

Conservatism and Fairness in Contemporary Politics: Unpacking the Psychological Underpinnings of Modern Racism*

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Abstract

The study of intergroup attitudes is a central topic across the social sciences. While there is little doubt about the importance of intergroup attitudes in shaping behavior, both the psychological underpinnings of these attitudes and the tools used to measure them remain contentious. Modern racism scales, which are the most common way to measure anti-Black prejudice in political science, were created in response to a shift in the attitudes of white Americans toward African Americans, and reflect a mix of social conservatism and anti-Black affect. Using experiments, we offer evidence that modern racism scales measure attitudes toward any group, rather than African Americans alone. In the spirit of the original motivation behind modern racism scales, which were created to capture changing public opinion about race, we suggest this property of modern racism may reflect a change in how stereotypes about low work-ethic are applied across groups and that the target of resentment for white Americans, especially for political conservatives, has broadened beyond African Americans. Our results suggest that modern racism scales reflect a general set of attitudes about fairness and that new instruments may be needed to measure group-specific prejudice.

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Measuring intergroup attitudes is centrally important to social science. A tremendous amount of scholarship is devoted to understanding the content and source of these attitudes and their influence on behavior. In the study of American politics, white attitudes toward African Americans may be especially relevant, and a great deal of influential scholarship has focused on refining the techniques used to measure anti-Black prejudice. Perhaps no theory in this area has been more successful than “modern racism” (Sears and Kinder, 1971; Kinder and Sears, 1981).

Theories of modern racism, also known as symbolic racism or racial resentment, were first postulated more than forty years ago in response to a shift in the expression of racial prejudice. As more explicit forms of prejudice began to fade, scholars identified a new set of racial attitudes, rooted in both anti-Black animus and the belief that Blacks violate traditional social values. In contrast to more traditional accounts of racism, in which overt prejudice is measured by support for racial stereotypes about Black inferiority, the new scales were devised to capture both the racial affect and social value judgments included in symbolic racial attitudes (Henry and Sears, 2002).

The use of these scales is widespread in social science. In fact, modern racism is by far the most common instrument used to measure racism in political science research. Given the extensive use of modern racism scales, understanding the attitudes underlying racial resentment is critically important to both the study of modern racism itself and the study of racial prejudice more broadly. We argue that because modern racism scales are specifically designed to measure a social value dimension, they may reflect a more diffuse set of attitudes that can be applied to groups other than African Americans. This property of modern racism may be especially relevant as the United States continues to diversify and the political landscape evolves to accommodate a wider range of groups. From this perspective, if modern racism does not exclusively target African Americans, but rather reflects a broader ideology about fairness and work ethic, future research that makes use of these scales may

be measuring attitudes distinct from those observed in the past, and the tremendous body of scholarship using these scales may need to be reinterpreted.

To investigate the attitudes underlying modern racism scales, we offer a novel test: we deploy surveys using the exact questions that constitute standard modern racism scales, but we substitute Blacks for other target groups that are not commonly associated with known stereotypes or overt prejudice in the United States. For example, we substitute Blacks for Lithuanians and then measure the difference between mean resentment toward Lithuanians and Blacks. Across multiple groups and multiple samples on different survey platforms, we find a strong and consistent pattern: the results obtained using groups other than Blacks are substantively indistinguishable from those measured when Blacks are the target group. Decomposing this measure further, we find that political conservatives express only minor differences in resentment across target groups. Far greater differences in resentment toward Blacks and other groups can be found among racially sympathetic liberals. In short, we find that modern racism questions appear to measure attitudes toward any group, rather than African Americans alone. We suggest that modern racism scales are primarily capturing two phenomenon: 1) racial liberalism or sympathy and 2) a general set of attitudes about fairness, or a political orientation known as “just world belief” that perceives the world as consisting of people who work hard and those who do not.

Despite their widespread use, there are well-known and largely unresolved (Hochschild, 2000) controversies about modern racism. Some scholars have argued that modern racism scales represent a set of social values associated with political and social conservatism, or “principled conservatism,” and thereby measure ideology more strongly than they do racial prejudice (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; Feldman and Huddy, 2005). Our findings allow us to refocus this debate, which has been largely unanswerable with existing approaches. We ask not whether modern racism is confounded with principled conservatism, but instead offer evidence to suggest that modern racism reflects a broad resentment that can be applied across

a range of groups, and that a common belief system underpins both modern conservatism and modern racism. We propose that high levels of modern racism are consistent with just world belief (Lerner, 1980), a belief-system that motivates conservatism (Jost et al., 2003) and shapes attitudes about fairness. On one hand, this indicates that critics of modern racism scales are correct: the scales do not capture attitudes specific to African Americans. However, the scales do capture a form of racism, both a general resentment that applies to many groups and a specific failure to recognize the unique historical plight of African Americans.

Foundations of Modern Racism

The measurement of intergroup attitudes is hindered, in large part, by the uncertain nature of prejudice and the factors that determine it. In addition to theoretical and methodological challenges, much of this difficulty stems from changes over time in how racial prejudice is expressed. Prior to World War II, anti-Black prejudice was overt, primarily rooted in the belief that African Americans were biologically inferior to whites and a desire for social distance between races. However, as the Civil Rights Movement unfolded, this “old-fashioned racism” grew less common, and white Americans were markedly less likely to provide biological justifications for prejudicial beliefs (Schuman et al., 1997). Racial attitudes began to take more subtle form, and despite rising white support for egalitarian principles and racial equality in abstract, anti-Black discrimination remained strong (Sears and Henry, 2003). To explain this shift in racial attitudes, scholars proposed new theories of racial prejudice, chiefly modern racism, which is derived from the belief in cultural, rather than biological, differences between Blacks and whites.

Unlike old-fashioned racism, modern racism is a “blend” of anti-Black affect and traditional values, such as individualism, self-reliance, and Protestant work ethic (Kinder and

Sears, 1981; Sears and Kinder, 1971). Specifically, modern racism reflects four primary beliefs about African Americans: (1) the unwillingness of Blacks to work hard has prevented their own advancement (2) Blacks demand too much (3) Blacks no longer face discrimination as they once did, and (4) Blacks have received more than they deserve (Henry and Sears, 2002).

A number of studies using modern racism scales to assess prejudicial attitudes have shown symbolic racism to be strongly predictive of preferences for race-oriented policies, in many cases overriding political ideology, party identification, and traditional racial attitudes (Tesler and Sears, 2010; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sears and Henry, 2005). In addition to having robust predictive power, modern racism appears to be both internally consistent and stable over time (Henry and Sears, 2009). Indeed, average racial resentment in the United States has been strikingly stable since 1986 (Tesler and Sears, 2010).

