Papers, reel 118, Massachusetts Historical Society.
102. On this issue see Gelles, *Portia*, 47–48; Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1980); Norton, *Liberty's Daughters*; and Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early Republic* (Philadelphia, 2007).
103. See Nash, *The Unknown Revolution*, 216–32. Nash notes that most of the African Americans who took up arms in the war fought for the British, who had promised their freedom, against the Americans, who showed little interest in ending slavery. For the unifying effect that the war had on the town of Concord, Massachusetts, see Robert A. Gross, *The Minutemen and Their World*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2001), chap. 3. On the war and the army more generally, see Wayne E. Carp, *To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783* (Chapel Hill, 1984); and Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783* (Chapel Hill, 1979).
104. The social and economic history of the American Revolution, so long neglected, is now a central preoccupation of many American historians. For an up-to-date overview of the issues and references to the literature, see the essays in Edward G. Gray and Jane Kamensky, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution* (New York, 2013). Other valuable recent accounts include Nash, *Unruly Americans*; Carol Berkin, *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence* (New York, 2005); Casandra Pybus, *Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American*

Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty (Boston, 2006); Benjamin L. Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (New York, 2007); Terry Bouton, *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (New York, 2007); Douglas Edgerton, *Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America* (New York, 2009); Ray Raphael, *Founders: The People Who Brought You a Nation* (New York, 2009); T. H. Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People* (New York, 2010); Benjamin Irvin, *Clothed in Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People Out of Doors* (Oxford, 2011); Alfred F. Young, Gary B. Nash, and Ray Raphael, eds., *Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in the Making of a Nation* (New York, 2011); and Alan Gilbert, *Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence* (Chicago, 2012). On the attractiveness of neutrality during the Revolution, see Michael A. McDonnell, *The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 2007).

105. Louis Duportail's letter, Papers of Sir Henry Clinton, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, is quoted in John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed* (Ann Arbor, 2004), 20, 301n17.
106. Theophilus Parsons, *Result of the convention of delegates holden at Ipswich* (Newburyport, MA, 1778), 20, 11, 33. On Parsons and the *Essex Result*, and the broader transformation of which it was a part, see Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 216–21.

107. Diary entry, April 6, 1778, in Adams, *Diary and Autobiography* 2:296; John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 12 and December 2, 1778, in *Adams Family Correspondence* 3:9, 125.
108. Instructions of the people of Stoughton to their delegate to the state constitutional convention, in *The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents of the Massachusetts Convention of 1780*, ed. Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin (Cambridge, MA, 1966), 424–26.
109. Adams, *The Report of a Constitution, or Form of Government, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, in *Revolutionary Writings*, 297–322.
110. Adams, *Works* 4:216.
111. Adams's draft began by paraphrasing the preamble to Jefferson's Declaration: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting their property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." Note that Adams elevated "acquiring, possessing, and protecting" property to the status of an "unalienable" right, which Jefferson had not done in the Declaration of Independence. That right, however, like all rights as understood by Adams and all good republicans, was circumscribed by duties: Adams stressed the necessity of collecting taxes from citizens to pay for the crucial services government must provide. When Adams wrote that not merely pursuing but "obtaining" both "safety and happiness" likewise stands among men's unalienable rights, he advanced a surprisingly ambitious claim—especially for someone as temperamentally pessimistic as Adams—concerning the possibilities of self-government.

Adams also declared religious observance an obligation of all citizens: “It is the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe.” But no one should be penalized “for worshipping GOD in the manner most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience” so long as he does “not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.” Given the traditions of religious intolerance in Massachusetts, that constituted a dramatic step. Adams judged religious faith indispensable because “good morals” are “necessary to the preservation of civil society,” and he believed that “the knowledge and belief of the being of GOD” provides “the only true foundation of morality.” For that reason the legislature should provide, at public expense, “a suitable support for the public worship of GOD” and for “the teachers of religion and morals.” But Adams also thought that all Massachusetts taxpayers should be able to direct their taxes to their own religious denomination, a novel means of institutionalizing religious pluralism in a culture notorious for its zeal in enforcing conformity. Although Adams’s commitment to the centrality of religion as the glue holding society together never wavered, his willingness to entertain—even facilitate—religious diversity showed how far he had traveled from the strict Calvinism that had troubled him in his youth. Most members of the convention were not persuaded by Adams’s latitudinarianism or by his arguments for broadening forms of religious observance. They inserted a provision for the state support, by tax revenues, of Congregationalism, which was not disestablished until 1833.

Adams’s draft was fully consistent with Jefferson’s submission, on returning to Virginia after the Continental Congress, of a Bill to Establish Religious Freedom.

Jefferson reasoned, as did Locke and other theists of the Enlightenment, that the conscience cannot be coerced, and that enforced religious observance is futile and counterproductive. The struggle for religious freedom required a lengthy campaign in Virginia, where Anglicanism had been the established religion since the founding of the colony, and came to fruition only in 1786. When the statute finally passed, it began with the telling words “Whereas Almighty God...” Adams’s and Jefferson’s experiences make clear that the attempt to establish the principle of religious tolerance met serious obstacles throughout the new nation. It made progress, when and where it did, within the context of a deep, wide, and continuing commitment to the centrality of religious faith. Although disputes persist concerning the number of Americans who were formally affiliated with particular congregations in the late eighteenth century, belief in the existence of God was taken for granted by the vast majority. Religious faith was rarely considered simply one option alongside agnosticism or atheism, both of which remained anathema in the new nation, as Tom Paine was to learn when he returned to America from Europe in 1802. Adams, *The Report of a Constitution*, 297–322; and see Jefferson, “A Bill to Establish Religious Freedom,” in *Writings*, 346–48.

112. *Independent Chronicle* (Boston), June 11, 1778; Ezra Stiles, *The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor* (New Haven, 1783), 21; William Hornby, *Gazette of the State of South Carolina* (Charleston), July 17, 1784; Christopher Gadsden, *The Writings of Christopher Gadsden, 1746–1805*, ed. Richard Walsh (Columbia, SC, 1966), 200–38. See also the fine overview in Rosemarie Zagarri, “Suffrage and Representation,” in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Green and J. R. Pole (Oxford, 1991), 648–53; and the discussions in Pole, *Political Representation*, esp. 277–

79 on the logic of the two models; Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 162–67; Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 210–62; and Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 162–96, which remains unsurpassed.

113. *Address of the Inhabitants of Grafton County*, in *Documents and Records relating to the State of New Hampshire*, ed. Nathaniel Bouton (Concord, NH, 1874), 10:233.

114. [William Whiting], *An Address to the Inhabitants of the County of Berkshire...* (Hartford, 1778), 24–27.

115. That understanding also lay behind the arguments of influential proponents of the United States Constitution, such as James Wilson and James Madison, at the Constitutional Convention and during the debates over ratification. See chapters 8 and 9 below.

116. On this point cf. Robert Brown, *Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts* (Ithaca, 1955); Michael Zuckerman, “The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 25 (1968): 523–44; John Murrin’s review essay on the controversy in *History and Theory* 11 (1972): 226–75; and cf. the discussion of the Constitution as “Betrayal in Massachusetts” in Nash, *The Unknown Revolution*, 290–305. Clearly it matters whether one is looking at the eligibility of voters from the perspective of 1780 or from the perspective of the late twentieth century. If the eligibility rate for voters in Massachusetts was 80% of white male adults, is that a lot or a little at a time when fewer than 10% could vote in the highly touted republic of Geneva and fewer than 20% could vote in England? Does it affect our judgment of the colonies’ democratic quality when we know that fewer than 10% of eligible voters in South Carolina, fewer than 25% in New England, and fewer than 40% in Virginia bothered to cast ballots in colonial elections? The idea of democracy remained new, and the power of

deference remained great, throughout the eighteenth century, although there is evidence of increasing participation and increasing turnover among representatives later in the century. For judicious discussions of these issues, see Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 198–200; Bernard Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York, 1968), 107–24; and Zagari, “Suffrage and Representation.” For the data, see Jack P. Greene, “Legislative Turnover in British America, 1696–1775: A Quantitative Analysis,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 38 (1981): 446–48; Butler, *Becoming America*, 90–98; David Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1989), 815; and Beeman, *Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America*, 54, especially the table that shows the number of representatives and the ratio of representatives to adult white men in each of the thirteen colonies in 1700, 1730, and 1770. In his appendices Beeman distills material from many sources to present data for all thirteen colonies on a wide range of issues, including qualifications for voting, participation in elections, legislative activity, and turnover rates.

117. On the large scholarly literature surrounding this transformation, see Pole, *Political Representation*, 277–79; and Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 184–85n42.

118. In light of the furor over the means of representing small towns, Adams necessarily addressed the mechanics of apportionment. In order “to provide for a representation of the citizens of this commonwealth, founded upon the principle of equality, every corporate town, containing one hundred and fifty ratable polls, may elect one representative.” Because the category “ratable polls” included men from sixteen to twenty one as well as many of those with little or no property who nevertheless paid taxes, many of those not eligible to vote were nevertheless included for purposes of

determining representation. Smaller towns would “associate” with larger towns so that their citizens’ views might be heard. Adams intended to reassure residents of the state’s many villages that they would thus be actually rather than virtually represented, but protests had already been lodged against this existing practice, and it would continue to attract criticism. Towns twice as large were to have two representatives, and so it would go until eventually the size of the house became “unwieldy” and reapportionment became necessary. Forty senators would be elected by different districts, to be determined by legislation and population, consistent with the conviction that Adams shared with many of his contemporaries: members of the upper house should provide a broader view than those chosen for the lower house.

119. Thus not the wealth of individuals but of communities was to determine the allocation of Senate seats. The convention stated the principle clearly enough: “The House of Representatives is intended as the Representatives of the Persons, and the Senate of the property of the Common Wealth.” Massachusetts Constitution, part 2, section 2, article 1, in *Popular Sources*, ed. Handlin and Handlin, 437; and cf. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 218; Pole, *Political Representation*, 342; and Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 238–40.

120. Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, in *Writings*, 245–46. This fascinating document, the only book Jefferson ever wrote, is discussed in detail below.

121. James Madison to Caleb Wallace, August 23, 1785, in Madison, *Writings*, ed. Jack Rakove (New York, 1999), 39–47.

122. Samuel Chase, *Maryland Journal*, February 9, February 13, 1787.

123. Arthur St. Clair, *Pennsylvania Journal*, February 14, 1784; see the discussion of this transformation in Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 249–50; and Adams, *The First American Constitutions*, 176–78, 260–64.
124. “Resolutions Passed at a Meeting in the State House, Philadelphia Pa., *Journal*, Oct. 22, Nov. 13, 1776,” *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 23, 1776, in *American Archives*, ser. 4, 2:1149–50.
125. See chapters 10 and 11 below; and cf. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*; Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 236–37; J. Paul Selsam and Joseph G. Rayback, “French Comment on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 76 (1952): 324; and Joyce Appleby, “America as a Model for the Radical French Reformers of 1789,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 28 (1971): 267–86.
126. Benjamin Rush, *Observations Upon the Present Government of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1777), 9.
127. William Gordon proposed a change in nomenclature to signal the shift. Since “the Senate will be as much a representative body” as the lower house, that chamber should no longer be designated “the House of *Representatives*” but instead the “House of Assembly.” William Gordon, *Continental Journal* (Boston), April 9, 1778.
128. Samuel Cooper, *A Sermon on the Day of the Commencement of the Constitution*, in Sandoz, *Political Sermons*, 631–35; and see Perl-Rosen, “The ‘Divine Right of Republics.’”
129. Reason and revelation provided the armature around which Cooper wrapped arguments from Voltaire on republics failed (Genoa) and flourishing (Switzerland), and from

Chatham, Burke, and other English critics on America's glorious ascent from the ashes of Britain's disastrous colonial policies. Cooper, *A Sermon on the Day of the Commencement of the Constitution*, 637, 639; and cf. the discussion of Sidney in chapter 5 above.

130. The grandeur of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, now often proclaimed the longest-lived constitution still in effect anywhere, would be enhanced if its origins were less murky. Stephen E. Patterson, *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts* (Madison, 1973); Marc W. Kruman, *Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Ronald M. Peters, *The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact* (Amherst, 1978); and Adams, *The First American Constitutions*.
131. Cooper drew on Montesquieu as well as Locke, Sidney, and Milton: "Virtue is the spirit of a republic; for where all power is derived from the people, all depends on their good disposition." The architecture of the new state reflected the wisdom of countless republicans from the prophets of the Hebrew Bible to those of the Enlightenment. If the people "are impious, factious, and selfish," Cooper warned, "if they are abandoned to idleness, dissipation, luxury, and extravagance; if they are lost to the fear of God, and the love of their country, all is lost." Earlier republics had followed the path of Rome. A thirst for glory impelled them to expand; at home they had decayed. The American republic, by contrast, would resist the lure of empire and focus instead on making their new nation "a seat of knowledge and liberty, of agriculture, commerce, and arts, and what is more important than all, of Christian piety and virtue." Cooper observed that his generation had the chance to compare the experience of other republics and other writers

and choose “for ourselves, unencumbered with the pretensions of royal heirs, or lordly peers, of feudal rights, or ecclesiastical authority,” the form of government that we “judge most conducive to our own security and order, liberty and happiness.” As Adams observed, most people in history had found themselves bound by their circumstances, but Americans, Cooper wrote, “though surrounded by the flames of war,” nevertheless enjoyed the precious opportunity of “deliberating and deciding upon this most interesting of all human affairs with calmness and freedom.” Having now “framed the constitution under which you choose to live,” his contemporaries in Massachusetts would henceforth be “subject to no laws, by which you do not consent to bind yourselves.” Like the ancient Hebrews in Jeremiah’s account, all of their government officials—including their “Nobles” in the senate and their governor—“shall be of themselves” and “shall proceed from the midst of them.” Cooper also shared the awareness that Americans enjoyed an unprecedented and unparalleled opportunity. Uncannily echoing Adams’s own sense of the moment and suggesting how widespread it was, Cooper observed that British blunders had given the new nation “an inestimable opportunity,” one “rarely if ever” occurring in history, “to avail ourselves of the wisdom and experience of all past ages united with that of the present.” Cooper, *A Sermon on the Day of the Commencement of the Constitution*, 642–45, 647–48, 655.

132. On these changes, see Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 197–391; and Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, pt. 3.
133. Henry Cumings, “A Sermon Preached at Lexington on the 19th of April” (1781), in Sandoz, *Political Sermons*, 681.

134. See Arthur Zilversmit, *The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North* (Chicago, 1967); more generally, Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, 1983); David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, 1975); and Seymour Drescher, *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (Cambridge, 2009).
135. See Ruth Bogin, “‘Liberty Further Extended’: A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lemuel Haynes,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 40 (1983): 85–105; and John Saillant, *Black Puritan, Black Republican: The Life and Thought of Lemuel Haynes, 1753–1833* (Oxford, 1983).
136. [Benjamin Lincoln] “The Free Republican,” *Independent Chronicle*, November 24, 1785, to February 9, 1786; identified as Benjamin Lincoln in the copy of the *Boston Magazine* (in which the first six essays were initially published) in the Massachusetts Historical Society.
137. Benjamin Franklin, *A Comparison of the Conduct of the Ancient Jews and of the Anti-Federalists in the United States of America*, in *The Works of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Jared Sparks, 10 vols. (London, 1882), 5:168. On this issue, see William Michael Treanor, “The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” *Yale Law Journal* 94 (1985): 695–96; and on the Loyalists more generally, see Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York, 2011).
138. When General Cornwallis surrendered to Washington’s army at Yorktown, one of the tunes said to be played was “The World Turned Upside Down,” which dated from the

Levellers' agitation in 1646. Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (1972; London, 1975), 380.

139. There has been much discussion of the idea of public sphere since Jürgen Habermas first articulated the concept in his analysis of the Enlightenment in the 1960s. See Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), which includes Habermas's response to critics who accused him of ignoring the dynamics of power and exclusion; Douglas Kellner, "Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy," in *Perspectives on Habermas*, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago, 2000), 259–88; Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism*, 82–99; and John L. Brooke, "Consent, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere in the Age of Revolution and the Early American Republic," in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic*, ed. Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher (Chapel Hill, 2004), 207–50.
140. See the discussion of Franklin's 1785 warning in Edmund S. Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, 2002), 307–8. For other warnings coming from Ezra Stiles in Connecticut and Benjamin Rush in Pennsylvania, see Noll, *America's God*, 64–65. For a particularly pointed argument on the overall significance of religious convictions in the American Revolution, and the reasons why historians have lost sight of it, see Clark, *The Language of Liberty*, 389–90. As I have noted, I consider Clark's overall argument overstated, but his reminder that those who fought the Revolution were overwhelmingly religious is accurate and important. See also Kloppenberg, *Virtues of Liberalism*, 38–46, for more detailed discussion of these issues in relation to the historiography on religion and the American Revolution.

141. [John Adams], “Letters from a Distinguished American,” no. 9, July 1780, in *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, 372.
142. Condorcet, *Oeuvres du Marquis de Condorcet*, ed. A. Condorcet O’Connor and M. F. Arago, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (Paris, 1847–49), 3:420.

Chapter 8

1. *Pennsylvania Packet*, October 14, 1786.
2. See Barbara Clark Smith, “Food Rioters and the American Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 51 (January 1994): 3–38; Kevin Kenney, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experiment* (New York, 2009); Terry Bouton, *Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (New York, 2007); Woody Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution* (New York, 2007); Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820* (Chapel Hill, 1990); Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill, 1982); and Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, *Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861*, rev. ed. (1947; Cambridge, MA, 1969).
3. William Findley in *Debates and Proceedings of the General Assembly, on the Memorial Praying a Repeal or Suspension of the Law Annuling the Charter of the Bank*, ed. Matthew Carey (Philadelphia, 1786), 129, 123. See also John Caldwell, *William Findley from West of the Mountains: A Politician in Pennsylvania, 1783–1791* (Gig Harbor, 2000); and Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 88–94. Despite the widespread reliance on credit in an era of scarce money, debt remained a sign of moral failure rather than adverse market conditions or bad luck in the eyes of many Americans. Bruce H. Mann, *Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), explains the protracted conflict between the traditional attitude toward debt, which treated

insolvency as a sign of wickedness or folly, and the slowly emerging view that finally culminated in bankruptcy laws for individuals as well as commercial institutions.

4. A population under fifty thousand generated two thousand cases at the same time in the Worcester County Court of Common Pleas; more people in the town of Springfield were in debt than were solvent. On conditions in Massachusetts, see Handlin and Handlin, *Commonwealth*, 3–50. For concise accounts of the reasons for and the consequences of the new nation’s economic challenges, see Stephen Mihm, “Funding the Revolution: Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Eighteenth-Century America,” and Terry Bouton, “The Trials of the Confederation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, ed. Edward Gray and Jane Kamensky (New York, 2013), 327–51, 370–87.
5. For vivid portraits presented from these varied perspectives, see Woody Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*, 3–176.
6. *Pennsylvania Packet*, October 14, 1786.
7. See Jürgen Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat: The Prehistory and Ratification of the American Constitution, 1787–1791*, ed. John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler (Charlottesville, 2012), 7–52; Richard Beeman, *Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia, 2004); Peter S. Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775–1787* (Philadelphia, 1983); and Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (1969; Chapel Hill, 1998), 257–467.
8. See Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York, 2011); and Philip Gould, *Writing the Rebellion: Loyalists and the Literature of Politics in British America* (New York, 2013).

9. See Max M. Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U. S. Constitution and the Making of the American State* (New York, 2003); and Peter S. Onuf, “Federalism, Democracy, and Liberty in the New American Nation,” in *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900*, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge, 2009), 132–59.
10. Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, September 11, 1779, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 27 vols. (New York, 1961–87), 166–67; and Hamilton, *The Continentalist* 6 (July 4, 1782), in *Papers* 3:103.
11. Thomas FitzSimons quoted in Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 166; and for the wider “rings of resistance” throughout Pennsylvania, see 145–67; Benjamin Hawkins to Richard Caswell, September 26, 1785, in *The State Records of North Carolina*, ed. Walter Clark, 30 vols. (Goldsboro, 1886–1914), 17:525; David Daggett, *An Oration Pronounced in the Brick Meeting-House, in the City of New-Haven, on the Fourth of July, A. D. 1787* (New Haven, 1787), 14. On the unrest of the 1780s more generally, compare Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*; and Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*; and on the ways in which courts administered local government, see David T. Konig, “Country Justice: The Rural Roots of Constitutionalism in Colonial Virginia,” in *An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the South*, ed. Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely (Athens, GA, 1989), 72–73; Richard E. Ellis, *The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic* (New York, 1971); and William Nelson, *Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830* (Cambridge, MA, 1975).

12. The most recent studies of Shays' Rebellion are David P. Szatmary, *Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection* (Amherst, 1980); and Leonard L. Richards, *Shays' Rebellion: The Revolution's Final Battle* (Philadelphia, 2002). On similar uprisings in rural Pennsylvania, see Terry Bouton, "A Road Closed: Rural Insurgency in Post-Revolutionary Pennsylvania," *Journal of American History* 87 (2000): 855–77; and Bouton, *Taming Democracy*.
13. George Richards Minot, *History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1810), 10, 21. See also Richards, *Shays' Rebellion*; and Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York, 2005), which contains an excellent discussion of these issues on 13–39, including the quotation from the anonymous farmer that appears on 31.
14. Thomas Dawes, Jr., *An Oration Delivered July 4, 1787, at the request of the inhabitants of the town of Boston, in celebration of the anniversary of American independence* (Boston, 1787). See also Stephen E. Patterson, "The Federalist Reaction to Shays Rebellion," in *In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion*, ed. Robert A. Gross (Charlottesville, 1993), 101–18.
15. James Wilson, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of America, with that Constitution prefixed, in which are unfolded, the principles of free government, and the superior advantages of republicanism demonstrated* (London, 1792), 68.
16. Henry Lee to Madison, October 19, 1786, in *Papers of James Madison*, 17 vols. (hereafter *PJM*), 9:144; Washington to Madison, November 5, 1786, *PJM* 9:174; William Grayson to Madison, November 22, 1786, *PJM* 9:231. Madison communicated his heightened anxiety in an extraordinary letter to Jefferson, a letter in which he

uncharacteristically signaled his alarm by encoding many of his words in cipher, which I will render in italics. Citing “credible information” indicating that people in the western regions of the country “*are already in great agitation and are taking measures for uniting their consultations,*” Madison predicted that the “*ambition of individuals will quickly mix itself with the original motives of resentment and interest,*” and eventually these dissidents would be in touch “*with their British neighbors.*” British agents were already plotting to multiply these isolated seditious and secessionist elements, he warned, and in that case Spain, then France, would not hesitate to join the international fracas haunting Madison’s dreams. Even though the Shaysites had been disarmed by the time Madison wrote, his fears had not abated. Madison to Jefferson, March 19, 1787, in James Madison, *Writings*, ed. Jack Rakove (New York, 1999), 66. It was not the first time Madison had resorted to code. On August 11, 1783, he had written a letter to Jefferson in which he masked the news that he had been jilted by a girlfriend. See *PJM* 7:268–69.

17. As Madison, Wilson, and many other Americans knew, Montesquieu had warned that all democracies disappear when the desire for wealth replaces virtue, and they worried that the United States would be only the latest in an endless series of popular governments to fail. For a comprehensive survey of the various forms of unrest during the mid–1780s, see Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*; and Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*. On Madison’s misgivings about the involvement of those with no experience in politics, see Gordon Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, ed. Richard Beeman et al. (Chapel Hill, 1987), 128–61. For a particularly pointed statement of these anxieties, see the first part of Madison’s letter to

Jefferson, August 12, 1786, in *Writings*, 52–59. In the closing paragraphs of that letter Madison tried to interest Jefferson in a land deal he and Monroe were cooking up on the Mohawk River in New York, a deal that Jefferson politely declined to accept. It is important to remember that, like James Wilson and Robert Morris, these Virginia planters were not only visionary statesmen but also ambitious businessmen. So too, it is important to remember, were many ordinary American farmers, who sought access to credit and went into debt to increase their land holdings. Not only the wealthiest Americans expected to profit from the greater prosperity they anticipated in an expanding economy. For a well-balanced discussion of this tension, see Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 215–25, 243–70.

18. See the discussion of Wilson's *Considerations* in chapter 6 above.
19. Standard accounts include Charles Page Smith, *James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742–1798* (Chapel Hill, 1956); and Mark David Hall, *The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742–1798* (Columbia, MO, 1997). On Wilson's debts to Thomas Reid in particular, see Sophia Rosenfeld, *Common Sense: A Political History* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 176–77. His writings are available in *Collected Works of James Wilson*, ed. Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 2007).
20. Wilson's home was located on the southwest corner of Third and Walnut. See John K. Alexander, "The Fort Wilson Incident of 1779," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 31 (October 1974): 589–612.
21. Criticism of Wilson as a greedy speculator only posing as a democrat began during Wilson's life and continued through the influential portraits of Charles Beard, Merrill Jensen, and more recent commentators such as Nash, *The Unknown American*

Revolution, 318–19; Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*, 197, 201, 211, 243; and Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 68–69, 172–85. For a concise survey of these critiques through the mid-1990s, see Hall, *The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson*, 34n70.

22. Aristotle, *Politics* 1296a7.

23. On Madison's years in Princeton, see the most detailed of many biographies, Irving Brandt, *James Madison*, 6 vols. (Indianapolis, 1941–61); and cf. the best of recent studies, Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic* (Ithaca, 1995). More recent biographies include Jack N. Rakove, *James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic*, 3rd ed. (New York, 2007); Jeff Broadbent, *James Madison: A Son of Virginia and a Founder of the Nation* (Chapel Hill, 2012); and Kevin R. C. Gutzman, *James Madison and the Making of America* (New York, 2012). On Witherspoon, see Jeffrey Morrison, *John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic* (Notre Dame, 2005); and Mark A. Noll, *Princeton and the Republic, 1768–1822: The Search for a Christian Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith* (Princeton, 1989). For Witherspoon's syllabus, see Dennis Thompson, "Bibliography: The Education of a Founding Father. The Reading List for John Witherspoon's Course in Political Theory, as Taken by James Madison," *Political Theory* 4 (November, 1976): 523–29. An ambitious study based in part on the lecture notes taken by Andrew S. Hunter, one of Witherspoon's students, in 1771–1772, Madison's final year in Princeton, is Seth Robinson, "Extending the Sphere of Influence: Scottish Philosophy, Formative Experience, and James Madison's *Federalist* 10" (Unpub. senior honors essay, Harvard University, 2006).

24. Madison to William Bradford, January 24, 1774, in *Writings*, 5–6, 7; Madison to William Bradford, September 25, 1773, in *PJM* 1:96; Madison to William Bradford, April 1, 1774, in *Writings*, 8, 9. On Witherspoon's engagement with Locke's *Essay on Toleration*, which Madison read at Princeton, see also James H. Nichols, "John Witherspoon on Church and State," *Journal of Presbyterian History* 42 (1964): 166–74.
25. Madison to Bradford, July 28, 1775, in *PJM* 1:161. On the militia in Orange County, see Charles Lowery, *James Barbour: A Jeffersonian Republican* (University, AL, 1964), 4; and Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 82–84. On the relation between religious dissent and the emergence of a stern republican political ethic in Virginia, see Rhys Isaac, "Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the Religious Order in Virginia, 1765–1775," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 31 (1974): 345–68; Isaac, "Preachers and Patriots: Popular Culture and the Revolution in Virginia," in *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*, ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb, 1976), 125–56; Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill, 1982); and see the discussion of deference in chapter 7 above.
26. See the discussion of the Virginia Constitution in chapter 7 above.
27. When Jefferson returned from the Continental Congress to participate in the Virginia debates, he joined with Madison and Henry in the campaign to remove the remaining powers of the state to license preachers and the continuing reliance on parishes to perform some civil functions. Jefferson took great pride in the bill he introduced in 1779, the Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, but not until the next decade did he and Madison succeed in achieving their goal of securing religious freedom by separating church and state. The point of their campaign was not to remove religion from a

privileged sphere of secular politics. On the contrary, they aimed to prevent politics from interfering with—whether by authorizing and thereby contaminating the purity of, or by prohibiting and thereby inciting hatred of—the free exercise of religious belief. Madison’s amendment is in *Writings*, 10. See also the discussion of this debate in Banning, *Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 84–87; Thomas E. Buckley, S. J., *Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776–1787* (Charlottesville, 1977); and Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan, eds., *The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History* (Cambridge, 1988).

28. Madison to Randolph, January 22, 1783, in *PJM* 6:55.
29. On January 28, 1783, Madison delivered an address contrary to Virginia’s instructions and most delegates’ positions. Physically unimposing at just over five feet tall, the thirty-one-year-old Madison gave an arresting speech, which showed the analytical ability and earnestness that became his trademarks. If the individual states continued to make their own decisions about whether or not to fund the national government, Madison predicted, the United States would establish “our national independence on the ruins of public faith,” as should be clear to “every mind which retained either honesty or pride.” The nation could no longer continue to depend on the whim of state legislatures to pay its debts, particularly its debts to its soldiers. “The patience of the army has been equal to their bravery,” Madison concluded, “but that patience must have its limits.” The severity of the crisis was forcing Madison to reconsider the relation between a representative and those who sent him. Madison admitted that his “principles were extremely unfavorable to a disregard of the sense of constituents” who had instructed him how to vote. Though “the declared sense of constituents” should be taken as “a law in general to these

representatives, still there were occasions on which the latter ought to hazard personal consequences from a respect to what his clear conviction determines to be the true interest of the former.” Madison was right about his constituents, who did remain opposed, as did some the other delegates to the Congress, to a national system of taxes to fund the national debt. But the patience of the army did indeed prove limited. Only six months later, the ominous threat of unrest among unpaid members of the Continental Army forced Congress to move from Philadelphia to Princeton. Indispensable French funds and personnel had enabled the United States to defeat Britain militarily, but now its soldiers seemed ready to turn against their own government. Madison, “Notes on Debates,” January 28, 1783, in *PJM* 6:143–44, 146, 147. On the relation between these debates in Congress and the army’s resentments, and the wide range of interpretations historians have offered to make sense of these developments in light of the machinations of Morris and Hamilton, see Banning, *Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 29–39, 412–17, especially notes 77–108. On Britain, see John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1763* (New York, 1983). On the ways in which the demands of the fiscal-military state shaped the forming of the United States Constitution, see Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*; and on the Madisonian/Jeffersonian alternative to Hamilton’s vision, cf. Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, 1980); and Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville, 2000).

30. See Banning, *Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 88–91, whose account I follow here.

31. Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance” is in *Writings*, 29–36. Henry F. May contends, in *The Enlightenment in America*, 371n18–19, that Madison might have been the most

serious student of religion among those involved in shaping the United States Constitution. The same evangelical fervor that fueled the protests of Baptists and Methodists against assessment in Virginia manifested itself throughout the new nation. Petitioners in Massachusetts prefigured Madison's "Memorial," warning of the "Rivers of Blood which run from the Veins of Marters [*sic*]" when legislators presumed to regulate "religeous [*sic*] Society." For that protest from Ashby, Massachusetts, against the support of Congregational churches contained in the 1778 and 1780 Massachusetts Constitutions, see Handlin and Handlin, *The Popular Sources of Political Authority*, 634. On the relative decline of Anglican congregations and the explosion of Baptist and Methodist congregations during these years, see Stephen A. Marini, *Radical Sects of Revolutionary New England* (Cambridge, MA, 1982); and on the broader transformation of the religious landscape, Nathan O. Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven, 1989).

32. Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 30, 34.
33. Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 30–36. On the lasting significance of the "Memorial and Remonstrance" and its relation to the establishment of the principle of religious freedom, see *The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom*. On the struggle fought to define American culture as Protestant despite legal disestablishment in Virginia and elsewhere, see David Sehat, *The Myth of American Religious Freedom* (New York, 2011).
34. Madison to James Monroe, October 5, 1786, in *PJM* 9:141. On Jay's proposal, Madison's response, and the Annapolis meeting, see Jack Rakove, *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York, 1996), 23–34.

35. So enamored of this image was Jefferson that he offered several alternate versions of it in several letters written within the following year. To Abigail Adams he wrote “I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the Atmosphere.” To the Adamses’ son in law William S. Smith he wrote more poetically that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants. It is it’s [sic] natural manure.” Although these were the months during which Jefferson was enchanted by his recent acquaintance Maria Cosway, he had not altogether softened his political edge. Immediately after minimizing the danger of rebellion, he cautioned Madison sternly concerning the danger of losing navigation rights on the Mississippi. Moreover, he did acknowledge that Madison had been correct in his skepticism about John Adams, with whom Jefferson had been in close contact while they toured English gardens in preceding months. But his judgment showed admirable balance and insight: Adams, he wrote, is “vain, irritable, and a bad calculator of the force & probable effect of the motives which govern men. This is all the ill which can possible be said of him. He is as disinterested as the being which made him; he is profound in his views: and accurate in his judgment except where knowledge of the world is necessary to form a judgment.” Jefferson to Madison, January 30, 1787, in *Writings*, 881–87.
36. Jefferson to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787, in *Writings*, 190; Jefferson to William Smith, November 13, 1787, in *Writings*, 911; Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, in *Writings*, 917; Adams to Jefferson, November 30, 1786, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian Boyd, 41 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950–), 10:557.
37. Jefferson to Charles Bellini, September 30, 1785, in *Writings*, 833.
38. Jefferson to John Bannister Jr., October 15, 1785, in *Writings*, 838–39.

39. Jefferson to Madison, October 28, 1785, in *Writings*, 840–43.
40. On the contexts within which Adams wrote, see C. Bradley Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty* (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 91–106.
41. Adams, fragment entitled “Literary Drafts and Notes,” Adams Papers, reel 188, Massachusetts Historical Society.
42. Adams to Francis Adrian Vanderkemp, April 20, 1812, Adams Papers, reel 118, Massachusetts Historical Society.
43. Adams, preface to *Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*, in *Works* 4:290.
44. Adams, *Defence*, in *Works* 6:142, 95. Jefferson wrote in February of 1787 to congratulate Adams and express the “infinite satisfaction and improvement” the book brought him and his belief that it would do “great good.” “It’s [*sic*] learning and it’s [*sic*] good sense will I hope make it an institute for our politicians, old as well as young.” More than mere politeness, Jefferson’s letter reflected his agreement with the central argument of the *Defence*. Many of Adams’s specific critiques of the American constitutions, particularly the lack of a strong executive and the lack of a clear distinction between the Assembly and the Senate, paralleled the reservations about Virginia’s constitution expressed in Jefferson’s *Notes on the State of Virginia*. Jefferson had admitted in an earlier letter to Madison his impatience with Adams’s vanity and irritability; see note 35 above. But he nevertheless commended the *Defence* to his fellow Virginian. Adams had shown himself in Paris to be “so amiable,” Jefferson concluded, that Madison “will love him, if ever you become acquainted with him.” That prediction proved off the mark, both in the short and long term. Madison did read the *Defence*, and he admitted to Jefferson that it had “merit.”

But he worried that Adams's misgivings about direct democracy and his fondness for mixed government might "revive the predilections of this Country for the British Constitution." That was the opposite of Adams's aim. He remained a lifelong foe of inherited positions of any sort. Jefferson to Adams, February 23, 1787, in *Papers* 11:177; Jefferson to Madison, January 30, 1787, in *Writings*, 881–87, and *Papers* 11:94–95; and Madison to Jefferson, June 6, 1787, in *Papers* 11:401–2.

45. That feature of New England culture remained visible in the later Federalist, Whig, and mid-nineteenth-century Republican parties. Adams, *Defence*, in *Works* 4:382, 6:66, 4:395.
46. Adams, *Defence*, in *Works* 6:115.
47. Madison's prediction concerning the hostile reception of Adams's *Defence* proved accurate, not only at the time but ever since. Madison to Jefferson, June 6, 1787, in Madison, *Writings*, 95–97. It is striking that this letter is dated the same day as Madison's opening speech at the Constitutional Convention, the speech in which, as I will make clear in chapter 9, he emphasized the democratic quality of the Virginia Plan for the federal constitution. In his later writings, of course, Madison would position the Constitution, which incorporated many elements resembling those Adams sketched out in his *Defence*, as the most stable as well as most responsive form of popular government. On the persistent misreadings of Adams's *Defence*, see Thompson, *Adams and the Spirit of Liberty*. From Thompson's perspective, Adams's heartfelt opposition to hereditary aristocracy shows that his *Defence* cannot be read as an apology for separate and permanent social orders but represents instead a hard-headed defense of meritocracy. For the most influential of the interpretations against which Thompson writes, see Wood,

Creation of the American Republic, 567–92; and Wood’s only slightly revised version in *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different* (New York, 2006), 173–202. On uses of Adams’s *Defence* at the Constitutional Convention and in the ratification debates, see Darren Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding* (New York, 2005), 194–96. For the clearest statement of Adams’s eerily prescient prediction of the course that the French Revolution would take, see the first volume of his *Defence*, written almost two years before the outbreak of the Revolution, in *Works* 4:406; and see the discussion in Thompson, 95–96, 103–5, and especially 175–76. The immediate reception of Adams’s *Defence* was hardly as negative as later commentators have suggested. Benjamin Rush, for example, wrote “I owe more than I can express to you for your excellent volumes upon government,” and he promised Adams that “They shall be the Alcoran [Koran] of my boys upon the great subject of political happiness.” See Rush to Adams, July 2, 1788, in *The Letters of Benjamin Rush*, ed. Lyman H. Butterfield, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1951), 1:468. Rush also wrote to Richard Price that “Mr. Adams’ book has diffused such excellent principles among us that there is little doubt of our adopting a vigorous and compounded federal legislature. Our illustrious minister in this gift to his country has done us more service than if he had obtained alliances for us with all the nations in Europe.” See Rush to Price, June 2, 1787, in *Letters*, 1:418. For further evidence of the praise lavished on the book in the US, Britain, and France, see Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty*, 250–54.

