Turkey and Africa:  
A Rising Military Partnership?

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Synopsis: Like many other aspirant emerging countries such as China, Brazil, and India, since 2002, Turkey has unleashed a charm offensive in Africa, deepening bilateral ties with African states in the realms of economics, politics, and more notably, defense and security affairs. What implications does this ever-growing relationship between Turkey and Africa have for the U.S.? Where do Turkey’s interests in Africa converge with those of the U.S. and where do they diverge? Given that Turkey’s military and security interests and goals in Africa largely parallel those of the United States, the U.S. stands to benefit from the unique chance to partner with a Muslim ally whose presence in parts of Africa appears to be more welcome than those of other Western countries due to its a shared religion, cultural ties, and lack of imperial history.

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Introduction

Like many other aspirant emerging economies like China, Brazil, and Iran, since 2002 Turkey has unleashed a charm offensive in Africa. The 2011 African Economic Outlook Report, produced by the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank, recently named Turkey as one of the most significant new actors on the continent.\(^1\) Topping Ankara’s agenda is the attraction of allies via economic endorsements, where Turkey has signed free trade agreements with numerous African states, including Ethiopia\(^2\) and Senegal.\(^3\) These enticements appear to be working: Turkey’s exports to Africa increased from $1.5 billion in 2001 to $10.3 billion in 2011,\(^4\) while the overall trade volume between Turkey and Africa rose from $4 billion in 2000 to $19 billion in 2011.\(^5\) Turkey has also been making its presence felt on the continent culturally and educationally, by both highlighting its Muslim heritage and opening up Turkish schools around the continent in hopes of cultivating what it calls an “Afro-Turkish elite.”\(^6\) In the diplomatic realm Turkey has been equally persistent. In what one commentator calls the “turning point” for Turkish-African relations, Ankara declared 2005 “The Year of Africa,” during which a number of unprecedented high-level visits took place, and Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union.\(^7\) Turkish president Abdullah Gül was a notably frequent presence in Africa in 2009 and 2010, when he visited Kenya, Tanzania,\(^8\) Cameroon,\(^9\) and the Democratic Republic of Congo.\(^10\) Most telling of Turkey’s new aggressively friendly stance towards Africa: in the last three years alone, Turkey’s diplomatic representation has nearly tripled, increasing from twelve embassies in 2009 to 34 by the end of 2012.\(^11\)

Yet while facets such as economics, culture, and politics have taken the limelight, questions of Turkish-African military relations and security affairs remain largely unconsidered and understudied. In light of Turkey’s new interest in Africa, many questions linger for the U.S. defense community. What near-term and long-term security and military implications could Turkey’s increasing presence in Africa have, and where do Turkey’s and the U.S.’s interests converge in Africa and where do they diverge?

In the main, Turkey’s new push into Africa will likely be of net benefit to U.S. interests. Not only are Turkey’s and the U.S.’s aspirations for and actions in military and security affairs quite closely aligned, but the U.S. will also serve to benefit strategically from collaboration with Turkey, a Muslim ally whose presence on the continent is generally
viewed with less suspicion by Africans because of religious, cultural, and historical ties with parts of the region. As a result, despite some areas of divergence, Turkey will be a unique and valuable partner on a continent whose own instability has the potential to threaten both U.S. and global security interests.

History and Contemporary Context of Turkish-African Relations

Turkey’s perception of Africa has historically been divided into the realms of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Turks have tended to view North Africa as Turkey’s ‘near abroad,’ due to the fact that most countries in North Africa were part of the Ottoman Empire during the 15th and 16th centuries. Those links, along with those countries’ Muslim populations, made this region largely familiar to Turkey, and historically formed the basis for Turkey’s “African” foreign policy. Turkish analyst Mehmet Özkan notes, however, that, in contrast to North Africa, Turkey has generally viewed Sub-Saharan Africa as “a distant geographic land of poverty, hunger, communicable diseases, and civil wars.”

