Aghion P, Aghion B. A New Growth Approach to Poverty Alleviation. 2004. PDF
Education et croissance
Aghion P, Cohen E. Education et croissance. La Documentation Francaise; 2004. Publisher's Version
Aghion P, Bolton P, Tirole J. Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives. Review of Finance. 2004.
Aghion P, Schankerman M. A Model of the Private and Social Returns to Market-Enhancing Infrastructure. Economic Journal. 2004.
Aghion P, Bacchetta P, Banerjee A. Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies. Journal of Monetary Economics. 2004.
Aghion P, Bacchetta P, Banerjee A. A Balance-Sheet Approach to Currency Crises. Journal of Economic Theory. 2004.
Aghion P, Alesina A, Trebbi F. Endogenous Political Institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004.Abstract

Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both “optimal” constitutional design and ”positive” aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Aghion P, Bond S, Klemm A, Marinescu I. Technology and Financial Structure: Are Innovative Firms Different? . 2003.
Aghion P, Bacchetta P, Banerjee A. Financial Development and the Instability of Open Economies . 2003.
Acemoglu D, Aghion P, Zilibotti F. Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth . 2003.
An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report
Aghion P, Bertola G, Hellwig M, Pisani-Ferry J, Sapir A, Vinals J, Wallace H. An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report. Oxford University Press; 2003. Publisher's Version
Aghion P, Dewatripont M, Rey P. Transferable Control. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2003.
Aghion P, Acemoglu D, Zilibotti F. Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier. Journal of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings. 2003.Abstract

We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing.

Aghion P, Bolton P. Incomplete Social Contracts. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2003.
Aghion P, Rey P. Allocating Decision Rights under Liquidity Constraints: A Simple Framework. In: E.Brousseau Essays on Incomplete Contracts. Cambridge University Press ; 2002.
Aghion P, Dewatripont M, Rey P. On Partial Contracting. European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 2002.
Aghion P, Howitt P, Violante G. General Purpose Technologies and Within-group Inequality. Journal of Economic Growth. 2002.
Aghion P. Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics of Income Inequality. Walras-Bowley Lecture. 2002;Econometrica.
Aghion P, Dewatripont M, Rey P. Agency Costs, Firm Behaviour, and the Nature of Competition. 2001.
Aghion P, Acemoglu D, Violante GL. Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 2001;55 :229-264.