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Foreign Affairs and Party Ideology in America: The Case of Democrats and World War II

While running for president in 1968, George Wallace frequently said that “there ain’t a dime’s worth of difference between the two parties.” The American party system, he suggested, was rigged to present voters with two versions of the same thing; voters simply were not offered real alternatives. Though it seems doubtful that Wallace surveyed the literature before opining, his argument was firmly rooted in a vast and time-tested scholarship. It has often been said that ideological differences—at least any of a serious or fundamental nature—are lacking in the American political tradition. Recently, however, scholars have paid more attention to the ideological component of political parties and challenged the consensus thesis. The most prominent and comprehensive work in this area has demonstrated that American political parties do have reasoned, observable, evolving, and oppositional ideologies. However, this scholarship has generally focused exclusively on “domestic policy ideologies.” As a result, the critical and interconnected role that international events—and particularly wars—have played in the development of party ideology has not been fully recognized.

In one sense, this omission is not surprising because, as David R. Mayhew and Ira Katznelson have recently noted, many scholars studying the United States limit their causal variables to those that can be found within the nation’s borders.¹ Regrettably, this narrow approach leaves out an enormous explanatory factor: foreign wars. The underappreciation of major U.S. wars as a causal variable in the domestic realm limits our understanding of American

politics and government. For scholars of American political development and policy history, the domestic and international realms are too often treated as separate entities, existing independently of each other. Like brief thunderstorms, international events are cast as temporary distractions that can make the lights flicker on Capitol Hill; but once the storms pass, normal business resumes unperturbed and in accordance with previously scheduled events.

What follows is, in part, an attempt to take up the scholarly call to arms by Mayhew, Katznelson, and others. I do so by exploring the relationship between international influences and party ideology. Wars, offering the most profound kind of foreign influence, are an obvious place to begin. I argue here that World War II offers a prime case study of this relationship and that it was a major contributing factor in the Democratic Party's ideological shift away from economic populism and toward inclusion and solidarity.

IDEOLOGY, RHETORIC, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Political scientist Louis Hartz argued that, in stark contrast to Europe, a classical liberal consensus was firmly planted in American culture, and that any party differences were minor and played out within the narrow confines of that ideological box.² Historians such as Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Boorstin led the "consensus school," which articulated a similar lack of ideological conflict.³ Hofstadter touched on political parties in making his broader consensus argument: "It is in the nature of politics that conflict stands in the foreground," he wrote. But the "fierceness of the political struggles has often been misleading; for the range of vision embraced by the primary contestants in the major parties has always been bounded by the horizons of property and enterprise."⁴

Only in the postreform era have scholars consistently focused on ideology as a central component of political parties. While studies emphasized the absence of intraparty ideological cohesion and lack of interparty ideological conflict in much of the post-World War II era, more recent research shows that in the post-1968-72 period, the parties have become more ideologically cohesive internally and more polarized comparatively.⁵ Congressional studies are paying more attention to ideology, many noting the increasing ideological cohesion of the caucuses.⁶ The elections and voting literature notes a revival in parties, partisanship, and ideological voting at the individual level.⁷ Other studies explore ideology and parties in the states.⁸ Scholars are also addressing

the role of intraparty factions, considering, among other things, their ideological influences on the larger parties.⁹ Several factors have been cited as drivers of party ideology, including economics and social class, ethnicity and culture, critical realignments, and elite-led responses to various domestic events.¹⁰ John Gerring aptly summarizes this literature: “To put it baldly, the premise of nonideological parties no longer seems to fit the facts as we know them. Indeed, contemporary work by political scientists and historians points toward a new understanding of ideology’s involvement in American party politics.”¹¹

The most comprehensive account of party ideologies comes from Gerring.¹² Challenging the consensus school (that is, a lack of ideological distinction between parties), he argues that from 1828 onward the Republicans (or their Whig precursors prior to 1860) and the Democrats have offered coherent, identifiable, and changing ideologies in opposition to each other. Gerring’s thorough account concludes with a consideration of the factors that drive this partisan change. Ultimately, he finds there “is no general factor” and that “lots of things” drive ideological shifts.¹³ Yet international influences are notably absent from Gerring’s extensive list of “lots of things.” To his credit, he directly explains his exclusive focus on domestic factors, arguing that “because foreign policy has rarely played a significant role in American electoral politics, I focus primarily on domestic policies.” He continues in a footnote:

Foreign policy issues have entered debate at infrequent intervals (generally under conditions of open or imminent military conflict) after which politics has resumed its normal pace and usual domestic preoccupations. ... Party views on foreign policy have not corresponded neatly with the historical development of party views on domestic policy matters; which is to say, foreign policy ideologies have changed at different times and (often) for different reasons than domestic policy ideologies. Therefore, foreign policy provides a somewhat misleading guide to the public political identities of the American parties, and is best analyzed separately.¹⁴

But it is far from clear that major foreign policy issues have been “rare” and “infrequent.” In its approximately 220 years as a country, the United States has fought “hot” wars for more than 40 of those years, was immersed in the Cold War for decades, and has been involved in numerous smaller international conflicts. This consideration suggests that exploring domestic and foreign policy ideologies in isolation is problematic.

Argument and Methodological Approach

The problem with excluding any consideration of foreign policy is that it omits a critical variable in understanding party ideologies. Major wars, in particular, have been an ongoing and significant influence on domestic American politics. I argue here that events in the form of foreign wars can alter party ideology because they reshape the political landscape, thereby compelling political parties to alter their governing philosophies. In other words, wars force the dimension of international relations into the ideological package.

This thesis builds on Gerring's typology by presenting a case study of ideological change in the Democratic Party following World War II. The war helps to explain the Gerring-identified shift in Democratic ideology away from economic populism. While Gerring is certainly correct that no single factor can account for *all* instances of ideological change, World War II was intimately tied to this particular shift in the Democrats' public philosophy and such a link suggests that other wars could have had—and could continue to have—a similar influence.

I adopt Gerring's general approach to studying party ideology. He focuses on "presidential parties," or those elements of a party that "select (or endorse) a party's national platform and presidential nominee," and examines only the parties' "public ideology—the words and actions by which leaders represented their party before the general electorate" (to the exclusion of "private communications, motivations, and interests").¹⁵ That is, this approach highlights a party's dominant ideological strain as seen in its national platforms and the rhetoric of its presidents and presidential nominees.

One limitation of this approach is that by focusing only on the dominant ideological strain within a party, the role played by internal groups or factions is minimized. While some nuance and historical detail may be lost in this approach, it carries the benefit of highlighting the dominant and most important ideological thread and is perfectly appropriate for the purpose of developing an historical synthesis of American party ideology. This focus also has the advantage of speaking directly to Gerring's scholarship. The value added here is not in establishing a grand theory of party ideology in this historical context, but rather in building upon a leading interpretation and in identifying a central source of party ideology overlooked in previous scholarship.

The emphasis on elite rhetoric, despite some of its own limitations, also offers an effective way to gauge ideology. It is possible, of course, that parties, presidents, and candidates may alter their rhetoric in front of different audiences. They may also conceal their "true" beliefs behind crowd-pleasing rhetoric.

And party platforms may be more indicative of carefully orchestrated, nonoffending platitudes than realistic statements of where party elites (or rank-and-file members) actually stand.¹⁶ Yet rhetoric is also the conduit through which parties and political leaders communicate with the public and, frequently, other elites. As Mark A. Smith argues, rhetoric “is the currency of politics in that everything important passes through it. . . . It provides the connecting link between the goals of [political] leaders and their successes, limited in some ways but profound in others, in reshaping electoral coalitions and changing public policy.”¹⁷ As such, rhetoric is an invaluable source for understanding the development of party ideologies in America. The rhetoric used here also offers the benefit of creating a level and comparable playing field across time. There is no reason to think that party platforms, campaign speeches, and State of the Union addresses from one year are any more or less representative than those of another year. Whatever the limitations of these data sources, they offer consistency. Additionally, the platforms, candidate speeches, and State of the Union addresses employed here were all delivered to national audiences, thus limiting instances of atypical pandering before small, homogenous groups. Finally, this approach conforms to that taken by Gerring. To engage his work—the only substantial study of party ideology throughout American history—it is helpful to proceed, at least initially, on similar methodological grounds.

WORLD WAR II AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY IDEOLOGY

Before World War II, Democratic ideology was rooted in class-based populism, but after the war, the party’s ideology was based on universality and solidarity.¹⁸ World War II played a critical role in this change. Mobilizing for and fighting the war required a unified country. The class-based rhetoric Democrats employed prior to the outbreak of hostilities was divisive, pitting different segments of the country against one another. The war—if only by necessity—required a new approach that brought people together in solidarity for a national cause. This need encouraged the party to adopt a more unifying, inclusive ideology that became evident in the war’s aftermath. Various other factors indirectly tied to the war also bolstered this ideological transformation.