In this framework, Turkey’s relations with Africa can be viewed in three distinct eras. During the first period, from approximately the early 16th century to 1923, the Ottomans had close relations with North Africa and tangible, if less profound, relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Until the beginning of its demise in the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire ruled over Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, and played an important role against the Spanish interventions in North Africa by providing military assistance. In addition, territories within contemporary Sub-Saharan countries, including Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Niger and Chad, were also ruled at various points by the Ottoman Empire. The last decade of this period saw the final demise of the Ottoman Empire, its loss of control in both North and Sub-Saharan Africa and the formation of the Republic of Turkey.

The second period, between 1923 and 1998, witnessed Turkish-African relations plummet, mostly due to overriding domestic problems within each. In Africa, European colonization precluded relations in the first half of this period, while the daunting task of postcolonial state building left little time for non-superpower allies in the second half. For its part, Turkey was focused on building a new Turkish state and establishing good relations with neighboring countries. What little engagement Turkey had with Africa was limited to North Africa. Especially during the Cold War, in an effort to align itself with the West, Turkey largely voted in lockstep with the U.S. on Africa matters in the United Nations, and thus had no comprehensive plan of its own towards the continent.

The third period began with a 1998 plan called the “African Opening” plan, a national
strategy to deepen Turkish relations with Africa. However, this plan was not implemented until 2002 due to numerous short-term coalition governments in Turkey— a period when the country lacked any consistent foreign policy. This changed with the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. The new outreach to Africa during this time was a result of Turkey’s futile attempts to join the European Union (EU), combined with a strengthened Turkish economy following 2002 and a political leadership looking to diversify Turkey’s foreign policy.\(^{15}\)

With the election of Turkey’s new AKP government in 2002, a new Turkish foreign policy vision began to take shape. The AKP adopted a foreign policy referred to as the “zero problems with our neighbors” plan, aimed at making Turkey a regional leader in the Middle East and North Africa. In essence, this plan envisioned a Turkey that would be able to engage a variety of countries by playing a mediator role in some of the region’s most difficult conflicts, particularly by playing up its multi-faceted cultural and historical identity and ties with Muslims, the Balkans, Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. As a result of these linkages and the mediation Turkey could provide, the AKP envisioned improved Turkish economic prospects and the creation of zones of economic integration and regional stability. Indeed, evidence of this policy can be seen in Turkey’s involvement in conflict resolution issues around the world in places like Somalia and Sudan, as well as its past attempts to moderate between the U.S. and Iran, and Israel and Syria, and to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.\(^{16}\)

It is in this context that we can view the AKP’s implementation of the “Africa Opening” plan. The AKP took this very seriously, and started plans to establish itself on the continent. Placing equal importance on both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, it crafted a more inclusive and comprehensive foreign policy regarding the continent. Rather than viewing Sub-Saharan Africa simply as a lost cause in the vein of former Turkish governments, it instead began to view the continent as a set of countries that could offer it opportunities for political and economic cooperation.

Various milestones have marked Turkey’s opening to Africa. In 2003, the Turkish Department of Foreign Trade crafted the “Strategy to Develop Economic Relations with African Countries.” Turkey also started participating in African Union Summits as a guest country after 2002. These developments culminated in the government declaring 2005 as “The Year of Africa,” when it took its involvement in the diplomatic, political, economic and military arenas to higher level. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visits to Ethiopia and South Africa in March 2005 marked the first time a Turkish prime minister visited Sub-Saharan Africa since the Turkish Republic was established.\(^{17}\) Also in 2005, Turkey obtained “observer status” in the African Union, with the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa becoming accredited by the organization as Turkey’s representative office.\(^{18}\)
2008, Turkey became a ‘strategic partner’ of the Union and gained membership in the African Development Bank. In August of that year Turkish President Abdullah Gül organized a “Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” in Istanbul, which hosted high-level officials from 49 African countries. During this meeting Turkey requested support for its bid to obtain a non-permanent UN Security Council status, which it eventually won, in part thanks to African support. Numerous other meetings and cooperation agreements have taken place since then.

