

Do listeners model speakers in on-line sentence comprehension?

Joshua K. Hartshorne, Manizeh Khan & Jesse C. Snedeker
Department of Psychology, Harvard University

Pragmatic Inferences


- Are inferences conventionalized or based on mental-state modeling?
- Evidence for on-line speaker-modeling
 - Inferences made in on-line processing disappear if listeners believe the speaker is socially/linguistically unusual
 - Adjectives (Grodner & Sedivy, in press)
 - Disfluency (Arnold, Hudson-Kam & Tanenhaus, 2007)

Question

To what extent do pragmatic inferences depend on beliefs about the speaker?

- Evidence so far is consistent with slower processing of the same inferences or with canceled inferences
 - Previous studies look at prediction, not interpretation
 - Instructions always disambiguated reference
- If speaker impairs truly cancel inferences, interpretation in a globally ambiguous sentence should be affected

Design




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- Visual world; TOBII eye tracker
- Novel objects, novel words – globally ambiguous instructions
 - Similar to Nadig, Sedivy, Bortfeld, & Joshi (2003)
- Unique referent only if contrast is inferred from the adjective

- **Speaker manipulation:** described as another student (*reliable*) or someone with social/linguistic impairments (*unreliable*); based on Grodner & Sedivy (in press)



Predictions

- **Reliable Speaker:** look at and choose target more than competitor
- **Unreliable Speaker:**
 - On-line processing: look equally to target and competitor
 - Final Interpretation:
 - *Canceled inference:* choose target and comp. at chance
 - *Slower inference:* choose target more than competitor




Experiment 1: Eye movement data

- Aim: Replicate unreliable-speaker effect from Grodner & Sedivy



Final Interpretation

- What people clicked on in Experiment 1
- Additional data from web-based sample, Experiment 2, $n=227$



- All groups chose target (item with a contrast object) above chance, $p's < .05$
- No sig. difference between reliable and unreliable speaker conditions, $p's > .05$

Summary

- Knowledge that a speaker is atypical affects online processing but does not necessarily block inferences

Future Directions

- Need to explore other types of pragmatic inferences
- Other types of speaker manipulations

References

- Arnold, J., Hudson-Kam, C., & Tanenhaus, M.K., (2007). If you say thee... uh... you are describing something hard: The on-line attribution of disfluency during reference comprehension. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 33, 914-930.
- Grodner, D. & Sedivy, J. (In press). The effects of speaker-specific information on pragmatic inferences. In N. Pearlmuter & E. Gibson (eds). *The Processing and Acquisition of Reference*. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
- Nadig, A., Sedivy, J., Joshi, A. & Bortfeld, H. (2003). The development of discourse constraints on the interpretation of adjectives. *Proceedings of the 27th annual Boston University Conference on Language Development*. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.