Due to the predictive strength and consistency of these instruments, modern racism scales have been widely used in social science research to measure racial attitudes. We analyzed four major political science journals, the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*, and found that from 2004 through 2015, nearly 70 percent of articles that measured attitudes toward Blacks used racial resentment scales to assess racial prejudice.

Racial resentment scales have become so commonplace that they are usually used to measure racial attitudes without explicit justification. As Tesler (2012) notes, “symbolic racism and racial resentment have become the focal constructs for explaining the role of racial attitudes in contemporary American politics” (see also Hutchings and Valentino (2004)). Moreover, measures of modern racism are not restricted to social science publications, but are commonly used by scholars and journalists writing about racism in the popular press.

Despite their widespread use, our understanding of modern racism scales, and the role of racial attitudes in American politics more generally, remains incomplete. Although most

of the debate surrounding modern racism took place more than twenty years ago, the use of racial resentment scales persisted without resolving much of the disagreement around the scales' validity. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986), among others, argue that measures of modern racism more strongly correspond to political conservatism than discriminatory attitudes (Tetlock, 1994; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Kluegel and Bobo, 1993; Zigerell, 2015). Others argue that modern racism scales reflect opposition to government assistance more broadly (Feldman and Huddy, 2005). Likewise, modern racism scales could capture a broader set of beliefs, such as ethnocentrism, individualism, or antiegalitarianism, rather than a specific anti-Black animus (Schuman et al., 1997; Carmines and Merriman, 1993; Sidanius et al., 1999).

Proponents of the modern racism scales emphasize that modern racism predicts attitudes toward racial attitudes more strongly than conservatism and other social values (Tarman and Sears, 2005; Sears and Henry, 2005). Furthermore, informative studies by Tesler and Sears (2010) and Tesler (2012) show that modern racism is correlated with attitudes about Barack Obama and policies supported by Obama and is less strongly associated with other Democratic presidential candidates or their policies.

Although the distinctive predictive power of modern racism measures suggests that these scales capture a more robust set of attitudes than conservatism alone, the nature of those attitudes remains unclear, especially when placed in context of past controversies and dramatic changes to the American political and racial landscape in the last 20 years alone. Rather, modern racism scales may reflect a more diffuse set of attitudes about fairness that can be applied irrespective of target group and, as we show, appear to be applied to nearly any target group made available.

Furthermore, nearly all studies that test the properties of modern racism scales rely on observational data and cannot effectively separate attitudes specific to modern racism scales from potential confounding attitudes. We therefore designed tests to experimentally assess

the attitudes that constitute these scales. If whites express the same attitudes no matter the group targeted in the question, or if differences in attitudes appear to be driven by racial sympathy rather than racial animus, then these attitudes are likely not reflective of a specific anti-Black animus, but rather a general resentment toward a broad range of target groups. In short, while there is little doubt that modern racism is predictive of political behavior and attitudes, an experimental investigation of the underlying properties is needed to understand the content of contemporary racial attitudes in the United States.

Work Ethic, Just World Belief and Conservatism

Why might we expect to see modern racism attitudes applied similarly to groups that are non-Black? To start, we note that the attribution of stereotypes about inadequate work-ethics to low-status groups can be seen across time and place. Scholars such as Sidanius and Pratto (2001) have even argued that the tendency to legitimize the position of low-status groups is a nearly universal feature of human societies. Such stereotypes are not uniquely targeted at Blacks, but instead reflect a general orientation toward low-status groups.

Manifestations of these claims in modern conservatism can be found, for example, in Mitt Romney's famous remark during the 2012 election that "47 percent [of Americans]... are dependent upon government." This comment was obviously intended to include low-status groups beyond just African Americans. Signals such as those from Romney could, of course, inform the political attitudes of conservative Americans so that they will endorse modern racism questions, regardless of how they feel about Blacks in particular. This narrative of fairness can also be seen in American politics more broadly. For example, recent research by Cramer (2016) explores the rise of anti-elitism and resentment among rural communities, who feel their urban counterparts are receiving undue benefits from the government. While this antagonism toward cities is noticeably tinged in racial prejudice, Cramer also notes that

attitudes among rural whites are rooted in a more fundamental sense of fairness. Perceptions and stereotypes around deservingness appear to be readily applied to racial minorities and perceived out-groups. Moreover, recent prominent conservative politicians, most notably Donald Trump, while not retreating from familiar stereotypes about African Americans, have accused other groups, including Latino immigrants, of abusing government assistance. To that end, because modern racial attitudes and attitudes about fairness seem to target a variety of groups, we ask: what underlying belief system induces this relationship?

While debates about modern racism have largely stagnated over the last 30 years, political psychology has made major advances in understanding the nature of belief systems. Much of this scholarly work has focused on the roots of conservatism. In an influential article, Jost et al. (2003) argued that political conservatism is a system of motivated cognition, adopted to satisfy certain psychological needs. Summarizing a meta-analysis of variables that predict conservatism, they state that “the core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and *justification of inequality*” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 339, emphasis added). This “system justification” is an ideological motivation to defend existing social systems against instability, threat, and attack. System justification draws on a related concept known as “just world theory” (Lerner, 1980), in which people are motivated to believe that people “get what they deserve.” From this perspective, poor individuals are impoverished due to a lack of work ethic, rather than social or political barriers. The tendency to adopt this view has been found to be higher in conservatives than in liberals (Jost, Burgess and Mosso, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).

Just world belief has obvious parallels to modern racism scales. When subjects endorse statements such as “it’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites,” it may reflect an underlying ideology that informs both conservative belief systems and modern racism. Political conservatives with high just world belief should be motivated to endorse statements that people could be

better off if they just tried harder, regardless of the target group in question, simply because this social value is part of their core motivated belief system. As such, modern racism scales will not measure attitudes specific to Blacks *per se*.

We also note that just world belief is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the modern racism scales. As biological justifications of racism were abandoned, new justifications were constructed to explain the inability of Blacks to achieve socioeconomic parity with whites. Just world, and the related theory of system justification, similarly assert that individuals are motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) by adopting the belief that people of low social status deserve their status—hence, as biological explanations for justifying the low social status of Blacks declined, a belief in a just world would motivate people to search for alternative explanations for Black social status, such as a lack of hard work. However, as we noted above, such a belief could be applied to any low status group and is not unique to Blacks, nor to racial groups more generally. To that end, as populist political rhetoric in the United States has simultaneously expanded the range of groups targeted by negative stereotypes and emphasized fairness, conservatives may readily apply the beliefs contained in the racial resentment scales to an expanding range of groups.

