Programmatic Policies Increase the Clientelistic Goods Received by Policy Beneficiaries: Evidence from Snow Subsidies in Japan

CatalinacMuraokaDec3.pdf2.29 MB

Abstract:

How do programmatic policies impact incumbent performance in clientelistic settings? The literature is mixed, with findings suggesting increases in electoral support, negligible effects on support, and effects among incumbents at some levels of government, but not others.  We help to explain this inconsistency by pointing to a confounder: the fact that incumbents in clientelistic settings have incentives to offset a potentially negative impact of a programmatic policy by funnelling more clientelistic goods toward policy beneficiaries, making the net effect of these policies ambiguous.  We examine this in Japan (1980-2005), which has unusually good data on the amounts of money different types of voters receive in exchange for their vote.  Helpfully, voters also differ in their eligibility for a programmatic policy awarded on the basis of snowfall.  Our evidence---fixed effect regressions, quasi-experiments and survey analysis---supports our claim.  This work suggests new avenues for theory and inference in clientelistic settings.

Last updated on 12/03/2020