@article {20099,
	title = {Theories of coalitional rationality},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
	volume = {144},
	number = {2},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {676-695},
	abstract = {This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability.
},
	author = {Attila Ambrus}
}
