“Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era provides a powerful new theoretical and operational foundation for the analysis of neoliberalism and its implications for individuals, nations, and organizations. Hall and Lamont, together with the volume’s distinguished contributing authors, seamlessly interconnect individual well-being with macro-level societal development, offering readers a wealth of fascinating findings. A must-read for social scientists in several disciplines, indeed for all those concerned to understand the contemporary era and its possibilities for human well-being — under often challenging conditions.”

— Robert M. Fishman, University of Notre Dame

“Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era gives a comprehensive and original account of neoliberalism as an idea, together with its social effects and productive provocations for social scientists. The editors’ introduction makes the key terms, issues, and stakes completely accessible, even for novice readers, leading the way to the contributors’ analyses of diverse policy regimes and their challenges for individuals, communities, and societies. The “resilience” in the book’s title reflects the other side of neoliberalism’s consolidation of social security around market principles. The book neither assures nor laments; rather, it opens a conversation that invites an engaged continuation.”

— Carol Greenhouse, Princeton University

“The problematic of Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era is nothing less than understanding the effects of neoliberalism on individuals, groups, communities, policies, and societies to uncover the sources of resilience in difficult times. This is a risky enterprise. Social scientists are often willing to salute the noble flag of interdisciplinarity in faculty meetings, but they are rarely willing to move outside their disciplinary comfort zones actually to engage in it. The results, when they are as probing as those in this book, prove that the risk is worth taking. Readers are left with sharply motivating ideas and new projects about how fundamental social issues can be better understood and explored.”

— George Ross, University of Montreal

This book is dedicated to Chaviva Hošek — visionary for a better society
are also deeply grateful to all the colleagues from a wide range of disciplines, countries, and institutions who discussed their work at program meetings as this book was taking shape. They will find traces of their ideas and comments throughout the pages of this volume. Many of those presentations inspired defining moments in this collaboration. For shepherding this work to publication, we are also grateful to the efficient team at Cambridge University Press and, in particular, to Lew Bateman, a great editor.

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Introduction

Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era

Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont

This book is an effort to assess developments in a neoliberal era spanning the past three decades of global history. Although social science examines many phenomena, it looks only rarely at what Pierson (2003) calls “big, slow-moving processes.” We are often not aware of the sands shifting beneath our feet as events change the character of the times in diffuse ways. Beginning in the 1980s, the growing influence of market-oriented ideas constituted just such a process, global in scope, pervasive in effects. We want to know what consequences neoliberal ideas and policies had for social, economic, and political life. But even more central to this inquiry is a desire to understand the process whereby neoliberal ideas worked their way into the policies of governments, the operation of organizations, and the lives of ordinary people. In that respect, this volume is an investigation into the dynamics of social change.

Compared with many studies, this one involves a shift in optics. Neoliberalism is often analyzed as a set of policy reforms reflecting a class politics that ranges capital against labor (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Harvey 2005). Although that approach has some validity, such perspectives tend to treat a multidimensional set of developments in largely economic terms and sometimes overemphasize the negative effects of neoliberalism. Perspectives that treat neoliberalism as a cultural phenomenon offer a useful corrective but often overstate the domination of neoliberal ideas over social life. In this volume, we try to integrate economic, political, and cultural analyses of neoliberalism, and instead of seeing it as a development with homogenous effects across space and time, we view it as a more open-ended stimulus that provoked a diversity of responses.

1 For their comments and suggestions, we thank the members of the Successful Societies program, particularly William Sewell, Jr., as well as Mary Brinton, Paul Leduc Browne, Mazen Elfakhani, Robert Fishman, Marion Fourcade, François Harelman, Devesh Kapur, Robert Sampson, Jennifer Silva, and Martin Schröder.
Developments associated with neoliberalism, such as the opening of markets and new policy regimes, put important constraints on many people, usually linked to their social positions. But it also offered opportunities and new tools from which a response to such developments could be fashioned. In short, one of the core arguments of this book is that neoliberalism brought forth various types of creative responses. The results were far from similar across populations and national settings, not only because neoliberal initiatives were more intense in some times and places but also because people responded to them differently, drawing upon cultural and institutional resources distinctive to those settings. The effects of neoliberalism must be seen as the product of syncratic social processes that engaged many actors mobilizing multiple instruments in the social, economic, and political environment.

This is also a book about social resilience. Although neoliberal initiatives improved the lives of some people, it also posed profound challenges to the well-being of many groups, communities, and individuals as more intense market competition reallocated resources and market logics worked their way into ever more spheres of social life. We are interested in the ways in which groups sustained their well-being in the face of such challenges, and we see this as a problem of social resilience. We use the term “social resilience” to refer to the capacity of groups of people bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community, or nation to sustain and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it. Although our focus here is on the response to neoliberalism, we conceptualize social resilience broadly to encompass the capacities of societies to cope with many kinds of challenges.

Social resilience is a central characteristic of what we call successful societies – namely, societies that provide their members with the resources to live healthy, secure, and fulfilling lives. We are especially interested in understanding the sources of social resilience, and we look for them in the institutional and cultural resources that groups and individuals mobilize to sustain their well-being. In that respect, this book builds on our previous endeavor, Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (Hall and Lamont 2009), which was also concerned with the resources that sustain people’s capabilities for coping with challenges. Both books are the product of intensive intellectual collaboration over several years among a group of scholars drawn from a wide range of disciplines.

Our approach to social resilience can be contrasted with influential perspectives that emphasize the psychological qualities needed to cope with various types of shocks. We are less interested in individual traits than in the social and cultural frameworks underpinning resilience, and we are skeptical of the efforts of some governments to find in individual resilience the solution to social problems. Even though many working class Americans believe they should find within themselves the psychological energy and resources to deal

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3 On resilience as an object of government policy and sponsored research, see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience and http://www.amindus.com/WWLVXYLQ.html.

with structural insecurity and rising inequality (e.g., Silva 2012; Sharone 2013), we look for the institutional and cultural resources that underpin resilience in the wider social environment.

