The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007;132:461-73..
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information. Econometrica. 1994;62:997-1039..
Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994;62:103-35..
Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships. In: Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press; 1993..
An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;54:26-47..
On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;53:428-38..
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players. Review of Economic Studies. 1990;57:555-573..
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990;51:194-206..
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. American Economic Review. 1990;80:274-9..
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica. 1986;54:533-554..
Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift?. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2007;247:574-80..
Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient. Games and Economic Behavior. 2007;61:27-49..
Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2005;102:10797-10800..