Christina L. Davis and Krzysztof Pelc. 2017. “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61, 2, Pp. 398-429.Abstract
Hard times give rise to greater demand for protection. International trade rules include provisions that allow for raising barriers to aid industries when they suffer economic injury. Yet widespread use of flexibility measures may undermine the trade system and worsen economic conditions. How do states balance these conflicting pressures? This article assesses the effect of crises on cooperation in trade. We hypothesize that governments impose less protectionism during economic crisis when economic troubles are widespread across countries than when they face crisis in isolation. The lesson of Smoot–Hawley and coordination through international economic institutions represent mechanisms of informal governance that encourage cooperation to avoid a spiral of protectionism. Analysis of industry-level data on protection measures for the period from 1996 to 2011 provides support for our claim that under conditions of shared hard times, states exercise strategic self-restraint to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
Christina L. Davis. 2017. “Foreign Policy and Trade Law: Japan's Unexpected Leadership in TPP Negotiations.” Proceedings of the American Society of Law Annual Meeting, 111, Pp. 90-92. davis2017_asil.pdf
Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kris Johnson. 2017. “State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade.” Journal of Conflict Resolution.Abstract
Can governments still use trade to reward and punish partner countries? While World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the pressures of globalization restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, politicization of trade is likely to occur where governments intervene in markets. We examine state ownership of firms as one tool of government control. Taking China and India as examples, we use new data on bilateral trade disaggregated by firm ownership type as well as measures of political relations based on bilateral events and United Nations voting data to estimate the effect of political relations on import flows since the early 1990s. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned enterprises are more responsive to political relations than imports controlled by private enterprises. This finding suggests that politicized import decisions will increase as countries with partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy. Extending our analysis to exports for comparison, we find a similar pattern for Indian but not for Chinese exports and offer potential explanations for these differential findings.
Christina L. Davis. 2015. “The Political Logic of Dispute Settlement: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Review of International Organizations, 10, 2, Pp. 107-118. davis2015_roio.pdf
Christina L. Davis and Meredith Wilf. 2015. “WTO Membership.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press. daviswilf2015.pdf
Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO
Christina L. Davis. 2012. Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Publisher's Website
Christina L. Davis and Sophie Meunier. 2011. “Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions.” American Journal of Political Science, 55, 3, Pp. 628-646.Abstract

Do political tensions harm economic relations? Theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade, but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange. Looking at two major economies, we show that negative events have not hurt U.S. or Japanese trade or investment flows.We then examine specific incidents of tensions in U.S.-French and Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade—two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations. Aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations. In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations.We argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes.

Supporting Information

Japan events data

Japan events log file

US events data

US events log file


Christina L. Davis. 2/2010. “Cashing in on Cooperation: Democracy, Free Trade, and International Rules.” Harvard International Review. davis_winter2010_hir.pdf
Christina L. Davis. 2009. “Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy.” Perspectives on Politics, 7, 1, Pp. 25-31.Abstract
This article examines the effect of overlapping institutions in trade policy, where theWorld Trade Organization, preferential trade agreements, and other economic negotiation venues give states many options for negotiating rules and settling disputes. This article argues that overlapping institutions influence trade politics at three stages: selection of venue, negotiation of liberalization commitments, and enforcement of compliance. First, lobby groups and governments on both sides of a trade negotiation try to choose the set of rules that will favor their preferred outcome. WTO rules that restrict use of coercive tactics outside of the WTO generate a selection process that filters the most difficult trade issues into WTO trade rounds or dispute adjudication while easier issues are settled in bilateral and regional fora. This selection dynamic creates a challenge at the negotiation stage by disaggregating interest group pressure for liberalization commitments. The narrowing of interest group lobbying for the multilateral process may impede negotiation of liberalization agreements that could only gain political support through a broad coalition of exporter mobilization. At the enforcement stage international regime complexity creates the potential for contradictory legal rulings that undermine compliance, but also adds greater penalties for noncompliance if reputation effects operate across agreements.
Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication.” Journal of Politics, 71, 3, Pp. 1033-1049.Abstract
The potential for international law to reduce power asymmetries depends on weaker countries learning to navigate the legal system. This paper examines the use of courts by developing countries to defend their trade interests. Power relations and low capacity may prevent these countries from fully participating in the international trade system. Yet some developing countries have been among the most active participants in GATT/WTO adjudication. We argue that high startup costs for using trade litigation are a barrier to developing country use of the dispute settlement process. Analysis of dispute initiation from 1975 to 2003 shows that past experience in trade adjudication, as either a complainant or a defendant, increases the likelihood that a developing country will initiate disputes. As weaker countries overcome these initial capacity constraints they will increasingly benefit from the international legal structures they have joined.
Christina L. Davis. 2008. “Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923.” International Security, 33, 3, Pp. 143-179. davis2008-09_intlsecurity.pdf
Christina Davis and Yuki Shirato. 2007. “Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of WTO Disputes.” World Politics, 59, 2, Pp. 274-313.Abstract
What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.
Christina L. Davis and Jennifer Oh. 2007. “Repeal of the Rice Laws in Japan: The Role of International Pressure to Overcome Vested Interests.” Comparative Politics, 40, 1, Pp. 21-40. davisoh2007_cp.pdf
Christina L. Davis. 2006. “Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field for Developing Countries? Lessons from Peru and Vietnam.” In Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Christina L. Davis. 2006. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization [in Japanese].” In Seido to chitsujo no seijikeizaigaku [The Political Economy of System and Order]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai. davis2004_apsr_japanesereprint.pdf
Christina L. Davis. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Liberalization.” American Political Science Review, 98, 1, Pp. 153-169.Abstract
This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization
in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues, then show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization.