@workingpaper {171981,
	title = {Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {
	What is so special about banks that their demise often triggers government intervention? In this paper we show that, even ignoring interconnectedness issues, the failure of a bank causes a larger welfare loss than the failure of other institutions. The reason is that agents in need of liquidity tend to concentrate their holdings in banks. Thus, a shock to banks disproportionately affects the agents who need liquidity the most, reducing aggregate demand and the level of economic activity. The optimal fiscal response to such a shock is to help people, not banks, and the size of this response should be larger if a bank, rather than a similarly-sized nonfinancial firm, fails. \&nbsp;\&nbsp;\&nbsp;\&nbsp;

},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {75426,
	title = {More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts},
	journal = {Cambridge Elements in Law, Economics, and Politics 2024},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	month = {2024},
	abstract = {
	Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on {\textquotedblleft}contracts as reference points{\textquotedblright}. Including a contingency of the form, {\textquotedblleft}The buyer will require a good in event E{\textquotedblright}, has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be strictly superior to a contingent contract.

},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka}
}
@journal {640373,
	title = {Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles (Revised Nov. 2022)},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	abstract = {Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts and these contracts are inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people are inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded and acting with integrity. We suggest that this tendency can be reinforced if these social norms are incorporated into a formal contract in the form of guiding principles. We develop a model in which guiding principles reduce shading behavior and discuss cases where the approach has been successfully applied in practice.},
	author = {David  Frydlinger and Oliver Hart}
}
@article {696693,
	title = {Private Sanctions},
	journal = {Economic Policy January 2024},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {203-268},
	url = {https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/epolic/eiad041/7462771?utm_source=advanceaccess\&utm_campaign=economicpolicy\&utm_medium=email},
	author = {Oliver Hart and David Thesmar and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {689394,
	title = {The New Corporate Governance},
	volume = {1},
	number = {1},
	year = {2022},
	month = {2022},
	pages = {195-216},
	url = {https://businesslawreview.uchicago.edu/2022/10/31/the-new-corporate-governance/},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {689038,
	title = {Exit vs. Voice},
	journal = {Published in Journal of Political Economy, December 2022},
	year = {2022},
	url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/720516},
	author = {Eleonora Broccardo and Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@magazinearticle {664486,
	title = {An Innovative Way to Prevent Adversarial Supplier Relationships},
	journal = {Harvard Business Review },
	volume = {October 8},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://hbr.org/2020/10/an-innovative-way-to-prevent-adversarial-supplier-relationships?ab=hero-subleft-3},
	author = {David  Frydlinger and Oliver Hart and Kate Vitasek}
}
@article {238511,
	title = {Continuing Contracts},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
	volume = {36},
	number = {2},
	year = {2020},
	pages = {284-313},
	abstract = {
	\&nbsp;



	Parties often regulate their relationships through {\textquotedblleft}continuing{\textquotedblright} contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example.\&nbsp; Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point.\&nbsp; A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or long-term contract.\&nbsp; However, fair bargaining makes adjusting to outside options difficult and may cause inefficient outcomes.\&nbsp; An implicit promise of a long-term relationship, as in employment, can improve matters.\&nbsp;



	\&nbsp;

},
	url = {https://academic.oup.com/jleo/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewz022/5717393?guestAccessKey=3064583f-6d17-4d84-ba35-dd789f2c81a5},
	author = {Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Oliver Hart}
}
@magazinearticle {640015,
	title = {A New Approach to Contracts},
	journal = {Harvard Business Review},
	volume = {Sept-Oct },
	year = {2019},
	url = {https://hbr.org/2019/09/a-new-approach-to-contracts},
	author = {David  Frydlinger and Oliver Hart and Kate Vitasek}
}
@article {548231,
	title = {Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting},
	volume = {2},
	number = {2},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {247-274},
	abstract = {What is the appropriate objective function for a firm? We analyze this question for the case where shareholders are prosocial and externalities are not perfectly separable from production decisions. We argue that maximization of shareholder welfare is not the same as maximization of market value. We propose that company and asset managers should pursue policies consistent with the preferences of their investors. Voting by shareholders on corporate policy is one way to achieve this.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@magazinearticle {572241,
	title = {Serving Shareholders Doesn{\textquoteright}t Mean Putting Profit Above All Else},
	journal = {Harvard Business Review {\textquotedblleft}This article was first published on HBR.org{\textquotedblright}},
	year = {2017},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {544016,
	title = {Incomplete Contracts and Control},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {107},
	number = {7},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {1731-1752},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {25743,
	title = {How Do Informal Agreements and Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points?},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {13},
	number = {1},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {1-28},
	abstract = {
	The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility but they do not fully resolve the problem of misaligned reference points. Our experiments also show that contract revision is a more nuanced process than the previous literature has recognized. We find, for example, that it is sometimes better for parties to write a simple (rigid) contract and then revise it ex post if needed, rather than to anticipate and include future contingencies in a (flexible) contract from the outset.