Prewar Democrats

Until recently, there was a general consensus that 1932 marked a critical hinge point for the Democratic Party. Before Franklin Roosevelt’s election in that

pivotal year, the party was plagued by constant disputes between its disparate, and often fundamentally opposed, elements. The party contained natural combatants: northerners and southerners; urban workers and rural farmers; nativists and immigrants; progressives and conservatives. In essence, the Democrats were a motley array of opposing forces unable to unify around a coherent ideology.¹⁹

All this changed, the standard view maintains, in 1932. Roosevelt not only saved the nation from the throes of the Great Depression but also rescued his party from irrelevance. For the first time in decades, the party had an identifiable ideology centered around the public philosophy of the welfare state.²⁰ Internal fissures did not disappear, but the majority of Democrats were united in their support for redistributive social and economic policies, statism, and science.²¹ As political scientist Sidney Milkis has argued, Roosevelt's reinterpretation of America's "liberal" ideals marked a profound break with the nation's limited government tradition. Prior to the 1930s, liberalism had always been linked to "Jeffersonian principles and the natural rights tradition of limited government drawn from Locke's Second Treatise and the Declaration of Independence. Roosevelt pronounced a new liberalism in which constitutional government and the natural rights tradition were not abandoned but linked to programmatic expansion and an activist national government."²²

Political scientists James Morone and John Gerring, however, argue that the transition was not quite so seamless. Morone notes that while the administrative state was greatly expanded under FDR, this was merely a natural response to the Depression: "The New Deal administrative inventions did not break sharply with the past. Roosevelt left behind a far greater government, but not one fundamentally different from ... that he found."²³ Gerring builds on Morone's analysis by demonstrating that the New Deal was the outgrowth of Bryanism and Wilsonianism and that the party's ideology fundamentally changed not with Roosevelt and the New Deal, but following World War II. Gerring reframes the period by identifying the Democratic Party's ideological hinge point in the late 1940s.²⁴ Contrary to the traditional view, Gerring maintains that the party was unified from the Bryan era on. "There was more cohesion and continuity within Democratic ideology between 1896 and 1948 than is generally recognized. This ideology was not oriented on Jefferson, nor was it oriented on the technocratic management of the welfare state; rather it was *Populist* in tone and policy."²⁵

Prewar Democrats were tied together by a belief in market regulation and wealth redistribution based on the public-interest model of evangelical

Christianity. Democratic ideology was rooted “in the ideal of majority rule and in the populist narrative in which the people fought for their rights against an economic and political elite. ... From 1896 to 1948, Democratic candidates sounded the bell of political and economic freedom and advocated for the rights of the common man.”²⁶ Policy proposals, invoking the language of reform, were tailored to benefit and appeal to the “people.” Monopolies and big business were targeted because they purportedly operated in opposition to the people’s interests.²⁷

All this, of course, is not to suggest that the 1932 election and the New Deal were unimportant for the Democratic Party. Indeed, the standard view is certainly correct that key aspects of the party looked very different after 1932. As Milkis argues, the presidency and its relationship to the party system were profoundly affected, and New Deal policies created a federal government that was a much more prominent and vital feature of Americans’ daily lives.²⁸ Yet the vast expansion of government during the 1930s was characterized by experimentation in direct response to the Great Depression—not a coherent, planned set of policy initiatives long envisioned by Roosevelt. Federal government intervention was initially conceived of as a temporary solution to a crisis and, even then, only after Roosevelt realized that traditional solutions such as balancing the budget would be insufficient.²⁹ Governing around a welfare state did not fully emerge within the Democratic Party until the 1960s. In sum, as Gerring argues, pre-World War II Democrats were, from a purely ideological standpoint, rooted in a public philosophy of class-based rhetorical appeals pitting the “people” against the “interests.”

Postwar Democrats

How, then, was Democratic ideology different after World War II? Most simply, a new strain of universality and solidarity emerged that was not present in the party’s public philosophy before the war, and it proved to be an important and enduring feature of its popular appeals.³⁰ Equality came to be associated with inclusion and formed the basis for postwar Democratic ideology. Gerring writes:

[In] the wake of World War II, the party’s egalitarian agenda was broadened to include a host of social groups and political issues that did not fit neatly into the socioeconomic perspective and the masses-versus-elites dichotomy of the Populist period. Equality in the 1890s or the 1930s did not mean the same thing as equality in the 1950s and 1960s. Forsaking the shrill polemics of Bryan, the party now adopted

a soothing tone and reassuring demeanor. The rhetoric of reconciliation replaced that of resentment. The all-inclusive American People subsumed the figure of the Common Man. . . . The organizing theme of Democratic ideology changed from an attack against special privilege to an appeal for inclusion. Party leaders rewrote the Democratic hymn-book; Populism was out, and Universalism was in.³¹

Tolerance, understanding, and inclusion became key components of the Democratic platform, which stood in stark contrast to the divisive “people vs. the powerful” rhetoric that preceded it.

Two specific changes in Democratic ideology—one rooted in economic policy, particularly with regard to labor issues, and one rooted in minority rights—are evident in the postwar epoch and differentiate the party’s prewar and postwar eras. During the first half of the century, Democrats embraced organized labor and the working man and rhetorically pitted them against business interests. But postwar Democrats worried less about capitalism’s excesses because John Maynard Keynes and John Kenneth Galbraith persuaded them that regulatory measures were sufficient to avoid serious economic depressions.³² Historian Alan Brinkley articulates the scope of the transformation. By the end of the war, he argues, “The concept of New Deal liberalism had assumed a new form. . . . [Its adherents] largely ignored the New Deal’s abortive experiments in economic planning, its failed efforts to create harmonious associational arrangements, its vigorous . . . antimonopoly and regulatory crusades, its open skepticism toward capitalism and its captains, its overt celebration of the state.”³³ In sum, liberal Democrats came to fully embrace capitalism. The lessons learned during the war, combined with previous New Deal policies, led to a dramatic softening of their prior economic views.

Also in the economic realm, the party became increasingly amenable to business in the 1950s, while organized labor became something of an electoral liability to the extent that candidates went to great lengths to demonstrate that they were not beholden to the American Federation of Labor or the Congress of Industrial Organizations. As Gerring explains, Populist-era Democrats employed “shrill cries against the depredations of ‘monopoly,’ ‘big business,’ and ‘usurious’ business practices. In the postwar era, the party dropped its litany of economic protest themes. . . . Democrats’ embrace of ‘the American capitalistic system’ was, for the first time in party history, unalloyed by Jeffersonian suspicions.”³⁴ The party gradually reduced labor’s influence, culminating in an altered method of selecting presidential candidates. By 1972, the Democratic nominee was chosen through primary elections. As

such, union leaders were no longer able to position themselves as powerful forces in the “smoke-filled rooms” where candidates were previously chosen.³⁵ Thus, the Democrats had moved from divisive pro-worker, anti-business rhetoric to a public stance of less support for organized labor coupled with less criticism of business interests.

The Democrats’ ideological pivot can also clearly be seen in their shift from focusing on majority rule to emphasizing pluralism and minority rights.³⁶ As many have pointed out, blacks especially became a consistent feature in the party’s rhetoric.³⁷ Of course, it should be noted that the staunchest supporters of segregation all hailed from the Democratic Party. Yet, among those elements of the party supporting racial liberalism (and this became the dominant strain by at least the 1940s), Gerring’s extensive content analysis yields interesting findings. Initially, Democrats, especially President Harry Truman, made an attempt to frame racial issues through the party’s prewar Populist lens by painting minorities, like laborers, as oppressed common people dominated by a cabal of powerful economic elites. But by 1948, as seen in that year’s convention platform, the party had adopted the new and now familiar frame of “civil rights” and “minority rights”:

The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination. We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution. ... We call upon Congress to support our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American principles: (1) the right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation.³⁸

This rhetorical shift was significant. It demonstrated that these issues were group-based, rather than afflictions pertaining to the great mass of common people. A similar group-based emphasis permeated the Democratic approach to poverty. The class-based rhetoric of Populist era Democrats was replaced by framing poverty as an abstract “social issue” with complex causes. As Gerring puts it, “There were still victims—the poor—but no longer any victimizers” like trusts or big business.³⁹

Democrats no longer saw a nation polarized between two classes, a small economic elite and the masses. The prewar notion of the common people

now appeared romantic and ill-informed.⁴⁰ Rather, there existed a vast middle into which numerous minority groups did not fit, and remedies were thus required to bring them into the fold. So, while prewar Populist Democrats were focused on bringing down the small economic elite and lifting the masses, postwar Democrats focused on helping relatively small, targeted minority groups and were suspicious of the masses who held them down. Ironically, mass society—once the intended beneficiary of Democratic efforts—had come to replace the conniving economic elite as the party’s target.

Gerrymandering provides numerous examples of this new focus throughout the party’s postwar epoch.⁴¹ In addition, this change is clearly reflected in Democratic Party platforms. They frequently began to list a series of particular minority groups along with tangible actions the party or candidate pledged to take on their behalf.⁴² The party’s platforms from its prewar Populist era did not reflect the laundry-list approach that the Democrats adopted in the postwar era.