**Defense and Security Issues in Africa**

The new Turkish-African relationship has a number of military, security, and strategic dimensions that have thus far gone largely unconsidered. The spectrum of Turkish-African security affairs ranges from instances of equitable partnership with some of the continent’s more powerful states (like South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia) to Turkish protectionism towards the continent’s more tumultuous states (like Somalia) to instances of training and collaboration on various topical issues.

At the most equitable end of the Turkish-African security spectrum is the Turkish-South African relationship. This is to be expected since Turkey and South Africa are very much similar: they are both powerful leaders of their respective regions that are wealthier than their neighbors and seeking increased power in the international political economy. Their relationship is thus, in many ways, that of equals. Most notably, in September 2012 Turkey and South Africa agreed to sign a defense industry pact called the ‘Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement,’ which would allow for greater cooperation and alignment in security and defense affairs. This agreement falls under the larger umbrella of the recently established Bi-National Commission, which aims to deepen the Turkish-South African relationship. Their security relationship runs deep in the private sector as well. In an attempt to update its helicopter fleet in 2006, Turkey was engaged in a multi-year bid to buy the Rooivalk (“Red Hawk”) attack helicopter from the South African defense firm Denel. Though it eventually decided on another model, the infrastructure for the acquisition of South African-made weapons is certainly in place, evidenced by the fact that Denel is up for the acquisition of a Turkish demining contract later in 2012.

Turkey has also sought to capitalize militarily on its relationships with some of the continent’s other powerful states, namely Nigeria and Ethiopia. Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country, signed a defense pact with Turkey in 2011 that included not only the procurement of naval ships and training from Ankara, but also Nigerian training for the Turkish navy. The countries also made pacts to conduct future joint exercises. For its part, Ethiopia signed a military cooperation pact in 2006, also with an emphasis on
Turkey’s providing training for Ethiopian troops.26

More broadly, however, the Turkish defense industry is eyeing Africa as a new market to be leveraged in an attempt to diversify its defense exports. Though Turkey was historically dependent on foreign suppliers for the importation of defense equipment, it has recently become self-sufficient. Now it is seeking to become an exporter of military products, such as its noted Heybeliada warship. In an effort towards such export diversification, it is increasingly interested in selling defense equipment, mainly military electronic equipment and armored vehicles, on the African continent to states such as South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Cameroon.27

While Turkey engages some African countries as equals, it offers assistance to others, most notably Somalia and Sudan. Particularly in the case of Somalia, Turkey has recently garnered international attention for its comprehensive development assistance to support peace and reconciliation. After some of the last members of the al-Shebab terrorist group were chased out of Mogadishu in August 2011, Ankara flooded the city with around 500 development and aid workers,28 and since then has given the country approximately $50 million USD in development assistance.29 In the same month Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan made history by becoming the first non-African leader to enter the city limits of Mogadishu since the country collapsed after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, while Turkish Airways subsequently became the first major commercial carrier to fly into Mogadishu since then.30

In May 2010, Turkey hosted the UN Somali summit in Istanbul, where Turkey promised development aid and military assistance to Somalia, in the form of providing training to Somali soldiers.31 In February 2012 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said that Turkey was poised to contribute both material and capacity-building resources.32 Turkey also sees itself as a legitimate mediator in the country, given its Muslim heritage.33 To that end, Somalia’s interim Prime Minister Abdulweli Mohamed Ali was quoted as saying, “Since the coming of Turkey there has been a paradigm shift...You can create peace and stability by working on the security side, but also on the development side at the same time. That is what Turkey is successful at.”34

