On the one hand stand the peoples of the world,—not only the peoples actually engaged, but many others who suffer under mastery, but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world.

**Woodrow Wilson, Address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918**

In contrast to Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, whose views and policies on racial issues are interesting largely in the context of domestic U.S. history, Woodrow Wilson is remembered also—perhaps more so—for his influence on U.S. relations with the world at large. Therefore, the question of the influence of his racial views, on his perceptions of the world outside the United States and on his policies toward that world, is central to any understanding of their significance. This is especially so since his views on race are often perceived, as they are in the domestic context, as coming into direct conflict with the ideals for which he claimed to stand in international affairs, especially his well-known advocacy of the equality of all nations and of their right to self-determination. Can Wilson's racial views be reconciled with the forceful advocacy of liberal internationalism for which he was widely hailed at the time and for which he is most often remembered today?

Wilson appeared on the international stage near the end of the Great War of 1914–18, which not only extinguished millions of lives and caused unprecedented devastation, but also brought in its wake expectations for a postwar world entirely different from what came before it. These expectations found their icon in Wilson, who appeared as a prophet of the new world order and came, however briefly, to symbolize to millions worldwide their own hopes and aspirations. Wilson's apparent promise of a new world order, articulated in a series of eloquent and widely circulated speeches, captured not only the imaginations of Americans and Europeans, but also those of many in Asia and Africa. The American war propaganda machine, of unprecedented scope and efficiency, also facilitated the dissemination of his words, and the messages they carried amplified and often exaggerated their meaning. The salesmen of the American creed saw Wilson's idealistic language and image as defender of right against might as a major asset in convincing the world of the righteousness of America's war effort and its plans for the peace. In the wake of a war, Wilson's words captured the attention of millions of nonwhite peoples and seemed to many of them to carry the promise of self-determination.

In Egypt, under British rule, men and women took to the streets to call for cheers for country, liberty, and President Wilson. In Korea, under the heavy hand of Japan, rumors spread that Wilson would swoop down from the sky, flying into Seoul on an airplane to declare Korean self-determination. In China, long the target of imperialist depredations, Wilson's wartime addresses were widely circulated in Chinese translation, and many schoolchildren could quote passages of the Fourteen Points address verbatim. In India, hopes that Wilson would support Indian home rule were widespread, and one editorial writer exclaimed that it would "be a sin if India does not lay her ailments before Dr. Wilson." Across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, then, subject peoples saw in the American president a potential champion of their struggles for self-determination. An American president had never before spoken, as Wilson did during the war, on such a grand stage, to such a broad audience, and with such a widespread effect. Arguably, none has done so since.

**The Elements of the Wilsonian Imagination**

Wilson's peace plan had numerous components that changed and evolved considerably in the course of the war and its aftermath, but several central, consistent elements in the plan tended to stand out for those groups who were colonized or marginalized in prewar international society. Those elements included, first, Wilson's oft-repeated call for the "equality of nations," asserting that small, weak nations were entitled to the same treatment and rights in international society as the great powers. A related second prin-
principle, summarized by its proponents at the time as “right over might,” was that international disputes should be resolved through peaceful means, relying on international law and mechanisms such as arbitration, rather than through a resort to armed conflict. And third, perhaps most celebrated and best known of the Wilsonian mantras, was the rejection of any international arrangements that would not receive the consent of the populations concerned. This was the principle of the “consent of the governed,” a term for which, for reasons explained below, Wilson began after February 1918 to substitute what would become his most famous and memorable phrase: the right of peoples to “self-determination.”

These elements were already there in the first major public address in which Wilson detailed a plan for the postwar settlement, delivered in Washington, D.C., on May 27, 1916, almost a year before the U.S. entry into the war. In it he called for political arrangements, whether national or international, anchored in popular legitimacy, or, in the phrase Wilson favored, “the consent of the governed,” and he asserted the notional equality of the political units constituted through such arrangements of consent. “We believe,” Wilson declared then, “that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live,” and that “the small states of the world shall enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity.” This was the essence of the principle of “the equality of nations,” which would later be eagerly reiterated by representatives of weak nations such as China. Eight months later, in his famous “Peace Without Victory” address, on January 22, 1917, Wilson urged that law and morality replace raw power in governing international relations. The “balance of power” must make way for a “community of power,” and this new international society must be constituted on the basis of “an equality of rights” that would “neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those who are powerful and those that are weak.”

