Chapter 4

How Culture Matters: Enriching Our Understanding of Poverty

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The term *culture* figures prominently in the literature on poverty, race, and ethnicity, though rarely with much theoretical or empirical sophistication. Conceived rather vaguely as a group's norms and values, as its attitudes toward work and family, or as its observed patterns of behavior, culture has been discussed by many poverty experts without the depth or the precision that characterize their analyses of such matters as demographic trends, selection bias, or the impact of public policies on work and family structure. This lack of sophistication is reflected in many practices, such as the use of *culture* and *race* interchangeably, as if all members of a racial group shared a unified set of beliefs or patterns of behavior, or the use of culture as a residual category to explain unaccounted-for variance in statistical model, or the use of culture exclusively as an intermediary mechanism—an intervening variable that helps explain why structural conditions such as neighborhood poverty lead to unwanted outcomes, but not an independently causal force. By contrast, other scholars reject cultural explanations altogether, arguing that culture cannot be studied scientifically or that cultural explanations inevitably blame the victims for their problems.

Poverty scholarship tends to reveal a rather thin understanding of culture. Over the last two decades, however, cultural sociologists have produced theoretical and empirical research yielding a subtle, heterogeneous, and sophisticated picture of how cultural factors shape and are shaped by poverty and inequality. They have used concepts such as *frames*, *cultural repertoires*, *narratives*, *symbolic boundaries*, *cultural capital*, and *institutions* to study how poor individuals interpret and respond to their circumstances, yielding insights that may be used to understand racial disparities in poverty. This literature has not coalesced into a coherent perspective on culture, but all of these approaches allow social scientists to move beyond the assumption that racial groups have inherent cultural traits, such as an Asian work ethic. These new concepts allow us to understand racial disparities in a way that avoids the cultural stereotypes that have too often characterized poverty policies and produced research of minimal explanatory power.

This new scholarship is often ignored by scholars of poverty and race, for at least two reasons. First, much of it has been conducted by social scientists who are not part of the community of economists, demographers, sociologists, and political scientists working on poverty and policy. Second, much of it is based on data-gathering techniques—participant observation, in-depth interviewing, comparative historical research, and content analysis—that are unfamiliar to quantitative social scientists. Lacking the training to distinguish between good and bad practitioners of these techniques, many quantitative researchers are tempted to dismiss qualitative work as anecdotal or worse, nonempirical (which too often seems to mean nonquantitative). Even quantitative research in the sociology of culture, such as research on cultural consumption and on networks, too often remains ignored by the interdisciplinary core of inequality scholars, much to the detriment of scholarship (for an attempt to rectify the situation, see Furstenberg 2007).

The consequences of ignoring this scholarship are not limited to the ivory tower. Culture is the subject or subtext of the recurrent public debates about poverty. It remains the subtext of the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, and it underlies claims that the welfare system has been too permissive (see Bullock and Soss and Schram, chapters 3 and 11, this volume). It is referenced, often cruelly, in the discussions of American individualism, responsibility, hard work, and fairness that characterize debates on poverty and immigration. The writings of influential policy researchers such as George Borjas (2001), David Ellwood (1988), and Lawrence Mead (1986) rely on assumptions about culture among the poor—assumptions often stemming from the culture of poverty theory—that have been criticized by sociologists of culture repeatedly since their emergence in the early 1960s (for example, Valentine 1968; Young 2004). Policy discourse often relies on unsubstantiated assumptions about American culture (for example, about what its core values are), assumptions that, in addition to lacking empirical foundation, have become part of a powerful narrative that equates liberalism with moral decadence and laissez-faire economics with fairness (Guetzkow 2006; O'Connor 2001; Somers and Block 2005).

These issues cannot be resolved without taking seriously the scholarship on poverty among sociologists of culture. In what follows we do not summarize or review all of this literature; in fact, we ignore many important works, to retain argumentative coherence. Rather, we identify those works we believe exemplify significant improvements on thin and dated conceptions of culture, discuss the pitfalls any new work on culture should avoid, and chart a research agenda for the study of poverty in the context of race that takes into account the difficulties in research on culture. Our review does not state where the field is headed—it states where we believe it should head. Although the scholarship we review has much to offer poverty research, it still varies widely in the extent to which its empirical claims can be evaluated quantitatively. In addition, its attempts at depicting sub-
strength have often come at the cost of lost parsimony. We take pains, therefore, to identify the limitations of the work we review and to suggest issues that culture scholars should address.

Many of the concepts we discuss (such as repertoires, frames, and narratives) may be turned into variables through content analysis or survey data analysis, and studied with statistical models (for an illustration concerning the use of content analysis, see Benson and Saguy 2005; for an illustration of the use of survey studies to boundary work, see Bail 2008). However, several of the analytical tools we describe are more suited to process-tracing (on process tracing, see Bennett and George 2003; on how qualitative methods can identify causal mechanisms, see Lin 1998). It is necessary to examine not only whether two phenomena are associated, but also how one leads to the other, or under what circumstances it does so—questions often best addressed with the help of qualitative data. Tackling such questions has been needed in the study of poverty for some time. In a review of the evidence on the spread of single-parent families, David Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, noting that "quantitative social science does best with sharp turning points and tight links between dependent and independent variables," skeptical concluded that "quantitative models have been done about as well as could be expected given the limits of our methods for investigating a complex system" (2004, 60). Getting beyond these limitations is essential to understanding the social and cultural mechanisms that affect racial and ethnic differences in poverty.

BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS

For years, the most prominent, if controversial, theory of culture and poverty was Oscar Lewis's culture of poverty (1969). Lewis argued that this culture emerged when populations that were socially and economically marginalized from a capitalistic society developed patterns of behavior to deal with their low status. This behavior was characterized by low aspirations, political apathy, helplessness, disorganization, provincialism, and the disparagement of so-called middle class values (190–2). Once such a culture was in place, Lewis argued, it developed mechanisms that tended to perpetuate it even if structural conditions changed.

Lewis's work was in part an attempt to bridge the structure-culture divide that had long been a feature of opposing explanations for poverty. Cultural explanations emphasized values and norms that directed behavior; structural explanations emphasized economic and structural constraints on behavior. However, the idea that the culture of poverty was self-perpetuating placed Lewis, in the eyes of many, on the cultural side. The debates that followed devolved into caricatures of the complex social processes involved; some blamed poverty on the inadequate values of the poor; others blamed "the system." The cultural conservatism of the 1980s polarized research even further, such that politically moderate social scientists were wary of associating themselves with cultural explanations for fear of being considered reactionary (Patterson 1997; Wilson 1987).

Beginning in the 1980s, sociological research on these questions began to follow multiple trajectories. Some scholars have examined the interaction between culture and structure with respect to issues such as agency, free will, and determinism, moving well beyond a simple dichotomy (Sewell 2005). Others have asked instead how people develop meaning systems—how they draw from their social circumstances to shape scripts, frames, repertoires, and so forth, rather than how those meaning systems determine their poverty or wealth.

Early approaches such as Lewis's also reflected a Parsonian conception of culture, whereby culture is a unitary and internally coherent set of attributes that characterizes a social group, such as inner-city African Americans or the Japanese. No consensus conception of culture has replaced Parsons' because different scholars focus on different social processes and use different metaphors to describe and explain what they observe. However, most would disagree with the Parsonian notion that emphasizes how culture is socialized into values that then shape behaviors (Sewell 2005, chapter 3). Many contemporary scholars have been influenced by Clifford Geertz (1973), who said: "Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs" (1973, 5). In this conception, as well as in the more practice-oriented approaches, culture refers to the meanings that human beings produce and mobilize to act on their environment (Ortner 1984). Instead of having a culture, individuals exist in the midst of, respond to, use and create cultural symbols.

In this respect, we fundamentally agree. The idea that races or ethnic groups have a culture—for example, that there is an Anglo American culture that differs from Asian culture or Afro American culture—is unhelpful to the study of racial differences in poverty. Intragroup differences are often larger than intergroup differences. Consequently, our understanding of racial disparities in poverty does not account for these as a function of inherent ethnic cultures. Instead of imprinting a shared culture to groups, we study empirically how individuals make sense of their lives.

CULTURE AND POVERTY TODAY

In what follows, we examine six ways culture has been conceived and examined—as frames, repertoires, narratives, cultural capital, symbolic boundaries, institutions—and assess what researchers studying poverty have uncovered by using each conception, and what differences it makes to use these concepts for our understanding of poverty. Some of the researchers we cover think of culture as an independent variable and poverty as the outcome. Others think of culture as the outcome. Others use neither as a causal outcome, producing instead descriptive accounts of the operation of both variables. Still others abandon the variable-based approach altogether. This heterogeneity is part of the strength of this body of work. Each approach is a lens through which to capture different dimensions of the causal processes that produce inequality and poverty. As such, they can be
combined, or used independently of one another. Together, they speak to how factoring in meanings can result in more comprehensive explanations of poverty.

Culture as Frames

Building on insights from Alfred Schütz (1962), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman (1966), Erving Goffman (1963), and others, some cultural sociologists ask how individuals cognitively perceive the world around them. Whereas normative conceptions focus on how we evaluate good and bad, cognitive ones ask how something is perceived as real. The philosophical underpinnings of this work stem from Immanuel Kant (1781/1982), whose distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds introduced the idea that the world as it truly is differs from the world we represent to ourselves, and that as people, we only have access to the latter.

Sociologists in this tradition assume that no one simply sees things as they are. Instead, every individual's perception of the social world—of social relations, the class system, race, the neighborhood, organizations—is filtered through cultural frames that highlight certain aspects and hide or block others.

The most prominent empirical application of the conception of culture as frames stems from the social movements literature. David Snow and Robert Benford defined a frame as "an interpretive [schema] that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (1992, 137). Much of this literature evolved in response to the resource mobilization perspective on social movements, which focused on the material resources that leaders could access and mobilize for their cause. The framing perspective's critique of resource mobilization theory is that cultural or symbolic elements are essential for the possibility of action. Regardless of resources, activists will be unable to mobilize potential participants without transforming their perceptions, by framing their situation in such a way that mobilization appears necessary (Small 2002, 23).

This perspective has been applied to the study of how people respond to neighborhood poverty. Mario Small's Villa Victoria (2004) analyzes local participation in a Latino housing project in Boston created as a response to political mobilization. He examined why residents, thirty years later, differed in their level of local community participation. Contrary to culture-of-poverty expectations, he found that differences in participation bore little relation to their expressed values, and more to differences in their (cognitive) framing of the neighborhood. When asked to describe their neighborhood (and thus, to reveal how they framed it), the two groups differed in whether they included the neighborhood's history in their description and whether they used community or projects to describe it. Those who perceived themselves as living in a neighborhood with a significant history of political and social involvement continued that tradition by participating in local activities. Those who perceived the neighborhood as little more than the projects, a low-income area with no especially notable history, did not. Those few who increased their participation level over time had first adopted frames consistent with those of other participants, learning from the latter, for example, the history of the political mobilization that led to the creation of the neighborhood.