Turkish presence is also being felt in the Sudans. Not only did Turkey offer air support for NATO’s Darfur mission in 200535 and signed a military cooperation memorandum of understanding with Sudan in 2006,36 but its role has increased even more since the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. After their split the two Sudans have been locked in frequent and deadly cross-border skirmishes. To this end, Turkey revealed that Sudan had recently reached out to it to serve as a mediator between the country and its former enclave.37
Turkey has also offered African states a notable amount of technical and training assistance, particularly in the areas of capacity building, and antipiracy and counter-terrorism training. It has been involved in the U.S.-led Combined Force 151 conducting antipiracy patrols off the coast of Somalia since 2009, and has led the force during May-August 2009, and September-December 2010. It also participates in Operation Ocean Field, NATO’s counter piracy mission (Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 - SNMG 2). More than just training and policing, Turkey has actually put its own soldiers on the ground, principally engaged in peacekeeping. As of late 2012 Turkey had been involved in five UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Finally, it is important to note that even seemingly nonmilitary aid offered by Turkey could have military implications, particularly when it comes to the country’s push to improve African infrastructure. Around the continent Turkey is working to help modernize African airports, as well as to open up more flights between Africa and Turkey, such as those connecting Turkey to African metropolises like Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Lagos. Turkey is also working to modernize African maritime capacities, such as the pledge to help update the Port of Mombasa in Kenya. Though these projects are couched in terms of increasing tourism, communications, and transportation abilities, the reality is that they could undoubtedly have military implications as well.

**Strategy and Perspectives from Turkey and Africa**

**Turkey’s Interests in Africa**

During a 2009 meeting in Kenya, Turkish President Abdullah Gül announced, “We view the problems of the African continent as our own problems... Africa’s pain is our pain, and Africa’s success and welfare is our happiness.” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu echoed this view three years later at the London summit on Somalia saying, “Turkey extends aid to Somalia as a humanitarian obligation, not as a result of strategic interests.” Despite this altruistic rhetoric, Turkey’s involvement in Africa is part of a greater foreign policy strategy aimed to improve Turkey’s economic prospects, along with its regional and international standing.

Africa represents both a market and a source of natural resources for Turkey. Africa is an opportunity for Turkey to diversify its trade and reduce its dependency on European
markets. Similarly, Turkey is looking to Africa to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, the source of 60% of its energy, thus reducing the leverage that Russia has over Turkey.44 As a fast-growing economy, Turkey needs more natural resources and raw materials.45 Construction, manufacturing, and agricultural vehicles are also leading sectors in trade with Africa. In addition, there are currently two Turkish-owned coal mines currently operating in South Africa.46

**Turkish Perspectives on Engagement with Africa**

The Turkish population's perceptions on the government's new African engagement vary. While the depth of relations with Africa is not widely known in Turkey, the high-level visits between Turkish and African officials do attract attention. In general, people in Turkey are unsure about the benefits that Africa could offer to Turkey, and while no "anti-Africa" lobby exists, some citizens are curious why Turkey would want to invest so much time in the continent, given that it has never been a high priority for Turkish foreign policy. Some perceive the new engagements on the continent to simply reflect a deepening of relations with Islamic countries, rather than with Africa per se. In particular, President Abdullah Gül’s trips to Kenya and Tanzania in 2009 and 2010 were viewed as a deepening of relations with Islamic countries, more so than an opening to Africa.47

Turkey’s Africa push is also frequently seen as a rebuttal to the country’s rejection by the EU and its resultant search for new alternative markets. Turkey’s defiant stance towards the EU is due to frustration over the fact that, after years of negotiations, visits, and periods of slow progress (followed by periods of stagnation), Turkey’s longstanding application to join the organization has gone nowhere. This rejection, coupled with Turkey’s increasingly independent and confident stance in the world, is now leading it to question its desire to join the EU. In this context, Turkey’s hosting of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir three times, despite his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Sudan's Darfur region, and against the EU’s disapproval, attracted significant attention as an act of Turkish defiance of the organization.48

Turkey’s new Africa obsession is also now being perceived as a domestic policy issue as well. Some in Turkey now believe that Erdoğan and the AKP are using aid to Somalia, for instance, to appeal to conservative Muslim voters eager for Turkey to show humanitarian stewardship towards a perceived suffering Muslim country, while simultaneously burnishing Turkey’s leadership credentials to a global audience.49

