

Mandarin particle *dou*: A pre-exhaustification exhaustifier¹

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1. Introduction

- This paper presents a uniform semantics to capture the seemingly diverse functions of the Mandarin particle *dou*: quantifier-distributor, free choice item (FCI)-licenser, scalar marker, ...

1. Quantifier/distributor:

In a basic declarative, *dou* universally quantifies over the subparts of the denotation of the associated item (enclosed in “[●]”).

- (1) [Tamen] **dou** dao -le.
they DOU arrive -ASP
‘They all arrived.’

Under this use, *dou* brings up more semantic consequences than \forall -quantification. Descriptively:

“Distributivity Requirement”: if the prejacent sentence admits both collective and (atomic/non-atomic) distributive readings, applying *dou* **eliminates the collective reading** (Lin 1996).

- (2) [Yuehan he Mali] **dou** jiehun -le. (3) [Tamen] **dou** mai-le fangzi.
John and Mary DOU get-married -ASP they dou buy-Perf house
‘John and Mary each got married.’ ‘They all bought houses.’(#collective)

“Plurality Requirement”: the item associated with *dou*, overt or covert, must be **non-singular**.

- (4) Yuehan [(mei-ci)] **dou** qu Beijing.
John every-time DOU go Beijing
‘For all the times, the place that John went to was Beijing.’

2. Scalar marker:

A [*lian...dou...*] construction evokes an *even*-like inference: the prejacent proposition is less likely than (some of) its alternatives. The use of *lian* is optional, but the associated item must be stressed.

- (5) (Lian) [LINGDAO]_F **dou** chi dao -le.
even leader DOU late arrive -ASP
‘Even the leader was late.’ \rightsquigarrow The leader is less likely to be late.

When associated with a scalar item (usually stressed), *dou* implies that the prejacent sentence ranks relatively high w.r.t the contextually relevant measurement.

- (6) **Dou** [WU dian]_F -le.
DOU five o'clock -ASP.
‘It is **dou** five o'clock.’ \rightsquigarrow It’s too late.

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3. FCI-licenser:

When associated with a pre-verbal *wh*-item/disjunction, *dou* evokes a \forall -FC reading.

- (7) [Shei] *(**dou**) hejiu.
 Who_{FCI} DOU drink
 ‘Anyone/everyone drinks.’
- (8) [Yuehan huozhe Mali] dou keyi jiao jichu hanyu.
 John or Mary DOU can teach Intro Chinese
 Intended: ‘Both John and Mary can teach Intro Chinese.’

The licensing of the \forall -FCI use of a pre-verbal disjunction is subject to Modal Obviation: it is only licensed in a pre-*dou*+ \diamond position.

- (8') [Yuehan huozhe Mali] **dou** *(keyi)/*bixu jiao jichu hanyu.
 John or Mary DOU can/must teach intro Chinese
 Intended: ‘Both John and Mary can teach Intro Chinese.’

- **Disambiguation by focus:** If a sentence has multiple items that are eligible to be associated with *dou*, the function of *dou* and the association relation can be disambiguated by stress.

- (9) a. [Tamen] **DOU/dou** lai -guo liang-ci -le.
 they DOU/DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP
 ‘They ALL have been here twice.’
- b. Tamen **dou** lai -guo [LIANG_F-ci] -le.
 they DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP
 ‘They’ve been here twice.’ \rightsquigarrow They’ve been here many times.
- c. (Lian) [TAMEN]_F **dou** lai -guo liang-ci -le.
 LIAN they DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP
 ‘Even THEY have been here twice.’

- **Overview**

I propose that *dou* is a special exhaustivity operator, which (i) operates on pre-exhaustified sub-alternatives, and (ii) presupposes the existence of a sub-alternative. Descriptively:

- (10) $\llbracket \mathbf{dou}(S_A) \rrbracket$ (S is the prejacent clause, A is the associated item)
 $\approx \mathbf{S}_A$ and not only $\mathbf{S}_{A'}$ (A' is a subpart/ weak scale-mate/ sub domain-alt/ ... of A, ...)

E.g. “[A and B] **dou** came” means: A and B came, not only A came, and not only B came.
 “**dou** [it is five o’clock]” means: It’s 5 o’clock, not just 4 o’clock, not just 3 o’clock, ...

Roadmap

- Section 2: Previous approaches
- Section 3: Defining *dou* as a special exhaustifier
- Section 4: \forall -quantifier/distributor
- Section 5: FCI-licenser
- Section 6: Scalar marker
- Section 7: Sorting the parameters: logical strength vs. likelihood
- Appendix: Alternative approaches in the realm of exhaustifications

2. Previous approaches

2.1. The distributor analysis (Lin 1998)

- *Dou* is a generalized distributor PART (Schwarzschild 1996). It distributes over the contextually determined cover of the associated item.

$$(11) \quad \llbracket dou \rrbracket(P, X) = 1 \text{ iff } \text{Part}_C(P, X) = 1 \\ \text{iff } \forall y[C(y) \wedge y \leq X \rightarrow P(y)], \text{ where } C \text{ is a cover of } X.$$

- (12) C is a cover of X iff
- (i) C is a set of subparts of X ; and (ii) every subpart of X is a subpart of some member in C .

For example: (3) “*abc dou* bought houses.”

The possible covers of *abc* are:

$\{a, b, c\}$	Atomic distributive	‘ <i>abc</i> each bought houses’
$\{a \oplus b, c\}$	}	Non-atomic distributive
$\{a \oplus b, b \oplus c\}$		
...		
$\{a \oplus b \oplus c\}$	Collective	‘ <i>abc</i> together bought houses’

– Problems:

1. Unlike the generalized distributor, *dou* eliminates a single-cover/collective reading (Xiang 2008).
 (3') *abc dou* bought houses.
 (# w : *abc* all only participated in a single house-buying event.)
2. Unlike English distributors like *each* and *all*, *dou* can be associated with a distributive expression like NP-*gezi* ‘NP each’.
 (13) They each (*each/*all) has some advantages.
 (14) [Tamen] *gezi dou* you yixie youdian.
 They each DOU have some advantage
 ‘They each **dou** has some advantages.’
3. This analysis cannot be extended to other uses of *dou*.

2.2. The maximality operator analysis (Cheng & Giannakidou 2006, Xiang 2008)

- *Dou* is a maximality operator (\approx *the*) with a plural presupposition; it operates on a set that has been partitioned by covers and picks out the maximal plural individual.

$$(15) \quad \llbracket dou \rrbracket(X) = |C| > 1 \wedge \exists y \in C[\neg \text{Atom}(y) \wedge \forall z \in C[z \leq y]]. \\ \text{iff } \forall y \in C[\neg \text{Atom}(y) \wedge \forall z \in C[z \leq y]] \text{ where } C \text{ is the cover of } X \\ (\llbracket dou \rrbracket(X) \text{ is defined iff the cover of } X \text{ is non-singleton and has a unique non-atomic maximal element; when defined, the reference of } \llbracket dou \rrbracket(x) \text{ is this maximal element.)}$$

– Problems:

1. It predicts no distributivity effect. Prediction: “*abc dou* bought houses” asserts that ‘the maximal element in Cov_{abc} bought houses’, not that ‘every element in Cov_{abc} bought houses’.
2. The plurality requirement comes as a stipulation on the presupposition of *dou*: *dou* presupposes that the selected maximal element is non-atomic.

3. Defining *dou* as a special exhaustifier

3.1. The canonical exhaustifier *only*

- *Only* operates on **excludable** (excl)-alternatives and presupposes the existence of an excl-alternative.

- (16) a. $\llbracket \text{only} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w [p(w) = 1 \wedge \boxed{\exists q \in \text{Excl}(p)}, \forall q \in \text{Excl}(p) [q(w) = 0]]$
 ($\llbracket \text{only} \rrbracket(p)$ is defined iff p is true and p has some excl-alternative(s); when defined, $\llbracket \text{only} \rrbracket(p)$ is true iff the excl-alternatives of p are false.)
 b. $\text{Excl}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge p \not\subseteq q\}$
 (The set of alternatives that are not entailed by the prejacent)

Illustrating the additive presupposition: *only* is odd in (17b) because the prejacent is the strongest among the alternatives.

- (17) Which of John and Mary will you invite?
 a. Only JOHN_F, (not Mary / not both).
 b. # Only BOTH_F.
 c. BOTH_F.

3.2. Defining *dou* in analogous to *only*

- In analogous, *dou* operates on pre-exhaustified **sub-alternatives** and presupposes the existence of a sub-alternative. Sub-alternatives are complements of excl-alternatives. Pre-exhaustification effect is realized by applying an *O*-operator to each sub-alternative.

- (18) a. $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w [\boxed{\exists q \in \text{Sub}(p)}, p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p) [O(q)(w) = 0]]$
 ($\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p)$ is defined iff p has at least one sub-alternative; when defined, $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p)$ is true iff p is true and **the exhaustification of each sub-alternative** of p is false.)
 b. $\text{Sub}(p) = (\text{Alt}(p) - \text{Excl}(p)) - \{p\}$ (To be revised)
 (The set of alternatives that are not excludable and distinct from the prejacent)
 (= The set of alternatives that are weaker than the prejacent)
 c. $O(p) = \lambda w [p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q [q(w) = 1 \rightarrow p \subseteq q]]$ (Chierchia et al. 2012)

A toy example: The anti-exhaustification condition (underlined) is entailed by the prejacent.