48. Madison, “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,” in *PJM* 9:3–22; and see Ralph Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography* (Charlottesville 1990), 183–85. On the relation

between Madison's studies and the federal idea, see Alison LaCroix, *The Ideological Origins of American Federalism* (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

49. It is important to keep in mind, however, how contingent the Constitutional Convention was. Those who planned and executed it had no warrant for it, and there was considerable ambivalence throughout the United States about the entire project. For a particularly vivid recent portrayal of this uncertainty, see the opening pages of Pauline Maier, *Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788* (New York, 2010), 1–26.
50. On the process whereby Madison came to see the desirability of a Constitutional Convention, the best account is Banning, *Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 43–75.
51. Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” in *Writings*, 69–71. Madison returned to the task of explaining why the Constitutional Convention was called some time between 1830 and 1836, when he wrote a preface to his *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787* prior to its publication in 1840. It is striking how closely his account of the overarching concerns with inadequate federal authority in that preface, which he entitled “A Sketch Never Finished Nor Applied,” echoed the reasons offered in “Vices.” See *Writings*, 828–41. On Madison's economic ideas, see Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, 1979).
52. See Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom* (New York, 1975); and the concise account in David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York, 2006), 141–56.
53. Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” 71–76. Some political scientists treat Madison as a contemporary at least in part because of his awareness of the problems of collective action and free riding. For a sampling of such analyses, see

Samuel Kernell, ed., *James Madison: The Theory and Practice of Republican Government* (Stanford, 2003). In his introduction to the collection, Kernell writes that Madison “thinks like an economist and reasons like a game theorist” (14). That judgment shows respect for the significance of Madison’s insights but little understanding of the vast differences that separate his world, and his world view, from that of contemporary social scientists, most of whom are less interested in issues of Christian, moral, and civic virtue, and more interested in a stripped-down version of self-interested “rational actors,” than were Madison and other members of his generation.

54. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 51, February 6, 1788, in *Writings*, 298.
55. Not content with the notion of politics as a slugfest in which individuals compete by advancing their own narrow self-interest, the image Rousseau deprecated as “the will of all” rather than the “general will,” Madison was struggling to find the words to express his alternative. In April of 1786, he had not yet come up with the metaphors of filters and sieves that would become clear to him as he participated in the Constitutional Convention. But he was already on that path. He was trying to find a way to explain how citizens’ participation in the democratic process of multiple elections, the deliberations of representatives, and the two-way communication between representatives and their constituents might—through an endless and apparently conflict-ridden series of arguments—bring into being the closest approximation of the common good that flawed human beings could create. Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” 78–80; Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 51, 298. On the related versions of this argument offered by Rousseau and Paine, see chapters 5 and 7 above. See also Robert Burt, *The Constitution in Conflict* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 96–98; and on

Madison and deliberation, see Coleen A. Sheehan, "Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public Opinion," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 59 (October 2002): 925–56.

56. Findley admitted that he pursued wealth himself; he owned "more land than I can make a proper use of." Unlike those backing the bank, however, he enjoyed only enough wealth "to give a spring to industry" and "procure the necessities and a competence of the comforts of life." He had been lucky; many of his constituents had lost everything in the post-war downturn. Findley feared that great wealth not only fed a yearning for greater wealth, getting rich at the expense of others also betrayed the moral principle of sympathy. Findley was incensed that Morris invoked republican virtue to camouflage his real motives, the sin Americans had accused the British of committing for decades. Morris claimed to have the public interest at heart, but because he was "interested in it personally," he and his associates were effectively "acting as judges in their own cause." For the Findley-Morris debate, see Matthew Carey, ed., *Debates and Proceedings of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1786), 64–73, 128–30. Compare the discussion of Findley in Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 105–10; with Wood, who first advanced this argument in his essay "Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, ed. Richard Beeman et al. (Chapel Hill, 1987), 69–109; and then incorporated it into *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 243–70. For a different version of a similar insight, see Gary Nash, "Artisans and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," in *Anglo-American Radicalism*, 165–78, where Nash contrasts the older artisanal ideal of "moral economy" to the newer ideals of "unlimited acquisition,"

“economic rationality,” and the “pursuit of self-interest.” I have quoted liberally from Findley because I think his position is more complicated than most accounts have acknowledged. Findley feared that great wealth would translate into political power and argued that “wealth in many hands operates as many checks.” According to Bouton, historians who have taken Findley as “the mouthpiece of economic liberalism and of an idea of democracy that equated with [*sic*] the unrestrained pursuit of one’s own self-interest have quoted selectively from Findley’s pronouncements and often taken his words out of context.” Although Bouton makes a convincing case for Findley’s commitment to rough economic equality, he does not address Findley’s ideas about the appropriate role of calculations of personal interest in politics. See Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 106–9, 289n7.

57. Madison to Caleb Wallace, August 23, 1785, in *Writings*, 39–47.
58. Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, Robert Morris, and Gouverneur Morris would be able to live in their comfortable homes during the summer of 1787, while the other delegates (except the venerable Washington, who accepted his friend Robert Morris’s invitation to be his houseguest) stayed in boarding-houses. Washington to Madison, March 31, 1787, in *The Papers of George Washington*, Confederation Series, 6 vols. (Charlottesville, 1992–), 5:115; Madison to Washington, April 16, 1787, in *Writings*, 80–85; Washington, “Notes on the sentiments on the government of John Jay, Henry Knox, and James Madison,” in *Papers* 5:163–66.
59. Madison’s comment on Richard Morris quoted in Richard Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution* (New York, 2009), 48; see also 44–57. One of Gouverneur Morris’s speeches in particular shows the gap between him and Richard

Morris, on the one hand, and Wilson and Madison on the other. On July 1 Gouverneur Morris argued that Senators “should have great personal property” so that “the aristocratic spirit” could pervade the Senate. “It must love to lord it thro’ pride, pride is indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor & the rich.” As Hamilton did, Morris called for life tenure in the Senate: “The aristocratic body, should be as independent & and as firm as the democratic.” Only if placed in a separate chamber, Morris insisted, could the “aristocratic interest” be prevented from dominating the “popular interest.” See *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention*, 233–35. For a detailed account of the two-front war fought by Madison, Wilson and their allies who sought to establish a strong national government without endorsing the domination of that government by the financial elites envisioned by Robert Morris and Hamilton, see Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*. For insight into the reasons why—and on Wilson’s likely role in determining that—the chief executive of the government would be called the president, I am grateful to Sidney Milkis.

60. The first scholar to criticize the Constitution as a repudiation of the democratic thrust of the Revolution was Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913; New York, 1961). That tradition has continued until the present. For recent critiques see Robert A. Dahl, *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* (New Haven, 2002); and Sanford Levinson, *Framed: America’s Fifty-One Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance* (New York, 2013).
61. Jared Sparks, journal entry, April 19, 1830, in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, 3 vols. (New Haven, 1911), 479. This passage, usually attributed to Madison himself, serves as the epigraph for Cass Sunstein, *The Partial*

Constitution, which is examined along with Robert Burt's *The Constitution in Conflict* in James T. Kloppenberg, "Deliberative Democracy and Judicial Supremacy," *Law and History Review* 13 (1995): 393–411. On the indispensability of autonomy for representatives in democratic decision-making processes, see Nadia Urbinati, *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago, 2006), and for recent debates on these issues among political theorists, see Jane Mansbridge, "Rethinking Representation," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 515–28; Mansbridge, "A 'Selection Model' of Representation," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (2009): 369–98; and Mansbridge et al., "The Place of Self-Interest in Deliberative Democracy," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18 (2010): 64–100. Recent historical studies of the Constitution include Akhil Amar, *America's Constitution: A Biography* (New York, 2006); Rakove, *Original Meanings*; Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*; and Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat*. Although I challenge aspects of his interpretation of the Constitution and Madison's arguments for it in the *Federalist*, I remain indebted, as do all students of this era, to the unsurpassed scholarship of Gordon Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 391–564. For spirited critiques of the Constitution that focus on its undeniable shortcomings from a twenty-first century perspective, see Dahl, *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?*; and Levinson, *Framed*.

62. Jefferson to Adams, August 30, 1787, in *Writings*, 906–9; George Mason to George Mason Jr., June 1, 1787, in Farrand, *Records* 3:33; Madison in Farrand, *Records* 1:13; and cf. the more critical assessment of these procedures in Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*, 79–85.

63. See Jack N. Rakove, *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York, 1996); and Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*.
64. For Randolph's speech, see Madison, *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison*, ed. Adrienne Koch (Athens, OH, 1966), 28–33.
65. For Sherman's, Gerry's, and Randolph's remarks, see Madison, *Notes of Debates*, 39–42.
66. Mason, Wilson, and Madison in Madison, *Notes of Debates*, 39–50. On the Great Seal and Wilson's predilection for the image of democracy as a great pyramid, see John Fabian Witt, *Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 13–82.
67. For Pierce's portrait of Wilson, see Farrand, *Records* 3:91–92.
68. See Bruce H. Mann, *Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), on the tangled webs of borrowing that ensnared even small farmers and artisans operating in a world of people with big ambitions and little money.
69. As he did in "Vices," Madison outlined the multiple rifts in every society, adding classical allusions and contemporary illustrations. In his own day some debtors "have defrauded their creditors," in others "the landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest," and in still others "holders of one species of property" have taxed disproportionately "holders of another species." Madison's diagnosis was accurate: from the humblest farmers to the richest financiers, many, perhaps even most, Americans in the mid-1780s both owed and lent money. There was plenty of ambition, and plenty of injustice, to go around. Madison's speech of June 6, 1787, is in *Notes of Debates*, 75–77, and in *Writings*, 92–93. I will return to Madison's phrases "the democratic form of

government” and the “inconveniences of democracy” when examining his celebrated argument in *Federalist* 10 in chapter 10 below. On Madison’s experience at the Convention, and the ways in which he changed his own positions in response to others’ arguments even as he remained committed to a democratic procedure as the best guarantee of his ideals of liberty and justice, see Rakove, *Original Meanings*; and Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 111–91, which also contains a masterful discussion of the vast secondary literature on the Constitutional Convention. Alan Gibson, *Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins and Foundations of the American Republic* (Lawrence, KS, 2006), is a more recent attempt to provide a well balanced overview of these contentious debates.

70. Forest McDonald, in *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, KS, 1985), 205–9, argues that only thirty-one of Madison’s seventy-one specific proposals made it into the Constitution. It can be argued that the Supreme Court ended up playing a role similar to that Madison envisioned for the national government vis-à-vis state legislatures, but the delegates to the convention had no idea how crucial these justices, appointed for life, would prove to be; in 1787 no one knew how judicial review would operate. I am grateful to Michael Klarman for stimulating conversation on this point. See also Max M. Edling, “A More Perfect Union: The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution,” in Kamensky and Gray, *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, 396–97.
71. Mason in Farrand, *Records* 2:94; Gerry in Farrand, *Records* 2:114; Wilson in Farrand, *Records* 2:103. The ultimate resolution of this conundrum, the electoral college, was almost an afterthought, and it did not take long—the contested election of 1800—for

evidence to emerge showing just how poorly thought-out was the Convention's scheme.

On the presidency and the electoral college, see Rakove, *Original Meanings*, 244–68.

72. Hamilton in Farrand, *Records* 1:146. For Butler's remarks, see *Notes of Debates*, 63. Hamilton's speech of June 18, 1787, in *Notes of Debates*, 129–39, shows the chasm dividing his approach to government from Madison's and Wilson's, and indeed from those of almost all the other delegates at the Convention. The belief that Madison and Hamilton were like-minded because they agreed to collaborate on the *Federalist* is difficult to sustain in light of Madison's speech on June 6 and Hamilton's twelve days later. Theirs was a strategic alliance for the sole purpose of achieving ratification of the Constitution. Both before and after that brief moment of cooperation, their distinctly different sensibilities were apparent in their writings and their activities. Hamilton's role at the Convention has been the subject of spirited debate. His call on June 18 for life tenure for the president and senators might actually have been calculated to generate support for the more moderate plan advanced by the Virginians. Moreover, because the rest of the New York delegation had already left Philadelphia, Hamilton's decision to return home at the end of June is easier to understand: New York lacked a quorum and thus no longer had a vote in the proceedings.
73. Although George Read of Delaware wanted to replace the Articles of Confederation, he announced that the Delaware delegation was under strict instructions to oppose any plan that deviated from equal representation of each state. Delaware's John Dickinson, who had trained Wilson in the law and was among the architects of the Articles of Confederation, and Roger Sherman from Connecticut argued that the Convention needed to recognize the importance of the states as states, an argument with the force of tradition

on its side. Farrand, *Records* 3:574–75; and see the discussion of the debates over this issue in the first Continental Congress in chapter 7 above.

74. Madison's July 9 speech is in *Writings*, 101–8. The record does not show how many delegates were still awake when Madison finished his exhaustive and exhausting history of the world's experiments in confederation. Although I have emphasized the importance of Madison's commitment to popular sovereignty in the Constitutional Convention, it is worth noting that he proposed a nine-year term for Senators, a dramatic departure from the annual elections in state legislatures. As he made clear in his letter to Caleb Wallace, he thought a longer term appropriate for an upper house designed to provide stability and temper the rashness he thought state legislatures had shown during the mid-1780s.
75. The notorious three-fifths clause has often been taken to indicate the triumph of the South over the North, but it might just as easily be seen, as indeed it was seen by Frederick Douglass and others, as a defeat for the South. Don Fehrenbacher, *The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's Relations to Slavery* (New York, 2001), points out that the alternative to the three-fifths compromise under discussion in 1787 was to count slaves as full persons for the purposes of apportioning representatives, just as women and children were counted, an outcome that would have increased substantially the number of congressional representatives from southern states.
76. Wilson compared the proposed Senate to the most rotten of England's notorious rotten boroughs; both he and Madison tried to show how unlikely was the feared alliance among large states. Madison trotted out even more historical examples to show how often large provinces and regions—from the cases of Rome and Carthage to those of France and England—had torn each other apart instead of uniting to dominate their smaller and

weaker neighbors. Above all, however, both emphasized the injustice of the scheme, its betrayal of majority rule and “the just principle of representation,” as Wilson put it. Are we designing a Constitution “for *men*,” Wilson asked, “or for the imaginary beings called *States*?” Would Americans accept such “metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told that the one third compose the great number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2nd as in the 1st branch.” Wilson’s speech of June 30, 1787, is in *Notes of Debates*, 220–22.

77. Farrand, *Records* 1:197–98.
78. Madison viewed the result as a far more bitter defeat than his loss of the national veto over state legislation, and many commentators have traced his later alignment with Jefferson and other southerners on the issue of states’ rights to his disillusionment with small-state delegations from the North who opposed him in Philadelphia. For Wilson’s major speeches relating to these issues, see Madison, *Notes on Debates*, 208, 220–22, 226, 295; and for Madison’s, 204–8, 213–15, 223–25, 228, 239–40, 263, 292–95, and Madison, *Writings*, 108–27. An enormous amount has been written on the subject of Madison’s nationalism, and the issues are complex and difficult to resolve. Of the available interpretations, I find most convincing the developmental approach offered in Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 138–64. See also the fine essay by Gordon Wood, “Is There a ‘James Madison Problem’?” in Wood, *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different* (New York, 2006), in which he subtly revises his earlier interpretation in *Creation of the American Republic* of Madison’s role at the Convention.
79. Some delegates thought the decision should be left to the states, since their practices were hardly uniform, and, as Wilson pointed out, it would be “very hard & disagreeable for the

same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the National Legislature.” In ten states, to cite just one example of such diversity, free blacks enjoyed the right to vote. In New Jersey, women had already been voting for over a decade. Gouverneur Morris urged the Convention to act responsibly by setting a minimum standard for the franchise; some delegates advocated limiting the vote to taxpayers, others to those owning property. But Mason observed that “eight or nine states have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders.” What would those people say, he asked, “if they should be disfranchised”? In a frequently quoted speech, Madison replied that “the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican government.” He was opposed to leaving the decision up to the state legislatures: that had been the “mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms.” Moreover, he shared Mason’s concern about the reaction in states in which “the right was now exercised by every description of people.” On the other hand, he was not oblivious to the problems identified by those who worried about a very broad franchise. The dangers already signaled by scattered agrarian revolts were no mirage. Suppose, he suggested, that in the future “a great majority of the people” might be not only “without landed, but any other sort of, property.” Such people might ally with each other, “in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands.” More likely, though, Madison concluded on the basis of his study of ancient and modern history, the propertyless would “become the tools of opulence and ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on the other side,” with bribery and corruption of the sort common in England the likely result. See Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York, 2005), 806n39; and

Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 2007), 30–48.

80. Only Delaware voted in favor of Gouverneur Morris's proposal to limit the franchise; the Maryland delegation was divided. All the other states, including Virginia and Pennsylvania, voted no. See *Notes of Debates*, 401–5. For Madison's reflections on the learning that occurred during the debates, see Farrand, *Records* 3:455. See also the discussion of this issue in Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 112, 139, 146, and 170–71.
81. Madison, *Writings*, 93.
82. Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, in *Writings*, 263–64.
83. Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, 288–89.
84. Adams to Jefferson, May 22, 1785, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson* 8:160.
85. See Davis, *Inhuman Bondage*, 144. The most recent attempt to make sense of Madison's views on slavery is Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, *Madison and Jefferson* (New York, 2010); see especially 631–40 for their well-balanced assessment. In 1791 Madison made preliminary notes for an essay demonstrating the incompatibility of slavery and democracy. He never published it. His notes for that proposed *National Gazette* essay are in *PJM* 14:163–64.
86. The idea of the three-fifths ratio, proposed by the slave-owning delegates from South Carolina, appeared originally in 1783, when delegates to the Confederation Congress were wrangling over whether each state's payments to the central government should be proportional to that state's wealth. Because it was estimated that a slave produced roughly 60 percent of the economic value of a free laborer, it was proposed that each

slave should be counted as three-fifths of a person when calculating that state's contribution. Although the scheme was never enacted, the ratio stuck in the minds of those who convened in Philadelphia four years later. At the Constitutional Convention, the alternatives to considering each slave as three-fifths of a person when calculating the population of slave states included counting each slave as a person—one who would enjoy no vote or other rights of citizenship—which would have given the South a decisive advantage in the House of Representatives, or not counting slaves at all, which delegates from the deep South said would cause them to abandon the Convention. Thus a notion initially concocted for one purpose, determining the revenues owed by states to the impoverished central government, was resurrected for another, and it served as one minor piece in complex negotiations between North and South that postponed for seventy-five years the nation's ultimate reckoning with the issue of slavery. When that reckoning came, it ripped apart the union woven by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

87. Madison, *Writings*, 93.

88. Dickinson's entry in his notebook is in James H. Hutson, *Supplement to Max Farrand's "The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787"* (New Haven, 1987), 158. For brief accounts of the twists and turns on the way to the three-fifths compromise and northern as well as southern delegates' refusal to face the issue of slavery, see Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*, 152–59, 200–25; and Amar, *America's Constitution*, 87–98. See also Paul Finkelman, "Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death," in *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, ed. Richard R. Beeman (Chapel Hill, 1987), 188–225; David Waldstreicher, *Slavery's Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification* (New York, 2009); and George

Van Cleve, *A Slaveholders' Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American Republic* (Chicago, 2010).

89. In Gouverneur Morris's words, "The rights of human nature and the principles of our holy religion loudly call on us to dispense the blessing of freedom to all mankind." Gouverneur Morris in Farrand, *Records* 2:221–23; see also James Kirschke, *Gouverneur Morris: Author, Statesman, and Man of the World* (New York, 2005), 62. On the economic dimensions of antislavery in the North, see the arguments advanced by David Brion Davis, Thomas Haskell, and John Ashworth in *The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 1992).
90. At the Convention, Mason echoed Jefferson's lament: slavery had "the most pernicious effect" on "the manners" of every white southerner, who "is born a petty tyrant" and learns to "despise labor." Mason in Farrand, *Records* 2:370; see also Helen Hill Miller, *George Mason, Gentleman Revolutionary* (Chapel Hill, 1975), 55–56; and see the discussion of Mason and slavery in chapter 7 above.
91. Hendrik Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us All,'" *Journal of American History* 74, no. 3 (December 1987): 1013–34, remains a valuable meditation on the double-sided character of the Constitution. Hartog exposes not only its limitations, as seen from the perspective of fifteen historians writing on the occasion of its bicentennial, but also the role of the Constitution in establishing rights not only as trumps but also as "a duty on public authority to undo—to destroy—the structures that maintain hierarchy and oppression"; in other words, to fulfill the democratic promise it established for the nation. Recent discussions of these issues include Davis, *Inhuman*

Bondage; Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat*; Waldstreicher, *Slavery's Constitution*; and Laura F. Edwards, "The Contradictions of Democracy in American Institutions and Practices," in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 40-56.

Chapter 9

1. Also laboring on the final draft was Gouverneur Morris, Madison's and James Wilson's closest associate at the convention and the likeliest author of the ringing preamble that located the power of the Constitution in the people themselves rather than the states. For an energetic defense of the proposition that the preamble establishes the fundamental democratic commitments of the Constitution, see Akhil Amar, *America's Constitution: A Biography* (New York, 2005), 5–10, 57–69.
2. Much of the controversy surrounding Madison's position has come from critics who disagree with his analysis of politics. Those who believe politics is about nothing but self-interest, whether from the right or the left, either distort Madison's position in order to enlist him into their ranks or dismiss him as an apologist for antidemocratic conspiracies he never joined. The best antidotes to such analyses are the most thorough recent studies of Madison's role in these years: Jack N. Rakove, *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York, 1996); and Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the New Republic* (Ithaca, 1995).
3. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, in Madison, *Writings*, ed. Jack Rakove (New York, 1999), 142–58.
4. [Alexander Hamilton], *The Farmer Refuted* (1775), 6. Wilson quoted in Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (1969; Chapel Hill, 1998), 271, 536.
5. Jefferson to Madison, December 30, 1787, in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 914–18. In an earlier letter to Adams, Jefferson complained primarily

about the office of the presidency, which he described as a “bad edition of a Polish king.”

The fact that the president could be re-elected to successive four-year terms meant, Jefferson feared, that he would be “an officer for life.” Jefferson to Adams, November 13, 1787, in *Writings*, 912–14.

6. See Bernard Bailyn, ed., *Debates on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification*, 2 vols. (New York, 1993) (hereafter *DOTC*): vol. 1, *Debates in the Press and in Private Correspondence, September 17, 1787–January 12, 1788; and Debates in the State Ratifying Conventions, Pennsylvania, November 20–December 15, 1787; Connecticut, January 3–9, 1788; Massachusetts, January 9–February 7, 1788*; and vol. 2, *Debates in the Press and in Private Correspondence, January 14–August 9, 1788; and Debates in the State Ratifying Conventions, South Carolina, May 12–24, 1788; Virginia, June 2–27, 1788; New York, June 17–July 26, 1788; North Carolina, July 21–August 4, 1788*. On this point see Bailyn’s explanation in 1:1049.
7. Less than six weeks after the convention closed, the Constitution had been reprinted in every newspaper in the United States. Robert A. Rutland, “The Great Newspaper Debate: The Constitutional Crisis of 1787–1788,” *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* 97 (1987): 47.
8. In other words, despite my agreement with Robert A. Dahl’s argument in *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* (New Haven, 2002) concerning the document’s shortcomings from our perspective, considering it historically I share Akhil Amar’s judgment in *America’s Constitution* that the Constitution advanced the cause of popular government and provided the framework for future democratization, a process

that can, at least in principle, continue as long as the United States exists. That is an essential feature of democracy.

9. Several dichotomies have been used to characterize the differences between those in favor and those opposed to ratification—including liberal vs. republican, Court vs. Country, cosmopolitan vs. local, conservative vs. radical, forward-thinking vs. tradition-bound, and, perhaps most common of all, elites vs. the common people—but none of those binaries captures the range of individuals involved or opinions expressed between the fall of 1787 and the summer of 1788. A few wealthy supporters of the Constitution, such as Alexander Hamilton and Robert Morris, did aim to build a powerful fiscal-military nation-state, tightly controlled by an elite of financiers and merchants and firmly committed to stable credit, a standing army, and centralized government. The most detailed account of these Federalists' interest in establishing a nation capable of raising men and money for military adventures is Max M. Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U. S. Constitution and the Making of the American State* (Oxford, 2003). He builds on arguments advanced by European historians and historical sociologists, including those in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975); Tilly, *Capital, Coercion and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford, 1990); and for Britain, John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (London, 1989). Although my analysis of the ratification debate focuses on democracy, Edling's analysis makes clear that some Federalists—although certainly not Madison, which helps explain why he later split from Hamilton—were more interested in fiscal-military state formation than in establishing institutions of representative democracy. The most implacable opponents of the

Constitution, including those drawn toward the separatist movements that had developed in the western regions of Virginia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts in the 1780s, were wary of all government beyond their own communities. Some radical proponents of local control, who thought even the Articles of Confederation threatened community autonomy, judged any increase in national authority incompatible with their ideas of democracy. The most thorough account of the range of Antifederalist ideas is Saul Cornell, *The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828* (Chapel Hill, 1999).

10. George Turner to Winthrop Sargent, November 6, 1787, and John Breckinridge to James Breckinridge, January 25, 1788, in Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski, and Gaspare J. Sardino et al., eds., *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution*, 30 vols. (Madison, 1976–) (hereafter *DHRC*), 13:565–66; 8:320–21.
11. “William Penn,” *Independent Gazetteer* (Philadelphia), January 2 and 3, 1788, in *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, ed. Herbert Storing, 7 vols. (Chicago, 1963–81), 3:168–73. Like Madison, Penn believed that the wisdom necessary for constitution writing was already contained in the “book of constitutions of the different states,” which “reflects such a mass of light as would have dazzled the greatest philosophers of antiquity. After the holy scriptures, it is certainly that book which contains the greatest store of eternal truths” concerning “the nature of government.” He singled out the Massachusetts Constitution, which showed how much American thinking deviated from that of Locke and Sidney. Penn endorsed Adams’s idea of “a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” On the shared assumptions of

Antifederalists and Federalists, see Herbert Storing, *What the Antifederalists Were For* (Chicago, 1981), 5; and Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 31–32. Note that this emphasis on a shared commitment to democracy does not deny the existence of deep social and economic conflicts, which surely predated and persisted after the ratification debates. But spirited disputes over the rules of the game presumed a shared commitment to the principle that the people must consent to those rules.

12. For the full range of Antifederalist essays, see *Debates on the Constitution*, which depends, as does all scholarship on the ratification process, on *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution*; *The Complete Anti-Federalist*; and *The Founders' Constitution*, ed. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 5 vols. (Chicago, 1987). A splendid one-volume account of the ratification process containing essays on each state is Michael Allen Gillespie and Michael Lienisch, eds., *Ratifying the Constitution* (Lawrence, KS, 1987). The most recent comprehensive account of these debates is Pauline Maier, *Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788* (New York, 2010).
13. Rawlins Lowndes, *Debates Which Arose in the House of Representatives of South Carolina on the Constitution Framed for the United States by a Convention of Delegates Assembled at Philadelphia*, in *DOTC* 2:19–25.
14. Patrick Henry's speech in the Virginia Convention, June 11, 1787, in *DHRC* 9:1161.
15. George Mason's speech in the Virginia Convention, June 17, 1788, in *DHRC* 10:1342.
16. Brutus III [Robert Yates?], November 15, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:317–23.
17. Benjamin Gale's speech in the Killingworth town meeting, November 12, 1787, in *DHRC* 3:421; *Carlisle Gazette*, March 5, 1788. The *Massachusetts Centinel* observed that northerners thought "that in the new Constitution, the southern states have

preeminence,” whereas southerners thought “in all things the eastern states out-wit and unhinge us.” Because the complaints balanced out, the Constitution was deemed fair by many commentators. *DHRC* 4:419.

18. On these divisions, see Cornell, *The Other Founders*. Cornell’s convincing demonstration of the diversity of the Antifederalists and their arguments shows why it is no longer plausible to treat the Antifederalists as if they expressed a unified sensibility. This is one of the few arguments in Wood’s *Creation of the American Republic* with which I disagree. On 475–84, Wood concedes that the Antifederalists included a wide range of individuals, including some as wealthy as any Federalists. Nevertheless, he concludes on 485 that the “quarrel” over the Constitution “was fundamentally one between aristocracy and democracy.” I do not believe the evidence sustains that judgment. Wood’s own more recent writings suggest that he too would moderate that claim. See notes 47 and 78 to chapter 8 above. On this issue, cf. the contrasting accounts of Antifederalism in Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York, 2005), 31–37; Jürgen Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat: The Prehistory and Ratification of the American Constitution, 1787–1791*, ed. John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler (1988; Charlottesville, 2012), 105–33; and Maier, *Ratification*, 82–95. Another interpretation, particularly influential among political theorists, that treats the Federalists’ arguments as aristocratic rather than democratic is Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge, 1997). Manin considers the use of election inevitably aristocratic and only the reliance on lotteries as properly democratic, a judgment that does not appear to have been shared by anyone in eighteenth-century America. For similar discussions of the debates between Federalists and Antifederalists

that treat the opponents of the Constitution as democrats and its supporters as an aristocracy, see Russell Hanson, *The Democratic Imagination in America: Conversations with Our Past* (Princeton, 1985); John Dunn, *Democracy: A History* (New Yorks, 2005); and the editor's introduction to a widely read edition of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, with the Letters of Brutus, *The Federalist*, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge, 2003). Questioning this widespread understanding of the Federalists, particularly Madison and Wilson, is among the principal goals of this chapter.

19. Centinel complained that the Constitution provided no bill of rights, unlimited power to tax, the possibility of a standing army, a Supreme Court accountable to no one, and, worst of all, a bicameral legislature that departed from the wise precedent of Pennsylvania's unicameral popular assembly. Writing in the shrill voice of warning, Centinel railed against a Senate that would shelter "the *better sort*, the *well born*" and nurture "a *permanent ARISTOCRACY*." Centinel I appeared in Philadelphia's *Independent Gazetteer* on October 5, 1787; it is reprinted in *DOTC* 1:52–62. Although John Adams's *Defence* played little part in the debates at the Constitutional Convention, it figured more prominently in the debates afterward—particularly for the Antifederalists. Adams had justified bicameralism by warning that the popular assembly needed to be checked by another institutional brake, and his claim that the British Constitution most nearly approached the desired balance had Antifederalists salivating. With its "hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank," Centinel shrieked, Britain exemplified the society for which a Senate would be appropriate. Another Antifederalist, John Humble, denounced "John Adams, Esquire," whose "profundity" helped convince the delegates that only "a new government consisting of three different branches, namely, *king*, *lords*,

and *commons*, or in the American language, *president*, *senate*, and *representatives*, can save this our country from inevitable destruction.” Centinel and John Humble aligned themselves instead with the cause of “the *low born*, that is, *all the people of the United States*” except for the few aristocrats conniving to end self-government. John Humble concluded his essay on a note familiar from the rough music of pre-revolutionary pamphlets: “we shall in future be perfectly contented if our *tongues* be left us to lick the feet of our well born masters.” Centinel in *DOTC* 1:55–57; the essay by John Humble appeared in the *Independent Gazetteer* (Philadelphia) on October 29, 1787, and is reprinted in *DOTC* 1:224–26.

20. Melancton Smith in the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 1788, in *DOTC*, 2:761; Rusticus, *New York Journal*, September 13, 1787.
21. Cato Uticensis [George Mason?], “To the Freemen of Virginia,” *Virginia Independent Chronicle* (Richmond), October 17, 1787, in *DHRC* 8:70–72.
22. One of the most comprehensive, and widely reprinted, Antifederalist tracts provides an excellent summation of their objections. See “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents,” in *DOTC* 1:526–52. On the relation between this document, probably written by Samuel Bryan and reprinted in many newspapers in the North and the South, and the multiple Federalist responses it evoked, see Bailyn’s note in *DOTC* 1:1168; and cf. Cornell, *The Other Founders*, 26–34, 309.
23. [James Winthrop], “Agrippa Letters,” in *Essays on the Constitution of the United States*, ed. Paul L. Ford et al. (1892; New York, 1970), 73.

24. “William Penn,” *Independent Gazetteer* (Philadelphia), January 2 and 3, 1788, in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist* 3:168–73.
25. “An Old Whig” [James Hutchinson], *Independent Gazetteer* (Philadelphia): no. 4, October 27, 1787; no. 5, November 1, 1787; and no. 8, February 6, 1788, in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist* 3:32–34, 35, 49.
26. The rifts among the Antifederalists showed the accuracy of Madison’s analysis concerning cross-cutting cleavages on the basis of religion, economics, geography, and cultural tradition. Many Antifederalists worried about the absence of religious tests in the Constitution. How could non-Christians be expected to behave honestly? Others disagreed about commerce. Were yeoman farmers uniquely attuned to the needs of democratic citizenship, or were merchants and commercial farmers better able to grasp the public good because they were engaged in wider social and economic networks? Antifederalist writers gave varying answers, with backwoodsmen trumpeting their unique qualities, small-town traders protesting that gluttonous elites would gobble up their places, and well-to-do southern planters skeptical about their slaves and their own security. Mercy Otis Warren was among the many Americans anxious about both excessive democracy and excessive aristocracy. On the one hand, she fumed about those who would reject all authority “like a restless, vigorous, luxurious youth, prematurely emancipated from the authority of a parent, but without the experience necessary to direct him to act with dignity or discretion.” On the other, she denounced the new constitution as the work of those who “secretly wish for aristocracy” instead of “a form established on the secure principles of republicanism.” A Columbian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren],

Observations on the new Constitution, and on the foederal and state conventions (New York, 1788), 20–21.

27. Brutus I in *DOTC* 1:172.
28. Federal Farmer I in *DOTC* 1: 253; Melancton Smith in *DOTC* 2:759.
29. Cincinnatus in *DOTC* 1:119.
30. Federal Farmer flatly rejected the idea that the people would remain sovereign in the Constitution. Since power “must be lodged somewhere in every society,” it would gravitate toward the executive and his “aristocratical” associates in the Senate. Federal Farmer noted, as had Wilson and Madison, that the Senate betrayed the principle of “equal representation” by giving the same power to Delaware as to Pennsylvania. He explained why “nine times in ten, men of elevated classes in the community only can be chosen” for Congress. If a state such as Connecticut were to elect five Representatives, then “not one man in a hundred of those who form the democratic branch in the state legislature, will on a fair computation, be one of the five” chosen. “The people of this country, in one sense, may all be democratic,” Federal Farmer observed. Yet “if we make the proper distinction between the few men of wealth and abilities, and consider them, as we ought, as the natural aristocracy of the country, and the great body of the people, the middle and lower classes, as the democracy, this federal representative branch will have but very little democracy in it.” Whether in the House of Representatives or in the even more exclusive Senate, the result would be the same: only the wealthy would be elected. Federal Farmer conceded that given the differences between the large and small states, and between the “Eastern, Middle, and Southern states,” compromises were necessary. He admitted that it was “impracticable” to “get the senate formed on any other

principles” than those established in the Constitution. “But this only proves,” he concluded, “that we cannot form one general government on equal and just principles.” If power did not remain lodged in the state governments, it would be abused. The nation was too vast, the distance between the people and the central government too great, and the differences between the northern and southern sections too profound to prevent the “consolidated” federal government from devolving into tyranny. The authorship of this widely read pamphlet, published with the title *Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention: and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. In a Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican*, remains unknown. Contemporaries thought it was the work of Richard Henry Lee; more recent scholars have proposed New Yorker Melancton Smith. It is published in *DOTC* 1:245–88; and see also Bailyn’s editorial note, with assessments of its importance from Hamilton and others, on 1155–56.

31. Federal Farmer, *Observations*, 249–69, 277–83. Even the most influential of the Antifederalists’ writings, including those of Federal Farmer and Brutus, were seldom reprinted. The complete set of letters by Federal Farmer, for example, was republished only in the *Country Journal* of Poughkeepsie, New York, although the forty-page pamphlet version went through multiple printings. See Maier, *Ratification*, 82–86.
32. Smith’s reasoning echoed Madison’s as well as Federal Farmer’s: “the interest of both the rich and the poor are involved in that of the middling class. No burden can be laid on the poor, but what will sensibly affect the middling class. Any law rendering property insecure, would be injurious to them.” Those in the middle shared the universal interest, which united almost all Federalists and Antifederalists, in economic growth and

expanding commerce. Middling men saw how quickly status could change in America, and they could understand those above and below them, which broadened their sensibilities and helped engender wider sympathies throughout society. “When therefore this class of society pursue their own interest, they promote that of the public, for it is involved in it.” Melancton Smith in the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 1788, in *DOTC* 2:757–65, 773–75.