Although most research that uses modern racism scales take high scores to measure a negative attitude toward African Americans, often termed “racial resentment,” Kinder and Sanders (1996) suggest that that the scales also measure “racial sympathy” and “distinguish between those whites who are generally sympathetic toward blacks and those who are generally unsympathetic” (106). Indeed, Tesler and Sears (2010) found evidence that low racial-resentment voters consistently supported Obama over other Democrats. By this perspective, modern racism scales capture both ends of the spectrum of racial attitudes: resentment and sympathy (see also Tesler and Sears (2015); Tesler (2016)). However, because conservatives’ responses may be driven by something other than specific attitudes about Blacks, they may respond consistently, regardless of what group is in question. For liberals,

on the other hand, attitudes toward race and equality are deeply salient to liberal ideology, and they may be sensitive to the particular historical plight of African Americans and less likely to be motivated by just world belief. As such, it may be liberals, rather than conservatives, for whom modern racism scales measure attitudes that are exclusive to Blacks. In that case, modern racism scales would *only* capture racial sympathy and not racial resentment.

Design

The four-question modern racism scale (Kinder and Sanders, 1996) consists of the following questions:¹

1. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
3. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

We suspect that respondents may answer these questions in a consistent manner, regardless of whether the target is Blacks or another group. If conservatives, in particular, respond consistently to these questions by endorsing conservative attitudes toward out-groups regardless of the target, this indicates that a common belief system is behind responses to these questions. For example, if white Americans will endorse the statement “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Niueans would only try harder they

¹Our study was pre-registered with egap on December 30, 2014, ID: 20150202AA.

could be just as well off as whites” at the same levels they will when the statement is made about Blacks, then responses to modern racism scale are likely driven by other psychological features of political conservatives that lead them to endorse these statements across target groups, rather than specific attitudes about Blacks.²

In our trials, subjects were asked two primary sets of questions. One set included questions used in the standard racial resentment scale with Blacks as the target group. The second set of questions was identical to the first, but with a non-standard target group in place of Blacks. The target group was randomly assigned from a diverse list of groups, such as “Bhutanese” or “Nepalese,” that are unlikely to be associated with stereotypes or racial animus like those expressed toward Blacks. We also included “Hispanic,” “some whites,” and “Americans” to test whether just world belief is driving responses in a way that would cause subjects to endorse statements about the importance of hard work, even if they have well-formed attitudes about the groups in question. We tested a total of seventeen non-Black target groups, with each subject answering questions about two groups: Blacks and one non-standard target group.³ With this range of groups, we test can test 1) whether subjects have systematically different responses across target groups; 2) the influence of racial sympathy, by observing whether liberals express lower resentment toward Blacks than other low-status groups, including Hispanics; 3) the role of low work ethic stereotypes, or just world belief, by observing the relationship between a belief in a just world and intergroup attitudes; both toward groups about which the subjects are likely to have weak or no beliefs, such as Bhutanese, and toward groups about which subjects may have strong beliefs, such as Blacks.

In the non-standard set of questions, we excluded the question about slavery since it is

²Sniderman and Carmines (1997) offered a related test, replacing “Blacks” with “new immigrants from Europe,” but use only a single item from the racial resentment scale (see also Neblo (2009)).

³Subjects on two surveys were randomized into either seeing a white target group or one of several other groups, including Black and non-Black groups. This was to ensure a robust sample of subjects who saw white as the target group.

not relevant to other groups. In most of our trials, when asked about Blacks, we randomly assigned subjects to receive either the three non-slavery questions or all four questions usually included in the racial resentment scale. In the Appendix, we establish that our results are unchanged using the three question modern racism scale and the four-question scale. As such, we report pooled results for anti-Black resentment, using both three and four question scales.

Response options to modern racism questions are a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Responses are scaled into a single score to measure resentment. We refer to scaled scores for the Black target group and alternative target groups questions as Black resentment and non-Black resentment, respectively, with higher means indicating higher levels of resentment. We randomized which set of questions appeared first to allow for both between-subject and within-subject tests. We suspect, however, that within-subject tests may suffer from anchoring or social desirability effects, so while the results we show below are even stronger using within-subject tests, we concentrate exclusively on between-subject comparisons for formal statistical tests. Following Tesler and Sears (2010), we test all subjects, regardless of their race, but similar results are obtained when limited to white subjects.

Using 12 separate surveys, we recruited 5,966 subjects using Amazon Mechanical Turk and the Harvard Digital Lab for the Social Sciences (DLABSS)⁴ and an additional nationally representative sample of 733 subjects through Time-sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) for 6,699 total subjects.⁵ We used different groups across trials as we iteratively tested the robustness of our findings. In the Appendix summarizes our trials. We see no systematic differences across survey platforms, so, in most analyses, we combine all our

⁴DLABSS is a volunteer, web-based, survey panel. Similar to Mechanical Turk (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012), it has been shown to have desirable survey qualities and using the platform researchers have replicated a range of studies (Enos, Hill and Strange, 2017).

⁵TESS recruits subjects through GfK Knowledge Networks. Subjects in this sample were randomly assigned to one of three target groups: Black, Surinamese, or Mauritanian.

surveys into a single dataset. In the Appendix, we also present summary statistics for the demographic characteristics of our subjects.

In some surveys, in addition to self-reported ideology, we also asked respondents about their positions on policies that do not contain a racialized component in order to measure ideological orientation. Some subjects were also asked their views on the death penalty and affirmative action in the hiring of Black employees, which are frequently used in modern racism research to measure how well modern racism scales predict implicit and explicit racial attitudes, respectively. In keeping with recent research on modern racism scales, in some trials we also included questions about Obama, specifically 2012 presidential vote choice, overall approval of Obama and his policies, and support for Obamacare. In some trials, we also administered a Just World Belief Scale (Lipkus, 1991). We also asked a general knowledge question about where in the world the non-Black target group originates. For example, if subjects were asked about “Bhutanese,” they were asked on which continent Bhutan is located.

We also tested two different versions of the modern racism questions: one using the original wording and one with “in the United States” added to each question to test if responses changed when groups are placed in context of the United States. This allowed us to be sure that subjects were thinking of Blacks and other target groups as being in the same context. In analysis reported in the Appendix, we find no meaningful difference in results between these question wordings.

Our primary test is straight-forward: if modern racism is measuring attitudes specific to Blacks, then average levels of resentment should be different when Blacks are included as the target group. In case responses to the modern racism scales vary by ideology, as the theories discussed above may predict, we also subset our data by ideology.

Results

What is the difference in resentment when asked about a Black versus non-Black target group? Pooling all target groups, we see little to no difference between Black and non-Black resentment. In Figure 1, we display average racial resentment toward different target groups, revealing a striking similarity in average racial resentment. The figure shows the distribution and median resentment for responses when the target group is Black, white, or all other groups collapsed into a single variable.⁶ The distribution of resentment toward Black and non-Black target groups is very similar, except that the spread of responses for Blacks, especially the bottom quartile, is larger than all other groups, indicating that a higher portion of respondents express low levels of resentment toward Blacks than toward other groups. We also see that the median response for the white target group is higher than for the Black target group. As we will see below, these differences are largely driven by liberal respondents. In Figure 2, we show the same figure for each group individually. The only target group to have a meaningfully different median is American.