- (19) [*a* and *b*] **dou** came.
 a. $\text{Alt}(a \oplus b) = D_e$
 b. $\llbracket S \rrbracket = \text{came}'(a \oplus b)$
 c. $\text{Alt}(S) = \{\text{came}'(x) : x \in D_e\}$
 d. $\text{Sub}(S) = \{\text{came}'(a), \text{came}'(b)\}$
 e. $\llbracket \text{dou}(S) \rrbracket = \text{came}'(a \oplus b) \wedge \underline{\neg O[\text{came}'(a)] \wedge \neg O[\text{came}'(b)]}$
- (20) [John] (***dou**) came. (ungrammatical unless *John* is stressed)
 a. $\llbracket S \rrbracket = \text{came}'(j)$
 b. $\text{Sub}(S) = \emptyset$
 c. $\llbracket \text{dou}(S) \rrbracket$ is undefined

4. Predicting the quantifier-distributor use

- I argue that the requirements of maximality and plurality are illusions. All the facts that are thought to result from these two requirements actually result from the presupposition of *dou*.

4.1. Deriving the “distributivity requirement”

- In (21), under a single-cover/collective reading, no alternative is asymmetrically entailed by the prejacent and no sub-alternative is available, making the use of *dou* undefined.²

(21) ‘*abc dou* bought houses.’

a. $p = \text{Part}_{C_{ov}}(f, a \oplus b \oplus c)$

b. $\text{Alt}(p) = \{\text{Part}_C(f, X) : X \in D_e\}$

c. **Atomic distributive** \checkmark

$$\begin{aligned} \text{If } C = \{a, b, c\}, \text{ then: } \text{Sub}(p) &= \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Part}_C(f, a), \text{Part}_C(f, b), \text{Part}_C(f, c) \\ \text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b), \text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus c), \text{Part}_C(f, b \oplus c) \end{array} \right\} \\ &= \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f(a), f(b), f(c) \\ f(a) \wedge f(b), f(a) \wedge f(c), f(b) \wedge f(c) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Non-atomic distributive \checkmark

$$\text{If } C = \{a, b \oplus c\}, \text{ then: } \text{Sub}(p) = \{\text{Part}_C(f, a), \text{Part}_C(f, b \oplus c)\} = \{f(a), f(b \oplus c)\}$$

Collective \times

$$\text{If } C = \{a \oplus b \oplus c\}, \text{ then: } \text{Sub}(p) = \emptyset$$

d. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{\text{Part}_C(f, X) : X \in D_e \wedge \{y : y \leq X \wedge C(y)\} \subset C\}$,

where C is the contextually determined cover of $a \oplus b \oplus c$.

- *Dou* can be applied to a collective statement as long as this collective predicate is divisive.

(22) P is divisive iff $\forall x[P(x) \rightarrow \exists y < x[P(y)]]$

(Whenever P holds of something x , it also holds of some proper subpart(s) of x .)

(23) ‘*abc dou* are friends.’

a. $\text{Sub}(\text{abc are friends}) = \{\text{ab are friends}, \text{bc are friends}, \text{ac are friends}\}$

b. ‘*abc dou* are friends’ means: *abc* are friends, not only *ab* are friends, not only *bc* are ...

In contrast, *dou* cannot be applied to a collective statement if the predicate is not divisive.

(24) Tamen (***dou**) zucheng -le zhe-ge weiyuanhui

they DOU form -ASP this committee

‘They (*all) formed this committee.’

²In the alternatives, C constantly denotes the contextually determined cover of the associated item in the prejacent (viz. the cover of $a \oplus b \oplus c$), and PART only distributes over C . (See Liao 2012: ch. 4.) For example, if $C = \{a, b, c\}$, the alternative $\text{Part}_C(f, d)$ is vacuously a tautology, and the alternative $\text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b \oplus c \oplus d)$ is logically equivalent to $\text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b \oplus c)$.

These consequences are fine for now. Nevertheless, problems arise in case that we want an operator to operate on excl-alternatives. For example, to derive the exhaustification inference of (1), ‘*b* bought houses’ shall not be a tautology.

(1) Only abc_F bought houses. $\rightsquigarrow d$ didn’t bought houses.

See a solution in Liu (2016) based on Link-Landman’s approach of encoding distributivity/collectivity distinction.

4.2. Deriving the “plurality requirement”

- This plurality is illusive; it is neither necessary nor sufficient.
- Unnecessary: *dou* can be associated with an atomic element as long as the predicate is divisive.

