Political Position and Social Knowledge

John Levi Martin and Matthew Desmond

The nature of social cognition—how we “know about” the social world—is one of the most deceptively obvious problems for sociology. Because we know what we know, we often think that we know how or why we know it. Here, we investigate one particular aspect of social cognition, namely, what we will call “political ideology”—that is, people’s self-placement on a dimension on which persons can be arrayed from left to right. We focus on that understanding that is in some ways the “ur-form” of social cognition—our sense of how we stand by others in an implicit social formation whose meaning is totally relational. At the same time, these self-conceptions seem to be of the greatest importance for the development of the polity and of civil society itself. Our question is, when citizens develop such a “political ideology,” what does this mean, and what do they do with it? We examine what citizens gain from their subjective placement on the dimension from liberalism to conservatism by using the results of a survey experiment that alters aspects of a hypothetical policy.

KEY WORDS: cognition; dual processing; ideology; knowledge; politics; social ontologies.

INTRODUCTION

The nature of social cognition—how we “know about” the social world—is one of the most deceptively obvious problems for sociology. Because we know what we know, we often think that we know how or why we know it. In recent years, there have been a number of calls for specific attention to cognitive processes in sociology (see especially Cerulo, forthcoming; DiMaggio, 1997, 2002; Lizardo, 2009, forthcoming; Vaisey, 2008a,b, 2009). Yet sociologists are only beginning to move past reasonable but unreliable armchair theories of how actors use their understandings of the social world.

1 We thank the reviewers and editor for comments and criticism that greatly increased the cogency of this article. This work was profoundly influenced by the work of, and conversations with, Paul M. Sniderman, though he himself may not agree with the conclusions we have drawn. We also thank James Wiley for comments that greatly improved this article. Previous versions were delivered at the Sesquianual Rutgers-Princeton Conference on Culture and the University of Wisconsin, Madison sociology colloquia; we thank the participants, especially Paul DiMaggio, for comments.

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Here, we investigate one particular aspect of social cognition, namely, what we will call “political ideology,” by which we mean people’s self-placement on a dimension on which persons can be arrayed from left to right. Of course, every subfield in social science seems to have its own use of the word “ideology” (Eagleton, 1991); in following the conventional usage of public opinion research and political science we do not mean to deny the usefulness of other approaches (for some recent examples, see Larson, 2009; Prasad et al., 2009). Rather, we focus on that understanding that is in some ways the “ur-form” of social cognition—our sense of how we stand by others in an implicit social formation whose meaning is totally relational. At the same time, these self-conceptions seem to be of the greatest importance for the development of the polity and of civil society itself. Our question is, when citizens develop such a “political ideology,” what does this mean, and what do they do with it?

We approach this issue of political ideology as a special case of social cognition and we apply current models of “dual processing” that are of increased interest in sociology (e.g., Vaisey, 2008a, 2009). Political ideology is an attractive realm of investigation because (along with group membership) it is one of the areas of social cognition on which a great many data have been collected. In this article, we attempt to shed light on the question of what citizens gain from their subjective placement on the dimension from liberalism to conservatism by using the results of a survey experiment that alters aspects of a hypothetical policy. Supplementing these results with supporting data from the same respondents, we argue that ideology shapes opinions primarily by what it implies about what is the case. In other words, political ideology should be conceived, not as a set of values that correspond to one’s self-placement in the political field, but as a kind of social ontology. It is not that liberals and conservatives are looking at the same thing and applying to it different values in their evaluations; it is that they are looking at different things housed under the same rubric (e.g., welfare, tax breaks) (cf. Dawson, 2001; Lau et al., 1991).

We begin by presenting some provisional evidence as illustration of the basic problem; we then consider recent work on cognition that has implications for how we study the effects of ideology on opinion formation. Last, we examine how those with more or less ideology respond to different scenarios when determining whether to support or oppose a hypothetical policy. Using a factorial design survey experiment, we are able to gain leverage on how respondents draw on ideological resources when making up their minds.

**KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES**

*The Value of Ideology*

We begin with the social fact that Americans array themselves—at least in response to heavily guided questions posed by researchers—along a
continuum running from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” Those at the extremes of this continuum are sometimes considered to have “more” ideology than those in the middle, let alone those who are not on this spectrum at all. Here, we will treat as “ideology” whatever “conservatives” and “liberals” have a lot of without specifying in advance what this may be. Just as we do not expect all persons to have the same degree of political information (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1987, 2002), so we need not assume that all have the same amount of ideology (see also Kinder, 1983:391; Kinder and Sears, 1985:664, 670; Sullivan et al., 1978).⁴

The question then is: What distinguishes those with “lots” of ideology of different sorts from one another? Somewhat surprisingly, there are few agreed-upon answers to this question. When analysts do define ideology, they tend to give extremely broad definitions, usually including beliefs, attitudes, and values (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950:2; Campbell et al., 1960:111, 192; Jost, 2006:653; Kerlinger, 1984:13; Tedin, 1987:65). In other words, no cognitive elements this side of emotions seem to be excluded, and theorists might hasten to add emotions if challenged. In these terms, there might seem to be little difference between an ideology and a belief system as discussed by Converse (1964). If opinions are themselves part of ideology, then how can we hope to understand how ideology shapes opinions?

Most social scientists have assumed that if ideology is separable from some other political beliefs or opinions, it is because ideology is intrinsically normative and generative (see Lane, 1973:85; for a recent synthesis, see Hinich and Munger, 1996). A classic example of an intrinsically normative definition of ideology comes from Downs (1957:96): “We define an ideology as a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society.” This idea that ideological differences are fundamentally about differences in valuations, both abstract and concrete (i.e., “values” and “attitudes”), is widespread (e.g., Billig, 1984:446; Rokeach, 1968:123–124; Tedin, 1987:65; see also Jacoby, 2006; Jacoby and Sniderman, 2006; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985; cf. Minsky, 2006). Thus conservatives are said disproportionately to value self-reliance, limited government, and so on, while liberals are thought disproportionately to value equal opportunity, tolerance, and so on (Goren, 2004, 2005; Jost et al., 2008; Klueger and Smith, 1986). It is such differences in values that we generally think about when we consider a political “clash of cultures” (see DiMaggio et al., 1996).

