<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel J. Christie</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cristina Montiel</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cognitive Dimensions of Foreign Policy Decision Making</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wiley-Blackwell Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NJ</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jennifer Lerner</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel J. Christie</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cristina Montiel</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Role of Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wiley-Blackwell Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NJ</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gary Sherman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lee, Julia</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amy Cuddy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chris Oveis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James Gross</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jennifer Lerner</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership and Stress: Leadership is Associated with Lower Levels of Stress</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Forthcoming</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>23</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jennifer Lerner</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philip Tetlock</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why don’t Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum just quit?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Washington Post</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">04/08/2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-dont-newt-gingrich-and-rick-santorum-just-quit/2012/04/06/gIQAzUZB0S_story.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sunday Outook</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tingley, Dustin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jooa Julia Lee</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It is by now well known that political attitudes can be affected by emotions.  most earlier studies have focused (to our knowledge) on emotions generated by some political event (e.g. terrorism or increased immigration).  In contrast, we focus on emotions incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to the decision process.  We found that anxiety -generated by a video stimulus -significantly affected physiological arousal as measured by tonic skin conductance levels, and that higher physiological reactivity predicted more anti-immigration attitudes. We show that physiological reactivity mediated the relationship between anxiety and political attitudes. &lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arthur Spirling</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations for Modeling `Effectiveness' in International Relations</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Working Paper</style></work-type></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assessing Capabilities in International Politics: Biased Overestimation and the Case of the Imaginary “Missile Gap”</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Strategic Studies</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115-147</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How states assess the capabilities of their adversaries and rivals is of 
paramount importance to the theory and practice of international relations. This paper presents a framework for understanding why states overestimate the capabilities of their adversaries. Three types of overestimation are presented, consisting of conscious/rational, erroneous and biased overestimation. In order to demonstrate the phenomenon of biased overestimation in international politics, the case of the ‘Missile Gap’ (1957–61) controversy in the United States is examined. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">'Mirroring Risk': Empathetic Failure and the Cuban Missile Crisis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Intelligence and National Security</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">315-338</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Cuban Missile Crisis is by this point well known to all scholars of international politics.  Yet, although it has yielded countless lessons over the years, one critical aspect of the case has remained unexamined: the failure of estimation prior to the crisis that led U.S. officials to discount the possibility of a missile deployment in Cuba.  This article re-examines U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis in light of the concept of ‘mirroring risk,’ introduced in this article.  I present a framework for understanding a class of intelligence failures that are caused by the mis-assessment of how an adversary frames a decision and the risks that they are willing to take.  I also present a new two-stage process for understanding how individuals assess the risk-propensity of adversaries in international politics.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political Psychology</style></secondary-title><short-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs</style></short-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">649-661</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article uses both public and private documents to measure the operational code of John F. Kennedy in the summer of 1962. Previous operational code research (and indeed, much of content analysis more generally) has relied exclusively on the analysis of public 
speeches and is thus open to charges that the speeches represent attempts at deception, persuasion, or impression management. This article tests the validity of using public speech data in operational code analysis by comparing the output to the results one gets by analyzing private statements from the same period. The results strongly indicate that one 
obtains the same results using either the public or the private data, thus providing tentative conﬁrmation of the validity of using public speeches for assessing the operational codes of leaders.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">649</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel Kahneman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Trevor Thrall</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jane Cramer</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hawkish Biases</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79-96</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush From Governor to Second Term President</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Conflict Resolution</style></secondary-title><short-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stability and Change in Belief Systems</style></short-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">52</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">820-849</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cognitive frameworks and belief systems are the primary lenses through which presidents view the world. Two important questions are whether these beliefs ever change signiﬁcantly, and if so, what causes these changes? This article develops empirical data on the strategic and operational beliefs of President George W. Bush (GWB) as a means of examining the theoretical basis for how and why core beliefs change. The author analyzes the foreign policy operational code of President Bush in four separate phases of his political career: the immediate prepresidential phase; his nine months in ofﬁce prior to September 11, 2001; the six months immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and his last year in ofﬁce as a second-term president. The results of this article allow us to address several recurring questions that concern the Bush administration and presidents’ belief systems and decision making. They challenge traditional interpretations of the Bush presidency and provide some insights into the causal mechanisms that underlie belief change. 
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></issue><reprint-edition><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reprinted in: Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations, Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici and Mark Schafer, eds. (New York: Routledge Press, forthcoming).</style></reprint-edition><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">820</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stanley Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political Psychology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">509-536</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central to Alex George’s work was a concern with the psychology of presidential decision making. Our analysis focuses on George’s work at the intersection of leadership psychology and the psychology of judgment in the making of consequential foreign policy decisions, specifically those dealing with issues of war and peace. We begin with a review of the fundamental dilemmas of political decision making, focusing on the various factors that present challenges to leaders seeking to make high-quality decisions. We then move to an analysis of the nature of judgment and the ways in which it both shapes and is shaped by cognitive dynamics and conclude by examining a number of steps designed to 
help leaders avoid the most damaging blind spots of their own psychologies and cognitive biases. 
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">509</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>19</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel Kahneman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why Hawks Win</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foreign Policy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">01/2007</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3660</style></url></web-urls></urls><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34-38</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">158</style></issue><reprint-edition><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reprinted in: Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes of War and Peace, 3rd Ed., Richard K. Betts, ed. (UK: Longman/Pearson Press, 2007)  AND The Best American Political Writing 2007, Royce Flippin, ed. (New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2007)</style></reprint-edition><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Suedfeld</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stanley Renshon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Psychological Origins of Preventive War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">201-230</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jonathan Renshon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention (foreword by Alexander L. George)</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9085</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Praeger Security International (Greenwood)</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Westport, CT</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>