(25) Yuehan ba [na-ping shei] **dou** he -le (*yi-ban).
 John BA that-bottle water DOU drink -ASP one-half

- √ ‘J had that bottle of water.’ \Rightarrow If x is part of that bottle of water, J had x .
 $Sub(\mathbf{J\ had\ that\ bottle\ of\ water}) = \{\mathbf{J\ had\ } x : x < \mathbf{\ that\ bottle\ of\ water}\}$
- × ‘J had half of that bottle of water.’ $\not\Rightarrow$ If x is part of that bottle of water, J had half of x .
 $Sub(\mathbf{John\ had\ half\ of\ that\ bottle\ of\ water}) = \emptyset$

- Insufficient: when applied to a statement with a **divisive** collective predicate, *dou* requires its associated item to denote a group containing at least 3 members. This is so because collective predicates are undefined for proper subparts of a dual-individual (i.e. atomics).

(26) ‘*ab* (***dou**) are friends.’

- $\llbracket \text{are friends} \rrbracket = \lambda x [\neg Atom(x). \mathbf{be-friends}(x)]$
- $Sub(\mathbf{ab\ are\ friends}) = \emptyset$

5. FCI-licenser use

5.1. Licensing conditions of Mandarin FCIs

- The English polarity item *any* is licensed as a \forall -FCI when appearing over a possibility modal, but not when it appears in an episodic statement or over a necessity modal.

(27) a. * Anyone came in. Episodic statements
 b. Anyone can come in. \approx Everyone can come in. Over possibility modals
 c. * Anyone must come in. Over necessity modals

- In Mandarin, the \forall -FCI use of a disjunction is only licensed in a pre-*dou*+ \diamond position.

(28) [Yuehan huozhe Mali] **dou** *(keyi)/*bixu jiao jichu hanyu.
 John or Mary DOU can/must teach intro Chinese
 Intended: ‘Both John and Mary can teach Intro Chinese.’

But the \forall -FCI use of a bare *wh*-word can be licensed without a modal. (Giannakidou & Cheng 2006)³

(29) [Shei] *(**dou**) dao -le.
 who_{FCI} DOU arrive -ASP.
 ‘Everyone arrived.’

The licensing conditions for *na*-CL-NP ‘which-NP’ and *renhe*-NP ‘any-NP’ are less clear. They can be licensed in a pre-*dou*+ \diamond position. Judgements for other contexts vary a lot.

³There are, however, variations with this judgement.

5.2. Deriving the \forall -FC inferences

- *Wh*-items are existential indefinites; thus the plain meaning of (29) is equivalent to a disjunction. Sub-alternatives of a disjunction are the disjuncts. Applying **dou** yields a \forall -FC implicature.⁴

(29') "Shei **dou** arrived."

- $\llbracket \text{shei arrived} \rrbracket = f(a) \vee f(b)$
- $\text{Sub}(\text{shei arrived}) = \{f(a), f(b)\}$
- $\llbracket \text{dou} [\text{shei arrived}] \rrbracket = [f(a) \vee f(b)] \wedge \neg Of(a) \wedge \neg Of(b)$
 $= [f(a) \vee f(b)] \wedge [f(a) \rightarrow f(b)] \wedge [f(b) \rightarrow f(a)]$
 $= f(a) \wedge f(b)$

! **Problem:** Disjuncts are stronger than a disjunction, how can they be considered as sub-alternatives?

Solution: sub-alternatives are the complements of "innocently (I)-excludable" alternatives.

(30) a. **Sub-alternatives**

$$\text{Sub}(p) = (\text{Alt}(p) - \text{IExcl}(p)) - \{p\}$$

(The set of alternatives excluding the I-excludable alternatives and the prejacent itself)

b. **Innocently (I)-excl-alternatives** (Fox 2007)⁵

$$\text{IExcl}(p) = \bigcap \{A : A \text{ is a maximal subset of } \text{Alt}(p) \text{ s.t. } A^\neg \cup \{p\} \text{ is consistent}\},$$

where $A^\neg = \{\neg q : q \in A\}$

(q is I-excludable to p iff q is included in every maximal set of alternatives of p s.t. the exclusion of this set is consistent with p .)

– Disjuncts are not I-excludable:

$$\{p \vee q\} \text{ is inconsistent with } \{p, q\}^\neg : \quad [p \vee q] \wedge \neg p \wedge \neg q = \perp$$

– Non-excludable alternatives are also not I-excludable. Hence, this revision doesn't change the derivation of the quantifier-distributor use of *dou*.

⁴This derivation looks very close to that of applying Fox's (2007) recursive exhaustifier O_R or Chierchia's (2013) pre-exhaustification operator $O_{D\text{-EXH}}$. But *dou* is not exactly $O_R/O_{D\text{-EXH}}$. First, unlike O_R , *dou* does not negate the I-excludable alternatives and hence doesn't yield an exhaustification inference. Second, while $O_{D\text{-EXH}}$ operates on domain alternatives, which are grammatically defined, *dou* operates on sub-alternatives, which are defined purely semantically. See Xiang (2016: §2.7) for more details.