These two broad factors—economic moderation and group-based minority rights—engendered a Democratic Party based around solidarity and inclusion. While the prewar Democrats focused on class divisions within society, the postwar party focused on national unity constructed around a series of disparate groups. Gerring concludes: “Consensus, tolerance, compromise, pragmatism, and mutual understanding . . . were the ideals to which the Democratic leaders aspired, ideals that were central to the party’s [postwar] *weltanschauung*, in which all peoples, all faiths, and all lifestyles were embraced (at least in principle).”⁴³

The Influence of World War II on the Democrats’ Ideological Shift

The primary question left to be addressed is how the ideology of the Democratic Party was transformed from its prewar class-based populism into postwar solidarity and inclusion. In other words, what accounts for Democrats altering their economic populism in favor of economic moderation and dropping their “people versus the powerful” rhetoric in favor of a group-based, minority rights approach? World War II played a major role. Most prominently, the war required national unity. Solidarity and cohesiveness were critical in facing what was arguably the nation’s gravest threat. Class-based divisions were secondary in this age of all-out war and had to be transcended if the country was to be victorious. This need for national unity made the old-style Democratic rhetoric seem out of place and retrograde. In addition,

World War II was tied up in other factors that Gerring emphasizes. Several revolved around economics: a long period of economic growth, the rise of the middle class, the ascendancy of Keynesianism, and the declining influence of labor unions. The Democratic Party's ideological shift was also influenced by the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge from the Left (e.g., the Communist Party, Huey Long, or the Progressive Party), and the Cold War.⁴⁴ In sum, multiple factors pushed the Democratic Party toward this major ideological shift. But a critical point to be noted for present purposes is that the crisis of World War II contributed directly to the shift by compelling the party to focus on national unity. In principle, once the war ended, the Democrats could have reverted back to their Populist-era ideological position. However, the complex and mutually reinforcing relationship between the war and the factors Gerring emphasizes helped solidify the change.

Wartime Solidarity: World War II's most important direct effect on the Democratic Party's ideological shift arose from the necessity of unifying the country behind the war effort. The divisive appeals pitting the "common people" against the "interests" or the economic elite quickly fell out of style after Japanese bombers attacked the United States.

This rhetorical shift is reflected in the party's 1936, 1940, and 1944 platforms and in President Roosevelt's major speeches. These three electoral years offer a good base for a prewar-postwar comparison. Roosevelt ran as a sitting president in all three. The first two occurred before the United States entered World War II, though by 1940 Roosevelt thought it was very possible that the country would ultimately become involved. The 1944 contest, of course, occurred several years after the Pearl Harbor attack brought America into the war.

The 1936 Democratic platform was filled with the party's then-commonplace class-warfare appeals. The document is full of pledges on behalf of "the people" and denunciations of the economic elite:

We hold this truth to be self-evident—that 12 years of Republican surrender to the dictatorship of a privileged few have been supplanted by a Democratic leadership which has returned the people themselves to the places of authority. ... We shall continue to use the powers of government to end the activities of the malefactors of great wealth who defraud and exploit the people. ... We have safeguarded the thrift of our citizens by restraining those who would gamble with other peoples savings [*sic*]. ... Monopolies and the

concentration of economic power ... continue to be the master of the producer, the exploiter of the consumer, and the enemy of the independent operator. ... The issue in this election is plain. The American people are called upon to choose between a Republican administration that has and would again regiment them in the service of privileged groups and a Democratic administration dedicated to the establishment of equal economic opportunity for all our people.⁴⁵

Similarly, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. notes, President Roosevelt's 1936 campaign emphasized class-based appeals, focusing on "the economic gains his Administration had secured [and] appeals to class differences."⁴⁶ Roosevelt emphasized these themes throughout his campaign, often alternating between the two touchstones from speech to speech.⁴⁷ An address in New York City on October 31, 1936, exemplified the class-based theme:

We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace—business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. They had begun to consider the Government of the United States as a mere appendage to their own affairs. We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred. I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master.⁴⁸

Roosevelt went on to refer to the financial elites as "tyrants" who "attack the integrity and honor of American Government itself" and "campaign against America's working people."⁴⁹ The key point here is that in the 1936 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party was emphasizing class-based differences. On one side stood the hard working common people, and on the other the elites seeking to exploit the less well off and greedily line their own pockets with the fruits of the working person's labor.

The 1940 Democratic platform was similar in tone and style to that of 1936. Again there was a lengthy discourse on how the administration had worked to protect average Americans from the selfish elites. A few illustrative lines convey the theme:

We have attacked and will continue to attack unbridled concentration of economic power and the exploitation of the consumer and the investor. We have attacked the kind of banking which treated America as a colonial empire to exploit; the kind of securities business which regarded the Stock Exchange as a private gambling club for wagering other people's money; the kind of public utility holding companies which used consumers' and investors' money to suborn a free press, bludgeon legislatures and political conventions, and control elections against the interest of their customers and their security holders.⁵⁰

In keeping with the party's standard prewar rhetoric, references to "the people" and "the average man and woman" were juxtaposed against "the selfish interest of a few" or "a privileged few" bent on "exploitation" as a means to amass "vast political empires."⁵¹

Roosevelt's acceptance speech to that national convention, by contrast, struck a very different note and signaled a crucial shift in his rhetoric. The President spent nearly the entire address discussing the war in Europe, noting that it "is not an ordinary war," that it "threatens all men everywhere," and "would of necessity deeply affect the future of this nation."⁵² Given this reality, Roosevelt said he would reluctantly serve a third term. He only briefly touched on domestic politics and the party's standard class-warfare theme, and did so in a remarkably less bellicose manner than had been typical:

We have had to develop ... the answers to aspirations which had come from every State and every family in the land. ... Some of us have labeled it a wider and more equitable distribution of wealth in our land. It has included among its aims, to liberalize and broaden the control of vast industries—lodged today in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals of very great financial power. But all these definitions and labels are essentially the expression of one consistent thought. They represent a constantly growing sense of human decency, human decency throughout our nation. This sense of human decency is happily confined to no group or class. ... You find it, to a growing degree, even among those who are listed in that top group which has so much control over the industrial and financial structure of the nation.⁵³

Also notable in Roosevelt's 1940 speech were his appeals for national unity. The President said, for instance: "National unity in the United States became

a crying essential in the face of” Europe’s turmoil. He went on to honor the sacrifice and national service of private citizens “who have placed patriotism about all else” by leaving their jobs and homes to protect the country in recent years.⁵⁴ In closing, Roosevelt referred to selfishness but not with its usual association with the rich. Rather, he used it to implore all Americans to join together in opposing the European forces fighting against freedom:

It is the continuance of civilization as we know it versus the ultimate destruction of all that we have held dear—religion against godlessness; the ideal of justice against the practice of force; moral decency versus the firing squad; courage to speak out, and to act, versus the false lullaby of appeasement. But it has been well said that a selfish and greedy people cannot be free. The American people must decide whether these things are worth making sacrifices of money, of energy, and of self.⁵⁵

Thus, while the 1940 Democratic platform echoed the party’s standard class-based, populist themes, Roosevelt’s acceptance speech focused on the war in Europe, scarcely mentioned class divisions, reached out to the economic elite, and called for national unity.

Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, national unity became central to Roosevelt’s strategy for winning the war. Any lingering attachment to divisive class-based rhetoric Roosevelt might have had was quickly discarded. As Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis has demonstrated, FDR’s chief worry was that the war “would be forced upon an America that remained deeply divided ideologically.” As a result, his job as president “had similarities to that of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War—the task of uniting the American people. . . . He must strive to make of himself the very personification of the kind of active American union that was vitally necessary, stressing the positive (all that made for union) while shunning, to the maximum possible degree, divisive words and deeds.”⁵⁶ In addition, the country was swept up in patriotism, which had a unifying force, rendering class distinctions, at least temporarily, less important.⁵⁷

Roosevelt’s new focus on solidarity was evident in his annual State of the Union addresses during World War II when he made more impassioned appeals for national unity and sought to quell domestic divisions. His 1942 address, for example, warned that “we must guard against divisions among ourselves.”⁵⁸ Similarly, appearing before Congress one year later, Roosevelt said: “Fortunately, there are only a few Americans who place appetite above patriotism. . . . We Americans intend to do this great job together. In our

common labors we must build and fortify the very foundation of national unity—confidence in one another.”⁵⁹ FDR’s 1944 State of the Union Address contained similar themes and omitted class-based denunciations—even when he detailed his new domestic economic plan, which he hoped would ultimately amount to a “second Bill of Rights.”⁶⁰ Before the war, such a proposal would almost certainly have been accompanied by stark class-based rhetoric.

All of these speeches were devoid of anything even approaching an appeal to class differences or denunciations of an economic or political elite. In short, as far as Roosevelt was concerned, Americans were in this fight together. Winning World War II required a unified effort and there was no room for internal division. This should not be a surprise. World War II was such a cataclysmic event that it completely reshuffled the American political landscape. The bitter class differences that characterized the prewar era appeared petty and unimportant when the country was faced with war against Nazism and fascism.

By 1944, the Democratic platform was in line with Roosevelt’s nomination speech four years earlier and his subsequent State of the Union addresses. There were appeals to unity and conscious efforts to display solidarity. For instance, the platform stated: “Our gallant sons are dying on land, on sea, and in the air. They do not die as Republicans. They do not die as Democrats. They die as Americans.”⁶¹ Notably, the prewar theme of helping “the people” remained, but the once constant references to a greedy oppositional elite were completely absent. The harshest class-based line stated: “We reassert our faith in competitive private enterprise, free from control by monopolies, cartels, or any arbitrary private or public authority.”⁶²

Similarly, Roosevelt’s short 1944 acceptance speech lacked any reference to the class-based appeals seen before World War II. Rather, the President emphasized solidarity even in his brief discussion of domestic economics: “The people of the United States have transcended party affiliation, not only Democrats but also forward-looking Republicans, and millions of independent voters have turned to progressive leadership, a leadership which has sought consistently and with fair success to advance the average American citizen who had been so forgotten during the period after the last war.”⁶³ Remarkably, that sentence about the domestic economy was the closest Roosevelt came to anything that could be construed as a class-based appeal.