},
	author = {Ernst Fehr and Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder}
}
@article {16280,
	title = {Liquidity and Inefficient Investment},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {13},
	number = {5},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {737-769},
	abstract = {
	We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the non-pledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over-hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex ante perspective.

},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {81206,
	title = {Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine},
	journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
	volume = {57},
	number = {4},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {975-1000},
	abstract = {
	Courts have articulated a number of legal tests to distinguish corporate transactions that have a legitimate business or economic purpose from those carried out largely, if not solely, for favorable tax treatment. We outline an approach to analyzing the economic substance of corporate transactions based on the property rights theory of the firm, and describe its application in two recent tax cases.

},
	author = {T. Christopher Borek and Angelo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart}
}
@article {26927,
	title = {Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points},
	journal = {Games},
	volume = {4},
	number = {3},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {437-456},
	abstract = {We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an investment that affects a buyer{\textquoteright}s value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset ownership. When shading is not possible and there is no contract renegotiation, an optimum can be achieved by giving the seller the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. However, with shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit the seller{\textquoteright}s offers, and possibly create ex post inefficiency. Asset ownership can improve matters even if revelation mechanisms are allowed.},
	doi = {10.3390/g4030437},
	url = {http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/437},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@webarticle {89501,
	title = {Tax shelters and the theory of the firm},
	journal = {VOX},
	number = {July 2, 2013},
	year = {2013},
	url = {http://www.voxeu.org/article/tax-shelters-and-theory-firm},
	author = {T. Christopher Borek and Angleo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart}
}
@article {9755,
	title = {A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions},
	journal = { American Law and Economics Review },
	volume = {13},
	number = {2},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {453-490},
	abstract = {We design a new capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFI) that are {\textquotedblleft}too big to fail.{\textquotedblright} Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure LFIs do not default on systemically-relevant obligations, we require that they maintain a cushion of equity and junior long-term debt sufficiently great that the credit default swap price on the long-term debt stays below a threshold level. If the CDS price moves above the threshold, either LFIs issue equity to bring it down or the regulator intervenes. This mechanism ensures that LFIs are always solvent, while preserving some of the benefits of debt.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {9746,
	title = {Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}The Theory of the Firm{\textquoteright}},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
	volume = {49},
	number = {1},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {101-113},
	abstract = {In this review, I describe how economists have moved beyond the firm as a black box to incorporate incentives, internal organization, and firm boundaries. I then turn to the way that the theory of the firm is treated in Daniel Spulber{\textquoteright}s book The  Theory  of  the  Firm:   Microeconomics  with  Endogenous  Entrepreneurs,  Firms,  Markets,  and  Organizations. Spulber{\textquoteright}s goal is to explain why firms exist, how they are established, and what they contribute to the economy. To accomplish this, Spulber defines a firm to be a transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of its owners. For Spulber, this separation is the key difference between the firm and direct exchange between consumers. I raise questions about whether this is a useful basis for a theory of the firm. (  JEL D21)},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {9742,
	title = {Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {101},
	number = {2},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {493-525},
	abstract = {Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as ref- erence points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts{\textemdash}which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions{\textemdash}cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid con- tracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about out- comes within the contract.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Ernst Fehr and Christian Zehnder}
}
@booklet {19725,
	title = {{\textquotedblleft}Curbing Risk on Wall Street{\textquotedblright}},
	journal = {National Affairs},
	volume = {3},
	number = {Spring},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {20-34},
	url = {http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_HartZingales.pdf},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@newspaperarticle {9758,
	title = {How to Make a Distressed Bank Raise Equity},
	journal = {Financial Times},
	year = {2010},
	month = {2/08/2010},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {9756,
	title = {A Theory of Firm Scope},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {CXXV},
	number = {2},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {483-513},
	abstract = {The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We consider two firms deciding whether to adopt a common standard. Nonintegrated firms may fail to coordinate if one firm loses. An integrated firm can internalize the externality, but puts insufficient weight on employee benefits. We use our approach to understand why Cisco acquired StrataCom, a provider of new transmission technology. We also analyze delegation.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom}
}
@article {9769,
	title = {Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {124},
	number = {1},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {267-300},
	abstract = {We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under condi- tions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In contrast to much of the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty, rather than noncontractible investments.},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@booklet {9767,
	title = {To Regulate Finance, Try the Market},
	journal = {Foreign Policy},
	year = {2009},
	month = {03 March 2009},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {9763,
	title = {Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley},
	journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
	volume = {47},
	number = {2},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {437-445},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {9761,
	title = {Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {7},
	number = {2-3},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {561-572},
	abstract = {In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a {\textquotedblleft}fundamental transformation{\textquotedblright} (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before. (JEL: C91, D03, D23)},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Ernst Fehr and Christian Zehnder}
}
@booklet {9760,
	title = {How the Tricks that Crashed Wall Street Can Save the World},
	journal = {Foreign Policy},
	year = {2009},
	month = {12/03/2009},
	url = {http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/03/how_the_tricks_that_crashed_wall_street_can_save_the_world},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {15258,
	title = {Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm},
	journal = {Economica},
	volume = {75},
	number = {299},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {404-411},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {9778,
	title = {Contracts as Reference Points},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {CXXIII},
	number = {1},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1-48},
	abstract = {We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship:  more precisely, for parties{\textquoteright} feelings of entitlement. A party{\textquoteright}s ex post performance  depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted  by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible  contract allows parties to adjust their outcomes to uncertainty but causes ineffi-  cient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence  of noncontractible investments and elucidates why {\textquotedblleft}employment{\textquotedblright} contracts, which  fix wages in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.
