%0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Competitive Liberalization meets the East Asian Growth Model: the Evolving Trade Order in the Asia-Pacific %A Davis, Christina L. %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Defining Statehood: Exclusion from Universal Organizations %A Davis, Christina L. %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Deterring Disputes: WTO Adjudication as a Tool for Conflict Management %A Davis, Christina L. %X

An e ective legal system not only solves speci c disputes but also inhibits future violations. This paper examines how the WTO dispute settlment process resolves speci c disputes and reduces their future occurrence. First, the process of selecting cases to escalate in the legal venue reveals information about the preferences of defendant and complainant. A third party arbitrator and multilateral membership adds international obligation and reputation as new leverage for compliance. Second, a formal dispute mechanism may have broader impact if the adjudication of one case leads to other countries reforming policies. Each dispute case clari es interpretation of the law and enhances the credibility of enforcement.

This paper examines WTO dispute settlement to assess the role of courts to solve disputes and prevent future incidents. The e ectiveness of WTO dispute settlement to resolve disputes is tested with statistical analysis of an original dataset of potential trade disputes coded from U.S. government reports on foreign trade barriers. Evidence shows that taking a dispute to the legal forum brings policy change in comparison with outcomes achieved in bilateral negotiations. In addition, past WTO disputes shape the subsequent pattern of trade barriers. Looking more broadly, the declining frequency of complaints led by all members from 1995 to 2015 is consistent with the deterrence argument. While some areas of law encounter repeat litigation, standards and new agreements have shown more resilient enforcement. Furthermore, analysis of the ling patterns from 1975 to 2012 suggests that the increase of legalization in the WTO has established deterrence e ects that were absent in the GATT period. Looking more closely at individual cases, the paper evaluates how past complaints serve to clarify the law and increase the credibility of enforcement.

%G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Flexibility by Design: Institutional Provisions for Accession to International Organizations. %A Davis, Christina L. %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Membership Conditionality and Institutional Reform: The Case of the OECD %A Davis, Christina L. %X Conditional membership may be one of the most important sources of leverage for IOs. What underlies the terms of selection and the willingness of applicants to pay the price of entry? The influence of accession conditions has been studied in the context of EU and NATO, where sizable benefits motivate major concessions by applicants. This paper examines a much less powerful organization, the OECD. The organization provides both public goods in the form of policy information and club goods in the form of status. Through a process of self-selection by applicants and screening by members, the organization has managed gradual expansion while preserving its value as an elite club of like-minded states. Informality of accession criteria has allowed flexibility to raise and lower the bar for entry. Statistical analysis highlights broad conditions related to income, democracy, and geopolitics that correlate with earlier entry into the OECD relative to other countries while there are less clear patterns for the role of trade and financial openness. Case studies of Japan, Mexico, Korea, and the Czech Republic are used to examine how prospective OECD membership motivated reforms in regulatory policies and trade. These countries sought to benefit from the status of association with the advanced industrial democracies. On the basis of shared liberal orientation and geopolitical alignment, these outsiders were accepted into the club. At the same time, a case study of Brazil highlights how its refusal to seek OECD membership reflects a political preference to remain distant from the advanced industrial nations even as its economy and policies are more integrated with these states. %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T What Defines a Region? Meritocratic and Club Politics in Regional Organizations %A Davis, Christina L. %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Foreign Policy or Industrial Policy? The Design of Trade Bureaucracy %A Davis, Christina L. %A Yon Soo Park %A Diana Stanescu %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Peer Conformity and Competition: How Business Managers Evaluate Firm Withdrawals from Russia %A Davis, Christina L. %A Jialu Li %A Sayumi Miyano %G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Shining Light on Regulatory Policies: The Impact of WTO Rulings on Notification Patterns %A Davis, Christina L. %A Jialu Li %G eng %0 Book %D 2023 %T Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations %A Davis, Christina L. %I Princeton University Press %G eng %0 Journal Article %J International Studies Quarterly %D 2023 %T The Limits of Liberalization: WTO Entry and Chinese State-Owned Firms %A Yeling Tan %A Davis, Christina L. %X

Does state ownership limit the liberalizing effects of the WTO? We examine the case of China, which is not only the largest exporting state but also lends active support to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that could distort global trade. Using data on import purchases disaggregated by ownership from 1993 to 2012, we analyze how WTO entry affects the commercial orientation of state-owned and private imports. We demonstrate that after WTO entry, tariff cuts have a larger effect on private compared to SOE trade. We then show that state ownership alone does not block the WTO’s liberalizing effects. For most industries, SOEs and private firms are alike in their commercial orientation. However, where strategic goods targeted by industrial policy hold a large share of bilateral trade, lowering tariffs has no impact on SOE trade. These findings highlight the tensions between state-led economic models and global trade law premised upon market principles.

