Among all the changes that have swept Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1989, those involving civil society are perhaps the least understood. Prevailing wisdom holds that communism wiped out traditional civil societies and rendered them largely helpless to aid the rise of democracy and markets or to block authoritarian reversals. When it comes to democratization, this theory goes, top-down reforms backed by potent international actors have done the heavy lifting while civil society has sat enfeebled on the sidelines.¹

The “proof” that postcommunist civil societies are uniformly weak and ineffective comes mainly from the World Values Survey and similar cross-European attitude polls. This bias in favor of cross-national surveys is surprising since there is a large body of other easily found evidence—including national-level surveys on volunteering and membership in civil society organizations, registers of organizations, expert assessments, protest-event analyses, and case studies—that sheds light on CEE civil society and allows us to assess its condition and activities across the region with greater precision than cross-national surveys of attitudes alone.²

In postcommunist countries, civil societies were not built from scratch. While the CEE countries did not inherit from communism a civil society properly so called, they did inherit a comprehensive and solidly institutionalized associational sphere. This included powerful trade unions and professional associations, churches, and organizations representing various groups and interests including young people, farmers, veterans, consumers, women, and ecologists. There were also sports
clubs, along with recreational, cultural, and leisure organizations and the like. Memberships were large, as were resources. Official associations boasted national offices in capital cities as well as local branches, and associations employed professional staffers with serious organizational skills.

To be sure, associational life under state socialism was politicized, bureaucratized, centralized, and comprehensive—it was used to help put the “total” in totalitarianism—but it also recognized and institutionalized a certain diversity of interests. After the 1960s, communist-controlled mass organizations in the more pragmatic and reformist countries such as Hungary and Poland became less ideological and began to act as “interest groups” that could lobby the party-state for economic concessions. In orthodox-communist Czechoslovakia and East Germany or semi-totalitarian Romania and Albania, by contrast, these organizations still served almost exclusively as regime “transmission belts.” Beneath the common institutional form of communism, every country was different, which helps to explain the broad range of post-1989 civil societies in the region.

In Poland after 1956, for example, the diversity and pluralism of associations gradually increased, but always within the boundaries marked out by the communist state. A number of political crises brought about mobilization on the part of workers, students, intellectuals, peasants, and Catholics, culminating in the 1980 appearance of the massive Solidarity movement. This led to the expansion of organizational capacity outside the state-controlled organizations. As Poland began to move away from communism, therefore, the country could boast an associational landscape that consisted of much more than just a bunch of centralized mass organizations. Some precommunist civil society traditions and even organizations (mostly in the realms of leisure, education, and culture) survived under communist rule, especially at the local level. They served as semi-official carriers of local traditions and provided a modicum of public space somewhat sheltered from direct political interference. Moreover, Poland’s powerful Roman Catholic Church secured considerable autonomy and supported various movements and organizations. Thus, by the mid-1980s, Poland had an “incomplete” civil society with relatively dense organizational structures both formal and informal at various levels and in all functional domains. The incompleteness flowed from a lack of autonomy and legally delineated public space guarded by enforceable rights and liberties. The Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia had smaller dissident sectors (filled by political, religious, and cultural groups) alongside the communist-controlled formal associations.

After 1989, many associations that had been under communist control reformed themselves in light of the new democratic conditions. Many lost members and resources, split up into smaller groups, and changed
their names, leaders, and agendas. Yet many survived and kept most of the resources that they had possessed before 1989.

Communism’s fall (combined with generous foreign aid) touched off an organizational revolution in CEE civil society. In the midst of mass political mobilizations associated with regime change, scores of new movements and organizations burst onto the public stage. Some faded fast, but others stayed. These newcomers mostly appeared in sectors disallowed under communism (such as NGOs, charities, or foundations), but quite a few entered the existing sectors and began competing directly with the inherited organizations. Since 1989, the number of civil society organizations has grown rapidly across the region. In Poland, every year sees the registration of about four-thousand new NGOs and a thousand new foundations.

Yet the differences among civil societies across the region remain considerable. Countries that saw early and successful transitions to democracy are, not surprisingly, far friendlier to civil society. In the most harshly authoritarian postcommunist countries, by contrast, the associational revolution’s footprint is tiny: Belarus has fewer than 2,500 registered NGOs while Uzbekistan has 415 and Turkmenistan boasts barely a hundred.

In those countries where civil society has flourished, the revamping of legal regulations has been key. In the 1990s, all CEE countries overhauled their laws on the rights to assemble and associate as well as financial and tax regulations, with the goal of making room for an active civil society. In authoritarian countries, by contrast, legal rules are used to restrict public space and curtail what civil society groups can do. Russia’s recent tightening of registration procedures and restrictions on financing from abroad are a case in point.

Much like their counterparts in Europe’s older democracies, the CEE civil societies are dense, diverse, and free. Differences between them and the rest of postcommunist Eurasia are striking. In Belarus (which is often called “Europe’s last dictatorship”), the inherited associational sector dominates and organizing new groups is deliberately made difficult. Unlike the highly institutionalized civil societies found in consolidated democracies, authoritarian and hybrid regimes typically feature civil society groups that operate more as parts of a “dissident” social movement that springs into action—as in the so-called color revolutions—when the powers that be steal an election, violate legal norms, or try to make existing regulations more authoritarian.

The side-by-side processes (moving slowly in some countries, more quickly in others) of reform within the inherited associational sphere and the rise of new organizations and sectors outside it have given the CEE region “recombined” civil societies. These vary from country to country according to the shape and pace that democratization assumed there, not to mention specific institutional incentives and historical
traditions. There is no truth to the claim that postcommunist civil societies had to be created from scratch in all their dimensions.

One or Many?

As far back as 1999, Jacques Rupnik noted that “the word ‘postcommunism’ has lost its relevance. The fact that Hungary and Albania, or the Czech Republic and Belarus, or Poland and Kazakhstan shared a communist past explains very little about the paths that they have taken since.” This observation applies to postcommunist civil societies as well. They differ from country to country depending on how communist authorities used to treat the associational sphere, how much energy went into the building of new organizations after communism fell, how historical traditions vary, and how current political conditions line up. Postcommunist civil societies can range from assertive and robust to anemic and tightly state-constrained—they are certainly not all of one type.

Expert evaluations back up this picture of staggering variance across the postcommunist region. The World Bank Governance Index shows that in the new EU members—especially Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia—civil society’s organizational composition and role in providing citizens with voice and a way to hold governments accountable are not far behind West European standards, and ahead of Greece and Italy. The 2012 U.S. Agency for International Development report on the sustainability of civil society organizations awards good marks to the ex-communist EU members, with Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic topping the list. The Eurasian countries (Russia and the other ex-Soviet countries outside the Baltics and Central Asia) run behind, while the five post-Soviet republics of Central Asia bring up the rear.

Similarly, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2013 study (which rates the strength of civil society on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being strongest) gives new EU members an average score of 1.95, with Poland achieving the best result (1.5). For the Balkans, the average score was 3.04. For the Eurasian states it was 5.28, with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan sharing the dubious privilege of carding a worst-possible 7 each.

In short, a systematic comparison of really existing postcommunist civil societies shows different patterns of transformation, diverging paths of organizational expansion, uneven influence on policy making, and growing intraregional disparities.

These civil societies differ from one another along at least three crucial dimensions. The first has to do with the “constitution of public space.” The most important single factor in determining how a given country’s public space is constituted is the type of relationship that civil society has with the state (which includes the degree of access that civil society organizations have to the policy-making process).
The state and its agencies define the public space by making laws, by building (or failing to build) institutions, by protecting (or disregarding) rights and liberties, and by implementing policies that either empower or constrain civil society organizations. On the actions and inactions of states, therefore, hinge the health, composition, and capacity of civil society. States vary across the postcommunist space, and therefore so do civil societies.