David Harding (2005, 2007) also examined how framing influences the response to poverty. Whereas Small looked at how individuals frame their neighborhood, Harding focused, among other things, on how they frame the idea of pregnancy. He found that adolescents in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Boston exhibit greater heterogeneity of frames than those in other neighborhoods—for example, in response to whether being pregnant as a teen would be "embarrassing" or "not all that bad." As a result, adolescents in disadvantaged neighborhoods have more options for conceiving their circumstances, including both mainstream and alternative conceptions of the world.

This literature improves on the culture of poverty perspective in two respects. Whereas by definition the culture of poverty expects a single set of cultural responses to arise from conditions of structural poverty, both Small and Harding made clear that heterogeneity is common and salient. Both found little support for the notion of a collective ghetto culture shared universally by residents in high poverty, and show important within-neighborhood differences in cultural frames. By extension, both suggested that studies of racial differences in poverty looking for explanations in values are unlikely to find much.

A second contribution of this work is to redefine the relation between culture and behavior. The norms-and-values perspective posited a cause-and-effect relationship between values and behaviors, whereas the frame perspective tends to posit what Small (2002, 2004) has called a constraint-and-possibility relationship. Frames do not cause behavior so much as make it possible or likely. However, a consequence of this redefinition is that cultural frames are, by design, insufficient explanations of behavior; they may be thought of as necessary but insufficient conditions.

Culture as Repertoires

Scholars have also conceived of culture as a repertoire of practices, beliefs, and behaviors that individuals call forth at the time of action. One of the most widely cited scholars in this tradition is Ann Swidler (1986), who approached culture as a tool kit that individuals open in unsettled times. She argued that "culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented but by shaping a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action'" (1986, 273). Whereas a metaphor in the frames perspective might be that culture is the particular tint of the glasses through which individuals see the world, in the repertoires perspective it is the set of tools individuals have at their disposal to manage the social world.

For Swidler, it was less important whether individuals are shaped by their values than that repertoires of action are available to them in their figurative tool-
kits. Different toolkits contain different repertoires of action, and the toolboxes of some have more repertoires than those of others. The notion of strategies of action, which she defined as "persistent ways of ordering action through time" (1986, 273), is important. Speaking explicitly about a perennial issue in the urban poverty literature, Swidler explained that asking whether the poor share the values of the middle class will yield very little.

The irony of this debate is that it cannot be resolved by evidence that the poor share the values and aspirations of the middle class, as indeed they seem to do. In repeated surveys, lower-class youth say that they value education and intend to go to college. ... People may share... aspirations while remaining profoundly different in the way their culture organizes their overall pattern of behavior.

The root of those differences lies in their toolboxes. Thus

culture in this sense is more like a style or a set of skills than a set of preferences or wants. If one asks a slum youth why he did not take steps to pursue a middle class path to success (or indeed asked oneself why one did not pursue a different life direction) the answer might well be not "I don't want that life," but instead "Who me?" One can hardly pursue success in a world where the accepted skills, style, and informal know-how are unfamiliar. One does better to look for a line of action for which one already has the cultural equipment. (Swidler 1986, 275)

This perspective views culture as a heterogeneous set of attributes, rather than a single, coherent system. It allows for cultural differentiation and contradictions within a group. Preceding Swidler, Ulf Hannerz's classic but often overlooked Soulside (1969/2004) argued that ghetto residents have access to a repertoire that included both ghetto-specific and mainstream behavior. William Julius Wilson (1996) extended this idea by arguing that under conditions of high joblessness, many mainstream forms of behavior are difficult to implement. In Flat Broke with Children (2003), Sharon Hays showed that low-income mothers use the alternative strategies of action available to them, and that these often contradict one another. She found that the notions of responsibility and financial self-sufficiency are clearly part of low-income women's cultural toolkits. When examining differences in poverty by race, this work leads to questions about the availability of strategies for acting in accordance with mainstream versus alternative values. Wilson's work suggests, for example, that the repertoire of strategies available is constrained by neighborhood (not just individual) poverty. Blacks have been shown to be much more likely than whites or Latinos to live in high poverty neighborhoods (Jargowsky 1997; Massey and Denton 1993). This would lead one to expect racial differences in repertoires, even if there are few racial differences in values.

As with the frame perspective, the added value of the culture as repertoire perspective is that it leaves room for accounts of diversity within groups and for a multiplicity of perspectives within a single actor. Because individuals can and do resort to different repertoires in the course of action, this perspective makes it possible to understand what to outsiders may appear as inconsistencies—for example, between a reported belief in the sanctity of marriage and a birth out of wedlock. In addition, it helps identify which actions are unlikely: if the strategies for obtaining a college degree or for sustaining a long-term marriage are not part of one's toolkit, one is not likely to pursue either course of action. Today, the strategies for entering a competitive college include contacting the Educational Testing Service and registering for the SAT, obtaining study materials or enrolling in a preparatory course, indicating to which colleges one wants the grades sent, and many others. If a seventeen-year-old does not know to do these things, it is unlikely he or she will pursue a college education in a competitive institution even if, in theory, going to college seems like a rational thing to do. The poor often need multiple repertoires to get out of poverty, such as knowledge of how to enroll in two- or four-year colleges, how to acquire technical skills, how to demonstrate street savvy, and how to avoid being drawn into street violence. Understanding their acquisition and use of these repertoires is critical to understanding the path out of poverty.