},
	author = {Oliver Hart and John Moore}
}
@newspaperarticle {9772,
	title = {Economists Have Abandoned Principle},
	journal = {Wall Street Journal},
	year = {2008},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales}
}
@article {9771,
	title = {Debt Enforcement Around the World},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {116},
	number = {6},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1105-1149},
	abstract = {Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforce- ment will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. This measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and avail- ability of floating charge finance, influence efficiency.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Simeon Djankov and Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Shleifer}
}
@article {9779,
	title = {Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {97},
	number = {2},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {182-186},
	author = {Oliver Hart and John Moore}
}
@article {15256,
	title = {On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {113},
	number = {4},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {675-702},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15255,
	title = {Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships},
	journal = {Economic Journal},
	volume = {113},
	number = {486},
	year = {2003},
	note = {Reprinted in The Economics of Public Private Partnerships, D. Grimsey and M. K. Lewis, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2005.},
	pages = {C69-C76},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {9784,
	title = {Norms and the Theory of the Firm},
	journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
	year = {2001},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@unpublished {9783,
	title = {Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control},
	year = {2001},
	month = {October 2001},
	abstract = {This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyze and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on acquisition offers. We first show how proxy fights unaccompanied by an acquisition offer suffer from substantial shortcomings that limit the use of such contests in practice. We then argue that combining voting with acquisition offers is superior not only to proxy fights alone but also to takeover bids alone. Finally, we show that, when acquisition offers are in the form of cash or the acquirer{\textquoteright}s existing securities, voting shareholders can infer from the pre-vote market trading which outcome would be best in light of all the available public information. Our analysis has implications for the ongoing debates in the US over poison pills and in Europe over the new EEC directive on takeovers.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and Lucian Bebchuck}
}
@article {9782,
	title = {Financial Contracting},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
	volume = {34},
	number = {4},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {1079-1100},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@inbook {15267,
	title = {Different Approaches to Bankruptcy},
	booktitle = {Governance, Equity and Global Markets},
	year = {1999},
	note = {Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe, June 21-23, 1999 (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 2000).},
	publisher = {Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000.},
	organization = {Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000.},
	edition = {Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe, June 21-21, 1999.},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15252,
	title = {Foundations of Incomplete Contracts},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {66},
	number = {1},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {115-138},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15245,
	title = {Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," The Economic Journal},
	journal = {The Economic Journal},
	volume = {105},
	year = {1999},
	note = {Reprinted in Corporate Governance, K. Keasey, S. Thompson, and M. Wright (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1999. Reprinted in Critical Perspectives: Mergers and Acquisitions, S. Peck and P. Temple (eds.), Routledge, 2002.
},
	pages = {678-689},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@unpublished {9786,
	title = {Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership},
	year = {1998},
	month = {February 1998},
	author = {Oliver Hart and John Moore}
}
@article {15251,
	title = {Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {113},
	number = {1},
	year = {1998},
	pages = {1-41},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15250,
	title = {The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {112},
	number = {4},
	year = {1997},
	note = {To be reprinted in
Developments in the Economics of Privatization and Regulation, Michael A. Crew and David
Parker, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Spring 2008.