Although no postcommunist state seeks to ban all activity by autonomous civil society groups, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan come close. As in the CEE region during the communist 1970s and 1980s, civil society faces severe repression. To the extent that it does exist, it tends to be incomplete and “dissident” in nature—again, not unlike what one would have seen in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland before 1989.

In another, less severely authoritarian set of postcommunist countries, civil society is treated less harshly, but must cope with tangles of restrictions. Some organizations, especially new NGOs, are marginalized. Others (often with communist pedigrees) receive favors, including public money. The norm is a mix between state corporatism and a regime of arbitrary limits on registration procedures, funding, types of activity allowed, and international contacts. In Russia, to name a prominent example, such restrictions have grown in severity as many civil society groups have angered the Putin regime by organizing the protest movements of the last few years.

In a third set of CEE countries—the new EU members—the rule of law guards civil society, whose organizations are free to take foreign help and receive support from both their own government’s and the EU’s funds. Here we catch sight of a picture that differs in no essential manner from what we see in the established liberal democracies of Western Europe. Moreover, in new member states civil society organizations often have formal roles in policy making and governance, especially at the local level. They may also lobby and use contention, though their effectiveness seldom if ever matches that of their West European counterparts.7

**Forms of Organization**

Although laws and institutions—the former to guarantee (or threaten) rights and liberties and the latter to furnish (or deny) a predictable, friendly environment—explain why some civil societies flourish more fully than others across the CEE region, differences in forms of civil society organization and levels of institutionalization matter as well. The CEE countries all began their respective transitions away from communism with associational domains based on centralized, state-controlled trade unions and professional organizations. As noted above, the crux of the post-1989 change was the transformation of this old associational
sector combined with the emergence of a diverse NGO sector and other social organizations prohibited by the old regime, including religious and nationalist movements. The pace and extent of change varied across the region, with state corporatism quickly withering away in some countries while remaining influential in others.

A major part of the process has been the waning of trade unions. In postcommunist countries, unions have seen their membership drop even more steeply than have their counterparts in Western Europe and the United States. The leading cause in the CEE region is “system-specific”: State socialism made membership in unions automatic (they served as tools of labor control and as channels for handing out in-kind benefits). In a sharp break with that past, postcommunist states turned toward capitalism and many have been moving away from corporatist (i.e., union-reliant) approaches to interest representation.

Yet unions have not vanished across the CEE region, nor is corporatism dead. Instead, after the deflation of the artificially oversized communist-era unions, the share of the workforce that is currently unionized differs to no drastic degree from the European average. Unions now draw their political influence not from mass memberships, but rather from effective organization, from traditional links to the state, and from ties to political parties. Unions in Poland (the CEE region’s least-unionized country) are small and divided, but they are vocal in opposing many changes to government welfare or labor policies. In other countries, unions’ political effectiveness varies and does not always depend on unionization rates. Again, the most significant dividing line within the postcommunist world runs between the CEE’s new EU members and the majority of post-Soviet states, even if labor unions in Russia may be more effective than is usually assumed.

In short, there are two general patterns in relations between civil societies and the states in which they reside: pluralist and corporatist. The distribution of these patterns in the region is not a matter of political geography: State–civil society relations in Poland are mostly pluralist while those in Hungary and Slovenia are largely corporatist. Further east, corporatism prevails. Whether a country is corporatist or pluralist will shape how fast or slowly organizations grow, the types of organizations that are privileged, and the form (as well as the intensity) of contentiousness within civil society.

Another source of differences among postcommunist civil societies is the level of institutionalization. Civil society under an authoritarian regime will typically feature a larger share of groups that are informal in nature. Under such a regime, social movements and sporadic popular mobilizations will be the most consequential form that civil society activity assumes. In postcommunist democracies, by contrast, formal organizations (NGOs, unions, professional groups) dominate. Additionally, many postcommunist civil societies, particularly in the new EU
member states, are decentralized both organizationally and in the way they behave. Although such decentralization may be more a general feature of contemporary civil societies than a trait specific to postcommunism, it does set today’s CEE apart from the historical pattern observable in the development of West European civil societies.