Thus, Democratic platforms and President Roosevelt’s key speeches from 1936 to 1944 demonstrate a profound transition in the party’s rhetoric. The class-based references that marked the prewar Democratic Party had been

abandoned. Of course, appeals were still made to average and working Americans but, crucially, the harsh denunciations of the “interests” and the “powerful” were dropped entirely. In their place were statements emphasizing solidarity and national unity. Gerring suggests that the prewar “people versus the powerful” rhetoric characterized the Democratic Party until at least 1948. But interestingly, the only Roosevelt speech Gerring cites after the United States entered the war does not support this assertion. In response to Republican accusations of communist sympathizers within his administration, Roosevelt said: “This form of fear propaganda is not new among rabble rousers and fomenters of class hatred.”⁶⁴ Gerring’s reliance on this quote to bridge the gap between 1941 and 1948 is curious because it is starkly different from the kind of class-based appeals that prewar Democrats made. Rather than speaking to the majority of average Americans by attacking a selfish and powerful elite, Roosevelt here seems to have been accusing Republicans of engaging in divisive class warfare.

In sum, World War II marked the crucial hinge point in Democratic ideology with regard to class antagonisms. The war changed the domestic political landscape and the Democrats responded, altering their rhetoric in crucial ways. Appeals to class tensions were out. National unity and solidarity were in. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent years of military conflict, class warfare simply did not resonate. In a similar vein, others have noted that overt efforts were undertaken to increase unity across ethnic lines and reduce divisive nativism.⁶⁵ Nationalism and patriotism were the order of the day. Although class distinctions remained during these years, the country “rallied around the flag.”⁶⁶ Class-based appeals have never fully melted away from the Democrats’ public philosophy (such as Truman in 1948, Gore in 2000, or Edwards in 2008), but they have not returned to claim the central, dominant role they played in the party’s prewar ideology.

Economic Factors: Overlooking World War II, Gerring identifies several economic factors (in addition to other influences discussed in the next section) in explaining the Democratic Party’s ideological shift. Specifically, he asserts that economic growth, the rise of the middle class, the triumph of Keynesianism, and the sagging influence of labor unions induced the transformation. These factors were undeniably important in the Democrats’ shift, but it is worth noting that the war itself was a contributing and reinforcing factor in these very economic changes. The war served, along with the economic considerations Gerring emphasizes, to ensure that the party’s ideological shift endured when, in principle, it might have reverted to its earlier Populist style.

The prewar Democratic focus on a “people vs. the powerful” rhetorical style is much more likely to be successful in an era of vast economic inequality or a period of economic hardship. Before the war, such appeals had obvious constituencies: first, poor laborers who worked hard under difficult conditions and then, after 1929, victims of the country’s worst-ever economic depression. After the war, the burgeoning and dominant middle class of the late 1940s—fueled by the G.I. Bill—combined with the period’s humming economy, gave class-based rhetoric less salience.⁶⁷ To have broad-based appeal, such rhetoric would have required the endorsement of the freshly constituted middle class, yet this demographic had new concerns of its own. As a result, the fierce class-based speech of the prewar Democrats fell on deaf ears. The natural audience for this message had dissipated.

These developments were reinforced by the Democrats’ adoption of Keynesianism, the economic theory of maintaining a market-based economy augmented by governmental policies to promote consumption, increase employment, and stimulate business. While this embrace signaled the collapse of the hotly contested doctrine of pure laissez-faire economics, it also put the party in a position of defending the market economy. As David Kennedy writes, “If earlier liberals conceived of the economy as a mechanism that needed fixing, the Keynesians thought of the economy as an organism that needed feeding but that otherwise should be left to its own devices.”⁶⁸ The adoption of Keynesianism, then, shifted the Democratic Party’s view of economics in general and of the government’s role in the economy in particular. Obviously, the full adoption of Keynes’ theories was related to the strong economic growth and the growing middle class that it helped produce. It was also tied to the beginning of the end for organized labor.⁶⁹

Labor unions continued a long, slow decline in influence in the postwar era. Organized labor had suffered during World War II because of, among other factors, limits on strikes and internal divisions within the labor movement. Then, following the war, passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, along with the growing economy and emergence of a strong middle class (which made the bill viable), all contributed to labor’s dwindling power. Historian Nelson Lichtenstein places the turning point between 1946 and 1948, when the union movement’s attempts to shape the postwar economy were stopped by business interests that by then had become at ease with Democrats. “Labor’s ambitions were thereafter sharply curbed, and its economic program was reduced to a sort of militant interest group politics, in which a Keynesian emphasis on sustained growth and productivity gain-sharing replaced labor’s earlier commitment to economic planning and social solidarity.”⁷⁰ The salient

point that emerges is that the above-referenced economic factors were all intimately tied together. The growing economy and resulting middle class moderated Democrats' suspicion of capitalism and led them to buy into America's market economy—albeit with their New Deal modifications. In addition, the economy's vitality proved the feasibility of, and validated the Democrats' adoption of, Keynesianism. And the Democrats' newly adopted Keynesian policies limited their commonalities with organized labor. These developments in turn led to labor's initial slip.

These related economic factors clearly played a role in the Democratic Party's new ideological makeup. Notably, though, World War II contributed to and reinforced these economic developments. Most economists and historians maintain that the war played an important role in ending the Great Depression and creating the ensuing strong economy.⁷¹ They argue that the Keynesian-inspired massive federal spending galvanized the economy with multiplied effects on the civilian sector. As a result, the nation reached full employment and increased GNP and personal consumption, and out of all this a strong middle class emerged. Economist Herbert Stein is representative of this camp. He notes that before the war, the nation was perpetually mired in stagnation and permanent deficits with no easy solutions. In addition, there were still ten million people unemployed and there was no prospect that private investment could significantly mitigate the problem. But “the war changed all of that dramatically.” Full employment became a reality; the issue of secular stagnation was put to rest; businessmen became involved in federal economic policy; the federal debt, enormous budgets, and the pay-as-you-go tax system were erased; and opposing economic factions were able to unite behind the war effort. “All of this,” Stein writes, “came about primarily as a result of conditions created coincidentally and accidentally by the war.”⁷²

A smaller group of scholars contend that World War II's influence on the economic recovery was less profound than is generally thought. None contend that it played no role, only that it was not the sole cause. Kennedy, for instance, says the war worked in tandem with the New Deal. “The New Deal petered out in 1938. ... [Full economic] recovery awaited not the release of more New Deal energies but the unleashing of the dogs of war. ... When the war brought ... a recovery that inaugurated the most prosperous quarter century America has ever known, it brought it to an economy and a country that the New Deal had fundamentally altered.”⁷³ Economists J. Bradford de Long and Lawrence H. Summers offer a stronger prewar argument. Utilizing pre- and postwar output data, they maintain that 80 percent of the economic recovery had already taken place by 1942. To the extent this is true, “It is hard

to attribute any of the pre-1942 catch-up of the economy to the war” — though, as De Long and Summers acknowledge, one could argue that Roosevelt began wartime mobilization well before the Pearl Harbor attack formally drew the United States into the war.⁷⁴ Still another view is offered by economist Robert Higgs, who argues that the major shift occurred not prior to (or as a result of) World War II, but in its immediate aftermath. While the war did push the economy out of the Depression, it did so indirectly. “Certain events of the war years—the buildup of financial wealth and especially the transformation of expectations—justify an interpretation that views the war as an event that recreated the possibility of genuine economic recovery. As the war ended, real prosperity returned.”⁷⁵ Thus, Higgs argues that the war ended the Great Depression but in a roundabout way. Rather than the war bringing the economic downturn to an end as most scholars contend, the conflict induced a postwar boom from 1946 to 1949.⁷⁶ Clearly, then, there is disagreement over the role World War II played in ending the Great Depression and initiating a strong economy. The timing of these effects is also contested. But the important point to note here is that the war and the economy were, in one way or another, related and mutually reinforcing with regard to the influence they had on the Democratic Party’s ideology.

The war was also entangled with the Keynesian triumph and its embrace by Democrats. Economist Tyler Cowen writes: “The onset of the war brought significant increases in demand and government spending, and eventually, government control over investment—precisely what Keynes had recommended.”⁷⁷ As a consequence, instead of merely pointing out the inequalities and downfalls associated with a pure market economy, Democrats were now in a position of supporting the economic system. As Brinkley puts it, “Keynes’s economic doctrines ... suggested ways to introduce in peacetime the kinds of stimuli that had created the impressive wartime expansion. They offered, in fact, an escape from one of liberalism’s most troubling dilemmas and a mechanism for which reformers had long been groping. They provided a way to manage the economy without directly challenging the prerogatives of capitalists.”⁷⁸ That is, the war experience demonstrated that governmental intervention in the private sector was extremely complicated and at some point became unnecessary. In addition, it showed that vast new regulatory functions were not required either. Rather, indirect economic oversight through monetary and fiscal “levers” combined with a moderate welfare state was sufficient. These initiatives were no longer viewed as temporary solutions to stem the flow until a more fundamental solution was settled upon. Instead, these measures had become the solution. The renewed wartime faith in economic

growth, Brinkley continues, led to “several ideological conclusions of considerable importance to the future of liberalism. It helped relegitimize American capitalism [among those] who had developed serious doubts about its viability. ... It robbed the “regulatory” reform ideas ... of their urgency and gave credence instead to Keynesian ideas.”⁷⁹

In sum, while the economic changes that Gerring identified clearly played key causal roles in the Democratic Party’s ideological shift at the end of the 1940s, World War II just as clearly contributed to and reinforced those developments.⁸⁰

Other Factors: Gerring argues that at least three other factors—the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a leftist challenger, and Cold War anticommunism—also played a role in the Democratic Party’s postwar ideological shift.⁸¹ Yet, like the economic considerations, these factors were also intertwined with the war in important ways.

