@workingpaper {614039,
	title = {Membership Conditionality and Institutional Reform: The Case of the OECD},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {Conditional membership may be one of the most important sources of leverage for IOs. What\&nbsp;underlies the terms of selection and the willingness of applicants to pay the price of entry? The\&nbsp;influence of accession conditions has been studied in the context of EU and NATO, where sizable\&nbsp;benefits motivate major concessions by applicants. This paper examines a much less powerful organization,\&nbsp;the OECD. The organization provides both public goods in the form of policy information\&nbsp;and club goods in the form of status. Through a process of self-selection by applicants and screening\&nbsp;by members, the organization has managed gradual expansion while preserving its value as an elite club of like-minded states. Informality of accession criteria has allowed flexibility to raise and lower\&nbsp;the bar for entry. Statistical analysis highlights broad conditions related to income, democracy, and\&nbsp;geopolitics that correlate with earlier entry into the OECD relative to other countries while there are\&nbsp;less clear patterns for the role of trade and financial openness. Case studies of Japan, Mexico, Korea,\&nbsp;and the Czech Republic are used to examine how prospective OECD membership motivated reforms\&nbsp;in regulatory policies and trade. These countries sought to benefit from the status of association with\&nbsp;the advanced industrial democracies. On the basis of shared liberal orientation and geopolitical alignment,\&nbsp;these outsiders were accepted into the club. At the same time, a case study of Brazil highlights\&nbsp;how its refusal to seek OECD membership reflects a political preference to remain distant from the\&nbsp;advanced industrial nations even as its economy and policies are more integrated with these states.},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
