Cutler, David, and Ellen Meara. 2003. “Changes in the Age Distribution of Mortality over the 20th Century.” Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, edited by David Wise. University of Chicago Press. Website
Cutler, David, and Srikanth Kadiyala. 2003. “The Return to Biomedical Research: Treatment and Behavioral Effects.” Measuring the Gains from Medical Research, edited by Robert Topel and Kevin Murphy. University of Chicago Press. Website
Cutler, David, Daniel Altman, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2003. “Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans.” Journal of Health Economic 22 (1): 23-45.
Cutler, David, and Robert Huckman. 2003. “Technological Development and Medical Productivity: The Diffusion of Angioplasty in New York State.” Journal of Health Economics 22 (2): 187-217.
Cutler, David. 2003. “Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage.” Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 6, edited by David Cutler and Alan Garber. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cutler, David, Michael Chernew, and Richard Hirth. 2003. “Increased Spending on Health Care: How Much Can the United States Afford?” Health Affairs 22 (4).
Cutler, David. 2003. “A Framework for Evaluating Medical Care Systems.” A Disease-Based Comparison of Health Systems: What Is Best and At What Cost? D.C. OECD. Website
Cutler, David. 2003. “Supplementing Public Insurance Coverage with Private Coverage: Implications for Medical Care Systems.” Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, edited by Seiritsu Ogura, Toshiaki Tachibanaki, and David Wise. University of Chicago Press. Website
Cutler, David. 2003. “Pay for Performance.” Forbes 172 (4): 40.
Cutler, David M, and Alan Garber. 2003. Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 6. Berkeley Electronic Press. Website
Cutler, David, and David Wise. 2003. “The US Medical Care System for the Elderly”. Abstract

This paper examines the structure of the American medical care system, especially the system of care for the elderly. We focus on three sets of interactions: coverage rules (how people get health insurance and who pays for it); the reimbursement system (how providers are paid); and access rules (what are the financial and nonfinancial barriers to receipt of care). Coverage in the United States is variable – guaranteed and complete for the elderly, but neither guaranteed nor complete for the nonelderly. Historically, reimbursement of providers was very generous, and access to providers was open. Increasingly, though, the reimbursement and access routes are being restricted, as insurers respond to the perception of significant moral hazard in the receipt of care.

Cutler, David, Edward Glaeser, and Jesse Shapiro. 2003. “Why Have Americans Become More Obese?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (3): 93-118.
Cutler, David, Jonathan Gruber, Raymond S Hartman, Mary Beth Landrum, Joseph P Newhouse, and Meredith B Rosenthal. 2002. “The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21 (1): 1-19.
Knaul, Felicia, Rafael Lozano, Oscar Mendez, and Beatriz Zurita. 2002. “Financial Crisis, Health Outcomes, and Aging: Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s.” Journal of Public Economics 84 (2): 279-303.
Cutler, David, and Jonathan Gruber. 2002. “Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Health Policy in the Clinton Era.” American Economic Policy in the 1990s, edited by Jeffrey A Frankel and Peter R Orszag, 825-899. Cambridge: MIT Press. Website
Cutler, David. 2002. “Public Policy for Health Care.” Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 4 , edited by Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Website
Cutler, David. 2002. “Health Care and the Public Sector.” Handbook of Public Economics, edited by Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 4. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Website
Cutler, David. 2002. “Equality, Efficiency, and Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of International Medical Care Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature, 881-906.
Cutler, David, and Richard Johnson. 2002. “The Birth and Growth of the Social Insurance State”. Abstract

We seek to explain the creation of national Old-Age Insurance (OAI) and Health Insurance schemes, and their subsequent growth. We estimate a hazard model of the ‘risk’ of a country’s creating social insurance. Many theories about the adoption of social insurance exist, but none fits the data well. We find weak evidence that the risk of adopting a system declines in a country’s wealth and in the ethnic heterogeneity of its population. Catholic countries are more likely to create earnings-related OAI systems. We conclude that social insurance can be politically expedient for many different reasons. The growth of OAI spending since 1960, controlling for population ageing, has varied considerably across countries. We find it has been faster in countries emerging from dictatorship, and slower in English-speaking countries. Thus the pension spending is following rather different trajectories across countries.