In Table 1, we compare responses for non-Black target groups against responses for the Black target group using a between-subjects T-test for difference of means, with the standard errors clustered by survey. We group together the responses to all non-Black target groups, other than white. For each group, we report the mean resentment score, standard deviation, the difference of means from Black resentment, the p-value of the T-test, and the N.

Among all respondents, the mean resentment toward non-Black target groups and the Black-target group is clearly different ($p < .01$ for both whites and other groups), but in the *opposite direction of what might be expected if these questions were capturing specific animus toward Blacks*. Resentment is clearly higher against all other groups.⁷

⁶With all non-Black target groups treated as a single variable, $\alpha = 0.73$. This is, perhaps, strikingly high—despite the disparate nature of these groups, α still reaches conventional levels of acceptable reliability. This, too, is evidence that answers to these questions may be driven by a broader set of attitudes that are independent of the target group.

⁷It is also possible that the similarity between levels of resentment toward Black and non-Black target

Figure 1: Racial Resentment using Black, white, and All Other Groups as the Target




Distribution of Racial Resentment for all subjects using Black, white, and all other groups as the target.

Table 1: Tests of Differences of Means in Racial Resentment

	Mean	SD	All			Conservatives					Liberals				
			Diff	p	N	Mean	SD	Diff	p	N	Mean	SD	Diff	p	N
Black	2.82	1.05			2643	3.50	0.87			617	2.45	1.01			1397
White	3.16	0.77	-0.33	0.00	1189	3.52	0.63	-0.03	0.61	233	3.01	0.79	-0.56	0.00	680
Other	2.98	0.76	-0.16	0.00	3233	3.39	0.69	0.11	0.14	743	2.73	0.74	-0.28	0.00	1681

Mean results for all subjects, self-identified conservatives, and self-identified liberals. For each group, we display the mean, standard deviation, difference in means from Black, the p-value associated with a T-test for difference in means from Blacks, and the N. Standard errors are clustered by survey.

Figure 2: Racial Resentment using Black and Other Groups as the Target



Distribution of racial resentment for all subjects using using Black and each individual group as the target.

We also compared average resentment toward Blacks to average resentment toward whites, which is both an in-group for a majority of respondents and a group that is well-known and easily identified by survey respondents. In Table 1, we see that respondents expressed higher average resentment toward whites than toward Blacks. Note also that in Figure 2 the distribution of attitudes when Hispanics are the target group are also similar to Blacks. Since respondents are more likely have preconceived attitudes or stereotypes about whites and Hispanics than they are about another non-Black target group this further suggests that an underlying ideological belief system motivates responses regardless of the target group under scrutiny.


Ideology and Racial Liberalism

On average, subjects express similar levels of resentment toward Blacks and non-Blacks, which suggests that these scales may capture a latent attitude that is non-specific to Blacks. However, liberals and conservatives may respond differently to the experiment: liberals are expected to be more sympathetic to Blacks, and conservatives may have an underlying belief system that contributes to both ideology and racial resentment. Figure 3 displays resentment

groups could stem from incoherent attitudes or a lack of knowledge about the non-Black target groups in question. Although we believe the strength of our test lies in the relative obscurity and variety of the target groups we selected, in order to test this possibility of incoherent attitudes, we compared levels of resentment when respondents correctly or incorrectly identified the geographical origin of the non-Black target. Overall, 58 percent of respondents who were asked about geographic origin were able to correctly identify the target group’s geography, and knowledge was consistent among both liberals and conservatives at 58 and 57 percent, respectively. Using geographic knowledge as a proxy for group knowledge, this suggests that the majority of respondents were at least able to recognize the non-standard target groups as a meaningful entity. More importantly, there is no significant difference in our formal tests comparing resentment towards Blacks and non-Black target groups depending on respondent’s preexisting knowledge of the group in question (see Appendix).

Another possibility is that individuals who have no well-formed opinion about a target group simply chose the middle response category of 3 on the Likert Scale (corresponding to “Neither Agree nor Disagree”) on all questions. This is, of course, difficult to separate from subjects who choose the middle response category because of a genuine attitude. It is notable that a median result of 3 is found across almost all target groups, including those about which subjects are more likely to have well-formed opinions, like Blacks, as well as for more obscure groups, making it seem less likely that a median response of 3 represents a non-attitude. To test if subjects who responded with a default response of 3 were driving the results, we simply reanalyzed the results with subjects who answered 3 to every question removed. The results were unchanged.

Figure 3: Distribution of Racial Resentment by Ideology with Different Target Groups



Distribution of racial resentment using Black, white, and all other groups as the target, by liberal (gray boxes) and conservative (white boxes) respondents. All other racial groups are collapsed together in this graphic. The dotted line represents the mean resentment against Blacks.

by target group and respondent self-reported ideology.⁸

The dotted line in this figure represents the mean resentment for all subjects when Black is the target group. Three important features are prominent in this figure: First, conservatives respondents (white boxes) show more resentment toward all groups than do liberals (gray boxes). Second, for conservatives, the distribution of resentment is nearly identical when asked about a white and Black target group to the distribution when asked about any alternate group, except with a slightly lower median. Third, for liberals, responses for the Black target group are significantly lower than for other groups, indicating that liberals may have greater sympathy for Blacks.

⁸In the Appendix, we replicate our primary results using other measures of ideology based on gender attitudes and foreign policy attitudes, and find that the results are substantively unchanged. This helps demonstrate that the relationship between attitudes about Blacks, non-Blacks, and conservatism likely does not spring entirely from attitudes about Blacks, but rather a broader set of attitudes.

This demonstrates that the relatively lower average resentment toward Blacks we see in our aggregate results is driven entirely by liberals. We can see this in formal tests, as well. Looking again at Table 1, for conservatives, the differences between responses for the Black target group and responses for other groups cannot be reliably distinguished from zero ($p = 0.61$ and $p = 0.14$, respectively). For conservatives, the point estimate on the difference between Blacks and other group is also relatively small—the effect is less than half the size of the absolute value among liberals of the difference between resentment toward Blacks and resentment toward other groups. The standardized effect size of the difference between Blacks and non-Blacks for conservatives is $\beta = .16$, for liberals it is $\beta = .38$.

In short, it appears that, although conservatives are more resentful overall, when it comes to attitudes about Blacks, these scales are more effectively capturing racial liberalism than specific anti-Black affect associated with conservatism. Furthermore, the inconsistent results among liberals, in contrast to the consistent results among conservatives, is evidence that a common feature of conservatism and intergroup attitudes is driving responses to these questions.