Now this approach to reducing political ideology to a collection of “typically conservative” or “typically liberal” values runs into the problems with all value- or norm-based explanation, namely, that our key explanatory

⁴ Thus all people may have a “belief system” as discussed by Converse (1964), or they may assimilate social action to “scripts” as discussed by Schank and Abelson (1977) or “frames” as in Goffman’s (1986) sense, but those in the middle of the spectrum are not considered to have the sort of ideology discussed here.
elements are very proximate to that which is to be explained—sometimes crashing into tautology.\(^5\) Explaining citizens’ preference for, say, a war effort or welfare benefits by pointing to their supposedly distinct values (militarism or equality)—that is, their political ideology—is somewhat akin to explaining why oak trees lose their leaves in autumn by pointing out that they are deciduous: neither explanation unveils the underlying mechanism motivating the process (cf. Lau et al., 1991). Of course, if it turns out that it is indeed values that separate conservatives from liberals, one cannot complain that these are not the analytic elements we wished for, but given the proximity of such values to the opinions they are to explain, we must be somewhat cautious of the initial appeal of the idea that ideology is fundamentally about valuation.

The second common understanding of ideology is that it is, as Downs (1957:96) stressed, *generative*: it is a “shortcut” that can facilitate taking a stand on an issue (Higgs, 1987:37–38; see also Lau et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992:26). In particular, most analysts of public opinion have embraced what Goren (2004) calls the “political sophistication” model. Ideological values are then combined with political information to produce nonrandom opinions on specific matters.

However, there have been a few recurrent anomalies for this approach. Most interestingly, ideology seems to have a direct effect on many policy preferences that cannot be explained according to a chain of reasoning whereby the abstract principles of the ideology imply more proximate principles that, when combined with political information, lead to the preference. For example, we might imagine that a liberal ideology leads people to favor, in principle, racial equality, which in turn might influence a particular policy choice such as one involving regulation of housing law. However, well-informed ideologues choose the “correct” side of some issue even when they do not hold the beliefs that should mediate between ideology and choice (Federico and Siderius, 2002; Sniderman et al., 1991:65–67, 81–84). Political psychologists have generally assumed that just as you can never be too smart or too rich, you can never be too ideologically consistent: indeed, they have tended to assume that such consistency (in the sense of the work of Festinger [1957], Feldman [1966], and Abelson et al. [1968]) is a prerequisite for good political participation. For this reason, the “hyper-consistency” of well-informed ideologues has not been treated as problematic, even though it forces us to reevaluate our assumptions about how ideologues reason.

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\(^5\) Some political psychologists have attempted to explain why someone has one political ideology and not another, but in so doing they have simply explained second-order values of the political order (like religious tolerance) by pointing to more fundamental or first-order values of the psychological order (like open-mindedness) (see Block and Block, 2006; Jost et al., 2008)—thus provoking the question: “Where, then, do *those* values come from?”
What Does Ideology Bring?

The dominant conception of political ideology assumes that liberals and conservatives possess different sets of values. But is this the case? We can shed empirical light on this thought experiment by examining a single value that might seem of critical importance to ideological position: self-reliance. Here, for illustrative purposes, we use data from the 1991 Race and Politics Survey (discussed in more detail below). Respondents were asked to indicate the weight they placed on self-reliance on a scale from 0 to 10. As we see in Fig. 1 (dashed line), there is hardly any difference in this mean weight across the ideological spectrum; liberals and conservatives initially tend to appear similar when asked about values in the abstract. Of course, this particular null finding is extreme in its nullity. For one thing, when asked to indicate the importance of any particular value, most people value nearly everything. We could certainly find more ideological variance if, following Rokeach (1968,

![Graph showing the average importance of self-reliance across ideological categories.](image)

Fig. 1. Values and beliefs across ideological categories. Average Importance of Value. Self-Reliance N = 1,698; Poor Don’t Try N = 621.

6 “(How about) Self-reliance—having everybody stand on their own two feet? (On a scale from zero to ten, how important is that to YOU?)”
1973), we were to require ranking or to invoke a specific comparison of importance across two values (of course, the ranking approach comes with its own set of problems [see, e.g., Gorsuch, 1970]). Further, the figure deliberately accentuates the lack of variance by having the vertical axis run all the way from 0 to 10, though only .5% of the respondents chose either 0 or 1. At the same time, social scientists may have become somewhat too ready to construct “analyzable” questions (those that have variance where we want it) and to forget serious findings about the lack of variance in the population.

Contrast this to the solid line in Fig. 1, which plots the percentage in each ideological category who agree that: “Most poor people these days would rather take assistance from the government than make it on their own through hard work.” Variance is clearly seen when respondents were asked a question as to what is the case. Similarly, from another item regarding the reasons why the poor are in fact poor we find that there is a 25-fold increase in the odds of choosing that they are “not working hard enough” as opposed to their “lack of education” when we move from strong liberals to strong conservatives.7 Ideology correlates with these descriptive statements much more than with purely prescriptive ones (cf. Kurtz et al., 1999; Rumelhart, 1989).

