Institutional corruption is typically viewed as a subset of corruption that is legal and systemic. There has been a surge of scholarship on institutional corruption in recent years, brought on in large part by a definition put forth by Lessig (2009b; 2013). Scholars have examined institutional corruption in various domains, such as Congress, the Department of Defense, and the pharmaceutical industry (Gilga, 2014; Sah & Fugh-Berman, 2013; Thompson, 2013). The growing body of research on institutional corruption has contributed to a much greater understanding of the legal corruption that is widespread in both public and private institutions; it has also raised new questions about institutional corruption. This paper systematically reviews the existing literature on institutional corruption and examines some of these remaining open questions. Specifically, we focus on the topics of institutional purpose, the funder-institution relationship, public trust, and personal responsibility, as they pertain to institutional corruption. Finally, we explore proposed solutions to institutional corruption, namely conflict of interest disclosure, conflict of interest elimination, and blinding.