Racial Resentment and Policy Attitudes

To further assess the attitudes underlying modern racism, we explore whether modern racism scales predict race-related policy attitudes when resentment is measured for target groups other than Blacks. Testing the relationship between racial resentment questions and policy views is a common technique used to assess how well modern racism scales measure anti-Black attitudes (Sears et al., 1997; Sears and Henry, 2003). These tests typically include racial resentment in a regression with ideology and other control variables, and demonstrate that racial resentment has independent predictive power. Although such evidence is suggestive, it only demonstrates that racial resentment has additional explanatory power beyond ideology and does not preclude the possibility that racial resentment is capturing attitudes

that are non-specific to Blacks. By subjecting racial resentment to an experimental test, we are able to directly test whether attitudes about Blacks specifically are driving policy attitudes, or if these attitudes reflect a more general belief system related to fairness.

Sears et al. (1997) examined the relationship between racial resentment and preferences for affirmative action, which they call a “race targeted policy.” Using our TESS data, we examine the relationship between racial resentment and attitudes about affirmative action and the death penalty which have been previously linked to racial resentment (Unnever and Cullen, 2007). In this and all following analysis, we use the racial resentment values generated for the between subjects tests above, so a given subject’s resentment is measured only for the group they were randomly assigned to see first, either Black or a non-Black target group. Similar to Sears et al. (1997), we find that the relationship between Black resentment and attitudes toward the death-penalty and affirmative action is strong even when controlling for party identification and ideology. These results are displayed in Table 2 in columns 1 and 3. However, in columns 2 and 4 we substitute Blacks for non-Black target groups and find that the estimated relationship between non-Black resentment and policy attitudes is remarkably similar. This very strongly suggests that the relationship between racial resentment and policy attitudes is not driven by attitudes specific to Blacks, but rather represent a general psychological orientation, in which stereotypes are applied similarly to any target group.

We also examine how well racial resentment predicts attitudes toward Obama and Obama policy. Racial resentment has been shown to be strongly correlated with both general support for Obama and support for public policy associated with Obama. Indeed, Tesler and Sears (2010) compellingly demonstrated that racial attitudes predicted support for Obama over Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic Primary. On the face of it, since Clinton and Obama had similar policy positions, this seems to provide evidence that candidate support was driven by racial attitudes. Of course, policy similarities notwithstanding, differences in

Table 2: Regression of Policy Support on Resentment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Affirmative	Action	Death	Penalty
	Black	Non Black	Black	Non Black
Black Resentment	0.46*		0.35*	
	(0.05)		(0.07)	
Non-Black Resentment		0.51*		0.35*
		(0.08)		(0.09)
Conservative	0.20*	0.17	0.10	0.38*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Democrat	0.02	-0.37	-0.29	0.29
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Republican	0.08	0.01	-0.14	0.32
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Intercept	1.55*	1.59*	1.95*	1.41*
	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.39)
N	251	444	254	446
R^2	0.35	0.22	0.15	0.09
adj. R^2	0.34	0.21	0.13	0.08
Resid. sd	0.65	0.78	0.91	0.96

*Regression of Affirmative Action (columns 1 and 2) and Death Penalty (columns 3 and 4) support on anti-Black resentment (columns 1 and 3) and non-Black resentment (columns 2 and 4). Standard errors are in parentheses. * is $p < .05$*

support for Obama and Clinton could also be driven by non-policy related attitudes that are not specific to Blacks. Alternatively, it could also be driven by racial sympathy rather than racial resentment, hence the need for an experimental test.

Using our TESS sample, we look at a battery of ten questions about favorability toward Obama policies that were asked of the survey panel at an earlier time. Each is coded as a binary variable with 1 representing an unfavorable opinion. Using exploratory factor analysis on these variables, we extracted three factors, which roughly correspond to domestic policy, foreign policy, and a third factor consisting of education and environmental policies.⁹ We separately scale the variables from each factor into a simple mean.

At first glance, the relationship between Black resentment and attitudes toward Obama seems to support the argument that racial resentment scales capture attitudes specific to Blacks, since racial resentment is strongly associated with attitudes toward Obama policies,

⁹The foreign policy factor consists of foreign policy generally, immigration, and terrorism. The domestic policy factor consists of health care, the economy, deficit, taxes, and energy.

while non-Black attitudes are more weakly associated. When we regress Obama foreign policy support on anti-Black racial attitudes, party identification, and ideology, we find a coefficient estimate of $\beta = .15$ with $t = 5.98$ on racial resentment. The same model, but with non-Black resentment instead, yields $\beta = .04$ and $t = 1.27$.

However, these linear regressions are deceiving because they obscure the relationship noted above: that liberals have particularly sympathetic attitudes toward Blacks. These sympathetic attitudes appear to spill-over into support for Obama policy. Although the causal direction of the relationship cannot be determined by this test, similar to the argument of Tesler (2012), it appears that liberal attitudes toward Blacks—which are far more positive than are those of non-liberals—are affecting attitudes about Obama’s policies and this induces a tight-linear relationship between Black resentment and Obama attitudes. However, no such relationship exists for liberal attitudes toward other groups. Conservatives, on the other hand, show a consistent relationship between their resentment toward Black and non-Black target groups and attitudes toward Obama policies.

This difference in liberal and conservative resentment relative to policy support can be seen in Figure 4 where we graph the relationship between resentment and Obama foreign policy attitudes for all respondents. The solid line represents a lowess curve of Black resentment on support for Obama foreign policy (with higher numbers meaning more unfavorable) and the dotted line represents a lowess curve of non-Black resentment. The distribution of Black resentment among self-identified liberals is plotted along the bottom margin and Black resentment among conservatives along the top margin. The difference in the distributions of resentment for conservatives and liberals is plainly evident, with conservatives clustered at the high end and liberals at the low end. Even when a lowess fit allows the line to freely conform to the data, there is an obvious linear relationship between Black resentment and racial attitudes. By contrast, the relationship between non-Black resentment and Obama attitudes is nonlinear. The separation of the lines on the left-hand side of the figure indi-


cates that the difference in fit between Obama attitudes and resentment is not driven by individuals with higher levels of resentment, but rather by those with low resentment scores. In short, individuals who express higher resentment, regardless of the target group in question, are highly consistent in their attitudes toward Obama policies. On the other hand, individuals with low racial resentment—political liberals—appear to be strongly influenced by their attitudes about Blacks in particular.¹⁰

Looking across Obama policy issues, and even at voting for Obama in 2012, we see the same pattern: for conservatives, the relationship between resentment and political attitudes is similar, regardless of the target group, but for liberals, the relationship between Black resentment and policy attitudes is nearly twice as large as the relationship between non-Black resentment and policy attitudes. Tesler and Sears (2010) argue that the election of Obama saw “two side of racialization,” with opposition against Obama driven by racial resentment and support for Obama driven by racial liberalism. Our findings suggests that modern racism scales better capture only one side of this racialization: rather than measuring racial resentment, modern racism scales appear to capture racial sympathy among liberals.

