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Maskin E. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We go from Here?. In: Arrow Lectures. Columbia University Press; Forthcoming.\par \par Maskin E. Culture, Cooperation, and Repeated Games. In: Harrison L, Yasin Y Volume in Memory of Samuel P. Huntington. ; Forthcoming.\par \par Maskin E. Foreword. In: Arrow KJ Social Choice and Individual Values, third edition. Yale University Press; 2012.\par \par Maskin E. Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;71:9-11.\par \par Maskin E. Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games. In: Levin S Games, Groups, and the Global Good. Springer; 2009. p. 79-84.\par \par Maskin E, Bessen J. Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation. Rand Journal of Economics. 2009;40(4):611-635.\par \par Maskin E. Can Neural Data Improve Economics?. Science. 2008;321:1788-1789.\par \par Maskin E, Roberts K. On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium. Economic Theory. 2008;35(2):233-240.\par \par Maskin E. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals. Les Prix Nobel 2007. 2008.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2008;26(2):412-420.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. On the Robustness of Majority Rule. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2008;6(5):949-973.\par \par Maskin E, van den Bos W, Li J, Lau T, Cohen J, Montague R, McClure S. The Value of Victory: Social Origins of the Winner?s Curse in Common Value Auctions. Judgment and Decision Making. 2008;3(7):483-492.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. Bargaining and Destructive Power. Annals of Economics and Finance. 2007;8(2):217-227.\par \par Maskin E. On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules. Florida State University Law Review. 2006;33(3):557-562.\par \par Maskin E. Public Goods and Public Science. In: Maskus K, Reichman J International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime. Cambridge University Press; 2005. p. 139-141.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting. American Economic Review. 2005;95(4):1290-1299.\par \par Maskin E. Why Has Inequality Increased in China?. Division of Labor and Transaction Costs. 2005;1(1):67-71.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. The Fairest Vote of All. Scientific American. 2004;290(3):64-69.\par \par Maskin E. Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2004;2(5):913-923.\par \par  ?Markets and Where They Come From,? Review of S. Bowles. Science. 2004;306(5700):1293-1294.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government. American Economic Review. 2004;94(4):1034-1054.\par \par Maskin E. Review of R. Weintraub, How Economics Became a Mathematical Science. Journal of Economic Literature. 2004;42(1):173-174.\par \par Maskin E. The Unity of Auction Theory. Journal of Economic Literature. 2004;42(4):1102-1115.\par \par Maskin E. Auctions and Efficiency. In: Dewatripont M, Hansen L, Turnovsky S Advances in Economic Theory (invited lectures from the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society). Cambridge University Press; 2003. p. 1-24.\par \par Maskin E, Baliga S. Mechanism Design for the Environment. In: M\'e4ler KG, Vincent J Handbook of Environmental Economics. Elsevier Science/North Holland; 2003. p. 306-324.\par \par Maskin E, Kornai J, Roland G. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint. Journal of Economic Literature. 2003;41(4):1095-1136.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. 2003;45:395-409.\par \par Maskin E, Sj\'f6str\'f6m T. Implementation Theory. In: Arrow K, Sen A, Suzumura K Handbook of Social Choice Theory Vol. I. Amsterdam: North Holland; 2002. p. 237-288.\par \par Maskin E. On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. European Economic Review. 2002;46(4-5):725-733.\par \par Maskin E. Kinds of Theory. In: Negishi T, Ramachandran R, Mino K Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets (essays in honor of Ryuzo Sato). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2001. p. 45-55.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2001;100:191-219.\par \par Maskin E. Roy Radner and Incentive Theory. Review of Economic Design. 2001;6:311-324.\par \par Maskin E, Xu C. Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market. Economics of Transition. 2001;9:1-27.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Asymmetric Auctions. Review of Economic Studies. 2000;67:413-438.\par \par Maskin E. Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers. European Economic Review. 2000;44(4-6):667-681.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. Efficient Auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2000;115:341-388.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions. Review of Economic Studies. 2000;67:439-454.\par \par Maskin E, Qian Y, Xu C. Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form. Review of Economic Studies. 2000;67:359-378.\par \par Maskin E, Arrow K, Dailey G, Dasgupta P, Levin S, Maler K-G, Starrett D, Sterner T, Tietenberg T. Managing Ecosystem Resources. Environmental Science and Technology. 2000;34:1401-1406.\par \par Maskin E, Simonovits A. Planning, Shortage, and Transformation. MIT Press; 2000.\par \par Maskin E, Dewatripont M, Roland G. Soft Budget Constraints and Transition. In: Maskin E, Simonovits A Planning, Shortage and Transformation (essays in honor of Janos Kornai). Cambridge: MIT Press; 2000. p. 143-156.\par \par Maskin E, Chen M. Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments. Journal of Economic Theory. 1999;89(1):140-147.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. Democracy and the Good. In: Shapiro I, Hacker-Cordon C Rethinking Democracy for a New Century. