to harness themselves to new and evolving political traditions. These are traditions contained, moreover, less than ever before, by culture and geography.

University of Nottingham

Anthony Hutchison

For some time now historians of the United States have been working, in the words of Tom Bender’s famous injunction, to rethink American history in a global age. Most of the efforts in this vein have concentrated on opening up the narrative of US history to transnational and global connections, networks, and flows.¹ But another, no less important, if somewhat less common, strain of this movement has been an effort to think about the impact of the United States, and of American history, around the world.

The US government, of course, has long tried to use American history abroad in ways useful to the needs of American power. In fact, the final chapter in the volume surveys American efforts to deploy the memory and image of Honest Abe in order to “sell” the United States abroad (as well as the ways in which others wielded Lincoln to criticize US Cold War policies). The chapter focusses in particular on the campaign launched during the Lincoln sesquicentennial in 1959, a campaign codirected by the United States Information Agency and the official Abraham Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission. Some readers may find a measure of irony, then, in the fact that this volume itself emerged from a 2009 conference convened at Oxford University, over the Fourth of July weekend, with the support of the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission. Scholars and their subjects, it seems, intersect in curious ways.

Besides four chapters that stand somewhat apart – the editors’ introductory essay, a chapter on Lincoln’s own approach to foreign relations, one on Lincoln-hating in the US South, and the essay mentioned above – the rest of the chapters, thirteen in all, fall into two types. The first four examine foreign perceptions of Lincoln the man – that is to say, views held by contemporaries during his own lifetime – while the other nine survey Lincoln the myth, the global resonance of the US President after his assassination in 1865. Not surprisingly, the man and the myth – Lincoln the politician and Lincoln the martyr – emerge as two very different men.

¹ Tom Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Bender’s own effort in this vein is his A Nation among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). Another pioneer in this field is Ian Tyrrell, e.g. in his Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Lincoln as seen by Europeans in his own lifetime appears, in a word, unremarkable. For contemporary Europeans, it seems, the American Civil War was a remote, confusing, even quaint conflict, in which neither side appeared particularly admirable. Contemporary British views of the conflict and the man, we learn, were shaped largely by ignorance and misunderstanding. Germans and Italians may have been more interested and perhaps better informed than the British but still viewed Lincoln through the lens of their own politics of national unification. Interestingly, given the common later view of Lincoln as a man of lofty ideals, the contemporary Europeans who admired Lincoln, from Giuseppe Garibaldi to Karl Marx, did so for his pragmatism, while his critics, such as Giuseppe Mazzini, found his idealism lacking. This view of Lincoln as a moderate turned out to be his undoing in France, where royalists saw him as a dangerous radical while revolutionaries dismissed him as too conservative.

Such relative European disinterest in Lincoln in his lifetime is hardly surprising. After all, the United States was remote; its diplomatic apparatus was amateurish, if not downright incompetent; and Lincoln himself, despite his sense, most famously articulated at Gettysburg, that the American experiment was of universal import, was a provincial man who had never left North America and knew little of the wider world. More importantly, Lincoln, unlike other US Presidents of international stature – Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and practically every President after 1945 – did not actually wield or project US power globally, so his impact on foreign lands in his lifetime appeared minimal. Historians now know, of course, that his decisions to go to war against the South and then to free the slaves played a major role in transforming the global cotton industry and, as a result, in recasting global labor regimes. But this aspect of Lincoln’s influence was, it seems, not apparent to his contemporaries in Europe, at least not in ways that shaped his image there.

It is in the chapters that cover Lincoln’s posthumous impact abroad that the more familiar Lincoln – the myth and martyr – comes into view. Actually, as is most often the case with such things, there have been several mythical Lincolns, each deployed at different times and in different places and for different purposes. The first and least political Lincoln is the self-made, self-reliant man of the people, a common man of uncommon deeds, an icon of hard work and authenticity. Or, in the rather patronizing formulation of The Times of London, Lincoln was “a piece of that common useful clay out of which it delights American democracy to make great Republican

---

personages” (112). Such projections of the “great man” as a model of self-improvement and patriotism seemed to have been popular with authoritarian regimes such as Franco’s Spain or interwar Japan, where the Lincoln myth, shorn of any connection to subversive notions of democracy or liberty, was deployed to encourage loyalty to the state.

But some of the most interesting insights in the volume emerge from the discussions of the numerous and often disparate political uses of Lincoln’s image abroad. Within the United States of the post-civil rights era, Lincoln is primarily commemorated as the Great Emancipator, the leader who set on track the historical process that culminated with the dismantling of Jim Crow in the 1960s (perhaps the two historical figures most familiar to many US elementary schoolchildren today are Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King). And yet, in this volume we find one author after the other reminding us how little traction the image of Lincoln as the Great Emancipator has had abroad, even in times and places, such as in sub-Saharan Africa in the era of decolonization, where one would have expected it to have substantial purchase.

Instead, even in decolonizing Africa, other Lincolns seemed to have greater resonance. The young Nelson Mandela in apartheid South Africa, we are told, learned of Lincoln as a martyr, as a man who took great risks for a cause and paid the ultimate price. For Desmond Tutu, Lincoln served in the post-apartheid era as an icon of national reconciliation after epic conflict. Kwame Nkrumah, on the other hand, invoked Lincoln as a great national unifier as he worked to construct a United States of Africa patterned after the American model. Other Africans saw Lincoln’s spirit at work in Nigeria’s General Gowon, who launched a brutal war of national unification from 1967 to 1970 to fend off the secession of Nigeria’s eastern provinces. Perhaps, Gaines muses about the relative African disinterest in Lincoln the emancipator, the notion of acquiring freedom by white decree seemed unlikely, even unappealing, to Africans struggling mightily for theirs.