These results cast doubt on using correlations with policy attitudes to defend racial resentment as a measure of attitudes specific to African Americans. While a great deal of research has drawn on policy correlations as evidence for the scales’ effectiveness, these results demonstrate that measures of association alone are insufficient to identify the mechanism behind modern racism questions, which we believe our experiment is uniquely designed to test. This data suggest that Black resentment, as measured by modern racism scales, does not drive policy attitudes. Instead, the correlations between modern racism and policy attitudes appear to primarily capture racial liberalism.

¹⁰When we divide the sample into liberals and conservatives and look at separate bivariate OLS regressions of Obama foreign policy support on Black resentment and non-Black resentment, we see that for conservatives the coefficients are quite similar: $\beta = .099$ and $.073$, respectively. By contrast, for liberals, the coefficient on Black resentment is much stronger than for other groups: $\beta = .132$ and $.068$, respectively.

Figure 4: Racial Resentment and Approval of Obama Foreign Policy



Approval of Obama foreign policy relative to resentment toward Black (solid line) and non-Black (dashed line) target groups, with 95% confidence intervals displayed. Racial resentment of liberals is displayed on the bottom axis in and conservatives on the top (both distributions are jittered for visual ease).

Belief in a Just World and Modern Racism

As previously discussed, we might expect conservatives to have higher levels of racial resentment regardless of the target group because of a dispositional tendency to believe people “get what they deserve.” By this logic, political conservatives would be willing to endorse any statement that said some group of people would be better off if they worked harder.¹¹

In multiple samples, we included measures of just world belief (Lipkus, 1991). This measure is constructed from a six-point Likert scale asking for agreement with statements such as “I feel that people get what they are entitled to have” (see Appendix for complete scale). Looking at our TESS data, we note that just world belief is significantly higher for self-identified conservatives than for liberals (conservatives = 3.75, liberals = 3.07, $t = 16.73, p < .01$), consistent with theories of conservatism as motivated cognition (Jost et al., 2003).

We treat racial resentment as the dependent variable and examine its relationship with just world belief to see if it varies across target group. We show these relationships in Table 3. In columns 1 and 3, we regress racial resentment for all target groups (Black and non-Black) on just world belief and we find a strong relationship for both liberals and conservatives. However, in columns 2 and 4, we interact just world belief with a treatment variable indicating whether the subjects were randomly questioned about a Black or non-Black target group. For conservatives (column 4), the coefficient on the interaction variable is small and statistically insignificant, indicating that conservatives apply this same just world belief, regardless of whether they are asked about Blacks or non-Black groups. This

¹¹Another possibility is that modern racism scales simply measure *ethnocentrism*. Kinder and Kam (2009) and that ethnocentrism is higher in conservatives. However, if this were true, we would likely expect white respondents to express lower resentment when whites are the target group, but we do not find this to be the case. We also find that liberal respondents actually have higher resentment toward whites than Blacks. We also note that the ethnocentrism measures developed by Kinder and Kam (2009) would be poorly suited to adjudicate between Black and non-Black resentment because the ethnocentrism measures ask specifically about Blacks.

Table 3: Racial Resentment Regressed on Just World Belief and Treatment of Black Target Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Liberals		Conservatives	
Intercept	1.98*	2.59*	2.74*	2.74*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.22)
Just World Belief	0.29*	0.12*	0.18*	0.14*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Black Target Group		-2.05*		-0.05
		(0.33)		(0.41)
Black Target Group x Just World Belief		0.57*		0.10
		(0.10)		(0.11)
<i>N</i>	194	194	249	249
<i>R</i> ²	0.15	0.30	0.04	0.11
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.14	0.29	0.04	0.09
Resid. sd	0.66	0.60	0.64	0.62

*OLS regression of racial resentment regressed on just world belief and treatment of Black target group versus non-Black target for self-identified liberals (columns 1–2) and conservatives (columns 3–4). Standard errors are in parentheses. * is $p < .05$*

result is consistent with our argument that the conservative world view contains the belief that any individual can get ahead with adequate effort, and this belief can subsequently apply to any target group, perhaps especially low-status groups.

For liberals (column 2) on the other hand, the effect of just world belief is strongly conditioned on the target group, with just world belief only becoming important when liberals are asked about African Americans. This is consistent with the argument that just world belief is not a central part of liberals’ world view, and our results show that, unlike conservatives, liberals do not apply this belief to all groups.¹²

The nature of this relationship between just world belief and liberal sympathy for African Americans deserves further investigation. It could be that the very liberal people at the bottom of the just world belief scale are particularly sensitive to the historical plight of African Americans or it could be that knowledge about the plight of African Americans has contributed to their belief that the world is unjust. It is also be the case that liberals who favor the policies historically championed by liberals that were originally constructed to help

¹²In two surveys, we asked about the related concept of “System Justification” (Jost and Banaji, 1994), also thought to be related to conservatism, and find consistent results.

African Americans, such as affirmative action, might adopt a belief in an unjust world and sympathy for African Americans, in order to maintain cognitive consistency. In either case, it is liberals, rather than conservatives, who hold attitudes specific to African Americans.

The strength and consistency with which just world belief correlates with both Black and non-Black resentment among conservatives is consistent with theories of conservatism as motivated cognition, such that conservatives are driven to endorse stereotypes about low work ethic and deservingness to justify existing inequality. As we have argued thus far, this suggests that modern racism attitudes are characterized by a general set of attitudes about fairness, perhaps reflecting a change in how stereotypes are applied to a broader set of target groups.

Discussion

In this paper, we have demonstrated that average resentment, as measured by modern racism scales, is generally similar across all target groups, and where it does vary, this variation seems mostly driven by liberals. For conservatives, modern racism scales seem to measure a more general orientation toward fairness, such as a belief in a just world. Importantly, our results indicate that, especially among political conservatives, the attitudes contained in modern racism are applied to a broader range of groups than African Americans alone.

Additionally, our results can speak to the central debate around the theory and measurement of modern racism: the extent to which the scales can be properly said to measure racism in the form of anti-Black affect. To address this question, it is useful to consider liberals and conservatives separately, because as our results suggest, liberals and conservatives likely draw on different belief systems when answering these questions.

Liberals show consistently lower levels of resentment toward Blacks than toward other

groups. Given that the correlation between resentment and policies is only present when Blacks are the target group, this suggests that liberals have special attitudes toward Blacks that shape their answers to these questions. The source of these attitudes is also unclear—they could result from a recognition of the historical and ongoing discrimination faced by African Americans, or from an affective or ideological commitment to African American empowerment. Our data does not allow us to separate these causes.