As Michele Lamont (1992, chapter 7) argued, the toolkit perspective presents problems, particularly in that it does not explain why some repertoire choices are followed in a course of action. In a sense, it is concerned with the supply side of culture, but not with the factors that influence the likelihood of access to, or of the use of, one set of tools (for example, how to get access to a college education) rather than another. The choice depends on opportunities and structural constraints that are shaped by cultural and noncultural factors. In addition, Swidler allowed a slippage among the terms strategies, repertoires, skills, styles, and habits, which weakens the powerful simplicity of the toolkit concept. Nevertheless, this approach does address many of the weaknesses of some earlier paradigms, notably, their incapacity to deal with heterogeneity or contradiction.

Culture as Narratives

Although frames, repertoires, and narratives all cognitively shape people's understanding of their social world, only narratives are stories; they often present a beginning, middle, and end, and are clearly identifiable as a chunk of discourse (Polletta 2006; Evick and Silbey 2003). Narratives of personal experience have informed the study of social class since the pioneering work of William Labov on the African American vernacular (1997; see also Bertaux and Kohli 1984). Although the term narrative is generally used very loosely and one finds many variations in how narrative analysis is practiced, in general it suggests that people develop an understanding of themselves, their environment, and others that shape their actions (Somers 1994). This approach posits that, when faced with two courses of action concerning, for instance, their project of social mobility, individuals are likely to pursue the one most consistent with their personal narrative, rather than one that might seem most rational to an outsider (for example, Abelmann 2003 on gendered projects of upward mobility in South Korea).
Culture as Symbolic Boundaries

Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions between objects, people, and practices that operate as a “system of rules that guide interaction by affecting who comes together to engage in what social act” (Lamont and Fournier 1992, 12). Boundaries distinguish between those who are worthy and those who are less so, from the standpoint of morality, economic success, cultural sophistication, and so forth. They are a necessary but insufficient condition for the creation of social boundaries manifested in spatial segregation, labor market segregation, and patterns of intermarriage (Lamont and Molnár 2002). These consequences show the importance of paying heed to the boundaries that members of various groups draw, their relative porosity (the extent to which boundaries are policed), the criteria used to draw and justify them, and the groups they exclude or stigmatize. They reveal how individuals implicitly and explicitly characterize members of various classes, and particularly what they view as the characteristics and flaws of groups, including the poor. Thus, in the United States, workers’ self-definitions stress hard work, responsibility, and self-sufficiency. In valuing their own attributes, they draw strong moral boundaries against the poor, whom they view as lazy and as taking advantage. In France, by contrast, workers are more likely to see the poor as fellow workers temporarily displaced by the forces of capitalism, and thus worthy of support. This view is sustained by cultural repertoires—a strong socialist tradition, Catholicism, and Republicanism—that make notions of solidarity widely available (Lamont 2000; Lamont and Thévenot 2000). This cross-national contrast corresponds to wider patterns in redistributive policies toward the poor in France than in the United States (see also Gallie and Pauquet 2000; Katz 1989; Silver 1993). Cultural categories of worth, which include widely shared views of the poor, figure prominently among the conditions explaining such policies in the United States (Steenland 2006) or comparatively (Dobbins 1994; Sato 2008).

Boundary work (the separation of Us and Them) is critical to the making of groupness. It is part of the process of construction of collective identity: individuals differentiate themselves from others by drawing on criteria of common traits and experiences and a sense of shared belonging. They must be recognized by outsiders as distinct for their collective identity to crystallize (Cornell and Hartman 1997; chapter 4; Jenkins 1996, chapter 4). Social identity theory, elaborated by social psychologists, suggests that “pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparison lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other” (Tajfel and Turner 1985, 16–17). Hogg and Abrams (1988) argue that processes of differentiation aim “to maintain and achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimension” (Tajfel and Turner 1985, 16–17). Hence, in-group favoritism, manifested in stereotyping, is common, especially among high-status groups (for a review, see Sidanius and Pratto 1999; see also chapter 3, this volume). Understanding this process affects how we account for people’s success and failures—with external-environmental as opposed to internal-individual and self-blaming explanations (Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998).

Studies of boundary work and identity among the poor have focused on how the poor self-define (as workers, good parents, or moral beings), rather than assigning them an identity by isolating specific cultural patterns as central and enduring aspects of a culture of poverty. These studies also consider whether, how, and by whom such self-identifications are validated, and whether they can crystallize as social categories and in turn affect behavior. For instance, in No Shame in My Game, Katherine Newman (1999) studied how the black and Latino working poor of Harlem who are employed in the fast-food industry contrast themselves with the unemployed poor. They develop a sense of their identity as workers in contrast to that of the unemployed poor, and create a status hierarchy that echoes the dominant social hierarchy and the dominant narrative of the American dream. Similarly, in The Code of the Street, Elijah Anderson (1999) analyzed intraracial boundaries that separate “decent” from “street” poor African Americans, and examines how the latter develop behavioral traits and identity defined in opposition to those of whites. Nathan Fossé (2008) showed how low-income black men define women as stunted and wifey, and how these categories are associated with different moral constructs concerning trustworthiness, which in turn affects the
prevalence of single-parent families. In My Baby’s Father, Maureen Waller (2002) showed how unmarried poor men understand their identities as fathers and describes the emotional contributions they make to the lives of their children (contra governmental programs that focus only on their material contributions). She contrasted her approach with earlier ones: “rather than examining whether low- income unmarried parents adopt sub-cultural values that contrast with those in the rest of society, [the] analysis [shows] that these parents draw their ideas, justifications, and practices regarding fatherhood from various sources, including their families, communities, other institutions, and general culture” (45). Thus, these men define themselves in opposition to the deadbeat dads targeted by government child-support enforcement programs. Focusing on their self-concept through boundary work captures conditions that make the choices they make possible, helping social scientists move beyond a view of their lives as aberrational. Without such a focus, analysts would miss important explanations for the choices the poor make.

