# Publications

Working Paper
Alesina, Alberto, Stefanie Stantcheva, and Armando Miano. Working Paper. “Immigration and Redistribution”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
We design and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in six countries to investigate how natives' perceptions of immigrants influence their preferences for
redistribution. We find strikingly large biases in natives' perceptions of the number and characteristics of immigrants: in all countries, respondents greatly overestimate the total number of
immigrants, think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them, and are economically weaker -- less educated, more unemployed, poorer, and more reliant on government transfers-- than is the case. While all respondents have misperceptions, those with the largest ones are systematically the right-wing, the non-college educated, and the low-skilled working in immigration-intensive sectors.
Support for redistribution is strongly correlated with the perceived composition of immigrants -- their origin and economic contribution. Given the very negative baseline views that respondents have of immigrants, simply making them think about immigration in a randomized manner makes them support less redistribution. To the contrary, experimentally showing respondents information about the true i) number, ii) origin, and iii) hard work'' of immigrants in their country manages to counteract and even outweigh the negative priors and generate more support for redistribution, including actual donations to charities.
Alesina, Alberto, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi. Working Paper. “'What do we know about the effects of austerity?'”.
Alesina, Alberto, Carlo Favero, Francesco Giavazzi, Omar Barbiero, and Matteo Paradisi. Working Paper. “The Effects of Fiscal Consolidations: Theory and Evidence”.Abstract

We investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidations based upon government spending cuts, transfers cuts and tax hikes. We extend a narrative dataset of fiscal consolidations, finding details on over 3500 measures. Government spending and transfer cuts are much less harmful than tax hikes. Standard New Keynesian mod- els match our results when fiscal shocks are persistent. Wealth effects on aggregate demand mitigates the impact of a persistent spending cut. Static distortions caused by persistent tax hikes cause larger shifts in aggregate supply under sticky prices. This channel explains different sizes of multipliers found in fiscal stimuli compared to consolidation plans.

Alesina, Alberto, Gualtiero Azzalini, Carlo Favero, Francesco Giavazzi, and Armando Miano. Working Paper. “Is it the "How" or the "When" that Matters in Fiscal Adjustments?”.Abstract

Using data from 16 OECD countries from 1981 to 2014 we specify
a model that determines the output eﬀect of fiscal adjustments as a function of the composition of the adjustment and the state of the cycle. We find that both the "how" and the "when" matter, but the heterogeneity related to the composition is more robust across diﬀerent specifications. Adjustments based upon spending cuts are consistently much less costly than those based upon tax increases. Our results are not explained by diﬀerent reactions of monetary policy. However, when the domestic central bank can set interest rates - that is outside of a currency union - it appears to be able to dampen the recessionary eﬀects of tax-based consolidations implemented during a recession.

Alberto Alesina, Stefanie Stantcheva, Edoardo Teso. Working Paper. “Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution”.Abstract

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about
intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the
U.K., and the U.S.. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for “equality of opportunity” policies. We find a strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility, their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility percep- tions, and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of these apply to right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as
a “problem” and not as the “solution.”

NBER Working Paper No. 23027

Alesina, Alberto, and Francesco Passarelli. Working Paper. “Loss Aversion, Politics and Redistribution”.Abstract

We study loss aversion in majority voting.  First, we show a status quo
bias. Second, loss aversion implies a moderating effect. Third, in a dynamic setting, the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters; however, in the presence of a projection bias, majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt. Fourth, in a stochastic environment, loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk, but also a smaller attachment to the status quo. The application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications.

Alesina, Alberto, Caterina Gennaioli, and Stefania Lovo. Working Paper. “Public Goods and Ethnic Diversity: Evidence from Deforestation in Indonesia”.Abstract

This paper shows that the level of deforestation in Indonesia is positively related
to the degree of ethnic fractionalization at the district level. To identify a casual rela- tion we exploit the exogenous timing of variations in the level of ethnic heterogeneity due to the creation of new jurisdictions. We provide evidence consistent with a lower control of politicians, through electoral punishment, in more ethnically fragmented districts. Our results bring a new perspective on the political economy of defor- estation. They are consistent with the literature on (under) provision of public goods and social capital in ethnically diverse societies and suggest that when the underlying communities are ethnically fractionalized decentralisation can reduce deforestation by delegating powers to more homogeneous communities.

NBER WP 20504

2017
Alesina, Alberto, Bryony Reich, and Alessandro Riboni. 2017. “Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars”.Abstract

The increase in army size observed in early modern times changed
the way states conducted wars. Starting in the late 18th century, states switched from mercenaries to a mass army by conscription. In order for the population to accept to fight and endure war, the government elites began to provide public goods, reduced rent extraction and adopted policies to homogenize the population with nation-building. This paper explores a variety of ways in which nation-building can be implemented and
studies its effects as a function of technological innovation in warfare.