By contrast, conservatives respond consistently across all target groups. The most obvious interpretation of this result is that modern racism scales do not capture anti-Black affect. Presumably, such affect would cause respondents to react differently to questions that ask about Blacks than they do to questions that ask about other groups. There is, however, a more complex explanation for the role of anti-Black affect in conservative responses: that it is the presence of anti-Black affect, rather than its absence, that causes conservatives to answer similarly regardless of the target group. This interpretation recognizes the historical injustices leveled at Blacks, and posits that conservatives choose to ignore this unique history because of a particular affect against Blacks.

Although we cannot directly test for this relationship, we suggest a more parsimonious model, that conservatives are motivated by a belief in a just world. This model is broadly consistent with major psychological models of conservatism. Moreover, the overall higher levels of resentment among conservatives that we observe is consistent with the idea that just world belief drives responses—conservatives are likely to agree with the statement that if somebody would only work harder they could get ahead, regardless of the group in question.

This belief can, of course, manifest in attitudes that could be interpreted as racism. Indeed, one of the principal attitudes the modern racism scale is designed to measure is the belief that “Blacks no longer face discrimination as they once did” (Tarman and Sears, 2005). If this belief causes people to oppose policies aimed at righting historical injustices, this could arguably be called a racist belief system. From the perspective of promoting racial

equality through policy, such as affirmative action, this represents a major hurdle for building support for such policies. Some conservative opponents may oppose the policy not because of ideological principle, but rather because they disagree with a primary justification of the policy: that historical injustices faced by African Americans impede their contemporary social and economic progress.

We do note, however, that from a scientific perspective, labeling consistent responses across target groups as racist raises a thorny issue. The scales were designed to measure racism toward Blacks, and decades of scholarly literature have claimed that the responses given by conservatives represented racism *because* the scales were specifically targeting Blacks. However, we show that conservatives give consistent answers regardless of the target group, which implies that these attitudes are not unique to Blacks. If the non-specific treatment of Blacks can *also* be claimed to be measuring racism, then it is not clear if these scales are usefully distinguishing racist from non-racist attitudes.

None of this is to say that these scales did not once measure specific anti-Black resentment. It is very possible that the nature of racial attitudes and conservatism has changed in the more than forty years since the scales were first developed. Our findings are consistent across respondent age cohorts, indicating that these results do not just reflect the dying out of a generation with particular anti-Black attitudes. Rather, the consistency between Black and non-Black resentment across cohorts suggests that either 1) responses to a Black target group and to a non-Black target group have always been similar, perhaps because of the underlying belief system we discuss, or 2) a change in political rhetoric has caused a shift in attitudes across all age groups.

While our data does not allow us to directly test these two possibilities, recent scholarship and political events appear to support the second claim. Recent research suggests that attitudes about deservingness have been especially activated by contemporary political trends (Cramer, 2016), and recent xenophobic political rhetoric, such as during Trump's campaign,

has targeted an array of groups, not just African Americans. To that end, our evidence suggests that social scientists should seek new instruments to measure group-specific prejudice that may be distinct from this broad form of resentment. Indeed, as we stated earlier, the original impetus for the modern racism scales was that the nature of racial attitudes had changed, such that questions designed to measure an old-fashioned type of racism were no longer adequate. A similar shift could also have taken place, in which African Americans are not singled out, at least by conservatives, as targets of the same unique racism to which they were subject over thirty years ago, but rather attitudes about fairness are widely applied across groups.

The theory of modern racism is centrally important to our understanding of intergroup attitudes. As argued by Tesler and Sears (2010), racial attitudes occupy a “focal place in modern-day partisan politics (p 16).” To that end, it is crucial that researchers constantly and skeptically examine our instruments of measure for this important topic. In addition to better understanding the components of intergroup attitudes, a goal of our research has been to improve our central measures in these domains, a mission that we hope will remain ongoing.


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Figure A.1: Anti-Black Racial Resentment by Four and Three Question Scales



Distribution of Anti-Black Racial Resentment as measured using four question scale (left box) and three question scale (right box).

Online Appendix

Tables A.1 and A.2 display the details of each trial and a summary of our subjects, respectively.

In Figure A.1 we present the distribution of resentment as a function of the standard four question scale and our modified three question scale across the ten tests in which we ran both versions. Subjects only saw one or the other version. Mean resentment is nearly identical when measured on both scales (2.83 and 2.86) and the median is actually slightly higher using the 3-question scale.¹³ Cronbach's Alpha (α) for the four question scale is 0.88 and is 0.84 with the slavery question removed.¹⁴

In Figure A.2, we see that average Black and non-Black resentment are largely consistent

¹³Our mean resentment scores are lower than the mean of 3.44 in 2012 Cooperative Congressional Analysis Project (CCAP), but this should be expected with the over-sample of liberals in MTurk and DLABSS samples. Our averages are also close the historical averages reported by Tesler and Sears (2010). Using only our TESS sample, the mean (weighted by survey weights) is 3.17.

¹⁴In the 2012 CCAP, $\alpha = 0.86$.

Table A.1: Summary of Experiment Trials

Trial	Platform	N	Groups	Scales	Question Wording	Number of Questions
1	mTurk	204	Black, White, Hispanic, Albanian, Angolan, Surinamese, Taiwanese, Jordanian	None	In US	3- and 4-question scales
2	mTurk	405	Black, White, Hispanic, Lithuanian, Bhutanese, Uruguayan, Mauritanian, Bahraini	Modern Sexism, foreign policy attitudes	In US	3- and 4-question scales
3	mTurk	834	Black, White, Hispanic, Lithuanian, Bhutanese, Uruguayan, Mauritanian, Bahraini	Modern Sexism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, foreign policy attitudes	In US	3- and 4-question scales
4	mTurk	504	Black, White, Hispanic, Niuean, Ivoirian, Guyanese, Maltese	Modern Sexism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, foreign policy attitudes	In US	3- and 4-question scales
5	mTurk	445	Black, White, Hispanic, Lithuanian, Bhutanese, Uruguayan, Mauritanian, Bahraini	Modern Sexism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, foreign policy attitudes	In US	3- and 4-question scales
6	mTurk	508	Black, White, Hispanic, Albanian, Angolan, Surinamese, Taiwanese, Jordanian	System justification, ethnocentrism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, Obama vote	In US	3- and 4-question scales
7	mTurk	553	Black, White, Hispanic, Albanian, Angolan, Surinamese, Taiwanese, Jordanian	Just World, ethnocentrism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, Obama vote	In US	3- and 4-question scales
8	mTurk	1,035	Black, Mauritanian, Surinamese	Just World, racial policy attitudes, attitudes toward inequality	Original	3-question scale only
9	DLABSS	188	Black, White, Hispanic, Niuean, Ivoirian, Guyanese, Maltese	Modern Sexism, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, foreign policy attitudes	In US	3- and 4-question scales
10	DLABSS	534	Black, White, Hispanic, Niuean, Ivoirian, Guyanese, Maltese	System justification, ethnocentrism	In US	3- and 4-question scales
11	DLABSS	756	Black, Mauritanian, Surinamese	Just World	Original	3-question scale only
12	TESS	733	Black, Mauritanian, Surinamese	Just World, Obama approval, support for Obamacare, Obama vote, racial policy attitudes	Original	3-question scale only