Ethnic and racial differences, which in the United States overlap with the boundary between the poor and the nonpoor, are often defended and contested by, among others, parents who reinforce ethnic identity to prevent their children from assimilating downward (Noh and Kaspar 2003). This daily boundary work contributes to both the reproduction of racial stereotypes and the policing of racial group boundaries. Policies created to address racial disparities in poverty need to clearly dissociate poverty from race and ethnicity—primarily African American, Native American, and Latino—if they are to avoid reinforcing stereotypical views of racial differences.

Culture as Cultural Capital

Cultural capital refers to the “institutionalized, i.e. widely shared, high status cultural signals” used to exclude others in various contexts (Lamont and Lareau 1988, 56). This concept has become widely used as an analytical device to understand how differences in lifestyles and taste contribute to the reproduction of inequality. It illuminates how middle and upper-middle class adults (professionals and managers) pass on advantages to their children, mostly by familiarizing them with cultural habits and orientations valued by the educational system. The early American literature on this topic tended to focus primarily on the similarity with high culture (for example, DiMaggio 1982), more recent work has tended to focus on a wider range of high status signals.

According to Pierre Bourdieu’s and Jean-Claude Passeron’s original framework (1977), children of poor and working class families are handicapped by a schooling system that systematically uses criteria of evaluation biased in favor of middle class culture—for instance, use of a wide vocabulary (Bernstein 1993). For these children, this bias frequently results in underselection, self-exclusion, and “relegation” or marginalization (Lamont and Lareau 1988). The living conditions of poor and working
tudes. These channels are germane to understanding mechanisms and opportunities for incorporation and exclusion. Institutions can be defined robustly, as formal and informal rules, procedures, routines, and norms (Hall and Taylor 1996), as socially constructed shared cognitive and interpretive schemas (Meyer and Rowan 1991), or more narrowly yet, as formal organizations. In all of these definitions, however, they enable or constrain shared definitions and experiences of race, class, and gender, which in turn affect poverty. Thus, institutions are the last culture-related analytical device to which we turn. They are particularly salient when one considers how cultural constructs feed into poverty-related policy, as when the latter resonates with institutionalized, taken-for-granted boundaries.

Examining guaranteed annual income proposals in the 1960s and 1970s, Brian Steensland (2006) analyzed the role of culture in the schematic, discursive, and institutional mechanisms leading to policy outcomes. Explanations in previous research, he suggested, centered on the impact of social movements, state autonomy, and business interests, but “the role of culture is recognized empirically, but disappears theoretically” (1280, n.8). He, however, emphasized interpretive feedback mechanisms, showing that supporters and opponents of guaranteed annual income proposals “use language that buttressed cultural categories of worthiness” (for example, welfare recipients versus the working poor, or “income supplement” versus “welfare support”), that in turn influence the shape of policies; this illustrates how templates for categorization (or boundaries) encounter discursive opportunity structures (or institutions) that influence the likelihood that specific schemas will diffuse, become institutionalized in policy, and affect who gets what. Moreover, “categories of worth exert institutional influence when they interlock with patterned practices in ways that channel routinized action” (1287). In other words, through feedback or loop effects, boundaries become institutionalized, that is, largely taken for granted and embedded in policies, in informal organization, and in cultural practices. Institutional arrangements come to reproduce themselves and result in systematic exclusion of some categories of the population.

Such processes have consequences for how the poor are incorporated and “dealt with” across advanced industrial societies. For instance, Hilary Silver (2006) contrasted French, British, and other European policies of social inclusion (and their desire to avoid social exclusion) with American approaches that isolate the poor, namely through means-tested (as opposed to universal) welfare programs (Silver 1993). Such cultural qua institutional processes help explain patterns of racial incorporation (for instance, through laws against employment discrimination, or through social security and welfare) in these different contexts. Robert Lieberman (2005) analyzed different configurations of “institutions, group-state linkages, and cultural repertoires” (25) that result in the unintentional but systemic exclusion of blacks in favor of whites in the United States, mediated by labor market access and state structure. This exclusion is then compounded by the efforts of individuals to make sense of their place in the world, as those efforts draw upon the status quo as starting point. Similarly, by contrasting recipients of welfare and disability insurance, Joe Soss (2005) described how the two programs’ regulations and organiza-

Culture as Institution

The growing literature on institutions has become preoccupied with analyzing precisely how institutional channels have cascading effects on individual atti-
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tion of casework result in different recipient understandings of their client status and of the potential effectiveness of collective action (see also, on the framing of membership, Jenson and Papillon 2001; Soss and Mettler 2004).

Investigating such institutionalized processes requires reframing poverty knowledge within a broader perspective. It requires focusing less on individuals and more on structures and institutions, including the cultural and social mechanisms that maintain classification systems that demarcate the poor from Us (O'Connor 2001). Cultural approaches to the study of poverty thus have to focus on poverty policies, as well as on the poor.

REMAINING CHALLENGES

We have not argued here that scholars of poverty and racial inequality should concern themselves only with culture. We would not expect, for example, that concentrated urban poverty would be explainable solely by a shift in certain repertoires of action among a population or by a secular decline in the belief in meritocracies. Rather, our goal has been to introduce alternative ways of thinking about culture and to suggest that culture, in its many forms, may interact with structure in ways other than those so far proposed by much of the scholarship on poverty and racial inequality.