⁵Another commonly seen definition of I-excl-alternatives is (1), which, however, is inadequate.

$$(1) \text{IExcl}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge \neg \exists q' \in \text{Excl}(p) [\underline{p \wedge \neg q} \rightarrow q']\}$$

(The set of alternatives p such that affirming p and negating q does not entail any excl-alternatives)

For example, in (2), where the prejacent is the strongest among the alternatives and thus has no excl-alternative, the condition underlined in (1) is vacuously satisfied; therefore, definition (1) predicts that every alternative of p is I-excludable.

(2) EVERY student came.

5.3. Explaining other licensing conditions

- **In licensing the FCI use of a pre-verbal *wh*-word, the use of *dou* is mandatory.**

When a *wh*-word has a non-interrogative use, its sub-alternatives are obligatorily activated and must be used by a c-commanding exhaustifier. (Liao 2012, Chierchia & Liao 2015) When *dou* is absent, these sub-alternatives would have to be used by a basic *O*-exhaustifier,⁶ yielding a contradiction:

$$(31) \quad \llbracket O [\mathbf{shei\ arrived}] \rrbracket = O[f(a) \vee f(b)] \\ = [f(a) \vee f(b)] \wedge \neg f(a) \wedge \neg f(b) \\ = \perp$$

- **Modal Obviation: licensing the \forall -FCI use of a pre-verbal disjunction needs a weak modal.**

A focused disjunction obligatorily triggers a scalar implicature (SI).

In a non-modalized context, the \forall -FC implicature clearly contradicts the SI, therefore FC-disjunctions are not licensed in episodic statements. (Same as Chierchia 2013 on English *any*.)

$$\forall\text{-FC: } f(j) \wedge f(m) \qquad \text{SI: } \neg[f(j) \wedge f(m)]$$

In a modalized context, the SI restricts the modal base *M* to the set of worlds where the SI is true.⁷

- (32) [John or Mary] **dou** can teach Intro Chinese.

\rightsquigarrow We are only considered with cases where only one person will teach IC.

$\not\rightarrow$ Not that both John and Mary will teach IC.

- a. SI pre-restricts the modal base *M*:

If $f = \{\langle w1, \{j\} \rangle, \langle w2, \{m\} \rangle, \langle w3, \{j, m\} \rangle\}$, then $M = \{w1, w2\}$

- b. Prejacent of *dou*: $\diamond f(j) \vee \diamond f(m)$

- c. Applying *dou* yields a \forall -FC implicature: $\diamond f(j) \wedge \diamond f(m)$ (True in *M*)

- (33) *[John or Mary] **dou** must teach Intro Chinese.

- a. SI pre-restricts the modal base *M*:

If $f = \{\langle w1, \{j\} \rangle, \langle w2, \{m\} \rangle, \langle w3, \{j, m\} \rangle\}$, then $M = \{w1, w2\}$

- b. Prejacent of *dou*: $\square f(j) \vee \square f(m)$

- c. Applying *dou* yields a \forall -FC implicature: $\square f(j) \wedge \square f(m)$ (False in *M*)

- **Remaining puzzle:** Why is that licensing the \forall -FCI use of *who* doesn't require a weak modal?

A possibility: bare *wh*-words do not generate SIs.

But this assumption makes it hard to capture the epistemic indefinite use of Mandarin *wh*-words. (See Chierchia & Liao 2015.)

⁶The sub-alternatives of a pre-verbal item cannot be used by a covert *dou* (or any other covert pre-exhaustification exhaustifier), due to the economy condition for language-particular operations: "don't do covertly what you can do overtly" (Chierchia 1998). Since *dou* is a language-particular particle, overt *dou* and covert O_{DOU} have complementary distributions.

(1) a. Ni [renhe-ren] *(**dou**) keyi jian.
You any-person DOU can meet.
^{OK}*dou*/^{OK} O_{DOU} [you can meet anyone]

b. Ni (***dou**) keyi jian [renhe-ren].
You DOU can meet any-person
^{OK}*dou*/^{OK} O_{DOU} [you can meet anyone]


⁷Alternative approaches in the realm of exhaustifications include Dayal (2009) and Chierchia (2013). Dayal assumes a Fluctuation Constraint: in an *any*-sentence, the intersection of the restriction and the scope that verifies the sentence should not be constant across the accessible worlds. Chierchia assumes a Modal Containment Constraint: the FC and scalar implicatures have different modal bases; in particular, the one for FC is a proper subset of the one for SI.

6. Scalar marker

6.1. The [*lian...dou...*] construction

- A [*lian...dou...*] sentence evokes an *even*-like reading:

(34) **Lian** [LINGDAO]_F **dou** chidao -le.
 LIAN leader DOU late -ASP
 ‘Even the leader was late.’



