Ebert JP, Wegner DM. Bending time to one’s will. In: Sinnott-Armstrong WP, Nadel L Conscious will and responsibility: A tribute to Benjamin Libet. New York: Oxford University Press; In Press.
Cross-country evidence shows that corruption could be controlled with support from the education, free press and independent judicial systems, yet the theoretical foundation for such a connection is somewhat limited. This paper investigates the mechanisms behind the anti-corruption effect of education through civic engagement. We argue that equal universal access to education and the free press is a crucial tool for the majority of citizens to acquire the correct information needed to succeed in their anti-corruption initiatives. A simple reduced-form theoretical model, which allows for heterogeneity in educational attainment among agents, is used to explain the link between education equality and corruption. Evidence from cross-national panel data estimation between 1990 and 2005 shows the robust support for the relationship. Education equality has independent and complimentary anti-corruption effects with press freedom and the duration of democracy.
Schacter DL, Chamberlain J, Gaesser B, Gerlach KD. Chapter. In: Nadel L, Sinnott-Armstrong W Memory and law: Perspectives from cognitive neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press; In Press.
Why do states choose multilateralism? We develop an argument focused on the burden-sharing versus control dilemma of principal-agent (PA) models. We also present two alternative theoretical frames that could explain this choice: a normative logic of appropriateness and hegemonic self binding. We examine the political bases of support for sending foreign aid through multilateral versus bilateral channels. First, we clarify the concept of multilateralism. We show that the choices for internationalism and multilateralism are distinct. Second, we develop hypotheses from each of the three theories and examine how public opinion data allow us to shed light on these different theories about multilateralism. Finally, we provide evidence about the correlates of public support for multilateral engagement. We isolate how two competing rationales—burden sharing and control—dictate some of the politics around the choice between multilateral versus bilateral aid channels. The data support our claim that a principal-agent model can help us to understand the choice for multilateralism.