Studying social resilience entails making linkages between the micro, meso, and macro levels of inquiry. Therefore, drawing on a range of analytical and disciplinary tools, we integrate accounts of the shifts in macro and meso contexts associated with neoliberalism with an examination of the impact those shifts had on what is perceived, conceived, and experienced at the individual level (Lefebvre 1974). Although the emphasis of each chapter varies, our focus is not only on the institutional and cultural changes structuring the contexts in which people live but on self-concepts, orders of worth and criteria of evaluation linked to the social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Lamont 1992, 2000; Boltanski and Thevenot 2006; Foucault 2008).

The Challenges and Impact of the Neoliberal Era

The past three decades, which we term the "neoliberal era," have seen profound economic, political, and cultural changes with global reach. We are most interested in those associated with neoliberalism, understood as a wide-ranging shift in prevalent ideas and social relationships privileging more intense market competition, less state intervention, and an entrepreneurial orientation to action (Harvey 2005). To some extent, of course, these are longstanding features of capitalism, whose prominence has ebbed and flowed over time (Sewell 2008). But we see the recent period as one in which they have come to the fore again with a new intensity.

Although there are important economic dimensions to these developments, including heightened competition in more open markets for goods, capital, and labor, at their heart was a series of shifts in thinking and discourse among ordinary citizens and elites. Some of these developments are bound up with globalization, but even the opening of global markets was contingent on changes in policy inspired by neoliberal paradigms. Therefore, we group a wide range of developments together under the rubric of neoliberalism.3 Many are described in more detail in the next chapter by Peter Evans and William Sewell, which also describes the historical emergence of neoliberalism, initially as an economic ideology and then as a social and political phenomenon inspired, at least in part, by the economic crises of the 1970s. However, we begin with a brief summary of what we mean by the term.

Neoliberalism

The defining feature of the neoliberal age has been the rise of market ideologies that, at their apogee, approached the "market fundamentalism" Somers (2008) has described. They were marked by a resurgent faith in the power of markets

3 Of course, many elements of neoliberalism are closely tied to the history of capitalism itself (see Harvey 2005; Joubert and Théret 1994; and Centro and Colletti 2013).
to secure efficient outcomes, whose corollary was declining confidence in the capacity of states to allocate resources efficiently. As such ideologies gained traction in domestic politics and the international sphere, they called into question the principles used to justify many kinds of state intervention, forcing governments to reconsider how they delivered public services and the division of labor between the public and private sectors (Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006).

Such issues are central to the collective imaginary of a society. We use the term "collective imaginary" to describe the overarching narratives that tell people what their society is about, what its past embodies and its future portends, who belongs to it, and what kinds of behavior merit social respect. Although there are distinctive features to every national imaginary, the latter also draws on ideographs, considered in chapters by Will Kymlicka, Jane Jenson, and Ron Levi on human rights, social rights, and multiculturalism. In line with these analyses, we see the neoliberal era as one defined, not only by a new set of policy regimes but also by a collective imaginings of communities (Anderson 1983). The effects were far reaching and multifaceted. Governments and international agencies were called upon to rethink their missions, and individuals faced profound redictions in the criteria for social worth as economic performance and market status became more central markers for social and cultural membership.4

This process of change was never simple or seamless. Even in the most settled of times, people subscribe with varying degrees of enthusiasm to some elements in the collective imaginary while rejecting others. As neoliberal narratives came to prominence, they were taken up with fervor by some groups and stoutly resisted by others. Neoliberalism did not impose a new framework of ideas so much as set in motion a series of contests over ideological and material resources - inside societies and states. It shifted the context in which everyone had to operate, generating new opportunities and constraints that are the focal points of our analysis.

One reason we emphasize the neoliberal imaginary is the range of its import. In their most familiar forms, neoliberal ideas endorsed the value of market competition. They called for a rearrangement of state-market relations and, in some guises, for a shift to more robust civil societies that could perform the tasks at which states were no longer thought to be efficient. Where others had once seen families or communities, growing numbers of economists and policymakers began to posit congeries of economic actors driven by a market calculus. In some instances, market competition was deliberately extended to new spheres, including the delivery of health care and public services. In others, the growing popularity of market logics altered the modus operandi of organizations through ancillary processes, such as the adoption of ranking systems that promote competitive behavior (Espeland and Sauder 2007).

These developments can be seen as a contemporary manifestation of the dictum that different historical periods typically authorize different modes of action. Ours is a period that has authorized self-interested market behavior in

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settings where it might once not have been legitimate. That in turn has inspired some reconfiguration in social relationships. If we free people completely from the restraining bonds of moral sentiment, neoliberal ways of thinking often led to a decline in the respect accorded to norms of communal solidarity (Streeck 2009). In many parts of the world, the growth of markets in goods for which people once depended on local patrons or personal relationships could be liberating (Kapur et al. 2010). People's choices often increased, although with redistributive consequences as the availability of some goods became more dependent on income. In some cases, such developments may be altering local social orders by shifting people's willingness to invest in certain kinds of communal relationships.

In much the same way, neoliberalism inspired changes in the dominant scripts of personhood toward ones more focused on a person's individuality and productivity (Greenhouse 2009). It promoted new criteria of worth that encouraged many people to approach their lives as if they were "projects" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). As more value was attached to the capacity to prosper on competitive markets, people who had once derived self-respect from being "hard workers" found that was no longer enough: one now had to be a worker with high productivity deploying skills validated by the market, signaling worth and social membership through consumption (Lamont and Molnár 2001). Developments such as these have a bearing on the terms in which social recognition is granted and self-concepts formed. Over time, the narratives people used to describe themselves changed, with implications for what they thought they could do and how they saw themselves as acting in the world (Abelmann 2003; Polletta et al. 2011). Socioeconomic status, often intertwined with notions of moral status, became more central to the matrix through which individuals conceived their self-worth - although with notable cross-national variations (Lamont 1992, 2000).