- English *even* triggers an existential scalar presupposition: the propositional argument is less likely than some contextually relevant alternative. (Bennett 1982, Kay 1990; cf. Karttunen & Peters 1979)⁸

(35) $\llbracket \text{even} \rrbracket(p) = \exists q \in C[q >_{\text{likely}} p].p$
 ($\llbracket \text{even} \rrbracket(p)$ is defined only if p is more likely than some contextually relevant alternative;
 when defined, $\llbracket \text{even} \rrbracket(p) = p$)

- **Getting the *even*-like reading of [*lian...dou...*]**

When *dou* agrees with a *lian*-NP (or a non-scalar focused item), the measurement for ordering alternatives gets shifted from logical strength to likelihood. Sub-alternatives are the ones more likely than the prejacent. The pre-exhaustification effect is realized by the scalar exhaustifier JUST.

(36) a. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge q >_{\text{likely}} p\}$
 (The set of p that are more likely than p)
 b. $\text{JUST}(q) = \lambda w[q(w) = 1 \wedge \forall r \in \text{Alt}(q)[r(w) = 1 \rightarrow p \geq_{\text{likely}} r]]$
 (q is true, and q is the most likely proposition among its true alternatives.)

We get a *dou* semantically equivalent to *even* (see computation in (38)): the additive presupposition of *dou* = the scalar presupposition of *even*; the assertion is vacuous.

(37) $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w[\exists q \in \text{Sub}(p). p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p)[\text{JUST}(q)(w) = 0]]$
 $= \exists q \in \text{Alt}(p)[q >_{\text{likely}} p].p$ $= \llbracket \text{even} \rrbracket(p)$

(38) $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p)$
 $= \exists q \in \text{Sub}(p).p \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p)[\neg \text{JUST}(p)]$
 $= \exists q \in \text{Sub}(p).\lambda w[p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p)\exists r \in \text{Alt}(q)[r(w) = 1 \wedge q >_{\text{likely}} r]]$
 $= \exists q \in \text{Alt}(p)[q >_{\text{likely}} p].$
 $\lambda w[p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Alt}(p)[q >_{\text{likely}} p \rightarrow \exists r \in \text{Alt}(q)[r(w) = 1 \wedge q >_{\text{likely}} r]]]$
 $= \exists q \in \text{Alt}(p)[q >_{\text{likely}} p].p$

[Whenever p is true, then any alternative of p that is more likely than p is less likely than some true alternative r , where $r = p$.]

⁸Karttunen & Peters (1979) assumes a universal scalar presupposition: the propositional argument of *even* is less likely than all of its alternatives that are not identical to it. This presupposition is too strong. An *even*-sentence can also describe a non-extreme case. Examples in (2) are from Kay (1990:90).

- (1) $\llbracket \text{even} \rrbracket(p) = \forall q \in C[p \neq q \rightarrow q >_{\text{likely}} p].p$
 (2) a. Not only did Mary win her first round match, she even made it to the semi-finals.
 b. The administration was so bewildered that they even had lieutenant colonels. making policy decisions

6.2. Minimizer-licensing

- **Fact 1:** Minimizers can be licensed in [*lian* MIN *dou* ...]. A post-*dou* negation is usually mandatory:

(39) Yuehan (*lian*) [YI-ge ren]_F *(**dou**) *(*bu*) renshi.
 John LIAN one-CL person DOU NEG know
 ‘John doesn’t know anyone.’

Analysis: Interpreting (39) involves reconstructing the minimizer, so as to satisfy the presupposition of *dou*. Without negation or if the minimizer scopes above negation, the preajacent clause of *dou* is logically the weakest among its alternatives (*a la* Crinč 2011 on English *even*).

(40) For any $n > 1$:
 a. $\exists 1x \neg [\text{know}'(j, x)] \Leftarrow \exists nx \neg [\text{know}'(j, x)]$ MIN > NEG
 b. $\neg \exists 1x [\text{know}'(j, x)] \Rightarrow \neg \exists nx [\text{know}'(j, x)]$ NEG > MIN

A minimizer cannot be licensed if it cannot be reconstructed to a position below negation.

(41) *(*Lian*) [YI-ge ren]_F **dou** *bu* renshi Yuehan.
 LIAN one-CL person DOU NEG know John.
 Intended ‘no one knows John.’

- **Fact 2:** The post-*dou* negation is optional in (42).

(42) Yuehan (*lian*) [YI-fen qian]_F *(**dou**) (*bu*) xiang yao.
 John LIAN one-cent money DOU NEG want request
 With negation: ‘John doesn’t even want one cent.’
 Without negation: ‘John wants it even if it is just one cent.’

Analysis: The desire predicate *xiang* ‘want’ is non-monotonic (Heim 1992, a.o.). If the minimizer takes scope below *xiang*, the alternatives are semantically independent.

(43) [**dou** [John_i want_{NM} [**one-cent** λx [e_i has x]]]]

We can order the alternatives based on likelihood. Sub-alternatives are the ones more likely than the preajacent: it is more likely that John wants more than one cent.