In yet another dimension, identity politics penetrates postcommunist civil societies unevenly. In countries with ethnic and religious divisions, collective-identity questions are likely to be salient. Groups with sectarian or nationalist agendas will be more prominent, and there may be high-profile conflicts among them. As with the distribution of unionization, moreover, the distribution of identity-related conflicts does not follow subregional divisions.

As the foregoing suggests, there is no one model of postcommunist civil society. Instead, we see a diversity of civil societies across the region and also over time. Many factors are at work, but the key one is the type of political regime. The landscape today in authoritarian Belarus, for example, looks much as it did during communism’s posttotalitarian phase: There is an official sector of state-controlled labor unions and other mass organizations, and there is a dissident civil society struggling against the nondemocratic regime. In the newer EU members, civil society is diverse and vibrant and looks much like civil society in the older EU members, albeit with less centralization and more informality.

Although civil society’s activities are often structured differently than they are in the West and may escape the attention of some Western observers, there is no truth to the common claim that postcommunist civil societies in the CEE region are passive and organizationally anemic.

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**Behavior Patterns**

In order to understand civil society’s role in a given country, examinations of public opinion or volunteerism must give way to studies of politically relevant actions such as lobbying and protest. Instead of measuring civil society’s “strength” by counting the number of organizations per capita or recording what people say in response to survey questions, we need to assess how and how often civil society gets involved in political and public life. We also need to look at the links between civil society groups and other players in the polity, asking how effective these links are. Focusing on contentious politics is one way to do this. In some countries, groups are reader to challenge officials and to use contentious forms of behavior to pursue their interests. In others, cooperation between the state and civil society is extensive and often institutionalized, while the level of political contention by civil society groups is lower. Institutions clearly play a role here, and so do history and tradition. Viewed from this vantage, civil societies can be classified
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as either “contentious” or “accommodating.” During the first decade of Poland’s transformation, the country had a contentious civil society, while most of its CEE neighbors and near-neighbors had lower levels of contention. In recent years, this trend has flipped, however, leaving Bulgaria and Hungary more contentious than Poland.

What causes a civil society to go from accommodating to contentious or vice-versa? The key seems to be regime type (authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, or democratic) plus specific features of the polity such as the structure and nature of the party system. Where parties work well to aggregate interests and pressure the government, civil society’s political role will be mostly complementary to that of the parties. Where the party system is unstable, civil society tends to become supplementary. Postcommunist civil societies are mostly of the latter sort: Parties are unstable and declining across the CEE region (new EU members included), just as they are throughout the rest of Europe. Civil society groups have stepped in to fill the gap, advocating particular policies in contentious disputes with the government. In the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian settings of Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia, parties do a poor job of interest representation and often find themselves overshadowed by periodically active protest and oppositional movements.

The CEE civil societies are no strangers to political involvement, but today their interventions rarely have an “antisystem” character: Clear alternatives to a market economy and political democracy are simply not there. Instead of being “against the system” and in favor of replacing it with something else, civil society engages in what we have called “contentious reformism.” For about a decade and a half after the Berlin Wall was torn down, CEE civil societies were, by and large, liberally minded and moderate, both in what they demanded and in how they went about trying to get it. In authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, the bulk of “dissident” civic actions have aimed at securing political freedoms and expanding the public sphere in which citizens can (safely) engage their governments. In democratic countries, most civil society organizations have supported liberal democracy and markets while focusing on better governance and representation.

Several countries of the region, particularly those with autocratic or weak democratic regimes, experienced waves of popular political mobilization, triggered by outrage at corrupt politicians, rigged democratic procedures, inept administrations, and sluggish economic growth. By far the most spectacular wave of protests was the set of so-called color revolutions that swept across Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2005. In Russia more recently, protestors have challenged Putin’s regime in the name of “honor, decency, dignity, and conscience.” Since 2006, reformism anchored in a neoliberal consensus has been a fading force in the CEE countries. Parties and movements that are dis-
tinctly populist and sometimes radically right-wing have become more visible. Growing numbers of people have been turning to them not only for ideological explanations, but for organizational vehicles that can convey the rising discontent and frustration many feel amid public-corruption scandals and a lingering period of worldwide economic woes.