33. On middling Antifederalists such as Federal Farmer, Philadelphiensis, Smith, Findley, Bryan, and John Nicholson, see Cornell, *The Other Founders*, 97–99, 148–50, 180–87, and 191–94; on the differences between them and plebeian Antifederalists such as William Petriken and William Manning, see 46–47, 84, 107–9, and 187.
34. Even the Federalists with the least sympathy for “the people” conceded that the decision was theirs. Harvard graduate Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, who notoriously declared that “a democracy is a volcano” that “conceals the fiery materials of its own destruction,” acknowledged that “the people always mean right,” and “if time is allowed for reflection and information, they will do right.” In any case, “all power resides” in their judgment because by choosing delegates to the state ratifying conventions, the American people would decide whether the Constitution best secured the foundations of their democracy. Fisher Ames, speech in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, January 15, 1788, in *DOTC* 2:891–95. On the pervasiveness of negative arguments in the debates, particularly those in which Federalists tried to refute their opponents’ claims, see Herbert J. Storing, “The ‘Other’ Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch,” *Political Science Reviewer* 6 (1976): 215; Bernard Bailyn, “The Ideological Fulfillment of the American Revolution: A Commentary on the Constitution,” in *Faces of Revolution: Personalities and Themes*

in the Struggle for American Independence (New York, 1990), 225–67; and Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 31–46.

35. James Wilson, *Lectures on Law, Delivered in the College of Philadelphia, in 1790 and 1791*, in *Collected Works of James Wilson*, ed. Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 2007), 1:432.
36. For that reason, Wilson claimed, the absence of a bill of rights made no difference: “it would have been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a foederal body of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by the intention or the act, that has brought that body into existence.” “Wilson’s Speech at a Public Meeting,” October 6, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:63–69.
37. “Wilson’s Speech.” On 1142, Bailyn describes this now little-known speech as “the single most influential and widely cited document in the entire ratification debate.” By the end of 1787, it had been printed in thirty-four newspapers, in twenty-seven towns, scattered across twelve states. The importance of the speech, according to Bailyn, stemmed from its claim that “the people retain all powers not explicitly given to the government,” an argument that he does not trace to Rousseau, but that I believe Wilson did. Rakove, in *Original Meanings*, 190, describes Wilson’s October 6, 1787, speech as “no rhetorical sleight of hand but a logical outgrowth of the underlying democratic theory that he had applied to the entire corpus of issues the Convention faced.” Seth Cotlar disputes these assessments of the significance of Wilson’s ideas in “Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland, 1750–1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 18. On Wilson as one of the few Americans

who studied Rousseau seriously, see Paul Merrill Spurlin, *Rousseau in America, 1760–1809* (University, AL, 1969). Like Adams, Wilson owned the 1764 London edition of *The Social Contract* translated by William Kenrick. See also Garry Wills, “James Wilson’s New Meaning for Sovereignty,” in *Conceptual Change and the Constitution*, ed. Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), 99–106.

38. Wilson’s preferred term for citizens’ freedom to follow the general will hearkened back to a word familiar to seventeenth-century Puritans, “Foederal liberty,” which “consists in the aggregate of the civil liberty which is surrendered by each state to the national government.” The principles operating in society, “with respect to the rights reserved or resigned by the individuals that compose it, will justly apply in the case of a confederation of distinct and Independent States” joining together to form a union. In such a federal system, sovereign power “remains and flourishes with the people,” and it is “under the influence of that truth,” Wilson declared, that “we, at this moment, sit, deliberate, and speak.” America’s democracy would reach decisions not by armed conflict, as other nations had done, but through the deliberative “means of obtaining a superior knowledge of the nature of government, and of accomplishing its end.” Wilson’s “great panacea of human politics” was Rousseau’s: “the supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the people,” who retain the power to alter their government as they see fit, not only by choosing their representatives but because they preserve the power of amendment. “Wilson’s Opening Address,” November 24, 1787, is in *DOTC* 1:791–803.
39. William Findley challenged Wilson’s logic at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, reasoning that officers in the federal government would maximize their power at the expense of the states and the people. Wilson replied that if they exceeded their authority,

they would be checked not by state or local institutions but by the irresistible force of the people themselves. “When I say the majesty of the people,” Wilson intoned, “I mean the thing and not a mere compliment.” Wilson emphasized how direct the popular control over the new government would be: “I have no idea that a safe system of power, in the government, sufficient to manage the general interest of the United States, could be drawn from any other source, or rested in any other authority than that of the people at large,” which he called “the rock on which this structure will stand.” The notion that Wilson envisioned a pristine, unchanging body of laws that would preserve forever a “pyramid” of government untouched by time is hard to square with Wilson’s portrait of a dynamic and constantly engaged public that would vote, oversee, and revise the laws by which it was governed. “Wilson’s Replies to Findley,” first on the federal authority, December 1, 1787, and then on the slave trade, December 3, 1787, in which he admitted that he would have preferred to take much stronger steps than were possible at the Convention to outlaw the institution, are in *DOTC* 1:820–28, 829–30.

40. Distinctive as Wilson’s rhetoric was, he and Madison were hardly alone in emphasizing the democratic dimensions of the Constitution. Writing as “Americanus” in the *New York Daily Advertiser* only a few days after Wilson’s first public speech, Federalist John Stevens Jr. distinguished the United States from the European nations that inspired Locke and Montesquieu. Whereas Spartan civic virtue turned rival states into “nests of hornets,” in the United States “the gusts of passion, which faction is ever blowing up in ‘a small territory,’” will “lose their force before they reach the seat of *Federal* Government.” By forming “mutual checks on each other,” the layers and branches of government will foster a spirit of moderation. “Representation is the grand secret in the formation of

republican government,” Stevens later wrote, because it transforms self-interest into a vision of the public good. November 2 and December 5–6, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:227–30, 457–64.

41. The town of Norwich instructed those it sent to the ratifying convention only to act “as their wisdom shall direct.” Norfolk empowered its delegates to “act as they think best.” In the town of Wingham, “after a very able and lengthy discussion of the subject” and two decisions to adjourn, a substantial majority of voters decided they should not make a decision: “as the proposed Constitution was to be determined on by a state Convention, it was not proper for this town to pass any vote on the subject.” See *DHRC* 3:405–51, and cf. Maier, *Ratification*, 134–36, whose assessment of the evidence differs from mine. She writes that only those towns that instructed their delegates how to vote “took their responsibility literally” and implies that the others meekly followed the advice of Federalists by deciding, in her words, that “the subject was beyond the capacities of ordinary people to understand” (135). By contrast, I think these Connecticut towns understood the spirit of representative democracy. They selected the delegates whose judgment they trusted, authorized them to participate in the give and take of debate, and then advised them to use their best judgment when the time came to vote. Maier notes that even some of the delegates instructed to oppose ratification nevertheless decided to vote for it. Debates about whether representatives are dependent on or independent of their constituencies are as old as democracy; neither position should be understood as the only genuinely democratic choice. When the issue was debated after the Constitution was ratified and instructing representatives was proposed as one of the amendments that became the bill of rights, it was defeated. See also Donald Lutz, “Connecticut: Achieving

Consent and Securing Control,” in Gillespie and Lienisch, *Ratifying the Constitution*, 117–37.

42. Roger Sherman, August 15, 1789, in *Annals of Congress* 1789, 763.
43. Anyone familiar with debate, Fisher Ames and Noah Webster argued, understands how ideas can change in that crucible. Had the delegates to the Constitutional Convention been under binding instructions, Ames pointed out, the document would never have been written. Fisher Ames, speech at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, January 15, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:891–95. For a similar argument concerning representative democracy, see Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], *American Magazine*, February 1788, in *DOTC* 2:304–15.
44. James Innes, speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in *DHRC* 10:1520; Edmund Randolph in *DHRC* 10:1366; John Jay, speech in the New York Ratifying Convention, in *DOTC* 2:784–88.
45. For Archibald Maclaine’s challenge to instructing delegates, see Publicola, “An Address to the Freeman of North Carolina,” in *DHRC* 16:438–39; James Iredell, speech in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in Jonathan Elliot, ed., *The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*, 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1907), 4:4–13. See also the excellent discussion of this issue in William E. Nelson, “Reason and Compromise in the Adoption of the Constitution, 1787–1801,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 44 (1987): 458–84; and Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 18–24. Some scholars doubt the sincerity of such calls for deliberation and the efficacy of debate. Pauline Maier, for example, questions whether any of these texts or speeches changed anyone’s mind. Such bracing tough-mindedness might be self-

defeating: why do historians write books if not to change readers' minds? See for example her discussion of Maclaine, Iredell, and their Antifederalist opponents in North Carolina in *Ratification*, 401–23.

46. John Adams, when looking for an exemplary ancient lawgiver as he wrote his draft of the Massachusetts Constitution, chose the Athenian Solon, who also served as the model for Adam Smith. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison made good their intentions to remain engaged in public life for the remainder of their lives.
47. Even though later commentators inflated the significance of the *Federalist* beyond its influence at the time, understanding its historical significance remains indispensable. Unlike most careful works of political philosophy, these essays addressed first principles either fleetingly or not at all. Most of the essays present debaters' points intended to respond to specific claims by their opponents. Only by ripping the *Federalist* from its historical context can it be seen, as commentators seem increasingly inclined to do—and as the Supreme Court has tended more and more to do in recent years—as an authoritative statement of the meaning of the United States Constitution. On this point, see above all Rakove, *Original Meanings*; Bernard Bailyn, “The *Federalist* Papers,” A Bradley Lectures Publication (Washington, 1998); and Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 195–233.
48. The authorship of individual essays has remained a vexed question since the essays' original publication. Madison and Hamilton both later claimed to have written some of the essays. Even though recent scholarship has resolved most of these disputes, the persistence of disagreements about who wrote which essays indicates clearly how conscious the authors were of making a consistent argument that masked their deep

differences. On this question of authorship, see the introduction to the most informative and reliable edition of the *Federalist*, ed. Jacob Cooke (Middletown, CT, 1961), xi–xxx.

49. Hamilton writing as Publius, *Federalist* I, October 27, 1787, ed. Cooke, 3–7. This essay first appeared in *The Independent Journal* and was reprinted after a couple of days, as were most of the essays, in *The New-York Packet* and the *Daily Advertiser*.
50. On the theme of union in the new nation, see Daniel Wewers, “The Spectre of Disunion in the Early Republic, 1783–1815” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2008).
51. Hamilton writing as Publius, *Federalist* 9, November 21, 1787, ed. Cooke, 50–56.
52. Primarily because of the layers of polemic that now surround it, the task of understanding *Federalist* 10 historically becomes ever more challenging. If, as one of the characters in David Lodge’s novel *Small World* observes, we cannot avoid the influence of T. S. Eliot on Shakespeare, we likewise cannot avoid the influence of two centuries of commentary on Madison.
53. The most detailed and persuasive accounts of the reasons for Madison’s judgment on this complex question, which critics think shows his fear of popular sentiment, are Rakove, *Original Meanings*; and Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*.
54. More than a century of sophisticated analysis of class formation challenging Marx’s framework, from Jean Jaurès to Dipesh Chakrabarty, has failed shake the certainty of American historians still committed to the idea that “the people,” conceived as a unitary force with shared interests and aspirations, lost their battle against “the elite” during the 1780s. On the reasoning of Marx’s early critics, see James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York, 1986); and on the rethinking of Marx’s legacy for post-colonial

and subaltern studies, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, 2000); and Robert J. C. Young, *White Mythologies* (1990; New York, 2004).

55. See the discussion of Adams and Paine on pp. 383–85 above. Writing about the *Federalist* late in his life, Adams discerned the peculiar nature of the attempt to differentiate between a “democracy” and a “republic” in *Federalist* 10: The “distinction between a republic and a democracy cannot be justified. A democracy is as really a republic as an oak is a tree, or a temple a building. There are, in strictness of speech and in the soundest technical language, democratical and aristocratical republics, as well as an infinite variety of mixtures of both.” Adams understood that the two terms were employed more or less interchangeably throughout the 1770s and 1780s to designate forms of popular government in contradistinction to monarchy, with different shadings depending on the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, the terms were used. Adams contended, sensibly enough, that the apparently hard and fast distinction in *Federalist* 10 was inconsistent with common practice in 1787. John Adams to J. H. Tiffany, March 31, 1819, in *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850–56), 10:377–78.
56. Whatever the source of faction, a charismatic demagogue, devotion to a religious sect, or an economic campaign such as “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,” or “for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,” its effects could best be checked through the institutions of representative government and the extended sphere of the great republic. Madison surely did oppose both the radical transformation of the money supply and the equalization of wealth, as did almost all

eighteenth-century Americans. The ban on states issuing paper money and canceling contracts was adopted by the delegates in Philadelphia with little debate. But Madison's repeated references to religious zealots and scheming party leaders were not smokescreens; they expressed genuine concerns with the obstacles posed by enthusiasm to deliberation. Terry Bouton, who stresses the fears expressed by ordinary people concerning the machinations of the wealthy, concedes in *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (New York, 2007), 107–8, that there was no support in the United States for an agrarian law or the radical equalization of wealth. Most Americans embraced the principle of equal opportunity, at least for white males, and even the majority who saw excessive wealth as a threat to democracy did not oppose the efforts of ordinary people to make themselves more prosperous through honest effort. The idea of progressive taxation, an idea advanced by John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Paine, and many others, represented the horizon of eighteenth-century American egalitarianism.

57. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 10, November 22, 1787, ed. Cook, 56–65. The commentary on this essay is enormous and continues to grow. An influential early critique of the 1950s liberal pluralist interpretation is Paul Bourke, "The Pluralist Reading of James Madison's *Tenth Federalist*," *Perspectives in American History* 9 (1975): 271–95. Readings of *Federalist* 10 that I have found particularly helpful include Marvin Meyers, whose introduction to *The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison*, rev. ed. (1971; Waltham, MA, 1981), xi–xvii, first sparked my interest in Madison as a theorist of justice, and with whom I had the good fortune to discuss Madison for many years; Gordon Wood, "Is There a 'James Madison Problem'?"

in Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 141–72, which represents a rethinking of his influential argument about “the Federalist persuasion” in *Creation of the American Republic*; David F. Epstein, *The Political Theory of “The Federalist”* (Chicago, 1984), esp. 68–72; Colleen Sheehan, “The Politics of Public Opinion,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 49 (October 1989): 609–29; Colleen Sheehan, “Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public Opinion,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 59 (2002): 925–56, although we differ in our readings of Rousseau; and Daniel Walker Howe, *Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 78–103. Above all I am indebted to Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, 198–219, who stresses Madison’s dual emphasis on popular participation and the preservation of liberty. In his discussion of the *Federalist*, Banning offers not only an incisive analysis of Madison’s own developing, dynamic ideas but a clear and fair-minded guide to the voluminous critical debates from Charles Beard through Robert Dahl to Martin Diamond, Irving Brant, and Gordon Wood. Madison’s distinction between democracy and republic, although it originated only in *Federalist* 10, rapidly became common among Americans who had not previously differentiated between the two, as indeed Madison himself did not prior to November of 1787. On this broader transformation, see for example Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era*, trans. Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber, 2nd ed. (1973; Lanham, MD, 2001), 110–14; and cf. J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1985), 16. Ever since Douglas Adair, “‘That Politics May be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and

the Tenth *Federalist*,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 20 (1957): 343–60, commentators have debated Madison’s debt to Hume’s essays, notably “Of the Independency of Parliament,” “Of Parties in General,” and “On the Idea of a Commonwealth.” Hume did indeed discuss the advantages of an extended republic, but so did other writers from Aristotle to Harrington, as I have tried to make clear in chapters 1 through 6. See especially Aristotle, *Politics* 1281a42–1281b10; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140b7–11; the discussion of Hume on pp. 235–42 above; and the discussion of Montesquieu on pp. 198–204 above. Recent scholars have tended to minimize the extent of Madison’s debt to Hume. See Drew McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 42–51. The idea of an extended republic likewise figured prominently in the writings of Algernon Sidney, with whose work Madison was also familiar. See Craig Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America* (Princeton, 1991), 202–3; and J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (1966; Berkeley, 1971), 16. Given Madison’s resistance to Hume’s moral psychology and his greater affinity with the ideas of Scottish common sense philosophy, it makes more sense to align him with Hutcheson, Reid, or Adam Smith. On that issue, see Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976), 119–120; Peter Winch, *Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision* (Cambridge, 1978), 146–63, 178–80; and Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 2001), 232.

58. Readers did not even know that *Federalist* 10 was Madison’s first appearance as Publius, nor did they seem to find its arguments any more compelling than those of numbers 1

through 8. Those essays focused on the importance of unity in face of the multiple threats facing the new nation, threats from European powers, threats from the wilderness and the Indians it contained, and threats from each other if they were to split apart. Madison's penetrating analysis of faction and his sophisticated case for deliberative democracy seem to have left his contemporaries underwhelmed. Strikingly, Publius himself lost interest in them for a while. Other issues loomed larger.

59. See Amar, *America's Constitution*.

60. Particularly pertinent to the history of democracy were some of Madison's other early contributions to the *Federalist*, which helped secure ratification of the Constitution—and later, when the first party division appeared in the 1790s, allowed partisans to read back into his contributions to the *Federalist* preferences and prophecies inconsistent with Madison's deepest convictions. Madison was self-consciously engaged in a strategic project. As the first essays of the *Federalist* were appearing in print, he emphasized in a letter that he was not writing political philosophy. As in Philadelphia, the Federalists had to keep their eyes on the target. "If any Constitution is to be established by deliberation and choice," Madison wrote to Archibald Stuart on October 30, 1787, "it must be examined with many allowances and must be compared, not with the theory which each individual may frame in his own mind, but with the system which it is meant to take the place of and with any other which there might be a probability of obtaining." Much as he might have enjoyed writing a *Republic*, a *Utopia*, an *Oceana*, or a *Social Contract*, he had a different objective, and in *Federalist* 10 and 14 he threw himself into it.

Wilson delivered his great Rousseauvian oration at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention just two days after Madison's *Federalist* 10 was published. Given Wilson's

explicit endorsement of Rousseau and the already noted parallels between Wilson's arguments and Madison's, only the stubborn insistence that Madison must have meant something different from Rousseau has blinded commentators to the similarities between his idea of a public good emerging from the deliberation of representatives and Rousseau's conception of the general will. Given the distinction that Madison and Hamilton had sketched in *Federalist* 9 and 10, Madison now had to establish the point that Wilson had made so powerfully in Pennsylvania. Replying to Antifederalists who worried that those elected to the United States Congress would be too remote from the people, Madison insisted in *Federalist* 14, his first contribution after Wilson's intervention in Pennsylvania, that their foes' objections foundered on two crucial considerations, the principle of popular sovereignty and the practice of representation. Echoing Wilson's arguments at the Ratifying Convention, Madison insisted that the entire American political system, from towns through states to the federal government, was founded on the principle of popular government. The anxiety about a state within a state, *imperium in imperio*, was baseless. All organs of government in the United States stood on a common, but unprecedented, foundation, the will of the people. Expressing themselves through elections at every level of government, the American people authorized the exercise of power by those they had chosen. The power remained with them, and they could use it whenever they saw fit by replacing one set of elected representatives with another.

That principle of popular sovereignty had been operating already for more than thirteen years. Against claims that representatives would be too aloof, or too distant from the concerns of local politics, Madison invoked Americans' experience during the war

for independence and under the Articles of Confederation, first with the Continental Congress and then with the Confederation Congress. Under the Constitution, the federal government would continue as before. Representatives would be elected to local, state, and national office to do the work appropriate to their positions, the work they were authorized by the voters to do. Although Madison and Hamilton had now adopted the term “republic” for this system of representative government and confined the use of “democracy” to small polities in which all citizens could gather and deliberate together, the Constitution they were defending in those terms was the same one Wilson had defended so eloquently and convincingly in Pennsylvania as “purely democratical.” Just as Wilson had insisted that the purpose of deliberation was to broaden the sensibilities of the representatives so that they might come to understand the “welfare of the whole” rather than the narrow interests of a part, and had offered Madison’s principle of enlarging the sphere as a means to that end, so had Madison reasoned in *Federalist* 10 concerning the means to the end of justice. Likewise, Wilson had described “a chain of connection with the people”; Madison in *Federalist* 14 claimed for “America the merit of making the discovery” of representation as “the basis of unmixed”—i.e., non-monarchical and non-aristocratic—“and extensive republics.” Their terminologies now differed. Their arguments did not. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 14, November 30, 1787, ed. Cooke, 83–89; and cf. my discussion of Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention in chapter 9 above, where the echoes of Rousseau are clear.

61. No philosophers had succeeded in distinguishing or defining the faculties of the mind, including “sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination.” So it is no surprise that even greater “obscurity” clouds our understanding of the institutions such

mysterious creatures create. Nor is our language equal to the task. Ideally, ideas about political institutions “should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriated to them,” but instead we lack the words for the most complex and novel products of our imaginations. Madison’s summary expressed his awareness of the problems faced in Philadelphia by those who produced, and now faced by those who were deciding whether to ratify, the Constitution: “Here then are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.” Although Madison offered no examples, his own creative substitution of “republic” for “democracy” would have provided an excellent illustration of his point. Given all these obstacles, he concluded, and given how seldom efforts to construct or reform existing constitutions have succeeded in history, the “real wonder” was not that the Constitution is flawed but that “so many difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost unprecedented.” It was a rare moment, Madison admitted. Achieving a better outcome at the end of the fractious and prolonged public debate over the Constitution would, he implied, be next to impossible. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 37, January 11, 1788, ed. Cooke, 231–39. On the epistemological grounds of Madison’s moderation, see the insightful discussion in Rakove, *Original Meanings*, 156–58.

62. Franklin in Max Farrand, ed. *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, 3 vols. (New Haven, 1911), 2:641–43. In several later essays, Madison emphasized the principle of popular sovereignty: all government officials “are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people.” Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 39, January 16, 1788, ed. Cooke, 250–57; *Federalist* 45, January 26, 1788, ed. Cooke, 308–14; *Federalist* 46,

January 29, 1788, ed. Cooke, 315–23. The quotation comes from 315. State legislatures, unchecked by weak executives, represented a more serious danger because unbalanced governments, with all power concentrated in the legislative branch, had proved the most common source of despotism. Those who feared the Senate misunderstood its function in the structure of popular representative government. Rather than being constituted by members of a separate social order, the United States Senate would provide only another deliberative forum that would balance the House, represent each state equally, and provide greater stability because of the longer terms of office. The Constitution explicitly prohibited the creation of an aristocracy. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 48, February 1, 1788, ed. Cooke, 332–38.

63. John Stevens Jr. writing as Americanus, *New York Daily Advertiser*, November 30, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:437–42.
64. A Columbian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren], *Observations on the Constitution*, February 1788, in *DOTC* 2:284–303. At the end of 1788, reflecting on Jefferson’s suggestion that members of the upper house of the Virginia assembly serve only two-year terms, Madison defended the longer terms of U.S. Senators by decrying the “spirit of *locality*” that was developing in the state legislature as representatives focused too narrowly on the particular interests of their constituencies. That obsession with their own neighbors caused them to “lose sight of the aggregate interests of the community, and even to sacrifice them to the interests or prejudices of their respective constituents.” Whereas most Antifederalists believed that such close attention to local interests was the point of popular government, and agreed with Columbian Patriot that annual elections were the best guarantee of responsibility so conceived, Madison disagreed. Madison writing as

Publius, *Federalist* 62, February 27, 1788, ed. Cooke, 415–22; and *Federalist* 63, March 1, 1788, ed. Cooke, 422–31. Madison’s “Observations on the ‘Draft for the Constitution for Virginia’” was his reply to the sketch in Jefferson’s *Notes on the State of Virginia*; it is in Madison, *Writings*, 409–18. On the emergence of the word and the concept of responsibility, see Thomas Haskell, *Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History* (Baltimore, 1998), 282–84.

65. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 55, February 13, 1788, ed. Cooke, 372–78.
66. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 51, February 6, 1788, ed. Cooke, 347–53.
67. A recent analysis that confirms this judgment is Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 35–39. The people would have all the power in their hands, Madison observed, and even if they chose poorly sometimes, “motives of a more selfish nature” would motivate representatives, because the “restraint of frequent elections” meant that elected officials could not escape the judgment of their constituencies. All these provisions would tie the governors to the governed, creating “between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments” that link representatives “with the great mass of the people” by “duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself.” From the most generous benevolence to the narrowest self-interest, Madison found multiple reasons why representatives would pursue the general interest. Madison writing as Publius, *Federalist* 57, February 19, 1788, ed. Cooke, 384–90.
68. Federal Farmer, for example, concluded his first set of letters by underscoring his confidence that the “state conventions” would “examine coolly every article, clause, and word in the system proposed.” Because the “state conventions will probably consist of fifteen hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science of

government, collected from all parts of the community and from all orders of men, it must be acknowledged that the weight of respectability will be in them.” He concluded that the delegates would represent “the solid sense and the real political character of the country.” Federal Farmer in *DOTC* 1:287, 285. The fullest analysis of the debates in the ratifying conventions is Maier, *Ratification*. See also Michael Allen Gillespie and Michael Lienesch, eds., *Ratifying the Constitution* (Lawrence, KS, 1989), and the massive collection on which all such studies depend, *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution*.

69. Consider just one example. In New York, the state to which the essays in the *Federalist* were devoted, so much was printed in so many publications that a truly comprehensive analysis of all the primary sources may never be possible. See Cecil L. Embanks, “New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of the Union,” in the best overview of these debates, *Ratifying the Constitution*, ed. Gillespie and Lienesch, 334n2; Linda Grant DePauw, *The Eleventh Pillar: New York State and the Federal Constitution* (Ithaca, 1966); John Kaminski, “New York: The Reluctant Pillar,” in *The Reluctant Pillar: New York and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*, ed. Stephen L. Schechter (Troy, NY, 1985), 48–117; and Isaac Kramnick, “The ‘Great National Discussion’: The Discourse of Politics in 1788,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (January 1988): 3–32.
70. Wilson’s speech of December 11, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:832–68. According to John Fabian Witt, Wilson’s use of the image of the pyramid shows that he conceived of the Constitution as an ideal of timeless perfection, a conception consistent with J. G. A. Pocock’s argument concerning republican obsessions with timelessness. Elsewhere in the essay, however, Witt notes that other contemporaries interpreted the pyramids as symbols

of decay. Suggestive as such cultural analysis can be, it is complicated by the frequency with which particularly potent symbols are interpreted in multiple ways at any given time and over different eras. It is at least equally plausible to align Wilson's use of the pyramid with the version of the symbol that eventually became part of the Great Seal of the United States, the 1782 image of an unfinished pyramid that was the work of Wilson's friend Francis Hopkinson, an image that powerfully suggests that the work of building a democracy is never completed. See Witt, *Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 15–82.

71. As the proceedings wound down to traded epithets and accusations, Smilie contended that because fewer than one-sixth of Pennsylvania's electorate had voted in the selection of delegates, the unrepresented majority might take matters into its own hands if the convention endorsed a Constitution "the people" deemed despotic. Federalists, who held a two-to-one majority at the convention, howled at the charge and insisted that Pennsylvanians would not be swayed by the ranting of disgruntled losers. William Shippen to Thomas Lee Shippen, December 12, 1788, in *DHRC* 2:601. The documentary record manifests these partisan divisions, and historians' accounts mirror the divisions. Cf. the strikingly discordant characterizations of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention and its aftermath in Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 171–96; Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*, 375–82; Maier, *Ratification*, 99–120; George J. Graham, Jr., "Pennsylvania: Representation and the Meaning of Republicanism," in *Ratifying the Constitution*, ed. Gillespie and Lienisch, 52–70; Saul Cornell, "Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Antifederalism," *Journal of American History* 76 (March 1999): 1148–72; and cf. Cornell, *The Other Founders*, 109–18.

72. *DHRC* 5:995–1001; and see Maier, *Ratification*, 138–53.
73. As Federalists had argued elsewhere, two-year terms made sense because it would take time to learn how to cope with the more complicated problems facing the entire nation. The South, they insisted, would simply never have accepted a Constitution that abolished slavery, and slavery would die when the supply of slaves was shut off. Finally the Senate, instead of serving as a breeding ground for aristocrats, simply registered the integrity of the state governments and guarded against excesses of popular passion.
74. See Maier, *Ratification*, 138–213; and Michael Allen Gillespie, “Massachusetts: Creating Consensus,” in Gillespie and Lienisch, *Ratifying the Constitution*, 138–67.
75. Also crucial was the Massachusetts Federalists’ earnest engagement with their opponents. They knew that the arrogance of Wilson and the Morrisses had antagonized many delegates. Smith in *DHRC* 6:1510, 1514; Backus in *DHRC* 6:1215, 1224–26; and Maier, *Ratification*, 188–208.
76. Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, in *Writings*, 914–18.
77. Madison’s initial objections to a declaration of rights stemmed from his judgment that rights were hopelessly vague, were impossible to enforce, and had proved ineffective in the states. For a detailed discussion of his changing ideas on this complex issue, see Rakove, *Original Meanings*, 290–338.
78. Madison, “Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on the Judicial Power,” June 20, 1788, in *Writings*, 393–400. Its crucial significance is so widely accepted that it has become one of the most frequently quoted of all of Madison’s writings, in part at least because it illustrates so well the mingling of Christian, Scottish common sense,

republican, and liberal intellectual traditions. See James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 21–37.

79. See, for example, “Melancton Smith Speaks in Support of Ratification without Condition,” July 23, 1787, *DOTC* 2: 852–53.
80. Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in *Writings*, 418–23. After his election, Madison wrote letters to various Virginians explaining his new position. “Circumstances are now changed: The Constitution is established on the ratifications of eleven States and a very great majority of the people of America.” Given that context, “amendments, if pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode, will be not only safe, but may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, and of providing additional guards in favour of liberty.” Now, Madison wrote, “it is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to be revised,” and he described the revisions he had in mind. Securing “the rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude,” the goal he and Jefferson had struggled to achieve for more than a decade, stood at the top of the list, followed by “freedom of the press, trial by jury, security against general warrants, &c.” Madison to George Eve, January 2, 1789, in *Writings*, 427–28.
81. Madison, “Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments,” June 8, 1789, in *Writings*, 437–52.
82. Madison, “Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments,” 441–42.
83. Madison, “Remarks in Congress on the ‘Most Valuable Amendment,’” in *Writings*, 470. On the Bill of Rights, see Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds., *Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress* (Baltimore, 1991); and cf. Akhil Amar, *The Bill of Rights: Creation*

and Reconstruction (New Haven, 1998); Cass Sunstein, *The Partial Constitution* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Donald S. Lutz, *A Preface to American Political Theory* (Lawrence, KS, 1993) 77–81; Calvin H. Johnson, *Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Making of the Founders' Constitution* (Cambridge, 2005); Woody Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Making of the Constitution* (New York, 2007); and Terry Bouton, *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (Oxford, 2007).

84. Widgery and Taylor in *DHRC* 6:1487–89; and cf. Maier, *Ratification*, 207–13; Beeman, *Plain, Honest Men*, 389–91; Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 136; and Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 216–56.
85. The festivities were described in the *Massachusetts Centinel*, February 13, 1788, in *DHRC* 7:1623–27. Baltimore followed with a celebration “allamode de Boston” designed to outdo the New Englanders. According to Baltimore’s *Maryland Journal*, the procession attracted more than three thousand participants, again including “Farmers, Mechanics and Merchants, to form the most interesting Scene ever exhibited in this Part of the World.” The comprehensive array of workers, representing every occupation practiced in the state, was designed to demonstrate that, contrary to the Antifederalists’ rhetoric, “the people” were as pleased with the new Constitution as were those Federalists’ dubbed “aristocrats.” The report concluded by emphasizing the absence of any “unfortunate Accident” to mar the “most perfect Regularity, Order and Harmony,” precisely what the Constitution’s champions expected for the nation itself. The conflicts of the critical period would give way to the “warmest Feelings of Benevolence, Hospitality, and Friendship,” just as the scene after the parade showed “the Happiness of

each Order, the Happiness of each Individual, the Happiness of every Spectator,” all of which were “increased by the Consciousness of heightening the Felicity of others.” The Federalists’ coalition included merchants, bankers, and lawyers, but many farmers and an overwhelming majority of the nation’s urban artisans also saw in the plan the prospect of economic growth after a decade of stagnation and struggle. When those marching through the streets of Baltimore and “a prodigious Number of spectators” joined for a post-parade feast, the after-dinner toasts began with a rousing one to “The Majesty of the People.” *Maryland Journal*, May 6, 1788, *DOTC* 2:430–38. See also Edward Countryman, “The Creation of the United States: From Revolution to Ratification,” in *What Did the Constitution Mean to Early Americans?*, ed. Edward Countryman (Boston, 1999), 17–23.

86. The “Account of the Grand Federal Procession” appeared in three Philadelphia newspapers on July 9, 1788 and was later published as a pamphlet and in German translation. See *DHRC* 18:246–49. Excerpts from Wilson’s notes for his address are in *DHRC* 18:242–46. See also Laura Rigal, ““Raising the Roof”: Authors, Spectators, and Artisans in the Grand Federal Procession of 1788,” *Theatre Journal* 48 (1996): 253–77; and Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat*, 340–78.
87. The toast by the Boston artisans’ committee was published in the *Independent Chronicle* (Boston), February 14, 1788, in *DHRC* 7:1630–31. The temptation to issue a final rebuke was too strong for one Massachusetts partisan to resist: now that the Constitution had been ratified, the word “federal” expresses “national honour, dignity, freedom, happiness, and every republican privilege,” whereas “anti-federalism” means only “anarchy, confusion, rebellion, treason, sacrilege, and rapine.” *Massachusetts Gazette*, January 18,

1788, in *DHRC* 5:744. New York's procession, which included professors in academic regalia along with the usual farmers and artisans, attracted twenty thousand spectators; even in the smaller city of Charleston, more than three thousand participated. A letter in the *United States Chronicle* concerning the festivities planned for July 4, 1788, explained that "it is therefore good Policy, and a sure Mark of Patriotism and public Virtue, to endeavour as much as possible that all Ranks and Orders of People should be pleased with, and should wish to support" the government of the new nation. The letter is quoted in Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat*, 372.

88. Benjamin Rush in *DHRC* 18:265. In the words of the Reverend Joseph Haven, Sermon Preached in Rochester, New Hampshire, November 27, 1788, "If wisdom, virtue, and integrity, and a public spirit prevail: in short, if we observe the Christian religion, we shall be a happy, a flourishing, wealthy, and renowned people." Haven quoted in Heideking, *The Constitution before the Judgment Seat*, 373. See also George J. Graham Jr., "Pennsylvania: Representation and the Meaning of Republicanism," in Gillespie and Lienisch, *Ratifying in the Constitution*, 52–70; and Maier, *Ratification*, 100–1. Illustrations of the value of using the tools of cultural history to illuminate early American public life include David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Len Travers, *Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early Republic* (Amherst, MA, 1997); Simon P. Newman, *Parades and the Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 1997); and the essays collected in Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher, eds., *Beyond the Founders* (Chapel Hill, 2004).

89. [John Stevens Jr.], *Observations on Government* (New York, 1787), 50; James Iredell's speech at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 28, 1788, *DOTC* 2:882–87; David Ramsay, *The History of the American Revolution* (Trenton, 1811), 452; Thomas Pownall, *A Memorial Addressed to the Sovereigns of America* (London, 1783), 53; Nathaniel Chipman, *Sketches of the Principles of Government* (Rutland, VT, 1793), 289–90.
90. Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, in Paine, *Writings*, ed. Eric Foner (New York, 1984), 594; Paine to George Washington, July 30, 1796, in *The Life and Works of Thomas Paine*, ed. William M. Van der Weyde (New Rochelle, 1925), quoted in Alfred F. Young, “The Framers of the Constitution and the ‘Genius’ of the People,” *Radical History Review* 42 (1988): 8–18. Young's article illustrates perfectly the persistent view that all Federalists—Madison and Wilson as much as Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, or Robert Livingston—had to be forced by popular pressure to accept the democratic provisions of the Constitution, including the bill of rights. That argument underestimates the extent to which Madison and Wilson at least were motivated from the outset by an abiding commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty. Although my analysis concentrates primarily on Madison and Wilson because I believe they contributed the most sophisticated and influential arguments both at the Constitutional Convention and in the ratification debates, they were hardly alone. See Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell, *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the “Other” Federalists, 1787–1788* (Indianapolis, 1998).
91. Adams to John Jay, December 16, 1787, in *Works* 8:467.