**Africa’s Interests**
Above all, Africa’s interest in Turkey stems from the continent’s overriding concerns of economic and human development. For the most part, African governments are all too willing to entertain the entrance of a new economic partner; particularly one that they can potentially play against more entrenched trading partners like China, the U.S., the U.K, and France. A second African strategic calculus is the new international visibility of African problems, which the Turkish alliance brings to the international community. For example, after Turkey won a nonpermanent spot on the United Nations Security Council in 2008, it stated later in 2009 that, “The Turkish Republic will be the spokesman for Africa at the UN. It will support Africa on all of its issues.” A third strategic interest for Africa relates to the provision of peace and security on the continent, which Turkey is assisting Africa to bring about, as previously discussed.

**African Perspectives on Engagement with Turkey**

African perspectives on Turkey’s involvement range from mildly cautious suspicion to full-blown adoration. On one side lay the unequivocally welcoming nations and populations of Africa, characterized most notably by Somalia. To this end, Somali analyst Abdihakim Aynte noted that Erdoğan’s visit lent “unprecedented validity to Turkish efforts and reinforced the popular theory that Turkey is distinctly - and uniquely - a reliable fellow Muslim nation that can create global awareness about Somalia’s plight.” As summed up by a Somali businessman: “Other governments say they will come but they are not serious. The Turkish government said it would come and it started operating immediately.” Others view the Turkish presence so positively that they worry that African governments risk not taking full advantage of its charm offensive. Writes one Tanzanian commentator: “The Turks are advocating a win-win situation, but we will only benefit when we know exactly what we want and go for it at the negotiation table.”

Yet some on the African continent are more wary. Due to their historical lack of interaction, many Africans are unsure of what the new Turkish presence means, while some francophone African citizens have expressed fears of a sort of “neo-Ottomanism” from Turkey in Africa. Other groups on the continent are openly hostile. Al-Shebab has ridiculed Turkey as “a stooge of the West,” whose moderate brand of Islam is inimical to its own interests, a disdain that manifested itself in the Al-Shebab-led bombings of the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu in December 2011.

**Implications for the U.S.: Areas of Convergence and Divergence**

In Africa, U.S. military and security interests greatly converge with those of Turkey. Both countries have an interest in and initiatives towards countering terrorism
and antipiracy, containing armed conflict and humanitarian crises, building peace, reducing international crime, and responding to growing Chinese and Iranian influence on the continent.\textsuperscript{58} Given these shared interests, there are several reasons why an effective partnership in military and humanitarian assistance operations would benefit Turkey, the U.S., and Africa.

First, Turkey’s Muslim heritage and lack of imperial history are unique and leverage-able assets for the U.S. in Africa. The U.S. and many other Western countries, all of which are former imperial powers and predominantly Protestant, have historically been viewed with suspicion by Africa. Most recently, African states expressed long-held wariness about the neocolonial intentions of the U.S. in their critiques of the standing up of AFRICOM.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, Turkey’s unique religious and (contemporarily) nonexistent colonial nature leads it to be viewed differently and with less suspicion. As an example of these benefits that Muslim Turkey could provide, in their book, \textit{A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West}, Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser note that all the peacekeeping operations that have taken place after the Cold War have been in Muslim countries or in countries in which Muslim interests are directly involved, making Muslim peacekeepers critical in the contemporary operational environment. Unsurprisingly, they identify Turkey as one of the countries most likely to succeed as leaders of these missions.\textsuperscript{60}

Second, it has been well noted in the national security literature that military cooperation can serve as a force multiplier. In \textit{Decade of War, Volume 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations}, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) states that partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier in operations in the last decade.\textsuperscript{61} The study suggests that strengthening existing security cooperation, relationships, and military training is important for effective partnering in military and humanitarian assistance operations. Indeed, these moves will help to establish and sustain unity of effort among allies in times of crises, as was the case in Libya in 2011. One area where military partnering has already yielded benefits on the African continent relates to the significant reduction of acts of piracy in the Horn of Africa. U.S. Navy statistics show that piracy in that region has fallen sharply in 2012, a fact that the Navy attributes to aggressive patrolling by a coalition of international forces.\textsuperscript{62}