This turn to the right is well documented. Yet it is worth recalling that the embrace of right-wing, populist ideologies is highly uneven across the postcommunist region. Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, and Ukraine have the largest potential far-right support pools (relative to population) of any countries in Europe. Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia, by contrast, seem to be more moderate, with rates of far-right support that are actually lower than what one finds in Italy and Portugal. Our own work on protest politics in Hungary and Poland provides additional evidence for significant disparities. Both countries have heard more right-wing rhetoric and seen more far-right protests since 2008, but such phenomena remain more common and more widely supported in Hungary.

Many CEE countries have been witnessing a rise in right-wing radicalization on the basis of slogans about national purification, opposition to the EU, and a return to “true values.” But antisystem and antidemocratic organizations have remained marginal in most places, while civil societies have stuck by and large to the path of moderation. Despite the social and economic costs of the postcommunist transformations and the post-2008 economic crisis, extremisms of right and left alike have been surprisingly subdued. Nowhere is a “Weimar scenario” likely.

**Setting the Record Straight**

There are three persistent myths about post-1989 civil societies in former communist countries. We challenge them all. First, as we have shown, postcommunist civil societies were not built from scratch. To a significant degree, they sprang from associational spheres that were inherited from the old regime, as well as from organizational traditions that pre-dated communist rule.

Second, some comparative analyses suggest that a new type of civil society has emerged in postcommunist countries. It is said to be a fresh variant, different in kind from the Continental, Anglo-Saxon, or Nordic types of civil society. Its roots supposedly lie in the shared communist past and in the specific nature of the revolutions against communism that broke out between 1989 and 1991. We think this is wrong, and argue the opposite. There is no convergence on a single model. On the contrary, postcommunist civil societies are becoming more divergent from one another, whether in sectoral composition, behavior, normative orientations, or predominant modes of relating to state authorities. These differences reflect not only the historical traditions of various
subregions within the old Soviet bloc, but also the contrasting outcomes of postcommunist transformations and the new divisions created across the European space by the EU’s successive enlargements.

The third and last myth that we wish to challenge is the one that paints postcommunist civil societies as chronically weak. While strength and weakness are not very useful categories, we have shown above that some civil societies in the region have dense and comprehensive organizational structures, operate in a friendly institutional and legal environment, and have some capacity to influence policy making on local and national levels. In other postcommunist countries, especially those that have reverted to various forms of authoritarian rule, civil societies are often organizationally weak and politically irrelevant. Civil society actors are shut out of routine consultation and governance and come together to influence politics only in extraordinary moments of rage triggered by economic downturns or gross state violations of laws and constitutional provisions, as witnessed recently in Ukraine.

Two questions dominate debates on civil society: 1) Is civil society necessary to undermine authoritarian rule and bring about regime change? 2) What impact does civil society have on government policies and democratic quality, particularly after regime change? The experiences of postcommunist countries shed light on both.

In general, we agree with Philippe Schmitter that civil society’s role in precipitating regime change is insignificant. Apart from Poland, there is no convincing evidence that organized civil society contributed to the communist collapse, although the defections of various associations, particularly at the moment of power transfer, were important. In 1989, several CEE countries experienced cascading cycles of mobilization—manifestations more of spontaneous rather than organized civil society—that tipped the balance against communism. That said, we hasten to note that several CEE countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, the Baltics) had consequential civil societies around the time of regime transition. Comparative study, moreover, shows that the stronger a country’s civil society was around that time, the more likely that country was to achieve a higher quality of liberal democracy, to enjoy a faster and stronger recovery from the transition’s economic dislocations, and to feature a lower level of social inequality years later. Yet not all forms of civil society mobilization under nondemocratic regimes help the rise of democracy, particularly if racist or radically nationalist activism is at the forefront (as in the former Yugoslavia).