The basic premise, clearly, was the need to universalize the American creed. The ideals on which American society was founded, Wilson had no doubt, would appeal to all peoples. They were quintessentially American—the United States, he said, “could stand for no others”—but at the same time they could and should be applied globally. These ideals held “the affections and convictions of mankind” and were shared by “forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community.” Their implementation would respond to the popular will of the world’s people, and was therefore a practical necessity for the achievement of lasting peace. Any arrangement that contravened them was bound to fail, since it would fail to muster popular consent, sparking resistance among “whole populations” who “will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize.” The principles of equality and of consent, then, were inextricably bound together.

Rule by popular consent rather than fiat, Wilson insisted, must serve as a basis for the international legitimacy of governments, and for the legitimacy of the international system as a whole. “No peace can last, or ought to last,” he intoned on that same occasion in January 1917, in a phrase that representatives of the colonized peoples later repeated often, “which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.” International peace required that no one nation seek to dominate another, but that every people should be left to determine their own form of government, their own path of development, “unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.” This principle, Wilson believed, had been at the heart of the foreign policy of the United States since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. His own project was, in essence, to extend the reach of that doctrine over the entire globe.

The “Peace Without Victory” address, the most complete and detailed plan for the postwar world articulated by any major statesman until that time, quickly became widely known and discussed around the world and affirmed Wilson’s stature as a leading figure in the international arena.

The logic inherent in Wilson’s argument that a durable peace required that governments rule by popular consent raised a direct challenge to the arrangements of imperial rule or influence that spanned much of the world at the time. Indeed, one historian has concluded that the address constituted “the first time that any statesman of stature” had launched what amounted to a “penetrating critique of European imperialism.”

Still, though Wilson articulated his vision in terms of universal maxims—no right anywhere exists—he was clearly referencing the situation in Europe, with little thought of dependent territories elsewhere. In the “Peace Without Victory” address itself, he gave the restoration of an independent Poland as an example of the principle of consent. Yet, imperialist powers could still take some comfort in Wilson’s words if they parsed them care-
fully enough. His liberal use of qualifiers such as "enlightened" and "modern," for example, to describe those groups who could appreciate such principles and should enjoy their benefits left the door wide open for exclusion of groups deemed to lack those characteristics. If certain groups were not sufficiently "modern," certain communities not fully "enlightened," they would not take part, at least for the time being, in the brave new world that the president envisioned.

The Fourteen Points and the Rise of "Self-Determination"

By the spring of 1917, Wilson's voice was becoming increasingly prominent in the international arena. On March 5, in the inaugural address of his second term in office, the president again declared that international order and cooperation could not last long unless it stood on the principles of equality of nations and government by consent. The United States, then, would insist both on "the actual equality of nations in all matters of right and privilege" and on the principle that "governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." A month later, when he came before Congress to ask for a declaration of war against Germany, the president said that the United States would fight "for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations."10

It was not until February 1918, however, that he had uttered in public the phrase "self-determination," with which he would soon become so closely associated and which would come to serve as the rallying cry for nationalists the world over. The phrase in fact came from socialist thought and was introduced into the rhetoric of Allied war aims in late 1917 by the Russian Bolsheviks.11 Wilson adopted it only after it was used by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in a speech he gave in early January 1918.12 Contrary to popular perceptions both at the time and later, the term "self-determination" itself was nowhere to be found in the text of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points address, given on January 8, 1918. However, several of the points, like the call for the "readjustment of the frontiers of Italy" along "clearly recognizable lines of nationality" and for reconstituting a Polish state along similar lines, seemed to imply Wilson's support for that principle, at least in some instances.

The address, moreover, included for the first time an explicit reference to colonial questions, calling for any settlement of colonial issues to take into account the interests of colonial populations. Colonial claims, Wilson said in Point Five of the fourteen, would have to be resolved in a "free, open minded, and absolutely impartial" manner. Their resolution, he added, would be "based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined."13 But the phrasing of this principle was ambivalent, since it suggested that it was the "interests" of colonial peoples rather than their wishes or preferences that should be taken into account, and thus left open the question of just who would decide what those interests were: the people themselves, or a "benevolent" colonial power? As if to emphasize the point, Wilson also balanced those "interests" against the "equitable claims" of the colonial governments, which would receive equal consideration.