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1999.\par \par Maskin E, Moore J. Implementation and Renegotiation. Review of Economic Studies. 1999;66:39-56.\par \par Maskin E. Introduction. In: Maskin E Recent Developments in Game Theory. London: Edward Elgar; 1999. p. ix-xviii.\par \par Maskin E. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. Review of Economic Studies. 1999;66:23-38.\par \par Maskin E. Recent Developments in Game Theory. Edward Elgar Publishing; 1999.\par \par Maskin E. Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review. 1999;89(2):421-425.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature. Review of Economic Studies. 1999;66:139-149.\par \par Maskin E. Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence. Economic Theory. 1999;14:429-437.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies. 1999;66:83-114.\par \par Maskin E. Theories of the Soft Budget Constraint. Japan and the World Economy. 1996:125-133.\par \par Maskin E, Banerjee A. A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1996;111(4):955-1605.\par \par Maskin E, Dewatripont M. Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation. Rand Journal of Economics. 1995:704-719.\par \par Maskin E, Dewatripont M. Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies. Review of Economic Studies. 1995;62:541-555.\par \par Maskin E, Hurwicz L, Postlewaite A. Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules when the Designer does not Know Endowments or Production Sets. In: Ledyard J The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability (essays in honor of Stanley Reiter). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1995. p. 367-433.\par \par Maskin E. Long-Term Investment by Japanese and American Firms. Japan and the World Economy. 1995;7:249-254.\par \par Maskin E. Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Games Forms. In: Basu K, Pattanaik P, Suzumura K Choice, Welfare, and Development (essays in honor of Amartya Sen). 100-109: Oxford University Press; 1995.\par \par Maskin E. Conceptual Economic Theory. In: Klein P The Role of Economic Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1994. p. 187-195.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D, Levine D. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information. Econometrica. 1994;62(5):997-1039.\par \par  The Invisible Hand and Externalities. American Economic Review. 1994;84(2):333-337.\par \par Maskin E, Dewatripont M. Centralization of Credit and Long-Term Investment. In: Bardhan P, Roemer J Market Socialism: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press; 1993. p. 169-174.\par \par Maskin E. Auctions and Privatization. In: Siebert H Privatization. J.C.B. Mohr Publisher; 1992. p. 115-136.\par \par  Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. (Maskin E, Dasgupta P, Gale D, Hart O). MIT Press; 1992.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values. Econometrica. 1992;60(1):1-42.\par \par Maskin E, Hart O. Production Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks. In: Dasgupta P, Gale D, Hart O, Maskin E Economic Analysis of Markets and Games (essays in honor of Frank Hahn). MIT Press; 1992. p. 107-127.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D. On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;53:428-438.\par \par Maskin E. Review of H. Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making. Journal of Economic Literature. 1991;29:1750-51.\par \par Maskin E, Dewatripont M. Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information. European Economic Review. 1990;34(2&3):311-321.\par \par Maskin E, Newbery D. Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency. American Economic Review. 1990;80(1):143-156.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market. Journal of Political Economy. 1990;98(1):70-93.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D. Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. American Economic Review. 1990;80(2):274-279.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D. Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990;51:194-206.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values. Econometrica. 1990;58(2):379-409.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D, Kreps D. Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-Run Players. Review of Economic Studies. 1990;57:555-573.\par \par Maskin E, Evans R. Efficient Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games. Games and Economic Behavior. 1989;1:361-369.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions. In: Hahn F The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games. Oxford University Press; 1989. p. 312-335.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example. Economics Letters. 1989;30:269-274.\par \par Maskin E, Farrell J. Renegotiation in Repeated Games. Games and Economic Behavior. 1989;1:327-360.\par \par Maskin E, Farrell J. Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium: Reply. Journal of Economic Theory. 1989;49(2):376-378.\par \par Maskin E. Corrigendum to "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition". European Economic Review. 1988;32(7):1567-1568.\par \par Maskin E, and with A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly OQCLFCI:. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs. Econometrica. 1988;56(3):549-570.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles. Econometrica. 1988;56(3):571-599.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots. Journal of Economic Theory. 1987;43(2):364-373.\par \par Maskin E. On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. In: Feiwel G Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow). MacMillan; 1987. p. 341-349.