Meaning is multifaceted; it may intervene differently at various points in the causal chain that determines whether members of different racial or ethnic groups end up in poverty. Its role will not be the same in all settings. For example, determining whether poor Native Americans born in reservations are likely to escape poverty may call for different cultural tools and analytical strategies, than determining why equally poor people of different racial groups differ in their use of traditional banking (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006). Thus, breaking down culture into many components is essential if we are to better understand its role in channeling racial disparities.

For this reason, we have not attempted to adjudicate among the six analytical tools we have presented except to suggest that they each can illuminate different processes through which meaning contributes to the uneven distribution of poverty across racial and ethnic groups. These processes cannot be captured by the culture of poverty thesis and its many implicit descendants. Some of these processes concern macrolevel processes of meaning making and decision making among the poor—for example, how low-income individuals' framing of their neighborhoods shapes their actions, how the narratives of different racial or ethnic groups affect their perceptions of the path to a good life, how the working poor use the poor to help define who they themselves are. Others relate to society-wide cultural representations about groups that impact the policies and institutions that regulate them—for example, the cultural assumptions of policy makers and politicians about the motivations of unwed mothers that cause poverty. The emerging picture is far more complex and multidimensional than that generated by the assumption that living in poverty creates self-perpetuating and pernicious cultural orientations. Again, only by considering a range of culture-related concepts that point to different aspects of an hypothesized causal process—as opposed to culture broadly defined—can a fuller and more fine-tuned understanding of the relevant aspects be brought to light.

For research on racial differences in poverty to produce work that builds on and improves on the literature just described, several changes will be necessary. First, such research should accommodate a broader understanding of how various disciplines accumulate empirical evidence. Certainly some of the ideas discussed here can be examined through quantitative, survey-based methods. Nevertheless, many are best studied through other data-gathering techniques. Inductive research and field-based methods are sine qua non if we are to capture the distinctive frames or narratives through which the poor make sense of their lives. These methods are also especially well suited to capture path-dependent processes and to perform process-tracing more generally. Familiarity with a variety of methods is probably a requirement for fulfilling the promise of the field.

Second, concerns with endogeneity should not stop researchers from considering how culture-related phenomena figure in the production and reproduction of inequality. Indeed, although the question of what is cause and consequence is critical for research that aims at assessing the relative significance of various factors in multivariate models, it is much less relevant in studies concerned with process-tracing, where loop-back effects and other similar patterns are common. This should be stressed because problems of endogeneity have often deterred quantitatively inclined social scientists from considering the causal role of culture.

Third, we need more heterogeneous views about how culture and poverty are causally related: cultural practices may shape responses to poverty, cultural repertoires may be limited by poverty, cultural frames may be expanded by neighborhood poverty, cultural narratives may change irrespective of poverty, and so on. Whether cultural change leads to structural change is a counterproductive question. Much more useful is to ask when, where, and how cultural change leads to structural change. It is imperative that the terms of the debate be changed to make room for conceptions of culture that go beyond thin accounts of preferences.

A few recent poverty studies show the promise and potential pitfalls of rethinking how culture is examined. In Promises I Can Keep, Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas (2005) painted a convincing picture of how poor single mothers understand the place of fathers, husbands, and children in their lives. Their respondents give positive meanings to aspects of their lives that many poverty researchers condemn, including marriage, children, and autonomy. If women do not marry, it is because they hold marriage in very high regard and wish to avoid divorce. If women do not postpone childbearing, it is because having a child is a source of self-esteem, given their low labor-market prospects. If they hold off from marriage, it is in part to protect their independence from men through financial security. These cultural orientations, and others, intersect with the structural factors that William Julius Wilson (1987) discussed, such as high male unemployment, to explain the high rate of nonmarital birth among the poor. What is missing, however, is an explicit account of how one meaning is connected to another, and the
processes through which women come to give a particular issue a given meaning—for example, whether tropes available from feminism, entertainment television, or Catholicism (especially among the Latina respondents) converge to produce the distinct meanings these women give to autonomy. Though Edin and Kefalas documented in detail how poor white, black, and Latina women living in Philadelphia accounted for their lives, they did not spell out how these accounts fed into the reproduction of poverty. Being clearer about such processes would lead to explicit and more detailed information about the relationship between culture and poverty, and would help us compare processes from case to case and from setting to setting.

Another example is Alfred Young’s *The Minds of Marginalized Black Men* (2004), based on interviews with twenty-six young, low-income African American men. Young’s respondents clearly aspire to a college education, without knowing how to achieve it in part because they are not in frequent contact with the college educated. Their isolation from the middle class makes it difficult to engage in practices likely to lead to higher educational attainment. Their firm belief in educational achievement thus cannot be easily translated into behavior. Just as these respondents value going to college but do not have a cultural template of how to get there, Edin and Kefalas’s respondents valued marriage, but viewed it as nearly unattainable because to them it required “the white picket fence lifestyle” (2005, 74, 111). The parallel between the findings of these two studies is striking and cries for further exploration of the disjuncture between the cultural tools made available by the American dream, disconnect between these tools and the lives of some Americans, and the resulting institutionalization of popular repertoires among the poor that may, from the perspective of significant social incorporation, be dysfunctional.