92. Wilson, "Lectures on Law, Introductory Lecture: Of the study of law in the United States," *The Works of James Wilson*, ed. Robert Green McCloskey, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1967), 1:79. On the new Pennsylvania constitution as a betrayal of democracy and "the people" effected by a coalition of Federalist and Antifederalist "elites," see Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 171–96.
93. Alexander Graydon, who did not share Wilson's enthusiasm for popular government, wrote in his memoir that "Wilson was truly great, but enthusiastically democratic. The symptoms of returning reason, evinced by the adoption of the federal constitution, had probably put him in good humour with the people, and made him more than ever in love with 'free and independent men.'" In response to Wilson's proposal that both the Senate and the Assembly in Pennsylvania should be elected by the people, Alexander Graydon wrote that Wilson's conception of popular sovereignty reminded him of Rousseau: "*Ces Pauvres Savoyards sont si bonnes gens!* As Jean-Jacques says. And who could say less of the good souls of Pennsylvania?" See Alexander Graydon, *Memoirs of a Life, Chiefly Passed in Pennsylvania, Within the Last Sixty Years* (Edinburgh and London, 1822), 371–72.
94. Wilson, "Lectures on Law, Lecture 10: Of Government," in *Works* 1:305.
95. Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 222–29.
96. John Stevens Jr. dissented from Madison's and Wilson's talk of justice and argued that representative democracy could function very well without "heroic virtues which we admire" in the ancient world. "The sacrifice of our dearest interests, self-denial and austerity of manners, are by no means necessary." If instead American citizens "pursue merely their own true interest and happiness," the republic will "flourish for ages." The

reasons, Stevens insisted, could be traced to the enlarged sphere of the republic, the responsibility forced on representatives by regular elections, and the difference between “self denial” on the one hand and citizens’ “true interest and happiness” on the other. Americanus [John Stevens Jr.], “On Representation and the Modern State,” *New York Daily Advertiser*, November 30, 1787, in *DOTC* 1:437–42.

97. Benjamin Rush, “A Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools,” in *Essays on Education in the Early Republic*, ed. Frederick Rudolph (Cambridge, MA, 1965), 19. The literature on the *doux commerce* thesis is extensive. Notable contributions include A. O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph* (Princeton, 1977); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 290–302; Winch, *Adam Smith’s Politics*; Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade* (Cambridge, MA, 2005); J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Honor, and History* (Cambridge, MA, 1985); and Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, 1990). The scholars who have done the most to introduce competing versions of this thesis into American historical studies include Lance Banning, *The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology* (Ithaca, 1978); and Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, 1980), who emphasized the role of classical republicanism in shaping the version they associated with Jeffersonian agrarianism. See also Joyce Appleby, “What Is Still American in the Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 93 (1982): 287–304; and Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, MA,

1992). For an extended discussion of this literature, see Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism*, chaps. 2–4.

98. In the New York ratifying convention he echoed the argument he had made in the Constitutional Convention: “the difference in property is already great amongst us. Commerce and industry will increase the disparity.” But rather than criticizing that development, as Jefferson, Adams, and Madison did repeatedly, Hamilton welcomed it: “as riches increase and accumulate in a few hands; as luxury prevails in society; virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from the republican standard.” Hamilton at the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 1788, in *DOTC* 2:771. For Hamilton’s earlier speech at the Constitutional Convention, see *Records* 1:283–301.
99. Here and in other, similar letters Jefferson also recommended, as guides to ethics, the works of Plato, Cicero, Locke, Hutcheson, Kames, Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the novelist Laurence Sterne. “Above all,” though, he urged Carr to “lose no occasion of exercising your dispositions to be grateful, to be generous, to be charitable, to be human, to be true, just, firm, orderly, courageous &c. Consider every act of this kind as an exercise which will strengthen your moral faculties, & increase your worth.” Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 10, 1787, in *Writings*, 900–6. See also Jefferson’s letters to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814, in *Writings*, 1335–39; and to John Minor, August 30, 1814, in *Writings*, 1557–61. In the letter to Law, Jefferson wrote, “Self-love, therefore, is no part of morality....It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities to self-gratification in violation of our moral duties to others....Take from man his selfish propensities, and he can have nothing to seduce him from the practice of virtue. Or

subdue those propensities by education, instruction or restraint, and virtue remains without a competitor.” Jefferson then reflected on the argument, advanced by Helvetius and others, that we perform acts of kindness and mercy “because we receive ourselves pleasure from these acts.” But the question, Jefferson noted, is why such acts “give us pleasure? Because nature hath implanted in our breasts a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses.” Echoing his letter to Carr twenty-six years earlier, Jefferson continued, “The Creator would indeed have been a bungling artist, had he intended man for a social animal, without planting in him social dispositions.” Although in some rare instances such a conscience seems to be lacking—as indeed in some instances people lack the capacity to see or speak—the defect is to be addressed through education. Jefferson conceded that the forms of behavior deemed virtuous can vary according to cultures and circumstances, but he remained firm in his conviction that “the existence of a moral instinct” is “the brightest gem with which the human character is studded.”

100. Adams, *Discourses on Davila*, in *Works* 6:114–15, 232–49. See the extended discussion of this desire for approbation in C. Bradley Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty* (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 151–73.
101. Mercy Otis Warren, “Alphabet for [her daughter] Marcia” (n.d.), in Mercy Otis Warren Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. This passage comes from the entry for the letter “G,” for “Gentleness of manners,” which Warren observes “is the result of goodness of heart” rather than “the studied decorum of politeness.” As was true of her friend Abigail Adams, Warren repeatedly emphasized the importance of duty. For the letter “D,” she wrote that “Duty should be the first consideration in whatever we undertake.”

Admonishing her children to lives of virtue is the central theme of her correspondence with her offspring. For two particularly pointed examples, see her letters to her son Winslow dated June, 1780, and September 26, 1780, in which she urges him to choose virtue over ease or beauty. In her letter to John Adams, May 18, 1780, Warren expresses her anxieties about the prospects for popular government should Americans lose their firm commitment to civic virtue. See also Rosemarie Zagarri, "Between Liberalism and Republicanism: 'Manners' in the Political Thought of Mercy Otis Warren," in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James A. Henretta, with the Assistance of Peter Becker (Cambridge, 2002), 121; Rosemarie Zagarri, *A Woman's Dilemma: Mercy Otis Warren and the American Revolution* (Wheeling, IL, 1995); and Rosemarie Zagarri, "The American Revolution and a New National Politics," in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, 483–98.

102. Ezra Stiles, *The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor* (New Haven, 1783), 7–8.

103. Charles Chauncy, *The Benevolence of the Deity* (Boston, 1784), 186.

104. Asa Burton, *A Sermon Preached at Windsor...on the Day of the Anniversary Election, October, 1785* (Windsor, VT, 1786), 22.

105. Charles Backus, *A Sermon Preached in Long-Meadow at the Publick Feast, April 17, 1788* (Springfield, MA, 1788), 13, 21.

106. Aaron Bancroft, "An Account of his Ministry in the Second Parish" (1785), 7–8, Aaron Bancroft Papers, 1789–1839, American Antiquarian Society; and David Barnes, "Sermon on Timothy 6:9," November 13, 1785, David Barnes Sermons, 2 manuscript vols., 1:1091, American Antiquarian Society. Even though the American Antiquarian Society

gives the dates 1789–1839 for the Aaron Bancroft Papers, the quoted passages come from the text Bancroft wrote on June 7, 1785, when he was accepting his appointment as minister of the breakaway Second Church of Worcester. He had been rejected by the majority of the congregation of the First Church because of his liberal views. His message to his new congregation is included among the notes he appended to the text of the sermon on the history of liberal Protestantism that he delivered at the Second Church to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination. Although Bancroft made no references in his sermons to his son, the historian George Bancroft, or to any other of his thirteen children, it is clear that he considered himself a historian as well. In his sermon “State Fast on Account of the War,” delivered on July 23, 1812, he provided an overview of English settlements in New England from the 1620s through the current conflict with Britain. Bancroft’s themes remained constant throughout his career. In that 1812 sermon, he wrote that “Piety & patriotism, righteousness & sobriety, formed the character of our venerable ancestors.” Those seventeenth- and eighteenth-century New Englanders “were not distracted by different interests, nor divided into political parties but...were united to promote the common good.” Aaron Bancroft Papers, American Antiquarian Society. Like those of Aaron Bancroft, David Barnes’s sermons are peppered with references to duty, obligation, and justice. See for example his “Sermon on Luke 2:14,” May 7, 1786, David Barnes Sermons, American Antiquarian Society. A fine essay locating Bancroft and Barnes in their historical context is Jason Opal, “The Labors of Liberality: Christian Benevolence and National Prejudice in the American Founding,” *Journal of American History* 94 (2008): 1082–1107.

107. Enos Hitchcock, *An oration: delivered July 4, 1788, at the request of the inhabitants of the town of Providence, in celebration of the anniversary of American independence, and of the accession of nine states to the Federal Constitution* (Providence, 1788), 21–22. On Hitchcock and the ways in which he and other Protestant ministers blended the Christian emphasis on benevolence with Federalist politics and antislavery sentiments, see Jason Opal, “The Labors of Liberality,” 1099–1107; and Jason Opal, *Beyond the Farm: National Ambitions in Rural New England* (Philadelphia, 2008), 69–95.
108. Benjamin Rush to John Adams, July 21, 1789, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, ed. L. H. Butterfield, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1951), 1:523; Rush to Elhanan Winchester, November 12, 1791, in *Letters* 1:611; Rush to Jefferson, August 22, 1800, in *Letters* 2:820–21.
109. Adams to Charles Francis Adams, January 9, 1794, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, ed. L. H. Butterfield et al., 12 vols. to date (Cambridge, MA, 1963–), 10:20.
110. Jefferson to Rush, September 23, 1800, in *Writings*, 1080–82.
111. Jefferson to Moses Robinson, March 23, 1801, in *Writings*, 1087–88. See also the book of selections from the New Testament that Jefferson pieced together to form the ethical code he considered the heart of Christianity: *Jefferson’s Extracts from the Gospels*, ed. Dickenson W. Adams (Princeton, 1983).
112. See Stephen A. Marini, “Religion, Politics, and Ratification,” in *Religion in a Revolutionary Age*, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, 1994), 184–217; Nathan Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven, 1991); Jon Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge, MA, 1990); and the especially judicious study by Mark Noll, *America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 2002).

113. For evidence of the wide variety of forms this new democratic sensibility took in the early national period, see Robert Wiebe, *The Opening of American Society: From the Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Disunion* (New York, 1984); Robert Shalhope, *A Tale of New England: The Diaries of Hiram Harwood, Vermont Farmer, 1810–1837* (Baltimore, 2003); Joyce Appleby, *Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans* (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 40–99; Andrew Robertson, *The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790–1900* (Ithaca, 1995); Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 423–55; Richard J. Twomey, “Jacobins and Jeffersonians: Anglo-American Radical Ideology, 1790–1810,” in *The Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism*, 284–99; Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992), chaps. 13–19; and Wood, “The Founders and the Creation of Modern Public Opinion,” in Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 245–74.
114. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. Franz Neumann, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), 96.
115. François-Alexandre Frédérique, duc de la Rochefoucauld, *Constitutions des treize Etats-Unis de l’Amérique* (Paris, 1783); François-Alexandre Frédérique, duc de la Rochefoucauld, *Travels through the United States of North America, the Country of the Iroquois, and Upper Canada in the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797*, 2 vols. (London, 1799), 1:64–66. Rochefoucauld-Liancourt also characterized American religiosity in tones eerily similar to those Tocqueville would use in *Democracy in America*. He noted that despite the flurry of church-building and church-going everywhere, religion for most Americans seemed more “a political engine than a way to salvation.” Again foreshadowing

Tocqueville, he noted only one exception to that rule: the inhabitants of New England—and New Englanders spreading westward—whom he found “more religious,” “remarkably industrious,” and “purer in their morals than any of the rest” (1:165).

Chapter 10

1. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des européens dans les Deux Indes* (1772; Geneva, 1781): 6:427–28; Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and the West Indies*, trans. J. O Justamond, 6 vols. (1776; New York, 1969). See also Michael Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2007); *Avantages et désavantages de la découverte de l'Amérique: Chastellux, Raynal et le concours de l'Académie de Lyon de 1787*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Lusenbrink and Alexandre Mussard (Saint-Etienne, 1994); and Christopher Iannini, “The Itinerant Man: Crèvecoeur’s Caribbean, Raynal’s Revolution, and the Fate of Atlantic Cosmopolitanism,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 61 (2004): 201–34.
2. Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, vol. 1: *The Challenge* (Princeton, 1959), 244, lists both the dates of the appearance of the major assessments of the new nation and the dates of the books’ translations into the major European languages. See also Palmer’s broader discussion of these issues on 238–82.
3. Louis Genty, *L’influence de la découverte de l’Amérique sur le bonheur du genre humain* (Paris, 1787), cited in Bernard Faÿ, *L’Esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux Etats-Unis à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1925), 133.
4. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Révolution de l’Amérique* (London, 1781), 85.
5. Lafayette’s letter quoted in Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 166.

6. Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville quoted in Durand Echeverria, *Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (Princeton, 1957). Brissot has been roundly criticized as a hack writer and opportunist who, characteristically, went to America as much to speculate in land as to learn about democracy. Cf. Palmer, *Democratic Revolution* 1:260–63; and Robert Darnton, “A Spy in Grub Street,” in Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 41–69. For a less cynical account, see Richard Whatmore and James Livesey, “Etienne Clavière, Jacques-Pierre Brissot, et les fondations intellectuelles de la politique des Girondins,” *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 3 (October 2000): 1–26.
7. Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville and Etienne Clavière, *Le Philadelphien à Genève, ou lettres d’un Américain sur la dernière révolution de Genève, sa constitution nouvelle, l’émigration en Irlande, etc., pouvant servir de tableau politique de Genève jusqu’en 1784* (Dublin, 1783). See also James Livesey, *Making Democracy in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
8. See Louis André Vigneras, “La Société gallo-américaine de 1787,” in *Bulletin de l’Institut français de Washington*, December 1952, and the discussion of the quick dissolution of the society in Palmer, *Democratic Revolution* 1:261–62. Evidently Clavière was impatient with the focus on France and America, believing, as he put it, that these truths would be “useful and beneficial to all men in general, without distinction of nation.”
9. Brissot, *Plan de conduite des députés du peuple aux Etats-Généraux de 1789* (Paris, 1789), 240–42.

10. Vivid portraits of France on the eve of the Revolution include William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1990); and Colin Jones, *The Great Nation: France from Louis XIV to Napoleon* (London, 2002). The standard source on French historical demography is Jacques Dupâquier et al., *Histoire de la population française*, vol. 2: *De la Renaissance à 1789* (Paris, 1988).
11. On the role played by these controversies between Jansenists and the Gallican Church in setting the stage for the struggles over Catholicism during the Revolution, see Dale Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven, 1996); and William Doyle, *Jansenism* (London, 2000).
12. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte*, ed. J. Le Brun (Geneva, 1967), 185; Bossuet, *Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture*, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge, 1990).
13. Antoine-Louis Séguier quoted in Keith Michael Baker, “French Political Thought at the Accession of Louis XVI,” *Journal of Modern History* 50 (1978): 279–303; reprinted in Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1990), 116.
14. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans Alan Kahan, ed. François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1998), 1:142.
15. The king’s declaration, “C’est légal parce que je le veux,” is quoted in Jones, *Great Nation*, 387. On the run-up to that crisis of 1787, see Durand Echeverria, *The Maupeou Revolution: A Study in the History of Libertarianism, France 1770–4* (Baton Rouge, 1985); and Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution*, 249–367. On the absence of republican traditions in France, cf. Nannerl Keohane, *Philosophy and the*

State in France (Princeton, 1980), 458; and the discussion of writers such as Joseph Saige, who made spirited attempts to invoke (or create) just such a tradition, in Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, 109–52. Despite Baker’s claims for the significance of such scattered efforts, the difference between the extensive political engagement from the local to the national level in the American colonies and the lack of such engagement in France remains striking. For a particularly pointed statement of François Furet’s broader and deeply influential case that the absolutist monarchy destroyed the political vitality of the institutions of the old regime in France, see François Furet, “Alexis de Tocqueville,” in *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 1021–32, and more broadly, the introduction by Furet and Françoise Mélonio to their edition of de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* 1:1–79.

16. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, October 28, 1785, in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 840–43, discussed on pp. 380–81 above.
17. Jefferson to George Wythe, August 13, 1786; and to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, in Jefferson, *Writings*, 857–60, 879–81.
18. Jefferson to J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, August 9, 1788, and to the Rev. James Madison, July 19, 1788, in *Writings*, 927–29, 923–27. On the emergence of a Jeffersonian “political economy of virtue” that registered and elicited widespread criticism of “luxury” as the principal problem in France, see John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, 2006).

19. Comparisons of the French and American Revolutions include Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*; Higonnet, *Sister Republics*; Anne Sa'adah, *The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France: A Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, 1990); and Mark Hulliung, *Citizens and Citoyens: Republicans and Liberals in America and France* (Cambridge, MA, 2002). Discussions with Higonnet and Hulliung have shaped my understanding of both the French and the American Revolutions even though my interpretation differs from theirs.
20. See the discussion of the physiocrats in chapter 6 above. On the sources and consequences of this crucial dynamic in French culture, see the illuminating discussion in Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics*, 121–70.
21. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, *Vie de Turgot*, in Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes de Condorcet*, 5:209–10, 211.
22. On Turgot's *Mémoire sur les municipalités*, written between 1774 and 1776, see Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, 120–22.
23. Turgot quoted in Jones, *Great Nation*, 295, from C. C. Gillespie, *Science and Polity in Old Regime France* (Princeton, 1980), 3. On Turgot and progress, see Frank E. Manuel, *The Prophets of Paris* (Cambridge, MA, 1962).
24. Turgot's letter to Price first appeared at the conclusion of Richard Price, *Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution and the Means of Making It a Benefit to the World* (London, 1784), 95–114.
25. Recall that when John Adams was boasting about the significance of the 1780 Constitution he wrote for Massachusetts, he claimed “it is Locke, Sidney, and Rousseau

and de Mably reduced to practice.” Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850–56), 4:216. See p. 351 above.

26. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, *Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen* (Paris, 1789), 126–27, 99.
27. Mably did not share Adams’s interest in an elected chief executive. Consistent with his other writings (and those of almost every other writer in France), Mably considered a king indispensable. See Palmer, *Democratic Revolution* 1:269–70.
28. Adams did not read *De la législation* until 1791; he reread it in 1806. His marginal notations, in his copy of *De la législation* in the Adams Papers at the Boston Public Library and available online, reflect his increasing ire concerning the course of the French Revolution as well as his changing attitudes toward Mably’s political ideas.
29. The only full-scale study of Mably is Johnson Kent Wright, *A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of Mably* (Stanford, 1997).
30. Although Jefferson showed much shrewder political instincts than Condorcet, he aligned himself with Condorcet’s belief that, as Jefferson put it, “the mind is perfectible to a degree of which we cannot as yet form any conception.” See Jefferson to William Green Mumford, June 18, 1799, in *Writings*, 1065. The most thorough study of Condorcet is Keith Michael Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975). See also *Condorcet: homme des Lumières et la Révolution*, ed. Anne-Marie Chouillet and Pierre Crépel (Fontenay-aux-Roses, 1997). For an astute analysis of Condorcet and a deft treatment of the wide range of recent critical appraisals of his work, see also David W. Bates, *Enlightenment Aberrations: Error & Revolution in France* (Ithaca, 2002), 73–97.

31. Julie de Lespinasse left a charming portrait of the young Condorcet, whom she helped ease from social clumsiness to the charm that came to mark “le bon Condorcet,” as he was often called: “He has received from nature the loftiest mind, the most considerable talent and the fairest of souls; his talent would have been enough to make him famous, his mind to make him sought after; but his soul wins him the friendship of all who come to know him at all well.” Condorcet could converse with ease, she continued, on “philosophy, belles-lettres, the sciences, the arts, government, jurisprudence,” and other topics ranging from “the details of the police” to the “names of the hats in fashion.” Reading his work or talking with him revealed so many “forms of benevolence” that “you will tell yourself a hundred times a day that this is the most astonishing man you have ever heard.” *Lettres inédites de Mlle de Lespinasse*, ed. Charles Henry (Paris, 1887), 232–42; the quotations are from 233–34.
32. Just as established authorities had condemned scientific advances in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so religious and political elites were inciting popular opposition to Enlightenment. But just as the experimental sciences had prevailed, so would the reformers’ projects. “One of the greatest sources of error in the moral sciences being submission to authority, once this submission has become ridiculous in the physical sciences it no longer has its basis in the others and cannot reestablish itself in them.” Condorcet’s notes for the speech accepting admission to the French Academy in 1782, Bibliothèque de l’Institut de France, MS 855, f. 7; trans. Baker, *Condorcet*, 75.
33. Condorcet, *Discours prononcé dans l’Académie française, le jeudi 21 février 1782, à la réception de M. Le marquis de Condorcet*, in *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, ed. A. Condorcet-O’Connor and F. Arago (Paris, 1887), 1:392.

34. Condorcet explained that “our principal task here is to discover the probability that assures the validity of a law passed by the smallest possible majority, such that one can believe that it is not unjust to subject others to this law and that it is useful for oneself to submit to it.” Condorcet, *Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix* (Paris, 1785), cvi.
35. Condorcet, *De l’influence de la Révolution d’Amérique*, in *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, 8:13. See also Robert Darnton, “Condorcet and the Craze for America in France,” in *Franklin and Condorcet: Two Portraits from the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia, 1997).
36. Condorcet quoted in Baker, *Condorcet*, 223; and Condorcet, *De l’influence de la Révolution d’Amérique*, 7.
37. Filippo Mazzei, *Recherches historiques et politiques sur les Etats-Unis*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1788). See also the discussion in Palmer, *Democratic Revolution* 1:277–79; and on Adams’s *Defence*, see chapter 8 above, esp. 383–5.
38. Only at the municipal level would citizens vote directly for electors, who would then choose those who would participate in assemblies, and so on as those selected at one level chose those at the next rung of the ladder all the way to the national assembly. All but the local selections would thus be indirect. Even so, Condorcet contended that those chosen for the unicameral national assembly would be best able to discern the genuine wishes of the nation because they would be “representatives of the citizens chosen by themselves.” Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 8:234.
39. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 8:601.

40. Because it incites “momentary passions that could lead the assembly astray,” deliberation is among “the principal causes of error, of weakness, and of the incoherence of decisions” made by majorities in legislative assemblies. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 8: 208, 211.
41. Condorcet’s early scheme continues to intrigue mathematically inclined social scientists, but its details matter less to historians both because it was soon mooted by events and because Condorcet himself later changed his mind about it. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 9:97–135, 8:117–659; and see Baker, *Condorcet*, 248–62, for commentary on these texts. On the broader significance of Condorcet’s calculus of probabilities, see Lorraine Daston, *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1988). With admirable understatement, Baker characterizes Condorcet’s argument in *Essai sur les assemblées provinciales* as “one of the most tortuously complicated constitutional schemes ever devised by an enlightened mind.” Baker, *Condorcet*, 256. On the relation between Condorcet’s political writings and his economic ideas, see Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 2001), 157–94.
42. Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, *Political Writings*, ed. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis, 2003), is the most accessible collection of Sieyès’s early writings. See also Sonenscher’s analysis of Sieyès’s ideas in the wider framework of European anxieties concerning public debt, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2007), a detailed account of the important role in sparking the French Revolution played by concerns regarding the implications of the French state’s financial crisis. Other recent studies include William H. Sewell, Jr., *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution: The Abbé Sieyès and ‘What Is the Third Estate?’*

(Durham, 1994); and Pasquale Pasquino, *Sieyès et l'invention du constitutionnalisme en France* (Paris, 1998).

43. Sieyès, undated fragment in Archives Nationales, 284 AP 4, dossier 5. More extensive collections of Sieyès's writings, which include such unpublished materials from his voluminous notes, are Roberto Zapperi, *Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès: Ecrits politiques* (Montreux, 1998); and *Des Manuscrits de Sieyès 1773–1799*, 2 vols., vol 1: 1773–1779, vol. 2: 1770–1815, ed. Christine Fauré, Jacques Guilhaumou, and Jacques Valier (Paris, 2000, 2007). English translations of some of these notes are available in Murray Forsyth, *Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyès* (Leicester, 1987); and in Sonenscher's incisive introduction to Sieyès, *Political Writings* (hereafter *PW*).
44. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 48.
45. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 48; and Sieyès, "Représentation du tout n'a rien au-dessus," Archives Nationales, 284 AP 5, 1:2.
46. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 134–35.
47. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 15–16.
48. For particularly acute formulations of this argument, see two undated fragments: Sieyès, "Représentation du tout n'a rien au-dessus," Archives Nationales, 284 AP 5, 1:2; and "Ordre politique, base démographique, édifice représentation," Archives Nationales, 284 AP 5, 1:3, quoted and discussed in Sonenscher's introduction of Sieyès, *PW*, xviii–xix.
49. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 9–11.
50. In sum, "the legislative power is always the product of the generality of individual wills." Only in that way can the "general will" or the "general view," the view that best

incorporates the different perspectives of different individuals, emerge through the process of deliberation. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 12–13, 36–37.

51. Sieyès addressed these issues directly in *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 140–44.
52. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 127–30.
53. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 50–51.
54. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 54–55; and *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 142–43.
55. Sieyès, *Views of the Executive Means*, in *PW*, 56–60.
56. Sieyès, *Essay on Privileges*, in *PW*, 69–88.
57. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 147–50.
58. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 110.
59. Sieyès, “Représentation du tout n’a rien au-dessus,” Archives Nationales, 284 AP 5, 1:2.
60. There is no evidence that Sieyès had read either Madison or John Adams, whose ideas concerning those “natural aristocrats” to be elected by the people also bore some resemblance to the argument Sieyès advanced in 1788–89.
61. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 154–55.
62. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 96.
63. Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier, *La formation des départements: La représentation du territoire français à la fin du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1989).
64. Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in *PW*, 157–58. In the notes he prepared for writing the history of French Revolution itself, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that 1788 was a watershed year: “At first people spoke only of working for a better adjustment in the relations between classes; soon they advanced, ran, rushed toward the idea of pure

democracy. In the beginning they quoted and commented on Montesquieu; in the end they talked of no one but Rousseau. He became and was to remain the only tutor of the Revolution in its youth.” See Alexis de Tocqueville, *L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, in Tocqueville, *Ouvres complètes*, ed. J. P. Mayer; vol. 2: book 1, chapter 5, trans. Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, 45.

65. Robespierre’s pamphlet is quoted in a particularly vivid recent account of his life and career, Ruth Scurr, *Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution* (New York, 2006), 75. Other biographies include J. M. Thompson, *Robespierre* (Oxford, 1939); Gérard Walter, *Maximilien Robespierre* (Paris, 1989); and David P. Jordan, *The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre* (New York, 1985).
66. In his singularly influential *Interpreting the French Revolution*, François Furet contended that “there are two ways of totally misunderstanding Robespierre as a historical figure: one is to detest the man, the other is to make too much of him.” Yet both temptations are hard to resist. Even Furet acknowledged that Robespierre “embodied the people for a longer time and with greater conviction than anyone else” and that “he was the mouthpiece” of the Revolution’s “purest and most tragic discourse.” Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge, 1981), 61, 57. The tendency to revere or revile Robespierre persists. Whereas many of his admirers, from 1789 until today, proclaim the utter sincerity of Robespierre’s commitment to his political ideals, others dismiss him as a charlatan who lacked convictions and responded only to the exigencies of the moment. An essay illustrating the latter view is “Robespierre,” by the distinguished historian Patrice Gueniffey, in Furet and Ozouf, *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 298–312.

67. Mirabeau knew the nobility would not bring change on its own. He wrote to Sieyès that the abbé was “called to serve us as a guide in the National Assembly that will fix our destiny.” If reform was to come, it would be led by renegades from the first and second estates. Mirabeau to Sieyès, February 23, 1789, quoted in Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 69. For a deft untangling of the knot of the nobility of the ancien regime, see David D. Bien, “Aristocracy,” in Furet and Ozouf, *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 616–28; and, more broadly, Guy Chaussinard-Nogaret, *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Enlightenment*, trans. William Doyle (Cambridge, 1985).
68. For a thorough account of the individuals who made up the French National Assembly, see Timothy Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture, 1789–1790* (Princeton, 1996).
69. Timothy Tackett, “Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789–1792,” *American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000): 691–713.
70. See Peter M. Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France: The Politics of Transition, 1774–1791* (Cambridge, 1995).
71. The most thorough accounts of voting practices during these years are Patrice Gueniffey, *Le Nombre et la raison: La Révolution française et les élections* (Paris, 1993), and Malcolm Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1996). For a brief overview, see Malcolm Crook, “Elections and Democracy in France, 1789–1848,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland, 1750–1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Cambridge, 2013), 83–97.

72. Sieyès, “Motion sur la vérification des pouvoirs,” June 10, 1789, in *Orateurs de la Révolution française*, ed. Ran Halévi and François Furet, vol. 1, *Les Constituants* (Paris, 1989), 1001.
73. Sieyès, “Motion sur la constitution des communes en Assemblée des représentants connus et vérifiés de la nation française,” June 15, 1789, in *Orateurs de la Révolution française* 1:1002.
74. Sieyès’s notes from July 20–21, 1789, Archives Nationales, 284 AP 5, quoted in Marcel Gauchet, “Rights of Man,” in Furet and Ozouf, *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 821. On the topic of individual rights and the common good, see also Bernard Groethuysen, *Philosophie de la révolution française* (Paris, 1956), 243–50. As Robert R. Palmer noted in *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, the proliferation of editions of Rousseau’s *Social Contract* after 1789 suggests that “the book did not so much make the revolution as it was made by it.” Palmer, *Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 1:119–20; Palmer includes a list all the editions on 120.
75. Detailed accounts include Jacques Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille: July 14, 1789*, trans. Jean Stewart (London, 1970); Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York, 1989), 369–425; and William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” in Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), 225–70.
76. Robespierre to Antoine Buissart, July 23, 1789, in Maximilien Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. E. Hamel et al., 10 vols. (Paris, 1910–67), 3a: 42–50. On July 14 and its aftermath, see Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille*; and Schama, *Citizens*, 369–425.

77. Morris embarked on an affair with a French noblewoman, and through her he became acquainted with philosophes such as Condorcet and Buffon, the celebrated Marquis de Lafayette, and various ministers, diplomats, and members of the fashionable salons such as Necker's daughter Madame de Staël.
78. Both the passage from Gouverneur Morris, *A Diary of the French Revolution*, 2 vols., ed. Beatrix Davenport (Boston, 1939) 1:159; and Morris's letter to Mrs. Robert Morris, July 22, 1789, are quoted in the fine book by Philip Ziesche, *Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the Age of Revolution* (Charlottesville, 2010), 29; see also Ziesche's broader analysis of Morris's Paris stay on 15–38.
79. Jefferson to Lafayette, February 28, 1787, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian Boyd et al., 41 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950–), 11:186; Jefferson to David Humphreys, March 18, 1789, in *Papers* 14:676–79; and Jefferson to John Jay, May 9, 1789, in *Writings*, 949–54. See also Ziesche, *Cosmopolitan Patriots*, 24–25.
80. Jefferson to Rabaut de St. Etienne, June 3, 1789, in *Writings*, 954–56.
81. Jefferson to Diodati, August 3, 1789, in *Writings*, 956–59.
82. Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*, trans. Joan White (1932; New York, 1973), stressed worries about a revolt of the aristocracy; Clay Ramsay, *The Ideology of the Great Fear: The Soissonnais in 1789* (Baltimore, 1992), contended that the Great Fear drove peasants to band together with nobles to protect the harvest against unidentified bands of brigands.
83. It is worth noting that no one in England's North American colonies had enjoyed any of those privileges even before they were formally outlawed in the United States Constitution. Thorough accounts of August 4 include Jean-Pierre Hirsch, *La nuit du 4*

août (Paris, 1978); Patrick Kessel, *La nuit du 4 août* (Paris, 1969); and Michael P. Fitzsimmons, *The Night the Old Regime Ended: August 4, 1789, and the French Revolution* (University Park, PA, 2003); more concise is François Furet, “Night of August 4,” in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 107–15.

84. Etienne Dumont, *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau et sur les deux premières assemblées législatives* (Paris, 1832), 146, 147.
85. This early draft of a constitution provided for amendments, a feature notably lacking in all the successive constitutions adopted and discarded in France during these tumultuous years except for the Constitution of 1795, which was superseded in 1799. See articles 336–350 of the 1795 Constitution. Jefferson described his dinner with those debating a new constitution in his Autobiography, *Writings*, 96; see also the account in Ziesche, *Cosmopolitan Patriots*, 30–32.
86. All quotations from the Declaration come from the translation by its most incisive American historian, Keith Michael Baker, “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,” in *Readings in Western Civilization*, vol. 7, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, ed. Keith Baker (Chicago, 1987), 237–39.
87. Sieyès’s speech in *Archives parlementaires* 8:259, quoted by Marcel Gauchet, “Rights of Man,” in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 825.
88. Sieyès, *Ecrits politiques*, ed. Roberto Zapperi (Paris, 1985), 238.
89. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,” in Baker, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, 237–39. For Baker’s interpretation of these issues, see Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*.

90. Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, *Plan de conduite pour les députés du peuple aux états-généraux de 1789* (Paris, 1789), 21.
91. Sieyès, *Quelques idées de constitution applicables à la ville de Paris en juillet 1789* (Versailles, 1789), 3; and Sieyès quoted by Marcel Gauchet, “Rights of Man,” in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 821. See also Pierre Rosanvallon, “The History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in France,” trans. Phillip J. Costopolous, *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995): 140–54; Raymonde Monnier, “Démocratie et révolution française,” *Mots* 59 (1999): 50–56; Ruth Scurr, “Varieties of Democracy in the French Revolution,” in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 57–68; and more generally, on the protracted debates over the right to vote, Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, 1992), 45–180. Rosanvallon notes on 196 that the term “universal suffrage” appeared for the first time in France in 1800.
92. Sieyès, “Sur l’organisation du pouvoir législatif et la sanction royale,” in *Orateurs de la Révolution française*, 1:1031.
93. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 6:86–95, 364–65.
94. On Sieyès’s attempt to combine the ideas of representation and the general will, see Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, 251.
95. Among the problems was a drought that had prevented the water mills from grinding flour; identifying the culprits conspiring against rain would have been challenging.
96. Louis Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, *Lafayette in the French Revolution through the October Days* (Chicago, 1969).
97. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 6:115.

98. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 9:445–46.
99. The *Prospectus* for the journal envisioned by the Society of 1789, written by Condorcet, is quoted in Baker, *Condorcet*, 274; see also Baker's broader discussion of the Society on 269–85.
100. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 10:71. On the centrality of economics to Condorcet's understanding of social art and social truth, see also Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*; and Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*.
101. *Chronique de Paris*, June 15, 1790.
102. See Patrice Higonnet, *Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); and two helpful essays that situate Higonnet's analysis within the contours of recent historiography, Jeremy D. Popkin, "Not Over After All: The French Revolution's Third Century," *Journal of Modern History* 74 (December 2002): 801–21; and Carla Hesse, "The New Jacobins," *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 663–70.
103. On these issues see Dale Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven, 1996); and his essay placing the French experience in the wider framework of eighteenth-century Christianity, "Christianity as Casualty and Chrysalis of Modernity: The Problem of Dechristianization in the French Revolution," *American Historical Review* 108 (2003): 1081–103. For the quotation from Maultrot and Mey, see Dale Van Kley, "Piety and Politics in the Century of Lights," in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), 110–43.

104. Bertrand Capmartin de Chaupy, *Réflexions d'un avocat sur les remontrances du parlement du 27 novembre 1755...* (London, 1756), 54.
105. Jean-Georges Lefranc de Pompignan, *Défense des actes du clergé de France, concernant la religion, publiée en l'assemblée de 1765, Oeuvres complètes de Jean-Georges Lefranc de Pompignan*, ed. M. Emery, 2 vols. (Paris, 1855), 1:574.
106. For a persuasive explanation of the reasons why the myth of a great divide between a secular Enlightenment and religious tradition developed in the wake of the French Revolution, and a convincing set of essays demonstrating how deep were the internal divisions among religious groups throughout Europe during the eighteenth century, see the essays in James E. Bradley and Dale Van Kley, eds., *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe* (Notre Dame, 2001). On the reasons why French Catholics in the Yonne supported the revolution, at least until 1797, by invoking the spirit of 1789 in defense of their right to practice their religion, see Suzanne Desan, *Reclaiming the Sacred: Lay Religion and Popular Politics in Revolutionary France* (Ithaca, 1990).
107. Recent scholarship challenging the argument that eighteenth-century France underwent a process of “dechristianization” includes John McManners, *Church and Society in Eighteenth-Century France*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1998); Nigel Aston, *Christianity and Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1830* (Cambridge, 2002); Stewart J. Brown and Timothy Tackett, eds., *Enlightenment, Reawakening, and Revolution, 1680–1815* (Cambridge, 2006); and Jonathan Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization,” *American Historical Review* 108 (2003): 1061–80.
108. See Ruth Necheles, “The Curés in the Estates-General of 1789,” *Journal of Modern History* 46 (1974): 125–44.