The postcommunist experience as a whole, however, attests to the positive and important role that civil society can play in democracy’s consolidation. After twenty-five years of massive transformations, postcommunist civil societies have built often-impressive amounts of organizational capacity and political influence. This may be exerted through contention, voluntary activities, assorted consultative arrangements, or
all three. For example, Polish unions and farmers’ groups have been able to defeat or delay many proposed economic and social reforms that they did not like. In other countries, including those that have had color revolutions, civil society organizations have resisted authoritarian reversals and uses of electoral fraud, holding even authoritarian rulers at least partly accountable. Case studies and anecdotal evidence suggest the significant impact that civil society organizations have had on the design and implementation of specific policies dealing with labor and the environment as well as rights for women and minorities (to say nothing of human rights more generally).

What is most striking, however, is the disparity of paths and outcomes. Under authoritarian regimes (Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), independent civil society organizations are thin on the ground, persecuted, and poorly institutionalized, often resembling the incomplete “dissident” civil societies of the years before 1989. In semi-authoritarian regimes (Russia and Ukraine), the state harasses and interferes with independent citizens and their NGO activities, but social movements make a mark on public life via waves of public protest. Many authoritarian governments have learned to coexist with and manage their (often truncated and not very consequential) civil societies.19

The democratic civil societies of the CEE region may not be able to match their West European counterparts in numbers and influence, but CEE civil society’s growth has been impressive nonetheless. And when it comes to transnational networking or the legal architecture of the public sphere, there are CEE civil societies that not only match Western Europe but are ahead of such states from Southern Europe as Greece, Italy, and Portugal. People in Hungary, Poland, and Romania are more likely than EU citizens generally to tell pollsters that they “share the values or interests” of civil society organizations and “trust them to act in the right way to influence political decision making.”20 These same respondents also report the belief that civil society organizations significantly affect policy making in their respective countries.

The political and economic problems that have swept the world since 2008 have fostered tenser relations between civil societies and hard-pressed states. Large swaths of the former have found themselves drawn to contention and right-wing populism. Béla Greskovits once marveled at how patient Central and East Europeans were while in the grip of massive and often painful political and social changes.21 Looking at the recent waves of intense protest in some CEE countries, we wonder: Is their patience giving out? One can only say: “It depends.”22 But recent protests in Poland (the CEE country that has been least affected by Europe’s economic crisis) may foreshadow a new cycle of popular mobilization triggered by the reduced capacity of states to satisfy public expectations.

If CEE publics may be in danger of losing their patience, are CEE
civil societies at risk of losing their moderation? The recent upsurge of political radicalization, extremism, and aggressive rhetoric in the region is undeniable. But these developments are unevenly distributed throughout the postcommunist world. While some CEE countries record the highest intensities of right-wing sentiment in all of Europe, others deviate hardly at all from typical Western levels.

In conclusion, many postcommunist civil societies have made considerable progress—often under far-from-ideal conditions—in building autonomous institutions and securing a public role for themselves.

NOTES

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1. Ralf Dahrendorf, “Has the East Joined the West?” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 7 (Spring 1990): 42.

2. Following Larry Diamond, we define civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules . . . it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.” See Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221.


8. There are some discrepancies in the existing reports. We calculate, based on our 17 November 2013 consultation of www.worker-participation.eu, that for the early 2010s, the average level of unionization in the postcommunist member states of the EU was 19 percent of the labor force. In the West European countries (without Scandinavia) this level was 29 percent. The averages do not tell the whole story, however. While the level of unionization in Portugal and Spain was 19 percent apiece, and ran as low as 8 percent in France, the percentages in Romania, Slovenia, and Poland were 33, 27, and 15, respectively. See also Jelle Visser, “Union membership statistics in 24 countries,” *Monthly Labor Review* 129 (January 2006): 38; available at www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/01/art3full.pdf.


