Chase Foster. 4/3/2018. “
Economic Patriotism After the Crisis: Explaining Continuity and Change in European Securities Enforcement.” Review of European and Russian Affairs, 12, 1, Pp. 1-23.
Publisher's VersionAbstractAbstract: Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by long standing national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, this article provides one of the first comparative assessments of the pattern of longitudinal change since the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties have increased 40-fold, and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern has been more continuous, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. The mixed pattern of change can be explained by domestic policymakers’ perception of the crisis. Where pre-crisis regulatory practices were seen as contributing to the financial meltdown, as in the UK, policymakers have overhauled domestic supervisory practices. But where domestic practices were not implicated, as in France and Germany, securities supervision has been less dramatically altered. While the regulatory path pursued in all three cases continues to reflect pre-existing strategies to promote national financial interests within the Single European Market, re-regulation on the European level may delimit regulators’ capacity to promote domestic financial interests in the future.
fosterrera2018_01.pdf