In some cases, these developments may have been emancipatory and in others not. Although it is difficult to establish how far reaching such changes have been, many of the most consequential aspects of neoliberalism lie in its implications for human subjectivities (Greenhouse 2009; Ong 2006).5 Again, however, these changes cannot be understood as the imposition of neoliberal modes of thinking on entirely plastic individuals. People responded to neoliberal values with varying degrees of enthusiasm and resistance, and many people turned neoliberal ideas to their own purposes (to establish racial equality, for instance, as noted in Chapter 4 by Lamont, Welburn, and Fleming on African Americans' responses to stigmatization). There is wide variation in the extent to which neoliberalism inspired new visions of agency.

Neoliberal Reform in the Economic and Political Realms

The concrete impact of neoliberal ideas is most obvious, of course, in the political realm, where they altered prevailing views about the appropriate relationship between the public and private sectors. In Chapter 1, Evans and Sewell

4 On social and cultural membership, see Lamont (1992, 2000) and Ong (2006).

5 On the gendered dimensions of subjectivity promoted by neoliberalism, see Walkerdine (2003).
provide a sweeping survey of these developments notable for its attention to the cultural as well as the political plane. Mainstream party platforms moved in neoliberal directions on both sides of the political spectrum and in many parts of the developed and developing world (Iversen 2006; Mudge 2011). As a result, the cultural matrix defining the “center of gravity” of political discourse was transformed. In the United States, for instance, the term “liberal” took on a negative valence, as the success of neoconservative movements altered the terms in which even their opponents characterized their own positions (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011). Encouraged by international agencies, governments across the world privatized public services (including public utilities, highways, prisons, schools, and hospitals) and “deregulated” markets with a view to promoting competition (Vogel 1996). Welfare programs were reconfigured into “workfare” programs to push recipients into employment under the guise of making them more “self-reliant” (Miller and Rose 2008; Duvoux 2009; Guettzkow 2010).

Jane Jenson and Ron Levi (in Chapter 2) see the political significance of neoliberalism in three developments affecting many spheres of policymaking. These include a shift in scale, as functions formerly performed by national states were passed to lower levels of government or to international regimes (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). Policies put a new emphasis on the individualization of risk, responsibility, and reward, and governments pursued a “new public management” that built market competition into the delivery of public services accompanied by “technologies of performance” based on monitoring, ranking, and benchmarking (Lascoumes and Le Gallès 2004; Miller and Rose 2008).

Corresponding economic developments have been equally consequential. Accelerated by technological developments and rising demand for services, the opening of world markets, made possible by neoliberal policies, shifted relative prices and the feasibility of producing some kinds of goods in particular countries. The results were a shift in the economic opportunity structures facing many workers, rising levels of national income inequality, and rapid rates of growth in many parts of the developing world.

However, liberalization was not a monolithic process. One of the striking observations of Evans and Sewell (in Chapter 1) is that governments embraced neoliberal policies with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm and implemented them in terms adapted to local contexts. The form of neoliberal policies also changed over time (Peck and Tickell 2002). The picture that emerges from this study is not one in which neoliberal discourse achieves complete dominance but one in which countercurrents are engaged wherever neoliberal initiatives are proposed, often producing a fragmentation of discourses and diversities in policy. Hall and Thelen (2009) underline this point when they note that many of the initiatives often described as “neoliberal” have very different effects

and that the effects even of similar policies vary by national context (see also Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).

Much the same can be said about the impact of neoliberal policies on overall economic well-being. Evans and Sewell (see Chapter 1) observe that the economic effects of neoliberal reform varied with the context into which it was introduced. In countries where markets had been highly restricted, as in China and the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe, neoliberal reform brought real benefits, such as increased trade and greater access to consumption goods. By contrast, such reforms rarely inspired the high rates of growth once promised in the developed economies. The most favorable aggregate effects seem to have come in the developing world. Rapid economic growth in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe owes much to neoliberal policies. Economic reform provided new opportunities to many people otherwise earning a subsistence living in rural communities (Collier and Dollar 2002: 49). International trade brought them new markets and products, and global communication opened up new vistas on life. People locked into traditional communities found in market logics a new basis from which to mount claims for equality, much as eighteenth-century Europeans once had (Kapur et al. 2010; Sewell 2010). In terms of its aggregate economic and political effects, neoliberalism has been far from a purely negative phenomenon.

New Inequalities

However, neoliberal reform has also had profound distributive effects. When markets are made more open or competitive, the opportunity structure changes and some people gain, but others lose. In general, those with the resources and skills to prosper on competitive markets do well, but those lacking in such resources are disadvantaged even if they had the right skill sets for a previous era. This redistribution of opportunity has been reflected in rising levels of income inequality in both developed and developing countries. Thus, neoliberal reform has posed stringent challenges to specific social groups.

How widespread these challenges are varies by national context. In the emerging economies where neoliberal reform inspired rapid rates of growth, new markets have offered opportunities to many people aspiring to middle-class positions (Ravallion 2009; Kharas 2010). By contrast, in most of the developed democracies, even the middle class has seen its well-being stagnate in recent decades, as Lucy Barnes and Peter Hall note in Chapter 7. Large gains at the top of the earnings distribution have not been matched in the lower half (Fischer et al. 1996; Piketty and Saez 2003; Bartels 2008). The result has been an unprecedented concentration of wealth in the hands of the corporate class in the United States and United Kingdom and rising intergenerational inequality in many countries (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Chauvel 2010).

