A Failure to Communicate: Networks and Intergroup Conflict
- Presents a game-theoretic model to examine the effect of an incomplete communication network on inter- and intra-group cooperation outside the 'shadow of the law.'
Cheating Because They Can
- Shows that, depending on how information spreads, sometimes tolerating a few cheaters in equilibrium is the best a group can do, and offers examples of almost fully cooperative social and economic arrangements.
Deceit, Group Structure, and Cooperation
- Analyzes the prospects for decentralized cooperation in the face of possibly deceitful group members.
Interethnic Cooperation, Civil Society, and Incendiary Rumors
- Assess the effectiveness of cross-group ties at mitigating interethnic conflict in different civil society contexts using a model adapted from Fearon and Laitin (1996).
What We Didn't Know We Know About Civil Society
- Presents findings from networks research in fields ranging from computer science to epidemiology to show the rich set of results that can inform the study of civil society in comparative politics.
Twitter, the Unambiguous Liberator?
- Shows that despite recent excitement about the role of online social networks media in pro-liberalization movements, under plausible conditions, the existence of such information channels might actually be detrimental to the success of movements.
The Fragility of Revolution
- Investigates a social movement's susceptibility to government repression based on the structure of communication between participants in the movement.
The Evolution of International Cooperation, with Andrew J. Coe
- Uses techniques from evolutionary game theory to identify the conditions under which cooperation can emerge and persist in the international system.