109. For a fascinating account of the persistence of religious belief and the complex process whereby early interest in reform turned to staunch opposition to the revolution in the admittedly atypical town of Avignon, see Eric F. Johnson, “The Sacred, Secular Regime: Catholic Ritual and Revolutionary Politics in Avignon, 1789–1791,” *French Historical Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007): 49–76.
110. Proclamation quoted in Pierre de la Gorce, *Histoire religieuse de la Révolution française*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1902–23), 1:303; trans. in Doyle, *French Revolution*, 144. On the transformative effect of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the divergent responses in different regions, and the long-term consequences, see Timothy Tackett, *Religion, Revolution, and Regional Cultures in Eighteenth-Century France: The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791* (Princeton, 1986). A map showing the extent of emigration from France during the revolution, in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 332, provides a graphic illustration of regional differences that tracks roughly on Tackett’s findings. Opposition to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was strongest—and emigration highest—in the peripheral regions of the northeast, the Massif Central, and the west; support was strongest in Paris, in the center of France, and in the southeast, the regions where Jansenism exerted the strongest appeal. In rural areas the clergy and the laity tended either to accept or reject the Civil Constitution together. In cities, though, they diverged, except in Paris, where the juring clergy constituted an overwhelming majority. Tackett demonstrates convincingly that these religious divisions followed their own logic and cannot be reduced to socioeconomic or other characteristics. The significance of these divisions persists into the twenty-first century: the regions in which

opposition to the Civil Constitution was most pronounced remain the most staunchly Catholic regions in France.

111. Johnson, “The Sacred, Secular Regime,” 70–76.

112. For Robespierre’s speech of June 9, 1790, see *Archives parlementaires* 16:154–56.

113. For this speech, the first of Robespierre’s speeches to attract widespread attention, see Dumont, *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, 60–61.

114. Madame de Houdetot to Jefferson, in *Papers of Thomas Jefferson* 17:485.

Chapter 11

1. On British responses, see Pamela Clemit, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to British Literature of the French Revolution in the 1790s* (Cambridge, 2011); Gareth Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate* (New York, 2004), in which Paine and Condorcet figure especially prominently; Richard Whatmore, “A Gigantic Manliness: Paine’s Republicanism in the 1790s,” in *Economy, Polity, and Society: British Intellectual History 1750–1950*, ed. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young (Cambridge, 2000); Emma Vincent Macleod, *A War of Ideas: British Attitudes to the Wars against Revolutionary France, 1792–1802* (Aldershot, 1998); Gregory Claeys, “The French Revolution and British Political Thought,” *History of Political Thought* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 59–80; H. T. Dickinson, *British Radicalism and the French Revolution, 1789–1815* (Oxford, 1985); and Albert Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1979).
2. “Lord,” Price concluded, “*now lettest thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes of seen thy salvation,*” first in England’s revolution of 1688 and now in the American and French revolutions. “Behold, the light you have struck out, after setting America free, reflected to France and there kindled into a blaze that lays despotism in ashes and warms and illuminates Europe!” Richard Price, “A Discourse on the Love of Our Country,” 4th ed., in Richard Price, *Political Writings*, ed. D. O. Thomas (Cambridge, 1991), 176–96; the quotations are taken from 191–96. See also John Seed, “‘A set of men powerful enough in many things’: Rational Dissent and political opposition in England, 1770–1790,” in

Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, 1996), 140–68.

3. Thomas Paine to Edmund Burke, January 17, 1790, in which Paine predicted “The Revolution in France is certainly a forerunner to other Revolutions in Europe,” in *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, ed. Thomas W. Copeland (Cambridge, 1958–78), 6:69.
4. Edmund Burke, “Speech on Conciliation,” March 22, 1775, in Burke, *Works*, 6 vols. (London, 1854), 1:490–91.
5. See Joseph Priestley, *Political Writings*, ed. Peter Miller (Cambridge, 1993); and the essays collected in *Science, Medicine, and Dissent: Joseph Priestley (1733–1804)*, ed. R. G. W. Anderson and Christopher Lawrence (London, 1987). Although he shows little interest in the religious ideas that animated Priestley and Price, see also Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, 1990).
6. See Nigel Aston, “Horne and Heterodoxy: The Defence of Anglican Beliefs in the Late Enlightenment,” *English Historical Review* 108 (1993): 895–919; and Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England, 1783–1846* (Oxford, 2006), 57–64.
7. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Thomas H. D. Mahoney (Indianapolis, 1955), 103, 8. The themes of sexual licentiousness and Burke’s own ambivalence about mastering his own impulses (of various sorts) are central to Isaac Kramnick, *The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative* (New York, 1977).

8. “If in the moment of riot and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the alembic of hell,” the usually sensible people of Britain too were tempted to “uncover [their] nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion” that had warmed, comforted, and civilized them, they would follow France into chaos. Burke, *Reflections*, 97, 99, 103.
9. All these abominations came to a head for Burke in the revolutionaries’ shameful treatment of the royal family. On the night of October 6, the queen, with the crowd massing just outside her bedchamber, was in such danger that “this persecuted woman had to fly almost naked” from the mob in Versailles. The king was accorded as little respect. Burke, *Reflections*, 87, 82.
10. Joseph Priestley, *Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, occasioned by his reflections on the revolution in France, &c.*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1791), 67. Friedrich Gentz quoted in Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, vol. 1, *The Challenge* (Princeton, 1959), 456. On Gentz’s arrangements with Britain, see Golo Mann, *Secretary of Europe: The Life of Friedrich Gentz* (New Haven, 1946), 50.
11. With some impatience, Paine explained his procedure: “I have now to follow Mr. Burke through a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies,” a series of fictional chapters “in which he asserts whatever he pleases, on the presumption of its being believed, without offering either evidence or reasons.” In contrast, Paine invoked the authority of an eyewitness whose trustworthiness was beyond reproach, his friend Lafayette. Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, in Paine, *Collected Writings*, ed. Eric Foner (New York, 1995) (hereafter CW), 456–62. Recent studies of Paine’s ideas include Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York, 1976); Harvey J. Kaye, *Thomas Paine and the*

Promise of America (New York, 2005), 15–111; and Gregory Claeys, *Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought* (London, 1989).

12. Paine to Benjamin Rush, March 16, 1790, in *CW*, 371–73. The key to the Bastille still hangs in Washington’s Mount Vernon.
13. See Patrice Gueniffey, “Terminer la Révolution: Barnave et la révision de la Constitution (Août 1791),” in *Terminer la Révolution: Mounier et Barnave dans la Révolution française*, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf (Grenoble, 1991); and Barry M. Shapiro, “Self-Sacrifice, Self-Interest, or Self-Defense? The Constituent Assembly and the ‘Self-Denying Ordinance’ of May 1791,” *French Historical Studies* 25 (2002): 625–56.
14. Maximilien Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. E. Hamel et al., 10 vols. (Paris, 1910–67), 7:268. On Robespierre’s maneuvering during the spring of 1791, cf. Ruth Scurr, *Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution* (New York, 2006), 141–67; David P. Jordan, *The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre* (New York, 1985), 58–79; and Furet, “Robespierre,” in *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 298–312. On the larger significance of the decision not to allow members of the Constituent Assembly to run for reelection, see Shapiro, “Self-Sacrifice, Self-Interest, or Self-Defense?” 625–56.
15. Quoted in Patrice Higonnet, *Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 31. One of the most troublesome features of the various constitutions written for France throughout this period was the absence of any provision for amendment. As many American commentators pointed, amending the United States Constitution had been essential for its ratification. See for example Joel

Barlow's 1792 "Letter to the National Convention," in *The Political Writings of Joel Barlow* (New York, 1796), 196–98.

16. The exchange appeared first in Paris—Paine's letter in *Le Républicain* and Sieyès's reply in the *Moniteur*—and then in London, where the *European Magazine and London Review* published translations of both in August 1791. The English versions are reprinted in Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, *Political Writings*, ed. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis, 2003), 163–73. For a clear discussion of the context of this exchange, see Sonenscher's comments on 163–64, and John Keane, *Tom Paine: A Political Life* (Boston, 1995).
17. Paine, "To the Authors of the Republican," in *CW*, 276–379.
18. Condorcet, *Mémoires sur l'instruction publique*, in *Oeuvres complètes de Condorcet*, 12 vols. (Paris, 1847–49), 7:226–27. For a discussion of these issues and Condorcet's decisions in the summer of 1791, see Keith Michael Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975), 304–42.
19. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 8:151.
20. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 4:34; 8:315. On Jefferson's letter to Charles Jarvis, September 28, 1820, see p. 6 above.
21. This point, first made by Jean Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, ed. Albert Mathiez (Paris, 1922), has been restated by Jean-Daniel Piquet, *L'émancipation des noirs dans la Révolution française* (Paris, 2002).
22. On slavery in the Enlightenment and revolution, see Louis Sala-Molins, *Le Code Noir; ou, la calvaire de Canaan* (Paris, 1987); Sala-Molins, *Les Misères des Lumières: sous la raison, l'outrage* (Paris, 1992); Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens:*

Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804 (Chapel Hill, 2004); Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,” *Social History* 31, no. 1 (February 2006): 1–14; and Sue Peabody, “*There Are No Slaves in France*”: *The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Regime* (New York, 1996). For a wide-ranging demonstration of the pervasiveness of racism in the Enlightenment, see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., *Race and Enlightenment: A Reader* (Oxford, 1997).

23. John D. Garrigus, *Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue* (New York, 2006); Garrigus, “Blue and Brown: Contraband Indigo and the Rise of a Free Colored Planter Class in French Saint-Domingue,” *The Americas* 50, no. 2 (October 1993): 233–63.
24. Peabody, “*There Are No Slaves in France*.”
25. Paine to Benjamin Rush, March 16, 1790, in *CW*, 372.
26. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*. The passages from the *Philadelphia General Advertiser*, October 11, 1791, and from J. Félix Carteau, *Soirées Bermudiennes, ou entretiens sur les événements qui ont opéré la ruine de la partie française de l’île Saint-Domingue* (Bordeaux, 1802) are both quoted in Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment,” 9–10.
27. On the royal reforms, see Jean-Daniel Piquet, *L’émancipation des Noirs dans la Révolution française: 1789–1795* (Paris, 2002); Carolyn Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: from plantation labour to peasant proprietorship,” *Slavery and Abolition* 21, no. 2 (August 2000): 11–40; Malick Ghachem, *The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, 2012); and Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment.” On the role of African

royalist traditions, see John Thornton, “‘I Am the Subject of the King of Congo’: African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution,” *Journal of World History* 4 (1993): 181–214.

28. On Brissot’s speech, see Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York, 2009), 96–97. Michael Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, 1995), 89, contends that “discourse always lagged behind practice” in the Haitian revolution. By contrast, Carolyn Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint-Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville, 1990); and Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment,” 13–14, emphasize the interaction between ideas and active engagement in social and political action. Dubois concludes with this balanced judgment: “the discovery of the Americas generated a space for new ways of thinking about humanity and natural rights, and out of encounters between Native Americans, Africans and Europeans there emerged new ways of thinking about belonging, governance, subject-hood and, eventually, citizenship.” Although educated elites produced the texts expressing these ideas, these new ways of thinking emerged through the debates and the efforts of illiterate as well as literate people on both sides of the Atlantic, and “these debates laid the foundations for the intellectual and political explosion that would take place during the 1790s in the Caribbean” (14).
29. See the classic study by C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, rev. ed. (1938; New York, 2001); Pierre Pluchon, *Toussaint Louverture: un révolutionnaire noir d’Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1989); Fick, *The Making of Haiti*; and Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*.

30. Louis Boisrond-Tonnerre quoted in Thomas Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti*, 8 vols. (1847–1848; Port au Prince, 1989–91), 3:145. For further discussion of Boisrond-Tonnerre, and for a copy of the 1804 Haitian Declaration of Independence, see David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 114–17, 193–98.
31. Dessalines quoted in Hubert Cole, *Christophe, King of Haiti* (New York, 1967), 144; see also Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World*, 111.
32. See the concise and convincing essay by David Geggus, “The Caribbean in the Age of Revolution,” in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840*, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (New York, 2010), 83–100.
33. See David Geggus, “Haiti and the Abolitionists: Opinion, Propaganda and International Politics in Britain and France, 1804–1838,” in *Abolition and Its Aftermath: The Historical Context, 1790–1916* (London, 1985); David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York, 2006), 157–74; and Ashli White, *Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic* (Baltimore, 2010).
34. *Doléances des Femmes françaises*, March 5, 1789, in the National Archives, Paris, quoted in Carol Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution* (Ithaca, 1986), 205. Madame B. B., *Cahier des doléances et réclamations des femmes*, quoted in Jane Abray, “Women in the French Revolution,” in *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, ed. Renata Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz (Boston, 1977), 239.

35. Exceptions include Christine de Pisan; Marie de Jars de Gournay, author of *Egalité des hommes et des femmes* (1622), a woman whom Montaigne described as his “*filie d’alliance*”; and Mary Astell. Even those who called for women’s education, as Astell did, tended to assume that women should be educated for different purposes and different lives, lives as wives and mothers. On this tradition, and the ways in which de Gournay in particular subverted it, see Christine Fauré, “Rights or Virtues: Women and the Republic,” trans. John Fletcher, in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, vol. 2: *The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002), 125–37.
36. Sophie de Grouchy’s commentaries on Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which she appended to her translation, have been published as Sophie de Grouchy, *Letters on Sympathy: A Critical Edition*, ed. Karin Brown, trans. James E. McClellan III, *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 98, no. 4 (Philadelphia, 2008).
37. See Catherine Larrère, “Women, Republicanism and the Growth of Commerce,” in Gelderen and Skinner, *Republicanism*, 2:139–56; and Baker, *Condorcet*, 293–3.
38. See Olympe de Gouges, *Ecrits politiques, 1788–1791*, ed. Olivier Blanc, 2 vols. (Paris, 1993); Sophie Mousset, *Women’s Rights and the French Revolution: A Biography of Olympe de Gouges* (New Brunswick, 2007); Olivier Blanc, *Olympe de Gouges*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1989); and, on her career as playwright, Carol L. Sherman, *Reading Olympe de Gouges* (New York, 2013).
39. Olympe de Gouges, “Declaration of the Rights of Woman,” in *Women in Revolutionary Paris, 1789–1795*, ed. Darline Gay Levy, Harriet Bronson Applewhite, and Mary Durham Johnson (Urbana, 1979), 89–96.

40. Recent biographical studies include Janet Todd, *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life* (London, 2000); and Barbara Taylor, *Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination* (Cambridge, 2003). See also Karen O'Brien, *Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 2009), 173–200; and for a sampling of critical perspectives, see Claudia Johnson, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Mary Wollstonecraft* (Cambridge, 2002). On the more general discourse of benevolence to which Wollstonecraft contributed, see Evan Radcliffe, “Revolutionary Writing, Moral Philosophy, and Universal Benevolence in the Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54 (1993): 221–40; and on the transatlantic literary radicals who took up Wollstonecraft’s cause, Andrew Cayton, *Love in the Time of Revolution: Transatlantic Literary Radicalism and Historical Change, 1793–1818* (Chapel Hill, 2013).
41. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Men*, in *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and A Vindication of the Rights of Men*, ed. Janet Todd (Oxford, 1993), 45, 47.
42. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 33.
43. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 22, 65–66.
44. Wollstonecraft elaborated the critique of “elegance” and “dazzle” suggested in her earlier writings. In the refined world of duplicity and deception, women are fit “only for a seraglio.” As merely “insignificant objects of desire,” they must mask their ideas and their feelings and adopt a “sickly delicacy that turns away from simple unadorned truth.” Instead they are forced to drown in “a deluge of false sentiments and overstretched feelings,” thereby “stifling the natural emotions of the heart.” Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 75, 72, 102, 74.
45. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 86–95, 128–29, 131, 150–66.

46. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 131–49. See for example Mary Poovey, *The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen* (Chicago, 1984); Cora Kaplan, “Wild Nights: Pleasure/Sexuality/Feminism,” in *Formations of Pleasure* (London, 1983); Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, 1988); Carla Hesse, *The Other Enlightenment: How French Women Became Modern* (Princeton, 2001); and Sarah Knott and Barbara Taylor, eds., *Women, Gender, and Enlightenment* (New York, 2005).
47. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 103, 113, 122, 197. See also Barbara Taylor, “The Religious Foundations of Wollstonecraft’s Feminism,” in Johnson, *The Cambridge Companion to Wollstonecraft*; Taylor, *Wollstonecraft*, 95–142, for the fullest account of the relation between religion and social criticism in Wollstonecraft’s writings; Jonathan Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization,” *American Historical Review* 108, no. 4 (October 2003): 1061–80; and the helpful review essay by Anthony La Vopa, “Women, Gender, and the Enlightenment,” *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 2 (2008): 332–57.
48. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 138, 215, 219–20.
49. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 221.
50. See László Kontler, “Beauty or Beast, or Monstrous Regiments? Robertson and Burke on Women and the Public Scene,” *Modern Intellectual History* 1, no. 3 (2004): 305–30.
51. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 222–31. See Judith A. Vega, “Feminist Republicanism and the Political Perception of Gender,” in *Republicanism*,

157–74, on Wollstonecraft’s idea of authenticity; and cf. Taylor, *Wollstonecraft*, 95–142, on the religious dimension of this idea.

52. See J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, 1995), 103.
53. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Men*, 57–59. On the relation between Wollstonecraft’s political economy and those of the traditions of civic republicanism and British philosophical history, see G. J. Barker-Benfield, “Mary Wollstonecraft: Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthwoman,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 1 (1989): 95–115; and Chris Jones, “Mary Wollstonecraft’s *Vindications* and their political tradition,” in Johnson, *The Cambridge Companion to Wollstonecraft*, 42–58.
54. As already noted, Franklin and Adams agreed with Jefferson, who had called for “silently lessening the inequality of property” by exempting the poor from taxation and taxing “the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise.” Madison urged “withholding unnecessary opportunity from a few, to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of riches.” To accomplish that aim Madison too endorsed “the silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth to a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence toward a state of comfort.” Jefferson, *Papers* 8:681–83; Madison, *The Papers of James Madison*, ed. ed. William T. Hutchinson et al., 17 vols. (Chicago and Charlottesville, 1962–91), 14:197–98.
55. See Paine to Jefferson, February 1788, in *CW*, 368–69; and Paine, *Rights of Man*, in *CW*, 552–56.
56. Paine, *Rights of Man*, in *CW*, 596–657. On the significance of Paine’s arguments in England, the classic study is E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*

(New York, 1963); see also Mark Philp, *Paine* (New York, 1989); Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America*, esp. 212–70; Seth Cotlar, *Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the Early Republic* (Charlottesville, 2011); and, on Paine’s wider and long-term significance, *Paine and Jefferson in the Age of Revolutions*, ed. Simon P. Newman and Peter Onuf (Charlottesville, 2013); and Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty?*.

57. Burke, *Reflections*, 193.

58. Paine conjured up a striking image: “A nation is not a body, the figure of which is to be represented by the human body,” the image familiar to all readers of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. The nation is instead “like a body contained within a circle, having a common center, in which every radius meets, and that center is formed by representation.” Unlike monarchy, “a silly, contemptible thing” in which maturity is rare and judgment often impaired, representative democracy “possesses a perpetual stamina, as well of body as of mind, and presents itself on the open theatre of the world in a fair and manly manner.” Whereas monarchies require regencies and ministers to compensate for a monarch’s not uncommon lack of capacity, representative democracy does without the “perpetual court cabal and intrigue, of which Mr. Burke is himself an instance,” and instead elects those who are deemed fit to govern. Those representatives, through their discussions of their constituents’ interests, come to understand—more clearly than would be possible for any single individual—where the different interests intersect, or, to return to Paine’s image, where “every radius meets.” Paine, *Rights of Man*, in *CW*, 564–78. Urbinati, *Representative Government*, 278n29, correctly aligns Paine’s ideas with James Wilson’s but distinguishes both Pennsylvanians from the authors of the *Federalist*, whom she

interprets as aiming to “contain” democracy. For a different reading of Wilson and Madison, see chapters 9 and 10 above. Mark Philp, “Talking about Democracy: Britain in the 1790s,” in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 101–13, painstakingly charts the progress of the words “democracy” and “democrat” in Britain and points out that they were used as epithets by conservatives before they were adopted by radicals. Whereas Philp emphasizes the difference between “representation” as Paine used it and “democracy” understood as direct government by the people rather than government by officials elected by the people, the passages quoted here show that Paine considered the American system a form of representative democracy. It is odd that so many contemporary champions of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, most of whom celebrate the “democrat” Paine and criticize “elitists” such as Madison and Wilson, neglect Paine’s own discussion of the revision of the 1776 Constitution in *Rights of Man* and his clearly stated preference for representative over direct democracy.

59. The most detailed study is Michael Sonenscher, *Sans-Culottes: An Eighteenth-Century Emblem of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2009), which challenges both the Marxist interpretation of Albert Soboul and the revisionism of François Furet. Sonenscher traces the origins of the Sans-Culottes to ancient cynicism, transmitted to eighteenth-century France via Fénelon and Rousseau, and stresses their commitment to using modern public finance, including nationalizing church property to compensate for the revenue lost because of the Haitian revolution and the aristocrats’ flight, to achieve an egalitarian republic of austere virtue. Called into being by moderate Brissontins, the Sans-Culottes escaped their control and gravitated toward the most radical wing of the revolution.

60. Gouverneur Morris, diary entry for June 20, 1790, in *The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, ed. Anne Cary Morris, 2 vols. (New York, 1888), 1:546.
61. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 8:408–19.
62. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 4:351–52, 358.
63. For a vivid account of the events of August 10, 1792, see Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York, 1989), 597–618.
64. *Collection complète des lois*, ed. J.-B. Duvergier (Paris, 1825–28), 4:297.
65. See Malcolm Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution: An Apprenticeship in Democracy* (Cambridge, 1996), 79–101; Patrice Gueniffey, “Suffrage,” in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 571–81; and Crook, “Elections and Democracy in France, 1789–1848,” in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 83–97.
66. Condorcet, *Adresse de l’Assemblée nationale aux français*, September 19, 1792, in Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 7:226.
67. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 5:17.
68. Marat in *L’ami du peuple*, September 21, 1792, 8.
69. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 9:93; and see more broadly Jordan, *Robespierre*, 118–27; and Scurr, *Fatal Purity*, 230–41.
70. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 9:122.
71. Robespierre, *Oeuvres complètes* 9:198, 228.
72. Paine’s speeches against executing the king, January 15, 1793 and January 19, 1793, are in *CW*, 382–91.

73. Perhaps Robespierre was right. To have tried the king and pardoned him would have prevented France from extinguishing the flame of monarchy. Even when rekindled with the Restoration, it never recovered its vibrancy in France as it did thanks to the posthumous sacralization of Charles I in England. Decades of satire, harmless and salacious, had thoroughly desanctified the French monarchy, and the years since 1789, particularly the abortive flight to Varennes, had confirmed the descent of Louis XVI from demi-god to the most ordinary of men. The continued existence of Louis Capet might have provided a focal point for an even more intense counter-revolutionary conspiracy than did arise.
74. Brissot quoted in Mona Ozouf, "The King's Trial," in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 96. The fullest accounts of the trial and death of Louis XVI are Jules Michelet, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1952); and Jean Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, vol. 4, *La Convention*, ed. Albert Soboul (Paris, 1969).
75. See Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty*, 18–63; and cf. John Dunn, *Democracy: A History* (New York, 2005), 123–26.
76. Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes* 10:612; 12:340–441. See also Baker, *Condorcet*, 320–42; and Urbinati, *Representative Democracy*, 176–221.
77. Condorcet's defenders, notably Keith Baker, Emma Rothschild, and Nadia Urbinati, have emphasized his awareness of the tension between his confidence in reason and his desire to enable informed popular choices. Much as I admire their scholarship, and deeply dependent on it as I am in this analysis, there is a difference between Condorcet's having acknowledged that tension and his having resolved it. Had Condorcet made as persuasive

a case for empowering the people as Baker and Rothschild make on his behalf, and had he clarified the means by which probabilistic reasoning could be made compatible with popular sentiment, his ideas might have been less vulnerable to the criticism that greeted the Girondin constitution, and he might have been less dismissive of the Jacobins' resistance to his ideas. See Baker, *Condorcet*; Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*; and Urbinati, *Representative Democracy*, 176–221.

78. Michael Sonenscher, in *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2007), 320–22, emphasizes the “conventionally republican” dimension of the Jacobin constitution, with its emphasis on the nation rather than its component parts. For an illuminating overview of the economic ideas of Girondins such as Condorcet and their Jacobin foes, see Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, 25–34.
79. On the debates over educational reform, see Baker, *Condorcet*, 316–20; and Livesey, *Making Democracy in the French Revolution*, 169–77.
80. Robespierre, “On the Principles of Revolutionary Government,” December 25, 1793, in Robespierre, *Virtue and Terror*, ed. Slavoj Žižek, trans. John Howe (London, 2007), 98–107; *Oeuvres complètes* 10:273–92; see also 9:399 and 9:569; and see the astute discussion of these speeches from November and December 1793, in Bates, *Enlightenment Aberrations*, 153–61; and Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue*, 216–37.
81. See Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution*, 105–11 on the vote for ratification and 115–16 on resistance.
82. Paine to Danton, May 6, 1793, in *CW*, 392–95.

83. For de Gouges's final political writings, see "Défenseur officieux de Louis Capet," "Mon dernier mot," "Testament politique," "Les trois urnes ou le salut de la patrie," and "Olympe de Gouges au Tribunal révolutionnaire," in de Gouges, *Ecrits politiques*; and the English translations of her writings by Clarissa Palmer at www.olympedegouges.eu.
84. For detailed accounts of some of the worst excesses of the Terror, see Colin Lucas, *The Structure of the Terror: The Example of Javogues and the Loire* (Oxford, 1973); and Schama, *Citizens*, 726–847 and the detailed bibliographical essay on 901–5.
85. Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, ed. O. H. Prior (Paris, 1933), 238–39. See also Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, 157–217.
86. Robespierre, "On the Principles of Political Morality," February 5, 1784, in Robespierre, *Virtue and Terror*, 108–25. Lucien Jaume argues, in *Le Discours jacobin et la démocratie* (Paris, 1989), 114–15, that Robespierre and Saint-Just sought a "regenerated representation" in which the distance separating "the people" from their officials vanished. See also Scurr, "Varieties of Democracy in the French Revolution," in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolution*, 665–68.
87. This interpretation of Robespierre and those engaged in the Terror, which sees their fatal flaw as their unwillingness to accept the inevitability of disagreement, has become much more widely accepted in recent years. Whereas the Terror was long seen by conservatives as evidence of the Jacobins' inherent evil or by radicals as evidence of their willingness to do what was necessary to root out the evil of the ancien regime, both of those readings of Robespierre now attract fewer adherents. Illustrations of this convergence include François Furet, "Terror," in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, 137–50; Higonnet, *Goodness Beyond Virtue*, 68–75, 116–43; Livesey,

Making Democracy in the French Revolution, 42–87; David Jordan, “The Robespierre Problem,” and Marisa Linton, “Robespierre’s Political Principles,” in *Robespierre*, ed. Colin Haydon and William Doyle (Cambridge, 1999); Jordan, *The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre*; Scurr, *Fatal Purity*; Isser Woloch, *The New Regime* (New York, 1993); Jean-Pierre Gross, *Fair Shares for All: Jacobin Egalitarianism in Practice* (Cambridge, 1999); and Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution*. For excellent overviews, see the review essays by Isser Woloch, “On the Latent Illiberalism of the French Revolution,” *American Historical Review* 95, no. 5 (December 1990): 1452–70; Jeremy Popkin, “Not Over After All: The French Revolution’s Third Century,” *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 4 (December 2002): 801–21; Rebecca Spang, “Paradigms and Paranoia: How Modern Is the French Revolution?” *American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (February 2003): 119–47; and Carla Hesse, “The New Jacobins,” *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 663–70. For an incisive discussion of the historiography, which shows how central participants in the Revolution anticipated explanations advanced by nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians and how Marx’s account of the conflict between bourgeois individualism and egalitarian universalism illuminates the Jacobins’ dilemma, see Patrice Higonnet, “Terror, Trauma, and the ‘Young Marx’ Explanation of the Terror,” *Past and Present* 191 (May 2006): 121–64. For reasons these recent studies make clear, the older Marxist and anti-Marxist interpretations of Robespierre and the Terror now seem less illuminating than do more detailed works demonstrating the particular social, economic, political, and cultural dynamics at work in different regions at different moments during the period stretching from the 1780s through 1800. Instead of seeing the Terror as unfolding inevitably from the earliest stages

of the revolution, as did Keith Baker and Patrice Gueniffey, it is now understood to have developed from the combination of circumstances—the genuine pressures from outside and within France—and the revolutionaries’ inability or unwillingness to accept inevitable conflict as the consequence of democracy.

88. Camille Desmoulins, *Oeuvres de Camille Desmoulins*, ed. Jules Claretie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1874), 1:218–19; Danton’s comment to Paine quoted in Hilaire Belloc, *Danton: A Study* (London, 1910), 301.
89. Robespierre, “On the Principles of Political Morality,” February 5, 1784, in Robespierre, *Virtue and Terror*, 112; Rosanvallon, “The History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in France,” 146; and Higonnet, *Goodness Beyond Virtue*, 55–60. Robespierre’s obsession with unity, a commitment he shared with many less bloody-minded revolutionaries, has been a central theme of much scholarship in recent decades. See for example Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*; Rosanvallon, *Le Sacre du citoyen*; Rosanvallon, *Le Peuple introuvable: Histoire de la représentation démocratique en France* (Paris, 1998); and Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée*; translated excerpts from the latter two books are included in Rosanvallon, *Democracy Past and Future*, ed. Samuel Moyn (New York, 2006).
90. Robespierre’s speech of July 26, 1794, is in Robespierre, *Virtue and Terror*, 126–41. On Robespierre’s final days, cf. Scurr, *Fatal Purity*, 324–58; and Jordan, *Robespierre*, 206–20.
91. David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the birth of warfare as we know it* (New York, 2007).

Chapter 12

1. Still the most comprehensive analysis of responses to the French Revolution—and of the decisive crackdowns against local insurgencies that succeeded in suppressing democracy in the rest of Europe for decades—is Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800*, rev. ed. with a new foreword by David Armitage (1959, 1964; Princeton, 2014). Janet Polasky, *Revolutions without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World* (New Haven, 2015), expands the canvas to include the Caribbean World and pays particular attention to the transmission of information concerning democratic revolutions. Other recent studies that extend the frame of analysis beyond the North Atlantic include *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, 1760–1840*, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (London, 2010); and Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York, 2009).
2. See Matthew Rainbow Hale, *The French Revolution and the Transformation of American Democracy* (Charlottesville, forthcoming); and Rachel Hope Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Antislavery* (Cambridge, 2009).
3. Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York, 2011); Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776* (Chapel Hill, 2007).
4. On Elijah Parish, “Psalm 136.2, Thanksgiving 1789”; the reprinting of Robespierre’s article in the American press; and the article “Club des Jacobins. Paris, August 18,” *Gazette of the United States*, November 6, 1789, see Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America*, 61–62.

5. See the discussion of Jefferson's response to Adams's *Defence* in n. 44 to chapter 8 above. Adams to Elbridge Gerry, April 25, 1789, in Adams Papers, reel 107, Massachusetts Historical Society, and in James T. Austin, *Life of Elbridge Gerry*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1828), 1:427–31.
6. "Mirabeau" quoted in Marcus Daniel, *Scandal and Civility: Journalism and the Birth of American Democracy* (New York, 2009), 122, 138–39; *Independent Gazetteer*, cited in *Aurora General Advertiser*, September 21, 1795.
7. Adams to Adrian Van der Kemp, March 27, 1790, Van der Kemp Papers, quoted in John Howe Jr., *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams* (Princeton, 1966), 184.
8. Adams to Benjamin Rush, October 25, 1809, in *Old Family Letters: Copied from the Originals for Alexander Biddle*, series A (Philadelphia, 1892), 245.
9. Adams, "Reply to the Massachusetts Militia," October 11, 1789, Adams Papers, reel 119, Massachusetts Historical Society. On de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, see pp. 452–53 above.
10. "Too many Frenchmen, like too many Americans, pant for equality of persons and property. The impracticality of this God Almighty has decreed" by giving men unequal abilities, "and the advocates of liberty who attempt it will surely suffer for it." Adams believed passionately that all citizens have equal rights and equal obligations, but he distinguished political and legal equality from the economic equality that was attempted through measures like Harrington's agrarian law. John Adams to Richard Price, April 19, 1790, in *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850–56), 9:564.

11. Adams selected the title *Discourses on Davila* in deliberate homage to Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*. See C. Bradley Thompson, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty* (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 117–19.
12. See David McCullough, *John Adams* (New York, 2001), 374–79; and for the vicious responses the book elicited from some Antifederalists, see the parody “On the New Constitution,” published in the *State Gazette of South Carolina*, January 28, 1788, in *Debate on the Constitution*, ed. Bernard Bailyn, (New York, 1993) 2:107–108.
13. John Adams, *Defence*, in *Works* 6:116, 4: 308–9, 6:116, 4:359.
14. Adams, *Defence*, in *Works* 6:116, 118, 171–72, 130–31, 116–17.
15. See Joyce Appleby, “The Jefferson-Adams Rupture and the First French Translation of John Adams’s *Defence*,” *American Historical Review* 73 (1968): 1084–91.
16. Jefferson’s note in Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time*, vol. 2, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man* (Boston, 1951), 357.
17. Jefferson to Adams, November 13, 1787, in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 912–14; and *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, ed. Lester J. Cappon (Chapel Hill, 1959), 213. On this exchange of letters, see McCullough, *Adams*, 380.
18. Adams to Jefferson, December 10, 1787, in *Works* 4:587.
19. John Quincy Adams’s “Publicola” essays are reprinted in *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), 1:65–110. See also Paul Nagel, *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, A Private Life* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 73–74.
20. Adams blundered in calling for titles and ribbons, and he did prefer the historically grounded institutions of British government to the various forms the French republic

took, but he never repudiated representative democracy. Looking back later in life, he expressed his judgment that the course of the French Revolution—and particularly the role of the Committee on Public Safety in the Terror—had vindicated his predictions in *Davila*. He feared that the campaign of Jefferson and Madison to brand him a monarchist, however unfounded it was, had done permanent (and unjustifiable) damage to his reputation as a champion of democracy. The last two hundred years have proven him right. On this point, see John Adams's marginal notations in his personal copy of the 1790 edition of *Discourses of Davila* in the collection of the Boston Public Library.

21. Writing to Jefferson in the spring of 1791, Madison sided with his fellow Virginian and expressed his own righteous fury about Adams. He dismissed his “mock defence of the Republican Constitutions of this Country” and claimed that Adams had actually “attacked them with all the force he possessed” both in his *Defence* and in *Davila*, which Madison wildly characterized as “antirepublican discourses.” He skewered Burke for defending monarchy not only against the French Revolution but also against the United States, “whose revolution & democratic Government come in for a large share of the scurrility lavished on those of France.” That sentence of Madison's, like those in Adams's letters to Jefferson, make clear that both Adams and Madison considered themselves partisans of democracy even though they disagreed passionately about its meaning by the 1790s. Although generations of critics have repeated the complaints of Antifederalists against Madison and those of Jeffersonians (including Madison) against Adams, neither Madison nor Adams wanted to see established in the United States anything other than the representative democracy established in Virginia, Massachusetts, and the Constitution of the United States. Their bitter anger in the 1790s is a sign of the fierce partisanship of that

decade, intensified by the French Revolution. Madison to Jefferson, May 12, 1791, in Madison, *Writings*, 490–91. An attempt to identify the links between Adams and Jefferson, and between Madison and Paine, concerning the principles of representative democracy is James T. Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” *Journal of American History* 74, no. 1 (June 1987): 9–33, reprinted in James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998), 21–37; a more recent effort is Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, “The Republic of the Moderns: Paine’s and Madison’s Novel Liberalism,” *Polity* 38, no. 4 (October 2006): 447–77.

22. Madison, *Writings*, 472–73, 480–90.
23. Madison’s essays, which appeared in the *National Gazette* from November 21, 1791, through December 22, 1792, demonstrate how committed Madison remained to a vigorous representative democracy closely connected to a vigilant people, an economic ideal of commercial farmers of middling rank, guarding their independence and thereby advancing the common good, and a spirit of republican civic virtue transcending the narrow perspectives of self-interest in its quest for the common good. See Madison, *Writings*, 490–534.
24. The passages from the *National Gazette*, *Providence Gazette*, and *Newport Mercury* are quoted in Hale, *The French Revolution and the Transformation of American Democracy*.
25. *National Gazette*, May 29, 1793. On the fetishization of liberty caps and other efforts to sacralize the French Revolution, and on Federalists’ mockery of such celebrations of the French Revolution, see Matthew Rainbow Hale, “Apostle of Freedom: Thomas Paine and Pro-French Democratic Crusaders in the Early American Republic,” forthcoming.