Other dimensions of neoliberal policy also imposed hardships on people in the lower socioeconomic strata. Initiatives that weakened the labor movement undercut the organizations best placed to defend these people (Fantasia and Voss 2004). Changes to the benefit levels, duration, and eligibility requirements

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6 In the United States, the positions we characterize as neoliberal were often adopted by organizations described there as neoconservative. See Vaise (2010).
of social benefits reduced the level of social protection available to them, and ancillary developments privatized risk (Smith 2002; Uchitel 2006; Hacker 2008; Jacobs and Newman 2008). Growing numbers of people have been forced into precarious positions marked by low pay and minimal social benefits, from which it is difficult to escape (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). In some countries, these developments have deepened social divisions, notably between labor-market insiders and outsiders (Palier and Telen 2010). Despite the labor activation schemes that have been a hallmark of the neoliberal era, there are durable differences between those engaged in social networks through work and those suffering from insecurity and social isolation as a result of poverty or unemployment that limits their access to income, sociability, and in some cases even health care (Paugam, Gallie, and Jacob 2003; Palier et al. 2012). Many societies are now better described by frameworks of social exclusion than of social capital (Silver 1994; Castel 1995; Paugam 1996; Daly and Silver 2008).

Moreover, the effects of such developments are by no means entirely economic. The shifts in relative prices that accompany the opening of markets induce corresponding shifts in social status even when they enrich the community as a whole. The status of those with skills in higher demand increases, but people whose status was based on outmoded skills or older institutional orders are threatened, for instance, as the jobs they held move to the global South. Effects of this sort stretch into the family, where women called upon to work to support the household sometimes gain, but underemployed men who might once have been the principal breadwinners lose stature. In both developed and developing economies, therefore, the more intense market competition characteristic of the neoliberal age gives rise to heightened status anxieties.

As various forms of social protection, both traditional and modern, have fallen, rising levels of material insecurity have threatened everyone. Even affluent members of the middle class have developed new concerns about reproducing their class position. Growing numbers of middle-class parents are devoting increasing amounts of resources to improving the prospects for their children (Lareau 2003; Aurini, Dierkes, and Davies forthcoming). For ordinary workers already under pressure to demonstrate self-reliance in a neoliberal world, the presence of the poor in public spaces keeps alive a “fear of falling,” and rising competition for jobs intensifies people’s concerns about losing ground vis-à-vis lower status groups (Ehrenreich 1989; Newman 1989; Duvoux 2009). The result has been rising xenophobia and declining support for poor relief (Art 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Developments such as these have implications not only for individuals but also for national communities. Chavel (2010) suggests, for instance, that long-term effects are likely to follow from the widespread fears market insecurity has induced in the younger generations. These fears are not only affecting self-concepts and levels of social engagement; they are also affecting their shared representations of the symbolic community (who cares for whom) in terms likely to be durable over the coming years (see also Brinton 2011). In much the same way, the shifts in self-concept associated with neoliberalism have political implications. Neoliberalism generally leads people to think of themselves as governed less by others and more by themselves (Greenhouse 2009). Although that has advantages for some individuals, it tends to feed declining levels of trust in the public authorities. Moreover, those suffering most from rising levels of inequality are most prone to distrust government and to doubt their capacities to influence it (Lascoumes and Bezares 2009). A self-perpetuating cycle is then set in motion as declining levels of civic engagement among these groups reduce electoral pressure on governments to redistribute resources (Anderson and Beramendi 2012).

Growing social divisions between insiders and outsiders also weaken the capacity of the public authorities to legitimate policies based on appeals to social solidarity (Palier et al. 2012). As we have noted, more intense competition for jobs and associated status anxieties feed a growing hostility toward immigrants. In France, for example, where southern European migrants were once regarded as contributors to the French economy (Noirlil 2006), non-European migrants are now more often resented as intruders (Bail 2008). In Chapter 5, Leanne Son Hing identifies a set of psychological dynamics that connect more intense market competition with more prejudice against outgroups; in Chapter 7, Barnes and Hall find more hostility to immigrants where the gap in well-being between the upper and lower middle classes is larger. Although the meritocratic values promoted by neoliberalism should lead, in principle, to less discrimination, Son Hing notes that people pruned by such values are more likely to express prejudice and people exposed to prejudice are more likely to suffer adverse effects if they subscribe to neoliberal values: they are more likely to blame themselves for their fate than to recognize structural discrimination. We see here that some of the most important effects of neoliberalism emerge from complex dynamics in which economic and political developments interact with shifting views of cultural membership and community.

To take another classic example, in many countries, rising levels of economic inequality have been accompanied by increasing spatial segregation in housing between income and ethnic groups (Massey and Denton 1994; Prêtrecellal 2009). That segregation then narrows prevailing definitions of the symbolic community (namely, those with whom we feel a sense of solidarity or responsibility as part of “us”), which in turn encourages further segregation (Lamont 2000). Neoliberal schemata also encourage people to be more mobile in social and spatial terms (Jasper 2002) and thus more disconnected from any particular community (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006, but cf. Fischer 2011). Although that might promote intergroup interactions, it can also make people feel more vulnerable and defensive vis-à-vis other social groups.

Our broad point is that the redistribution of advantage and disadvantage associated with the categories people use to ascribe worth. Neoliberal ideas promote particular frames used by people to define how they should live their lives, what they are capable of, and for what they can hope. These are constitutive
elements of horizons of possibility and of the contours of symbolic communities. A discourse that elevates market criteria of worth tends to classify people who are affluent into a bounded community and to marginalize those with fewer economic resources. Corresponding ideas about productivity are often used to draw rigid moral boundaries around people who are unemployed, low skilled, or low paid, thereby narrowing the circle of people to whom citizens feel a sense of responsibility. Moreover, by defining worth in terms of levels of income or productivity they can never attain, neoliberal schemata can be disabling for people with low levels of income or skill. They come to be defined (and often self-defined) as “losers” – especially in societies that do not support varied matrices of worth based on morality, solidarity, or other attributes unrelated to income (Lamont 2000).