},
	pages = {1126-1161},
	author = {Oliver Hart and A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny}
}
@article {15249,
	title = {A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions},
	journal = {European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings},
	volume = {41},
	number = {3-5},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {461-473},
	author = {Oliver Hart and R. La Porta Drago and F. Lopez-de-Silanes and J. Moore}
}
@article {15248,
	title = {The Governance of Exchanges: Members{\textquoteright} Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership},
	journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy},
	volume = {12},
	number = {4},
	year = {1996},
	note = {Partially reprinted in ASX Perspective, Australian Stock Exchange "Covering the Securities Markets," 4th Quarter, 1997.
},
	pages = {53-69},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15247,
	title = {An Economist{\textquoteright}s View of Authority},
	journal = {Rationality and Society},
	volume = {8},
	number = {4},
	year = {1996},
	pages = {371-386},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15246,
	title = {Insolvency Reform in the U.K.: A Revised Proposal},
	journal = {Insolvency Law and Practice},
	volume = {11},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {4-11},
	author = {Oliver Hart and P. Aghion and J. Moore}
}
@article {15217,
	title = {Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {85},
	number = {3},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {567-585},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@book {9747,
	title = {Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure},
	year = {1995},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA},
	organization = {Oxford University Press, USA},
	address = {New York},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15216,
	title = {Improving Bankruptcy Procedure},
	journal = {Washington University Law Quarterly},
	volume = {72},
	number = {3},
	year = {1994},
	note = {Reprinted in Entrepreneurial Economics, A. Tabarrok (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2002.
},
	pages = {849-872},
	author = {Oliver Hart and P. Aghion and J. Moore}
}
@article {15215,
	title = {A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {109},
	number = {4},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {841-879},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15214,
	title = {A Proposal for Bankruptcy Reform in the U.K.},
	journal = {Insolvency Law \& Practice},
	volume = {9},
	number = {4},
	year = {1993},
	pages = {103-108},
	author = {Oliver Hart and P. Aghion and J. Moore}
}
@article {15213,
	title = {An Economist{\textquoteright}s View of Fiduciary Duty},
	journal = {University of Toronto Law Journal},
	volume = {43},
	year = {1993},
	pages = {299-313},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15212,
	title = {The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization},
	volume = {8},
	number = {3},
	year = {1992},
	author = {Oliver Hart and P. Aghion and J. Moore}
}
@article {15211,
	title = {Is {\textquoteright}Bounded Rationality{\textquoteright} an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?},
	journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
	year = {1990},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15210,
	title = {Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {98},
	number = {6},
	year = {1990},
	note = {Reprinted in numerous volumes.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15208,
	title = {An Economist{\textquoteright}s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm},
	journal = {Columbia Law Review},
	year = {1989},
	note = {Reprinted in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, Oliver Williamson (ed.), Oxford University Press (1990). Reprinted in The Managerial Economics Reader, Douglas J. Lamdin (ed.), Kolb Publishing Company, Miami, FL, 1994. Reprinted in Firms, Organizations and Contracts, Peter J. Buckley and Jonathan Michie (eds.), Oxford University Press, 1996. Partially reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, L. Putterman and R. Kroszner (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1996. Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, Nicolai Foss (ed.), Routledge, 2000. Reprinted in Alternative Theories of the Firm, R. L. Langlois, T. F. Yu, and P. L. Robertson (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 2002. Translated into Spanish for GESPYE Gestion Publica y Empressarial, University of Guadalajara, February 2004.
},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15207,
	title = {Bargaining and Strikes},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {CIV},
	year = {1989},
	note = {Reprinted in Economic Models of Trade Unions, T. Khalidson (ed.), Chapman \&amp; Hall Ltd, 1992.
},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15206,
	title = {Capital Structure As a Control Mechanism in Corporations},
	journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
	volume = {XXI},
	number = {3},
	year = {1988},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15205,
	title = {Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {LV},
	year = {1988},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Tirole}
}
@article {15204,
	title = {Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	volume = {56},
	number = {4},
	year = {1988},
	author = {Oliver Hart and J. Moore}
}
@article {15203,
	title = {Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm},
	journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization},
	volume = {4},
	number = {1},
	year = {1988},
	note = {Reprinted in The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, Oliver Williamson and Sidney Winter (eds.), Oxford University Press (1991).
},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15202,
	title = {One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control},
	journal = {Journal of Financial Economics,},
	year = {1988},
	note = {Reprinted in The Theory of Corporate Finance, M. J. Brennan (ed.), Brookfield VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1996.
},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15200,
	title = {The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	year = {1986},
	note = {Reprinted in numerous volumes.},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15201,
	title = {Price Destabilizing Speculation},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	year = {1986},
	author = {Oliver Hart and D. Kreps}
}
@article {15199,
	title = {Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results},
	journal = {Economic Journal},
	volume = {95},
	year = {1985},
	note = {Reprinted in The Economics of Product Differentiation, J. Thisse and G. Norman (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1994.