_Ideology and Dual Processing_

We have seen suggestive evidence that ideology provides not so much values and beliefs but a theory or image of what the world is like. Certainly, the principle of cognitive economy suggests that it would be reasonable for political ideology—that is, some set of general and mutually reinforcing political convictions—to affect understandings of “what is the case,” allowing for simpler deductions. For example, consider the case of someone deciding whether or not to support a government transfer program such as TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). If ideology were to affect the policy choice via differential weightings of _valued ends_, this person must connect the forecasted differences in certain outcomes were the program present as opposed to absent (e.g., number of vulnerable children, unemployment rates, out-of-wedlock birth rates, crime rates, expenses of incarceration, child-care expenses) to more transcendent values (e.g., compassion for the innocent, importance of responsibility, need for competition). How much easier it would be if ideology simply told us: “They are bums.” The only values invoked are relatively simple ones that are the

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7 Respondents were asked: “What do you think makes most poor people poor? Most of them are poor because … (A) They don’t try hard enough to get ahead; (B) They don’t get the training and education they need; (C) Both statements are wrong.” The ratio of the number choosing A to that choosing B goes from .02 for strong liberals to .14 for weak liberals to .19 for moderates to .23 for weak conservatives to .54 for strong conservatives.
subject of widespread consensus (such as “bums are not deserving of my help”).

Now a fair amount of research finds that people have two complementary ways of handling information, sets of processes that may be used independently or together (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert, 1991, 1999; Vaisey, 2009). One mode involves “top-down” processing, assimilating data to existing prototypes, whereas the other involves “bottom-up” processing, piecing together disparate types of information (Brewer, 1988; Lui and Brewer, 1983; for recent uses in studies of political ideology, see Devine, 1989; Duckitt et al., 2002). Although various formulations of dual processing differ somewhat (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Fazio, 1986; Smith and DeCoste, 2000), all distinguish between the relatively easy processing we use when relying on associations to existing categories and a more formula-based one we use when those associations are unavailable. Although some political psychologists have argued for a division within the populace that seems similar to this division in processing (see Chui et al., 1997; Erdley and Dweck, 1993; Levy et al., 1998, 1999), most agree that all people make use of both processes under certain conditions (Gilbert, 1991, 1999).

In sum, there is evidence that people can approach reasoning problems such as opinion formation in two fundamental ways, one of which is “fast and frugal” (to use the term of Gigerenzer et al., 1999) and uses an assimilation to existing “knowledge” about the way the world is organized. We propose that ideology can affect political opinions by giving citizens the “knowledge” about the world that allows them dispense with bottom-up, formula-based reasoning. It is known that certain forms of bias can increase with political sophistication (Lodge and Taber, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Further, although people in general seem to process information faster when they find it congenial, this effect increases with the strength of prior attitudes (Lodge and Taber, 2005; Redlawsk, 2002). Bell (1962:405) may have been on the right

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8 There is a well-hallowed tradition in political psychology that would lead us to expect an association between ideology and views about the world, namely, the idea of confirmation bias (McGraw, 2003). First, people are more likely to expose themselves to congenial information—through their choice of media, for example—but even holding exposure constant, we find that political ideology can affect how people process factual information. People are more likely to accept arguments that they find congenial and to reject or find flaws in those they find uncongenial (Bartels, 2002; Fischle, 2000; Kunda, 1989; Lord et al., 1979; McCann, 1997; each, 1974; for reviews, see Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2000). Some (e.g., Gerber and Green, 1999; Miller and Ross, 1975) have argued that confirmation bias is compatible with more conventional models of reasoned cognition, such as Bayesian updating. It is simply that ideology gives people extremely weighty priors. According to such analysts, people evaluate evidence by employing a single reasoning model that is compatible with formal principles. However, we believe that work in dual-process theory suggests that this is an unnecessary assimilation of two different processes.

9 Such a division and its relevance to issues of judgment is consonant with current neurological evidence (Greene et al., 2004). There is some overlap of this distinction with that made between conscious as opposed to automatic processing (for a recent review, see, e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 1999), though many automatic processes go even below the level generally understood as involving “top-down” reasoning, as people may deny that they have made use of such processes.
track when he called ideologues “terrible simplifiers” (the phrase is originally Burckhardt’s).

Social Ontologies

Building on the above arguments, then, we may propose that rather than distinguish between ideology and information, we should distinguish between two types of political knowledge. The first has to do with one’s knowledge of the political system—what the political parties stand for, how political actors have behaved in the past, and what they have said about their intentions in the future (we call this “political sophistication”). The second type has to do with citizens’ beliefs about the nature of the world (we call this “social ontology”). While analysts might distinguish between elements that can be known with precision (such as the proportion of families receiving TANF who are black) and those that must be treated as matters of opinion (such as the most important reason for homelessness), it seems likely that there is no such distinction for political actors. That is, actors may treat opinions about the way the world works as knowledge.

Much of what we would describe as political ideology consists of such knowledge. The hyper-consistency of those possessing a coherent ideology comes, we propose, from the fact that ideology is affecting the (unmeasured) social ontology, which in turn affects (say) policy choice. Moreover, the more politically sophisticated we are, the tighter this connection between ideology and ontology is likely to be because we understand which ontological claims are, in the current constellation of the political field, associated with which political programs—not only those claims tied to our own positions, but those that are tied to others’. For example, consider the statement “upbringing plays the dominant role in the measured intelligence of children.” Regardless of whether this is accurate, it can still serve the social function of being “knowledge.” While no one really knows what proportion of intelligence is explained by genetics and what by upbringing—indeed, “intelligence” has no unambiguous existential referent—people can still subjectively have firm knowledge about this question.

If this knowledge refers to things we cannot observe, from where does it come? If we consider the positions on a continuum from running liberal to conservative as “politicized” in the sense of being oriented toward political conflict, then we may propose that the “knowledge” that comes with ideological position is that which best facilitates this politicization. It is not simply that people believe that which furthers their “interests,” although there are undoubtedly tendencies in this direction. It is that, along the lines indicated by dual-processing theory, ideology leads people to “put into the world” ontologies that facilitate opinion formation.

