Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers

Eric Maskin

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS | FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES | HARVARD.EDU

Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers

Citation:

Maskin E. Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers. European Economic Review. 2000;44(4-6):667-681.

Notes:

(text of the Marshall lecture to the European Economic Association)

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Eric S. Maskin

Adams University Professor

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Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers

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Notes:

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