My research is in comparative political economy with a substantive focus on the development of state-market relations, and a regional focus on Europe and the United States. Empirically, I am interested in how economic regulation has developed historically, why and how the institutions and philosophies of governance have often differed across jurisdictions, and how, since the 1970’s, regulatory regimes have evolved in response to economic globalization and the diffusion of neoliberal economic ideas. Theoretically, a central concern is the autonomy of the state within capitalism, and the ways that state actors independently shape policy development and change. More broadly, I am interested in the conditions in which regulatory regimes produce and reinforce market inequality, and the contexts in which they contribute to more egalitarian outcomes.


Much of my work places the politics of public policy in the European Union and the United States in comparative perspective, providing new insight into the study of two political systems that are more often examined in isolation. Combining my training in political science with my previous experience in the policy field and ongoing interests in economics and law, I have completed several comparative studies that (1) highlight important differences in the political origins and institutional design of the American and European regulatory states; (2) trace how the trajectory of policy change is conditioned by the law and pre-existing regulatory arrangements; (3) examine the consequences of policy choices for the political economy.