@article {614000,
	title = {Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	volume = {79},
	number = {3},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {964-978},
	abstract = {Which states join international institutions? Existing theories of the multilateral trade regime, the GATT/WTO, emphasize\&nbsp;gains from cooperation on substantive policies regulated by the institution. We argue that political ties rather\&nbsp;than issue-area functional gains determine who joins, and we show how geopolitical alignment shapes the demand and\&nbsp;supply sides of membership. Discretionary accession rules allow members to selectively recruit some countries in pursuit\&nbsp;of foreign policy goals, and common interests attract applicants who are not yet free traders.We use a duration model\&nbsp;to statistically analyze accession time to application and length of accession negotiations for the period 1948{\textendash}2014. Our\&nbsp;findings challenge the view that states first liberalize trade to join the GATT/WTO. Instead, democracy and foreign policy\&nbsp;similarity encourage states to join. The importance of political ties for membership in the trade regime suggests that\&nbsp;theories of international institutions must look beyond narrowly defined institutional scope.},
	author = {Davis, Christina L. and Wilf, Meredith}
}
