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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
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FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
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HARVARD.EDU
Oliver Hart
Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor
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1980
Hart, Oliver, and S Grossman
. 1980. “
Take-Over Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation
.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 11: 42-64.
1979
Hart, Oliver
. 1979. “
On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies
.” Econometrica 47: 1057-1083.
Hart, Oliver
. 1979. “
Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities
.” Review of Economic Studies 46: 1-30.
Hart, Oliver, and S Grossman
. 1979. “
A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
.” Econometrica 47: 293-329.
1977
Hart, Oliver
. 1977. “
Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium
.” Journal of Economic Theory 16: 53-83.
Hart, Oliver
. 1977. “
On the Profitability of Speculation
.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 91: 579-597.
1975
Hart, Oliver
. 1975. “
On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete
.” Journal of Economic Theory 11: 418-443.
Hart, Oliver, and HW Kuhn
. 1975. “
A Proof of the Existence of Equilibrium without the Free Disposal Assumption
.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 2: 335-343.
1974
Hart, Oliver
. 1974. “
On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Securities Model
.” Journal of Economic Theory 9: 293-311.
Hart, Oliver, and DM Jaffee
. 1974. “
On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries
.” Review of Economic Studies 41 (January): 129-147.
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