Recall that we distinguished between two types of political “knowledge”—one (social ontology) is what we suggest is provided by
ideology. The other, political sophistication, pertains to knowledge of the constitution of the political field. Such knowledge can be expected to facilitate the development of social ontologies that support undemanding decision making. To stick with the field metaphor, an ideologue of low political information may indeed occupy a position in this field, say, to the extreme left, though her outlook may be myopic (she cannot take in the constellation of positions); by contrast, the ideologue of high information, no matter what her ideological leanings, can survey the field as a whole, associating certain knowledge with specific positions. The heights of political knowledge do not necessarily increase one’s ideological passion; rather, they allow one a greater field of vision. This means that the ideologically sophisticated should be less likely to use complex reasoning when forming opinions because they have preorganized the world so as to make effortless and efficient associations. Those “innocent of ideology,” by contrast, must employ more painstaking and conscious reasoning when facing problems because they cannot assimilate them to existing prototypes.

These arguments—that ideology provides people social ontologies, and sophistication helps let them know which ontologies support which policies—may seem farfetched, both because they have been derived in large part from reflection on work in cognitive science and because they are at odds with the conventional assumption that the more sophisticated respondents do not need to rely on social ontologies, or (put less kindly), stereotypes. Yet this is precisely what Goren (2003) found in recent analyses. The greater respondents’ level of political sophistication, the more their opinions seemed to be affected by their possession of a stereotype.

In sum, we hypothesize that the politically astute are able to form hyper-opinions because they know what kinds of knowledge about the social world help and what kinds hurt their position, and they will then have a preference to believe what supports their ideological leanings. Thus when we attempt to model decision as a calculus involving both knowledge and values, we find a hyper-consistency because there already has been an interaction between these. In ignoring the descriptive effects of political ideology—the knowledge that remakes the world in the image of the conclusions citizens wish to draw—we ascribe too much to the politically astute and detract too much from the naive.

If the preceding reasoning is correct, then descriptive effects of ideology, should we find them, will be larger for the politically sophisticated. Furthermore, since this descriptive component of ideology reassures the politically astute that they “know” what they need to know, we should be able to unsettle them when we implicitly contradict their knowledge.10 This should force

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10 Our results will suggest that many survey experiments unwittingly do this. By violating the beliefs about the world that are part and parcel of ideology, they reduce the effect of ideology. For example, the “laid-off worker” experiment (Sniderman et al., 1991:253) found that conservatives were likely to propose greater government assistance for a laid-off black claimant with a dependable work history than were liberals. But this hypothetical largess is correlative to an actual stinginess—most conservatives simply do not believe most unemployed blacks are this dependable.
them to abandon “top-down” processing for a more analytic mode of reasoning. The experiment we analyze had the unintended effect of doing just this. We demonstrate that what sets politically astute ideologues apart from the less astute is not that they know how their values and beliefs should produce opinions, but that they know what to believe given what they value.

DATA

We use data from the 1991 Race and Politics Survey (Paul M. Sniderman, PI). A random-digit-dialing method was used to contact potential respondents, of whom 65.3% completed interviews, resulting in a sample of 2,223. Respondents were also asked if they would agree to complete an additional mail-based questionnaire—53.9% complied. Although conventional survey data are not particularly good at testing claims regarding processes, survey experiments wed the ability of experiments to cast light on processes with the ability of surveys to explore the thought constellations of the general populace (Sniderman and Grob, 1996). In what we follow Sniderman by calling the “helping hand” experiment, respondents were asked whether they would favor or disapprove of a government program to “help people having trouble with poverty.” Three critical aspects of the program were randomly varied: namely, who was to be helped, how they were to be helped, and why they needed the help (for other analyses of these data, see Sniderman et al., 1996).

Regarding the first, half the respondents were told that the beneficiaries of the program would be “blacks and minorities,” while the other half were told they would be “new immigrants from Europe.”11 Regarding the second, half the respondents were told that the program would be “welfare,” while the other half were told it would be “job training.” Regarding the third, half the respondents were told that the people selected “had shown they want to work their way out of their own problems,” while the other half were told they “have had trouble hanging on to jobs.” The three variations were independent, leading to eight different possible treatment combinations. The range of possible responses was Strongly Agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly Disagree. We analyze only the white respondents (N = 1,663).

To determine whether the claims made above have any merit, we need measures of political ideology and political sophistication. Ideology was measured by a self-report question to which respondents could answer that they were liberal, moderate, conservative, or that they never thought about it.12 Political sophistication was measured as an index of correct responses to

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11 “New immigrants from Europe” connotes “white” without saying so explicitly.
12 Those who were liberal or conservative were asked whether they were strong or mild in their preference; those who indicated moderation were asked whether they leaned one way or the other (middle was still allowable). This leads to eight categories, but analyses (available upon request) demonstrated that for our purposes, this finer resolution added nothing to our ability to predict response.
five political information questions (see the online appendix). These questions tap general political “savvy” more than “book learning”: three ask about the respective positions of the main political parties, while the other two ask about simple matters pertaining to the structure of the federal government. This produces a score from 0 to 5 for political information.

METHODS

The factorial nature of the experiment might suggest a typical analysis of variance; however, since our dependent variable has four categories and our interest centers on comparing different groups, a log-linear approach is better suited for our analysis. The conventional log-linear analysis is like an analysis of variance for qualitative variables that also allows for constraints on factor effects. We have a model that looks in many ways like a regression model, but rather than attempt to predict each case’s value on a dependent variable, we attempt to predict the total number of observations in any category formed by the cross-classification of the observed variables. Thus in such an analysis, the treatment effects as well as the independent variables of information and ideology are all considered dimensions in a multiway table. Since the number of cells grows multiplicatively with the number of categories for any variable, there are good reasons to attempt to collapse some codings (e.g., to turn something measured with four categories into a dichotomy). However, such collapsing can change the results (see Brooks, 1994). Goodman (1981) has demonstrated how to determine when rows and columns in a table can be collapsed for parsimony. This involves comparing the loss of fit of independence models using the unrecoded and recoded versions of the variables.