Third, Turkey is an important geographic ally for U.S. interests in Africa. Turkey’s militarily and politically important role on the issue of NATO involvement in Libya in early 2011 made Turkey’s position in Africa even more vital for the U.S.\textsuperscript{63} During Operation Unified Protector, NATO’s Air Command Headquarters for Southern Europe was based in Izmir, Turkey (AC Izmir), from where the air operations were managed (the air campaign itself was conducted from NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre
Nevertheless, there are areas of divergence between U.S. and Turkish policy in Africa. First, the two countries are among the many who compete for continent’s natural resources, including China, India, Japan, and Brazil. Second, Turkey’s desire to diversify its trading portfolio by opening up to Africa and its efforts to limit its dependence on other countries have led to a reduced dependence on the U.S. as a supplier of defense technologies. Turkey now seriously considers offers from non-U.S. suppliers, such as South Africa. While such suppliers may not be as technologically advanced or reliable as the US, Turkey perceives them as being more flexible in negotiating and in sharing expertise, and therefore more helpful in contributing to its long-term goal of industrial self-reliance. Some of these procurement and industrial cooperation policies have come into conflict with U.S. practices regarding coproduction and technology sharing.

Finally, there is the issue of Turkey’s approach to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2009 as a war criminal for his genocide in Darfur. The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has spoken of taking measures against al-Bashir, and some in Congress are trying to cut off economic aid to any country that hosts him. In contrast, Turkey has hosted him multiple times at the highest levels of government, attracting criticism from human rights groups. Turkish officials have claimed that this approach is more constructive to conflict resolution and necessary for providing aid to Sudan. In a 2012 interview with journalist Ali Bayramoğlu, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said, “Our Sudan policy is not a policy of supporting al-Bashir and his Darfur stance. We went to Darfur in 2005 and look what we have done [transported aid, health services and the Red Crescent]. We were able to reach Darfur and provide aid through our relationship with al-Bashir. Similarly in South Sudan. Is it a mistake; is it a crime for me to go there? No. If there [is] hope, we would go.”

Conclusion

After decades of generally being overlooked in the geopolitical sphere, Africa is increasingly attracting the attention of new actors on the continent, such as India, Brazil, Iran, and Turkey. Ankara’s initiatives in Africa are a relatively new but important development that Turkey hopes will elevate its status as a key regional and global power. Indeed, Turkey is trying to create a new image for itself in international affairs in taking advantage of its soft power and diplomatic clout to show how it can be an asset for the 21st century global order. As such, the world is likely to see a more assertive Turkey in African politics and one that is more involved in conflict resolution, particularly in the continent’s Muslim states. For its part, African states appear to be equally open to the
new Turkish presence. Though not rivaling the push led by China, African states are openly welcoming Turkey as a military partner, trading cohort, and, in the case of Somalia, one of the most steadfast international allies it has yet found. The new amity between them, coupled with the U.S.’ strategy to partner with both sides, speaks to the benefits of the new Turkish-African engagement in both the near and long-term future.

NOTES

5 “TÜSİAD’in gözü Afrika’da (The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association Eyes Africa),” CNNTurk, 31 May 2012, http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/ekonomi/genel/05/31/tusiadin.gozu.afrikada/663236.0/index.html

Most notable of these visits were Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visits to South Africa and Ethiopia; and the visit to Turkey of the African Union Commission President, Prof. Alpha Oumar Konaré- the first ever high-level visit from the African Union to Turkey.


Özkan, Mehmet. “Turkey’s ‘New’ Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications,” Perceptions, Ibid. (p.118)


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“Global Insider: Turkey-Africa Relations,” World Politics Review, Ibid.