},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15198,
	title = {Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {LII},
	year = {1985},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15197,
	title = {Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot-Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry},
	journal = {International Economic Review},
	volume = {26},
	number = {3},
	year = {1985},
	author = {Oliver Hart and R. Guesnerie}
}
@article {15195,
	title = {The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme},
	journal = {Bell Journal of Economics},
	volume = {14},
	number = {Autumn},
	year = {1983},
	pages = {366-382},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15194,
	title = {Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {50},
	year = {1983},
	note = {Reprinted in Implicit Contract Theory, Sherwin Rosen (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1994.
},
	pages = {1-35},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15193,
	title = {Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {98},
	year = {1983},
	note = {Reprinted in Implicit Contract Theory, Sherwin Rosen (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1994.
},
	pages = {123-156},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15192,
	title = {An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	year = {1983},
	note = {Reprinted in Foundations of Insurance Economics, G. Dionne and S.E. Harrington (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. Reprinted in The Economics of Executive Compensation, K. F. Hallock and K. J. Murphy (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1999.
},
	pages = {7-46},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15196,
	title = {Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {91},
	year = {1983},
	pages = {907-928},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman and E. Maskin}
}
@article {15190,
	title = {Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {49},
	year = {1982},
	pages = {313-314},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15189,
	title = {A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics },
	volume = {97},
	year = {1982},
	note = {Reprinted in Temporary Equilibrium Selected Readings, Jean- Michel Grandmont (ed.), Academic Press, Inc., San Diego, CA. (1988). Reprinted in New Keynesian Economics: Coordination Failures and Real Rigidities, N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer (eds.), Vol. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1991). Reprinted in Macroeconomics and Imperfect Competition, Jean-Pascal Bénassy (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1995.
},
	pages = {109-138},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15188,
	title = {The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information},
	journal = {Journal of Finance},
	volume = {36},
	year = {1981},
	pages = {253-270},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15187,
	title = {Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment},
	journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings},
	volume = {71},
	year = {1981},
	pages = {301-307},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15186,
	title = {Disclosure Laws and Take-Over Bids},
	journal = {Journal of Finance},
	volume = {35},
	year = {1980},
	pages = {323-334},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15185,
	title = {Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	volume = {22},
	year = {1980},
	note = {Symposium on Non-Cooperative Approaches to Perfect Competition
},
	pages = {279-312},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15184,
	title = {Take-Over Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation},
	journal = {Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science},
	volume = {11},
	year = {1980},
	note = {Partially reprinted in Posner and Scott, eds., Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation. Reprinted in The Theory of Corporate Finance, M. J. Brennan (ed.), Brookfield VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1996. Reprinted in Corporate Governance, K. Keasey, S. Thompson, and M. Wright (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1999.
},
	pages = {42-64},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15182,
	title = {On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	volume = {47},
	year = {1979},
	pages = {1057-1083},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15180,
	title = {Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {46},
	year = {1979},
	note = {Reprinted in Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, J.-F. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1999.
},
	pages = {1-30},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15179,
	title = {A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies},
	journal = {Econometrica },
	volume = {47},
	year = {1979},
	pages = {293-329},
	author = {Oliver Hart and S. Grossman}
}
@article {15178,
	title = {Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	volume = {16},
	year = {1977},
	note = {Reprinted in Financial Markets and Incomplete Information, S. Bhattacharya and G. Constantinides (eds.), Rowman \&amp; Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1989.
},
	pages = {53-83},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15177,
	title = {On the Profitability of Speculation},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {91},
	year = {1977},
	pages = {579-597},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15176,
	title = {On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory },
	volume = {11},
	year = {1975},
	note = {Reprinted in General Equilibrium Theory Vol. II, Gérard Debreu (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996.
},
	pages = {418-443},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15175,
	title = {A Proof of the Existence of Equilibrium without the Free Disposal Assumption},
	journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics},
	volume = {2},
	year = {1975},
	pages = {335-343},
	author = {Oliver Hart and H.W. Kuhn}
}
@article {15174,
	title = {On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Securities Model},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	volume = {9},
	year = {1974},
	note = {Reprinted in Temporary Equilibrium Selected Readings, Jean-Michel Grandmont (ed.), Academic Press, Inc., San Diego, CA (1988).
},
	pages = {293-311},
	author = {Oliver Hart}
}
@article {15173,
	title = {On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	volume = {41},
	number = {January},
	year = {1974},
	pages = {129-147},
	author = {Oliver Hart and D.M. Jaffee}
}