Using this technique, we find that we can ignore any differences within liberals, conservatives, and moderates, and that we can group “those who never thought about” ideology with moderates. (All provisional analyses pertaining to data collapsing, omitted for reasons of space, are available upon request.) Further, we are able to dichotomize the political information variable into low (0–2 questions answered correctly; 60.2% of our sample) and high (3–5 questions answered correctly; 39.8%). This vastly simplifies our analysis, especially since parallel analyses not reported here indicated that we are unable to collapse the dependent variable. This leads us to a $3 \times 2 \times 4 \times 8$ table, that is, one with 192 cells. This is still large and poses problems of cells with small counts, but with an average of 8.6 observations per cell, conventional measures of fit should be applicable. We now turn to analyzing this table consisting of ideology, information, response, and the three experimental conditions.

Statistical tests indicated that it was not acceptable to collapse the tetrachotomy to a dichotomy (which would allow for logistic regression); however, neither could the dependent variable be treated as interval level. Hence a conventional ANOVA analysis was also ruled out.
ANALYSES

Preliminary Analyses

We have six possible combinations of ideology and level of political information (low-information liberals, high-information liberals, low-information moderates, high-information moderates, low-information conservatives, and high-information conservatives). We might expect that the effect of the three experimental conditions will vary not only across the three ideological categories, but also by level of information. Accordingly, a very flexible model would hold that the effects of these treatments are independent, but allow the treatment effects to vary across these six categories. Thus if what separated those with different ideologies (and degree of information) pertained to how they ordered their values (e.g., self-reliance being of more interest to conservatives than to liberals), this model should capture the observed response patterns. As this is a very "weak" model (in that the only claim it makes is that that the various aspects of the experimental conditions affect response according to a conventional additive process), it is a quite reasonable specification of how ideology and information might interact with the experimental conditions, but it fits quite poorly (Model M1 in Table I).

Why does this model fail to fit? One reason may have to do with the "moderate" category. People who claim to be "moderates" are often not moderates in the sense intended by the researcher. While they may be neither liberal nor conservative, they do not necessarily stand in-between these poles. This may be especially likely for those who are not politically astute. While the politically informed may be "true moderates," the politically uninformed, we hypothesize, are less likely to understand how the political field is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model #</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Probability($L^2$)</th>
</tr>
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<td>(HIPA)(HIPB)(HIPC)M</td>
<td>103.03</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.005</td>
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<td>55.40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables
H Helping-hand response, dependent variable
P Political information
I Ideology
A Experimental treatment—job training as opposed to welfare
B Experimental treatment—recipient black/other minority as opposed to new immigrant
C Experimental treatment—recipient shown he or she wants to work own way out of problems as opposed to having had trouble hanging on to jobs
M (PIABC)—independent variable marginals that cannot be reduced
X Parameters to fit low-information moderates exactly
Q Parameters to fit the two assumed scenarios

Key to Model Notation: The parentheses imply a hierarchical nesting of terms. Thus (ABC) denotes not only the three-way ABC interaction, but also the three two-way interactions, AB, AC, and BC, as well as the three marginal effects A, B, and C.
organized and, hence, are unable to stake out a position within that field. The “low-information moderates,” then, are a suspect group.

This suspicion is borne out by Table II, which demonstrates that, looking only at the “low information” respondents, self-proclaimed moderates are more likely than liberals or conservatives to be unable to answer any of the factual questions correctly and are less likely to be able to answer two correctly (this difference is highly statistically significant). In other words, these low-information moderates may indeed represent those with neither the information nor the values to form opinions that will be systematically related to wider political discourse. It may well be that these respondents are able to form idiosyncratic but no less thoughtful opinions (Lane, 1962), but the answers of this subgroup may not be systematically related to each other and therefore incomparable to those of other groups. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, we have eliminated this group from further consideration.

The elimination of this category can be accomplished by blotting out those cells from Table II. Just as in regression analyses we may eliminate residuals to better understand the core relationships—as long as we know why our exceptions are exceptions—so here we focus our analyses on the cases that we can explain. We do this by adding one term for each cell eliminated, thereby fitting that cell exactly without affecting the parameterization of the table. Such a model loses one degree of freedom for each cell eliminated and is a more restricted version of the model that does not eliminate these cells. We are therefore able to test the hypothesis that these cells were “more trouble” for the model than they were worth. Model 2 (see Table I) drops the low-information moderates from analysis; a comparison to Model 1 yields a the chi-square difference of 23.15, highly significant at 12 df \( p = .026 \), indicating that we could not drop the terms fitting each troublesome cell exactly. But the overall fit of the model remains poor: there is some complexity that escapes this model. It is here that we need to take into account the descriptive component of ideology.

The Influence of Social Ontologies

We proposed above that ideology does not simply tell people what things are good but what things are. If ideology has a descriptive as well as a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Correct Answers</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1,013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Chi-square = 16.38 at 4 df; \( p = .003 \).
prescriptive component, this implies that it affects what they assume the typi-
cal assistance to involve. Liberals and conservatives alike believe that self-reli-
ance is an important value; thus, if they are to support their contrasting stands on concrete policies, they must have different social ontologies. We propose, therefore, that the conservative’s “ideal typical” model of assistance is to the unmotivated, whereas liberals believe that recipients of government assistance are worthy of it and are victims of circumstance. Furthermore, as will be emphasized below, both conservatives and liberals think that government assistance archetypically consists of welfare for blacks (see Gilens, 1999:x, 71, 98). These existential beliefs come with the ideology and fill in the context when that context is not given.