26. Civis Mundi's article from the *New York Diary* appeared in the *Gazette of the United States*, January 30, 1795. See also Evan Radcliffe, "Revolutionary Writing, Moral Philosophy, and Universal Benevolence in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54 (1993): 221–40.
27. *Gazette of the United States*, January 31, 1795. See also Matthew Rainbow Hale, "On Their Tiptoes: Political Time and Newspapers during the Advent of the Radicalized French Revolution, circa 1792–93," ms in author's possession; and Hale, "American Hercules: Militant Sovereignty and Violence in the Democratic-Republican Imagination, 1793–1795," in *Making Democracy: Violence, Politics, and the American Founding* (Charlottesville, forthcoming), ms in author's possession.
28. "An American," writing in *Independent Chronicle*, cited in *Eastern Herald*, October 26, 1793. On the use of religious imagery by Jeffersonians, see Hale, "Apostle of Freedom."
29. Barlow's lyrics were printed in the *North-Carolina Gazette*, November 29, 1794. Barlow's celebrity in France resulted from his "Letter to the National Convention of France on the Defects in the Constitution of 1791," a straightforward invitation to France to follow the United States and dispense with monarchy, a national church, colonies, slavery, and a restricted electorate and adopt a system of representative democracy. Barlow's "Letter" is reprinted in *American Writing during the Founding Era, 1760–1805*, vol. 2, ed. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz (Indianapolis, 1983), 812–38.
30. On these developments see Hale, *The French Revolution and the Transformation of American Democracy*; Richard Twomey, "Jacobins and Jeffersonians: Anglo-American Radical Ideology, 1790–1810," in *The Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism*, ed. Margaret Jacob and James Jacob (London, 1984), 284–99; Seth Cotlar, *Tom Paine's*

America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the Early Republic (Charlottesville, 2011); Albrecht Koschnik, “The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and the Limits of the American Public Sphere, circa 1793–1795,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 58, no. 3 (July 2001): 615–36; and Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America*.

31. The French word “*chute*,” which conveys not only fall, downfall, and collapse but also overthrow, seems singularly appropriate for the events of late July. The *chute de Robespierre* is typically designated in studies of the French Revolution as 9 Thermidor, the date according to the revolutionary calendar that was put in place on October 5, 1793 and abandoned on January 1, 1806. Because most non-specialists find confusing the lingering tradition of dating events during that brief period according to the revolutionary calendar, I have chosen not to use the revolutionary calendar at all except for the period following the *chute* of Robespierre, universally (and usefully) designated the Thermidorian reaction.
32. On Thermidor, see Pierre Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée* (Paris, 2000), 90–100; and William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1990), 276–92.
33. See Andrew Jainchill, “The Constitution of the Year III and the Persistence of Classical Republicanism,” *French Historical Studies* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 399–435; and James Livesey, *Making Democracy in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2001). For the passages from Anton François Boissy-Anglas, Jean-Denis Lanjuinais, and Merlin de Douai, see Malcolm Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1996),

- 115–30. For a brief account of the oft-told tale of Paine’s narrow escape from execution, see Harvey Kaye, *Thomas Paine and the Promise of America* (New York, 2005), 84–86.
34. On Sieyès and the 1795 Constitution, see Michael Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 2007), 350–51; and James Sheehan, “The Problem of Sovereignty in European History,” *American Historical Review* 111 (2006): 1–15.
35. For a clear and concise account of Sieyès’s final scheme, see Sonenscher’s introduction to Sieyès, *Political Writings*, ed. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis, 2003), xxxi–xxxiii.
36. Jacques Necker, *Dernières vues de politique et de finance* (1802), in Necker, *Oeuvres*, 12 vols. (Paris, 1821), 11:15–16, 21. See also Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge*, 352. For a brisk account of Thermidor and the Directory, see Higonnet, *Goodness beyond Virtue*, 60–68; more detailed is Isser Woloch, *Jacobin Legacy: The Democratic Movement under the Directory* (Princeton, 1970).
37. Mona Ozouf, *L’école de la France: essais sur la Révolution, l’utopie, et l’enseignement* (Paris, 1984).
38. Roger Martin, *Rapport fait par Roger Martin, au nom de la commission d’instruction publique, sur l’organisation des écoles primaires* (Paris, Year V), quoted in James Livesey, *Making Democracy in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 174.
39. François de Neufchâteau, quoted in Livesey, *Making Democracy*, 116. In Livesey’s formulation, these French reformers sought to establish agricultural societies that “would ignite a virtuous cycle that would make the country rich, happy, virtuous, and glorious” (119). The Jeffersonians shared precisely that dream. See Drew McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (New York, 1980); and Joyce

Appleby, *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s* (New York, 1984).

40. See Mona Ozouf, "Revolutionary Calendar," in *Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 538–59; Livesey, *Making Democracy*, 198–233; Jainchill, "The Constitution of the Year III"; and Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984). One of the tantalizing details of these tumultuous years is the sermon given on Christmas day, 1797, by the Bishop of Imola, who later became Pope Pius VI, in which he minimized the significance of the differences between Christianity and democracy and suggested the possibility that they might be reconciled. See Robert R. Palmer, "Notes on the Use of the Word 'Democracy,' 1789–1799," *Political Science Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (June 1953): 203–26. Palmer noted that the future Pope used the word democracy with a positive valence eleven times within a few hundred words. Palmer concluded, "I know of other two other places, in documents of the period, where the word occurs with equal frequency in a favorable sense: in Robespierre's address [of February 5, 1794], and in the second part of Paine's *Rights of Man*." Most French historians have dismissed the significance of this observation and wave away the future Pope's words as strategic. See for example Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 386. Despite the trajectory of the Roman Catholic papacy over the years since 1797, which with only a few exceptions such as Leo XIII and John XXIII has been wary of democracy, I disagree with that judgment. The possibility of rapprochement signaled by the sermon of the future Pope Pius VI indicates how devastating and long lasting was the damage done to democracy in France by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the

revolutionary calendar, and similar efforts to eradicate religious belief instead of allowing it to develop alongside democratic government, as it had done for decades in North America. The sharp contrast between the pluralistic religious culture of the United States and the resolutely anti-republican stance of the French Catholic Church, which republicans since 1789 have invoked to justify efforts to uproot religious belief, helps explain the nations' different political trajectories in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

41. See Dale Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven, 1996), 374–75.
42. Jacques Necker, *Dernières vues*, in *Oeuvres* 11:94.
43. Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, December 30, 1792, in *Writings*, 1001–2.
44. Jefferson to William Short, January 3, 1793, in Jefferson, *Writings*, 1003–6; and cf. Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789, in *Writings*, 940–2.
45. James Sullivan, *The Altar of Baal Thrown Down; or, The French Nation Defended, against the Pulpit Slander of David Osgood, A. M. Pastor of the Church in Medford: A Sermon* (Stockbridge, MA, 1795), 23; and Joseph Eckley, *A Sermon, Preached at the Request of the Ancient and Honourable Artillery Company, June 4, 1792 Being the Anniversary of Their Election of Officers* (Boston, 1792), 16–20, quoted in Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America*, 5–7. See also Ashli White, *Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic* (Baltimore, 2010), on the range of responses.
46. See for example *A Specimen of Unrelenting Cruelty of Papists in France, and the Unshaken Faith & Patience of the Protestants of That Kingdom: Now Entering upon the Seventieth Year of Their Persecutions* (London, 1756); Nathan O. Hatch, “The Origins of Civil Millennialism in America: New England Clergymen, War with France, and the

- Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 31 (July 1974): 407–30; and Francis D. Cogliano, *No King, No Popery: Anti-Catholicism in Revolutionary New England* (Westport, CT, 1995).
47. Noah Webster, *An Oration Pronounced before Citizens of New Haven on the Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, July 1802*, in *American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760–1805*, ed. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1983), 2:1220–40. On Federalist political thought, see James M. Banner, *To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815* (New York, 1970); James M. Banner, “The Federalists—Still in Need of Reconsideration,” in *Federalists Reconsidered*, ed. Barbara B. Obeng and Doron S. Ben-Atar (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998); Seth Cotlar, “The Federalists’ Transatlantic Cultural Offensive of 1798 and the Moderation of American Democratic Discourse,” in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early Republic*, ed. David Waldstreicher, Andrew W. Robertson, and Jeffrey Pasley (Chapel Hill, 2004); and Hale, *The French Revolution and the Transformation of American Democracy*.
48. Robespierre, *Report upon the Principles of Political Morality: Which Are to Form the Basis of the Administration of the Interior Concerns of the Republic. Made in the Name of the Committee of Public Safety, the 18th Pluviôse, Second Year of the Republic (February 6, 1794)*, trans. Benjamin Franklin Bache (Philadelphia, 1794).
49. “New Jersey. Schallenburg, July 6,” *Aurora General Advertiser*, July 20, 1795.
50. Elijah Parish, “Ezra 8.23, Fast (April) 1794,” quoted in Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America*, 68–69.

51. *Gazette of the United States*, May 17, 1798.
52. Massachusetts *Minerva* quoted in *Gazette of the United States*, July 14, 1798.
53. Monangahela County writer quoted in *Aurora*, April 15, 1799. See Matthew Rainbow Hale, “Neither Britons nor Frenchmen: The French Revolution and American National Identity” (unpub. PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2002), 234. Historians of nationalism have emphasized that it is necessarily relational, framed in terms of the relation between one’s own nation and the “other.” See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (1983; London, 2006).
54. On Madison’s use of Adams’s *Defence* in Philadelphia, see Darren Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding* (New York, 2005), 195–96.
55. Since 1793, when France went to war against Britain, France had captured American ships because the British navy had put the French fleet out of commission. The XYZ affair heightened tensions between the United States and France, and the “Quasi-War” consisted of a few naval engagements rather than full-scale hostilities. Republican Francophiles accused the Federalists of capitulating to Britain and needlessly antagonizing France, but Adams peacefully resolved the dispute in the Treaty of Montefontaine. See Alexander DeConde, *The Quasi-War* (New York, 1966).
56. Madison, “Political Reflections,” *Aurora General Advertiser*, February 23, 1799, in *Writings*, 599–607.
57. For recent research on the political history of the 1790s, see Andrew W. Robertson, “Afterward: Reconceptualizing Jeffersonian Democracy,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 33 (2013): 317–34; Donald Ratcliffe, “The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy,

1787–1828,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 33 (2013): 219–54; Rosemarie Zagarri, “The Family Factor: Congressmen, Turnover, and the Burden of Public Service in the Early American Republic,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 33 (2013): 283–316; the essays in the fine collection *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic*, ed. Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher (Chapel Hill, 2004); and Jeffrey L. Pasley, *The First Presidential Contest: 1796 and the Founding of American Democracy* (Lawrence, KS, 2013). Cultural histories that locate the new nation in the force fields of Britain include Kariann A. Yokota, *Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial Nation* (New York, 2011); and Sam W. Haynes, *Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World* (Charlottesville, 2010). Seth Cotlar, “Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800,” in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 13–27, charts the changing uses of the term in the newspapers during the 1790s. Although I disagree with Cotlar’s claim that “democracy” was rarely used in the earlier period, he is surely right that its meanings changed after 1789. He contends that Americans began to consider their own revolution democratic only in the 1790s, as Jeffersonians adopted the term as their own and “succeeded in inventing a genealogy for democracy that stretched back to the Revolutionary era.” Because Cotlar associates “democracy” only with direct popular action, he does not consider the forms of representative democracy adopted by Americans during this period “democratic.” He contends that almost everyone in the United States, including those who elected Jefferson in 1800, was committed to “containing” or rolling back popular government. Jeffersonian Democrats embraced the term, Cotlar argues, in order to

position themselves as moderates between the “aristocratic” Federalists on their right and the “anarchic” Jacobins on their left. From Cotlar’s perspective, “the capture of this once oppositional concept by a political party had a long-lasting, moderating effect on the nation’s language of democracy” (27). For a different interpretation of these developments, see Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992), 229–43, esp. 230–31. A well-balanced account is Rosemarie Zagarri, “The American Revolution and a New National Politics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, ed. Edward Gray and Jane Kamensky (New York, 2013), 483–97.

58. Candor in *Independent Chronicle*, June 26, 1800. Among the recent studies of this pivotal election, see John Ferling, *Adams versus Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800* (New York, 2005).
59. Moderate, writing in *Centinel of Freedom*, September 17, 1799.
60. John Adams, diary entry on March 9, 1783, in Adams, *Revolutionary Writings, 1775–1783*, ed. Gordon S. Wood (New York, 2011), 549.
61. Adams, *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*, ed. L. H. Butterfield, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1962), 3:240–41. For the fullest analysis of the moderate Enlightenment, see the still illuminating account in Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976).
62. Adams to John Taylor in *Works* 6:461; and Adams to Jefferson, July 9, 1819, in *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 350–52.
63. Noah Webster, *The Revolution in France, Considered in Respect to Its Prospects and Effects* (New York, 1794), 59–60. For a fine analysis and demonstration of the “powerful exclusionary tendency” that led to the emergence of the paired terms “aristocrat” and

“democrat” in the United States from the 1760s through 1800, see Hale, *The French Revolution and the Transformation of Democracy*. For a discussion of the similar dynamic in France, where “aristocrat” and “democrat” also appeared as epithets alongside each other at the time of the Revolution, see Pierre Rosanvallon, “The History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in France,” trans. Phillip J. Costopolous, *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995): 140–54.

64. Adams, *Discourses on Davila* (Boston, 1805), 74, 83, 92.
65. On this dynamic, see Laura Edwards, “The Contradictions of Democracy in American Institutions and Practices,” in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 40–54; and Andrew Robertson, “Democracy: America’s Other ‘Peculiar Institution,’” ms. in author’s possession; and on African-American festive culture and free blacks’ affiliation with the Federalists, see David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, 1997).
66. Adams to Benjamin Rush, September 9, 1806, in *The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805–1813*, ed. Douglass Adair and John A. Schutz (San Marino, CA, 1966), 66–67. See the discussion of these issues in Staloff, *Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson*, 177–94.
67. Friedrich von Gentz, *The Origin and Principles of the American Revolution, Compared with the Origin and Principles of the French Revolution*, trans. “an American gentleman” [John Quincy Adams] (Philadelphia, 1800).
68. See Alison LaCroix, *The Intellectual Origins of American Federalism* (Cambridge, 2010).

69. Samuel Hopkins to Levi Hart, January 29, 1788, in Samuel Hopkins Papers, New York Historical Society, quoted in May, *Enlightenment in America*, 100. See also Joseph A. Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement* (Grand Rapids, MI, 1981). Gabriel's Rebellion, an abortive Virginia slave revolt in 1800, was conceived in a pro-French framework by people who thought that poor whites would join in a Jacobin-like uprising against seacoast merchants. See Hale, "Neither Britons nor Frenchmen," 241ff. The literature on slavery and antislavery in the early national and antebellum periods is overwhelming. Two recent overviews by eminent scholars are Seymour Drescher, *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (Cambridge, 2009); and David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York, 2008).
70. An excellent compilation of the wide range of women's writing in America is Dawn Keetley and John Pettegrew, eds., *Public Women, Public Words: A Documentary History of American Feminism* (Madison, WI, 1997), vol. 1: *Beginnings to 1900*. On women in late eighteenth-century America, see Nancy Cott, *The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in New England, 1780–1835* (New Haven, 1977); Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800* (Boston, 1980); Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (New York, 1986); Kathy N. Davidson, *Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America* (New York, 1986); Susan Branson, *Those Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early National Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 2001); Dana Comi, "'In the Shade of Solitude': The Mind of New England Women, 1630–1805" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2003); Ruth H. Bloch, *Gender and*

Morality in Anglo-American Culture, 1650–1800 (Berkeley, 2003); Mary Kelley, *Learning to Stand and Speak: Women, Education, and Public Life in America's Republic* (Chapel Hill, 2006); and Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 2007).

71. Murray produced prodigious amounts of mediocre poetry, mostly in rhyming couplets. Although she claimed to share the anxiety of many New Englanders concerning the effect of fiction and drama on public morals, she wrote novellas and plays that were published and performed.
72. Challenging as her circumstances became, Murray evidently stopped writing for another reason as well. The humiliation she endured from critics, and from the mockery of a nephew and a cousin who separately produced cruel parodies of her work, hurt deeply enough that she abandoned her forays into the world of print. After *The Gleaner* appeared in 1798, and three of her plays were performed to ungenerous reviews, she retreated to the domestic sphere to which most women found themselves consigned after the brief opening provided by the American Revolution. Declining an invitation to write a biography of her nephew Winthrop Sargent, Murray explained that she demurred because of the “repeated mortification, and rebuffs, which I have encountered in my literary career.” A good introduction to Murray is Sheila L. Skemp, *Judith Sargent Murray: A Brief Biography with Documents* (Boston, 1998). Murray’s letter to her nephew Winthrop Sargent, January 27, 1816, is quoted on 67; the letter to an unidentified recipient, October 6, 1808, is quoted on 106. A fuller portrait is available in Sheila L. Skemp, *First Lady of Letters: Judith Sargent Murray and the Struggle for Female Independence* (Philadelphia, 2009). See also the introduction by Nina Baym to the modern edition of *The Gleaner*

(1798; Schenectady, 1992), originally published by Murray under the pseudonym “Constantia.”

73. Murray, “On the Equality of the Sexes,” in Skemp, *Judith Sargent Murray*, 176–82.
74. Multiple editions of Wollstonecraft’s *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* appeared in the United States. In 1792 it was published in Boston by Peter Edes, for Thomas and Andrews, and in Philadelphia by William Gibbons; two years later another edition was published in Philadelphia by Matthew Carey. On the long-underestimated impact of Wollstonecraft’s ideas on American women, see Eileen Hunt Botting and Christine Carey, “Wollstonecraft’s Philosophical Impact on Nineteenth-Century American Women’s Rights Advocates,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (October 2004): 707–22; and Andrew Cayton, *Love in the Time of Revolution: Transatlantic Literary Radicalism and Historical Change, 1793–1818* (Chapel Hill, 2013). Arguments for confining women to the domestic sphere proved remarkably durable: only in 1920 did women win the vote in the United States, in Britain in 1928, in France in 1944, and in Rousseau’s native Switzerland in 1971.
75. For Murray’s letter to Mrs. K——, April 21, 1802, see Skemp, *Judith Sargent Murray*, 113.
76. Murray, *Gleaner* 89, ed. Baym, 709–16; Murray to Mrs. Barrell of York, November 25, 1800, quoted in Skemp, *Judith Sargent Murray*, 114.
77. Murray, *Gleaner* 91, ed. Baym, 727–28
78. Murray, *Gleaner* 26, ed. Baym, 206–13.
79. Murray, *Gleaner* 27, ed. Baym, 214–22.

80. Murray, "Dedication to John Adams, L. L. D., President of the United States," in *Gleaner*, ed. Baym, 11.
81. On Abigail's admonition to John Adams, see pp. 342–46 above. On female academies, see Kelley, *Learning to Stand and Speak*; on the long-term effect of Federalist women's aversion to cruelty and violence, see Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America*; and on the brief opening of opportunities for women in the wake of the American Revolution and its decisive closing in the following decades, see Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash*.
82. See Gareth Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate* (New York, 2004) 64–132; Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England, 1783–1846* (Oxford, 2006), 1–371; Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 391–425; and Higonnet, *Goodness Beyond Virtue*, 240–58.
83. See the discussion of the "Fort Wilson Riot" in pp. 372–373 above. Cf. Paine to Danton, May 6, 1793, and Paine's "Response to the Riot Outside James Wilson's House," October 16, 1779, in Paine, *Collected Writings*, ed. Eric Foner (New York, 1995), 392–95, 218–21.
84. On the responses to Paine's *Age of Reason*, see Harvey J. Kaye, *Thomas Paine and the Promise of America* (New York, 2005), 82–155; John Keane, *Tom Paine: A Political Life* (Boston, 1995), 455–63; and David Freeman Hawke, *Paine* (New York, 1974), 353–56, 365–71.
85. Thomas Paine, "Dissertation on the First Principles of Government," in *The Works of Thomas Paine* (Boston, 1796), 423. A recent addition to the burgeoning scholarly literature on Deism in America is Eric Schlereth, *An Age of Infidels: The Politics of Religious Controversy in the Early United States* (Philadelphia, 2013).

86. On this dynamic, see Seth Cotlar, *Tom Paine's America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the Early Republic* (Charlottesville, 2011), 161–214. Cotlar minimizes the significance of Paine's *Age of Reason* and the controversy it sparked. He stresses instead what he considers the illegitimacy of representative democracy and the consequences of the Jeffersonians' and Federalists' adoption of the term "democratic" for their varieties of what Cotlar considers elitist rule. That development, Cotlar claims, snuffed out the participatory democratic radicalism that he associates with Paine and his followers. Cotlar does not address Paine's repeated endorsements of representation as one of the principal features of legitimate democratic government.
87. Paine to Samuel Adams, January 1, 1803, in *Collected Writings*, 416–21.
88. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in *Writings*, 492–96. Jefferson's insistence on unity was hardly exceptional. On Americans' pervasive fear of disunion, and the equally pervasive calls to unite, see Daniel Wewers, "The Specter of Disunion in the Early American Republic, 1783–1815" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2008). On the revolution of 1800, see Peter Onuf, *Jefferson's Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville, 2000), 102–8; Joyce Appleby, *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s* (New York, 1984); and James Horn, Jan Lewis, and Peter Onuf, eds., *The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic* (Charlottesville, 2002).

Chapter 13

1. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (1962; Cambridge, MA, 1989), 89–140; Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society* (New York, 1984); Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (New York, 1983); Donald Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750–1834* (Cambridge, MA, 1996); Gareth Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate* (New York, 2004); Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen: histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, 1992), 185–294; Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée: histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France* (Paris, 2000), 101–238; Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York, 2005); and Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848* (New York, 2007).
2. Fisher Ames and George Cabot quoted in Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1991), 229–43. On the mock epic poem by “Aquiline Nimble Chops, Democrat,” see Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 61.
3. Elias Smith, *The Loving Kindness of God Displayed in the Triumph of Republicanism in America; Being a Discourse Delivered at Taunton, (Mass.), July Fourth, 1809* (Taunton, MA, 1809), 13–14.
4. [Edward Tyrrel Channing], “The Abuses of Political Discussion,” *North American Review* 4 (1817): 197–201; and see Marshall Foletta, *Coming to Terms with Democracy: Federalist Intellectuals and the Shaping of American Culture* (Charlottesville, 2001);

Catherine O'Donnell Kaplan, *Men of Letters in the Early Republic: Cultivating Forums of Citizenship* (Chapel Hill, 2008); and Sandra M. Gustafson, *Imagining Deliberative Democracy in the Early American Republic* (Chicago, 2011).

5. See the fine discussions of these complex developments, which took different courses in every state, in Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York, 2000), 26–52, 42–43 quoted; and Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 116–25.
6. The fullest account of the disfranchisement of women is Rosemarie Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 2007). On the end of property qualifications for white men, the abolition of slavery, and the disfranchisement of African Americans, see the detailed accounts in Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 53–80; and Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 181–218. As Keyssar points out, twenty states also instituted prohibitions against voting by “paupers,” usually defined as men dependent on public relief. As Keyssar notes, such laws did not derive from British precedents but reflected new distinctions being drawn between wage earners, now deemed worthy of the franchise, and those whose poverty, in the words of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, was “inconsistent with independence.” Although changes in the nature of work altered requirements of property ownership, earlier fears about the unreliability of dependent persons persisted for “paupers” as for “vagrants” and those convicted of felonies. See *The Right to Vote*, 61–65.
7. *Washington Globe*, July 26, 1832. Fine recent overviews of these political and cultural battles, which I cannot examine in detail here, include Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of*

Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (New York, 2009); Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*; and Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*.

8. On democratic discourse and the protean meanings of “the people,” see Daniel T. Rodgers, *Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence* (New York, 1987); Russell L. Hanson, *The Democratic Imagination in America: Conversations with Our Past* (Princeton, 1985); and Andrew Robertson, *The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790–1900* (Ithaca, 1995). Robertson argues that the nineteenth century witnessed a new emphasis in electoral politics on the values of private individuals instead of civic virtue.
9. See Malcolm Crook, “Elections and Democracy in France, 1789–1848,” Joanna Innes, Mark Philp, and Robert Saunders, “The Rise of Democratic Discourse in the Reform Era: Britain in the 1830s and 1840s,” and Joanna Innes, “People and Power in British Politics to 1850,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750–1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 93–97, 114–28, 129–46; and Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 498–507.
10. Matthew Arnold, “Democracy,” originally written in 1859 as the introduction to his official *Report on the Systems of Popular Education in France, Holland, and the French Cantons of Switzerland*, published in 1861, and later republished separately in 1871 with Arnold’s *Mixed Essays*, in Arnold, “*Culture and Anarchy*” and *Other Writings*, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge, 1993), 1–25; the quoted passage appears on 8.
11. See John Belcham, “*Orator*” *Hunt: Henry Hunt and English Working-Class Radicalism* (Oxford, 1985), 137–61.

12. Recent overviews include Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England, 1783–1846* (Oxford, 2006); K. Theodore Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford, 1998); Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen*; Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée*; and Alan S. Kahan, *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 2003).
13. Religious tensions further destabilized society and politics. European champions of postreligious rationality, including the new ruling elites who assumed power after the Napoleonic wars, were quick to declare religion dead. Yet piety made a comeback, often explicitly in opposition to the anti-Catholicism of the most radical French revolutionaries. In France and elsewhere in Catholic Europe, a more militantly anti-democratic and intolerant Catholicism bolstered conservative regimes while simultaneously nurturing new groups, such as Frédéric Ozanam's Society of St. Vincent de Paul, that tackled problems of poverty and ill health ignored by post-Napoleonic states. On the increasing conservatism of most Catholics and the denunciations of democracy by the Catholic hierarchy, see Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "The Divisions of the Pope: The Catholic Revival and Europe's Transition to Democracy," in *The Politics of Religion in an Age of Revival*, ed. Austen Ivereigh (London, 2000), 22–42; Jay P. Corren, *Catholic Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democracy* (Notre Dame, 2002); Ralph Gibson, *A Social History of French Catholicism, 1789–1914* (New York, 1989); and Eileen Groth Lyon, *Politicians in the Pulpit: Christian Radicalism in Britain from the Fall of the Bastille to the Disintegration of Chartism* (Aldershot, 1999).
14. "A Christian," in the words of Benjamin Rush, "cannot fail of being a republican, for every precept of the Gospel inculcates those degrees of humility, self-denial, and

brotherly kindness, which are directly opposed to the pride of monarchy and the pageantry of the court. A Christian cannot fail of being useful to the republic, for his religion teacheth him, that no man 'liveth to himself.' And lastly, a Christian cannot fail of being wholly inoffensive, for his religion teacheth him, in all things to do to others what he would wish, in like circumstances, they should do to him." Of course, many nineteenth-century conservatives drew precisely the opposite conclusion about the implications of their faith for democracy. Rush, *A Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools and the Diffusion of Knowledge in Pennsylvania; To Which Are Added Thoughts upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic. Addressed to the Legislature and Citizens of the State* (Philadelphia, 1786), 16. Overviews of antebellum religion include Nathan A. Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven, 1991); Jon Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge, 1992); and Mark A. Noll, *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 2005).

15. Tocqueville's liminal status has been a central theme of most biographical studies written in recent decades, beginning with Andre Jardin's masterpiece, *Tocqueville: A Biography*, trans. Lydia Davis and Robert Hemenway (1984; New York, 1988); Jean-Claude Lamberti, *Tocqueville and the Two Democracies*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (1983; Cambridge, MA, 1989); Roger Boesche, *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville* (Ithaca, 1987); Alan Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burkhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville* (Oxford, 1992); Cheryl Welch, *De Tocqueville* (Oxford, 2001); and Jean-Louis Benoit, *Tocqueville: un destin paradoxal* (Paris, 2005).

16. Despite Hervé's gruesome and grueling experience during his months in prison, the family remained resilient. After 1815 Hervé served as mayor of the town of Verneuil and as prefect in multiple postings from Metz to Versailles, exhibiting a relatively progressive public spiritedness rare among Restoration ministers. He might also have served as a confidant of the Comte d'Artois, the brother of Louis XVI, during the years he spent in exile before his return to France and his reign as Charles X. Eventually Hervé's loyalty was rewarded. He regained titles to chateaux in Normandy and Brittany, and in the French House of Peers he aligned with the few moderates until the revolution of 1830 ended his political career. Hervé spent his lengthy retirement writing a fairly conventional history of the ancien regime, focused on the aristocracy and the royal court, but lacking the bile that marked his wife's embittered, ultra-royalist sensibility. On the Tocqueville family history, see Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 3–55.
17. Recent studies of Constant include Stephen Holmes, *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberty* (New Haven, 1984); Biancamaria Fontana, *Benjamin Constant and the Post-Revolutionary Mind* (New Haven, 1991); Rémy Hebding, *Benjamin Constant: le libéralisme tourmenté* (Paris, 2009); Steven K. Vincent, *Benjamin Constant and the Birth of French Liberalism* (New York, 2011); and Helena Rosenblatt, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Constant* (Cambridge, 2009). See also Helena Rosenblatt, "Why Constant? A Critical Overview of the Constant Revival," *Modern Intellectual History* 1 (2004): 439–53.
18. Constant's early writings contrasted the *hauteur* of Bourbon rule with Britain's milder monarchy. There "the calm security" of the rule of law meant that "all the rights of the citizens are safe from attack," and "popular elections keep the political body alive." To

the chaos of the French revolution he counterposed the relative tranquility of modern oligarchic republics such as Switzerland, with its “private happiness and public loyalty,” and Holland, with its “good sense, fidelity and scrupulous honesty, even amidst civil dissent.” Benjamin Constant, *The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation to European Civilization* (1814), in Constant, *Political Writings*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge, 1988), 86–87.

19. Constant, *The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation*, 122–29.
20. Constant, *The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation*, 113.
21. Constant, *The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation*, 77.
22. “The citizens possess individual rights independently of all social and political authority, and any authority which violates these rights becomes illegitimate.” Constant listed the rights he considered elemental: “individual freedom, religious freedom, freedom of opinion, which includes the freedom to express oneself openly, the enjoyment of property,” and “a guarantee against all arbitrary power.” Constant, *Principles of Politics Applicable to all Representative Government* (1815), in *Political Writings*, 175–289; the quoted passage appears on 180.
23. For Constant on democracy, see especially Constant, *Principles of Politics*; his 1806 manuscript, only recently published, *Principes de politique applicable à tous les gouvernements*, ed. Etienne Hoffmann, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1980), now translated as *Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments*, trans. Dennis O’Keefe (Indianapolis, 2003); Holmes, *Constant*, 83–103; and Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen*, 213–43.

24. On the *idéologues*, see Cheryl Welch, *Liberty and Utility: The French Idéologues and the Transformation of Liberalism* (New York, 1984); on the *doctrinaires*, so called because of their professorial manner in debate, cf. Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le moment Guizot* (Paris, 1985), and Aurelian Craiutu, *Liberalism under Siege: The Political Thought of the French Doctrinaires* (Lanham, MD, 2003). More generally, see Pierre Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, trans Rebecca Belinski (Princeton, 1994); and K. Steven Vincent, *Benjamin Constant and the Birth of French Liberalism* (New York, 2011).
25. “The citizens possess individual rights independently of all social and political authority, and any authority which violates these rights becomes illegitimate.” Constant listed the rights he considered elemental: “individual freedom, religious freedom, freedom of opinion, which includes the freedom to express oneself openly, the enjoyment of property,” and “a guarantee against all arbitrary power.” François Guizot, “Elections,” *Encyclopédie progressive* (1821), in *Discours académiques, suivis des discours prononcés pour la distribution des prix au concours général de l’Université et devant diverses sociétés religieuses et de trois essais de philosophie littéraire et politique* (Paris, 1861), 395.
26. If the capacity to make political judgments depends on the capacity to discern justice and the truth, then only those so equipped should participate actively in politics. All societies contain “natural, legitimate electors,” and the earlier French distinction between passive and active citizens was the best way to “discover” their judgment. The purpose of elections is to “collect and concentrate all the reason that exists scattered in the society” in order to discern truth and justice. Guizot, “Elections,” 406. It is instructive to compare

this phrase to the phrase in Madison's essay "Vices of the Political System in the United States," in which Madison writes, "An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and the most capable to devise the proper means of attaining it." See Madison, *Writings*, ed. Jack Rakove (New York, 1999), 79–80. Despite this apparent similarity, I have discovered no evidence that Guizot was aware of Madison's ideas.

27. François Guizot, *Histoire parlementaire de France* (Paris, 1864), 2:223.
28. Guizot was among many French liberals who adopted a version of Constant's distinction between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns. Charles Théremin had earlier extended Sièyes's notion of a specialized division of labor to politics, reasoning that only specially trained experts should participate actively in public life. Whereas the few citizens of Athens and Rome were equipped to engage in politics, that option was foreclosed because the "idleness" enjoyed by citizens in the ancient world no longer existed. Now that all citizens must work, they prefer to savor the joys of private life and leave the demands of the public sphere to others. The Terror had shown the perils of the alternative. See the discussion of Charles Théremin in Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen*, 247.
29. See Guizot, "Discours du 18 août, 1842," in *Histoire parlementaire de France* 3:685. Guizot contributed to the common misapprehension of Rousseau that has persisted into the present. He argued that Rousseau had located sovereignty in the will of every individual, a fatal error that authorized the excesses of the Revolution. Instead, Guizot

insisted, reason, not will, should be sovereign. Because no will is infallible, no individual should pretend that his own judgment trumps the judgment “extracted” by the process of elections by a select few voters. Although the undeniable passivity of the French people during the early years of the Restoration, when those few voters made the decisions as everyone else looked on, seemed to confirm that judgment, the moment of calm did not last long. For Guizot’s critique of Rousseau, see François Guizot, *The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe*, trans. Andrew R. Schauble, ed. Aurelian Craiutu (Indianapolis, 2002), 286–97. For another reading of Rousseau, which emphasizes the importance for Rousseau of individuals learning to align their own wills with the general will—as Emile does thanks to the tutor’s instruction—see chapter 5 above.

30. In the history of democratic thought, Guizot’s contributions were crucial for three reasons. First, his historical scholarship established the existence of earlier experiments with representative government and challenged the absolutist claims of royalists and Bonapartists alike. Second, his conception of the “sovereignty of reason” legitimated excluding most citizens from active participation in politics and pointed France toward government by educated elites insulated from popular pressure. Finally, his emphasis on public debate inadvertently helped erode the public’s trust in those experts. Eventually, if hardly immediately, increasing numbers of French citizens educated in the public schools that Guizot helped reform came to consider themselves capable of participating in the political debates from which he was content to see them excluded.
31. Pierre Rosanvallon has probed the shortcomings of French liberals’ solutions to the problems of post-revolutionary France in many incisive studies since *Le moment Guizot*

was published in 1985. Until recently he has shown little interest in the differences between the forms of democracy in France, Britain, and the United States, differences that I think help illuminate all three traditions. On Rosanvallon, see the splendid essay by Samuel Moyn and Andrew Jainchill, “French Democracy between Totalitarianism and Solidarity: Pierre Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography,” *The Journal of Modern History* 76 (2004): 107–54. In his most recent writings, Rosanvallon has shown greater willingness to engage with American thought and experience. See for example Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, 2011).

32. Tocqueville described this crisis in a letter dated February 26, 1857, in Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. J. P. Mayer (Paris, 1951–), 15:315.
33. Louis-Philippe, Tocqueville wrote, “was an unbeliever in religion like the eighteenth century, and skeptical in politics like the nineteenth; having no belief in himself, he had none in the belief of others.” Tocqueville resolved to reconcile himself to the new day that was dawning. Having achieved nothing of note in his three years in Versailles, and uneasy in the unfamiliar new circumstances in which most members of his and his friends’ families were deemed suspect, he was ready for a change. The new king, he wrote later, “was a born friend of the law, an enemy of all excesses” and “extremely polite,” but he lacked “discrimination or greatness.” Tocqueville, *Recollections*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer and A. P. Kerr (Garden City, NY, 1970), 6–7.
34. Tocqueville’s 1835 letter to an unnamed correspondent, probably either Eugene Stoffels or Louis de Kergolay, is in *Oeuvres complètes* 1:373–75.

35. Sailing across the Atlantic in 1831, Beaumont outlined to his father their “ambitious plans.” He and Tocqueville would study America’s “inhabitants, its cities, its institutions, its mores. We will learn how the republican government works.” It would be valuable for all Europeans to have a reliable book about the people of America, one “that paints a broad portrait of their history, boldly outlines their character, analyzes their social state, and corrects the many mistaken opinions” about the United States. Gustave de Beaumont, *Lettres d’Amérique, 1831–1832*, ed. André Jardin and George W. Pierson (Paris, 1973), 28.
36. See, for example, Marc Pachter and Frances Stevenson Wein, eds., *Abroad in America: Visitors to the New Nation, 1776–1914* (Reading, MA, 1976); René Rémond, *Les états-unis devant l’opinion française, 1815–1852* (Paris, 1962); Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning* (New York, 2007), 277–307; and Aurilean Craiutu and Jeffrey C. Isaac, eds., *America Through European Eyes: English and French Reflections on the New World from the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (University Park, PA, 2009).
37. Alexis de Tocqueville to Louis de Kergolay, December 15, 1850, in Tocqueville, *Selected Letters on Politics and Society*, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. J. Toupin and Roger Boesche (Berkeley, 1985), 252–58, reprinted in *The Tocqueville Reader: A Life in Letters and Politics*, ed. Olivier Zunz and Alan S. Kahan (Oxford, 2002), 255–59. Tocqueville’s writings on the 1848 revolution, never intended for publication, appeared in an incomplete version, entitled *Souvenirs*, in 1893. The entire text, published only in 1942, is available in English as *Recollections*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (Garden City, NY, 1970). For further analysis of Tocqueville’s attitude toward historical

scholarship and of his significance for contemporary scholarship in history and the social sciences in France and the United States, see James T. Kloppenberg, “The Canvas and the Color: Tocqueville’s ‘Philosophical History’ and Why It Matters Now,” *Modern Intellectual History* 3, no. 3 (2006): 495–521.