Indeed, the image of Lincoln as nation-builder and national (re)unifier emerges as the one that has had the most enduring resonance abroad across time and space. Already in the later nineteenth century Lincoln was often linked with other national icons such as Bolívar, Garibaldi, Cavour, Bismarck, and Gladstone. This image of Lincoln was not only durable but flexible; in Ireland, Lincoln as forceful opponent of secession has been used by Unionists to argue against the secession of Ireland from the United Kingdom and by Irish nationalists to protest the separation of Ulster from Ireland. As always with claims that the nation must remain undivided and the people must

---

3 Indeed the image of Lincoln as nation-builder – Lincoln as the American Bismarck – also emerges from new work seeking to place the American Civil War in a global context, as in Bender, A Nation among Nations, chapter 3.
govern, much comes down to who gets to decide the central questions: where is the nation? Who are the people?

Americans, for their part, have, of course, preferred to see (and to advertise) Lincoln not simply as a nation-builder but as a leader who promoted national unity predicated on American democratic principles: government “of the people, by the people, for the people.” It was this Lincoln that the US military occupation promoted in Japan after 1945 as it labored to mold Japan in America’s image. It is also the image suggested in a World War II-era stamp produced by the US Postal Service that set Lincoln beside Chinese national hero Sun Yat-sen and equated Lincoln’s famous tripartite formulation of popular government to Sun’s Three Principles of the People (234).

Lincoln’s legacy, not unusually for famous martyrs, had something for everyone: to German conservatives he was a Bismarck; to Weimar intellectuals, a symbol of democracy; and to Karl Liebknecht, following Marx’s lead, a proto-socialist. This last characterization has more recently been adopted, less favorably, by activists on the radical libertarian right, for whom Lincoln is the fountainhead of all that is evil, a tyrant who concentrated power in the federal government and ran roughshod over states’ rights and individual freedoms.

The one weakness of this otherwise well-compiled, illuminating collection is its Eurocentric coverage. Of the thirteen chapters that deal with perceptions of Lincoln in specific regions outside the US, fully nine cover countries or regions within Europe and only four look at the rest of the world. Thus, while we have four chapters devoted to the British Isles (one on Britain and three others on England, Ireland, and Wales, though not Scotland), the entirety of East Asia, Latin America, and Africa are covered in one chapter each. Moreover, there is nothing at all on anywhere in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or (perhaps most puzzlingly) Europe east of Germany. Only the introduction (and readers’ imaginations) suggests how fascinating such coverage might have been. It notes Lincoln’s resonance in the post-emancipation Russian Empire and the interest in him by Marx and other early socialists. It mentions the French censoring of a 1929 Vietnamese-language biography of Lincoln that exhorted young Vietnamese to follow his example and liberate their country from the slavery of French colonialism. And finally, it lists Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, as well as Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak, among the thirty-something languages that have Lincoln biographies.

Granted, just as Lincoln knew to leaven his ideals with pragmatism, compiling a collection of essays must be an exercise in the art of the possible. Still, the necessary breadth of the extra-European chapters makes them at once some of the most interesting in the volume and also the ones that appear to provide the most fertile ground for further research. The chapter on East Asia, compelled to cover both China and Japan (though not Korea); the chapter on Africa, shifting gamely from Ghana to South Africa, Nigeria to Tanzania,
and beyond; or the chapter on Latin America, covering Cuba, Mexico, Chile, and elsewhere (though not, understandably but regrettably, Haiti), offer us fascinating glimpses into the significance of Lincoln, and of the US image more broadly, in a panoply of colonial and postcolonial contexts, and they leave us wishing to know much more. We will not, one hopes, have to wait for the Lincoln sesquicentennial to fulfill that wish.

Erez Manela
Harvard University

We would like to thank Nicholas Guyatt, Erez Manela, and Anthony Hutchison for their constructive comments on our collaborative project. Thanks also to Bevan Sewell for bringing this to print.

The reviews all situate The Global Lincoln within the recent trend of globalizing the history of the United States. We certainly hoped that the application of this approach would cast new light on the significance of a US statesman who is almost exclusively understood in national terms. We also hoped that the project would make a methodological intervention. The range of knowledge and languages required to pursue global history lends itself to collaborative scholarship. This meant finding scholars who specialized in areas other than the United States, not just calling upon the legion of Americanists who are now eager to take part in a transnational enterprise. The greatest challenge in this project was assembling a team of scholars who worked in fields far removed from our own. We were fortunate to complete the very strong roster that we did, for the assignment we presented to the contributors in an email that they received out of the blue one day in 2006 was a substantial one. We invited them to pursue time-consuming primary research on a topic that in almost all cases was not related to their current research agenda.

Erez Manela notes the disproportionate coverage given to Western Europe in the volume. We join him in hoping that our volume will prompt more work on the reception and appropriation of American symbols in areas outside Europe. That said, the volume’s focus on British views of Lincoln was not without justification. It should come as no surprise that here was to be found the richest discussion of Lincoln. Furthermore, as the communications hub of a global, imperial network, Britain often served as a filter and transmitter of views of Lincoln around the world. We found, for example, that British biographies of Lincoln ended up scattered across the empire, in some cases eclipsing those exported from the United States. Charting the plural story of English, Welsh, and Irish views of Lincoln thus was important to understand the more general “Global Lincoln.”

Anthony Hutchison contends that the volume is too centered on nation-states and suggests that more attention could have been given to the...