Still, the inclusion of a reference to the interests of colonial peoples, however tentative and equivocal, signaled the president's dissatisfaction with the reigning imperial order in international society. Wilson did not draft the Fourteen Points address alone, and many of the points followed the recommendations of a memorandum authored by members of a panel of experts assembled by Wilson's close adviser, Colonel House. But the memorandum made no mention of colonial issues, and it was Wilson himself who added this reference to the text of the address.14 "At first it was thought we might have to evade this [colonial question] entirely," House told his diary, "but the President began to try his hand on it and presently the paragraph which was adopted was acceptable to us both, and we hoped would be to Great Britain." Wilson did not consult the Allies on this question, so germane to their interests, and House was clearly concerned about their reaction.15 The decision to refer to the colonial question and to the interests of colonial peoples was Wilson's alone.

Why did he make that choice? Was it primarily a tactical decision, reflecting specific wartime considerations, or an important element of Wilson's overall vision for the postwar world order? One influential interpretation has argued that the Fourteen Points address was essentially a response—a "countermanifesto"—to the challenge that Lenin and Trotsky had presented with the announcement of their own radical peace plan.16 In this context, Point Five might be seen as a rejoinder, albeit a hedged, tenta-
tive one, to the Russian Bolsheviks' sweeping call for self-determination for colonial peoples. But the call made in Point Five was also entirely consistent with Wilson's previous wartime pronouncements, as well as with his longstanding position on the nature and purpose of colonialism. The specific timing of the Fourteen Points address reflected the recent Bolshevik challenge, but its content drew on principles that had long been part of his basic worldview. The essential elements of the Wilsonian scheme for world order, both in the colonial realm and elsewhere, had been part of his rhetoric long before the Bolshevik challenge emerged, expressed in his assertions of the right to "self-government" and the requirement that governments receive the "consent of the governed."17

Wilson's position on the colonial question in the Fourteen Points was still hedged and equivocal, but his rhetoric soon grew bolder, and five weeks later he used the phrase "self-determination" in public for the first time. On February 11, 1918, the president came before Congress again to outline the principles of the American peace plan. In the coming settlement, he said, "national aspirations must be respected" and people may be "dominated and governed only by their own consent." "Self-determination," he emphasized, was not "a mere phrase," but rather "an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." In invoking the principle of "self-determination," Wilson realized that he was incorporating a novel term into his wartime ideological lexicon. Nevertheless, he adopted this phrase as his own and assimilated it into his program for the postwar international order. Calls for a peace based on self-determination would henceforth largely replace in Wilson's wartime rhetoric references to the "consent of the governed." This switch aimed to neutralize Bolshevik critiques of the Allied war aims by co-opting their language, but it did not change the essence of Wilson's vision in his own mind. To him, the term "self-determination" was simply synonymous with "self-government." And he added qualifications: only "well-defined national aspirations" would receive consideration, and only to the extent that they would not create or perpetuate "elements of discord."18

Thus, although Wilson borrowed the term "self-determination" itself from the Bolsheviks, he gave it a different meaning and used it for a different purpose. For the Bolsheviks, who always talked specifically about "national" self-determination, it was a call for the revolutionary overthrow of colonial and imperial rule through an appeal to the national identity and aspirations of subject peoples. Wilson, on the other hand, rarely if ever uttered the specific term "national self-determination"; rather, he used the more general, vaguer phrase "self-determination," and usually equated the term with popular sovereignty, conjuring an international order based on democratic forms of government. He did at times, as in the cases of Poland or Italy, advocate redrawing borders according to ethnic lines, but as a matter of prudence or convenience rather than of principle. Indeed, acutely aware as he was of the multiethnic character of American society itself, it was always popular consent, rather than ethnic identity, that stood at the center of Wilson's understanding of self-determination.19

In addition, while Lenin saw self-determination as a revolutionary principle and sought to use it as a wrecking ball against the reactionary multiethnic empires of Europe, Wilson hoped that self-determination would serve in precisely the opposite role: as a bulwark against radical, revolutionary challenges to existing orders, such as those he saw in the Russian and Mexican Revolutions. If revolution, as Wilson and other Progressives believed, was a reaction to oppression by autocratic, unaccountable regimes, then the application of self-determination, defined as government by consent, would largely remove the revolutionary impulse and promote change through rational, gradual reforms. In the case of colonialism, as already noted, he envisioned that self-determination would emerge through gradual processes of reform, with the acceptance and cooperation of the colonial powers, rather than through the abrupt overthrow of colonial rule.20

These distinctions between Wilson and Lenin, however compelling they are in retrospect, were hardly so clear-cut at the time. To many around the world, and especially in the nonwhite world, Wilson and Lenin appeared more similar than different. Both advocated a new, open diplomacy; both were sharply critical of imperialism; both called for a radical transformation of international relations; and both relentlessly advocated a peace based on the principle of self-determination.