%B International Studies Quarterly %G eng %0 Report %D 2022 %T Description of dataset used in “The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions.” %A Davis, Christina L. %A Pratt, Tyler %B Political Economist Newsletter %I APSA %G eng %0 Journal Article %D 2022 %T Workshops Without Borders: Building an Online Community of Japan Scholars %A Davis, Christina L. %A Charles Crabtree %A Amy Catalinac %A Shinju Fujihira %A Yusaku Horiuchi %A Phillip Y. Lipscy %A Frances McCall Rosenbluth %A Daniel M. Smith %G eng %0 Report %D 2021 %T To Exit or Remain? The High Stakes of Membership in International Organizations %A Davis, Christina %B The Japan Institute of International Affairs %G eng %U https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2021/07/economy-security-linkages-fy2021-01.html %0 Book Section %B The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics %D 2021 %T Japanese Trade Policy %A Davis, Christina L. %E Robert J. Pekkanen %E Saadia M. Pekkanen %X This chapter examines Japanese trade policy to explain how economic interests and domestic political institutions have supported the resilience of free trade policies in Japan. The mercantilist ideas and the reactive state model of past years have been replaced by strong support of free trade and Kantei diplomacy to lead in setting rules for the trade regime complex. Once dependent on the United States and mired in bilateral trade friction, Japan has emerged as an active supporter of engagement with China and the pursuit of free trade agreements, alongside continued commitment to the multilateral rules. Japanese-style trade adjustment and the slow path to liberalization served to balance economic efficiency with political stability as the government has supported narrow interests along with long-term trade strategies for economic growth. %B The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics %I Oxford University Press %G eng %U https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190050993.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190050993-e-30?rskey=tIcjRp&result=3 %0 Journal Article %J The Review of International Organization %D 2021 %T The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions %A Davis, Christina L. %A Pratt, Tyler %X

The link between security and economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? While existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, we examine how geopolitics shapes membership in multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs as states welcome or exclude states based on foreign policy similarity. Biased selection of members can politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing new data on membership patterns for 231 economic organizations from 1949 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for nearly half of the membership decisions in economic institutions.