But in these experiments, context was given. Ideologues had no opportunity to pull out their packaged opinions and beliefs, as they might have with a more general question. What, then, is the relevance of this point regarding the influence of ideology on social ontologies? It is that in one-eighth of the experimental situations, each ideological group was presented with the scenario that they would assume was operating. In these cases, we may hypothesize, their response would resemble a response to the less precise question: “Do you favor or oppose assistance programs?” But in the other situations, respondents’ ontological assumptions were challenged by the question presenting a scenario that to some degree was different from what they would have assumed. In these cases, they may have had no other recourse in answering than to think from the ground up, applying their valuations to each aspect of that context to make a judgment (a process we term a “moral calculus”). This implies that the response process is different when people are given their social ontologies from when they are not.

Furthermore, it is reasonable to propose that the effect of the assumed scenario is an exaggeration of ideological tendencies. The scenario is assumed because it justifies the ideological tendency that brings it forth. For example, to support the government program, liberals think its beneficiaries are innocent victims. Hence we predict surplus support when liberals’ assumed situation is used compared to when liberals use a moral calculus. Similarly, we expect surplus rejection from conservatives when their assumed situation is presented.

These types of predictions can be tested by using parameters to exactly fit the cells that correspond to liberals’ and conservatives’ assumed scenarios in a log-linear model, using a technique for “ideological consistency” first outlined by Duncan (1985). (The use of this technique for Duncan’s case was reasonably criticized by Stinchcombe [1984]; his critique does not, however, apply to the current usage.14) The empirical purchase of the descriptive component of

14 Stinchcombe (1984) pointed out that Duncan’s technique assumed the particular functional form of the logistic transformation as being the “linear” transformation that would be the baseline for interactions. This critique makes sense given a set of indicators of a common trait applied to a whole population, but our use of this technique here is quite different. First, there is no common trait and, second, we fit cells exactly only for some groups and not others. Even if there were a common trait, the fact that this cell is only meaningful to some groups would be incompatible with the hypothesis that there was no interaction, only a non-logistic-linear functional form.
ideology for this experiment is the hope that all the confusing interactions we could not simplify owe to the presence of these ontological assumptions. When these cells are removed from the analysis, there are no interactions: people simply combine the effects of the different aspects of the context (the treatments) in a straightforward moral calculus. These additional parameters allow us to gauge the “hyper-consistency” in ideologues’ responses by measuring the difference between their actual answers to their “assumed scenario” and what we would expect their answers to be, given what we know about how they respond to other situations where at least one element of the assumed scenario is missing.

Finally, we have stated that liberals and conservatives have different ontological assumptions—that conservatives assume recipients are undeserving, while liberals believe they are deserving—but we expect both to share the common misconception that most or nearly half of government support comes in the form of “welfare” for blacks. Indeed, as we see in Table III, ideologues with high political information are more likely than those with lesser information to greatly overestimate the proportion of poor who are black (this is also found by Gilens, 1999; Sigelman and Niemi, 2001:90; see also Kaplowitz et al., 2003). The ideologues with high political information are also more likely than moderates with high political information to make this overestimation. (The correct figure is somewhere around 30%, depending on the criterion.) The “knowledge” that politically astute ideologues have is not necessarily accurate.

Thus, the assumed scenario for liberals is “welfare for blacks who have shown they want to work their way out of their problems themselves,” while the assumed scenario for conservatives is “welfare for blacks who have had trouble hanging on to jobs.” If conservatives are given the situation of “jobs for undeserving blacks,” they have to think things through, balancing different factors; in the same way, liberals given “welfare for deserving immigrants” have to construct a response on the basis of the concrete situation.

Finally, there are the high-information moderates. Unlike the low-information moderates, we expect that this group actually consists of “moderates,” people who understand the political terrain but do not have a pronounced ideological commitment. This group should be capable of the same type of moral calculus used by ideologues, though it lacks an assumed scenario.

Table III. Proportion of the Poor Respondent Believes to Be Black, by Ideology and Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Percent Believing More than 50% of Poor Are Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We thus have a number of concrete predictions for five groups: high-information liberals, low-information liberals, high-information moderates, high-information conservatives, and low-information conservatives. We will first determine the best model for this combination of groups, and then interpret the parameters in terms of the light they shed on how political awareness and ideology shape response. These parameters, however, cannot be estimated in all cases due to observed counts of zero in certain cells. For example, there might be no high-information liberals who strongly disapproved of policies to give job training to highly motivated blacks. To facilitate the derivation of meaningful parameters, we add a fraction to all cells in such a way as to only introduce conservative bias. More specifically, we follow Clogg and Eliason (1981:237f; cf. Clogg et al., 1991:70f for similar reasoning) in our computations. (For details, readers may consult http://home.uchicago.edu/~jlmartin/HH.pdf.)

As indicated above, our conception of the effect of ideology on response processes implies a different parameterization for the different subgroups. Since there are several different models for each of our five subgroups, the presentation of these findings has been relegated to the online appendix. The results demonstrate that adding a term to fit the liberal assumed scenario of welfare for deserving blacks improves the fit of the model only for liberals (not for moderates or conservatives), while adding a term to fit the conservative assumed scenario of welfare for undeserving blacks improves the fit of the model only for conservatives (not for moderates or liberals). Further, we find that once we take the assumed scenario into account, well-informed ideologues are indifferent to race.