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. Monopoly with Asymmetric Information about Quality: Behavior and Regulation. European Economic Review. 1987;31(1):483-489.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ, Rochet JC. Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics. In: Groves T, Radner R, Reiter S Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms (essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; 1987. p. 256-266.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios. Economic Journal. 1987;97:581-595.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition. European Economic Review. 1987;31(4):947-968.\par \par Maskin E, Radner R, Myerson R. An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria. Review of Economic Studies. 1986;53(1):59-69.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part I (Theory). Review of Economic Studies. 1986;53(1):1-26.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part II (Applications). Review of Economic Studies. 1986;53(1):27-41.\par \par Maskin E. The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms. American Economic Review. 1986;76(2):382-386.\par \par Maskin E, Fudenberg D. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica. 1986;53(3):533-554.\par \par Maskin E. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms. In: Heller W, Starr R, Starrett D Uncertainty, Information and Communication, Volume 3 (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow). Cambridge University Press; 1986. p. 229-238.\par \par Maskin E. Auction Theory with Private Values. American Economic Review. 1985;75(2):150-156.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes. Journal of Public Economics. 1985;28(1):1-23.\par \par Maskin E. The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey. In: Hurwicz L, Schmeidler D, Sonnenschein H Social Goals And Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge University Press; 1985. p. 173-204.\par \par Maskin E, Tirole J. On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory. 1984;32:317-327.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Monopoly with Incomplete Information. Rand Journal of Economics. 1984;15(2):171-196.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers. Econometrica. 1984;52(6):1473-1518.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. A Second-Best Approach to Incentive Compatibility. In: Boyer M, Kihlstrom R Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. Elsevier Science Publishers; 1984. p. 143-154.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive-Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods. Review of Economic Studies,. 1983;50:171-196.\par \par Maskin E, Riley J. The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions. In: Englebrecht-Wiggans R, Shubik M, Stark R Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting. 205-230: New York University Press; 1983.\par \par Maskin E, Bohm V, Polemarchakis H, Postlewaite A. Monopolistic Quantity Rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1983;98:189-198.\par \par Maskin E, O.Hart, Grossman S. Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks. Journal of Political Economy. 1983:907-926.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1982:17-47.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. The Theory of Incentives: An Overview. In: Hildenbrand W Advances in Economic Theory (invited lectures from the 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society). Cambridge University Press; 1982. p. 31-94.\par \par Maskin E, Diamond P. An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, II: A Non-Steady Example. Journal of Economic Theory. 1981:165-195.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms. Econometrica. 1980;48:1507-1520.\par \par Maskin E. On First-best Taxation. In: Lecomber JRC, Slater M Income Distribution: 5 The Limits to Redistribution. 9-22: Scientechnica; 1980.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P, Hammond P. On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control. Review of Economic Studies. 1980:857-860.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickrey Auction. Economics Letters. 1980;6:309-313.\par \par Maskin E, Fishburn P, Gehrlein W. Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures. Discrete Applied Mathematics. 1979;1:229-252.\par \par Maskin E. Decision-Making under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice. Theory and Decision. 1979;11:319-337.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms. In: Laffont JJ Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. 289-308: North Holland; 1979.\par \par Maskin E, Laffont JJ. On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1979:27-37.\par \par Maskin E, Diamond P. An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contracts, I: Steady States. Bell Journal of Economics. 1979;10:282-316.\par \par Maskin E. Fonctions de Pr\'e9f\'e9rence Collective D\'e9finies sur des Domaines de Pr\'e9f\'e9rence Individuelle Soumis \'e0 des Constraintes. Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econom\'e9trie. 1979:153-182.\par \par Maskin E. Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium. In: Laffont JJ Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. North Holland; 1979. p. 433-440.\par \par Maskin E, Dasgupta P, Hammond P. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility. Review of Economic Studies. 1979;46(2):185-216.\par \par Maskin E, Fishburn P, Gehrlein W. Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures. Economics Letters. 1979;2:313-314.\par \par  Voting for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule. National Tax Journal. 1979;32:105-110.\par \par Maskin E. A Theorem on Utilitarianism. Review of Economic Studies. 1978;46(4):93-96.\par \par }