We hope our discussion has made it clear that researchers are unlikely to understand racial disparities in poverty by looking at racial or ethnic cultures, in the sense of sets of values or attitudes that all or most members of a racial, ethnic, or class group share. This idea was ineffective in its culture of poverty incarnation, and has recently been shown to be of limited value in other realms as well—see, for instance, the criticisms of the oppositional culture thesis (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; Cook and Ludwig 1998; Fordham and Ogbonnaya 1998; Ogbonnaya 1978). The concepts we have discussed all locate cultural processes in individuals or in relations between individuals, rather than in groups. This suggests that the most promising venues for understanding racial disparities through cultural concepts lies in how individuals of different racial backgrounds face differential discrimination, access to structural opportunities, wealth advantages, social capital, and other opportunities and constraints. Cultural factors are more likely to operate in conjunction with these factors, not independently of them.

A proper framing of the role of culture in producing racial disparity in poverty should lead to more appropriate policy recommendations, based on more accurate and encompassing understandings of the social worlds that the poor inhabit. For instance, one may imagine that a better understanding of the narratives that white, black, and Latino unwed mothers use to make sense of their experience would result in more adequate programs to reduce out-of-wedlock childbirth. Programs to combat poverty among the elderly should be shaped by a more detailed understanding of the frames used to define moral boundaries around family responsibilities among Asians, Latinos, blacks, and whites (Espiritu 1997). Similarly, programs to address prisoner recidivism should take into account that being arrested or having been imprisoned may carry different meanings among different ethnic groups and in different neighborhoods (see Winship and Berrien 2003).

Of course, culture cannot be easily manipulated or changed through policies. However, institutions can be more effective as policy levers if they are based on a fuller understanding of the environment they aim to engineer, and of changes that are in sync with shared understandings. Policies can stimulate cultural responses or exacerbate cultural tensions. An adequate comprehension of contexts, including shared definitions of the situation, are essential to produce successful policy implementation, and to avoid pernicious unintended consequences (on this point, see Swidler forthcoming).

There are many issues we have ignored and much work we have not covered in this chapter—for example, (Patterson 1997, 2000) has attempted to demonstrate the long-term cultural impact of the experience of slavery on African Americans. Although this and other studies are in some senses couched in older conceptions of culture, they nevertheless introduce a concern with meaning that has too often been neglected by poverty scholars. What remains is to enrich this literature with the conceptual tools produced in other traditions more traditionally hospitable to cultural analysis, so as to move toward a richer understanding of the cultural mechanisms involved in the production of poverty. Without this effort, a good part of the puzzle will remain unsolved.

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NOTES

1. A straightforward indicator of the messiness of culture research among poverty scholars is its failure to distinguish attitudes from behavior. For instance, failure to marry (a pattern of behavior) does not necessarily indicate an anti-marriage attitude, just as infidelity does not signal the belief that adultery is acceptable. In a recent study of the differences between what employers say concerning their willingness to hire ex-cons and what they actually do, Devah Pager and Lincoln Quillian (2005) rightly
noted that "the resolution of these differences represents an important focus of sociological investigation in its own right. Although low correlations between attitudes and associated behaviors are often viewed as a purely methodological test of survey questions, in many cases, these discrepancies actually may provide clues for a better substantive understanding of the cognitive-emotional basis for action" (372).

2. Even scholars deep in the sociological tradition who believe cultural factors are important often argue that culture itself stems from economic or structural conditions. For instance, William Julius Wilson (1987) argued that the social isolation fostered by concentrated poverty influences one's cultural orientation (through the scarcity of conventional role models). This model stresses adaptations to constraints and opportunities. However, Robert Sampson and William Julius Wilson (1995) describe community contexts as "cognitive landscapes" concerning behavioral norms (for a focus on culture as repertoire, see also Wilson 1996; Hannerz 1969/2004).

3. The reception of a few works—such as Katherine Newman's No Shame in My Game (1999), Elijah Anderson's Code of the Street (1999), and Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas's Promises I Can Keep (2005)—is an exception.

4. This is not the venue for an extended discussion of methodology. We proceed on the assumption that social science requires multiple methods, because some questions are only or best addressed through particular methods. Still, we believe that culture may be studied through multiple methods, including qualitative methods.

5. Certainly, authors may believe that the welfare system should require work, but stating that Americans believe this idea requires empirical substantiation. For example, criticizing Charles Murray's critique of AFDC programs during the 1980s, David Ellwood (1988) wrote: "But what is often missed in this frenzy is that although Murray is almost certainly wrong in blaming the social welfare system for a large part of the predicament of the poor, he is almost certainly correct in stating that welfare does not reflect or reinforce our most basic values" (6). What are these basic values? Ellwood acknowledges the difficulty of answering this question, but tries anyway: "I have yet to find a definitive and convincing statement of our fundamental American values. The work of philosophers is often esoteric and the results of surveys are difficult to distill. Yet, I see recurring themes in public and academic discourse about what it is Americans believe. Four basic tenets seem to underlie much of the philosophical and political rhetoric about poverty" (1988, 16). Ellwood's "four value tenets" are the autonomy of the individual, the virtue of work, the primacy of the family, and the desire for and sense of community. Thus, the author presents a major statement about the characteristics of "American culture" based on no empirical data.