We can summarize this model with a “design matrix.” Table IV shows which parameters are included for which groups and decomposes the overall chi-square by the subgroups. Overall, the model fits well with a chi-square of 55.40 and 54 degrees of freedom. In other words, the loss of only three degrees of freedom associated with the addition of the assumed scenarios has turned Model 2 (Table I) from a model that did not fit at all to one (Model 3, Table I) that fits quite well. We can conclude that the results of this experiment can be parsimoniously understood only when we postulate the existence of two response processes: (1) a moral calculus in which ideology affects the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV. Explication of the Parameterization of the Final Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High moderates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table includes all those parameters that affect response on the dependent variable (X indicates that the parameter in question is included).*
relative weight of values respondents use in making a decision and (2) a social ontology, manifest in the hyper-consistency of ideologues who are able to proceed confidently with “knowledge” provided by their ideology.

Interpretation of Model Parameters

The easiest way to gauge the effects of the assumed scenarios is to compare the predictions of the model for respondents when they receive their scenario to that which would be expected if they used the same “moral calculus” in this case as they do in other scenarios. Inspecting these results demonstrates that although the low-information ideologues are responsive to these assumed scenarios, their responses are not straightforward. (For reasons of space these results are not shown.) For low-information liberals, it appears that being presented with the assumed scenario actually lowers support for the policy; for low-information conservatives, the effect of the assumed scenario seems to be that those weakly opposing instead strongly oppose the policy.

For ideologues with high information, however, things are much simpler. We present these results as pairs of lines: the dashed line indicates the distribution that would be observed in the absence of such an effect of the assumed scenario, were the ideologues to use their moral calculus. The solid line, however, indicates the modeled distribution given the uniqueness of the ideologue’s response to their assumed scenario. Liberals are far more likely to support the policy than would be expected (see Fig. 2) while conservatives are far less likely (see Fig. 3). The effect for high-information conservatives leads the “flight from strong favoring” to be around seven times greater than would be expected on the basis of the conservatives’ moral calculus. The effect is on the order of decreasing by 90% the tendency to strongly—or somewhat—favor versus strongly oppose.

In sum, we find that the effects of the parameters fitting the assumed scenarios for ideologues are stronger for the politically astute ideologues than for the low-information ideologues and these effects are to dramatically increase the tendency of conservatives to oppose, and liberals to favor, a government program. Hence, those with greater political information seem more responsive to being presented with their ideal-typical case—a case that, after all, is a stereotype (cf. Gilens, 1999:78). This does not imply that respondents are morally wanting; rather, it demonstrates that part of what ideology does for people is to tell them about the world and to give them a headstart in their jump to a predetermined conclusion.

CONTRAIDEOLOGICAL SITUATIONS

We have seen that ideology has a descriptive component that leads to a “hyper-consistent” form of reasoning: the assumptions ideologues make about
Fig. 2. Difference between moral calculus and assumed scenario for high-information liberals.

Fig. 3. Difference between moral calculus and assumed scenario for high-information conservatives.
the world are those that allow them to reach conclusions they would like to reach without having to reason from the bottom up. If the above interpretations are correct, what would we expect to happen when people are presented with the “assumed scenario” of the antipodal ideological viewpoint? This should pose special difficulty for ideologues of high information, who would understand that this scenario supports their opponents. The ideologue suddenly must consider precisely that situation that she or he denies to be typical. How do ideologues respond?

One way to investigate this is to examine the time respondents took to answer the question. There is evidence that respondents take longer to respond when presented with disliked scenarios (e.g., Lodge and Taber, 2005; Redlawsk, 2002; see also Fazio, 1990; Posner and Snyder, 1975; and Barsalou 1992 on the use of response time for issues of cognition). If being presented with opponents’ assumed scenario is the ideologue’s nightmare, for it requires entertaining the very social ontology he or she wishes to deny, we might expect people to take longer to respond. Fortunately, the interviewers coded response time, pressing one key as they finished reading the question and another when the respondent began to answer. This is not an incredibly accurate method, of course, and we may expect that it loses information at the low end of the scale, as interviewers’ own reflex time plays a larger role in the outcome. However, it is likely to do well at distinguishing very long from short and medium pauses before response. Table V presents the mean response time in 100ths of a second for our different categories of ideologues. For ideologues of high information, those for whom the effect of assumed scenarios was strongest and cleanest, being presented with the opponents’ assumed scenario results in the longest average response time (cf. Lodge and Taber, 2005).15

When we regress response time on scenario, this difference in response time is statistically significant using two-tailed tests at the .05 level for high-information liberals and at the .10 level for high-information conservatives (see also Table V). These models also include the group’s own assumed scenario, which does not significantly affect response time; thus the constant is equivalent to the average of the “neutral” scenarios (neither those of the respondents nor those of their opponents) and the test is a difference between the valenced category and this average.16 Thus being presented with one’s

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15 It is also noteworthy that aside from this effect, there is almost perfect similarity in the rankings of average response times for the other categories among high-information liberals and conservatives.

16 Other models including only a group’s own assumed scenario and only their opponents’ assumed scenario were also tested; the results were unchanged. In addition, it is common for researchers using response time as a variable to take its logarithm to reduce the effect of outliers—those who take an extremely long time to respond. Our results only strengthened as a result of this transformation. In addition, there were no significant effects of either assumed scenario for high-information moderates. These analyses are available upon request. As for the absence of a faster response when presented with one’s own assumed scenario, which we might expect under the dual-processing theory, it may well be that this is a floor effect related to inexactitude in measuring briefer pauses.
descriptive “nightmare” lengthens response time—but only for those of high political information.

It is also noteworthy that those of low information tend to take longer to respond (compare the averages across information groups). Low-information ideologues take almost 3 seconds, while high-information ideologues take a little over 2 seconds. The differences are far from overwhelming, but they highlight the discrepant case of the opponents’ scenario for those with high information—usually accustomed to answering in just over 2 seconds, their mean response time doubles to around 5 seconds.