Moreover, by the summer of 1918, as the tide of the war began to turn decisively in favor of the Allies, Wilson's rhetoric grew bolder still. On the Fourth of July, in a brief Independence Day address at George Washington's estate at Mount Vernon, he invoked the legacy of the Founding Fathers in support of his own mission. They had "entertained no private purpose" and "desired no particular privilege" in their historic endeavors, he said, but were "consciously planning that men of every class should be free," and
striving to make America a haven for "the rights and privileges of free men." The United States' participation in the European war was an extension of that self-same mission: it would secure not only the liberty of the United States "but the liberties of every other people as well."21 This address, though based on a rather generous interpretation of the purposes of the American Revolution, nevertheless presented Wilson's boldest formulation yet of his postwar plans, and it resonated widely around the world, far beyond the president's intended audiences in the United States and Europe.

**Wilson and the World beyond Europe**

Although Wilson in his wartime utterances did not explicitly exclude non-European or colonial populations from the right to be governed by consent, he did not elaborate at any length on his views on colonial questions, nor explain how and to what extent that principle applied in colonial situations. Some of Wilson's advisers, at least, clearly believed that the principle of self-determination, whatever its merits, was inapplicable to most colonial populations. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, for instance, was an early critic of Wilson's advocacy of self-determination as "dangerous to peace and stability." Lansing noted with alarm "the frequent repetition of the phrase in the press and by members of certain groups and unofficial delegations, who were in Paris seeking to obtain hearings before the Conference," which made him all the more convinced of "the danger of putting such ideas as self-determination "into the minds of certain races," where it was bound to stir up "impossible demands" and "create trouble in many lands."22 Even those who advocated self-determination "as a great truth," he added, did not "claim it for races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations."23

When Wilson initially wanted to include a reference to the principle of self-determination in the League of Nations Covenant, many of his own advisers balked at the idea because of what it might mean for the future of international relations, especially for the place of nonwhite peoples within them. General Tasker Bliss, an American peace commissioner who was usually an ardent supporter of the president's peace plan, wondered incredulously upon seeing Wilson's draft of the Covenant whether its provisions "contemplate the possibility of the League of Nations being called upon to consider such questions as the independence of Ireland, of India, etc., etc.?"24 David Hunter Miller, the international lawyer who was the chief American legal expert responsible for negotiating the final text of the League Covenant, warned the president that his ideas for continuous adjustment of boundaries in accordance with the principle of self-determination would make "dissatisfaction permanent," compelling "every power to engage in propaganda" and legalizing "irredentist agitation." When Miller met his British counterpart in order to merge the various American and British proposals for the League Covenant into a single document, the two quickly agreed that this section of Wilson's draft simply had to go.25

Some historians have noted the failure of the great powers, including the United States, to apply in the peace settlement the principle of self-determination meaningfully outside Europe, and they have therefore concluded that Wilson "believed that national self-determination applied almost exclusively to Europeans." Colonial peoples who expected any support from the American president, they argue, were simply naive.26 But this conclusion may be too simple, since it conflates results with intent and since it ignores other elements that shaped Wilson's policies during those years. Indeed, the decisions made in Paris that are often taken as evidence of Wilson's racism are in fact more easily and fully explained by other factors at play. Wilson's rejection of the Japanese demand to insert a "racial equality" amendment into the League of Nations Covenant, often cited as conclusive evidence of his racism, is one such case in point. In fact, scholars who have studied this decision agree that it was a combination of two factors—pressure from British dominions like Australia and New Zealand, and domestic opposition in the United States to the Asian immigration that the Japanese proposal was intended to protect—that explain why Wilson felt compelled, after long delays, to exclude the amendment from the League Covenant.27

That Wilson in Paris largely ignored the pleas for self-determination of nonwhite peoples, in particular those who made claims that stood to injure the interests of his European allies, is also taken as evidence of racism. But Wilson ignored similar pleas from white Europeans, such as the Irish and the Catalans, when they appeared to him irrelevant to the specific issues that the peace conference had to settle. Such claims, he believed, would be dealt with in the future by the League of Nations. Indeed, this sense of the limited scope of what the conference itself could accomplish is the main reason that Wilson insisted on the establishment of the League as its first
order of business. The conference could do only so much, and the rest, he assumed, would be sorted out in due course by the League of Nations. Explaining his position on the demands of Irish leaders for independence, he said that the League, once organized, would “afford a forum not now available for bringing the opinion of the world and of the United States in particular to bear on just such problems.”