%B The Review of International Organization %V 16 %P 903–929 %G eng %0 Book %D 2020 %T Landscapes of Law: Practicing Sovereignty in Transnational Terrain %A Carol J. Greenhouse %A Davis, Christina L. %I University of Pennsylvania Press %C Philadelphia %G eng %U https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/16075.html %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Conflict Resolution %D 2019 %T State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade %A Davis, Christina L. %A Andreas Fuchs %A Johnson, Kristina %X Can governments still use trade to reward and punish partner countries? While World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the pressures of globalization restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, politicization of trade is likely to occur where governments intervene in markets. We examine state ownership of firms as one tool of government control. Taking China and India as examples, we use new data on bilateral trade disaggregated by firm ownership type as well as measures of political relations based on bilateral events and United Nations voting data to estimate the effect of political relations on import flows since the early 1990s. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned enterprises are more responsive to political relations than imports controlled by private enterprises. This finding suggests that politicized import decisions will increase as countries with partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy. Extending our analysis to exports for comparison, we find a similar pattern for Indian but not for Chinese exports and offer potential explanations for these differential findings.  %B Journal of Conflict Resolution %V 63 %P 405-438 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B Megaregulation Contested: Global Economic Ordering After TPP %D 2019 %T Japan: Interest Group Politics, Foreign Policy Linkages, and the TPP %A Davis, Christina L. %E Benedict Kingsbury %E David M. Malone %E Paul Mertenskötter %E Richard B. Stewart %E Thomas Streinz %E Atsushi Sunami %B Megaregulation Contested: Global Economic Ordering After TPP %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %P 573-591 %G eng %0 Newspaper Article %B Nihon Keizai Shimbun %D 2018 %T Boeiki senso no yukue, (On the Way to a Trade War) %A Davis, Christina L. %B Nihon Keizai Shimbun %G eng %0 Newspaper Article %B Financial Times %D 2018 %T It is Up to China to Save the Global Trading System %A Davis, Christina %B Financial Times %G eng %0 Journal Article %J International Studies Quarterly %D 2018 %T Protecting Trade By Legalizing Political Disputes: Why Countries Bring Cases to International Court of Justice %A Davis, Christina L. %A Morse, Julia %X How does economic interdependence shape political relations? We show a new pathway to support a commercial peace in which economic interdependence changes strategies for conflict management. The uncertainty arising from political disputes between countries can depress trade flows. As states seek to protect trade from such negative effects, they are more likely to bring their disputes to legal venues. We assess this argument by analyzing why countries bring cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Using data on 190 countries from 1960 to 2013, we find that countries are more likely to file ICJ cases against important trading partners than against states with low levels of shared trade. We conclude that economic interdependence changes the incentives for how states resolve their disputes. %B International Studies Quarterly %V 68 %P 709-722 %G eng %0 Report %D 2017 %T From Follower to Leader: Japan in the TPP %A Davis, Christina %I Abe Fellowship Program, SSRC %C New York %P 13-16 %G eng %0 Magazine Article %D 2017 %T Make Trade Great Again: America Needs New Strategies to Address International Trade %A Davis, Christina %B First Year: Where the President Begins %V 10 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Politics %D 2017 %T Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO %A Davis, Christina L. %A Wilf, Meredith %X Which states join international institutions? Existing theories of the multilateral trade regime, the GATT/WTO, emphasize gains from cooperation on substantive policies regulated by the institution. We argue that political ties rather than issue-area functional gains determine who joins, and we show how geopolitical alignment shapes the demand and supply sides of membership. Discretionary accession rules allow members to selectively recruit some countries in pursuit of foreign policy goals, and common interests attract applicants who are not yet free traders.We use a duration model to statistically analyze accession time to application and length of accession negotiations for the period 1948–2014. Our findings challenge the view that states first liberalize trade to join the GATT/WTO. Instead, democracy and foreign policy similarity encourage states to join. The importance of political ties for membership in the trade regime suggests that theories of international institutions must look beyond narrowly defined institutional scope. %B Journal of Politics %V 79 %P 964-978 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Conflict Resolution %D 2017 %T Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection %A Davis, Christina L. %A Pelc, Krzysztof %X Hard times give rise to greater demand for protection. International trade rules include provisions that allow for raising barriers to aid industries when they suffer economic injury. Yet widespread use of flexibility measures may undermine the trade system and worsen economic conditions. How do states balance these conflicting pressures? This article assesses the effect of crises on cooperation in trade. We hypothesize that governments impose less protectionism during economic crisis when economic troubles are widespread across countries than when they face crisis in isolation. The lesson of Smoot–Hawley and coordination through international economic institutions represent mechanisms of informal governance that encourage cooperation to avoid a spiral of protectionism. Analysis of industry-level data on protection measures for the period from 1996 to 2011 provides support for our claim that under conditions of shared hard times, states exercise strategic self-restraint to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. %B Journal of Conflict Resolution %V 61 %P 398-429 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the American Society of Law Annual Meeting %D 2017 %T Foreign Policy and Trade Law: Japan's Unexpected Leadership in TPP Negotiations %A Davis, Christina L. %B Proceedings of the American Society of Law Annual Meeting %V 111 %P 90-92 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Conflict Resolution %D 2017 %T State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade %A Davis, Christina L. %A Andreas Fuchs %A Johnson, Kris %X Can governments still use trade to reward and punish partner countries? While World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the pressures of globalization restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, politicization of trade is likely to occur where governments intervene in markets. We examine state ownership of firms as one tool of government control. Taking China and India as examples, we use new data on bilateral trade disaggregated by firm ownership type as well as measures of political relations based on bilateral events and United Nations voting data to estimate the effect of political relations on import flows since the early 1990s. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned enterprises are more responsive to political relations than imports controlled by private enterprises. This finding suggests that politicized import decisions will increase as countries with partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy. Extending our analysis to exports for comparison, we find a similar pattern for Indian but not for Chinese exports and offer potential explanations for these differential findings. %B Journal of Conflict Resolution %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of International Organizations %D 2015 %T The Political Logic of Dispute Settlement: Introduction to the Special Issue %A Davis, Christina L. %B Review of International Organizations %V 10 %P 107-118 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade %D 2015 %T WTO Membership %A Davis, Christina L. %A Wilf, Meredith %B The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %G eng %0 Book %D 2012 %T Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO %A Davis, Christina L. %I Princeton University Press %C Princeton %G eng %U https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9747.html %0 Journal Article %J American Journal of Political Science %D 2011 %T Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions %A Davis, Christina L. %A Sophie Meunier %X