The precise impact of developments such as these is hard to assess, of course, and they are to some extent part of an older story about capitalism. Over history, as markets expanded, consumption came to be viewed more widely as a marker of cultural membership, often in competition with notions grounding cultural membership in citizenship rights (Marshall 1950). Galbraith (1958) and Marcuse (1964) saw such processes at work in the 1950s, but they may have been intensified under the influence of a highly commercial media during the 1970s and 1980s (Schor 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Commercial considerations are certainly penetrating more deeply into spheres of life once construed as autonomous from them (Zelizer 2010). Such tendencies are especially marked in countries such as China (Davis 2000; Hersner 2008) and Russia (Chevchenko 2001), which moved from command to market economies. However, Boltanski and Chiappello (2007) argue that even long-established market economies have seen the rise of a new model of individuality that views the most valued social actor as a networking entrepreneur developing his or her human capital for the purpose of achieving individual success. Barnes and Hall find some evidence for such shifts in attitudes (see Chapter 7), and, in Chapter 6, James Dunn charts changes in housing policy based on corresponding shifts in premises about how actors will behave.

A Syncretic Social Process

Neoliberalism must not be seen, however, as a blanket laid over the world. The process whereby neoliberal schemas acquired influence over policymaking and popular beliefs is ultimately best described as a syncretic social process. Neoliberal schemata had significant effects on the course of events; they were not simply a smokescreen behind which a politics driven by material or ideal interests went on exactly as before. But their social impact was inflected by the creativity with which political actors used them and conditioned by the contexts into which they were introduced. In many cases, actors devoted to a particular cause found they could pursue it by adopting the language made widely available in the neoliberal era (with references to benchmarking, return on investment, social entrepreneurship, best practices, and the like). By framing their demands in new terms, many groups could advance longstanding purposes. Over time,
was understood as a property that allows the system to recover its prior state after suffering a shock, but ecologists have recently begun to see resilience in more dynamic terms, much as we do, emphasizing adaptation or transformation over return to an earlier state. In one pioneering formulation, Folke (2006: 259) notes that:

Resilience is currently defined in the literature as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks. . . . But resilience is not only about being persistent or robust to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories. In this sense, resilience provides adaptive capacity. . . .

In developmental psychology, the term “resilience” is generally used to describe an outcome, characterized by satisfactory performance (academic or otherwise) after an individual has been exposed to factors that put this performance at risk, such as poverty or the loss of a parent (Schoon 2006). Studies link this kind of resilience to the availability of close attachments or a supportive and disciplined environment. Resilience is usually seen as a characteristic of the individual associated with better coping skills, multiple domains of the self, or stress-response characteristics that mitigate the negative effects of risk factors. However, sociologically oriented psychologists have developed related formulations, such as the concept of self-efficacy proposed by Bandura (1977, 1982), to understand how people feel empowered or constrained by their social world. This literature has also inspired influential social analyses, such as the study by Furstenburg et al. (1999) and others of successful parenting strategies among low-income families in Philadelphia (see also Carlson and England 2011).

We draw on the insights of these literatures but define resilience somewhat differently. Our principal concern is with well-being broadly defined and how it is secured by groups of people more or less bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community, or country. Accordingly, we use the term “social resilience” to denote an outcome in which the members of a group sustain their well-being in the face of challenges to it. We define “well-being” broadly to include physical and psychological health, material sustenance, and the sense of dignity and belonging that comes with being a recognized member of the community (Taylor 1994). We avoid specifying a precise hierarchy of needs or self-actualization as the goal because current research suggests that the value attached to these varies across populations and contexts (cf. Sen 1999). We see resilience in dynamic terms, not as the capacity to return to a prior state but as the achievement of well-being even when that entails significant modifications to behavior or to the social frameworks that structure and give meaning to behavior. At issue is the capacity of individuals or groups to secure favorable outcomes (material, symbolic, emotional) under new circumstances and, if need be, by new means.
Social Resilience as a Process

We are most interested in exploring the sources of social resilience. What confers social resilience? To what extent did developments during the neoliberal era bring such factors to the fore? Or did neoliberalism erode the factors on which resilience depends?

We look in particular at how the institutional structures and cultural repertoires available to people by virtue of how they are embedded in various sets of social relations enhance their capacities to sustain their well-being in challenging circumstances. In that respect, these chapters build on the formulations of our previous collective work, Successful Societies (Hall and Lamont 2009), which argued that well-being is conditioned by the balance between the life challenges people face and their capabilities for coping with them. We suggested that capabilities depend on access not only to economic resources but also to cultural and social resources embodied in networks, social hierarchies, and cultural repertoires. This book can be read as an effort to extend the concept of social resources and to analyze their role in contexts of social change.

The chapters that follow find that people fashion responses to challenges from resources found in multiple spheres nested inside one another—ranging from the family, neighborhood, and local community to the region, nation-state, and transnational regimes (e.g., Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). Indeed, one feature of the contemporary era is the interdependence visible between these levels, as the media carry national and international tropes into the heart of the family and local communities depend on national states or transnational organizations for crucial forms of support. The prospects of immigrants within a local community, for instance, cannot be understood without taking into account the recognition given minorities by national symbolic communities, the multicultural principles to which they might appeal, and the concrete resources and services provided by national policies (Bloemraad 2006; Kymlicka 2007). Even international regimes are relevant by virtue of how they support human rights and transnational linkages among migrant groups (Soss 1994; Merry and Levitt 2009). Thus, to understand the situation of vulnerable groups, we need to consider not only the groups themselves but also the institutional and cultural scaffolding surrounding them, with an eye to the opportunities it offers and forecloses (Lamont 2009).

One of our conclusions is that social resilience is the result of active processes of response. Groups do not simply call passively on existing sets of resources. Social resilience is the product of much more creative processes in which people assemble a variety of tools, including collective resources and new images of themselves, to sustain their well-being in the face of social change. In some instances, those tools are features of existing context; in others, they are made available by neoliberalism itself. In many respects, this is another story about “culture in action” (Swidler 1986), as meaning making that occurs in the course of everyday interaction and collective political endeavor.