Race played a significant role in altering the Democrats’ ideological position. Traditionally, the party had been rooted in white supremacy, making this transformation all the more notable. Civil rights did not fit comfortably into the Democrats’ old majoritarian ideology. Rather, it was a new issue requiring the extension of new rights to a targeted minority group. The party’s adoption of the issue spurred it to identify other groups in need of rights extensions.⁸²

While the new attention to civil rights on the national agenda and in the Democratic Party’s ideology clearly had multiple propellants, African American involvement in the war reinforced its emergence. The black community’s contribution to the war effort began to alter white attitudes on race.⁸³ In addition, the war galvanized the black community to organize itself by developing some of the key groups that would lead the civil rights movement in coming decades.⁸⁴ And finally, the war spurred a new moral and intellectual environment that was more sympathetic to race issues. Specifically, the intellectual war against the Nazi regime undermined any ideology of racial supremacy in the United States by exposing unavoidable contradictions and hypocrisy at home. For example, several months before the United States even entered the war, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in Newfoundland to issue the Atlantic Charter, a brief statement laying out the eight “common principles in the national policies” of the United States and Great Britain “on which they base[d] their hopes for a better future for the world.” One of these principles was respect for “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and [the United

States and Britain] wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”⁸⁵ The *New Republic* summed up the difficulty, arguing that racial discrimination at home made a “mockery of the theory that we are fighting for democracy, and we are giving aid and comfort to the enemy thereby.”⁸⁶ The editors also worried that whites engaged in stoking racial tension in cities such as Detroit “were assuredly doing Hitler’s work. We don’t doubt that the story of that riot was told all over Asia, with Nazi trimmings.”⁸⁷ Similarly, in 1943, *The Nation* argued: “It is time for us to clear our minds and hearts of the contradictions that are rotting our moral position and undermining our purpose. We cannot fight fascism abroad while turning a blind eye to fascism at home. We cannot inscribe on our banners: ‘For democracy and a caste system.’ We cannot liberate oppressed peoples while maintaining the right to oppress our own minorities.”⁸⁸ Liberal intellectuals, Brinkley notes, started moving “from a preoccupation with ‘reform’ (with a set of essentially class-based issues centering around confronting the problem of monopoly and economic disorder) and toward a preoccupation with ‘rights’ (a commitment to the liberation of oppressed peoples and groups).”⁸⁹

As a result of the war-induced factors described above—altered white attitudes, African American organization, and the changed intellectual climate—tangible policy benefits were achieved. Several labor policies related to African Americans were initiated as a result of World War II. The number of blacks working in defense industries skyrocketed during the war and much of this employment came in higher-paying, skilled jobs. While this transition resulted primarily from wartime labor shortages, it was due in part to several federal government initiatives designed to increase African American employment. The War Labor Board, for instance, barred wage differences based on race in 1943.⁹⁰ In addition, labor unions restricting black membership were no longer offered the necessary certifications by the National Labor Relations Board. Finally, the U.S. Employment Service banned job listings by race.⁹¹ Combined, these policies amounted to what economist William J. Collins calls “the federal government’s first effort to enforce a wide-ranging anti-discrimination policy.”⁹²

While these employment advances were significant, the most profound World War II-era policy changes for African Americans occurred in the realm of voting rights. The Soldier Voting Act of 1942 federalized the right of soldiers to register and to vote absentee.⁹³ Even more important, though, the Soldier Voting Act abolished the poll tax. Eliminating the tax, which was designed to, and had the effect of, decreasing black access to the ballot in

southern states, was obviously crucial to providing full political participation to all citizens. Liberals in Congress had been attempting to do away with the poll tax for several years but had made little headway because bills were blocked in the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee. But with the war under way, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers was difficult to oppose and proponents of the measure emphasized its new relevance. As Florida Senator Claude Pepper said, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers “would ring around the world that America was carrying out its professions of democracy.”⁹⁴ Historian Steven Lawson maintains that it was this new war-related argument that carried the day. Opponents had no cover to “filibuster [the bill] because they found it difficult to justify the deprivation of the right to vote to men fighting for their country.”⁹⁵ While states would still retain administrative control over absentee voting, the Soldier Voting Act was a turning point in the campaign for African American voting rights. As Alexander Keyssar argues, the “federal government’s disapproval of poll taxes had become a matter of law, and the wartime climate of opinion contributed to the repeal of the poll tax in Georgia in 1945 as well as to the postwar passage of state laws exempting veterans from poll taxes.”⁹⁶ Tellingly, the Soldier Voting Act marked the first expansion of African American voting rights since Reconstruction.

Smith v. Allwright, a 1944 U.S. Supreme Court case, carried even more significance for black voting rights.⁹⁷ In an 8–1 decision, the Court reversed 1935’s *Grovey v. Townsend*, which had held that political parties were private associations and thus not subject to the Fifteenth Amendment’s protections against racial discrimination.⁹⁸ *Smith*, by contrast, declared the so-called white primary unconstitutional. As Keyssar notes, “The justices were not immune to events transpiring in the world around them. ... They were well aware of the links between the ideological dimensions of World War II and the exclusion of blacks from voting in the South.”⁹⁹ Historian Darlene Clark Hine argues that the “white primary was one of the first casualties of World War II.”¹⁰⁰ Contemporaneous accounts also made the connection. The *New York Times* Washington bureau chief Arthur Krock pinned the decision directly on the altered intellectual environment emanating from the war. “The real reason for the overturn,” Krock wrote, was that “the common sacrifices of wartime have turned public opinion and the court against previously sustained devices to exclude minorities from any privilege of citizenship the majority enjoys.”¹⁰¹ *Smith*’s results were dramatic. By 1952, more than a million southern blacks were registered to vote—four times as many as in 1940.¹⁰² In sum, World War II played an important and reinforcing role in elevating the prominence of racial politics.

Along the same lines, the lack of a significant challenge from the left was at least partially a consequence of the economic factors addressed above. Before the war, there was no shortage of left-wing challengers, including the Union Party, Huey Long, the American Labor Party, and the Communist Party. The strong postwar economy and developing middle class limited the constituency to which such leftists could easily appeal.

Another factor in the Democrats' ideological shift was Cold War anti-communism. It, too, was partially linked to the war. As Kennedy asserts, "World War II led directly to the Cold War and ended a century and a half of American isolationism."¹⁰³ Indeed, World War II initiated an ongoing era of involvement in international relations. Much of the U.S. desire to stay engaged in world affairs emanated out of the war. Because the war affected the United States so profoundly and in so many ways, the country sought to do everything in its power to minimize the chances of a similar future war. It laid plans for a world deliberative body similar to Wilson's rejected League of Nations. In addition, the United States sought not only to rebuild benign versions of Germany and Japan, but also to export the ideology of democracy and capitalism. In short, World War II changed America's position in, and view of, the world. A widespread consensus developed that authoritarianism had to be confronted lest a Hitler-like figure be allowed to emerge again.¹⁰⁴

World War II also changed the Soviet Union. For starters, the war was felt much more deeply in the USSR than in the United States. The Soviet Union was left in ruins with roughly 27 million fatalities—90 times the number of American dead. Joseph Stalin emerged from the war, like his U.S. counterparts, determined to avoid another conflict on that scale. He also felt the USSR was entitled to compensation for its wartime losses but, due to its devastation, the country was in no position to unilaterally take what it wanted. There was, however, a silver lining from Stalin's perspective. Steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology, he believed capitalism was bound to destroy itself. Stalin thought that once the war ended, Britain and the United States would have no further reason to cooperate and capitalism's inherent flaws would emerge and plunge its practitioners into another depression. At that point, Stalin theorized, the Soviets could take over Europe as Hitler had amid squabbling capitalists in the aftermath of World War I.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the postwar world sported the newly, but fully, engaged United States, on the one hand, as the planet's leading champion of freedom, and, on the other, a devastated, but entitled, Soviet Union as the most authoritarian

nation on Earth biding its time for its rightful ascension over all of Europe. In this sense, World War II was very much at the root of the Cold War world that developed in its aftermath. It is difficult to know if this ideological confrontation would have eventually emerged without World War II because those years shaped both countries in ways that made the Cold War so much more likely, if not unavoidable. Admittedly, this tie is indirect. And, admittedly, the Cold War itself influenced Democratic ideology. Nonetheless, World War II played a role in setting the stage for this superpower confrontation.

This new international climate—which reinforced domestic anticommunism in the United States—had reverberations on the Democrats’ ideological repositioning. Gerring succinctly writes: “It is difficult to overestimate the effects of the Cold War, which helped marginalize the left and legitimate the right; which seemed to vindicate the (Republican) perspective that statism, not individualism, was the primary enemy of the American public; and which granted foreign policy an ascendance over domestic policy that it had rarely enjoyed.”¹⁰⁶ This consideration—along with the economic factors—may also help explain why Republicans enjoyed relative ideological stability in this period of Democratic flux.