Do political tensions harm economic relations? Theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade, but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange. Looking at two major economies, we show that negative events have not hurt U.S. or Japanese trade or investment flows.We then examine specific incidents of tensions in U.S.-French and Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade—two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations. Aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations. In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations.We argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes.

Supporting Information

Japan events data

Japan events log file

US events data

US events log file

Codebook

%B American Journal of Political Science %V 55 %P 628-646 %G eng %N 3 %0 Magazine Article %D 2010 %T Cashing in on Cooperation: Democracy, Free Trade, and International Rules %A Davis, Christina L. %B Harvard International Review %P 56-60 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Perspectives on Politics %D 2009 %T Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy %A Davis, Christina L. %X This article examines the effect of overlapping institutions in trade policy, where theWorld Trade Organization, preferential trade agreements, and other economic negotiation venues give states many options for negotiating rules and settling disputes. This article argues that overlapping institutions influence trade politics at three stages: selection of venue, negotiation of liberalization commitments, and enforcement of compliance. First, lobby groups and governments on both sides of a trade negotiation try to choose the set of rules that will favor their preferred outcome. WTO rules that restrict use of coercive tactics outside of the WTO generate a selection process that filters the most difficult trade issues into WTO trade rounds or dispute adjudication while easier issues are settled in bilateral and regional fora. This selection dynamic creates a challenge at the negotiation stage by disaggregating interest group pressure for liberalization commitments. The narrowing of interest group lobbying for the multilateral process may impede negotiation of liberalization agreements that could only gain political support through a broad coalition of exporter mobilization. At the enforcement stage international regime complexity creates the potential for contradictory legal rulings that undermine compliance, but also adds greater penalties for noncompliance if reputation effects operate across agreements. %B Perspectives on Politics %V 7 %P 25-31 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Politics %D 2009 %T Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication %A Davis, Christina L. %A Blodgett Bermeo, Sarah %X The potential for international law to reduce power asymmetries depends on weaker countries learning to navigate the legal system. This paper examines the use of courts by developing countries to defend their trade interests. Power relations and low capacity may prevent these countries from fully participating in the international trade system. Yet some developing countries have been among the most active participants in GATT/WTO adjudication. We argue that high startup costs for using trade litigation are a barrier to developing country use of the dispute settlement process. Analysis of dispute initiation from 1975 to 2003 shows that past experience in trade adjudication, as either a complainant or a defendant, increases the likelihood that a developing country will initiate disputes. As weaker countries overcome these initial capacity constraints they will increasingly benefit from the international legal structures they have joined. %B Journal of Politics %V 71 %P 1033-1049 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J International Security %D 2008 %T Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923 %A Davis, Christina L. %B International Security %V 33 %P 143-179 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J World Politics %D 2007 %T Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of WTO Disputes %A Davis, Christina %A Shirato, Yuki %X What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members. %B World Politics %V 59 %P 274-313 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Comparative Politics %D 2007 %T Repeal of the Rice Laws in Japan: The Role of International Pressure to Overcome Vested Interests %A Davis, Christina L. %A Oh, Jennifer %B Comparative Politics %V 40 %P 21-40 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book Section %B Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA %D 2006 %T Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field for Developing Countries? Lessons from Peru and Vietnam %A Davis, Christina L. %B Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA %I Cambridge University Press %C Cambridge %G eng %0 Book Section %B Seido to chitsujo no seijikeizaigaku [The Political Economy of System and Order] %D 2006 %T International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization [in Japanese] %A Davis, Christina L. %B Seido to chitsujo no seijikeizaigaku [The Political Economy of System and Order] %I Toyo Keizai %C Tokyo %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Political Science Review %D 2004 %T International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Liberalization %A Davis, Christina L. %X This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization
in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues, then show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization. %B American Political Science Review %V 98 %P 153-169 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book %D 2003 %T Food Fights Over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization %A Davis, Christina L. %I Princeton University Press %C Princeton %G eng %U https://press.princeton.edu/titles/7664.html