Subject populations, both in Europe and elsewhere, would eventually have self-determination, but they would get there through gradual reforms and international institutional and legal processes, not violence and revolution. This was the logic behind Wilson’s struggle in Paris to establish colonial “mandate” territories, in which the powers, supervised by the League of Nations, were to serve as “trustees” of populations deemed not yet ready to govern themselves.

None of this, of course, proves that Wilson was not a racist, but it does suggest that his racism provides neither the only nor even the leading explanation for his policies toward the demands of nonwhite peoples in 1919. Beyond the establishment of the mandate principle, Wilson did not give much thought during his time in Europe to colonial questions. Britain and France, the main colonial powers among the Allies, were naturally unwilling to entertain discussion of their own colonial possessions and policies at the peace table. The conference dealt with only those colonial issues that arose directly from the war, largely those related to former German and Ottoman possessions outside Europe, and in any case, Wilson focused most of his energy and attention in Paris on the complex issues of the European settlement.

A broader perspective on the development of his thinking on colonial issues is therefore needed if one is to probe the conceptual world behind Wilson’s advocacy of self-determination and gain a better understanding to what extent, and in what fashion, he might have seen his principles as applicable to non-Europeans. Wilson’s attitude toward the United States’ own imperial possessions, initially as a prominent academic and then as a political leader, is especially relevant in this regard.

Wilsonian Theory: Between Imperialism and Consent

Woodrow Wilson, as others in this volume have noted, was a son of the American South, born in 1856 in antebellum Virginia and raised in Georgia, where he lived through the Civil War as a boy, and later in South Carolina.
should not have those rights: “Freedom is not giving the same government to all people, but wisely discriminating and dispensing laws according to the advancement of a people.” Cautioning against attempts to implement the American system of government in the Philippines prematurely, he warned that the United States would “have to learn colonial administration, perhaps painfully.” At the same time, he spoke against the colonial authorities’ initial efforts to suppress Filipino criticisms of America’s imperial policies. The United States should “do everything openly and encourage those in our new possessions to express freely their opinions,” in order to prove to Filipinos that it had “only their welfare at heart.” Americans should teach the rudiments of democracy by example and work to earn the goodwill of the native population.

Wilson also criticized American anti-imperialists, who opposed the annexation of the islands, as irresponsible. Their argument that the United States was constitutionally ill-suited for colonial rule and should leave the Philippines to another power reminded him, he told one audience, of a vain woman who had recently found religion. When asked about her newly plain appearance, she replied: “When I found that my jewelry was dragging me down to hell, I gave it to my sister.” It was America’s duty to govern the Philippines for the advancement of the native population, and it could not shirk it. Those anti-imperialists who compared Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino resistance to the American occupation, to George Washington misunderstood, he thought, the true nature of liberty. In this context, Wilson was fond of quoting one of his favorite thinkers, Edmund Burke, in his quip on the French Revolution. How, Burke had asked, had France’s “new liberty” been “combined with government; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with social and civil manners”? Aguinaldo, Wilson continued, offered the Philippines liberty without order, and that was not true liberty at all. Filipinos could have liberty eventually—they were not inherently incapable of it—but only by a process of gradual, measured progress, supervised by the United States.

A conservative Burkian sensibility permeated Wilson’s thinking on the Progressive mission overseas. Wilson summarized the task of the United States in the Philippines and Puerto Rico as the establishment of self-govern-
Erez Manela explained. You will have to work on your own muscle,—and I shall be very much interested to know where your thinking lands you. I shall have to tackle the problem myself more formally than I have yet tackled it.39