Table A.2: Demographics of Subjects


	Total	mTurk	DLABSS	TESS
N	6699	4488	1478	733
White	0.70	0.72	0.66	0.70
Black	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.11
Hispanic	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.10
Male	0.48	0.54	0.31	0.49
College Degree	0.49	0.49	0.59	0.28
Average Age	36.02	32.59	39.89	48.52
Conservative	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.37

Table A.3: Differences of Means in Racial Resentment by Question Wording

	In US	Original
Black Mean	2.80	2.85
Black SD	1.06	1.04
Other Mean	3.02	2.92
Other SD	0.80	0.68
N	4175	2524

Mean results for surveys asking about groups “in United States” or original question wording, which did not include this modifier. For each group, we display the mean and standard deviation from the question with a Black target group or other target groups, except for white and Hispanic, and the N.

Figure A.2: Racial Resentment with Black and Other Target Group by Platform



Distribution of Anti-Black Racial Resentment (dark bars) and all other groups collapsed (light bars) across different platforms. Dotted line is mean resentment toward Blacks across all surveys.

across survey samples and survey platforms. Black resentment tends to be lower in the DLABSS samples, because of the large proportion of liberals in the sample.

Just World Belief Scale

The following questions constitute the Global Belief in a Just World scale (Lipkus, 1991). Response options are a six-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”

1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.
2. I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded.
3. I feel that people earn the rewards and the punishments they get.
4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought in on themselves.
5. I feel that people get what they deserve.
6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.
7. I basically feel that the world is a fair place.

Table A.4: Tests of Differences of Means in Racial Resentment by Platform

Platform	All			Liberals			Conservatives			
	Difference	T-value	N	Difference	T-value	N	Difference	T-value	N	
1	MTurk	-0.13	-1.09	184	-0.15	-1.01	112	-0.14	-0.57	33
2	MTurk	-0.18	-1.97	375	-0.31	-2.64	211	0.22	1.13	70
3	MTurk	-0.14	-1.40	710	-0.26	-2.07	416	-0.13	-0.79	133
4	MTurk	-0.05	-0.54	464	-0.10	-0.78	257	0.22	1.42	96
5	MTurk	-0.29	-2.96	432	-0.36	-2.60	228	-0.24	-1.44	100
6	MTurk	-0.11	-1.25	475	-0.31	-2.94	252	0.20	1.30	102
7	MTurk	-0.28	-3.13	486	-0.43	-3.34	226	-0.01	-0.06	118
8	MTurk	-0.04	-0.64	1011	-0.10	-1.31	524	0.03	0.26	232
9	DLABSS	-0.01	-0.08	145	-0.03	-0.16	91	0.55	1.37	14
10	DLABSS	-0.31	-3.00	327	-0.25	-2.16	203	-0.12	-0.62	68
11	DLABSS	-0.14	-1.87	556	-0.22	-2.84	360	0.30	2.26	131
12	TESS	0.10	1.57	711	-0.23	-1.81	198	0.34	3.81	263

Mean results for all subjects, conservatives, and liberals by platform. For each group, we display the between subjects difference in means between Black and all non-Black groups other than whites, the test statistic from a T-test for difference in means from Blacks, and the N. N is only for subjects comparing Black to groups other than whites, so the N is different than the total N for a survey displayed in Table A.1.

Alternative Measures of Political Conservatism

A potential objection to our analysis is that responses to modern racism scales, even when using other target groups, is driven by anti-Black animus because anti-Black animus causes political conservatism in the first place and conservatism drives other attitudes. This could be true, for example, if conservative political ideology is caused by attitudes toward Blacks and, in turn, these conservative political beliefs cause resentment toward other groups, a “Just World Belief,” or a general resentment of “free-loading.” This is an important objection because attitudes toward Blacks have been persuasively argued to be “symbolic attitudes” that are formed early in life and come to dominate other beliefs (Sears, 1993; Sears and Henry, 2003).

While not objecting to the argument that attitudes toward Blacks can spill-over into other domains, we check for the possibility that anti-Black animus is underlying responses to all our questions by measuring political conservatism using variables that are plausibly independent of racial attitudes. If, when political ideology is measured independently of racial attitudes, political conservatives still respond consistently across all groups, this gives us confidence that political conservatism is correlated with a general tendency to endorse these statements, and that this tendency is driven by something other than anti-Black animus.

We construct alternative measures of conservatism using the “Modern Sexism Scale” created by Swim et al. (1995), which we asked on five of our surveys. This scale is believed to measure underlying sexist attitudes, reflected in the denial of sex discrimination and antagonism toward women’s demands. We coded respondents scoring higher than the median on Modern Sexism as conservative and lower than the median as liberal and replicated our analysis above.

In Table A.6 we display these results, which are very similar to those categorized by self-

identified conservatism in Table 1, giving us more confidence that the tendency for political conservatives to endorse these statements, regardless of the target group, is not driven by anti-Black affect.

As an additional robustness check, we constructed another measure of political conservatism, this one based on a simple two-question battery about military spending and U.S. foreign policy. We asked these questions on five of our surveys and we again coded respondents scoring higher than the median as conservative and lower than the median as liberal and replicated our analysis above. Table A.7 displays the results and the pattern is once again broadly consistent, no matter how conservatism is defined.

These results increase our confidence that political conservatism is correlated with a general tendency to endorse the statements on the Modern Racism Scale and that this tendency does not spring from anti-Black animus. We turn next to a brief discussion of the roots of attitudes underlying responses to the Modern Racism Scale.

Table A.7: Tests of Differences of Means in Racial Resentment by Foreign Policy Attitudes

	All			Conservatives			Liberals				
	Mean	SD	p	Mean	SD	Diff	Mean	SD	Diff	p	N
Black	2.86	1.04		3.18	1.04		2.73	1.02			550.00
White	3.16	0.77	0.00	3.26	0.79	-0.08	3.12	0.76	-0.39	0.00	747.00
Other	3.05	0.78	0.00	3.26	0.81	-0.09	2.97	0.75	-0.23	0.00	931.00

Mean results for all subjects, conservative foreign policy, and liberal foreign policy respondents. For each group, we display the mean, standard deviation, difference in means from Black, the p-value associated with a T-test for difference in means from Blacks, and the N. Standard errors are clustered by survey.