2016
Alesina, Alberto, and Andrea Passalacqua. 2016. “The Political Economy of Government Dept.” Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2: 2599-2651. North Holland, 2, 2599-2651.
Alesina, Alberto, Salvatore Piccolo, and Paolo Pinotti. 2016. “Organized Crime, Violence and Politics”.Abstract

We show that in Sicily Mafia killings of politicians increase before elections and
have negative effects on the vote received by parties not captured by the Mafia. Then, using a very large data set of electoral speeches, we find strong evidence that anti-mafia activities by politicians elected in Sicily are, in fact, negatively correlated with the levels of pre-electoral violence. Using data on homicides in all regions of Italy starting from the end of the nineteenth century, we identify a political cycle of homicides only in regions with organized crime. We also show how this electoral cycle changes as a function of different electoral rules and the relative strength of captured and non-captured parties. All these empirical findings are rationalized by a simple signaling model in which criminal organizations exert pre-electoral violence to inform adverse politicians about their military strength.

Alesina, Alberto, Benedetta Brioschi, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2016. “Violence Against Women: A Cross-cultural Analysis for Africa”.Abstract

Using a new dataset, we investigate the determinants of violence
against women in Africa. We focus on cultural factors arising from pre-colonial customs and find evidence consistent with two hypotheses. First, ancient socioeconomic conditions determine social norms about gender roles, family structures and intrafamily violence which persist even when the initial conditions change. Norms about marriage patterns, living arrangements and the productive
role of women are associated with contemporary violence. Second, women’s contemporary economic role affects violence in a complex way which is itself related to traditional norms in ancient times and current bargaining power
within the marriage.

Alesina, Alberto, Stelios Michalopoulos, and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. “Ethnic Inequality.” Journal of Political Economy 124 (2): 428-488.
Alesina, Alberto, Johann Harnoss, and Hillel Rapoport. 2016. “Birthplace Diversity and Economic Prosperity”.Abstract

We propose an index of population diversity based on people’s birthplaces and decompose it into a size (share of foreign-born) and a variety (diversity of immigrants) component. We show that birthplace diversity is largely uncorrelated with ethnic, linguistic or genetic diversity and that the diversity of immigration relates positively to measures of economic prosperity. This holds especially for skilled immigrants in richer countries at intermediate levels of cultural proximity. We partly address endogeneity by specifying a pseudo-gravity model predicting the size and diversity of immigration. The results are robust across specifications and suggestive of skill-complementarities between immigrants and native workers.

2015
Alesina, Alberto, Benedetta Brioschi, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2015. “Violence Against Women: A Cross-cultural Analysis for Africa”.Abstract

Using a new dataset constructed matching the Demographic Health Surveys with Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, we investigate the determinants of violence against women in Africa. We focus on cultural determinants of violence arising from ancient living arrangements, types of economic activities and marriage patterns. Our outcomes include both violence actually experienced by women and attitudes towards domestic violence reported by men and women. We nd evidence consistent with two hypotheses. First, ancient socioeconomic conditions determine social norms about gender roles, family structures and intrafamily violence which persist over time even when the initial conditions change. We show that norms about marriage patterns, living arrangements and the productive role of women in ancient times are associated with contemporary violence. Second, women's economic role aects violence in a complex way. On the one hand, in societies where in pre-colonial times women had an active economic role and/or a brideprice was paid upon marriage, implying a high economic value of women, men are less prone to violence today. On the other hand,we find increases in domestic violence for couples where the woman is currently economically independent, i.e., where she may have more bargaining power and pose a threat to the husband.

Alesina, Alberto, Traviss Cassidy, and Ugo Troiano. 2015. “Old and Young Politicians.” NBER WP 20977.

NBER WP 20977

Alesina, Alberto, Michele Battisti, and Joseph Zeira. 2015. “Technology and Labor Regulations: Theory and Evidence”.

NBER WP 20841

Alesina, Alberto, Omar Barbiero, Carlo Favero, Francesco Giavazzi, and Matteo Paradisi. 2015. “Austerity in 2009-2013.” Economic Policy Journal.
Alesina, Alberto, and Matteo Paradisi. 2015. “Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities”.Abstract

The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 generated a natural ex- periment, which is useful to test political budget cycles, i.e. the strategic choice of fiscal variables in relation to elections. We do find substantial evidence of political budget cy- cles, with municipalities choosing lower tax rates when close to elections. We observe this budget cycle only for smaller municipalities where the tax was more likely to be the single most important issue for
the local government. Cities close to elections with large deficits did not set lower rates before elections, probably because they felt the binding constraints
of budget rules.

NBER WP 20570

Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. 2015. “Culture and Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature.
Alesina, Alberto, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi. 2015. “The Output Effect of Fiscal Consolidations.” Journal of International Economics.Abstract

We show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a
scale adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather
than of individual scale shocks. Simulation of scale plans adopted
by 16 OECD countries over a 30-year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design. Fiscal
adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly, in terms
of output losses, than tax-based ones and have especially low out-
put costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go
changes in taxes and spending. The difference between tax-based and
spending-based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies, including monetary policy. It is mainly due to the
different response of business confidence and private investment.