This statement is important since it illustrates the central difficulty that Wilson, like other progressives, had in resolving the conflict between the universal scope of his ideals and the narrowness, in terms not only of race but also of class and gender, of their practical application. Wilson admitted that, “in theory,” Filipinos had as much right to government by consent as Americans; “in practice,” however, which Wilson described as the essence of politics, there was a difference: Filipinos were unable to exercise in practice that right of self-government which they possessed in theory, and therefore more-developed nations had a duty of tutelage until such time that they could. This tension between the theoretical equality of people and of nations and their perceived practical inequality, both as individuals and as groups defined by race, gender, or class, is, of course, a central conundrum of all liberal thought. As his reply shows, Wilson was well aware of this problem as it applied to the relations of the United States with nonwhite peoples, and he had a well-established opinion about how to solve it in practice through “benevolent” imperialist tutelage. In theory, however, he could not resolve it to his satisfaction: What indeed was the difference between the consent of the Filipinos and that of the American colonists? Though he promised his correspondent that he would “tackle the problem” more formally, he never did. Soon after the letter was written, he became president of Princeton, and then governor and U.S. president, and his time was taken up ever more with matters of practice, not theory.

The view that many, if not all, of the nonwhite “races” were, either inherently or developmentally, unfit for self-government was a common one in American public discourse, as it was in Europe, in the early decades of the twentieth century. Some opponents of imperialism invoked that view to argue that nonwhite populations, inherently “savage,” could not be “developed” and should therefore be left alone.40 For Wilson, however, the lack of fitness for self-government of many nonwhite populations was a result of their stage of development rather than the result of permanent racial deficiencies, and could therefore be remedied by time and training, though he usually stressed that the process would take many years. During the turn-of-the-century debates over the acquisition of an overseas colonial empire, then, Wilson believed that U.S. colonial rule could be useful for both colonizers and colonized, and that its goal was to allow colonial populations eventually to exercise self-government. In the meantime, however, the position of the colonized would be akin to students to be taught, or children to be raised, by their American masters. Independence would come eventually, but only through a lengthy period of tutelage and cultural and institutional development.

Wilsonian Practice: The Philippines, Haiti, and Beyond

In the decade from 1902 to 1912, Wilson said little, and apparently thought little, about colonial issues as he rose quickly in the world, first becoming president of Princeton University, then in 1911 governor of New Jersey, and finally the Democratic candidate for president in 1912. Despite his earlier writings in favor of colonial rule, during the presidential campaign Wilson adopted the anti-imperialist planks of the Democratic platform, and upon taking office his administration moved quickly to implement them. He appointed Francis Burton Harrison, a liberal-minded Democrat, governor of the islands, with instructions to give Filipinos majorities in both houses of the Philippine legislature and to respect the decisions of that legislature.41 This, Wilson explained in his first annual message to Congress, would allow Filipinos to prove their “sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power,” and, if successful, would allow them to proceed toward full independence. The United States would gradually extend and perfect the system of self-government on the islands, testing and modifying it as experience required, giving more control to the indigenous population, and eventually establishing their independence. Americans were beginning to gain the confidence of Filipinos, Wilson believed, and the colonial officials would rely on the counsel and experience of the Filipinos in order to learn how best to serve them, and how soon they could withdraw.42

For Wilson, success in this task was more than just an issue of domestic interest. It was a practical test of American ideals and principles, conducted before a global audience. The eyes of the world, Wilson said, were on the American experiment in the Philippines, and the United States had the opportunity, indeed the obligation, to instruct the whole world on how to manage the benevolent transformation of a backward people.43 Outlin-
ing his view on America's role as a “trustee” of overseas territories, Wilson emphasized that the United States was not there to do as it pleased or to further narrow interests. A new era had dawned in relations between the advanced powers and developing regions: “Such territories, once regarded as mere possessions, are no longer to be selfishly exploited; they are part of the domain of public conscience and of serviceable and enlightened statesmanship.” The aim of U.S. policy in the Philippines must be the Filipinos’ ultimate independence, and the transition to independence must move forward “as steadily as the way can be cleared and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid.”

Already here the outlines of what in 1919 would become the mandate principle were clear, and also its contradictions. The “civilizing” colonial power had to stay in control in order to allow it, eventually, to relinquish control and leave. Colonial populations had a right to self-government, but the implementation of that right could be deferred, perhaps indefinitely.