Introduction

Marcos Ancelovici’s study of the response of French trade unions to developments in the neoliberal era underlines this point (see Chapter 2). Contemporary analyses often treat “globalization” and “neoliberalism” as if they were exogenous shocks of homogenous character. But Ancelovici shows that organizations experienced neoliberalism as a series of developments unfolding in time that had to be interpreted, and these interpretations were filtered through the matrix of concerns preoccupying each actor. Thus, French trade unions experienced “globalization” and “neoliberalism” as an organizational challenge manifested in declining levels of membership, and their response was oriented to this problem. When neoliberalism is understood at the level of lived realities, it becomes apparent that how the problem is perceived varies across contexts and that responses are constructed from available cultural repertoires and previous experiences (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). In an analysis with resonance for other types of agents, Ancelovici breaks down this response into processes of narration, learning, and institutionalization. He finds that organizations with more heterogeneous repertoires and leaders with more organizational autonomy devised a more resilient response.

The Role of States and Social Organizations

As Polanyi (1944) observed some years ago, states have long been the most important potential counterweight to markets; their regulations shape market competition; they are the source for public goods that markets do not supply and for measures mitigating the adverse effects of markets on vulnerable groups. Therefore, states should have been important sources of social resilience during the neoliberal era, and our findings confirm that they often were. Evans and Sewell (see Chapter 1) note that aggregate well-being was sustained more effectively in countries where neoliberal initiatives were accompanied by substantial new efforts at social protection, as in France, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea. From a neoliberal perspective, it may seem antithetical for governments to increase social spending and market competition in tandem, but they often did so with salutary effects.

In parallel terms, Barnes and Hall (see Chapter 7) find that the lower-middle class has been better off where governments did not simply increase social spending but targeted it on redistribution, and Chapter 8 by Keating, Siddiqi, and Nguyen attributes better developmental health outcomes in Canada, compared with the United States, to higher levels of public provision and policies that decoupled access to basic goods such as health care and education from income (see also Zuberi 2006). They argue that investment in basic goods such as education can mediate the long-term effects of neoliberal initiatives on adolescent health and development. These findings resonate with a literature attributing the economic success of the “small states” of northern Europe to the ways in which they linked flexible responses to world markets to significant levels of social protection (Katzenstein 1985; cf. Rodrik 1997).
However, states do not automatically operate as factors of social resilience. In many instances, governmental initiatives were central to the intensification of market competition, and the levels of social protection they provided varied dramatically across countries. Similar to societies, states were sites for competition between advocates of neoliberal reform and those attempting to limit its effects, and much depended on the balance of power between them (Mudge 2008).

Relevant here is the finding of Barnes and Hall (see Chapter 7) that the well-being of the working class is better where trade unions are stronger. Some analysts see trade unions as part of the economic problem rather than the solution, and neoliberal initiatives have sent many unions into serious decline. But trade unions emerge as one of the organizations most central to the well-being of people in the lower socioeconomic strata, in particular, because of their political role as advocates for those people. Barnes and Hall find that a person’s well-being is more strongly affected by the density of trade union membership in the country as a whole than by whether he or she is a member of a union. Trade unions seem to contribute to social resilience by shifting the balance of power between advocates and opponents of social protection.

In this context, dramatic declines in union membership are one of the most durable and deleterious legacies of the neoliberal era (Western and Rosenfeld 2011).

However, social resilience also has roots in other forms of social organization, and, in the case of Québec, Gérard Bouchard explores a classic example (see Chapter 9). For most of the past twenty years, aggregate well-being has been sustained more effectively in Québec than in the other provinces of Canada. Bouchard attributes much of this success to the ways in which the province has nurtured a “social economy” marked by large numbers of cooperatives, enterprises supported by quasi-public organizations, and some notable deliberative processes. Public policies helped sustain this model, but it was built on networks of social organizations. In these respects, Québec resembles the regions of northern Italy and Germany that flourished in competitive world markets by forging highly competitive market relations at home for more collaborative interfirm relationships built on dense social networks supporting a culture of cooperation (Piore and Sabel 1984; Herrigel 1996; Streeck 1991).

Social networks underpin social resilience in other ways as well. A large literature suggests that ties to families, friends, and acquaintances constitute social resources on which people can draw to cope with many kinds of challenges (Berkman 1997; Berkman and Glass 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Liebenberg and Unger 2009). From such connections, people secure information, logistical, and emotional support. Barnes and Hall (see Chapter 7) find that these types of social connectedness were important during the neoliberal era. Over the past three decades, people with closer ties to family and friends reported consistently higher levels of subjective well-being, and, as analysts of social capital posit, well-being was higher in countries with denser networks of civic engagement (Putnam 2000). Social connectedness in

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9 On the relationship between social capital, networks, and meaning, see Fishman (2009) and Pachucki and Beigel (2010).
some approaches to gaining recognition more successful than others (Lamont and Thévenot 2000).

These analyses are the tip of an important iceberg. The shared cultural references, myths, and narratives embodied in collective imaginaries can buttress an individual’s sense of self and capabilities in many ways. People depend on the cultural tools such imaginaries provide to make sense of challenges and to imagine solutions to them (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010; Swidler 1986). At stake are the possible selves and the futures people imagine and pursue for themselves and their communities (Markus and Nurius 1986). Chandler and Lalonde (1998) show, for instance, that differences in suicide rates across first-nation communities in British Columbia are conditioned by the community’s ability to transmit to its younger members a sense of pride in its collective identity and history. Particularly important are broader narratives about recognition and dignity, often conveyed by school policies about the display of group-distinctive ways of dressing, speaking, and demonstrating collective identity (Carter 2012).

Alongside these collective imaginaries are a range of ancillary cultural structures likely to be consequential for social resilience. Because people find strategies for action by observing the behavior of those around them, many aspects of local cultural orders can be important for social resilience. Young (2006) shows, for instance, how marginalized black men imagine paths to upward mobility in interaction with their environment. Cultural frameworks specific to particular ethnic groups may be enabling or disabling. African Americans are less likely than Latinos, for example, to recognize co-ethnics for jobs, partly because widespread stereotypes about welfare dependency among African Americans encourage them to invest more strongly in notions of self-reliance (Smith 2010). Exploring what cultural repertoires contribute to recognition and social resilience should be an important item on contemporary research agendas.