6. More specifically, the culture of poverty perspective argued that the poor remained in poverty not merely as a result of their economic conditions but also because of cultural values and practices they had developed from poverty. This perspective, as exemplified by Oscar Lewis (1969) and Edward Banfield (1974), argued that culture constituted a set of norms and values that guided the behavior of individuals. These, however, conceived of culture as a lifestyle, at times called a worldview, which made the escape from poverty difficult or impossible. Both authors catalogued a series of characteristics that defined this culture. These included an orientation toward the present and instant gratification, a preference for happiness over work, a tendency to value familial ties over moral considerations of right or wrong, engaging in sex with multiple partners over the life course, and others. There were several problems with the culture of poverty conception: it assumed that individuals' practices were caused by their values, largely ignoring that many people, rich or poor, constantly act against their values despite this, its catalogue of the culture of poverty included both values and behaviors, leading to an often circular argument (people have multiple sexual partners because they have a culture characterized by the presence of multiple sexual partners); it assumed that a single culture categorized very diverse people; it assumed that people's culture is fundamentally static and does not change over their lifetimes, as though people play little role in the creation of their own culture or practices (for a related perspective, see Rainwater 1970; for a critique, see Small and Newman 2001).

7. Others, such as Elliot Liebow (1967), attempted to redefine the terrain by proposing the notion of "value stretch." Carol Stack's All Our Kin (1970) was also a particularly influential critique of Lewis's thesis.

8. Maria Kefalas (2001) analyzes how white working class people in Chicago define and defend their identities largely against blacks who they see as the poor, in what they perceive to be an imperiled environment. They define themselves through the care with which they keep their homes clean, cultivate their gardens, maintain their property, defend the neighborhoods, and celebrate the nation. In both studies, the meanings given by workers to the poor are closely tied to their own identities as responsible, hard-working, moral people.

9. More specifically, in Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977) proposed that the lower academic performance of working-class children is accounted for not by lower ability but by institutional biases. They suggest that schools evaluate all children on the basis of their familiarity with the culture of the dominant class (or cultural capital), thus penalizing lower class students. Extensive vocabulary, wide-ranging cultural references, and command of high culture are valued by the school system, and students from higher social backgrounds are exposed to this class culture at home. Hence, children from other classes, including the poor, are overselected by the educational system. They are not aware of it, as they remain under the spell of the culture of the dominant class. They blame themselves for their failure, which leads them to drop out or to sort themselves into lower prestige educational tracks.

This work can be read as a direct extension of Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels's (1845/1979) dominant ideology thesis, which centers on the role of ideology in cementing relations of domination by camouflaging exploitation and differences in class interests. However, the control of subjectivity in everyday life through the shaping of common sense and the naturalization of social relations is the focus of their attention. Bourdieu and Passeron broaden Marx and Engels by suggesting that crucial power relations are structured in the symbolic realm proper and are mediated by meaning. They de facto provide a more encompassing understanding of the exercise of hegemony by pointing to the incorporation of class-differentiated cultural dispositions mediated by both the educational system and family socialization.

In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu applied this analysis to the world of taste and cul-
tural practice at large. He showed how the logic of class struggle extends to the realm of taste and lifestyle, and that symbolic classification is key to the reproduction of class privileges: dominant groups define their own culture and ways of being as superior (opposing refined food to heavy food, linen to polyester, tennis to bingo, and so on). Thereby they exercise symbolic violence, that is, impose a specific meaning as legitimate while concealing the power relations that are the basis of its force (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). They defined legitimate and dominated cultures in opposition: the value of cultural preferences and behaviors are defined relationally around binary oppositions (or boundaries) such as high-lower, pure-impure, distinguished-vulgar, and aesthetic-practical (245). The legitimate culture they thereby defined is used by dominant groups to mark cultural distance and proximity, monopolize privileges, and exclude or recruit new occupants for high status positions (31). Through the incorporation of habits, or cultural dispositions, cultural practices have inescapable and unconscious classificatory effects that shape social positions. Thus this framework accounts for how the cultural marginalization of the poor is central to processes of domination and to the reproduction of inequality.

In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu (1977) defined habitus as “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations” (78). Repeated exposure to similar social conditions leads individuals to develop a set of dispositions toward action that are class-specific, or to simplify, specific to the distance toward material necessity that is characteristic of each class. One of the most successful applications of the concept has been MacLeod’s Ain’t No Makin’ It (1995), in which the author studied two small groups of adolescent boys (whites and blacks) as they develop their aspirations in a housing project. He showed that as working class children, the white boys had developed a habitus (a set of rules about their own lives) through which they expected no more than working class lives. To speak of their habitus is to invoke the habitual element of their culture, whereby they expected a working class life because it had never occurred to them or their parents that another life was reasonably possible. In contrast, the high aspirations of the black boys stemmed, in part, from what they saw as the reduction in racial injustice that resulted from the civil rights struggles of their parents’ generation—thinking that their own opportunities would be greater than their parents’, their aspirations were appropriately higher.

The poverty literature is hardly unique in its use of a rather thin conception of culture. Indeed, building on Kornhauser (1978), social scientists studying crime and deviance are also leaving unexamined the impact of cultural mechanisms on their object (Sampson and Bean 2005), and those studying sexuality among the poor have also tended to use a theoretically impoverished model to understand patterns of behavior across a population (Fosse 2008).

It is also the case that professing faith in these ideals is a means of acquiring cultural citizenship in a context of acute social exclusion, an issue Lamont has discussed elsewhere (2000; Lamont and Molnár 2002).

From our analysis, one should not conclude that no cultural traits or orientations exist that are concentrated among various categories of poor people. There may be large differences in the types of verbal interaction and the words used among professional, working class, and low-income parents when talking with their children. Betty Hart

and Todd Risley (1995), for example, counted class differences in numbers of words employed with children—in the tens of millions by as early as age three (see also Farkas 2003). However, we suggest that such differences should be understood not through the prism of essential or permanent differences between class norms or attitudes, but as elements in a broader account that employs multiple analytical tools to examine the problem.

REFERENCES


The Colors of Poverty