Besides his policy on the Philippines, the most obvious test case of the influence of Wilson's racial thinking on his foreign policy would appear to be the U.S. invasion and occupation of Haiti, the only black republic in the Western Hemisphere. In the summer of 1915, Wilson authorized a military invasion of Haiti in the name of restoring order on the Caribbean island, precipitating an American occupation that lasted until 1933. Indeed, scholars who have studied the occupation have found that U.S. racial attitudes, and especially Southern Jim Crow ideas and practices, were central in shaping the U.S. presence on the island and the interactions of U.S. soldiers and administrators with the Haitians. However, a close examination of the terms through which Wilson himself articulated his policy on Haiti proves surprising, inasmuch as they lacked any explicit racial references. In both official and private correspondence, Wilson repeatedly admitted that the question of Haiti caused him “anxieties” and left him “perplexed,” and once he even called it “a pretty mess” in a letter to his future wife, Edith Galt. But while he referred to Haiti as a “small republic,” he did not make any reference to its racial makeup.

This, of course, is not conclusive evidence that racial attitudes had no influence on his policy, but if there were such influence he was reluctant to articulate it, even in private, perhaps even to himself. As in the case of the Philippines, in the case of Haiti, too, Wilson the progressive intellectual and politician articulated his thinking in terms of development, order, and progress, and not in terms of race.

In addition, the world war itself, especially after the U.S. entry into it, transformed Wilson's conception of America's world role, and as a result exerted significant influence on his thinking and attitudes toward nonwhites, both within and outside the United States. Already in 1916, as the administration launched its preparedness program and the president began to contemplate the possibility of entering the conflict, colonial policy became even more directly linked in his mind to the larger context and goals of the United States' growing world role. In its actions and policies in the Philippines, Wilson declared in February 1916, the United States had to prove its disinterested and benevolent attitude toward peoples of all races and in all regions of the globe. What America had to give the world, he announced, was of universal value, explicitly transcending differences of geography, ancestry, or race. The American flag “stands for the rights of mankind, no matter where they be, no matter what their antecedents, no matter what the race involved; it stands for the absolute right to political liberty and free self-government, and wherever it stands for the contrary American traditions have begun to be forgotten.”

Self-government, then, at least in theory, was a universal right, not a privilege limited to specific geographical regions or racial groups.

Among other things, the war heightened tensions within American society and led Wilson to think more deeply than he had before about the multiethnic composition of American society and the concomitant need for the American creed to transcend boundaries of race, ethnicity, or background. Thus, despite his long-standing boundaries of race, ethnicity, and tradition as the font of American liberty and political culture, Wilson now saw clearly that these ideals had to be severed from their supposed “racial” origins. In an interview with a British journalist soon after his arrival in England in December 1918, Wilson made this point clear:

You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers. We are neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States. Nor must too much importance in this connection be attached to the fact that English is our common language... No, there are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and of interests.
The pressures introduced by the war also led Wilson to voice a more forceful opposition than he had previously to racist practices, such as lynch­ing, that were in clear breach of the principles for which, he tried to con­vince the world, the United States stood. If the United States was going to be a light unto the world—the antithesis of the militarism and barbarity
that Wilson attributed to the Central Powers—then American society had to be a model, and the stakes involved in domestic race relations were higher than ever before. No longer were they crucial only for the future of American society, but for the future of the world. Thus, in July 1918 the president for the first time publicly denounced lynching, both of African Americans and, as happened on numerous occasions during the war, of those deemed “German sympathizers.” The perpetrators of such acts, he charged, were emulating the “disgraceful example” of Germany and harming the war effort by sullying the image of the United States abroad:

We proudly claim to be the champions of democracy [but] every American who takes part in the actions of a mob [is] its betrayer, and does more to discredit her by that single disloyalty to her standards of law and of right than the words of her statesmen or the sacrifices of her heroic boys in the trenches can do to make suffering people believe her to be their savior. How shall we commend democracy to the acceptance of other peoples, if we disgrace our own by proving that it is, after all, no protection to the weak?49

The statement had a practical purpose—to allay the discontent among African American soldiers fighting in Europe—but the fact that Wilson framed his condemnation of lynchings in the context of the U.S. world role was nevertheless revealing. And Wilson's wartime conception of America's global responsibilities helped change his attitude not only on questions of race, but also on those of gender. Initially reluctant to support a constitu­tional amendment guaranteeing women the vote, he changed his position by 1918, telling the Senate in September that the amendment was necessary in order for the United States to retain the faith and trust of the common people of the world. “The plain, struggling, workaday folk . . . are looking to the great, powerful, famous Democracy of the West to lead them to the new day for which they have so long waited; and they think, in their logical simplicity, that democracy means that women shall play their part in affairs alongside men.”50 Wilson, then, had come to view the major social and political issues within the United States as intimately connected to the global role he envisioned for it in the postwar world. The next day, the amendment came up for a vote in the Senate and fell only two votes short of achieving the requisite two-thirds majority. It was finally passed the following summer and ratified in August 1920.