However, neoliberalism may have effects of its own on collective imaginaries, and these also deserve more exploration. Because neoliberal ideals privilege market criteria for assessing worth, they should bolster the self-concepts of skilled market players but threaten people who lack marketable resources. The resilience of the latter may depend on whether they have at their disposal alternative repertoires for evaluating themselves (e.g., moral repertoires) so that they are not entirely dependent on the dominant standards for status (Lamont 2000). However, some societies support such repertoires better than others (Lamont 2000), and the influence of neoliberal narratives may have narrowed the availability of alternative repertoires.

Chapter 6 by James Dunn illustrates how complex the effects of neoliberalism are. He notes many ways that housing sustains resilience at the micro-level; in particular, it has developmental value for children and serves as a source of ontological security for adults. But access to supportive housing is dependent on conditions at multiple scales, ranging from the housing policies of the locality to the terms on which international markets supply finance. Because of interdependencies across these planes, it is difficult to determine the net effect of neoliberal developments on housing, but this is clearly a case in which the fate of an important source of resilience at the micro level depends on meso- and macro-level processes that proceed without much regard for the ultimate implications for social resilience.

Collective Capacities: The Interplay of Culture and Institutions

Social resilience depends not only on the features of society on which individuals draw to enhance their capabilities but also on the capacity of communities to mount collective responses to challenges. We have already noted the roles that states can play in this process, which turn on their capacities to redistribute resources, supply public goods on terms independent of income, and encourage forms of social organization that maintain employment and social solidarity. However, several chapters of this book identify collective capacities that are important at the local level and explore the conditions that sustain them. They point, in particular, to the importance of capacities to supply collective goods, understood as something more than standard public goods.

In Chapter 10, Clyde Hertzman and Arjunan Siddique note that efforts to foster early childhood development, crucial for the entire community’s long-term well-being, cannot be understood simply as a matter of providing public goods. Thinking of early childhood development as a public good fails to capture the fact that fostering it requires active cooperation from multiple actors in the local community, ranging from school superintendents to parents and local business people. To convey this, Hertzman and Siddique describe early childhood development as a “collective-implementation good”—a term that can also be applied to other endeavors central to the social resilience of a community—seeing it as the product of government policy but one that can be produced only with the sustained involvement of durable, intersectoral coalitions.

In a different setting, Ann Swidler examines a similar problem, namely, how collective goods are supplied in African villages (see Chapter 11). Collective goods are goods that improve the well-being of the community and would not be supplied by markets because their benefits are nonexcludable, but similar to collective-implementation goods, they are supplied only through active forms of cooperation. Capacities to provide such goods are crucial to a community’s ability to maintain its well-being in the face of challenges. Therefore, understanding how they are generated is important for understanding social resilience.

Swidler’s findings highlight the contributions that appropriate institutions and cultural frameworks make to such capacities. In the villages of Malawi, she finds that the institution of the local chief is crucial to the provision of collective goods, and she sees the “chief” as a culturally constituted institution made

10 For parallel discussion of such problems in the case of common pool resources, see Ostrom (2005).
possible by the shared narratives of the community. These narratives accord chiefs a position from which they can seek the cooperation of the members of the community in collective endeavors. Their authority is bolstered by traditional control over symbolic resources, of the sort embodied in participation at a funeral, and by control over the allocation of some minor material resources, such as coupons for fertilizer. However, it is the culturally embedded role of the chief that is crucial to the supply of collective goods. By eliciting cooperation and ensuring everyone knows that the costs of contributing to the collectivity are being equally shared, chiefs provide assurances that encourage cooperation. They are the keystone for an arch of interdependencies that reaffirms the value attached to the collectivity.

This analysis has implications beyond African villages. Similar to Tsai’s (2006) work on public goods in China, it suggests that a desire for status often motivates actors’ contributions to collective goods and that collective goods are more likely to be supplied where shared narratives, reinforced by ritual, emphasize the value of the collectivity. Hertzman and Siddiqi observe that similar narratives support complex interdependencies in modern communities, and evidence indicates that the search for recognition within local status orders may motivate public-spirited action even inside institutional hierarchies (Willer 2009). In short, markets and hierarchies are not the only instruments available for organizing collective endeavor, and the contribution formal institutions make to the social resilience of a community often depends on their interplay with extant cultural frameworks (cf. Williamson 1985; Dobbin 1994; Ostrom 2005). Cultural and institutional structures can either reinforce or undercut another, as they do in schools where peer-based status orders collide with teacher-driven status orders (Carter 2005; Warikoo 2010).

These observations have special pertinence for developments during the neoliberal era. As neoliberal ideas—about entrepreneurial behavior, for example—became more popular, they often shifted the cultural frameworks underpinning institutional practices, giving rise to new forms of behavior. Schröder (2011) shows, for example, that the willingness of companies to offshore production to low-cost countries was not driven entirely by clear-cut economic circumstances but often influenced by managers’ embrace of neoliberal narratives. By the same token, market-oriented initiatives to improve the well-being of local communities in the developing world have had mixed success partly because many have not been attentive enough to local cultural contexts (Vollan 2008). Where such experiments ignore the social resources embedded in local cultural practices, they may destroy rather than create collective capacities (Rao and Walton 2004; Swidler and Watkins 2009).

However, resilience is not given by a static set of cultural frameworks. As we have noted, resilient outcomes usually demand active processes to engage and sustain the appropriate frameworks. Swidler emphasizes how ritualized activities reaffirm the value attached to the collectivity. Bouchard notes the importance of collective consultation, in the Estates General, to the successes of Québec politics. Hertzman and Siddiqi find that durable intersectoral coalitions

for early childhood development depend on processes of concerted mobilization, and Ancelovici sees active processes of learning and institutionalization in the Confédération française démocratique des travailleurs’ (CFDT’s) response to neoliberalism. Social resilience ultimately depends on what might be called “cultural frameworks in action” and the use actors make of the “strategic capacities” for concerted response to challenges that institutions confer on them.