Yet there is no evidence that conservatives respond “ideologically” to the liberal scenario, or that liberals respond “ideologically” to the conservative scenario. In other words, high-information ideologues respond to the assumed scenario of the other side using their moral calculus. They do not penalize the item by refusing to take its claims seriously even if it invalidates their preconceptions; nor do they distance themselves from incongruous claims (“polarization” in the phraseology of Lord and colleagues [1979]). But the ideologues are a bit surprised: it knocks their wind out, so to speak, forcing them to reorient themselves, to un-know the social “knowledge” that they use to construct a familiar world.

Table V. Response Times for Different Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>WSB (own scenario)</td>
<td>249.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSI</td>
<td>124.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTB</td>
<td>314.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WSI</td>
<td>83.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTI</td>
<td>236.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSB</td>
<td>76.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WTI</td>
<td>991.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WTB (opponents’ scenario)</td>
<td>189.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average of neutral scenarios</td>
<td>296.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>WTB (own scenario)</td>
<td>421.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSI</td>
<td>261.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTB</td>
<td>292.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WSI</td>
<td>429.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTI</td>
<td>306.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSB</td>
<td>234.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WTI</td>
<td>281.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WSB (opponents’ scenario)</td>
<td>344.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average of neutral scenarios</td>
<td>288.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
J = Job training vs. W = Welfare
S = Solve own problems vs. T = Trouble hanging on to jobs
B = Blacks vs. I = New European Immigrants
*p < .05; †p < .10; two-tailed tests, OLS model.
CONCLUSIONS

We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for a more general examination of the nature of social knowledge (Cerulo, 2002). It is nearly a sociological commonplace to assert a correspondence between mental structures and position in social structures (see Dawson, 2001; Lau et al., 1991). But we have seen for the case of political structures, first, that not everyone has a clearly located position. Of course, everyone is somewhere, but beyond this, some people have a place in a socially organized scheme.

Second, some of these people have, in addition, a “sense-of-place”—the sort of political sophistication that allows them to understand their position vis-à-vis others. We have found not simply that “people in general” have a cognition correlative to place but, specifically, that sophisticated ideologues have a world that corresponds to their position in contrast to those of their opponents. In other words, ideology carries with it a sense of the political landscape and the ways persons are situated in it. The politically knowledgeable are, not surprisingly, more likely to think they know the world—even when their knowledge is inaccurate. They are more confident that they know who the average welfare recipient is and are more likely to marshal this “knowledge” in support of their ideological predispositions. But when they are presented with an ontologically jarring situation, they need to sort things out from first principles, principles that are unable to reproduce their ideologically motivated responses.

For those with high information, these principles are more or less the same: high-information liberals respond strongly to both job training and good work histories, issues that might be thought to be more relevant to conservatives. (The ideological difference that comes into play regarding the moral calculus has mostly to do with the fact that some conservatives cannot be budged and oppose the program no matter what the conditions.) This suggests that what political ideology does in terms of orienting citizens to forming policy opinions is not to give them a set of values or images of the good society that can then be used as major premises in syllogistic reasoning. For ideology, like other developed senses-of-place, allows for a switch to a simplistic, top-down form of cognition, and an avoidance of detailed logical reasoning.

Ideology, then, is not so much a “view of the world” but a “filling-in of the world”; in our case, it tells us what government aid is. Conservatives imagine this aid to involve welfare for undeserving blacks, while liberals imagine it to involve welfare for deserving blacks (cf. Apostle et al., 1983; Goren, 2003). Both groups exaggerate their natural proclivities when facing a question that confirms their assumptions. Those citizens with both high information and ideological commitments may display hyper-consistency of response not because they understand the sociopolitical environment well enough to know how to consistently apply their well-articulated values but because they are better able to “make up” a world in the image of these values.

That is, most analysts have assumed that ideology gives us differential principles of valuation; we, however, see evidence that what it gives us is not
values but “knowledge.” Second, most analysts have assumed that those with more information use more complex reasoning in their decisions. We, however, stress that they are able to resort to stereotypes. Our own self-beliefs—our conviction that we are politically motivated through values and our faith in the beneficent nature of all forms of education and enlightenment—may have interfered with our understanding of the processes by which social cognition operates.

In particular, we must be open to the possibility that the more information we have, the firmer our view of the world, which means that the more we employ top-down reasoning. Such top-down reasoning is efficient and jibes with many of our treasured theoretical frameworks regarding practice (e.g., Bourdieu, 1990). It also implies that those with more sophistication, more information, perhaps more education, are more likely to rely on stereotypes when making weighty decisions.

Finally, our results have some suggestive implications for our understanding of the relation between culture and action more generally, and the place of dual-processing theories therein. Vaisey (2008a:610) argues that one of the attractive things about the dual-processing theory is that while we understand that most of our cognitive processes may be automatic (as emphasized by DiMaggio in his comments [in Cerulo, 2008]), we also note that discursive consciousness (our “cool” mode) can interrupt and override such “hot” thinking (see, e.g., Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:136–137). On the other hand, DiMaggio (like Vaisey, 2009) points to the evidence of persons being quite inflexible in their decisions when interviewers suggest scenarios that neutralize the reasons respondents give to explain their initial decision. On the third hand, we are also confronted with evidence of wild lability of survey responses to minor contextual changes in question wordings (Schuman and Presser, 1981).

Our results suggest that just as those with a smaller horizon of experience may hold their opinions more ferociously (Zerubavel, 1995), so, too, may those whose ontological assumptions go without effective challenge persist in hot cognition. Social ontologies are a key part of a culture that is neither idiosyncratic nor universal, and variations in our responses to identical situations and stimuli may be best explained by the differences in these ontologies: what they are, how many bits of them we have, and our resilience to abandoning them in the face of empirical challenge. This may not be as empty as it sounds, for we suggest that those who have a subjective sense of position in some field are not only likely to have more ontological beliefs, but to cling to them more strongly.

REFERENCES