Conclusion

The world beyond Europe, then, had a deeply ambivalent place in the Wilsonian imagination. In theory, its peoples were to become part of the new international order of self-determining states that Wilson advocated. In practice, however, they would join that order only through a slow, de­liberate process of colonial reform, overseen by the League of Nations and dependent, to a significant extent, on the good will of colonial powers. In the end, it was not Wilson's intent but the perceptions, goals, and contexts of his often unintended audiences that defined the receptions and implica­tions of his rhetoric among nonwhite peoples in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The interpretations and import given to Wilson's words there often went far beyond his own beliefs. The message stood independently of the man, and could be used without regard—sometimes in conscious disregard—of his intent.

As others in this volume have suggested, perhaps no one knew better the limits of Wilson's liberalism than William Monroe Trotter, the black leader whom Wilson had thrown out of his White House office several years earlier for urging him to fulfill his promises to African Americans. But despite that experience, in 1919 Trotter was quick to adopt the language of self-determination to make the case for black liberation, within the United States and elsewhere. The peace conference, he believed, “with its talk of democracy and self-determination,” could “provide a stage from which to tell the world about the plight of blacks in the United States.” Overcoming State Department objections, Trotter arrived in Paris in April 1919 to launch a campaign for black self-determination, inundating the assembled press and conference delegates—including Wilson—with letters and memoranda aimed at “letting the world know that the Negro race wants full liberty and equality of rights.” Black Americans, Trotter argued, were “an ethnical minority denied equal rights,” and they demanded the same rights as every-
one else. Like anticolonial nationalists across the ocean, Trotter enlisted Wilsonian language on self-determination for purposes different and more radical than Wilson himself had imagined.

Notes


3. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s advocacy of the United Nations in the last years of the Second World War may have come close (see Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights [Cambridge, MA, 2005]).


9. Knock, To End All Wars, 115.


12. This address has been published as David Lloyd George, British War Aims: Statement by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable David Lloyd George, on January 5, 1918 (London, 1918). On Lloyd George’s speech and its background, see Knock, To End All Wars, 142–43; Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 313–28; and David R. Woodward, “The Origins and Intent of David Lloyd George’s January 5 War Aims Speech,” The Historian 26 (November 1970): 22–39.


14. The memorandum is reproduced in ibid., 45:439–75. Its authors were Sidney Mezes, president of the College of the City of New York; David Hunter Miller, an expert on international law; and a young Progressive journalist named Walter Lippmann.


17. On this point, see Knock, To End All Wars, 144–45; and Betty Miller Unterberger, “The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 929–31. Knock has argued that it was Lenin’s proclamations in the spring of 1917 that echoed Wilson’s “Peace Without Victory” address in January of that year (Knock, To End All Wars, 138).


25. Ibid., 1:53; Knock, To End All Wars, 214–16.


36. Filipinos, he said on one occasion, "can have liberty no cheaper than we got it. They must first take the discipline of law, must first love order and instinctively yield to it. . . . We are old in this learning and must be their tutors." (An Address entitled "The Ideals of America" given in Trenton, NJ, December 26, 1901, in *PWW*, 12:217–18, 222). For more on Wilson’s view of the relationship between progress and order, and on the gradual and “organic” nature of political progress, see Lloyd Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Wilmington, DE, 1991), 8–9.


42. An Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1913, in *PWW*, 29:8–9.


44. An Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1913, in *PWW*, 29:8–9. In his last Annual Message to Congress, in December 1920, Wilson again reminded Congress that “the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress on their behalf,” and thus “it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably cover” (An Annual Message on the State of the Union, December 2, 1920, ibid., 66:496).


49. A Statement to the American People, July 26, 1918, ibid., 49:97–98. See also "President Demands that Lynchings End," *New York Times*, July 27, 1918, 7; and "Mt. Wilson on the Mob Spirit," *New York Times*, July 27, 1918, 8. The latter piece echoed the president’s perspective on the relationship between domestic atrocities and for-
eign affairs, concluding: "We are fighting arbitrary, cruel, law-scoring, and violent Powers. Let our hands be clean from any tincture of their iniquity."


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