@article {645014, title = {Geographically-Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems}, journal = {World Politics}, year = {2021}, abstract = {How do governing parties use geographically-targeted spending in mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems? \ Despite being used in thirty countries, little attention has been paid to this question. \ We posit that under MMM, majority-seeking parties carve out {\textquoteleft}preelectoral coordination{\textquoteright} strategies with small parties, and once in government, use geographically-targeted spending to motivate supporters to comply with their strategy. \ We extend work on preelectoral coordination by explaining why it is likely to involve the exchange of candidacies in the district tier for votes in the proportional tier, even under single-ballot MMM. \ We test our propositions using municipality-level election returns and central government transfers in Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016). \ In both cases, the dominant coalition rewarded municipalities that complied with more transfers after elections. \ Our findings have broad implications for research on mixed-member systems, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico, respectively.}, author = {Catalinac, Amy L. and Lucia Motolinia} }