The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile. American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3: 601-619.. 2012.
Political foundations of the resource curse: A simplification and a comment. Journal of Development Economics 106, no. 1: 194-198.Abstract. 2014.
In this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original JDE 2006 paper generates all the same results. We also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper.
The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. S1: 5-44.. 2013.
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 2: 173-192.. 2013.
Finding El Dorado: Slavery and Long-Run Development in Colombia. Journal of Comparative Economics 40, no. 4: 534-564.. 2012.
Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia. In Institutions and Economic Performance, 181-245. 1st ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.. 2008.
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply. American Economic Review 102, no. 6: 3077-3110.. 2012.
Democracy, Public Policy and Inequality. APSA-Comparative Democratization 11, no. 3: 2-20.. 2013.
The Consequences of Radical Refrom: The French Revolution. American Economic Review 101, no. 7: 3286-3307.. 2011.
The Political Economy of Clientelism. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115, no. 2: 260-291.. 2013.
Colombia: Another 100 Years of Solitude? (plus the Spanish translation). Current History 112, no. 751: 43-48.. 2013.
Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?. Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 3: 845-875.. 2013.
Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa. Journal of Comparative Economics 41, no. 1: 534-564.. 2013.
The Myth of the Frontier. In Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.. 2011.
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control over the Military. Journal of the European Economic Association 8 , no. 2-3: 655–663.Abstract. 2010.
The question of who guards the guards is intimately connected with broader questions of state capacity and the establishment of a monopoly of violence in society, something which is often viewed as the defining feature of the modern state. But to establish such a monopoly, civilian rulers need not only to build an effective military, but also to control it. In this paper we study how governments may solve this problem when they recognize that their decisions to build a strong army may have ramifications for subsequent coups.