@workingpaper {684993,
	title = {Competitive Liberalization meets the East Asian Growth Model: the Evolving Trade Order in the Asia-Pacific},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {684995,
	title = {Defining Statehood: Exclusion from Universal Organizations },
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {614038,
	title = {Deterring Disputes: WTO Adjudication as a Tool for Conflict Management},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {An eective legal system not only solves specic disputes but also inhibits future violations. This paper examines how the WTO dispute settlment process resolves specic disputes\&nbsp;and reduces their future occurrence. First, the process of selecting cases to escalate in the\&nbsp;legal venue reveals information about the preferences of defendant and complainant. A third\&nbsp;party arbitrator and multilateral membership adds international obligation and reputation as\&nbsp;new leverage for compliance. Second, a formal dispute mechanism may have broader impact\&nbsp;if the adjudication of one case leads to other countries reforming policies. Each dispute case\&nbsp;claries interpretation of the law and enhances the credibility of enforcement.This paper examines WTO dispute settlement to assess the role of courts to solve disputes\&nbsp;and prevent future incidents. The eectiveness of WTO dispute settlement to resolve disputes\&nbsp;is tested with statistical analysis of an original dataset of potential trade disputes coded from\&nbsp;U.S. government reports on foreign trade barriers. Evidence shows that taking a dispute\&nbsp;to the legal forum brings policy change in comparison with outcomes achieved in bilateral\&nbsp;negotiations. In addition, past WTO disputes shape the subsequent pattern of trade barriers.\&nbsp;Looking more broadly, the declining frequency of complaints led by all members from 1995\&nbsp;to 2015 is consistent with the deterrence argument. While some areas of law encounter\&nbsp;repeat litigation, standards and new agreements have shown more resilient enforcement.\&nbsp;Furthermore, analysis of the ling patterns from 1975 to 2012 suggests that the increase of\&nbsp;legalization in the WTO has established deterrence eects that were absent in the GATT\&nbsp;period. Looking more closely at individual cases, the paper evaluates how past complaints\&nbsp;serve to clarify the law and increase the credibility of enforcement.},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {684996,
	title = {Flexibility by Design: Institutional Provisions for Accession to International Organizations.},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {614039,
	title = {Membership Conditionality and Institutional Reform: The Case of the OECD},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {Conditional membership may be one of the most important sources of leverage for IOs. What\&nbsp;underlies the terms of selection and the willingness of applicants to pay the price of entry? The\&nbsp;influence of accession conditions has been studied in the context of EU and NATO, where sizable\&nbsp;benefits motivate major concessions by applicants. This paper examines a much less powerful organization,\&nbsp;the OECD. The organization provides both public goods in the form of policy information\&nbsp;and club goods in the form of status. Through a process of self-selection by applicants and screening\&nbsp;by members, the organization has managed gradual expansion while preserving its value as an elite club of like-minded states. Informality of accession criteria has allowed flexibility to raise and lower\&nbsp;the bar for entry. Statistical analysis highlights broad conditions related to income, democracy, and\&nbsp;geopolitics that correlate with earlier entry into the OECD relative to other countries while there are\&nbsp;less clear patterns for the role of trade and financial openness. Case studies of Japan, Mexico, Korea,\&nbsp;and the Czech Republic are used to examine how prospective OECD membership motivated reforms\&nbsp;in regulatory policies and trade. These countries sought to benefit from the status of association with\&nbsp;the advanced industrial democracies. On the basis of shared liberal orientation and geopolitical alignment,\&nbsp;these outsiders were accepted into the club. At the same time, a case study of Brazil highlights\&nbsp;how its refusal to seek OECD membership reflects a political preference to remain distant from the\&nbsp;advanced industrial nations even as its economy and policies are more integrated with these states.},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {684994,
	title = {What Defines a Region? Meritocratic and Club Politics in Regional Organizations},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L.}
}
@workingpaper {684992,
	title = {Foreign Policy or Industrial Policy? The Design of Trade Bureaucracy},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L. and Yon Soo Park and Diana Stanescu}
}
@workingpaper {697314,
	title = {Peer Conformity and Competition: How Business Managers Evaluate Firm Withdrawals from Russia},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L. and Jialu Li and Sayumi Miyano}
}
@workingpaper {697315,
	title = {Shining Light on Regulatory Policies: The Impact of WTO Rulings on Notification Patterns},
	year = {Working Paper},
	author = {Davis, Christina L. and Jialu Li}
}