It was this powerful anticommunist sentiment in the wake of World War II that created such a difficult environment for labor (and leftists in general) and provided yet another reason for its marginalization. Anticommunist rhetoric became an animating point for Democrats following the war. Preventing communism from taking hold on the home front was of particular concern.¹⁰⁷ Typical of this new mind-set was Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson’s 1952 acceptance speech:

I suggest that we would err, certainly, if we regarded communism as merely an external threat. Communism is a great international conspiracy and the United States has been for years a major target. ... Communist agents have sought to steal our scientific and military secrets, to mislead and corrupt our young men and women, to infiltrate positions of power in our schools and colleges, in business firms and in labor unions and in the Government itself. At every turn they have sought to serve the purposes of the Soviet Union. ... Along the way they have gained the help, witting or unwitting, of many Americans. ... I fear there are still people in our country under illusions about the nature of this conspiracy abroad and at home. ... Communism is committed to the destruction of every value which the genuine American liberal holds most dear. So I would say to any

Americans who cling to illusions about communism and its fake utopia: Wake up to the fact that you are in an alliance with the devil.¹⁰⁸

The key point here is that communism and socialism had become public enemy number one for the Democrats. And organized labor—perhaps unfairly, but nonetheless—paid a price. In stark contrast to its prewar stance, the private sector became a point of pride for Democrats and they distanced themselves from labor. As Stevenson said later in his campaign: “We are for private, and profitable, business. The Democratic Party is against socialism in our life in any form—creeping, crawling or even the imaginary kind which shows up so often in the Republican oratory. I am opposed to socialized medicine, socialized farming, socialized banking, or socialized industry.”¹⁰⁹ While he did not single out labor, the implication was unavoidable: the Democratic Party was not going to support much of the action that labor sought. This development was a striking departure from the party’s prewar position. Thus, this new anticommunist focus played a role in labor’s demise along with Keynesianism, the strong economy, and the burgeoning middle class.

In sum, the Democrats’ ideology changed dramatically after World War II. It focused less on the populism associated with the first half of the century and took on an ideology based on solidarity and universality. These postwar Democrats were more economically conservative. In addition, they focused on minority rights as a means of inclusion and dispatched with their prior rhetoric trumpeting class warfare. And World War II had a profound influence on this ideological shift. It directly created an environment requiring national unity that discredited divisive class-based appeals. The war also influenced and reinforced other factors explaining the Democrats’ ideological shift, including economic growth, a developing middle class, Keynesianism, the decline of organized labor, the emergence of racial politics, the absence of a leftist challenge, and the Cold War.

CONCLUSION

The ideological component of American political parties has received increased attention in recent decades. Scholars have posited various sources of party ideology, including class-based economics, ethnicity and culture, critical elections, and various elite-driven initiatives. Left out of these accounts is a role for international events.

Major wars shape and change party ideologies by recasting the political landscape and, as a result, forcing political parties to alter their governing

philosophies. In other words, wars drive the element of international relations into political parties' public philosophies. The focus here has not been on promoting an overarching theory to explain party ideology, but in isolating and explaining a key source of party ideology that has not received adequate attention.

The importance of foreign policy in party ideology can be seen through an examination of the World War II-era Democrats. A significant shift occurred in the late 1940s. As John Gerring describes, prewar Democrats were rooted in class-based populist rhetoric pitting "the people" against powerful and entrenched elites. Following World War II, the party's ideology has been characterized by inclusion. The war was a key contributing factor in this major shift. Most important, the war effort required national solidarity, which undermined and negated the often fierce and divisive prewar Democratic rhetoric. Accordingly, the party adopted a more unifying and inclusive public philosophy as is evident in the party's platforms and President Roosevelt's speeches. World War II also contributed to and reinforced the economic prosperity that made the Democrats' "people vs. the powerful" rhetoric less salient with the newly expanded middle class. The humming economy was also linked to the ruling Democrats and, thus, led them to embrace the success of their Keynesian-style capitalism even more fully and in a way they previously had not. The war also was intertwined with, and played a reinforcing role in, several other factors that simultaneously pushed Democrats toward this ideological shift, including the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge from the Left, and the new era of Cold War anticommunism.

Because wars are such major events with the frequently realized capacity to fundamentally shift the country's political landscape, it is natural for political parties to adjust their ideologies to the new terrain. Other scholars have touched on this point. Martin Shefter has argued that by presenting threats and opportunities to various groups in the American population, international conflicts have generated the cleavages that have shaped party structure and competition.¹¹⁰ Such a framework for understanding party politics has clear ideological implications. More directly, John W. Compton has argued that Republican ideology shifted due to the Spanish-American War. The GOP's thirty-year focus on the strategic and commercial benefits of foreign engagement, he maintains, was dispatched in favor of a new mission to aid foreigners.¹¹¹ Other instances of war-induced shifts in party ideology could be explored in future research. For instance, the Vietnam War's influence on the rise of the "New Politics" Democrats could be examined as a possible source of lasting significance in the party's ideology—especially with regard to Democratic positioning on foreign affairs and identity politics.

The case presented here was highlighted because it was a particularly important and enduring shift, and because it so clearly displays the way in which wars can alter a party's ideology. More research that encompasses both foreign and domestic policy is needed in order to gain a complete picture of party ideology. Such work should ideally be comprehensive and address party ideology on both of these fronts—as parties themselves are forced to do—rather than isolate a domestic ideology and a foreign affairs ideology. In the real world of politics, these arenas influence one another and cannot be divorced. Scholarly attempts to do so will yield only a partial and distorted picture of parties and their ideological makeup.

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NOTES

1. David R. Mayhew, "War and American Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 473; Ira Katznelson, "Rewriting the Epic of America," *Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development*, ed. Katznelson and Martin Shefter (Princeton, 2002), 7–8. See also Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (New York, 1985).

2. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955).

3. Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1948); Daniel Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953). Even before Hartz and the "consensus school," American political parties had frequently been said to lack ideology. Visiting in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that "great political parties are those that are attached more to principles than to their consequences; to generalities and not to particular cases; to ideas and not to men. . . . America has had great parties; today they no longer exist." And even when they did exist, Tocqueville thought that "the two parties were in agreement on the most essential points" (Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago, 2000), 167. Fifty years later, a young Woodrow Wilson denounced the lack of "principles" in America's political parties, criticizing these organizations for failing to live up to the "responsible party" ideal (Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston, 1885). The Progressive movement brought ideological leaders including William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson to the fore and generated a scholarly enthusiasm in the "Philosophy of History." Yet the movement's partisan influence was blunted because progressivism amounted to a square peg next to the Democrats' and Republicans' round holes and failed to map directly onto either party's political thought. This era's historians—predecessors to the consensus school—emphasized political conflict and the inevitable progressive force of history. See, for instance, Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York, 1909); Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (Toronto, 1913);

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston, 1957 [1920]). See also James W. Ceaser, *Nature and History in American Political Development* (Cambridge, 2006); Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (New York, 1980).

4. Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition*, ix, viii.

5. The Democratic Party was, at least until recently, comprised of conservative “Southern Democrats” and liberals based in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the Far West. Similarly, the Grand Old Party had its Goldwater conservatives as well as its more moderate “Rockefeller Republicans.” Nicol Rae, *The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans from 1952 to the Present* (New York, 1989); Rae, *Southern Democrats* (New York, 1994); Byron Shafer and Richard Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge, 2006).

6. See, for instance, Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna, and Sahar Shafqat, “The Liberal-Conservative Ideology of U.S. Senators: A New Measure,” *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1997): 1395–413; Keith T. Poole and R. Steven Daniels, “Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980,” *American Political Science Review* 79, no. 2 (1985): 373–99; Steven S. Smith, “The Consistency and Ideological Structure of U.S. Senate Voting Alignments, 1957–1976,” *American Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4 (1981): 780–95.

7. Larry Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 35–50; Norrander, “Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters,” *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (1989): 570–87; Teresa L. Levitin and Warren E. Miller, “Ideological Interpretations of Presidential Elections,” *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 3 (1979): 751–71.

8. For example, Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr., and John McIver, *Statehouse Democracy* (New York, 1993).

9. Howard Reiter, “Factional Persistence Within Parties in the United States,” *Party Politics* (May 2004); Daniel DiSalvo, “The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal-Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948–1972,” *Journal of Policy History* 22, no. 3 (Summer 2010).

10. Beard, *The American Party Battle* (New York, 1928); Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (New York, 1945); Everett Carll Ladd, *American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response* (New York, 1970); Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York, 1970); Raymond E. Wolfinger, “The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting,” *American Political Science Review* 59, no. 4 (1965): 896–908; Michael Parenti, “Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification,” *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 3 (1967): 717–26; Robert Kelley, *The Cultural Pattern in American Politics: The First Century* (New York, 1977); Paul Kleppner, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” *American Historical Review* 82, no. 3 (June 1977): 531–62; Michael Barone, *Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York, 1990); Rae, “Class and Culture: American Political Cleavages in the Twentieth Century,” *Western Political Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (September 1992): 629–50; V. O. Key, “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” *Journal of Politics* 21 (1959): 198–210; James L. Sundquist, *The Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1973); John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996* (New York, 1998).

11. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 6.

12. Ibid. For an extensive discourse on defining ideology, see Gerring, "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (December 1997): 957–94. I adopt Gerring's conclusion that "the definitional core of the concept consists of three intertwined attributes—coherence, differentiation, and stability. ... One might note that this core definition of ideology takes no cognizance of whether a party's views on political matters are distorting, dogmatic, repressive, self-interested, or reflective of a particular social class or social order." Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 6.

13. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 274–75.

14. Ibid., 7.

15. Ibid., 6. See also 22–27.

16. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park, 1948), 32.

17. Mark A. Smith, "Intellectuals, Rhetoric, and Context: The Move to Economic Arguments by Conservative Writers," *Studies in American Political Development* 20 (Spring 2006): 17. See also Smith, *Right Talk* (Princeton, 2007).

18. For the purposes of this discussion, I follow Gerring in understanding class warfare to be one possible form of populism.

19. See, for instance, Burnham, "The System of 1896: An Analysis," *The Evolution of American Electoral Systems*, ed. Kleppner et al. (Westport, Conn., 1981), 158; Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York, 1955); Ladd, *American Political Parties*, 161; Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal* (New York, 1993), 21; Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, chap. 3.

20. This account of Democratic ideological history complements realignment theory's emphasis on 1932. That year's "critical election" and the federal government's ensuing activist policies created a massive partisan realignment in favor of the Democrats. Sundquist writes: "The millions of voters who switched from the Republican to the Democratic party or were mobilized into the electorate as Democrats for the first time, attracted by the Democratic program and the Rooseveltian personality and leadership ... made the latter the country's clear majority party for the first time in eighty years" (Sundquist, 214. See also Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (February 1955): 3–18; Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System," 198–210; Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*.) Even critics of realignment theory recognize the 1932 election as a turning point in American political history. Indeed, for realignment skeptics, 1932 is perhaps the only election in the canon that clearly satisfies the theory's requirements. (e.g., Shafer, *The End of Realignment*, Shafer, ed. (Madison, 1991); Mayhew, *Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre* (New Haven, 2002), 141). In addition, a key statistical study demonstrates the significance of 1932. Jerome Clubb, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale measure the amount of enduring electoral change each presidential election produced from 1836 to 1964. They show that Roosevelt's first contest for the White House produced the largest and most significant lasting change of any election in their study (Jerome Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (Beverly Hills, 1980), chap. 3. See especially table 3.1a, pages 92–93). Thus, not only did 1932 purportedly bring about a sea change in the dominant strain of Democratic ideology, but it also brought the party to power for the better part of the next several decades.

Yet it is important to note that these two outcomes (ideological change and electoral dominance) represent two separate and not necessarily connected claims. The first identifies an intraparty ideological hinge point. Theoretically, a shift in Democratic ideology could make the party less popular, more popular, or result in no popularity change and could occur independently of any specific election. By contrast, realignment's emphasis on 1932 is more broadly concerned with the relationship between the two major parties and their relative levels of electoral success. In theory, then, the two developments are not co-dependent. Practically, however, it is not a coincidence that these two literatures both emphasize 1932 because there is obvious overlap between them. And this convergence makes for a neat, logical, causal narrative. It is comforting, in a sense, to have everything coalesce around 1932. Under this appealing and accessible plot line, the Democratic Party, led by Roosevelt, reacted to the Depression's economic horrors and the do-nothing policies of Herbert Hoover with a new ideology geared toward the nation's challenges. As a result, the electorate rallied to the Democratic banner, thereby crushing Republican dominance rooted in the "System of 1896" and ushering in a new political era.

21. This is not to say that the party's ideology was synonymous with the liberal Democrats' position. The Democratic Party was, in Milkis' words, a "bifactional party with durable ideological and policy divisions" (75–76). Conservative Southern Democrats were powerful and influential in many respects. Nonetheless, Roosevelt's policies did represent the dominant strain of the party and was clearly in control of the party's national rhetoric (the "presidential party," as Gerring calls it). Milkis, *The President and the Parties*, 75–76; Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 6. For more on the Southern Democrats, see Rae, *Southern Democrats*.

22. Milkis, "Programmatic Liberalism and Party Politics: The New Deal Legacy and the Doctrine of Responsible Party Government," in *Challenges to Party Government*, ed. John Kenneth White and Jerome M. Mileur (Carbondale, Ill., 1992), 109. For most scholars, then, this was the decisive break in Democratic ideology. Today's party is still the same as the one forged by Roosevelt in the 1930s. See, for instance, Samuel Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," *Left, Right, and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the U.S.*, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago, 1965), 145–46; Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980* (Princeton, 1989); Ladd and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformation of the American Party System* (New York, 1975); William E. Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan* (Ithaca, 1983); Herbert S. Parmet, *The Democrats: The Years After FDR* (New York, 1976); Skocpol, "The Legacies of New Deal Liberalism," *Liberalism Reconsidered*, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, N.J., 1983).

23. James A. Morone, *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government* (New Haven, 1990), 129.

24. Gerring says the transition happened between 1948 and 1952. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 17.

25. *Ibid.*, 188 (italics in original). I follow Gerring in using "Populism" to refer to the ideology of the Democratic party in the 1896–1948 period and *populism* to invoke the general (nonspecific) concept" (188). See also Terri Bimes and Quinn Mulroy, "The Rise and Decline of Presidential Populism," *Studies in American Political Development* 18, no. (2004): 136–59.

26. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 189.

27. *Ibid.*, 193–200.

28. Milkis, *The President and the Parties*. Milkis argues that political parties had always been primarily ensconced in state and local politics; governing at the national level was often only an afterthought. Roosevelt and his New Deal allies recognized that this feature of American politics limited the ability of a president to initiate the kind of progressive action needed in the early 1930s. As a result, Roosevelt engineered a reshuffling of American government in which the executive was at the center of the action and in a better position to direct a coherent policy agenda.

29. Roosevelt famously asserted as much in his commencement address at Oglethorpe University in 1932: “The country needs . . . persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Oglethorpe University Address,” 22 May 1932. See also Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 228.

30. This is not to say that everything changed. Postwar Democrats, for instance, had a similar understanding of social justice, welfare, and wealth redistribution.

31. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 233.

32. John Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism* (New York, 1952).

33. Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980*, ed. Fraser and Gerstle, 109–10.

34. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 235 and 236. Gerring argues that “only McGovern, Carter (in 1976), and Mondale integrated Populist themes into their rhetoric on a regular basis, and these occasional notes of protest were not nearly as vehement or shrill as those registered by their predecessors in the 1896–1948 period. It might also be pointed out that only one of these candidates made it to the White House,” with the other two suffering overwhelming defeats. Gerring continues: “Thus, although Populists were the most successful candidates during the 1896–1948 period they were, by and large, the *least* successful candidates in the postwar period.”

35. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton, 1979), chap. 5. James I. Lingle, *Representation and Presidential Primaries: The Democratic Party in the Post-Reform Era* (Westport, Conn., 1981); Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York, 1983), 55–57, 78, 86–87, 92–97, 361; Graham K. Wilson, *Unions in American National Politics* (New York, 1979), 44.

36. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 238–45.

37. Merle Black and George B. Rabinowitz, “American Electoral Change, 1952–1972,” in *The Party Symbol*, ed. William Crotty (San Francisco, 1980); Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, 1990), 115–37; Ladd, *Where Have All the Voters Gone?* (New York, 1978); Gerald M. Pomper, “From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968,” *American Political Science Review* 66 (1972): 28–45; Pomper, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: What, Again?” *Journal of Politics* 33 (1971): 916–40; Sundquist, 382–93; Jules Witcover, *Party of the People: A History of the Democrats* (New York, 2003).

38. “1948 Democratic Platform,” *History of American Presidential Elections: 1789–1968*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger (New York, 1971), 3154.

39. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 241–45.

40. Christopher Lasch, *The Agony of the American Left* (New York, 1969).

41. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 238–45.

42. The 1952 platform, for instance, contained specific promises to veterans, children in general, children of migrant workers in particular, American Indians, as well as racial, religious, and ethnic minorities. Reaffirming most of these, the 1956 platform added farmers, the handicapped, poor children, and the elderly to the list, while the 1960 Democrats extended their reach to the mentally handicapped, the temporarily disabled, and women. Gerring aptly assesses the eventual results of this group-based focus: “The multifocused Democratic agenda kept spreading outward as the decades progressed, incorporating the demands of an ever wider set of ethnic, racial, sexual, and issue-based groups. Eventually, all sorts of groups were endowed with inalienable rights.” The extension appeared to have reached its postmodern zenith when Democrats codified “the right to be different” and “the rights of people who lack rights” in 1972. Yet the extension has continued. “The pinnacle of this help-everybody rhetoric,” Gerring writes, “was reached in the party’s recent embrace of multiculturalism.” The 1992 platform included the following provision: “As the party of inclusion, we take special pride in our country’s emergence as the world’s largest and most successful multiethnic, multiracial republic. We condemn anti-Semitism, racism, homophobia, bigotry and negative stereotyping of all kinds. We must help all Americans understand the diversity of our cultural heritage.” “1952 Democratic Platform,” *History of American Presidential Elections: 1789–1968*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, 3267–81; “1956 Democratic Platform” and “1960 Democratic Platform,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, 3355–85 and 3471–510; Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 244; “Democratic Party Platform of 1972,” in *National Party Platforms, Volume II, 1960–1976*, ed. Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana, 1978), 790–91; Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 245.

43. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 250. There is a substantial literature demonstrating that similar intraparty changes occurred following World War II throughout the democratic Western world. Otto Kirchheimer has shown that Western political parties transformed from hardened ideological entities into “postwar catch-all” organizations. In addition, like the American Democrats, these parties dropped their emphasis on class and sought to attract members throughout the entire population. These results were reinforced by John Clayton Thomas’s study of fifty-four political parties in twelve countries, which found “a dramatic narrowing in the scope of domestic political conflict.” In this comparative context, identifying the Democrats’ ideological hinge point in the late 1940s makes even more sense. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, 1966), 177–200; John Clayton Thomas, “The Decline of Ideology in Western Political Parties: A Study of Changing Policy Orientations,” *Sage Professional Papers in Contemporary Political Sociology*, 06–012 (Beverly Hills, 1975), 46.

44. Gerring discusses these indirect factors. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 274.

45. “Democratic Platform, 1936,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 3, ed. Schlesinger, 2851–56.

46. Schlesinger, *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 3, ed. Schlesinger, 2888.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Roosevelt, “Speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, October 31, 1936,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 3, ed. Schlesinger, 2900–2902.

49. *Ibid.*, 2902.
50. “Democratic Platform, 1940,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 3, ed. Schlesinger, 2952.
51. *Ibid.*, 2948, 2953–54.
52. Roosevelt, “Acceptance Speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, July 19, 1940,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, 2967–69.
53. *Ibid.*, 2971.
54. *Ibid.*, 2968.
55. *Ibid.*, 2973.
56. Davis, *FDR: The War President, 1940–1943* (New York, 2000), 72, 361, 746, 756. See also George McJimsey, *The Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), 215; John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York, 1973), 63–65, 170–71.
57. Davis, *FDR*, 348–49, 361.
58. Roosevelt, “Address to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1942,” *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 Volume* (New York, 1950), 39.
59. Roosevelt, “Address to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1943,” *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943 Volume*, 28–29.
60. Roosevelt, “Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 11, 1944,” *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944 Volume*, 41. There was mention of “a noisy minority [that] maintains an uproar of demands for special favors for special groups” in 1944. Yet, as the President went on to explain, this was largely geared toward those who had grown complacent and did not think further sacrifice was necessary. This “minority” cut across class divides. In short, Roosevelt was not making a class-based distinction here.
61. “Democratic Platform, 1944,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, 3040.
62. *Ibid.*, 3041.
63. Roosevelt, “Acceptance Speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, San Diego, July 20, 1944,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, 3062.
64. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 198.
65. Robert L. Fleegler, “Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 1938–1947,” *Journal of Mississippi History* 68, no. 1 (2006): 1–28.
66. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*; Richard W. Steele, “The War on Intolerance: The Reformulation of American Nationalism,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 9 (Fall 1989): 9–35; Richard Polenber, *One Nation Divisible* (New York, 1980), 46–49; John Blum, *V Was for Victory* (New York, 1976), 147–72; Philip Gleason, *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America* (Baltimore, 1992), 153–87; Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York, 1998), 237–39; David H. Bennett, *Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement* (Chapel Hill, 1995), 285.
67. On the G.I. Bill, see, for instance, Suzanne Mettler, “Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 2 (2002): 351–65; Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York, 2005); Edward Humes,

Over Here: How the G.I. Bill Transformed America (New York, 2006); Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin, *The G.I. Bill: The New Deal for Veterans* (New York, 2009).

68. David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945* (New York, 1999), 359–60.

69. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 233–38.

70. Nelson Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era,” *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980*, ed. Fraser and Gerstle, 122–23. See also Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 233–38. For more on American labor in the 1940s, see, for instance, Irving Bernstein, *Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941* (Boston, 1970); Melvyn Dubofsky, *American Labor Since the New Deal* (Chicago, 1971); Walter Galenson, *The American Labor Movement, 1955–1995* (Westport, Conn., 1996); Michael Goldfield, *The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States* (Chicago, 1989); Robert Zieger, *American Workers, American Unions* (Baltimore, 1986).

71. See, for example, Michael A. Bernstein, *The Great Depression* (New York, 1971), 207; Blum, *V was for Victory*, 90–91; Tyler Cowen, “Why Keynesianism Triumphed or, Could So Many Keynesians Have Been Wrong?” *Critical Review* 3 (1989): 525–26; Stanley Lebergott, *The Americans: An Economic Record* (New York, 1984), 472 and 477; Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York, 1985), 15–16 and 19; Albert W. Niemi Jr., *U.S. Economic History* (Chicago, 1980), 390; Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Westport, Conn., 1980), 36; Robert C. Puth, *American Economic History* (Chicago, 1988), 521 and 531–32; Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1991), 169–70; Harold G. Vatter, *The U.S. Economy in World War II* (New York, 1985), 14; J. R. Vernon, “World War II Fiscal Policies and the End of the Great Depression,” *Journal of Economic History* 54, no. 4 (1994): 850–68; Gary M. Walton and Hugh Rockoff, *History of the American Economy*, 6th ed. (San Diego, 1990), 520, 523–24, and 535; Allan M. Winkler, *Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War II* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1986), 14 and 20.

72. Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America*, 169–70.

73. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 363.

74. J. Bradford de Long and Lawrence H. Summers, “How Does Macroeconomic Policy Affect Output?” *Brookings Papers on the Economic Activity* 19, no. 2 (1988): 433–94, quote on 467. For similar accounts, see Christina D. Romer, “What Ended the Great Depression?” *Journal of Economic History* 52, no. 4 (1992): 757–84, esp. 782; Peter Temin, “The Great Depression,” in *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (New York, 2000), 328.

75. Robert Higgs, “Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940s,” *Journal of Economic History* 52, no. 1 (1992): 58.

76. *Ibid.*, 41.

77. Cowen, “Why Keynesianism Triumphed,” 525.

78. Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” 108–9.

79. *Ibid.*, 109.

80. These various economic factors contributed directly to labor’s initial decline—the final economic variable that Gerring identifies. While the war did not directly contribute to labor’s less prominent position in the Democratic Party, it was intertwined with these other main economic factors that hastened labor’s diminished position. The party’s adoption of

Keynesianism, the strong economy, and a burgeoning middle class gave labor's appeals to the American working class less credibility.

81. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, notes each of these: 251–53, 274. He also suggests that television played a role. The postwar (but apparently pre-Bill O'Reilly) “shift from ‘hot’ stump speaking to the ‘cool’ medium of television—mandating a softer, more personal, more conciliatory brand of rhetoric”—was also behind the Democrats' ideological shift according to Gerring. This factor was in no way related to the war.

82. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 253.

83. Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York, 2000); Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* (Chicago, 1999); Fleegler, “Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism,” 2–3; Richard W. Steele, “The War on Intolerance: The Reformulation of American Nationalism,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 9 (Fall 1989): 9–35; Polenberg, *One Nation Divisible*, 46–49; Philip Gleason, *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America* (Baltimore, 1992), 153–87; Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, 237–39.

84. Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*; Harvard Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954–1980* (New York, 1981), 11; John Dittmer, *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi* (Urbana, 1994), 1–18.

85. “The Atlantic Charter,” *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 10, ed. Samuel Rosenman (New York: 1938–50), 314.

86. “Back to Jim Crow,” *The New Republic*, 16 February 1942, 221.

87. Peter J. Kellogg, “Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s,” *Historian* 42 (November 1979): 31; Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 167–68.

88. “Defeat at Detroit,” *The Nation* (3 July 1943), 4.

89. Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York, 1996), 170; Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 186. See also Fleegler, “Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism”; Steve Lawson, *Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America Since 1941* (New York, 1997), 10.

90. Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, 191–92.

91. Polenberg, *War and Society*, 116–17; Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 191.

92. William J. Collins, “The Political Economy of State-Level Fair Employment Laws, 1940–1964,” *Explorations in Economic History* 40:1 (2002), 28.

93. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 247.

94. Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 174.

95. Steven F. Lawson, *Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969* (New York, 1976), 66.

96. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 247.

97. *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

98. *Grove v. Townsend*, 295 U.S. 45 No. 563 (1935).

99. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 248.

100. Darlene Clark Hine, *Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas* (Millwood, N.Y., 1979), 236–37.

101. Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: Self Reexamination Continues in the Supreme Court,” *New York Times*, 4 April 1944, 20. See also Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 248; Harvard

Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks* (New York, 1981), 229–37; Ward E. Y. Elliott, *The Rise of Guardian Democracy: The Supreme Court's Role in Voting Rights Disputes, 1845–1969* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 78–80.

102. Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 195. Incidentally, it was about this time that general elections became competitive in the South—at least at the presidential level.

103. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 855.

104. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York, 2005), 5–47.

105. *Ibid.*, 10–14.

106. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 274.

107. *Ibid.*, 251–53.

108. “Speech by Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, Albuquerque, September 12, 1952,” *History of American Presidential Elections*, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, 3308–9.

109. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, 252.

110. Shefter, “War, Trade, and U.S. Party Politics,” in *Shaped by War and Trade*, ed. Katznelson and Shefter, 113–33.

111. John W. Compton, “From Commerce to Mission: The Impact of the Spanish-American War on Republican Party Ideology,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (20 April 2006).