6.3. Associating with a scalar item

- Associating *dou* with a scalar item implies that the preajacent ranks relatively high in the contextually relevant scale. The associated item can appear on the right side of *dou* but must be stressed.

(44) a. It is **dou** FIVE o’clock! \rightsquigarrow It’s too late.
 b. John **dou** has eaten THREE burgers! \rightsquigarrow John has eaten too much.

When *dou* agrees with a focused scalar item, alternatives are ordered w.r.t. a contextually determined measurement μ . Sub-alternatives are the ones ranking lower than the preajacent w.r.t. μ . The pre-exhaustification effect is realized by the scalar exhaustifier JUST.

(45) $[[\text{dou}]](p) = \lambda w [\exists q \in \text{Sub}(p). p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p) [\text{JUST}(q)(w) = 0]]$
 a. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge p >_{\mu} q\}$
 (The set of alternatives of p that rank lower than p w.r.t. μ)

- b. $\text{JUST}(q) = \lambda w[q(w) = 1 \wedge \forall r \in \text{Alt}(p)[r(w) = 1 \rightarrow r \geq_{\mu} q]]$
 (r is true; r ranks the highest w.r.t. μ among its true alternatives.)

A toy example:

- (46) **Dou** [WU_F-dian] -le.
 DOU five-o'clock -ASP
 'It is **dou** FIVE_F o'clock.'
 a. $\text{Sub}(\text{it's 5 o'clock}) = \{\text{it's 4 o'clock}, \text{it's 3 o'clock}, \dots\}$
 b. $\llbracket \text{dou} [\text{it's 5 o'clock}] \rrbracket = \text{'it's 5, not just 4, not just 3, ...'}$

7. Sorting the parameters: Logical strength vs. likelihood

- Two basic ways to define sub-alternatives:

Def A: weaker than the prejacent;⁹ (based on logical strength)

Def B: more likely than the prejacent. (based on likelihood)

Def A is strictly stronger than Def B : due to rule (47), if a proposition is logically weaker than the prejacent, it is also more likely than the prejacent; but not the other direction.

(47) Entailment and scalarity (Crinč 2011:15)

If $p \subset q$, then $p <_{\text{likely}} q$.

- Assuming that the logical strength-based semantics is basic, and that the likelihood-based semantics is derived¹⁰ and is only licensed in [*lian...dou...*], I predict the following distributional pattern of *dou*:

If the prejacent is ...	Can <i>dou</i> be licensed in...	
	(i) basic declaratives?	(ii) [<i>lian...dou...</i>] constructions?
a. the logically strongest alt	Yes	Yes
b. the logically weakest alt	No	No
c. neither	No	Yes

The prediction for (c-i) is empirically supported (capitalizing marks stress):

- (48) a. They **dou** bought houses. (#collective, $\sqrt{\text{distributive}}$)
 b. (Lian) THEY **dou** bought houses. ($\sqrt{\text{collective}}$, $\sqrt{\text{distributive}}$)
- (49) a. * John **dou** arrived.
 b. (Lian) JOHN **dou** arrived.

⁹For now, I have to neglect the complications of innocent excludability. If an alternative is stronger but not I-excludable, it is still less likely than the prejacent. One option is to pursue the following path, where the *even*-like and FCI-licenser uses of *dou* are derived from the distributor-quantifier use by weakening the def of sub-alternatives.

The derivation path of sub-alternatives: $A \begin{cases} \rightarrow B \\ \rightarrow C \end{cases}$ where

A. $\text{Sub}(p) = (\text{Alt}(p) - \text{Excl}(p)) - \{p\}$
 B. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge q >_{\text{likely}} p\}$
 C. $\text{Sub}(p) = (\text{Alt}(p) - \text{IExcl}(p)) - \{p\}$

¹⁰This idea is supported by diachronic evidence. The quantifier-distributor use of *dou* emerges as early as the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220) (Gu 2015), while the *even*-like use in the [*lian...dou*] construction emerges around the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). I thank Feng Gu (p.c.) for data in Ancient Chinese.

The prediction for (c-i) favors my proposal over Liu’s (2016). Liu treats the likelihood-based semantics as the default semantics of *dou*. But, if this were the case, *dou* should be licensed whenever its likelihood-based semantics is satisfied, and hence should have the same distribution in (i) and (ii), contra the fact.

For example, for (48a), if ‘they bought houses together’ $>_{\text{likely}}$ ‘the others bought houses together’, the likelihood-based semantics of *dou* would be licensed even if the prejacent takes a collective reading.

8. Conclusions

- *Dou* is a special exhaustifier which (i) operates on pre-exhaustified sub-alternatives and (ii) presupposes the existence of a sub-alternative.