38. The most detailed account of Tocqueville and Beaumont’s trip is George Wilson Pierson, *Tocqueville in America* (1938; Baltimore, 1996). James T. Schleifer, *The Making of Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”*, 2nd ed. (1980; Indianapolis, 2000); and the critical edition of *Democracy in America* edited by Eduardo Nolla and translated by James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis, 2006) contain the most exhaustive explorations of Tocqueville’s path from his American journey to the publication of the book.
39. This complex tale has now been told several times, but the clearest, most detailed, and most recent account is Robert T. Gannett, Jr., “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township,” *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 1–16, a brilliant article that traces the story from François Furet’s early sleuthing to more recent investigations into Tocqueville’s notes, drafts, and manuscripts that have demonstrated the somewhat exaggerated nature of Furet’s initial and influential claims about the importance of Guizot’s lectures for Tocqueville. A fuller version of Gannett’s argument is available in the first part of Robert T. Gannett Jr., *Tocqueville Unveiled: The Historian and His Sources for “The Old Regime and the Revolution”* (Chicago, 2003). My quotations from Tocqueville’s notes, in the Tocqueville archives at the Chateau de Tocqueville in Normandy, are taken from Gannett’s article. Readers interested in following this story from its origin should begin with Furet, “The Conceptual System of *Democracy in America*,” in *In the Workshop of History*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum

(Chicago, 1984); and Furet, “The Intellectual Origins of Tocqueville’s Thought,” *The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville* 7 (1985/86): 117–29.

40. Distinct from Guizot, but equally convinced that centralization breeds atomistic individualism, were early nineteenth-century legitimists such as Joseph Fiévée, Joseph de Villèle, Ferdinand Béchard, and the writers clustering around Tocqueville’s friend Louis de Kergolay’s *La Revue provinciale* and the Catholic journal *L’Avenir*. Although such writers helped focus attention on the advantages of decentralization, their legitimism distinguished their perspectives from Tocqueville’s as well as Constant’s and Guizot’s. On these legitimists, see Annelien de Dijn, “Aristocratic Liberalism in Post-revolutionary France,” *Historical Journal* 48 (2005): 661–81; and Annelien de Dijn, “The Intellectual Origins of Tocqueville’s *L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution*,” *Modern Intellectual History* 5 (2008): 1–25.
41. See Pierson, *Tocqueville in America*; and cf. Schleifer, *The Making of Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America,”* 325–39, in which Schleifer points out that Tocqueville worked with as many as nineteen different meanings of democracy. On the role of Tocqueville’s informants from New England and England, see James T. Kloppenberg, “Tocqueville, Mill, and the New England Gentry,” *The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville* 27 (2006): 351–79.
42. Thomas Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, April 24, 1816, in Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 1387.
43. Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816, in *Writings*, 1392–93.
44. Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in *Writings*, 1399.

45. See Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 36–42; and Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 196–202.
46. Cf. Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 222–31; and Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 147–60.
47. John Adams, First Annual Message, December 6, 1825, printed in *Journal of the House of Representatives*, 19th Congress, 1st Session, December 6, 1825 (Washington, 1825).
48. Biographies of John Quincy Adams include Fred Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams, American Visionary* (New York, 2014); and Paul C. Nagel, *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, A Private Life* (Cambridge, MA, 1997). See also Cory M. Pfarr, “John Quincy Adams’s Republicanism: ‘A Thousand Obstacles Apparently Stand before Us,’” *Massachusetts Historical Review* 16 (2014): 73–121.
49. Daniel Webster, *A Discourse, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1820* (Boston, 1821). See also Robert Remini, *Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time* (New York, 1997), 172–87; and Gustafson, *Imagining Deliberative Democracy*, 42–46. As Gustafson points out on 71–79, the writers who shaped the *North American Review* made a point of presenting Cicero, whom Webster quoted at Plymouth, as a model of virtuous citizenship.
50. On Webster’s two replies to South Carolina Senator Robert Y. Hayne, see Harlow Sheidley, “The Webster-Hayne Debate,” *New England Quarterly* 67 (1994): 5–29; the concise discussion of the issues involved in Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 367–73; and Gustafson, *Imagining Deliberative Democracy*, 102–12. Compare these speeches with Webster’s 1825 Bunker Hill address, discussed in Gustafson, *Imagining Deliberative Democracy*, 52–57.

51. Cf. Andrew W. Robertson, *The Language of Democracy*; and Robertson, "'Look on this Picture...And on This!' Nationalism, Localism, and Partisan Images of Otherness in the United States, 1787–1820," *American Historical Review* 106, no. 4 (October 2001): 1263–80; Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin, *Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, 2000); John L. Brooke, "Consent, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere in the Age of Revolution and the Early American Republic," in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic*, ed. Jeffrey Pasley, Andrew Robertson, and David Waldstreicher (Chapel Hill, 2003), 207–50; Mark E. Neely, Jr., *The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era* (Chapel Hill, 2005); Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 181–217; and Zagarri, *Revolutionary Backlash*. All these historians have emphasized that the expansion of voting by white males was accompanied by the shrinkage of voting rights for free blacks and the closing off of avenues for civic participation by women. Popular insurgency in antebellum America took many forms, some partisan and many outside the sphere of partisan politics. Identifying either the Jacksonians or the Whigs as the party of "democracy" seems to me no longer tenable. Two detailed accounts, which trace the making and unmaking of community and show how difficult it is to generalize about parties because of the intensely local, episodic, and contingent quality of so much partisan political organizing in antebellum America, are John L. Brooke, *The Heart of the Commonwealth: Society and Political Culture in Worcester County, Massachusetts, 1713–1861* (Cambridge, 1989); and Mary Babson Fuhrer, *A Crisis in Community: The Trials and Transformation of a New England Town, 1815–1848* (Chapel Hill, 2014).

52. For a thorough discussion of the non-mainstream views of more progressive Jacksonians who challenged Leggett's ideas of laissez-faire, see Yonatan Eyal, *The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828–1861* (Cambridge, 2007).
53. On one issue only did Leggett distance himself from the Democratic Party mainstream. Like a minority of Jacksonians, he opposed slavery and criticized southerners' efforts to prevent even the discussion of abolition. But he considered emancipation and intermarriage "preposterous," and he favored colonization as the best solution to the problem. For a representative sample of Leggett's writings, see William Leggett, *Democratick Editorials: Essays in Jacksonian Political Economy*, ed. Lawrence H. White (Indianapolis, 1984), 58, 178–80, 254–62; and on slavery and antislavery, 192–98. See also Carl N. Degler, "The Locofocos: Urban Agrarians," *Journal of Economic History* 16 (1956): 322–33.
54. These passages from Calvin Colton, *A Voice from America to England* (London, 1839) were quoted in the book more responsible than any other for identifying the Whigs with elitism and the Jacksonians with democracy in America, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Jackson*, 279–82.
55. James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in Madison, *Writings*, ed. Jack Rakove (New York, 1999), 790–94.
56. See especially Gordon S. Wood, "The Trials and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson," in *Jeffersonian Legacies*, ed. Peter S. Onuf (Charlottesville, 1993), 395–417; and Drew McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy* (Cambridge, 1989). In Wood's words, Jefferson "sensed that American society, including

Virginia, might not be getting better after all, but actually going backward. The people were not becoming more refined, more polite, and more sociable; if anything, they were more barbaric and more factional than they had been. Jefferson was frightened by the divisions in the country and by the popularity of Andrew Jackson, regarding him as [a] man of violent passions and unfit for the presidency. He felt overwhelmed by the new paper-money business culture that was sweeping through the country and never appreciated how much his democratic and egalitarian principles had contributed to its rise” (414).

57. See William Novak, *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill, 1996); and Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*.
58. Jefferson to Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in *Writings*, 1403. Historians have debated this issue throughout American history. For particularly valuable discussions, see Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*; Robert Wiebe, *The Opening of American Society: From the Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Disunion* (New York, 1984); Wiebe, *Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy* (Chicago, 1995), where he introduced the concept of “lodge democracy”; and Paul Nolte, “Republicanism, Liberalism, and Market Society: Party Formation and Party Ideology in Germany and the United States, c. 1825–1850,” in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James A. Henretta (Cambridge, 2002), 187–208. A recent overview with an up-to-date bibliography is Seth Rockman, “Jacksonian America,” in *American History Now*, ed. Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia, 2011), 52–74.

59. See Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860* (Chicago, 1961); and Leonard P. Curry, *The Free Black in Urban America, 1800–1850: The Shadow of the Dream* (Chicago, 1981).
60. Members of one of those cultures would have been charmed by Jefferson's discussing with John Quincy Adams, in a quiet corner of Madison's inaugural party in 1809, the merits of Homer, Virgil, and the "minor poets" of the ancient world; the other would have recoiled from such unmanly snobbery. John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, March 5, 1809, in *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Worthington Chauncy Ford, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), 3:288–90. Adams remained an avid reader of the Greek and Roman classics throughout his life, also translating the Greek Bible and reading French (Pascal and Montaigne rivaled Rousseau for his affections) and German to keep up his facility with those languages. His studies intensified while spending summers at Harvard as the Boylston Professor of Oratory, lecturing primarily on the salutary and deleterious effects of oratory and its significance for politics in a democracy. See Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams*, 218–25. On the effect of ethnocultural and religious divisions on antebellum American politics, see Robert Swierenga, "Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," in *Religion and American Politics*, ed. Mark A. Noll (New York, 1990), 146–71, and the sources cited in note 6 above.
61. Because the Jacksonians had few quibbles with the program on which John Quincy Adams was elected to the presidency in 1824, their antagonism to him initially was almost exclusively personal. As the Jackson Party took shape between 1824 and 1828, Adams and his supporters deliberately tried to place themselves and their program "above party." His supporters, notably Daniel Webster, repeatedly denounced party spirit as

inimical to “the public good.” On these issues the most detailed account is Thomas Coens, “The Formation of the Jackson Party, 1822–1825” (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2004).

62. The most thorough recent account of Jackson’s rise and his significance is Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*. As Wilentz notes on 327, Jackson’s Indian policy “reinforced those elements within the Jackson Democracy that presumed the supremacy of whites over nonwhites, and interpreted any challenge to that supremacy as pretended philanthropy disguising a partisan agenda.” In the aftermath of the 1830s, “this turn of mind would complicate and compromise the Jacksonian variant of political democracy, by rendering all kinds of benevolent reform as crypto-aristocratic efforts to elevate blacks and Indians at the expense of ordinary white men.” See also 370–74 on the “muddled reasoning” and “illogical” argument in Jackson’s bank veto message, which according to Wilentz “combined Jackson’s constitutional views with his larger democratic vision,” and on the strength of which he won reelection and “personal vindication.” Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* (Stanford, 1970), remains a fascinating meditation on the blend of forward-looking ambition and nostalgic closed-mindedness in Jackson’s appeal to his contemporaries.
63. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans George Lawrence (Garden City, NY, 1969), 35–36; John Quincy Adams, *An Oration at Plymouth, December 22, 1802, at the Anniversary Commemoration of the First Landing of Our Ancestors at That Place* (Boston, 1802).
64. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 46–47.
65. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 58–60.

66. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 344, and more generally, 316–95.
67. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 339.
68. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 250, and see also 248–61. More generally, on what Tocqueville learned in the United States, see Schleifer, *The Making of Tocqueville's "Democracy in America"*; and Schleifer, "Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* Reconsidered," in *The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville*, ed. Cheryl B. Welch (Cambridge, 2007), 121–38.
69. Adam I. P. Smith, "The 'Fortunate Banner': Languages of Democracy in the United States, c. 1848," in Innes and Philp, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*, 29n4, reports that "the Library of Congress online directory of newspapers lists 1,465 weekly, semi-weekly, or daily publications with the word 'Democrat' or 'Democratic' in the title published between 1830 and 1860. The second most popular title-word was 'Republican' with 1,039 titles in this period. In contrast, in the period between 1790 and 1820 there were 342 newspapers with 'Republican' in the title and only twenty-nine that contained 'Democrat'—and at least eight of these were compounds like 'Democratic Republican.'"
70. On Franklin's civic activities and his conviction that the associations he founded might contribute to fostering benevolence and preventing factionalism, see pp. 255–59 above. On the rich literature surrounding Tocqueville's analysis of civil society, including both his contemporaries in the United States and his fellow French visitor to the United States Michel Chevalier, see Gustafson, *Imagining Deliberative Democracy*, 25–29, 227–28; and Kloppenberg, "The Canvas and the Color."
71. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 274, and more generally, 270–76, 295–300.

72. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 315.
73. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 94, and more generally 190–95.
74. Tocqueville's unpublished letter to his father, dated May 7, 1835, is in the Tocqueville archives; see Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 235.
75. For the Reform as a sop designed to stave off revolution, see E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963; New York, 1966), 816–32. For a succinct account of the process of passing the Reform Act and its provisions, see Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People?*, 420–38. On the significant consequences of the Reform Act of 1832 for the development of new forms of party organization, see John A. Phillips and Charles Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England," *American Historical Review* 100, no. 2 (1995): 411–36; and on the relation between local and national partisanship, see Philip Salmon, *Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties, 1832–1841* (London, 2002).
76. John Russell, *Hansard*, December 12, 1831, 166.
77. Earl Grey, *Hansard*, October 3, 1831, 934.
78. John Russell, *Hansard*, December 17, 1831, 497; John Campbell, *Hansard*, July 6, 1831, 822.
79. Henry Bunbury, *Hansard*, September 19, 1831, 227. On hierarchy and deference as the goal of Russell, Grey, and their allies, see Michael Brock, *The Great Reform Act* (London, 1973); and James Vernon, *Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c. 1815–1867* (Cambridge, 1993); Jonathan Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian England* (New Haven, 1993); and Daniel Ziblatt, *Conservative*

Political Parties and the Birth of Democracy in Modern Europe, 1848–1950 (Cambridge, 2012).

80. See Sir Charles Wetherell, Commons, August 3, 1831, in *Hansard*, 2nd ser., 5:689; and Lord Wharncliffe, Lords, May 24, 1832, in *Hansard*, 2nd ser., 13:20; Troy Bickham, *The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire and the War of 1812* (Oxford, 2012); Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes, introduction to *Rethinking the Age of Reform, Britain, 1780–1850*, ed. Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes (Cambridge, 2003), 1–70; Miles Taylor, “Empire and Parliamentary Reform: The Reform Act of 1832 Revisited,” in Burns and Innes, *Rethinking the Age of Reform*, 295–311; and John A. Phillips, *The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs: English Electoral Behaviour, 1818–1841* (Oxford, 1992), 153.
81. John A. Roebuck, *Pamphlets for the People* (London, 1835), 6–8; Innes, Philp, and Saunders, “The Rise of Democratic Discourse in the Reform Era,” 114–28.
82. On the rise of the language of democracy in Chartist organizations and publications, see Joanna Innes, Mark Philp, and Robert Saunders, “The Rise of Democratic Discourse in the Reform Era,” 121–28.
83. William Lovett and John Collins, *Chartism: A New Organisation of the People*, in *The Chartist Movement in Britain, 1838–1850* ed. Gregory Claeys (London, 2001), 214.
84. See for example Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, 824–32; and cf. Gareth Stedman Jones, “Rethinking Chartism,” in *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working-Class History, 1832–1982* (Cambridge, 1983), 90–178; and see the discussion of the transformation of British labor and political history in William H. Sewell Jr., *The Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), 62–67.

85. Malcolm Chase, *Chartism: A New History* (Manchester, 2007); Edward Royle, *Chartism*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1996); and Dorothy Thompson, *The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1984).
86. Tocqueville's letter to Mill, dated June 13, 1835, in *Oeuvres complètes* 6:293–95. The article Tocqueville contributed to Mill's *London and Westminster Review*, "Etat social et politique de la France avant et depuis 1789," which stressed the importance of the rise of democracy in France for the rest of Europe, appeared in April, 1836; see Tocqueville, *Oeuvres*, ed. François Furet and Françoise Mélonio (Paris, 2004), 3:33–66. On the larger significance of Jefferson's September 28, 1820, letter to Charles Jarvis, see pp. 6–7 above.
87. Tocqueville to Mill, dated June 13, 1835, *Oeuvres complètes* 6:293–95. See also Tocqueville, *Journeys to England and Ireland*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New Haven, 1958); and *Alexis de Tocqueville's Journey in Ireland July-August 1835*, ed. Emmet Larkin (Washington, DC, 1990). Still the best sources on Tocqueville's travels in England are Seymour Drescher, *Tocqueville and England* (Cambridge, MA, 1964); and Seymour Drescher, *Dilemmas of Democracy: Tocqueville and Modernization* (Pittsburgh, 1968). See also *Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Reform*, ed. Seymour Drescher (New York, 1968); Alan S. Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville* (New Brunswick, 2001); and the selection of Tocqueville's published and unpublished writings on England and industrialization in *The Tocqueville Reader: A Life in Letters and Politics*, ed. Olivier Zunz and Alan S. Kahan (Oxford, 2002), 141–50.

88. James Mill, "Education," Supplement to *Encyclopedia Britannica* (London, 1825), reprinted in *James Mill on Education* (Cambridge, 1969).
89. In the *Autobiography* that Mill wrote near the end of his life, he contended modestly that "any boy or girl of average capacity and healthy physical constitution" could do what he had done if given similar opportunities. Yet in Mill's own estimation, his extraordinary training had given him "an advantage of a quarter of a century over my contemporaries." *Autobiography of John Stuart Mill*, ed. John Jacob Coss (New York, 1924), 21; in John Stuart Mill, *Collected Works*, ed. John M. Robson et al., 33 vols. (Toronto, 1963-91), 1:33.
90. Mill, *Autobiography*, 118-21; *Collected Works* 1:139-77.
91. On Mill's falling-out with Roebuck, precipitated by their formal debate concerning the relative merits of Wordsworth, whom Mill preferred, and Byron, see Mill, *Autobiography*, 102-10.
92. Mill, *Autobiography*, 94-136; *Collected Works* 1:147-81. Mill to John Sterling, July 10, 1833, in *Collected Works* 12:164-67.
93. In a letter to Mill, the only reviewer whom Tocqueville credited with seeing his aim in both volumes, he admitted that volume two lost "the ordinary reader" by trying to "depict the general features of democratic societies" rather than adding new details to his earlier portrait of American democracy. Volume two moved from concrete particularities to the abstract and conceptual: only fifteen names of individuals appear, and not one is an American. As he wrote to Mill, volume two pleased only readers "very accustomed to looking for general and speculative truths." In his review of the second volume, Mill had acknowledged precisely that feature of the book. Tocqueville's letter to Mill, December

- 30, 1840, is in Zunz and Kahan, *The Tocqueville Reader*, 213–14. See also Seymour Drescher, “Tocqueville’s Two Democracies,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 25 (1964): 201–16; Drescher, *Tocqueville and England* (Cambridge, MA, 1964).
94. The perennial appeal of *Democracy in America* in the United States stems partly from the lack of congruence between Tocqueville’s ideas and those prevailing in American politics at any time, which makes possible his adoption by disparate guardians eager to embrace or excoriate him for their own purposes. By his own admission he was neither simply a democrat nor simply an aristocrat. He fits only awkwardly into standard American categories such as Federalist or Jeffersonian, Whig or Jacksonian, Republican or Democrat, conservative or liberal. It makes more sense to characterize him as a “venturous conservative” or an “aristocratic liberal.” For a spirited critique of one of the most acerbic analyses of Tocqueville as a backward-looking aristocrat, Sheldon Wolin’s *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life* (Princeton, 2001), see Melvin Richter, “The Deposition of Alexis de Tocqueville,” *The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville* 23 (2002): 173–98. See also Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion*, 33–56; Roger Boesche, *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville* (Ithaca, 1988); and Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism*.
95. Mill’s review of Tocqueville’s second volume appeared in *Edinburgh Review*, 1840; Mill, *Collected Works*, 18:156.
96. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 506–8.
97. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 524–26.
98. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 572.
99. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 509.

100. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 515. The lessons Tocqueville drew from Madison were quite different from the lessons drawn by post–World War II American political scientists, who saw in Madison’s *Federalist* 10 nothing more than an account of how to manage unruly interest groups jockeying for position; see chapter 9 above. Tocqueville was clearly aware of the productive value of conflict as well as reconciliation, as was Madison, which is why I am unpersuaded that Tocqueville was guilty of excessive emphasis on conciliation alone. For a different reading, see Jason Frank, *Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America* (Durham, 2010), a provocative book that runs parallel to my own on some important issues. An essay that captures some of my own misgivings, as well as acknowledging the value of Frank’s concept of “constitutive surplus,” is Johann N. Neem, “Who are ‘the People’? Locating Popular Authority in Postrevolutionary America,” *Reviews in American History* 39 (2011): 267–73.
101. Mill’s review of Tocqueville’s vol. 2, *Collected Works* 18: 169.
102. On Tocqueville’s loss of conventional religious faith, see his letter to Mme. Swetchine, February 26, 1857, in Zunz and Kahan, *The Tocqueville Reader*, 334–36; and cf. the discussion of his idiosyncratic form of religiosity in Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 493–504, 528–33. See also the discussion of this issue in Agnès Antoine, *L’impensé de la démocratie: Tocqueville, la citoyenneté, et la religion* (Paris, 2003); Joshua Mitchell, *The Fragility of Freedom: Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future* (Chicago, 1995); and Larry Siedentop, *Tocqueville* (Oxford, 1994).
103. Tocqueville, *The European Revolution and Correspondences with Gobineau*, trans. John Lukacs (Gloucester, MA, 1968), 190–91; Tocqueville, *Selected Letters on Politics and*

Society, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. James Toupin and Roger Boesche (Berkeley, 1985), 342–44; and Joshua Mitchell, *The Fragility of Freedom: Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future* (Chicago, 1995).

104. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 289, 294, 445.

105. See for example Sean Wilentz, “Many Democracies: On Tocqueville and Jacksonian America,” in *Reconsidering Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America,”* ed. Abraham E. Eisenstadt (New Brunswick, 1988), 207–28.

106. Mill, who had little interest in or patience with religious faith, mentioned religion in his review of Tocqueville only in connection with the danger of mob violence that democracy also brings: he cited examples of religious or racial intolerance such as the burning of an Ursuline convent in Boston and the sacking of abolitionists’ houses in New York and Philadelphia. See Mill’s review of Tocqueville, *Collected Works* 18:176–78.

107. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 689.

108. Among the numerous studies of Tocqueville’s French predecessors and their influence on his thought, I am particularly indebted to the brilliant article by Robert Gannett, Jr., “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township,” which both demonstrates the centrality of *political* associations in Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy and makes clear the significance of the recent scholarly discovery of Guizot’s 1829–30 lectures at the Sorbonne. By discussing the presence of more or less self-governing towns in medieval Europe, towns whose independence vanished before the absolutist monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Guizot appears (however inadvertently) to have readied Tocqueville to accept the judgment of New Englanders concerning the importance of town government.

109. In the city of Worcester, an hour west of Boston, stands a nineteenth-century neo-classical courthouse with the following words carved in stone: “Obedience to law is liberty.” It would be hard to find a clearer statement of the sensibility of the proto-Whigs who served as some of the most influential of Tocqueville’s informants. On the idea of self-discipline that was closely related to “ordered liberty” in American history, see Daniel Walker Howe, *Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Cambridge, MA, 1997); Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago, 1979); and Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*. See also the discussion of these themes in David Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1979).
110. Many historians, beginning with Charles Andrews and Herbert Baxter Adams in the closing years of the nineteenth century, have worked to contextualize Sparks’s own views on the New England town, but they have bequeathed a distorted understanding of his meaning. When Tocqueville visited, New England’s former Federalists and proto-Whigs were engaged in a political project of their own. Concerned that they had been tainted by the Hartford Convention and were now being marginalized by the rise of Andrew Jackson and the growing strength of his party, particularly in the South, they wanted to affirm their loyalty to the United States and contrast it to the threats of disunion beginning to rumble from the southern states. In light of those sectional tensions, historians have stressed Sparks’s ulterior motives and tried to explain why he wanted to make New England the repository of American democratic principles and practice. The position Sparks took, however, was inconsistent with the values of hierarchy, authority, and order, and with a nationalism grounded on such principles, that historians have

attributed to the New England elite. Sparks located the legitimate source of authority at the local level, beneath the state sovereignty being claimed by southerners anxious about northern criticism of slavery. Thus the portrait Sparks painted for Tocqueville actually ran *counter* to the positions most of his peers were taking in their critiques of their southern rivals for national political prominence. See Herbert Baxter Adams, “Jared Sparks and Alexis de Tocqueville,” *Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science* 16 (1898): 7–49.

111. A recent compilation of these documents, drawn from every English colony and showing a wide variety of ideas and the distinctiveness of the New England compacts and covenants, is Donald Lutz, ed., *Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History* (Indianapolis, 1998).
112. Holly Brewer has pointed out that a generation of historians, misled by conclusions derived from an unpublished 1926 University of Chicago doctoral dissertation by C. Ray Keim, misinterpreted the significance of the abolition of entail in Virginia. She shows that Jefferson was right when he claimed that the abolition of entail was central to the effort to eradicate “every fibre...of ancient and future aristocracy” and to lay “a foundation...for a government truly republican.” Brewer’s research also confirms that Tocqueville too was right about the deliberate and self-conscious challenge to the legal underpinnings of aristocracy in the South. Loathsome and anti-democratic as the institution of slavery was, it now seems clear that the end of entail and primogeniture did transform property holding among whites in the South—even though it did not address the fundamental abomination of slavery—in just the ways that Jefferson and Tocqueville claimed it did. See Holly Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: ‘Ancient

Feudal Restraints' and Revolutionary Reform," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 54, no. 2 (April 1997): 381–402; and Holly Brewer, "Tocqueville as Historian of the Struggle between Democracy and Aristocracy in America," *The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville* 27 (2006): 381–402.

113. Tocqueville learned the same lesson from another northerner, Benjamin Richards, who was soon to begin a second term as mayor of Philadelphia when he met with Tocqueville. "Our republic is the triumph and the government of the middle classes," Richards told Tocqueville. "In the Middle States and those of New England, for example, there exists no true tie between the people and the classes that are altogether superior," precisely the point John Quincy Adams had made. The upper classes, Richards continued, "betray but little faith in the wisdom of the people, a certain scorn for the passions of the multitude, a certain distaste for its manners; in fact, they isolate themselves." In return, the people rarely elect the wealthy to office. Instead "they choose candidates ordinarily from the middle classes. It is really they who govern" everywhere except the South and the West, where there was so much mixing and mingling that subtle gradations were impossible. Tocqueville's own impressions of the South confirmed Richards' judgment. He found both that the region was very different from the rest of the nation and that divisions between upper- and lower-class whites were less pronounced, paradoxically, than in the North, as a result of slavery. He predicted that the South's peculiar institution, which he abhorred, might eventually tear the Union apart. Tocqueville's notes on his conversations with John Quincy Adams and Benjamin Richards are quoted in Pierson, *Tocqueville in America*, 419, 483.

114. Mill, *Autobiography*, 134, and *Collected Works* 1:199.

115. The five central themes of Mill's reviews of Tocqueville echo almost perfectly the central themes of Sparks' outline of American democracy: 1) the crucial role of citizens' participation in the original New England towns, a practice derived from Puritan congregationalism and extended to political decision making; 2) the indispensable political and moral education each citizen gains from participating in civic life; 3) the unlikelihood that anything other than the common good will emerge from decisions made by majority vote after the deliberation of well educated and independent-minded citizens; 4) the distinction between the narrow focus of individuals on their own self-interest in the economic sphere and the broadening of their sensibilities as a result of political engagement; and 5) the tight connection between the rough economic equality of citizens of moderate means and their willingness to engage each other in democratic debate and sometimes even to change their minds as a result of that experience. Mill's reviews of Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* appeared in the *London Review* in 1835 and in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1840; they are reprinted in Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, Historical* (London, 1859); and in Mill, *Collected Works* 18:47–90, 153–204.

116. In his review of volume 2 of *Democracy in America*, Mill highlighted the importance of “public spirit” and the danger to liberty deriving from the conformity that would result if citizens abandoned civic engagement to concentrate on material gain. He fretted—as Tocqueville did after his return from industrializing England—that such an outcome was becoming increasingly likely, due less to “democracy” than to the growing power of a “commercial class” as dominant in “aristocratic England” as in democratic America. Mill's review is in *Collected Works* 18:153–204. Mill's aversion to all forms of organized

religion manifested itself in his refusal even to acknowledge, in either of his reviews of Tocqueville, the importance attributed to Christianity in *Democracy in America*.

117. Mill, *Autobiography*, 162–63, and *Collected Works* 1:241. My analysis of Mill's changing ideas concerning democracy has benefitted from a number of recent studies, including Nadia Urbinati, *Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government* (Chicago, 2002); Joseph Hamburger, *John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control* (Princeton, 1999); Eldon Eisenach, ed., *Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism* (University Park, PA, 1998); Wendy Donner, *The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy* (Ithaca, 1991); Richard Ashcraft, "Class Conflict and Constitutionalism in J. S. Mill's Thought," in *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Bernard Semmel, *John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue* (New Haven, 1984); Fred Berger, *Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill* (Berkeley, 1984); and Stefan Collini, "The Tendencies of Things: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Method," in Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow, *That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History* (Cambridge, 1983).
118. Lincoln, "Address to the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838," in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York, 1989), 28–36.
119. Lincoln, "Address to the People of Sangamo County, New Salem, Illinois, March 9, 1832," in *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 1–5.
120. Lincoln's 1844 lines of poetry, from a letter to Andrew Johnston dated April 18, 1846, are in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 138–39. On Lincoln and romanticism,

see Stewart Winger, *Lincoln, Religion, and Romantic Cultural Politics* (DeKalb, 2003).

On the circuitous journey as a trope in romantic writing, see M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York, 1973).

121. “Representative Government,” *American Review: A Whig Journal Devoted to Politics and Literature* 1, no. 3 (March, 1848): 280–81.

122. *National Intelligencer* (Washington), April 29, 1834. For a vivid account of the Whigs’ innovative Log Cabin and Hard Cider campaign strategy in 1840, see Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 493–507. Historians agree that both the Whigs and the Jacksonians perpetuated divisions inherited from the early nineteenth century. The Whigs included not only champions of internal improvements and education such as John Quincy Adams, they also attracted conservatives clinging to the remnants of Federalist ideology and hard-driving entrepreneurs who saw economic opportunity in the Whigs’ commitments to facilitating commerce and transportation. The Democrats attracted both “city” and “country” radicals, to use Wilentz’s terminology in *The Rise of American Democracy*, and also rather less progressive elements descended from Old Republicans such as Virginia’s John Randolph, who were committed above all to preserving and expanding slavery against all challenges, and others, such as Van Buren, who created the first political machine in U.S. history. See Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 237–41, on the Albany Regency, and for judicious accounts of the Jacksonians, 328–445, and the Whigs, 570–612.

123. Although John Quincy Adams knew precisely how pivotal his father’s contributions were, with uncharacteristic modesty he did not emphasize his role as intermediary when tracing the ideas of popular government from their earlier sources through the writing of

American state constitutions. John Quincy Adams, *The Social Compact Exemplified in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with Remarks on the Theories of Divine Right of Hobbes and Filmer, and the Counter Theories of Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau* (Providence, 1842), 1–31.

124. Adams, *The Social Compact Exemplified*, 31–32.

125. Cf. George M. Dennison, *The Dorr War: Republicanism on Trial, 1831–1861* (Lexington, KY, 1976); and Marvin Gettleman, *The Dorr Rebellion: A Study in American Radicalism, 1833–1849* (New York, 1973).

126. Junius [Calvin Colton], *Democracy* (New York, 1844), 2–5, 11.

127. Orestes Brownson, “The Laboring Classes,” *Boston Quarterly Review* 3 (1840): 358–95.

128. Orestes Brownson, “Democracy,” *Boston Review* 1 (January 1838): 33–74, in Orestes Brownson, *Works*, ed. Henry F. Brownson, 20 vols. (Detroit, 1882–87), 15:1–34. For an example of Brownson’s eclectic ideas and the diversity of readers’ responses to his writings, see the discussion of his essays “The Laboring Classes” and “Democracy and Liberty” in Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 499–501, 537–39. To the surprise of many, Brownson converted from Transcendentalism to Catholicism; to the surprise of others, he condemned the revolutions of 1848. See Patrick W. Carey, *Orestes A. Brownson: American Religious Weathervane* (Grand Rapids, 2004).

129. The founders had deliberately differentiated eruptions of momentary enthusiasm from the careful articulation of reasoned judgments. “The American genius is republican as opposed to monarchical, but it is not democratic,” Brownson wrote, at least not in the spirit in which Jacksonians used the word. The Constitution was designed to make use of “popular reason separated from popular passion,” thereby “enabling that which is not

corrupt in the people to govern without subjection to that which is corrupt.” Orestes Brownson, *Works* 16:88–90.

130. On Calhoun, see James H. Read, *Majority Rule Versus Consensus: The Political Thought of John C. Calhoun* (Lawrence, KS, 2009), who demonstrates that, despite Calhoun’s claims to the contrary, Calhoun’s ideas about democracy diverged sharply from Madison’s; and the fine treatment in Michael O’Brien, *Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 2004), 2:817–36 on nullification, and 849–62 on Calhoun’s theory of the concurrent majority. To place Calhoun within the context of South Carolina’s proslavery oligarchy, see Manisha Sinha, *The Counter-Revolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina* (Chapel Hill, 2000).
131. For an excellent sampling of little-known voices from the earliest years of antislavery agitation, see the collection of documents gathered in *American Abolitionists: A Collection of Anti-Slavery Writings, 1760–1820*, ed. James G. Basker et al. (New York, 2005); and see Richard S. Newman, *The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic* (Chapel Hill, 2002). Most free blacks in the North gravitated toward Federalism, then toward the Whig Party, precisely because the Jeffersonians, then the Jacksonians, defended slavery and denigrated blacks. For evidence of this dynamic, see David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, 1997), 311–19, 333–35, 343.
132. Lovejoy’s article in the *Alton Observer*, July 20, 1837, is reprinted in Joseph C. Lovejoy and Owen Lovejoy, *Memoir of the Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy: Who Was Murdered in*

Defence of the Liberty of the Press at Alton, Illinois, with an introduction by John Quincy Adams (New York, 1838), 236.

133. See the essays by Thomas Haskell and David Brion Davis in *The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 1992); Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak,” *Journal of American History* 82 (1995): 463–93; O’Brien, *Conjectures of Order*; David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York, 2006); Lacy K. Ford, *Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South* (New York, 2009); and Margaret Abruzzo, *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism* (Baltimore, 2011).
134. See Jefferson’s chilling letter to Jared Sparks, February 4, 1824, in which he explained his rationale for favoring the compulsory relocation of all black children to Saint-Domingue. Jefferson conceded that his plan “involves some constitutional scruples” and that “the separation of infants from their mothers, too, would produce some scruples of humanity.” Jefferson, *Writings*, 1484–87. It must be noted, however, that some African Americans likewise favored colonization—although not through the forced separation of infants from their families—because they doubted that white Americans’ racism would ever permit them to enjoy equality in the United States. The vast majority of blacks, however, opposed the idea of colonization. On Adams, who opposed slavery, opposed colonization, and also opposed intermarriage, see Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams*, 480–82.
135. William Lloyd Garrison to the *Patriot* (London), August 6, 1833; Garrison, “To the Public,” the lead editorial in the first issue of the *Liberator*, January 1, 1831. A fine study that locates Garrison within the transatlantic community of antislavery discourse is Caleb

McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform* (Baton Rouge, 2013).

136. Wendell Phillips, "Speech of Wendell Phillips," *Liberator*, August 14, 1857; and Phillips, "Public Opinion," in Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures, and Letters* (Boston, 1870), 40; and see McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy*, 95.
137. Wendell Phillips, "Public Opinion," "Women's Rights," and "Sims Anniversary," in *Speeches, Lectures, and Letters*; the quotations are on 45, 18, and 82.
138. For the Ashman amendment, see *Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st session, 95. Henry David Thoreau, "Resistance to Civil Government," in Thoreau, *Collected Essays and Poems*, ed. Elizabeth Hall Witherell (New York, 2001), 208.
139. According to John L. O'Sullivan, the Democratic Party journalist who coined the term "manifest destiny," it was God's will that the United States spread across the continent. Without the war, England, Spain, or France might obstruct the nation's divinely ordained expansion. See Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York, 1963); on the expansionist Democrats of New York City, see Edward L. Widmer, *Young America: the Flowering of Democracy in New York City* (New York, 1998); and more generally Yonatan Eyal, *The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828–1861* (Cambridge, 2007).
140. Perhaps as much as from the multiple fault lines dividing American workers and the rhetorical strategies of politicians, the comparatively moderate tone of class relations in the United States stemmed from the American ideology of endless expansion and universal prosperity for all native-born whites, the despair of later Marxists and the source of so much unwarranted American smugness. A searching critique of this

ideology and its consequences is Aziz Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

141. M. Ducos's speech, in the *Moniteur Universel*, February 15, 1842, is quoted in Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism*, 46–47. See also Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen*, 239, 277.
142. Guizot's speech, in the *Moniteur Universel*, March 26, 1847.
143. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 27–28.
144. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 38, 41.
145. Tocqueville to Pierre Royer-Collard, September 27, 1841, in Zunz and Kahan, *The Tocqueville Reader*, 155–57.
146. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 86–95.
147. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 136–54. Tocqueville's detailed account of his encounters during the June days with his doorkeeper, who threatened to kill him but left him unharmed, and his manservant, who fought alongside the insurgents during the day and returned home to tend to Tocqueville in the evening, provide a rare glimpse into the double-sided world all of them inhabited, a world in which the privileges flowing from Tocqueville's wealth and title persisted even as a revolution was unfolding.
148. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 105–6.
149. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 132.
150. Tocqueville's *Souvenirs*, first made available to the public in a truncated form by his grandnephew in 1893, was published in its entirety in the *Oeuvres complètes* in 1964. The quotations come from Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 14, 191–92, 177.
151. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 181.

