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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
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FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
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HARVARD.EDU
Drew Fudenberg
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Publications by Type: Book Chapter
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2008
Fudenberg D, Levine DK
.
Introduction
. In: A Long Run Collaboration on Long-Run Relationships. World Scientific Publishing Company ; 2008.
PDF
2007
Fudenberg D, Villas-Boas MJ
.
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition
. In: Economics and Information Systems, Volume 1. Oxford: Elsevier Science ; 2007.
PDF
1993
Fudenberg D
.
Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships
. In:
Laffont JJ
Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1993.
1989
Fudenberg D, Tirole J
.
Game Theory for Industrial Organization: Introduction and Overview
. In:
Schmalansee D, Willig R
Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam, New York: North Holland ; 1989. pp. Ch. 5.
1985
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Tirole J
.
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information
. In:
Roth A
Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1985. pp. 73-98.
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Publication Types
Book
(4)
Book Chapter
(5)
Conference Paper
(1)
Conference Proceedings
(1)
Journal Article
(110)
Publication Topics
Bargaining, Contracting, Renegotiating, and Mechanism Design
(11)
Decision Theory
(2)
Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics
(15)
Evolution, Learning, and other Non-Equilibrium Adjustment Processes
(32)
Foundations and Mathematics of Game Theory
(19)
Macroeconomics
(1)
Repeated Games
(19)
Reputation Effects
(5)
Theoretical Industrial Organization
(20)
Recent Publications
Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Models: A Lyapunov Approach
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility
It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion
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