– Default case (distributor and FCI-licenser):

- (50) a. $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w [\exists q \in \text{Sub}(p). p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p) [O(q)(w) = 0]]$
 i. Presupposition: the prejacent has some sub-alternative(s).
 ii. Assertion: the prejacent is true, the exhaustification of each sub-alternative is false.
 b. $\text{Sub}(p) = (\text{Alt}(p) - \text{IExcl}(p)) - \{p\}$
 (the set of alternatives excluding the I-excludable alternatives and the prejacent itself)

– Scalar marker

- (51) a. $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w [\exists q \in \text{Sub}(p). p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p) [\text{JUST}(q)(w) = 0]]$
 b. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge q >_{\text{likely}} p\}$ if in a [*lian ... dou*] construction
 c. $\text{Sub}(p) = \{q : q \in \text{Alt}(p) \wedge q <_{\mu} p\}$ if associated with a scalar item

- The assertion of *dou* is responsible for the derivation of \forall -FC inferences.
- The presupposition of *dou* is responsible for:
 - (i) the distributivity and plurality requirements of distributor/quantifier-*dou*,
 - (ii) the *even*-like semantics of a [*lian...dou...*] construction,
 - (iii) the licensing conditions of minimizers in [*lian MIN dou...*] constructions,
 - (iv) the scalar inferences in cases where *dou* is associated with a scalar item.

Appendix: Alternative proposals in the realm of exhaustifications

Liao (2012: ch. 4)

- The particle *dou* is a focus indicator and has no meaning *per se*. It signals the use of an E-operator (\approx *even*) (Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2013) and assigns an [+add] feature to the \sim -operator (Rooth 1985).

- (52) [E [$\sim_{[+add], C}$ [_{douP} they_i [dou *t_i* arrived]]]]
- a. $\llbracket \text{E} \rrbracket(p) = \forall q \in \text{Alt}(p) [p \neq q \rightarrow p <_{\text{likely}} q].p$
 b. $\llbracket \sim_{[+add], C} \rrbracket(p) = \lambda w [\exists q \in C [q \neq p \wedge q(w) = 1] \wedge \forall q \in C [q \neq p \rightarrow (\diamond q)(w) = 1]].p$

The *even*-like meaning is due to the presupposition of the E-operator. This presupposition is trivially satisfied when *dou* applies to a distributive statement.

When *dou* is associated with a *wh*-item, the presupposition of the $\sim_{[+add], C}$ -operator forces the prejacent to be recursively exhaustified, yielding a \forall -FC inference.

(53) [E [$\sim_{[+add],C}$ [O_R [d_{ouP} who_i [d_{ou} t_i arrived]]]]]

• Problems:

1. The *even*-inference of a *dou*-clause is always local. The locality effect is not predicted: if a downward-entailing operator is inserted between E and *dou*, we wouldn't get the *even* reading.

(54) If **lian** JOHN_F **dou** came, Mary would be happy.

\rightsquigarrow John is less likely to come compared with others.

- a. If E [**lian** JOHN_F **dou** came], Mary will be happy ✓
- b. E [if **lian** JOHN_F **dou** came, Mary will be happy] ×

2. The additive presupposition is too strong.

(55) (**Lian**) JOHN_F **dou** passed the exam, how come that the others all didn't!

3. In (53), due to the Relativized Minimality, the E-operator has nothing to be associated with. Liao assumes that E is then associated with IP, whose focus value is purely determined by context.

4. The violation to the additive presupposition of the \sim -operator could also be salvaged by any DE operators, and then the \forall -FC inference wouldn't be forced, contra the fact.

(56) He didn't what **dou** buy.

Predicted LF: [E [$\sim_{[+add],C}$ [not [what_i [d_{ou} [he bought t_i]]]]]]

- a. Desired reading: He didn't buy everything, (but he still bought something.)
- b. Predicted reading: He didn't buy anything.

Liu (2016)

- Liu (2016) adopts Karttunen & Peter's (1979) semantics of *even* and defines *dou* as equal to *even*:

(57) $\llbracket \text{dou} \rrbracket(p) = \forall q \in \text{Alt}(p)[p \neq q \rightarrow p <_{\text{likely}} q].p$

(*dou* is truth conditionally vacuous but presupposes that its prejacent is the most unlikely proposition among its alternatives.)

When *dou* applies to a distributive statement, the prejacent entails all the alternatives, and thus the presupposition gets trivially satisfied.

Liu (2016) also make improvements on the treatment of distributivity/collectivity in the derivation of alternatives.

• Problems:

1. Treating *dou* as *even* is incompatible with the fact that *dou* has more limited distribution in basic declaratives than in [*lian ...dou...*] constructions. (See section 7)
2. The universal scalar presupposition is too strong. *Dou* can be used in non-extreme cases.

(58) a. [The kids] **dou** arrived, the teachers also arrived.

b. **only** [the kids] arrived, # the teachers also arrived.

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