**After the Crisis…**

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 can be seen as the culmination of the neoliberal era. Indeed, its roots lie in the relaxation of government regulation and a blind faith in markets that encouraged unparalleled expansion of the financial sector and a vast increase in debt in many countries (Tett 2009; Rajan 2010). In addition to recession, the legacy is likely to be a politics of austerity lasting many years (Schafer and Streeck 2013). One feature of this politics has been a growing sense of grievance, as unemployment rises in some countries and citizens wonder why banks were bailed out when they were not. That has increased support for parties and factions on the radical right and left, some explicitly opposed to neoliberal policies. In the developing world, the crisis has discredited doctrines based on an overweening faith in markets and stimulated a resurgence of interest in the developmental state (Bresser-Pereira and Oreiro 2012). But the hopes of some that the crisis will sound the death knell for neoliberal ideas seem likely to be disappointed in anything but the very long term.

Neoliberal narratives and practices are now so deeply embedded at multiple levels in the economy, polity, and society that they are difficult to dislodge (Mudge 2008; Centeno and Cohen 2012). Although the doctrine of “efficient markets” has been discredited and Keynesian prescriptions for economic growth occasionally revived, few alternatives to the principles that became central to mainstream economics during the neoliberal era have gained traction (Hall 2013). Moreover, neoliberal practices have been so deeply institutionalized by governments and other organizations that they will be difficult to roll back. Some banks have been nationalized and modest efforts made to stiffen financial regulation, but even governments that would like to pursue alternative policies are constrained by the internationalization of finance, which grants credit on the basis of how well they conform to neoliberal practices. In the public sphere, the crisis has sparked a reaction, most visible in the Occupy movements that appeared in many countries, but it has inspired a competition for jobs and resources that tends to reinforce the same qui peut patterns of behavior characteristic of the neoliberal era (Ancelovici 2012).

In this context, there is more reason than ever to be concerned about social resilience. Many groups are facing strained circumstances. In the United States, Hacker et al. (2010) estimate that the level of economic insecurity has almost doubled since the 1980s, and Fischer (2012) cites estimates that about
half of all Americans will have some experience of poverty between the ages of 25 and 75 years. In southern Europe, the situation is dramatically worse and taking a deep toll on all aspects of people’s well-being. In Greece, for instance, population health has deteriorated, and suicides increased by more than 50 percent between 2007 and 2012 (Kentikelenis et al. 2011). Conditions such as these strain the capacity of social groups to sustain their well-being and make it even more urgent to identify the sources of social resilience.

Conclusion

No single volume can do full justice to the big, slow-moving process associated with neoliberalism or to the sources of social resilience. However, the chapters in this volume provide an unusually multidimensional account of these phenomena. To appreciate the complexity of a sweeping macro-level process, we have tried to see it from the inside out as well as from the outside in, with an eye to the ways in which organized actors and ordinary people adopt new sets of categories and turned them to their own purposes (Bourdieu 1998). We see the unfolding of neoliberalism as a syncretic social process marked by adjustment, resistance, and creative transformation. It took place in a multilayered social space replete with institutional frameworks and cultural repertoires out of which actors constructed responses to the opportunities and challenges of this era.

We have paid special attention to these challenges in order to advance understandings of social resilience defined as the capacity of groups to sustain their well-being. That entails charting the ways in which institutional practices and cultural repertoires are constitutive of the sources of social resilience. But we have also argued that social resilience is more than a matter of calling upon existing resources. Instead, it is an active process that mobilizes people with loyalties and attachments promoted by particular cultural frameworks — French trade union leaders, African chiefs, Canadian school superintendents, and members of stigmatized groups. These processes of adjustment often shade, in turn, into creative endeavor, as actors find new ways to deploy existing institutions or cultural repertoires and exploit the new categories and opportunities generated by a neoliberal age. A reflexivity absent in physical systems plays an important role in these processes as memories rooted in the shared history of communities are mobilized to imagine future paths and construct new grammars of action.

Our goal has been to advance a larger research agenda. Social resilience is a key characteristic of successful societies, seen as ones that perform well on indicators for population health, social inclusion, and social justice. In such societies, many groups have at their disposal the cultural and institutional resources needed to respond to successive challenges. If we are to understand what makes societies successful, we need to know more about how social resilience is constituted and operates. Moreover, as an optic, social resilience casts old issues into a new light. As a framework for approaching issues of social justice, it is an alternative to traditional right–left debates about threatened welfare states, the virtues and dangers of individualism, or the evils of government intervention. It transcends traditional disciplinary frameworks to consider how institutions work in tandem with cultural repertoires to constitute collective capabilities, and it considers issues of recognition and cultural membership in tandem with questions about the distribution of resources.

Our hope is that the studies in this volume will open up new agendas and provide inspiration for further research into the effects of neoliberalism and the sources of social resilience. At the core of inquiries into social resilience must be the macro–meso–micro link. At the macro level, there is room for further modeling of adjustment shocks (Bronfenbrenner 1979; Wiermlt et al. 2012). At the meso level, we need a better understanding of how to keep institutions robust and cultural repertoires resilient. At the micro level, we need deeper explorations of the connections between cultural repertoires, institutional frameworks, and individual resilience of the sort indicated, for instance, by the finding that minority students with the best educational outcomes are typically "mediators" endowed with a strong group identity but also with capacities to engage the majority culture (Carter 2005; Oyserman et al. 2006). One route into this would be through studies of the social processes that support "possibilities and hopes" understood as the institutional and cultural practices that allow individuals to negotiate new environments in flexible and ambitious ways.

Similarly, there is room for further investigation of the ways in which developments during the neoliberal era have affected the sources of social resilience. We have made a number of observations about this but not undertaken a systematic assessment of which resources were eroded or augmented over the past thirty years; and more specific case studies will be needed to develop a fine-grained understanding of such issues. Moreover, the recessions that many countries experienced in the wake of the global financial crisis have posed new challenges for social groups that could fruitfully be analyzed within this framework. We see many opportunities for following up the formulations introduced in this book.

References