152. Tocqueville, *Recollections*, 105. Cf. the discussions of 1848 in Wolin, *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds*, 409–97; and Seymour Drescher, “Who Needs Ancienneté?: Tocqueville and Aristocracy and Modernity,” *History of Political Thought* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 624–46. For a more temperate and detailed account of Tocqueville during the 1848 Revolution and its aftermath, see Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 407–80.
153. John Stuart Mill to John Pringle Nichol, September 30, 1848, in Mill, *Collected Writings* 13:738–39; Harney quoted in Innes, Philp, and Saunders, “The Rise of Democratic Discourse in the Reform Era,” 125.

Chapter 14

1. Leopold von Ranke, *Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Theodor Schieder and Helmut Berding (Munich, 1971), 415-17; trans. in Willi-Paul Adams, “The Liberal and Democratic Republicanism of the First American State Constitutions,” in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James Henretta (Cambridge, 2002), 128.
2. On democratic reformers’ challenges to laissez-faire liberalism and revolutionary socialism on both sides of the Atlantic after the 1870s, see James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York, 1986).
3. *Washington Daily Union*, March 2, 1850; *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, February 20 and 25, 1850, quoted in Elizabeth Varon, *Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789–1859* (Chapel Hill, 2008), 214–15. The most complete study of the reverberations of the revolutions of 1848 in the United States is Timothy Mason Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville, 2009).
4. *Christian Inquirer* (New York), April 7, 1849; *New York Tribune*, March 29, 1848; *New York Tribune*, April 20, 1849; and see the discussion of these issues in Adam I. P. Smith, “The ‘Fortunate Banner’: Languages of Democracy in the United States, c. 1848,” in *Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013), 28–39.
5. *Times* (London), July 17, 1847; F. M. L. Thompson, *English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1963); E. F. Biagini, *Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform:*

- Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860–1880* (Cambridge, 1992); K. Theodore Hoppen, “Roads to Democracy: Electioneering and Corruption in Nineteenth-Century England and Ireland,” *History* 81 (1996): 553–71.
6. Derek Fraser, *The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 2003); Fraser, *Urban Politics in Victorian England: The Structure of Politics in Victorian Cities* (Leicester, 1976), 262; and David Roberts, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State* (New Haven, 1960).
 7. See David M. Potter, *The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861* (New York, 1976); Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York, 1970); Michael F. Holt, *The Fate of Their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 2004); and Varon, *Disunion!*
 8. Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Peoria, Illinois, October 16, 1854, in Abraham Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, ed. Don Fehrenbacher (New York, 1989), 315.
 9. On Lincoln’s voracious reading in philosophy and political theory, see Ronald C. White Jr., *A. Lincoln: A Biography* (New York, 2009). For an unmatched analysis of the Peoria Address, see John Burt, *Lincoln’s Tragic Pragmatism: Lincoln, Douglas, and Moral Conflict* (Cambridge, MA, 2013), 27–93. In Burt’s words, “the promise of equality has a power that many other kinds of moral claim do not have, because the reciprocity it demands is at the heart of democratic political ideals, and democracy cannot be maintained without it” (70).
 10. Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 334.
 11. Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 316; see also 329.

12. The most recent in the long line of books on Lincoln's evolving ideas about slavery and race is Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York, 2010).
13. Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 326–27. On the sources of Lincoln's moral philosophy, the most thorough study is William Miller, *Lincoln's Virtues: An Ethical Biography* (New York, 2002). See also Richard J. Carwadine, *Lincoln* (London, 2003). Although it is clear that Lincoln learned the principles of political economy from reading Francis Wayland, *The Elements of Political Economy* (1837; Boston, 1853), there is no direct evidence that Lincoln was also familiar with Wayland's widely read textbook in moral philosophy, *The Elements of Moral Science* (1835; Boston, 1856), the conduit by which the idea of sympathy passed from Scottish common sense philosophy into many corners of nineteenth-century American culture. The best evidence that exists seems to be the letter from Lincoln's friend W. H. Herndon to Jesse K. Weik, January 1, 1866, in which Herndon wrote that Lincoln "ate up, digested, and assimilated" Wayland's writings in moral philosophy. Herndon quoted in Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago, 1979), 270. For the relation between novels such as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and the spread of sympathy toward African Americans, cf. Margaret Abruzzo, *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism* (Baltimore, 2011); and David S. Reynolds, *Mightier Than the Sword: Uncle Tom's Cabin and the Battle for America* (New York, 2012).
14. Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 81.
15. On this crucial issue see George Fredrickson, *Big Enough to Be Inconsistent: Abraham Lincoln Confronts Slavery and Race* (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

16. Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 328.
17. Lincoln's fragment on slavery is in *Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858*, 303.
18. See Sumner's speech in *The Works of Charles Sumner* (Boston, 1873), 4:125–48; and see David Donald, *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 1960); and cf. William E. Gienapp, "The Crime against Sumner: The Caning of Charles Sumner and the Rise of the Republican Party," *Civil War History* 25 (1979): 218–45. For an illuminating discussion of the ways in which Sumner's speech violated the accepted rituals of Congressional behavior and the ways in which Lincoln more subtly but just as decisively transformed American political rhetoric, see Andrew W. Robertson, *The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790–1900* (Ithaca, 1995), 68–95.
19. Chief Justice Roger Taney held that the Constitution should not be interpreted as applying to blacks, whether slave or free. Because slaves were not citizens, Dred Scott lacked the standing necessary to file suit as a citizen in a federal court. Taney also ruled that the laws of slave states governed the slaves wherever they were and that, as property, their status was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Dred Scott* seemed to many Northerners to authorize the importation of slaves anywhere in the nation, and to forbid Congress or state legislatures from intervening to prevent it. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics* (New York, 1978); Paul Finkelman, *Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, 1997); and the recent overview of the significance of the case in Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 707–44.

20. On Lincoln's romantic nationalism, see Stewart Winger, *Lincoln, Religion, and Romantic Cultural Politics* (DeKalb, 2003).
21. Lincoln's speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858, *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858*, ed. Robert W. Johannsen (New York, 1965), 14–15.
22. Speech of Stephen A. Douglas, Chicago, July 9, 1858, in Johannsen, *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858*, 22–36; the quotations are from 23, 27, 30, 35.
23. On the role of Lincoln's physical appearance in his political career and its enduring significance in the American imagination, see Richard Wightman Fox, *Lincoln's Body: A Cultural History* (New York, 2015). Among the many accounts of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, see Burt, *Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism*; Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (Stanford, 1962); Alan Guelzo, *Lincoln and Douglas: The Debates That Defined America* (New York, 2008); and David Zarefsky, *Lincoln, Douglas and Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate* (Chicago, 1993).
24. Johannsen, *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates*, 37–114.
25. Douglass, "What To the Slave Is the Fourth of July?," first delivered in Rochester, New York, July 5, 1852, is in *The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One: Speeches, Debates, and Interviews*, ed. John W. Blassingame et al., 2 vols. (New Haven, 1982), 2:359–88.
26. *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass Written by Himself*, first published in 1881 and reissued in 1892, is in Frederick Douglass, *Autobiographies*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (New York, 1994); the quotation is from 921. On the complex and evolving relationship between Douglass and Lincoln, see James Oakes, *The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics* (New

York, 2008); and John Stauffer, *Giants: The Parallel Lives of Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 2008).

27. On Lincoln's reverence for Clay, its role in shaping his own political career, and the reasons why he invoked this phrase, see Richard Carwadine, *Lincoln* (London, 2003), 11–28; William E. Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America* (New York, 2002), 40–45; and Burt, *Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism*, 356–59, 596–97. On the central issue separating Lincoln from Douglas and its persistent significance in our own day, Burt writes, “The world Lincoln feared in the ‘House Divided’ speech is a world that has become familiar to us. It is a world in which the human being is the plaything of natural forces, a bundle of instincts and desires, a higher primate who makes many noises that sound like moral arguments but are really only the reflection into an interior space of the urges such primates feel in external nature or external culture. It is a world in which the ideology of autonomous agency and free labor is replaced by the ideology of impersonal economic or biologic law. It is a world in which actual people have merely formal equality, but the state is foreclosed, in the name of an imprisoning ideology of property, from rendering that equality meaningful” (177).
28. Johannsen, *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates*, 219–20.
29. Johannsen, *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates*, 316, 226.
30. See Edouard Laboulaye, *Le parti libéral, son programme et son avenir*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1863), 149–50. For his analysis and defense of representative democracy in the United States as a guide for the study of comparative law, see Edouard Laboulaye, *De la constitution américaine et de l'utilité de son étude, discours prononcé le 4 décembre 1849 à l'ouverture du cours de législation comparée* (Paris, 1849); and on the history of

relations between France and the United States more generally, Edouard Laboulaye, *Les Etats-unis et la France* (Paris, 1862). On Laboulaye, see Walter D. Gray, *Interpreting American Democracy in France: The Career of Edouard Laboulaye, 1811–1883* (Newark, DE, 1994). Laboulaye is now best remembered in the United States as a compiler of fairy tales and for his role in the process that led to the construction of the Statue of Liberty. See Francesca Lida Viano, *La statua della libertà: una storia globale* (Bari, 2010); and Yasmin Sabina Kahn, *Enlightening the World: The Creation of the Statue of Liberty* (Ithaca, 2010).

31. Macaulay's letter to Henry S. Randall, May 23, 1857, was reprinted from the *Southern Literary Messenger* in *New York Times*, March 24, 1860.
32. For Gladstone's speech, see *Hansard*, May 11, 1864, 324–25; and the discussion in K. Theodore Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford, 1998), 244–45. See also F. B. Smith, "'Democracy' in the Second Reform Debates," *Historical Studies* 11 (1964): 306; and K. Theodore Hoppen, "The Franchise and Electoral Politics in England and Ireland, 1832–1885," *History* 70 (1985): 202–17.
33. Arnold, "Democracy," in *"Culture and Anarchy" and Other Writings*, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge, 1993), 5–13. Arnold's judgment has struck most twentieth-century commentators as an illustration of his blindness and elitism, but when British history is compared with the histories of other European nations, his characterizations seem less implausible. As even Marx conceded, the British Conservative Party did make overtures that attracted more widespread support than did conservative parties elsewhere. See Daniel Ziblatt, *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe, 1848–1950* (Cambridge, 2012).

34. F. B. Smith, *The Making of the Second Reform Bill* (Cambridge, 1966), 160.
35. H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. McKibben, and J. A. Kay, "The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party," *English Historical Review* 91 (1976): 724. On these developments and their limited significance, see the concise discussion in K. Theodore Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford, 1998), 263–71.
36. For a representative statement of the logic of this position, see Hannah Mather Crocker, *Observations on the Real Rights of Women, with Their Appropriate Duties, Agreeable to Scripture, Reason, and Common Sense*, ed. Constance J. Post (1818; Lincoln, NE, 2011).
37. For decades, historians have dismissed Tocqueville's sentimental observations concerning the "genius" of American women as stereotypes revealing his blindness to the unequal status of women in American democracy. Our understandable emphasis on the costs of inequality, however, and our awareness of the burdens imposed on women (and African-Americans) by white men and justified by the ideology of female self-sacrifice, have obscured Tocqueville's point. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Olivier Zunz, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, 2004), 695–97.
38. This interpretation of Tocqueville's discussion of American women derives from the discussion in Cheryl Welch, *De Tocqueville* (New York, 2001), 190–207. For a strikingly different view, see Delba Winthrop, "Tocqueville's American Woman and 'The True Conception of Democratic Progress,'" *Political Theory* 14 (1986): 239–61; and for a psychoanalytic analysis, see Laura Janara, *Democracy Growing Up: Authority, Autonomy, and Passion in Tocqueville's Democracy in America* (Albany, 2002).
39. Frances Wright, *Views of Society and Manners in America*, ed. Paul R. Baker (1821; Cambridge, MA, 1963), 167. According to an 1828 article in the sympathetic *New*

Harmony Gazette, Wright envisioned Nashoba in its second iteration as a place where the twin ideals of liberty and equality might be not only declared but lived “without regard to sex or condition, class, race, nation or color.” Because she considered the “aristocracy of color” the “particular vice” of the United States, Wright was said to have racial equality as her particular goal, but liberating women from existing marriage laws was to be equally important. No woman would “forfeit her individual rights or independent existence” in Nashoba, and no man could “assert over her any rights or power whatsoever, beyond what he may exercise over her free and voluntary affections.” Nashoba never approached Wright’s lofty goals. Like many visionaries, she thought she knew what was best for members of her community. Despite her exuberant praise of the United States in *Views*, democratic governance had no place in Nashoba. The article from *New Harmony Gazette*, January and February, 1828, is reprinted in *Public Women, Public Words: A Documentary History of American Feminism*, ed. Dawn Keetley and John Pettigrew, 3 vols. (Madison, 1997), 1:124–27. On the distance between Wright’s reputation and her life, see Gail Bederman, “Revisiting Nashoba: Slavery, Utopia, and Frances Wright in America, 1818–1826,” *American Literary History* 17 (2005): 438–59; and Celia Morris, *Fanny Wright, Rebel in America* (Urbana, 1984).

40. Sarah Grimké, *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women, Addressed to Mary S. Parker, President of the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society* (Boston, 1838), 4, 7, 46, 17, 122–23, 127, 128, 10. On the Grimké sisters, see Gerda Lerner, *The Grimké Sisters of South Carolina: Pioneers for Women’s Rights and Abolition*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, 2004); and Lerner, *Women’s Rights Emerges within the Anti-slavery Movement, 1830–1870: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, 2000).

41. Margaret Fuller, *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1845), 154, 158, 161.
42. On this dynamic see Lori D. Ginzberg, *Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (New Haven, 1990). Rachel Hope Cleves, *The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Antislavery* (Cambridge, 2009), shows how the Federalist women who reacted in horror to the excesses of the French Revolution contributed to the waves of reform in the 1830s and 1840s. See also Daniel Walker Howe, *Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 157–88; and Margaret Abruzzo, *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism* (Baltimore, 2011). A convenient compilation of texts illustrating this emphasis on self-control as the route toward social reform is *Antebellum American Culture: An Interpretive Anthology*, ed. David Brion Davis (Lexington, 1979).
43. “When in the course of Human Events,” the Litchfield Declaration began, “it becomes necessary for the Ladies to dissolve those bonds by which they have been subjected to others, and to assume among the self styled Lords of Creation that separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and their *own talents* entitle them,” they must explain “the causes which impel them to the separation.” Among the truths held to be self evident, the authors declared, was “That all *mankind* are created equal” and possess “certain unalienable rights.” Respecting women’s rights required nothing less than the transformation of “social relations.” Beyond their light-hearted rebuke of men for having unjustly “plundered our pantries” and “ravaged our sideboards,” the Litchfield Declaration included a critique of so-called American democracy: men forced women to “relinquish the right of representation in the Legislature” and systematically excluded

women “from taking any part in public deliberations.” “The Ladies Declaration of Independence,” from Miss Pierce’s School Papers, 1839, Litchfield Historical Society, Litchfield, Connecticut, in Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1980), 278–79.

44. The 1837 Proceedings, reprinted in *Turning the World Upside Down: The Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women*, ed. Dorothy Sterling (New York, 1987), 19.
45. See Margaret Hope Bacon, *Valiant Friend: The Life of Lucretia Mott* (New York, 1980), 125; and on the relation between the 1848 revolutions and Seneca Falls, see Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 164–78.
46. Stanton’s speech, delivered often in the 1840s, is in *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, ed. Ann D. Gordon (New Brunswick, 1997), 94–123.
47. On developments in upstate New York before the Seneca Falls meeting and the activities of antebellum women in public life, see Lori D. Ginzberg, *Untidy Origins: A Story of Women’s Rights in Antebellum New York* (Chapel Hill, 2005). On the broader issues of women and the law, see Linda Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York, 1998). On woman suffrage, see Ellen Carol DuBois, *Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women’s Movement in America, 1848–1869*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, 1999). The Declaration of Sentiments and the Resolutions passed in Seneca Falls are reprinted in Dawn Keetley and John Pettegrew, eds., *Public Women, Public Words: A Documentary History of American Feminism*, vol. 1: *Beginnings to 1900* (Madison, 1997), 190–93.
48. *North American Review* 109, no. 225 (October 1869): 556–65.

49. Harriet Taylor Mill, "Enfranchisement of Women," originally published in *Westminster Review*, July 1851, and republished as a pamphlet in 1868, is Appendix C in John Stuart Mill, *Collected Works*, ed. John M. Robson et al., 33 vols. (Toronto, 1963–91), 21:405; and is also reprinted in *Sexual Equality: Writings by John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, and Helen Taylor*, ed. Ann P. Robson and John M. Robson (Toronto, 1994), 192.
50. The reviewer noted that the most notable progress along the path toward equality had been made with the end of slavery and the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Now it was women's turn. *North American Review* 109, no. 225 (October 1869): 565.
51. Mill quoted in William Thompson, *Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery* (1825; London, 1983), 9.
52. Harriet Taylor to J. W. Fox, May 10, 1848, in *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Correspondence and Subsequent Marriage*, ed. F. A. Hayek (London, 1951), 123. On the Chartists' lack of interest in woman suffrage and their relegation of women to staying home and keeping house, see Anna Clark, *The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class* (Berkeley, 1995), 220–47.
53. See Bonnie S. Anderson, *Joyous Greetings: The First International Women's Movement, 1830–1860* (New York, 2000), for the struggles between women's rights groups and the broader reform movements of which they were a part.
54. Mill to Harriet Taylor [1850?], in the Mill-Taylor Papers, London School of Economics, in Hayek, *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor*, 166–67; and in Mill, *Collected Works*,

- 14:49. See the illuminating discussion of the connections between Mill, Taylor Mill, and American, French, and German women's rights activists in Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*.
55. Reprinted in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, *History of Woman Suffrage*, 6 vols. (Rochester, 1881), 1:853. See the discussion of socialism, antislavery, and women's rights in Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 67–98.
56. Derooin's response, published *L'Opinion des Femmes* 4 (May 1849), 4, is quoted in Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 8.
57. On the relation between the 1848 revolutions and the struggle for women's rights, see Roberts, *Distant Revolutions*, 90–104; and Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 15–18, 164–78.
58. Harriet Taylor Mill, "The Enfranchisement of Women," in Mill, *Collected Works*, Appendix C, 21:415; and in Robson and Robson, *Sexual Equality*, 203. See also Evelyn L. Pugh, "John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor, and Women's Rights in America," *Canadian Journal of History* 13, no. 3 (December 1978): 423–42; and Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*.
59. John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women*, in "On Liberty" and other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge, 1989), 120–21; and Mill, *Collected Works* 21:262–63. On the collaboration between Mill and Taylor, the reasons why he considered her the most important influence on his work, and the reasons why some scholars have questioned that influence, see John M. Robson, *The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of John Stuart Mill* (Toronto, 1968), 50–68. For a critique of Mill and Taylor's argument from the perspective of a more recent feminist theorist, see Susan Moller Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, 1979).
60. Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 123–130; and Mill, *Collected Works*, 21:264–70.

61. Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 131, 135–36, 138, 143–45; and Mill, *Collected Works* 21:271–73, 276, 280–82.
62. Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 148, 153, 158–59; and Mill, *Collected Works*, 285, 288, 294.
63. “We are entering into an order of things in which justice will again be the primary virtue; grounded as before on equal, but now also on sympathetic association; having its root no longer in the instinct of equals for self-protection, but in a cultivated sympathy between them; and no one being now left out, but an equal measure being extended to all.” “The true virtue of human beings,” they wrote, again begging the question of how such foundational claims could be established on the basis of experience, “is fitness to live together as equals.” Such individuals will claim “nothing for themselves but what they as freely concede to every one else.” Mill, *On the Subjection of Women*, 159–60; and Mill, *Collected Works* 21:294. Here Taylor and Mill’s analysis echoed the discussion of Christianity in Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*; cf. Tocqueville’s discussion of this issue in chapter 13 above.
64. “The moral regeneration of mankind” could only begin, they concluded, when marriage “is placed under the rule of equal justice, and when human beings learn to cultivate their strongest sympathy with an equal in rights and in cultivation.” Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 195, 207–8, 211; and Mill, *Collected Works* 21:323, 336.
65. Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 213; and Mill, *Collected Works* 21:337. For a corrective to the simplified and misleading understanding of Mill as a champion of individual freedom, particularly the “negative liberty” of Isaiah Berlin, see Bernard Semmel, *John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue* (New Haven, 1984); and the discussions of Mill in Duncan Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgment in Modern*

Political Thought (Princeton, 2011); Nancy Rosenblum, *Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought* (Cambridge, MA, 1987); Stephen Holmes, *Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy* (Chicago, 1995); and Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930* (Oxford, 1991), esp. 166–69.

66. Mill, *Autobiography*, 186; and Mill, *Collected Works* 1:265.

67. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), in Mill, *Collected Works* 19:380–94. The fullest and best-balanced analyses of Mill’s ideas about democracy are Dennis F. Thompson, *John Stuart Mill and Representative Government* (Princeton, 1976); and Nadia Urbinati, *Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government* (Chicago, 2002). Thompson makes clear that Mill wrestled with the relation between cultivation and participation and viewed both within the framework of his ideals of what constitutes a fully realized life. Urbinati, who stresses Mill’s careful study of George Grote’s *History of Greece*, seems to me to overstate the significance of Athens and underplay the importance of more proximate sources, especially Tocqueville, in shaping Mill’s thought. Cf. Robson, *The Improvement of Mankind*, 105–14, on Tocqueville’s significance for Mill. Overall, however, Urbinati’s account of the value both of participation and of the productive value of disagreement for Mill respond convincingly to critiques of Mill’s “elitism” and demonstrate why Mill valued representative democracy as a cultural project. For a parallel account of the concepts of individuality and freedom that Mill prized and the relation between those values and Mill’s assessment of the potential of representative democracy, see Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty*, 173–222.

68. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, in *Collected Works* 19:410–12, 436.
69. Mill, *Autobiography*, 162–63. See the discussion of Mill’s reformist activities and his service as MP in Collini, *Public Moralists*, 121–69.
70. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, 3rd ed. (London, 1867), 40–45; see also 27–28, 36, 46–47, 53, 95–96; and Mill, “Speech to the London National Society for Women’s Suffrage, March 26, 1870,” in *Collected Works* 29:387.
71. Mill, “Utility of Religion,” in *Three Essays on Religion* (London, 1874), 108–9. On Mill as moralist, see Robson, *The Improvement of Mankind*, 117–59; and Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists*, 121–69.
72. Having condemned slavery in *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville joined the French Society for the Abolition of Slavery as early as 1835. The report of the committee charged by the Chamber of Deputies to study the issue, which Tocqueville himself filed, defies easy summary. On the one hand, the committee did call for fixing a date to end slavery in all French colonies, after which it urged the government to commit itself to the education of former slaves. On the other hand, slave owners were to be indemnified and that cost paid by a tax on former slaves’ labor. Perhaps because of lingering support for slavery, or perhaps because of the Society’s proposal was incoherent, the Chamber of Deputies never acted on it. Tocqueville’s 1843 report “The Emancipation of Slaves” is in Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, ed. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore, 2001), 199–226; see Pitts’s discussion of these issues in her introduction, xxix–xxxv.
73. On Tocqueville’s historical sensibility, see James T. Kloppenberg, “The Canvas and the Color: Tocqueville’s ‘Philosophical History’ and Why It Matters Now,” *Modern*

Intellectual History 3 (2006): 495–521; and Robson, *The Improvement of Mankind*, 224–25.

74. Mill, *Autobiography*, 187–90; and “The Contest in America,” in *Collected Works* 21:136–41. “The South are in rebellion,” Mill wrote, “not for simple slavery; they are in rebellion for the right of burning human creatures alive.” On Phillips’s admiration for Mill, see McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy*, 238–41. Mill was much more ambivalent about the British role in India than he was about the need to abolish slavery in the United States.
75. Cooper Union Address, in Abraham Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, ed. Don Fehrenbacher (New York, 1989), 129–30.
76. Even Emerson, who resisted the abolitionists’ entreaties for so long, ended up admiring Brown as “an idealist” who came to think “he existed to put them all into action; he said ‘he did not believe in moral suasion, he believed in putting the thing through.’” A splendid compilation of speeches on writings on John Brown is *The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harper’s Ferry Raid*, ed. John Stauffer and Zoe Trodd (Cambridge, MA, 2012). For the passage from Mill’s *Autobiography*, see 415–16; John Andrew, 126–27; Frederick Douglass, 492–99; Wendell Phillips’s eulogy, 174–77; and Ralph Waldo Emerson, 113–16. The quotation from Phillips’s essay “Harper’s Ferry,” in Wendell Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures, and Letters* (Ann Arbor, 2005), 272–82, is quoted in McDaniel, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Democracy*, 226.
77. For Lincoln’s defense of free labor and his ideal of America as a land of independent yeomen, see his address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, September 30, 1859, in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 90–101.

78. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 215–24.
79. Lincoln’s Speech on Discoveries and Inventions, Jacksonville, Illinois, February 11, 1859, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 3–12; the quoted passages are on 6.
80. Two decades earlier Lincoln had addressed the Washington Temperance Society of Springfield, Illinois. Because he did not drink alcohol himself, the group’s efforts would not affect him, but he commended their efforts as the opposite of “impolitic and unjust.” Rather than antagonizing those they hoped to reform, they spoke to them and about them with charity. They relied on persuasion, which is essential when both appetite and interest are involved, as in the case of alcohol. Lincoln pointed out that progressive change usually comes, as it did with the American Revolution, through a painful and sometimes unavoidably violent process. The Washington Temperance Society, however, wanted to effect change without inflicting pain or causing destruction. When Lincoln turned his attention to slavery, that method remained his model. Democracy requires citizens to deploy their capacity for persuasive communication rather than resorting to force. Lincoln, “Address to The Washington Temperance Society of Springfield, Illinois,” February 22, 1842, in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 81–90.
81. On Lincoln’s gradual development from skepticism to the embrace of religious faith in the last decade of his life, see Michael Burkimer, *Lincoln’s Christianity* (Yardley, 2007). Although Lincoln himself disliked evangelicals’ fervor, their increasingly enthusiastic support of his presidency ended up sustaining him into his second term. On his uneasiness with the evangelical Christians who projected onto him their own ideas about America’s sacred mission, see Carwadine, *Lincoln*. Mark A. Noll, *America’s God:*

From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Oxford, 2002), locates Lincoln within the broader history of American Protestantism.

82. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address.
83. On this theme see William Novak, "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," *American Historical Review* 113 (2008): 752–72; William Novak, *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Richard R. John, ed., *Ruling Passions: Political Economy in Nineteenth-Century America* (University Park, PA, 2006); David Konig, ed., *Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic* (Stanford, 1995); the essays by Richard R. John, "Affairs of Office: The Executive Departments, the Election of 1828, and the Making of the Democratic Party," William J. Novak, "The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America," and Michael Vorenberg, "Bringing the Constitution Back In: Amendment, Innovation, and Popular Democracy During the Civil War Era," in *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History*, ed. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian Zelizer (Princeton, 2003), 50–84, 85–119, 120–45; and Steven Conn, ed., *To Promote the General Welfare: The Case for Big Government* (New York, 2012), a collection that establishes the persistent presence of the federal government throughout American history despite its usual "invisibility." That paradox was first noted by Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, 77: in the United States "government authority seems anxiously bent on keeping out of sight."
84. Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 246–61. Lincoln's proposals ended up generating little opposition. The departure of southern

Democrats and the death of Stephen A. Douglas meant there was no one left to organize opposition at this early stage of Lincoln's presidency. See Donald, *Lincoln*, 304–5.

85. Lincoln later conceded to Congress, when presenting elaborate calculations purporting to show how much whites would benefit from the departure of former slaves, that very few African Americans seemed interested in taking him up on the offer. See Lincoln's Address on Colonization to a Committee of Colored Men, Washington, DC, August 14, 1862, in Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 353–57; and Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 493–15.
86. Lincoln to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 357–58.
87. See Carwadine, *Lincoln*, on the paradoxical consequences of the Emancipation Proclamation, which rallied to the Union cause—and bolstered Lincoln's own standing among—those radicals whose fervor he had distrusted and whose strategies he had rejected.
88. Paradoxically, as James M. McPherson argued in *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (Oxford, 1988), had the Union succeeded in suppressing the Confederate rebellion in 1861 or 1862, it is unlikely that slavery would have ended in the 1860s.
89. Garry Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America* (New York, 1992), is a beautifully crafted and immensely valuable study of this pivotal speech. In light of the emphasis I have placed on equality in American history from the seventeenth-century origins of New England, however, readers will not be surprised that I consider Wills's claim concerning Lincoln's discovery of equality and its "remaking" of America overstated. Lincoln borrowed his formulation of democracy as government of,

by, and for the people from the New England preacher Theodore Parker. See Dean Grodzins, *American Heretic: Theodore Parker and Transcendentalism* (Chapel Hill, 2002).

90. Lincoln, Address at the Sanitary Fair in Baltimore, Maryland, April 18, 1864, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 585–86.
91. See, for example, Lincoln's letter to Albert G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 585–86.
92. Today that percentage would total nearly six million persons. Although twenty-first-century Americans lament the casualties from the wars and disasters of our own day, and although the scale of the slaughter was similar for mid-twentieth-century Europeans, most Americans find it hard even to imagine carnage on the scale of the United States Civil War.
93. Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 686–87.
94. Lincoln to Thurlow Weed, March 15, 1865, in *Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865*, 689.
On European responses to Lincoln's speech, see Mark Noll, *America's God*, 6–7, 425–35. For transcripts of contemporary newspaper reports, see Benjamin Barondess, *Three Lincoln Masterpieces* (Charleston, WV, 1954), 51–109.
95. The best study of the consequences of the North's retreat from Reconstruction is Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York, 1988).
On the failure to limit the franchise in New York City, see Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (Cambridge, 2001), 207–37.

96. On this process and its consequences, see David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA, 2002).
97. Mill, “The Contest in America” (February 1862), in *Collected Works* 21:136–41.
98. Mill also wrote that Lincoln provided “an example of how far singleminded honesty will often go, in doing the work and supplying the place of talent.” Mill to John Elliot Cairnes, December 26, 1863, in *Collected Works* 15:911–13; Mill to John Plummer, May 1, 1865, in *Collected Works* 16:1042; Mill to Max Kyllmann, May 30, 1865, in *Collected Works* 16:1062–63. Ledru-Rollin wrote a joint letter to Lincoln from London, together with his fellow exiles Giuseppe Mazzini and Karl Blind, proclaiming “a bond of unity between you and us” and warning that the Confederacy’s victory would “furnish arms to all the despotisms of Europe.” K. Blind, G. Mazzini, and A. A. Ledru-Rollin to Lincoln, April 24, 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, quoted by Richard Carwadine, “Lincoln’s Horizons: The Nationalist as Universalist,” in *The Global Lincoln*, ed. Richard Carwadine and Jay Sexton (New York, 2011), 39. Michael Vorenberg, “Liberté, Egalité, and Lincoln: French Readings of an American President,” in *The Global Lincoln*, 95–106, points out that French *Communards* lost interest in Lincoln after their failed revolution caused them to see the U.S. president as more akin to Napoleon III than to Blanqui. See also Eugenio Biagini, David Blight, Caroline Boyd, Richard Carwadine, Kevin Gaines, Vinay Lal, Nicola Miller, Jörg Nagler, Jay Sexton, Adam I. P. Smith, and Odd Arne Westad, “Interchange: The Global Lincoln,” *Journal of American History* 96 (September 2009): 462–91.
99. On Tocqueville and Mill, see the splendid introduction by Françoise Mélonio and François Furet to their edition of Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French*

Revolution, trans. Alan S. Kahan, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1998), 1:1–73, esp. 3–4; and James T. Kloppenberg, “The Canvas and the Color.” Sheldon Wolin notes in *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life* (Princeton, 2001), 571, that “postmodern despotism consists of the collapse of politics into economics” and the transmutation of power into solicitude, “popular sovereignty into consumerism, mutuality into mutual funds, and the democracy of citizens into shareholder democracy.” Although Wolin levels that critique at Tocqueville, the preface to *The Old Regime* shows how close it is to Tocqueville’s own viewpoint.

100. Tocqueville, *The Old Regime* 1:87.

101. On the *Manifeste des soixante*, see Pierre Rosanvallon, *La question syndicale* (Paris, 1988), 204, who considers it among the most important documents of nineteenth-century French politics.

102. Edouard Laboulaye, *Histoire des Etats-Unis*, 5th ed., 3 vols. (Paris, 1870), 3:v–xii. On the efforts of French republicans during these years to establish a stable, “limited democracy” on the model of the United States and Mill’s *Representative Government*, see Rosanvallon, *La démocratie inachevée*, 243–70. Neither a party resembling the Jacksonians nor a workers’ party willing to participate in parliamentary government appeared until Jean Jaurès transformed the socialist party in the early twentieth century.

103. Francis Lieber, *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, 3rd ed. (1853; Philadelphia, 1888), 159–70, explains why representative government should not be considered second best, compared with the direct democracies of Greece and Rome, but as the ideal form of democratic government. On Lieber, see Duncan Kelly, “Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State: Reasons of State and the Birth of American Political Science,” in *The Worlds of*

American Intellectual History, ed. Joel Isaac, James T. Kloppenberg, Michael O'Brien, and Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen (New York, 2016); and Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge, 1991), 37–62.

104. Edouard Laboulaye, *La république constitutionnelle* (Paris, 1871). On Laboulaye's final years and the frustrations of liberals with the Third Republic, see John Bigelow, *Some Recollections of the Late Edouard Laboulaye* (New York, 1889?). The literature on the Paris Commune is vast, beginning with Karl Marx, *Civil War in France*, in *Marx: Later Political Writings*, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge, 1996). A recent study is Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Cambridge, 1998), which places the Commune within the broader history of the persistent tensions between local and national authority in France. On the broader community of discourse within which Laboulaye and others worked, see André Jardin, *Histoire du libéralisme politique: de la crise de l'absolutisme à la constitution de 1875* (Paris, 1985), 367–414; and Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, 1992), 299–338.
105. Charles Eliot Norton, "American Political Ideas," *North American Review*, October 1865, 550–56. Norton's arguments could be multiplied many times. For a broader view of Norton in relation to Mill and other like-minded thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic in the closing years of the nineteenth century, see Leslie Butler, *Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform* (Chapel Hill, 2007). As James Turner points out in his superb study *The Liberal Education of Charles Eliot Norton* (Baltimore, 1999), 202–3, "American Political Ideas" was the high-water mark of Norton's enthusiasm for American democracy. Developments in succeeding years

plunged him into pessimistic assessments of popular government nearly as bleak as that expressed by Francis Parkman in his diatribe “The Failure of Universal Suffrage,” *North American Review*, July–August 1878, 1–20.

106. Daniel W. Hamilton, *The Limits of Sovereignty: Property Confiscation in the Union and the Confederacy during the Civil War* (Chicago, 2007).
107. Mill to Norton, November 24, 1865, Norton Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Daniel Farbman is writing a dissertation at Harvard on radical Republicans’ attempt to reorganize southern counties into townships, not only in order to provide the institutions, but also to inculcate the participatory sensibility of Tocqueville’s New England town. Like the Port Royal experiment, another radical attempt to plant democracy in the former Confederacy, the effort failed, but the attempt itself shows the persistence of the understanding of democracy that Tocqueville took from Jared Sparks and John Quincy Adams.
108. Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” in Whitman, *Complete Poetry and Collected Prose* (New York, 1982). See also David S. Reynolds, *Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography* (New York, 1995), 476–84; and for the broader community of discourse, Butler, *Critical Americans*.
109. On the relation between Mill and Tocqueville and Kant’s ideas of reason and right, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (1962; Cambridge, MA, 1989), 89–140, which also reflects the debts Habermas owes to John Dewey.
110. See Foner, *Reconstruction*, 604, 610, for persuasive formulations of this argument.

111. “He said to him, ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.’ On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.” Matthew 22: 37–40.
112. “Be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves. Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others.” St. Paul to the Philippians 2:2–4.
113. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 689. More recently that relation has been reversed, with the result that the equality Tocqueville thought triumphant is in danger of vanishing from the democratic political imagination. Tocqueville’s insight concerning the ironies of freedom and democracy was hardly unique. Toward the end of *Democracy in America* (526), he attributed to Montaigne a clear understanding of the ironies of self-interest properly understood as it operates in conditions in which individuals can exercise independent judgment. Similar insights had also been expressed, in different keys, by thinkers as different as Condorcet, Hume, Adam Smith, and Napoleon. See the concluding pages of Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 236–52.